Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

71370 July 7, 1986 SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC and DIANNE ELIZABETH CUNNINGHAM BOBANOVIC, Petitioners, vs. HON. SYLVIA P. MONTES, (in her capacity as MINISTER OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DEVELOPMENT), Respondent.

ALAMPAY, J.:

chan roble s virtual law lib rary

As gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, it appears that on November 28, 1984, a petition to adopt the minor Adam Christopher Sales was filed by spouses Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic, both Australian citizens with established residence at 3 Rethel Close Keilor Downs, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia but who then were temporarily residing at No. 8 Aries, Bel-Air, Makati, Metro Manila. Said petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. M-531, Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

It appears that upon the filing of the aforestated petition, the court a quo on the same date issued an order setting the hearing of the same on December 27, 1984, and caused copy of this order to be published at the expense of the petitioner in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In the same order it was directed that a copy thereof be served upon the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and the Ministry of Social Services Development (MSSD). Said Ministry was directed to conduct a social case study of the minor sought to be adopted as well as on both his natural and adopting parents and to submit a report and recommendation on the matter at least one week before the date of the hearing and to intervene on behalf of the child if it finds that the petition should be denied.
chanroble svirt ualawli bra ry c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

From the case records, it is disclosed that at the initial hearing of the petition on December 27, 1984, the MSSD failed to comply with the stated Order of November 28, 1984. No case study was conducted by the Ministry regarding the aforesaid minor and his natural and adopting parents. Neither did the MSSD submit any report or recommendation. It did not intervene in the case. Due to such inaction, a Social Worker assigned to the aforementioned Regional Trial Court, by the name of Alma Algenico, RIC Staff Assistant V, conducted the requisite case study, She submitted the corresponding report to the court a quo, recommending favorable action on the petition for adoption.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On January 4, 1985, judgment was rendered granting the adoption of the minor Adam Christopher Sales by the petitioners herein. On January 21, 1985, a certificate of finality of the order granting the adoption was issued by the Officer-In-Charge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 133. In said certification, it was mentioned that copy of the order of January 4, 1985 granting adoption was received by the Solicitor General on January 4, 1985, and by the Ministry of Social Services and Development on January 5, 1985. Said certification also stated that the order of adoption not having been amended nor modified and without any appeal taken therefrom, the adoption order became final and executory.
chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry c hanro bles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Subsequently, petitioners as the adoptive parents, applied for a travel clearance with the Ministry of Social Services and Development in order that their adopted son, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, may travel to Australia. The Minister of Social Services and Development then, Minister Sylvia P. Montes, declined to issue the requested travel clearance on the ground that the MSSD, prior to the initial hearing of the adoption case, was allegedly not furnished with a copy of the petition for adoption nor with the court order dated November 28, 1984, requiring the MSSD to make a case study. Claiming

that the MSSD was denied the opportunity to conduct the case study required by law and as it was supposedly deprived also of the opportunity to intervene in the case, it was respondent's contention that there was no basis for her to determine whether petitioners meet the specified eligibility criteria required by the provisions of the Australian Procedures Relating to Placement of Children from other countries for adoption. Without assurance afforded her that the adopted Filipino child will be in good hands, the respondent Minister averred that mandamus will not lie to compel her to issue the subject travel clearance.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Respondent appears to insist that the MSSD is the only agency authorized under the law to conduct the case study and no adoption case can be properly acted upon by the Court involved if no referral to the MSSD is made of the case for study, report and recommendation.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Due to the refusal of public respondent Minister to issue the travel clearance, a petition for mandamus was filed with this Court on July 22, 1985 by the adoptive parents, praying therein that public respondents be directed to issue in favor of their adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, the requisite clearance to travel
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

In the resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1985, the public respondent Minister was required to comment on the petition. In the comment of public respondent filed with the Court on September 27, 1985, it was averred that the writ of mandamus prayed for in this instance should not be issued because there was no neglect of duty on the part of respondent Minister inasmuch as the issuance of a travel clearance by her office is not a ministerial duty but a matter necessarily involving the exercise of her judgment and discretion. Furthermore, it was pointed out that in the order or judgment granting adoption, there is no specific directive that the Minister of Social Services Development should issue a clearance to travel Respondent Minister maintained the view that only after she finds that petitioner is qualified under Australian and the Philippine Laws on adoption and that the Filipino child will be in good hands that the issuance of the travel clearance certificate becomes a duty on her part to perform.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In their reply to the comment filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of respondent Minister, petitioners refute respondent's allegation that MSSD 'was not duly advised of the petition or the scheduled initial hearing of the case. In this regard, petitioners stress the fact that the court a quo, in denying public respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting adoption under its order of April 30, 1985, found otherwise. Petitioners submit, therefore, that the MSSD must be deemed duly notified of the petition and also of the scheduled hearing of the same on December 27, 1984. Petitioners contend that because it is an admitted fact that the decree of adoption dated January 4, 1985, had been served on and was received by the MSSD and as the said decree of adoption ultimately became final and executory, the respondent Minister can no longer properly question and negate its effects and subsequent implementation by denying the issuance of the requested certificate of clearance to travel Petitioners argue that such denial would in effect frustrate and render meaningless the rights of adoption granted to the petitioners by the court.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nro bles vi rt ual law lib rary

In the resolution of this Court dated May 14, 1986, We resolved to give due course to the petition and to consider respondent's comment to the same as the latter's answer to the petition. The parties were also asked to file their respective memoranda.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

In resolving the merits of the petition, We find it proper to consider the order of the court below dated January 4, 1985, granting the petition for adoption of the Adam Christopher Bobanovic, and which is hereunder reproduced in full: Before this Court is the verified petition of Spouses Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic for the adoption of the minor Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry ch anroble s virtual law l ib rary

When this case was called for initial hearing on December 27, 1984, nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition notwithstanding publication of the order of hearing, (Exh. "A" in the "Filipino Times", a newspaper of general circulation, in its issues of November 29, December 7, and 14, 1984 (Exhs. "C",

"C-1 " to "C-4"). Copies of the same order were likewise sent and duly acknowledged by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Ministry of Social Services and Development and the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila (Exhs. "B", "B-1" and "B-2").
c hanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Evidence so adduced shows that petitioners are both of legal age, Australian citizen, legally married (E Exhs. "H" and "H-1"), and presently residing at No. 8 Aries Bel Air 111, Makati, Metro Manila. They are childless since their marriage on November 16, 1979 due to primary infertility on the part of the wife petitioner (Exh. "M"). Petitioners have a combined income of A$42,384.00 as shown by their Income Tax Returns (Exhs. "J" and "Q"), and have assets total A$121.560.00 as evidenced by their Statement of Assets and Liabilities (Exhs. "K" and "K-1").
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic was born on April 5, 1984 to Lulu Sales as shown by her Birth Certificate (Exhs. "C" and "C-1"). She was given to the care and custody of the petitioners by her natural mother on November 19, 1984 as shown by the Deed of Surrender and Waiver (Exhs. "E" and "E-1") and gave her written consent to this Adoption (Exhs. "D" and "D1").
chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Petitioners have been certified to be of good moral character (Exhs. "N" and "N-1"), they have no derogatory records here in the Philippines as well as in their country (Exhs. "L", "L-1", "O" ,"O-1" and "P") and that they are both found to be physically and mentally fit to adopt (Exhs. "M" and "M-2" and "R"). Petitioners, being Australian citizen, are allowed by their laws to adopt a Filipino child (Exh. " I "). Petitioners have cared for and love the child as their own natural child and in case they will have a child of their own, they will treat him as their first child. They are also aware that the child will become their compulsory heir and that they will not inherit from him. (Tsn., Dec. 27, 1984, p. 4). Further, according to the report of the Social Worker, petitioners are aware of the responsibilities attached to the petition and they are found to be physically, emotionally and financially capable to rear the child Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic (Exhs. "U". "U-1" and "U2").
chan roble svi rtualawl ib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Petitioners are therefore qualified under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) to adopt the aforesaid minor. The trial custody required by Art. 35 of said code is dispensed for the best interest of his child and considering that the child is getting along well with his adoptive parents as depicted in his picture (Exhs. III 1).
c han roblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, granting the petition and ordering that henceforth the minor Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic is freed from all legal obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and to all intents and purposes, said minor is considered the legitimate child of the petitioners qqqSlobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic. The local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila is directed to issue the corresponding amended birth certificate of said child in accordance with Arts. 37 and 39 of P.D. 603.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

That this judgment shall take effect as of November 28, 1984, the date of the filing of this petition. "Let copies of this Order be furnished upon the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan and Makati, Metro Manila.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

GIVEN this 4th day of January, 1985, at Makati, Metro Manila. SGD. ROSARIO R. VELOSO Judge (Annex B. Petition, Rollo, p. 9)
chan roble s virtual law lib rary

chan roblesv irt ualawli bra ry

c hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In the light of the facts and circumstances above-stated and from what We see in the records, the Court finds merit in the petition.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Firstly, the claim of respondent MSSD that it was not served copy of the petition or the order of November 28, 1984, was clearly passed upon in the court below when it denied in its order of April 30, 1985, MSSD's motion for reconsideration of the adoption order based on its findings that: ... the records show that the MSSD was served copy of the petition (Order of Nov. 28, 1984) which was published in the Filipino Times for 3 consecutive weeks, through the Court Social Worker, who is authorized to receive and act for MSSD as RTC Staff Assistant V (Supreme Court En Banc Resolution in Adm. Matter No. 8527136-RTC.-Re: Request of Minister Sylvia P. Montes for the issuance of a Court Circular to all Regional Trial Courts regarding the proper application of the provision on adoption of P.D. No. 603). ... (Order of April 30, 1985; Rollo, p. 86) We fail to find any compelling circumstance or reason to disturb the findings of fact of the court below in this respect.
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

Undisputed also is the fact that the Order of November 28, 1984 was duly published in a newspaper of general publication and that copies of said Order were likewise sent and duly acknowledged by all government offices concerned including the one authorized to receive the same for the MSSD. Of greater significance is that when the Order granting adoption was promulgated by the Regional Trial Court on January 4, 1985, and upon denial of the motion for reconsideration of said order, filed by the MSSD, no appeal at all was interposed by the Ministry. The factual issue then of whether MSSD must be deemed to have received prior notice of the petition for adoption must now be considered foreclosed due to the absence of any appeal by MSSD. It is readily understandable that the alleged lack of notice to the MSSD of the petition or the stated Order of November 28, 1984 would be asserted by the MSSD. Such explanation can provide the usual and convenient excuse for its noncompliance with its obligation to render the corresponding case study and report and/or to intervene in the adoption proceedings.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

The evidence offered by the MSSD which is but its own certification that it did not receive a copy of the petition and the order of November 28, 1984 setting the initial hearing of the same is neither sufficient nor weighty as to disturb the factual findings of the lower court. Furthermore, the said order of November 28, 1984 was admittedly published in a newspaper of general circulation and copies of the order sent to all government offices concerned. By this it may also be presumed that MSSD would have knowledge of the adoption proceedings and could have intervened.
chan rob lesvi rtual awlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Respondent MSSD by its receipt of the said Order of January 4, 1984, granting adoption would inescapably be aware that the Social Worker assigned by the court a quo, had in fact conducted the corresponding case study and report and that the judgment rendered in the adoption case had given credit to said report.
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry c hanrobles vi rt ual law li brary

When respondent MSSD filed on February 25, 1985 its motion to set aside the order of January 4, 1985 granting adoption, it should have as early as then, challenged or disputed the fitness of the petitioners to adopt the minor child, if at all MSSD has any reason to be apprehensive. Paradoxically however, MSSD has not at all shown or even intimated in all pleadings submitted to this Court during an the time elapsed since the instant case was commenced on July 25, 1985 that MSSD has found even one specific fact or circumstance warranting denial of the requested travel clearance certificate on the ground that the welfare of the adopted child would be adversely affected. Absent any submission and proof that prejudice would be caused the adopted child if allowed to join his adoptive parents, the MSSD should be faulted for declining to issue the necessary clearance certificate.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

To dispel the farfetched qualms MSSD seemingly entertain, suffice it to point to the relevant portions of the order granting adoption which even make reference to pertinent certifications and exhibits. These, for convenience are hereunder again quoted: xxx xxx xxx
chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Petitioners have been certified to be of good moral character (Exhs. "N" and "N-1 "), they have no derogatory records here in the Philippines as well as in their country (Exhs. "L", "L-1", "O", "O-1" and "P") and that they are both found to be physically and mentally fit to adopt (Exhs. "M" to "M-2" and "R"). Petitioners, being Australian citizen, are allowed by their laws to adopt a Filipino child (Exh. "T"). Petitioners have cared for and love the child as their own natural child and in case they will have a child of their own, they will treat him as their first child. They are also aware that the child will become their compulsory heir and that they will not inherit from him, (tsn. Dec. 27, 1984, p. 4). Further, according to the report of the Social Worker, petitioners are aware of the responsibilities attached to the petition and they are found to be physically, emotionally and financially capable to rear the child Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic (Exhs. "U", "U-1" and "U-2") (supra, Rollo, pp. 9-10) In the matter of the issuance of the travel clearance certificate, how simple it could have been for respondent MSSD to have just looked into and considered said report of the Social Worker and/or verified the same. In all the pleadings submitted by respondent MSSD to this Court, there is no insinuation that the report of the Social Worker submitted to the court below is in any way erroneous, incorrect or faulty. MSSD's stance appears to be just to stubbornly insist and maintain that the exclusive prerogative to make a case study pertains to that Ministry. Public respondent would disregard and ignore the favorable report and recommendation of the Social Worker referred to in the decision of the court a quo without any given reason except for its persistent invocation of what to this Court would now appear to be a frivolous technicality after the finality of the judgment or order decreed by the court below. By refusing to issue the travel clearance respondent Minister would in effect frustrate said judgment of adoption for the adopting parents who reside in a foreign country would consequently remain separated from their adopted child. The respondent Minister would in effect take away from the petitioners what already belongs to them as a vested legal right. The unfairness of such a situation created by the action of the public respondent is patently a wanton abuse of her discretion and a neglect of her plain duty to assist in the reasonable implementation of the final order of a proper court.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

In refusing to grant the travel clearance certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects of a valid and final jugdment of the court, regarding which no appeal had even been taken from. Respondent MSSD should have realized that it would be incongruous to accept said judgment from which no appeal was made and yet render the same judgment ineffective by barring the implementation of the same. It is rather paradoxical that this particular Ministry should be overly concerned over its claimed exclusive prerogative to conduct the case study work instead of placing more importance on the possible prejudicial effects of its refusal on the welfare of the child. This is aside from the resulting bitter frustration MSSD inflicted on the adopting parents. When MSSD elected to no longer pursue an appeal from the Order of Adoption after its motion to set aside the judgment in this case was denied, undoubtedly, petitioners' hopes and expectations that they would now be able to bring to Australia the child they love and had adopted, to live with them permanently and at the soonest tune, must have soared. It is almost cruel that petitioners should continue to be rebuffed by the rigid and inflexible attitude of a bureaucratic office which, over all the agencies should be more sensitive and have deep concern for human feelings.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Even assuming, that the issuance of a travel clearance certificate would require exercise of judgment, how simpler it could have been and much efforts of the petitioners and this Court could have been spared, if the MSSD, as workers in the government, had only been inspired to take the initiative to help instead of to hinder. All that MSSD had to do was to use a little of its time to verify the correctness of the case study report, prepared and submitted by the Social Worker who acted upon instructions of the court below. In a matter of days, this verification could have been accomplished. If at all there was any reason to impeach or assail said report, MSSD could then have so stated for the satisfaction of the parties and of this Court. Instead, We note that the arguments of the respondent herein are confined and restricted to its recalcitrant view that the MSSD having been allegedly denied opportunity to make a case study report, therefore it should not issue the travel clearance certificate.
chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

This claim has of course been rejected as without any factual basis and of no merit. It became also irrelevant after MSSD's awareness of the valid and final court judgment of adoption which therein

made mention of a government worker's report regarding the subject minor Adam Christopher Bobanovic and his adopting parents. The undue importance which MSSD attaches to prerogatives which it claims belong exclusively to it, reflects poorly on its perception as to what truly are the more desirable values. As a government agency that is expected to be service oriented, its attitude shown in this case is rather disappointing.
chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The claim of respondent MSSD that mandamus should not issue because there is no law specifically enjoining her to issue a clearance to travel or that such directive is not carried in the order granting adoption is a manifestly specious and absurd argument. As a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision but also to those necessarily included therein or is necessary thereto (Unson vs. Lacson, 25 SCRA 86) it follows, therefore, as a logical effect of the decree of adoption, that the adopted minor should be allowed to travel to Australia to join his adoptive parents
virtua l law lib rary

chanroble s

The absence of any law that directs respondent Minister to issue a clearance to travel will not preclude this Court from issuing the writ of mandamus prayed for. What respondent has overlooked is the basic principle that judgments, orders or processes of the court should be enforced by public officers and obeyed by those affected by the judgment of the court. As the right of the adoptive child and the adopting parents to live together is inherent in an order or judgment granting adoption, it becomes no less a duty of the public officers concerned to translate the effects of such a judgment or order into reality. Under Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, it is an inherent power given to the courts to compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes.
chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

One final word. Respondent MSSD apparently has overlooked, forgotten, or has not taken time to be aware of what this Court had stated in previous other cases and which would now be worthwhile to reiterate. ... adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration...are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter against well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. (Malkinsons vs. Agrava, 54 SCRA 66) (Citing Santos vs. Aranzanso 16 SCRA 344 (1966); Santos vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 378 (1967); Frasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665 (1956). In Duncan vs. CFI of Rizal L-30576, 69 SCRA 298, We again emphasized that "the rule of Dula lex sed lex" should not be applied but softened in matters relative to adoption of children or to acts designed to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children The widest lattitude of sympathy and assistance should be extended by courts because as therein said, "the law is not, and should not be made, as instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy." These pronouncements should be accorded fullest consideration and appreciation by the respondent Ministry of Social Service and Development.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the writ of mandamus be issued directing the present Minister of Social Services and Development, who now would be acting for the respondent Minister in this case, to forthwith issue without undue delay the requisite travel clearance certificate in favor of the herein petitioners' adopted child, ADAM CHRISTOPHER BOBANOVIC.
c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [A.M. No. P-94-1015. March 29, 1999] JASMIN MAGUAD and REBECCA BRIOSO, complainants, vs. NICOLAS DE GUZMAN and RUBY C. BARCENAS,Respondents. DECISION BUENA, J.: This is a complaint filed by Jasmin Maguad and Rebecca Brioso against Nicolas de Guzman, Sheriff of Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City and Ruby Barcenas, Court Social Worker in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, for grave misconduct, falsification and immorality. The complaint[1 alleges that sometime in 1982, respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully married to Corazon Punzalan de Guzman), and respondent Ruby Barcenas, single, unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay City; that in October, 1983, when respondents' first illegitimate child Nathaniel Roy was born, respondents unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the Birth Certificate of said child, making it appear that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1982; that when respondents' second illegitimate child Natalia, was born in 1984, respondents unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the said child's Birth Certificate, making it appear that respondents were lawfully married on December 8, 1984 (perhaps a typographical error meant to be December 8, 1982 as in the first Birth Certificate). In their joint comment and/or answer,[2 the respondents admitted that respondent Nicolas de Guzman was married to Corazon Punzalan in 1968 and has two legitimate children with her; de Guzman explained that he and Corazon Punzalan had long been separated in fact and a reconciliation between them for purposes of their living together again has become quite remote as she is now living with another man by the name of Eliseo Almero; de Guzman added that he has not been remiss in his obligations as a father to his two legitimate children, as he provided them within his means all that they needed for their sustenance. Respondents denied the complainants' allegation that they cohabited as husband and wife under scandalous circumstances; they also denied that they unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify the entries in the certificates of live birth of their two children. They claimed that the truth is that respondent de Guzman had no knowledge, much less any participation in the entries therein relating to their alleged marriage on December 8, 1982; that in the birth certificates of the children, the informant appearing therein is only-respondent Barcenas. The respondents explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply such erroneous information as regards her civil status solely for purposes of shielding her two children from the stigma of shame and disgrace that they might encounter in their later years in life by reason of their illegitimacy." De Guzman and Barcenas took exception to the claim of the complainants that they filed the present charges as "concerned citizens." According to the respondents, "for some ulterior designs," the complainants allow themselves to be the willing pawns of one Leoncio Cesar in the latter's attempts to unduly harass herein respondents because respondent Barcenas was one of the private complainants against Leoncio Cesar for Grave Oral Defamation before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 46, in Crim. Cases Nos. 93-1300 to 1303. In a resolution[3 dated March 23, 1994, the complaint was referred to Executive Judge Conchita Carpio Morales for investigation, report and recommendation. However, in view of the promotion of Executive Judge Morales to the Court of Appeals, this case was referred to Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo of Branch 116, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for investigation, report and recommendation.[4 During the hearing of the case, instead of presenting proofs in support of the accusation, the complainants offered in evidence their joint Affidavit of Desistance,[5 dated August 12, 1994 stating, among others:

xxx "3. That, assisted by our private lawyer, we recently conferred with the said two accused about this case and we have realized: (a) that they had no malicious or criminal intent when they made that entry and that Ruby Barcenas innocently did it in the best interest of their said children to avoid future social stigma upon the persons of the said children when they grow up; and (b) that Mr. De Guzman had been separated for many years from his wife, who has likewise been living her own life with a common-law husband in Mindoro; and that his wife and two children with her had expressly condoned and consented to his relationship with Ms. Barcenas many years ago; "4. That we are no longer interested to pursue this administrative case and that therefore, in the interest of justice, we hereby request the Supreme Court, thru the investigating Executive Judge of Pasay City to dismiss the same." In his Investigation Report[6 dated November 2, 1994 Acting Executive Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo (now Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan), made the following findings which the Court quotes with approval: "Misconduct means intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, specially by a government official. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456) No act of the respondents appears or has been established which can be considered as misconduct in office. The charge of grave misconduct against them is therefore without any basis. "With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the respondents committed the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were married on December 8, 1982, or December 8, 1984, in Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this accusation is predicated on one of the ways of committing falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. One essential element of this kind of falsification is that there must be a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the fact claimed to be false. In other words, there must be a law requiring, expressly or impliedly, the disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified. No law has been shown by the complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by it are married or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents cannot likewise prosper. "It is alleged in the complaint that the respondents conspired with each other in making the entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were married. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). The rule is that conspiracy should be shown by strong and convincing evidence. No evidence has been adduced in this case indicating that the respondents agreed and decided to make the entry in the birth certificates of their children that they were married. Even on the assumption that such entry in the birth certificates of Nathaniel and Natalia would constitute falsification by making an untruthful statement in a narration of fact, only respondent Barcenas, the informant who made the entry, could be held liable therefor. Respondent De Guzman could not be made to answer for it, since there is no proof that he conspired with his co-respondent in making such entry. "On the other hand, the circumstances in this case admitted by the respondents are sufficient to sustain the charge of immorality. It is not in accordance with the norms of morality for a man who is legally married to cohabit with another woman during the subsistence of such marriage. In the same manner, it is against the tenets of morality for a woman to be living together with a married man not her husband. The stigma of immorality attaches to this kind of relationship even if the married man is separated from his wife and the woman living with him is single. This is specially so when the persons concerned are public officers who are supposed to maintain a high standard of morality so as to live up to their role to be looked upon as models in society.

"However, to temper justice with mercy, these circumstances may be considered to mitigate the liability of the respondents: "1. They have voluntarily admitted that they are living together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. "2. Respondent De Guzman and his lawful wife have been separated in fact for a long time and his wife is already cohabiting with another man, thereby rendering reconciliation between them improbable. "3. Notwithstanding their separation, respondent De Guzman has continued giving support to his children with Punzalan. "4. The relationship between the respondents is one of the realities of life which is difficult to prevent from happening, more so because respondent De Guzman has been separated for a long time from his wife. "5. Apparently, the lawful wife and legitimate children of respondent De Guzman have tolerated the relationship between the respondents as can be implied from the fact that none of them has filed a complaint against them. "6. There is no indication that the relationship between the respondents has caused prejudice to any person or has adversely affected the performance of their functions and duties as officers of the government to the detriment of the public service. "7. The complainants have desisted from further prosecuting their complaint and asked for its dismissal, admitting that the filing of the present charges was an offshoot of a civil case involving complainant Maguad and the respondents." The investigating Judge made the following recommendation: "1. Respondents Nicolas de Guzman and Ruby Barcenas be exonerated of the charges of grave misconduct and falsification; and "2. Both respondents be found guilty of the charge of immorality. "However, because of the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, only the penalty of suspension from office for one (1) month without pay be imposed on them. "Additionally, the respondents should be admonished to terminate their cohabitation or to take such proper course of action as will legitimize the relationship between them." The Court fully agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the respondents be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, the same being duly supported by the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the matter. With regard to the third accusation, the stigma of immorality attaches to the kind of relationship between the respondents, the same being improper, notwithstanding the fact that respondent de Guzman was separated from his wife (who is now living with another man) and respondent Barcenas was single. In Nalupta, Jr. vs. Tapec,[7 this Court held that illicit relations is considered disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action pointing out that Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission has categorized disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day shall be imposed for the first offense while the penalty of dismissal is imposed for the second offense.

However, this being the first offense of the respondents and there being no allegation in the complaint that respondent Barcenas knew that de Guzman was married even before they started their relationship and came to know of it only when it was already too late to back out, with the birth of their children, and taking into account the circumstances enumerated by the Investigating Judge that may be considered to mitigate their liability, the Court, in order to temper justice with mercy is inclined to impose a lighter penalty upon the Respondents. In a Memorandum[8 for the Chief Justice dated September 28, 1998, the Court Administrator recommended that the respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Social Worker Ruby Barcenas be absolved from the charges of grave misconduct and falsification, but respondent de Guzman should be suspended for two (2) months without pay for immorality and respondent Barcenas be suspended for fifteen (15) days without pay and that both respondents be admonished to terminate their relationship or to take the necessary steps to legitimize the same. Parenthetically, on February 5, 1999, the respondents filed a Manifestation[9 stating among others: xxx "5. That on May 25, 1995, respondent Nicolas de Guzman filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite; "6. On August 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the Honorable Judge Dolores C. Espaol in favor of the respondent; "7. That on November 27, 1998, Entry of Final Judgment regarding the Annulment of Marriage was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite; and, "8. That on October 19, 1998, the respondents had tied their marriage knot before the Honorable Judge Leticia P. Morales of Regional Trial Court, Makati." WHEREFORE, respondents Deputy Sheriff Nicolas de Guzman and Court Social Worker Ruby Barcenas are absolved from the charge of grave misconduct and falsification, but respondent de Guzman is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay and respondent Barcenas for fifteen (15) days also without pay, both for immorality. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
[1 Rollo, pp. 1-7. [2 Ibid., pp. 30-32. [3 Ibid., p. 44. [4 Ibid., p. 45. [5 Rollo, pp. 69-70.

[6 Rollo, pp. 97-109. [7 220 SCRA 505 (1993). [8 Rollo, pp. 111-117. [9 Rollo, pp. 118-124.

SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. P-02-1603 - July 23, 2002 GEPTE M. PEREZ, Complainant, vs. MARIA ISABEL D. HILARIO, Social Worker II, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: This pertains to the letter-complaint of Gepte M. Perez, Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Metro Manila, Branch 116, dated October 12, 2001, to the Office of the Court Administrator, seeking administrative sanctions against Ms. Maria Isabel D. Hilario, Court Social Worker, RTC of Pasay City, Branch 113, for non-payment of a just debt. In his sworn complaint, Perez alleged that on November 9, 1998, Ms. Hilario borrowed from him the sum of P3,000, promising to repay it immediately. Ms. Hilario, however, reneged on her word and kept on putting off Perez each time he asked her to pay. On April 5, 2001, Ms. Hilario executed a promissory note1 to pay her debt to Perez within six months from date thereof. Sometime in the first week of July 2001, Ms. Hilario paid Perez P500, but made no payments thereafter, despite continuous demand with reminders from Perez. On October 12, 2001, Perez filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Ms. Hilario "for whatever administrative penalty that might be meted out on her." 2 On November 15, 2001, the OCA directed Ms. Hilario to comment on the complaint. On December 14, 2001, Perez withdrew his complaint against Ms. Hilario after the latter had fully paid the sum owing him. On December 19, 2001, Ms. Hilario wrote to the OCA, stating that she had already settled her account with Perez and that the latter had withdrawn the complaint filed against her. She prayed that the case against her be closed or dismissed. In a memorandum submitted to this Court,3 the OCA stated that, inasmuch as the promissory note executed by Ms. Hilario stated that the debt would be paid in six months from date, and the debt was fully paid on December 14, 2001, there was delay in payment for only a little over a month. It then recommended that this matter be considered "CLOSED and TERMINATED."

We note, however, that this is the second case of this nature involving Ms. Hilario. As the OCA itself stated, Ms. Hilario should be reminded that this Court has reprimanded her in A.M. No. P-001433, Esperanza de Guzman vs. Isabel D. Hilario, dated April 4, 2001, for similar shortcomings on her part. In said case, she was sanctioned for a similar misconduct, which we found violative of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). In particular Book V, Section 46 thereof states: Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. - (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. (b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: . (22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes to the government; xxx Under Rule XIV, Section 22, of the Omnibus Rules of the Civil Service, "just debts" pertain to: 1. claims adjudicated by a court of law, or 2. claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. In the present case, Ms. Hilario in her comment did not deny incurring the debt much less the fact that it was a just debt. She also did not deny her failure to pay it when due. Instead, she asked that the case against her be closed or dismissed since she had settled her account with Perez on December 14, 2001, and the latter had already withdrawn his complaint against her. In the light of her admissions, we find the aforecited provision of the Revised Administrative Code applicable. Complainant's withdrawal of his complaint did not relieve her of her administrative culpability. Proceedings against a public officer or employee for misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance cannot just be withdrawn anytime by the complainant nor should they depend on complainant's whims and caprices. The complainant is in a real sense, only a witness therein.4 The purpose of complainant was not only to collect from Ms. Hilario, but also to seek administrative disciplinary action against her. The penalty therefore is not directed at Ms. Hilario's private life but at her actuation unbecoming a public employee.5 Under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules of the Civil Service, willful refusal to pay a just debt is a light offense. The penalties prescribed under said rule are reprimand for the first offense; suspension from one to 30 days for the second offense; and dismissal from the service for the third offense. Since this is Ms. Hilario's second offense, she should be suspended and not merely reminded about the previous reprimand imposed on her in A.M. No. P-00-1433, as recommended by the OCA. However, we deem it proper to consider the present economic conditions of court employees and thereby temper the penalty to be imposed against her. For we note that she did, after all, pay off her debt albeit with admitted delay. A suspension from office for five working days should suffice in her present case. WHEREFORE, MARIA ISABEL D. HILARIO, Court Social Worker, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, National Capital Region, Branch 113, is hereby SUSPENDED for five (5) working days for conduct unbecoming a public servant by first refusing and then failing to pay on time a just debt, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1

Annex "A," Rollo, p. 2. Rollo, p. 3. Dated March 5, 2002. Florenda vs. Enrile, A.M. No. P-92-695, 239 SCRA 22, 29 (1994).

Martinez vs. Muoz, A.M. No. P-94-1006, 249 SCRA 14, 22 (1995), citing Flores vs. Tatad, A.M. No. P-1808, 96 SCRA 676, 679 (1980).