Cases on Law of the Treaties; International Law and Municipal Law (compiled and taken from other sources)

Jul10

Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear The Court held that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia and, in consequence, that Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory. It also found that Thailand was under an obligation to restore to Cambodia any sculptures, stelae, fragments of monuments, sandstone model and ancient pottery which might, since the date of the occupation of the Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the Temple of the Temple area by the Thai authorities. Application of doctrines (general principles of law) of estoppel and acquiescence. The map was never formally approved by the Mixed Commission, which had ceased to function some months before its production while there could be no reasonable doubt that it was based on the work of the surveying officers in the Dangrek sector. The court nevertheless concluded that, in its inception, it had no binding character. It was clear from the record however, that the maps were communicated to the Siamese government as purporting to represent the outcome of the work of delimitation; since there was no reaction with the Siamese Authorities, either then or for many years they must be held to have acquiesced. The map were, moreover, communicated to the members of the Siamese Mixed Commission, who said nothing to the Siamese Minister of the Interior. If the Siamese authorities accepted the Annex I map without investigation, they could not now plead any error vitiating the reality of their consent. The Siamese Government and later the Thai Government had raised No query about the Annex I map prior to its negotiation with Cambodia in Bangkok in 1958. Thailand had nevertheless continued also to use and indeed to publish maps showing Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia. Moreover, in the course of the Negotiations for the 1925 and 1937 Franco-Siamese Treaties, which confirmed the existing frontiers, and in 1947 in Washington before the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission, it would have been natural for Thailand to raise the matter: she did not Do so. The natural inference was that she had accepted the frontier at Preah Vihear as it was drawn on the map, irrespective Of its correspondence with the watershed line. Moreover, when in 1930 Prince Damrong, on a visit to the Temple, was officially received there by the French Resident adjoining Cambodian province, Siam failed to react. From these facts, the court concluded That Thailand had accepted the Annex I map. Even if there were any doubt in this connection, Thailand was precluded from asserting that she had not accepted it since France and Cambodia had relied upon her acceptance for fifty years enjoyed such benefits as the Treaty of 1904 has conferred on her. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Annex I map caused it to enter the treaty

settlement; the Parties Had at that time adopted an interpretation of that settlement which caused the map line to prevail over the provisions of the Treaty and, As there was no reason to think that the Parties had attached any special importance to the line of the watershed as such, as compared With the overriding importance of a final regulation of their own frontiers, the Court considered that the interpretation to be given now Would be the same. Whitney v. Robertson United States Supreme Court 124 U.S. 190 (1888) Facts Whitney (plaintiff), a merchant engaged in importing sugar to the United States from the Dominican Republic brought suit against Robertson (defendant), a United States Customs official, arguing that he should not be required to pay duties on the sugar because his product was similar to sugar being imported duty-free into the United States from the Hawaiian Islands. In making this argument, Whitney cited a treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic which guaranteed that no higher duty would be imposed on goods imported by the United States from the Dominican Republic than on goods imported from any other country. However, an act of Congress also existed which authorized the collection of these duties on goods imported from the Dominican Republic. The statute was passed after the United States entered into its treaty with the Dominican Republic. The lower court held for Robertson, and Whitney appealed. Held: It follows, therefore, that when a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that character belong to another department of the government. The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will. In Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, it was objected to an act of Congress that it violated provisions contained in treaties with foreign nations, but the Court replied that so far as the provisions of the act were in conflict with any treaty, they must prevail in all the courts of the country, and after a full and elaborate consideration of the subject it held that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can be the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal. HEAD MONEY CASES EDYE V. ROBERTSON 112 U.S. 580 (1884) The suit is brought to recover from Robertson, collector of the port of New York, sum of money he received from the plaintiffs, on account of their landing in that port, passengers not citizens of the United States. The collection was based on the act of Congress entitled An act to regulate immigration on August 3, 1882. The act provides that there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 50 cents for each and every passenger, not a citizen of the United States, who

shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within the United States. The said duty shall be paid to the collector of customs of the port where the passenger shall come. The plaintiffs are partners in trade in the city of New York under the firm name Funch, Edye & Co. involved in the business of transporting passengers and freight upon the high seas between Holland and the United States of America as consignees and agents. On October 2, 1882, it sailed to the port of New York and carried 382 persons not citizens of United States and among said persons, there were 20 severally under age of one year and 59 were severally between the ages of one year and eight years. On this account, Robertson, the collector of the said port, decided that the plaintiffs must pay a duty of 191 dollars for the said passengers costing 50 cents for each of the 382 passengers before they be permitted to land. The plaintiffs paid and protested against the payment. The circuit court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and which is called upon review. The issue is whether the act of Congress violates treaties by the Unites States with friendly nations? The opinion of the court is that as far as the provisions of the act may be found to be in conflict with any treaty with foreign nation, the act must prevail in all judicial courts of this country. The court held that: A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provision which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country. The constitution of the United States places provisions in the treaties in the same category as other laws of Congress by its declaration that this constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule decision for the case before it as it would to a statute. But even in this aspect of the case there is nothing in this law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The constitution gives it no superiority over and act of Congress in this respect,

which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date. Nor is there anything in its essential character, or in branches of the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this superior sanctity. The court opined that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND V. ICELAND International Court of Justice 17 Aug 72 25 Jul 74 [1974] ICJ Rep. 3 On 14 April 1972, the United Kingdom instituted proceedings against Iceland concerning a dispute over the proposed extension by Iceland of the limits of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 nautical miles to 50 nautical miles. United Kingdom contends that such actuation is a breach of an agreement between the parties, evidenced by an Exchange of Notes in 1961. It specified therein that the United Kingdom would no longer object to a 12-mile fishery zone, that Iceland would continue to work for the implementation of the 1959 resolution regarding the extension of fisheries jurisdiction that would give the United Kingdom six months notice of such extension and that in case of a dispute in relation to such extension, the matter shall, at the request of either Party, be referred to the International Court of Justice. Iceland declared that the Court lacked jurisdiction, and declined to be represented in the proceedings. It argued that the Exchange of Notes in 1961 has already been terminated as evidenced by the policy statement issued by its Government on 4 July 1971 stating that the agreements on fisheries jurisdiction with the British and the West Germans be terminated and that a decision be taken on the extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 50 nautical miles from base lines, and that this extension become effective not later than September 1st, 1972. At the request of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany (which also contested the claim of Iceland), the Court in 1972 indicated, and in 1973 confirmed, provisional measures to the effect that Iceland should refrain from implementing, with respect to their vessels, the new Regulations for the extension of the fishery zone, and that the annual catch of those vessels in the disputed area should be limited to certain maxima. In Judgments delivered on 2 February 1973, the Court found that it possessed jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. The facts requiring the Courts consideration in adjudicating upon the claim were attested by documentary evidence whose accuracy appeared to be no reason to doubt. As for the law, although it was to be regretted that Iceland had failed to appear, the Court was nevertheless deemed to take notice of international law, which lay within its own judicial knowledge. Having taken account of the legal position of each Party and acted with particular

circumspection in view of the absence of the respondent State, the Court considered that it had before it the elements necessary to enable it to deliver judgment. In Judgments on the merits of 25 July 1974, it found that the Icelandic Regulations constituting a unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights to a limit of 50 nautical miles were not opposable to the Government of the United Kingdom, that the Government of Iceland was not entitled unilaterally to exclude United Kingdom fishing vessels from the disputed area, and that the parties were under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith for the equitable solution of their differences concerning their respective fishery rights. NAMIBIA CASE (Advisory Opinion) 1971 I.C.J. 16 ***Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).*** On 27 October 1966, the General Assembly decided that the mandate for South West Africa was terminated and that South Africa had no other right to administer the Territory. In 1969 the Security Council called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from the Territory, and on 30 January 1970 it declared that the continued presence there of the South African authorities was illegal and that all acts taken by the South African Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the mandate were illegal and invalid; it further called upon all States to refrain from any dealings with the South African Government that were incompatible with that declaration. On 29 July 1970, the Security Council decided to request of the Court an advisory opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. The issues to be resolved are: a.) Under international context, in the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia under the mandate system illegal despite the issuance of the Security Council Resolution 276? b.) If the answer is in the affirmative, what are the legal consequences of such fact? The Court said, the United Nations acting through its competent organ, must be seen above all as the supervisory institution competent to pronounce on the conduct of the Mandatory. As such the General Assembly of the United Nations, in terminating the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia, was not making a finding on facts, but formulating a legal situation. It would not be correct to assume that, because it is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting, in special cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative design. However, since the General Assembly lacked the necessary powers to ensure the withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory and therefore, acting in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter, enlisted the co-operation of the Security Council. The Council for its part, when it adopted the resolutions concerned, was acting in the exercise of what it deemed to be its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. Article 24 of the Charter vests in the

Security Council the necessary authority. Its decisions were taken in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter, under Article 25 of which it is for member States to comply with those decisions, even those members of the Security Council which voted against them and those Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Council. Thus, the determination made by the Security Council is binding upon South Africa, hence, its continued presence in Namibia is illegal and should withdraw its administration in Namibia immediately. Finding that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal, the Court further found that the legal consequences of such act would be: (a) that State Members of the United Nations were under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africas presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia; and (b) to refrain from any acts implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration. Finally, it stated that it was incumbent upon States which were not Members of the United Nations to give assistance in the action which had been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia. DANUBE DAM CASE (Hungary v Slovakia) 37 ILM 162 (1998) In 1977, The Treaty between the Hungarian Peoples Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabckovo-Nagymaros System of Locks was concluded on 16 September 1977.The treaty was concluded to facilitate the construction of dams on the Danube River. It addressed broad utilization of the natural resources of the Danube between Bratislava and Budapest, representing two hundred of the Rivers two thousand eight hundred and sixty kilometers. Intense criticism of the construction at Nagymaros centered upon endangerment of the environment and uncertainty of continued economic viability. This growing opposition engendered political pressures upon the Hungarian Government. After initiating two Protocols, primarily concerned with timing of construction, Hungary suspended works at Nagymaros on 21 July 1989 pending further environmental studies. In response, Czechoslovakia carried out unilateral measures. Hungary then claimed the right to terminate the treaty, at which point the dispute was submitted to the International Court of Justice. Hungary also submitted that it was entitled to terminate the treaty on the ground that Czechoslovakia had violated Articles of the Treaty by undertaking unilateral measures, culminating in the diversion of the Danube. Slovakia became a party to the 1977 Treaty as successor to Czechoslovakia. On 19 May 1992 Hungary purported to terminate the 1977 Treaty as a consequence of Czechoslovakias refusal to suspend work during the process of mediation. As the Treaty itself did not feature a clause governing termination, Hungary proffered five arguments to validate its actions: a state of necessity, supervening impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, material breach and the emergence of new norms of international environmental law. Slovakia contested each of these bases. The Court easily dismissed Hungarys first claim, simply stating that a state of necessity is not a ground for termination. Even if a state of necessity is established, as soon as it ceases to exist treaty obligations automatically revive.

The doctrine of impossibility of performance is encapsulated in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. In this case, the legal regime governing the Gabckovo-Nagymaros Project did not cease to exist. Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977 Treaty provided the means through which works could be readjusted in accordance with economic and ecological imperatives. Furthermore, Article 61(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties precludes application of the doctrine where the impossibility complained of is the result of a breach by the terminating Party. If the joint investment had been hampered to a point where performance was impossible, it was a consequence of Hungarys abandonment of works. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies international law in respect of fundamental change of circumstances and treaty relations. Hungary submitted that the 1977 Treaty was originally intended to be a vehicle for socialist integration. Fundamental changes cited were the displacement of a single and indivisible operational system by a unilateral scheme; the emergence of both States into a market economy; the mutation of a framework treaty into an immutable norm; and the transformation of a treaty consistent with environmental protection into a prescription for environmental disaster. The Court held that although political changes and diminished economic viability were relevant to the conclusion of a treaty, they were not so closely linked with the object and purpose of the 1977 Treaty so as to constitute an essential basis of the consent of the Parties. New developments in the efficacy of environmental knowledge were not unforeseen by the Treaty and cannot be said to represent a fundamental change. The Court did not consider whether the emergence of new environmental norms would catalyze the application of Article 62 in a situation where the terms of a treaty stand abhorrent to new norms. Hungary claimed that Variant C materially breached Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977 Treaty, concerning the protection of water quality, the preservation of nature and guardianship of fishing interests. Article 60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes material breach of a treaty as a ground for termination on the part of the injured State. Extending its reasoning on the principle of approximate application, the Court held that a material breach only occurred upon the diversion of the Danube. As Czechoslovakia dammed the Danube after 19 May 1992, Hungarys purported termination was premature and thus invalid. As its final basis for the justification of termination, Hungary advocated that, pursuant to the precautionary principle in environmental law, the obligation not to cause substantive damage to the territory of another State had evolved into an obligation erga omnes (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). Slovakia countered this argument with the claim that there had been no intervening developments in international environmental law that gave rise to jus cogens norms that would override provisions of the 1977 Treaty. The Court avoided consideration of these propositions, concluding instead that these new concerns have enhanced the relevance of Articles 15, 19 and 20. Given that international environmental law is in its formative stages, it is unfortunate that the International Court of Justice did not grasp at this opportunity to discuss its role in the governance of relations between States. To that end, the Court may have clarified the controversial application of the sic utere principle to modify notions of unrestricted sovereignty in the Trail Smelter arbitration.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 185, L 2662 March 26, 1949

Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a formerly a Lietenant-General of the japanese imperial army and commanding general of the japanese imperial forces in the philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charge before a military commission convened by the chief of staff of the armed forces of the philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the imperial japanese forces in the violations of the laws and customer of war. Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for its acts committed in violation of Hague Convention and the Geneva convention because the Philippines is not signatory to Hague Convention and signed the Geneva only in 1947. He also challenges the participation of the two American attorneys in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. Issues: 1. Whether or not the executive order no. 68 is a ground for the violations of our provision of constitutions law and to our local law. 2. Whether or not Atty. Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to practice the law professions in the philippines. Ruling : The court holds that the Executive Order is valid and Constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that The Philippines renounces war as an instruments of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague and Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the U.N, all the persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing, or waging a war of aggression and commission of the crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefore. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order no. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part our Constitution. On the second issue, the court ruled that the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow this representation in said trial.

The petition was denied. Adolfo vs. CFI of Zambales The petition thus squarely raised in issue the validity of the exchange of notes on August 10, 1965, more commonly known as the Mendez-Blair Agreement insofar as it would modify or amend the provisions of the Military Bases Agreement without such exchange of notes having been submitted to the Senate for ratification as the Constitution requires in the case of treaties. It made a distinction between a treaty and executive agreements, to which category the aforesaid exchange of notes belongs. Thus: A treaty may be defined as a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare.. Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts effecting external, relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, termed as presidential agreements, and (2) agreements entered into in pursuance to acts of Congress, designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.. However, the distinction between a treaty or the called executive agreements is best understood by statements of including examples thereof what they are supposed to cover, of. This we can find in the above-cited case of the Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, supra, citing U.S. authorities, to wit: International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. 5 Therefore, said Agreement is a treaty which must be ratified as it Was ratified, by the Senate. 7 The petition reinforced the above conclusion with this argument: Since the power to make treaties is lodged under our Constitution with the President with the concurrence of twothirds of the Senate. the power to amend these treaties must similarly be vested in those organs of the government. After all, an amendment to a statute produces one law, usually the statute as amended. In pari materia is the observation that only Congress, with its legislative power, can make laws and alter or repeal them (Cooley, p. 183). The Chief Executive, with all his vast powers, cannot suspend the operation of a statute; a fortiori, he cannot exercise the greater power to amend or to revoke a statute. Therefore, as applied to this case, the making of the treaty having been undertaken under the joint auspices of the President and the Senate, its amendment or revision must similarly be undertaken by both agencies of the State as directed by the Constitution. The August 10, 1965 notes to the U.S.-P.I. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, not having been ratified yet by the Senate, remain as mere proposals. 8 GUERREROS TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. v. BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION SERVICES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-KILUSAN), LABOR ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES and JOSE CRUZ

FACTS In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This

bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerreros Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblocks 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union). When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerreros MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed. Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to submit themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasnt appealed so it was declared final & executory Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions. ISSUE W/N the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero. RULING YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/ military requirements, to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected employees for employment. A treaty has 2 aspects as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give priority to the employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerreros Transport Services, subject to the following conditions: a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned. For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the Union. Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.

Bayan vs Zamora G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000 On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was

respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F. Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two Committees. On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued. On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens, and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement. - The issue her is whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement entered by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Sates is constitutional or unconstitutional. - The Supreme Court held that the Visiting Forces Agreement is constitutional having been duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate. The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase recognized as a treaty. US treats VFA as an executive agreement because as governed by international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.

SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO GR 81510, 14 March 1990 FACTS: On 21 October 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) charged Hortencia Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, allegedly the formers manager, for withholding the formers PECC Card. On 3 November 1987, Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to Salazar a telegram directing the latter to directly appear before Ferdie Marquez, POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit 6/F, POEA Building, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Mandaluyong on 6 November 1987 at 10 a.m. RE case filed against Salazar. On the same day, having ascertained that Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment agency, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his Closure and Seizure Order 1205 against Horty Salazar. On 26 January 1988, POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the Peoples Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to Salazars residence. There it was found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.) However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon 12 talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. On 28 January 1988, Flora Salazar filed with POEA a letter, requesting that the personal properties seized at Horty Salazars residence be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. On 2 February 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, Salazar filed the petition for prohibition, contesting the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. On even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal (IS-88-836). ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code. HELD: Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory

powers for the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. On 1 May 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers. On 26 January 1986, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well. The decrees in question stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. Under the new Constitution, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, the Court declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the COurt reaffirmed the principles that (1) Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search; and (2) The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. Thus, the Court herein granted the petition, declaring Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code unconstitutional and null and void, and thus ordering the POEA to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order 1205.

Gonzales vs Hechanova On October 29, 2011

Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not

applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Sen. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 158088 , July 6, 2005

Facts :This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court for the Senates concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. That under the treaty law and customary international law, Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute. Respondents on the other hand, questioned the legal standing of herein petitioners and argued that executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence. Issues : Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit. Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by the Philippine Member to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. Ruling : Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the nontransmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts. Petitioners interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong to the Senate. Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.

The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty. The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective. Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus, Thus, the petition is DISMISSED. Drilon vs Lim August 4, 1994 Petitioner: Hon. Franklin Drilon Respondents: Mayor Alfredo Lim, Vice Mayor Jose Atienza, City Treasurer Anthony Acevedo, et al Ponente: Cruz Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code[1]. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC Held: Yes

Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution. Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional Held: Yes

Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these

flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned

for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.