Elements of Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Note: the positivist tradition has evolved from more radical to less radical

versions.

phenomenalism

(19th century)

logical positivism

(1920s-30s)

logical empiricism

(1940s-50s)

Elements of Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Note: the positivist tradition has evolved from more radical to less radical versions.

phenomenalism

(19th century)

- all share an empiricist epistemology - all share a certain hostility/skepticism toward metaphysical speculation

logical positivism

(1920s-30s)

logical empiricism

(1940s-50s)

Elements of Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Note: the positivist tradition has evolved from more radical to less radical versions.

phenomenalism

(19th century)

logical positivism

(1920s-30s)

- science describes the content of experience, not an independently existing world - claims about physical objects can be analyzed as logical constructions describing possible sensory experiences

logical empiricism

(1940s-50s)

Elements of Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Note: the positivist tradition has evolved from more radical to less radical versions. - empiricist epistemology AND logical positivism (1920s-30s) - empiricist theory of meaning - vericationism - the meaning of a statement just IS its method of verication
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phenomenalism

(19th century)

logical empiricism

(1940s-50s)

Elements of Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism Note: the positivist tradition has evolved from more radical to less radical versions. - relaxed the strict vericationist theory that identied meaning with the method of verication - instead, made veriability a necessary condition for meaningfulness

phenomenalism

(19th century)

logical positivism

(1920s-30s)

logical empiricism

(1940s-50s)

Three Central Questions for Any Philosophy of Science 1. scientic methodology 2. scientic change 3. the interpretation of scientic theories

Three Central Questions for Any Philosophy of Science 1. scientic methodology - specically, testing and conrmation - when and how does evidence provide support for the truth of a scientic theory?
(wrapped up with the problem of induction, which we talk about shortly ...)

Three Central Questions for Any Philosophy of Science 2. scientic change - what drives scientic change? Is it a rational process (is there a logic to it)? Is it progressive? (Are later theories better than previous theories? If so, in what sense?

Three Central Questions for Any Philosophy of Science 3. the interpretation of scientic theories - does science aim to give a true picture of the fundamental structure of the world, it does it aim at something else? e.g. description and prediction of observable phenomena? - what does a scientic theory say about the world? What must the world be like, if a given scientic theory is true?

For Logical Positivism/Empiricism ... 1. scientic methodology 2. scientic change 3. the interpretation of scientic theories

- observation statements can function as a neutral basis for deciding between competing theories - scientic theories aim for general, law-like statements about observable phenomena - conrmed predictions provide evidence for the truth of these generalizations (Popper calls this inductivism)

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For Logical Positivism/Empiricism ... 1. scientic methodology 2. scientic change 3. the interpretation of scientic theories

- scientic change is, generally, progressive and cumulative - successor theories, in general, offer more complete and more accurate explanations and predictions than their predecessor theories

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For Logical Positivism/Empiricism ... 1. scientic methodology 2. scientic change 3. the interpretation of scientic theories

- science, in general, aims for empirical adequacy, not a true description of the world behind the appearances - to accept a theory is to accept that it is empirically adequate within a given domain of application - one should be agnostic about the parts of a theory that refer to unobservable entities or processes

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Question: How do we justify inferences like this? 1. 2. 2. : n. swan 1 is white swan 2 is white swan 3 is white swan n is white

Therefore, ALL swans are white.

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Question: How do we justify inferences like this? 1. 2. 2. : n. swan 1 is white swan 2 is white swan 3 is white swan n is white

the conclusion doesnt follow deductively so, does it follow inductively?

Therefore, ALL swans are white.

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Another example ... 1. Every day for recorded human history, the sun has risen in the east. Therefore, the sun will rise in the east tomorrow morning.

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Another example ... 1. Every day for recorded human history, the sun has risen in the east. Therefore, the sun will rise in the east tomorrow morning.

the conclusion doesnt follow deductively so, does it follow inductively?

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Another example ... 1. Every day for recorded human history, the sun has risen in the east. Therefore, the sun will very probably rise in the east tomorrow morning.

does this help?

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The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) Another example ... 1. Every day for recorded human history, the sun has risen in the east. 2. Whenever x has occurred without exception in the past, it will very likely occur in the future. Therefore, the sun will very probably rise in the east tomorrow morning.
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does this help?

The Problem of Induction - originates with David Hume (18th century) - inductive inferences dont follow deductively - so, do they follow inductively? - it seems that inductive inferences rely on assumptions that presuppose the reliability of inductive inferences - this seems CIRCULAR - this was the original question, it doesnt help to simply assume it ... - so ... what justies inductive reasoning?

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