EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING AND STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn.

2012; 41:6179 Published online 4 May 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/eqe.1118

Seismic risk assessment of interdependent critical infrastructure systems: The case of European gas and electricity networks
Karmen Poljanek, , Flavio Bono and Eugenio Gutirrez s
European Laboratory for Structural Assessment, Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, T.P. 480, I-21020 Ispra (VA), Italy

SUMMARY We study the seismic vulnerability of the interdependent European gas and electricity transmission networks from a topological point of view, whereby the electricity network depends on the gas network through gas-red power plants. First, we assessed the seismic response for each independent network; then we analyzed the increased vulnerability due to their interdependency. We implemented a probabilistic reliability model that encompasses the spatial distribution of both network structures and their seismic hazard exposure using a Geographic Information System. We characterized the network interdependency using the strength of coupling of the interconnections, together with the seismic response of the independentgasnetwork. We calculated the network fragility curves of the independent and dependent networks in terms of various performance measures (connectivity loss, power loss, and impact on the population) and found that the gas network is more seismically vulnerable than the electricity network. The interdependency introduces an extra vulnerability to the electricity network response that decreases with the extensiveness of the networks damage states. Damage was also evaluated at a local level in order to identify the most vulnerable parts of the network, where it was found that the potential for the highest power loss is located in southeast Europe. Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 21 April 2010; Revised 7 February 2011; Accepted 10 February 2011 KEY WORDS:

earthquake hazard; critical interdependent infrastructure; network analysis; network fragility curve; interoperability matrix; geographical spread of damage

1. INTRODUCTION The issue of vulnerability of critical infrastructures has attracted considerable attention from both the policy-making and academic spheres. Whereas policy making are concerned with how the lack of performance of said infrastructure affects social wellbeing, researchers consider understanding of the generic characteristics of real-world networks as one of the great challenges in, so-called, complex system analysis. One of the most important mathematical methods used in complex system analysis is the presentation of critical infrastructures as graphs. Graph theory has developed a broad range of interesting results to study the vulnerability of certain classes of graphs: important steps were taken by analyzing how the topology of different graph models (random [1], Small-world [2] and Scale-free graphs [3]) changes due to certain kinds of attacks [46]. By attack we mean the generic elimination of graph elements (i.e. the vertices and links) resulting from an intentional plan (terrorist attack), a random process (human error) or natural processes (earthquakes, storms,
Correspondence

to: Karmen Poljanek, European Laboratory for Structural Assessment, Institute for the Protection s and Security of the Citizen, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, T.P. 480, I-21020 Ispra (VA), Italy. E-mail: karmen.poljansek@gmail.com Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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ageing). The effects on real-world networks of such attack strategies have been the subject of recent research [710]. If we turn our attention to transportation and lifeline utility systems (water management, energy, and communication systems) we realize that real infrastructure networks extend over large geographical areas and are composed of many elements, which, most importantly, are physically connected engineering structures. Each type of network can be treated as an entity in its own right; however, this is not the whole picture: real-world networks are interconnected, either by physical, operational, or social ties. So, in reality, critical infrastructures are not many but rather one mega-infrastructure that encompasses all our daily activities. In order to manipulate data on such complex and geographically distributed infrastructures, the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) has become widespread. GIS is a convenient tool for matching the spatial characteristics of infrastructures to the spatial variability of the hazard demand on the overall system. Another key item is the possibility to parse this information into a connectivity matrix that can be analyzed using graph-theoretic methods. Finally, having numerically processed the network, GIS can again be used for effective visualization of the results. Network elements (i.e. engineering structures) exposed to natural hazards can suffer physical damage. Thus, the response of the infrastructure network is strongly dependent on the physical vulnerabilities of its constituent assets which, in turn, are dependent on their structural characteristics. A widely used method to assess the vulnerability of those individual assets to a given type of hazard is the use of structural fragility curves. One of the sources of a networks complex behaviour is its connectivity; indeed, the topology of the connection dictates how damage may spread through the network. In general, three types of failure propagation can be diagnosed that eventually dene how the vulnerability of each element inuences the vulnerability of the network as a whole. First, we may have failure of one element which is independent of the failure of others but, notwithstanding individual failures, changes the topology overall. Second, the network can be treated as a dynamical system that carries load ows, so that changes in the topology or increased system load can trigger load redistributions in such a manner that overloading of the elements causes additionalcascadingfailures (in this case the failure of one element is dependent on the failure of other element(s) in the network). Third, regarding interconnected infrastructure networks, the failure of one element is dependent on the failure of element(s) in the other network and the coupling links between them. In this paper only the rst (element-by-element) and the third (interconnections) types of failure propagation will be addressed. In order to assess the nal vulnerability of the network, different performance measures, like connectivity loss [11], have been used to describe the networks response, its damage states and, eventually, the denition of network fragility curves. In order to evaluate the networks performance measure in a probabilistic manner, the fragility curves of the elements are used in tandem with probabilistic numerical approaches (such as Monte Carlo simulations). This combination of methodswhich is the basis of our method herewas, for example, applied to the assessment of seismic vulnerability of existing county-sized electricity networks [1214] and also seismic vulnerability of the two interdependent county-sized networks (water distribution and electricity networks) in [15]. Clearly, developing an analysis for an all-enveloping mega-infrastructure is not yet feasible, but we can take some more steps into understanding how (at least) two types of large continental infrastructure networks depend on each other, and how their interdependence affects their aggregate vulnerability. More specically, what we address in this paper is how an earthquake not only explicitly generates vulnerabilities in a given network (here the European Electricity transmission network), but also how the vulnerability of another network on which it is partially dependent (here the European Gas Transmission network) induces a second, implicit, vulnerability by virtue of their interconnections. We are therefore primarily concerned with the probabilistic approach of assessing the topological vulnerability without considering the ow dynamics of the systems. Our paper starts off by explaining the procedure for assembling GIS information in order to compile the interconnected graph of the European gas and electricity networks; then we discuss the theoretical background of network analysis in order to dene the performance measures used.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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We then present the type of data we use, and later we deal with the mathematical formulation of the probabilistic reliability model, the seismic response of the networks and their interdependency behaviour. Finally, we present the results of our case studythe European Interconnected Gas and Electricity Transmission networksfrom two perspectives: rst the global network measures of (independent and dependent) network fragility, and then the geographical distribution of their local fragility.

2. EUROPEAN INTERCONNECTED ENERGY NETWORK 2.1. Description of data sets used in the study A key component of our work is the assembly of data sets of the European gas and electricity transmission networks. The source data are gathered from the Platts GIS features data sets [16] of the European gas and electricity infrastructures. The interconnected network we present here is the result of processing the GIS data into a connectivity matrix. The high-voltage electricity network consists of transmission lines with voltage greater or equal to 220 kV, substations and power plants. The gas transmission network consists of gas pipelines with a diameter greater or equal to 15 in., LNG terminals and compressor stations. Power plants are divided into two groups by fuel type: the gas-red power plants and all the other types (hydro, nuclear, etc.). Here we consider gas-red power plants as the common elements of both the gas and electricity networks, whereas all the other types of power plants are connected to the electricity network only. For the full description of how the raw Platts data set is parsed and compiled we refer to [17]. 2.2. Sinks and sources We classied the vertices of both networks (i.e. the 3231 and 10508 vertices in the European gas and electricity networks, respectively) into source, sink, and transmission classes (Table I). For the gas network, the sources are vertices located in the countries of the exploitable gas elds (142 vertices) and the LNG terminals (21 vertices), whereas sinks are gas-red power plants. In the electricity network, on the other hand, all power plants are source vertices; but, in addition to the 998 gas-red power plants (which cover approximately 20% of the total electricity generation capacity), there are 4383 power plants using other fuels. Conversely, sink vertices are those substations that deliver power into the electricity distribution network (see [17]). Thus, altogether, there are 3708 such distribution substations. The compiled European gas and electricity networks are, in the rst instance, undirected; but here we have assumed that the primary directions of ows (electricity power or natural gas) are from sources to sinks; therefore, we have introduced into the networks topology an extra information eld, namely, directedness of those links which are adjacent either to a source (directed out) or a sink (directed in). By introducing directedness as a key functionality of the network, we force the shortest-path-nding algorithm (Section 3) to disregard unrealistic solutions. For example, the shortest path from source to sink that goes through another source is, in our case, not admissible because power plants do not have a transmission function. Electricity sink vertices are regarded as the entry points into the electricity distribution network (i.e. that other network that delivers electricity to consumers). This functionality was implemented

Table I. Division of vertices in the European gas and electricity networks.

Source vertices Gas network Electricity network 163 5381 Transmission vertices 2070 1419 Sink vertices 998 3708

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for Europe using the, so-called, Thiessen polygon method [18] (by partitioning the area around each distribution substation into convex polygons). Using the geographical distribution of the population in [19] we assign the population contained in each polygon to the corresponding distribution substation.

3. NETWORK ANALYSIS Graph theory is one of the most immediate mathematical methods to describe and manipulate network data sets. Here, we deal with mixed graphs since our compiled networks contain directed (arcs) and undirected (edges) links. A mixed graph G = (V, E, A) is composed of a vertex set V , where N denotes the number of vertices, an edge set E (of unordered pairs of vertices), and an arc set A (of ordered pairs of vertices). The graphical connectivity of the network model denes its topological structure, and is represented by the N N connectivity matrix C, where ci j = 1 if (i j) A or ci j = c ji = 1 if (i, j) E and 0 otherwise. Having such a presentation of a network model we can solve the problem of nding the shortest path [20] from one vertex to another (shortest in the sense of the least number of links). The existence of the path between two vertices veries the connection between them. Such paths are jeopardized whenever the network topology changes due to the elimination of vertices or links from the network as a result of some attack. Next, we discuss how such attacks affect the networks performance. 3.1. Parameters of a networks response to element failures: performance measures We measure a networks performance by its capability of carrying ow (i.e. the existence of paths) from the sources through the transmission vertices to the sinks. We considered metrics that describe the damage to a network in terms of the loss of service due to the disconnections between sources and sinks. We used various descriptive parameters of loss. First, we counted the lost connections and then we weighted the importance of the lost connections depending on the additional attributes that are inherent to the network: for example, for the electricity network we consider the nominal power of the power plants and the population attached to each distribution substation. All the performance measures (connectivity loss, power loss, and impact on the population) are presented as a relative value in the range 01, reecting no damage and complete disconnection, respectively. Furthermore, performance measures are the attributes of the whole network and as such can dene the network (as opposed to the structural) damage states. However, due to a dearth of substantiated technical evidence to justify correlation trends between the extent of the network damage and network condition, we followed prior examples in the literature [15]; where 20, 50, and 80% performance measure levels have been assigned to dene minor, moderate, and extensive network damage states, respectively. When damage states are presented as the probability estimation, they can be applied as a surrogate measure for risk indicators; however, they reect the response of the network under the chosen hazard. Connectivity loss: The concept of connectivity loss has already been presented in [11]. It measures the average reduction in the ability of sinks to receive ow from sources. Although, in [11], it is assumed that in the initial state each sink is connected to all the sources, this is not always the case in real networks. Therefore, in order to apply the same concept to fragmented networks as well, we have to rst count the number of the sources connected to the ith sink in the i i original (undamaged) network Nsource,orig , and then in the damaged network Nsource,dam . Finally, we calculate the modied version of connectivity loss CL as: CL = 1 where
Copyright
i Nsource,dam i Nsource,orig i

(1)

denotes averaging over all sink vertices.

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Power loss: Upgrading the connectivity loss with the size of the power plant (in MW) to which sink vertices are still connected to, we can dene the power loss PL as the next performance measure PL = 1
i Pdam i Porig i

(2)

i i where Porig and Pdam are the sums of the power of all the power plants connected to the ith distribution substation in the original and damaged networks, respectively. Impact factor on the population: Attaching to each distribution substation i the assigned population POPi we can assess the overall share of the population affected by the power loss. We assume that the share of the population receiving power from the ith distribution substation equals i i its normalized power supply Pdam /Porig in the damaged network. We can eventually dene the impact factor on the population IP as: i Pdam i Porig

i=1, ...,ND

POPi . (3)

I P = 1

POPall

Here, ND is the number of distribution substations in the electricity network and POPall is the population in the Thiessen polygon area supplied by the electricity network.

4. REQUIRED DATA FOR THE PROBABILISTIC EVALUATION OF THE NETWORK RESPONSE We must bear in mind that the vulnerability analysis of an engineering structure is concerned with the response of the structure under different levels of seismic load. Furthermore, if we consider conducting a risk analysis, we must combine the probability of occurrence of the phenomena (i.e. the load induced by the earthquake event) and the probabilistic evaluation of the consequences (i.e. the response of the affected structures). We must therefore collect such statistical data (from published and available sources) for all the elements of the infrastructure network, whereas their location and characteristics are already in the GIS database [16]. We use the European seismic hazard map for the probabilistic and spatial characteristics of peak ground acceleration (PGA), which, at present, is only available for the 475-year return period and 10% of probability of exceedance in 50 years of exposure time [21]. In addition to this, we need the hazard curve for the location of each element of our networkor at least the seismic hazard maps for different return periods (different hazard levels). However, because none of these have been compiled at a European continental scale, we multiplied the values of the PGA from the existent seismic hazard map by a general factor, called the PGA factor (PGA factors lower than 1 correspond to return periods shorter than 475 yearslower hazard levelsand PGA factors more than 1 correspond to return periods longer than 475 yearshigher hazard levels). As a rule of thumb the PGA factors 1.25 and 2.5 correspond to 1000-year and 10 000-year return period, respectively. We must point out that these estimations are based on seismic hazard maps for different hazard levels found for Italy [22] and Slovenia [23]. Thus, we cannot prove that the rule described is valid for the whole of Europe; even so, we get a feel for the general PGA factor in terms of the return periods. However, the application of the probabilistic seismic hazard map introduces inconsistences [24] because it is improbable that the seismic intensities at geographically different sites occur simultaneously. Thus, the probabilistic seismic hazard map is applicable when assessing the risk to one network element, while in the present case of spatial structures, it would be much more correct to apply the spatial distributions of seismic intensity. However, the latter vary with the seismic source and one would need an extensive earthquake catalogue to consider different earthquake scenarios [25]; unfortunately, such a catalogue has not yet been made for Europe.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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In addition, we were obliged to disregard the inuence of the local soil type on the seismic risk because neither the soil type associated with the facilities nor the geological map as a GIS data set for the whole of Europe was generally known. Next, for the seismic vulnerabilities (expressed as a conditional probability of exceeding a certain damage state at a given PGA) of the elements of the infrastructure network, we use the appropriate fragility curves. Our source for the fragility curves of important elements of the utility systems is HAZUS-MH [26], a standardized methodology for multihazard potential loss estimation that was proposed for application in the United States. Fragility curves for the facilities modeled as vertices (electric substation, power plants, and compressor station) are dependent on the PGA ground parameter. They are classied according to the functional capacity (except in the case of compressor stations, whose vulnerability is similar to that of pumping plants in oil systems), seismic design considerations, and damage states. Electric substations are classied according to their voltage rating (low voltage <150 kV, medium voltage 150350 kV, and high voltage >350 kV). Power plants are classied according to the generation capacity in MW under normal operations (small power plants 200 MW and medium/large power plants >200 MW). We have chosen the fragility curves assuming that the structures design is in accordance with the seismic provisions, and we have also assumed that failure in our analysis corresponds to an extensive damage state; i.e. the range of damage that is characterized by loss of basic functions and exceeds the short-term recovery time. Conversely, the link elements (which in our case are the gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines whose vulnerabilities in the electricity network were not considered) are already spatially distributed structures. According to empirical studies in [27] the damage of such structures is better correlated with peak ground velocity (PGV) due to seismic wave propagation, and permanent ground displacement (PGD) due to ground failure. Unfortunately, seismic hazard maps for PGD and PGV values are not available at the European level, so we used a conversion from PGA to PGV suggested by Wald et al. [28]. In this way, we could consider damage due to seismic wave propagation, whereas we had to factor out damage caused by ground failure. Fragility curves for pipelines are based on the empirical functions of repair rates (repairs/km) and the assumption that ruptures follow a Poisson process [26]. We adopted the repair rate function from [29] for a buried and brittle pipeline (although most gas pipelines are typically made of ductile steel, we classify all the pipelines as brittle because the database has no information on the type of joining between the pipe segments). We dened the failure (i.e. a damage state corresponding to a non-functional situation) of the pipeline segment with the occurrence of at least one rupture (breaks or leaks). A similar approach was adopted in [15]. The HAZUS data sets are, in most cases, more adapted to the design criteria and hazard exposure in the U.S.A. Therefore, it is evident that we are bound to encounter difculties when applying the same data sets to Europe. In particular, the major concerns are the unavailability of seismic hazard maps for different hazard levels and the seismic fragility curves applicable to European facilities and design standards. Nevertheless, the feasibility of performing the analysis at the European level might, at least, motivate the compilation and collation of the missing data sets that are geographically specic to Europe.

5. PROBABILISTIC RELIABILITY MODEL The probabilistic reliability model we propose can deal with spatially distributed entities that are identied by topological, geographical, and sometimes even geometrical features. Here, these entities are, on the one hand, infrastructure networks and, on the other, the natural disaster. The reliability of spatially distributed systems is jeopardized into two ways: one concerns how a localized failure in the network propagates spatially through the network, and another is the fact that an earthquake (being a spatially distributed phenomenon) affects the network over a wide area; all of which is therefore likely to cause the simultaneous failures of many elements. Our main interest is how the seismic damage of each of the vulnerable networks elements affects the overall
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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Figure 1. Propagation of probabilities of elements failure through the analysis.

network performance. In order to apply the probabilistic reliability model as a risk analysis tool, the Monte Carlo simulations serve to examine how failure probabilities of the singular elements are propagated through the network analysis (Figure 1), and to assess the probabilities of different outcomes (network damage states) for the whole infrastructure network. Every element of a network is exposed to differing seismic demands (depending on its geographical location on the seismic hazard map) and differing seismic responses (depending on its dynamical characteristics as represented by its fragility curves). Once we have determined which elements have failed, we can generate a damaged network. It is presumed that only the topological deterioration of the overall connectivity, due to the failure of any of the element(s), compromises the functionality of the entire network. But, were it possible to construct a ow model, one could expand the analysis to detect also the failures due to dynamic processes in the ow regime. Thus, in our study, the extent to which the damaged network is capable of operating functionally is, in principle, assessed solely by the network connectivity analysis. We can say that our probabilistic reliability model consists of a seismic-performance network analysis of damaged networks generated using Monte Carlo simulations. The basic steps of the models algorithm are: (1) Choose the seismic hazard level. (2) Identify the location of all the vertices of the network and assign the PGA value to this location from the seismic hazard map. (3) Find the probability of exceeding the limit damage state for all the vulnerable elements of the network from the relevant fragility curves. (4) Execute the random number generator with the uniform probability distribution between 0 and 1 for all the elements. An element is damaged when the random number drawn is smaller than the probability attained in step 2. (5) Dene the damaged network: the elimination of each considered element is dependent merely on its location (PGA), dynamical characteristics that reect the seismic response (fragility curves) and a random number. (6) Perform the network analysis to obtain the connectivity characteristics of the damaged network. (7) Determine the performance measures (connectivity loss, power loss, and impact on the population). Steps 47 perform one trial in the Monte Carlo simulation; repeating these steps we are executing more trials. One series of trials gives us one set of performance measures that corresponds to one hazard level. Each set of performance measures is then presented as the complementary cumulative distribution function, where the probability of exceeding a given value of the performance measure is calculated as the ratio of the number of trials where the performance measure exceeds this value according to the number of all the trials.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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In order to construct the network fragility curves, one series of trials must be performed at several PGA factors (reecting different hazard levels). Only then does the response data satisfactorily capture the phenomenon behaviour. After all the series of trials are completed, we introduce the notion of network damage states (Section 3.1). The probabilities of exceedance of a certain damage state at each hazard level (characterized by the maximum PGA in the network) become the input for the calculation of network fragility curves, i.e. tting the probabilities to a cumulative lognormal distribution function. So, one network fragility curve describes one network damage state, whereas the Monte Carlo simulations executed at one hazard level contributes only one point (probability) to the fragility curve of each damage state. 5.1. Results of independent networks In order to compare the independent network fragility curves for the gas and electricity networks, they are presented in terms of connectivity loss. We consider nine hazard levels, applying the method with the PGA factors (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 for the gas and electricity networks, respectively), and extract three levels of damage state. In the case of the gas network, 10 000 Monte Carlo simulations were executed, whereas in the case of the electricity network we performed 1000 simulations in one series of trials. The analysis of the electricity network is computationally much more demanding because the electricity network has not only ve times more vertices, but also more than 30 times more source vertices. Figures 2(a) and 3(a) show the complementary cumulative distribution functions for different hazard levels. The results follow the trend that the probability of exceedance of a certain value of connectivity loss increases with the hazard level. These results are the basis for the network fragility curves of different damage states shown in Figures 2(b) and 3(b). We observe that the more extensive a damage state, the lower is the probability of its occurrence at any given PGA. This is more evident with the shift of the network fragility curves of the more extensive damage state to the right. Next, we observe the steep part of the curves, where signicant changes in probabilities occur at small variations of hazard levels; however, the more extensive the damage state, the gentler is the slope. Furthermore, these results show that the gas network is more vulnerable to earthquake hazard than the electricity network. Notice that at the hazard level of 475-year return period the performances of the networks differ considerably. In the gas network the minor (20% CL) and moderate (50% CL) damage states would certainly be achieved, and the extensive (80% CL) damage state would occur with 44.4% probability of exceedance. Conversely, in the electricity network the minor damage state would occur with only 6.2% probability of exceedance, and the moderate and extensive damage states would not even arise.

Figure 2. Results of Monte Carlo simulations in the case of European gas network: (a) presented for different hazard levels as complementary cumulative distribution functions and (b) summarized in network fragility curves for different damage states.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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Figure 3. Results of Monte Carlo simulations in the case of European electricity network: (a) presented for different hazard levels as complementary cumulative distribution functions and (b) summarized in network fragility curves for different damage states.

We impute the reason for this difference in vulnerability to the different geographical distribution of the source vertices in each of the networks, and to the high vulnerability of the long pipelines. Probabilities of failure of the vertices are always a reection of the seismic hazard map (Figure 4). This is because the fragility curves of the vertices are mostly dependent on the PGA of the vertex location. This is not the case for links (pipes), where the fragility is not only dependent on the PGA of the end vertices, but also on the length of the link itself. Therefore, in the gas network, the pipelines (Figure 4(b)) that have the highest probabilities of failure do appear not only in the areas with the high PGA values, but also in the source countries (Algeria, Turkey, and North Sea in Norway). This is because the majority of gas pipelines in the source countries are very long, since they must transport the gas directly from the gas elds to the areas of the high gas consumption. It is precisely the disconnection of the gas elds that causes the fast rise in the connectivity loss because the gas elds represent 87% of all source vertices, whereas the sources in the gas network represent only 5% of all the vertices. As such, gas elds play an important role in the network performance. On the other hand, in the electricity network (Figure 4(c)) this long-range peculiarity is not present, so, rst, only the vulnerability of vertices has been analysed and, second, we can assume that the sources and the sinks are evenly distributed across Europe. Consequently, the sinks mapped with high PGA regions will suffer heavier connectivity loss than those sinks within the low PGA regions, but the range of loss is levelled out at the network level as a result of the averaging process contained in Equation (1).

6. THE MODELLING OF NETWORK INTERDEPENDECY In order to introduce interdependency between the networks (also known in the literature as coupling behaviour), we will have to return to the element level of our model. In our case, the electricity network is dependent on the gas network but only through gas-red power plants. Strictly speaking, gas-red power plants are exposed to earthquake damage as well as to disturbances of their gas supply. This additional vulnerability is applied directly on a gas-red power plant when it is considered as the vertex of the electricity network. Rinaldi et al. [31] presented a universal multidimensional concept of the coupling behaviour, which although a very generic description, could, on the other hand, be useful for the identication of all possible interaction mechanisms. Among these, we nd it possible to explore three aspects that manage to capture the essential mechanism of coupled networks. These are: physical interdependence, direction of the interaction, and strength of coupling, which we build into our probabilistic reliability model using the interoperability matrix, similar to [15], as follows.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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Figure 4. (a) Seismic hazard map of Europe [21] for the 475-year return period, then relating probabilities of failure of the elements considered in (b) the European gas network and (c) the European electricity network (visualized by PAJEK [30]).

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6.1. Theoretical concept of the interdependency Generally, we try to capture bidirectional relationships, but for each direction of the coupling behaviour we dene one interoperability matrix. The size of the interoperability matrix is always Nindependent Ndependent , where Nindependent refers to the size of the independent network and Ndependent is the size of dependent network. Two possible interoperability matrices arise by switching the roles between dependent and independent networks. For example, I E/G is an N G N E interoperability matrix which captures the inuence of the gas network on the electricity network, and IG/E is an N E N G interoperability matrix which captures the inuence of the electricity network on the gas network (N G the size of the gas network, N E the size of the electricity network). The interoperability matrix is a weighted version of inter-connectivity matrix. Inter-adjacent vertices are specied with the type of dependencyin our case physical dependence where the state of each infrastructure depends upon the material output of the other, but, of course, dened at the element level. Since all vertices in one network usually do not couple to all vertices in the other, the inter-connectivity matrix is very sparse. For the electricity network, we may consider that only gas-red power plants are dependent on the gas supply from the gas network. If the vertex i from the gas network and the vertex j from the electricity network are adjacent, the (i, j) element in the corresponding inter-connectivity matrix A E/G receives the value 1 and represents the directed link between two networks. Conversely, A G/E is full of zeros because the supply of electrical energy to run the compressor stations is not taken into account (many compressor stations run on gas). So, the direction of interaction is only one way and, therefore, the gas network is independent, whereas the electricity network is partially dependent on the gas network. Finally, to complete the interoperability matrix, the weights are introduced to describe the strengths of coupling, referring them directly to the interconnections. The strength of coupling dep is dened as the conditional probability of failure of the jth electricity vertex E j at the given failure G i of the ith adjacent gas vertex: P(E j |G i ) = p E j|Gi
dep dep

for all i adjacent to j,

dep

(4)

which can be tuned from complete independence P(E j |G i ) = 0, to complete dependence P(E j |G i ) = 1; simulating loose and tight coupling, respectively, on a plant-by-plant basis. Thus, tightly coupled interactions are those that do not tolerate delay; for example, disturbances in the gas supply would have an almost immediate effect on electrical power generation. On the other hand, loose coupling implies the presence of slack in the system because the propagation of the disturbances from one network to another is very slow. For example, a gas-red power plant could have local gas storage or could switch to alternative fuel. Such situations could also imply different levels of loose coupling of the gas-red power plants to the gas network. 6.2. Implementation of the probabilistic reliability model To consider interdependency behaviour with the probabilistic reliability model, we need the updated probabilities of failure of electricity vertices. In general, the failure of the jth vertex of the

Figure 5. Venn diagram of failure of the electricity vertex: (a) due to earthquake and (b) due to the failure of the adjacent gas vertex.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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electricity network, denoted E j , can occur due to an earthquake or due to the failure of the gas dep supply, denoted E earth and E j , respectively. Therefore, the event E j (Figure 5(a)) can be dened j as the union of the events E earth and E j : E j = E earth E j . Because E earth E j = 0, these j j j two events are not mutually exclusive and the probability of the electricity vertex failure can be formulated as: P(E j ) = P(E earth E j ) = P(E earth )+ P(E j ) P(E earth E j ). j j j Since we know that E earth and E j j and E j
dep dep dep dep dep dep dep dep dep

(5)

are statistically independent, the joint probability of E earth j

dep

equals P(E earth E j ) = P(E earth )P(E j ), therefore we get: j j P(E j ) = P(E earth E j ) = P(E earth )+ P(E j ) P(E earth )P(E j ). j j j
dep dep dep

(6)

Our next task is to calculate all the probabilities in Equation (6). First, P(E earth ) is determined j from the fragility curves of the elements seismic vulnerability. Conversely, obtaining P(E j ) is not so straightforward. We know that event E j
dep dep

will occur only after the occurrence of the

dep

failure of the adjacent gas vertex (denoted as event G i ). So, events E j and G i are statistically dependent (Figure 5(b)). The relationship among the probabilities of their occurrences is dened by dep the conditional probability that expresses the probability of event E j given the occurrence of G i : P(E j |G i ) =
dep

P(E j G i ) P(G i )

dep

(7)

It is convenient for our analysis that we deal with the extreme case of the dependent events dep where one set (events G i ) contains the other (events E j ) as presented in Figure 5(b). Since the intersection of G i and E j
dep dep

is explicitly dened as E j G i = E j , the joint probability is

dep

dep

dep

expressed as P(E j G i ) = P(E j ). Now, we can simplify Equation (7) as: P(E j ) = P(E j |G i )P(G i ).
dep dep dep dep

(8)

Eventually, for the statistical realization of the P(E j ), we need to know P(E j |G i ) and P(G i ). P(E j |G i ) is actually the strength of coupling p E j|Gi dened in the interoperability matrix, whereas the calculation of probability P(G i ) is entirely related to the vulnerability of the independent network (Section 6.3). 6.3. Gas-source supply stream fragility curves
earth The failure event of a gas vertex distributing gas G i , can be induced by an earthquake G i connect . So, event G is dened as the union of G = or by the disconnection from the sources G i i i earth connect . Since both events are not mutually exclusive (G earth G connect = 0), they can Gi Gi i i happen simultaneously, so the joint probability theoretically equals: earth connect earth connect earth connect P(G i ) = P(G i G i ) = P(G i )+ P(G i ) P(G i G i ). dep

(9)

earth P(G i ) are determined from the elements seismic fragility curves, whereas the disconnection of connect ) is impossible to compute analytically. The reason for this gas vertices from the sources P(G i connect ) reects the seismic response of the whole gas network (Figure 6), which is is because P(G i associated with the probabilities of failure of other components in the gas network. However, the earth connect ) can be measured with the connectivity loss calculated as part of probability P(G i G i the seismic-performance network analysis of the gas network using the Monte Carlo simulation.

Copyright

2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM

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Figure 6. Schema of gas-source supply stream of the gas-red power plant.

Figure 7. The gas-source supply stream fragility curves for all gas-red power plants (left) and the European electricity network showing the probability of failure of gas vertices adjacent to gas-red power plants at hazard level of 475-year return period (right).
earth is considered as a 100% connectivity loss of the gas In that case we assume that event G i vertex i. The probability of failure P(G i ) due to both causes is then determined as

CL = 1
i

i NgasPP,dam i NgasPP,orig

(10)

i i where NgasPP,orig and NgasPP,dam are the number of sources connected to the ith gas vertex adjacent to gas-red power plant in the original and in the damaged network, respectively. For each gas vertex adjacent to a gas-red power plant the fragility curve is constructed in terms of connectivity loss and local PGA (Figure 7). These fragility curves describe the seismic vulnerability of the whole gas-source supply stream, while also taking into account the whole topology of the gas network. The gas-source supply stream failure is dened by the exceedance of the damage state dened by 80% of connectivity loss of the gas vertex i adjacent to a gas-red power plant.

6.4. Results of dependent networks With the Monte Carlo simulation of element failures, we construct the dependent network fragility curves for the dependent network which, in our case study, is the electricity network. Here, the failure probability of the electricity vertices P(E j ), as required in the probabilistic reliability model
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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K. POLJANSEK, F. BONO AND E. GUTIRREZ

Figure 8. Network fragility curves of the European electricity network in terms of connectivity loss (left), power loss (middle) and impact factor on the population (right).

(Section 5), is determined with P(E earth ), P(E j |G i ) and P(G i ). In contrast to the analysis of j the independent electricity network (Section 5.1), we present now three performance measures: connectivity loss, power loss, and impact factor on the population. Likewise, we extract network fragility curves for three damage states, and we consider three different values of strength of dep dep coupling to model the total independence (P(E j |G i ) = 0), the partial dependence (P(E j |G i ) = 0.5), and the complete dependence (P(E j |G i ) = 1). In order to construct the damaged network, the same strength of coupling is used for all gas-red power plants. Finally, the network fragility curves for the dependent network are presented in Figure 8. We note from Figure 8 the small difference between the different performance measures. We should stress that all presented metrics are correlated, because they are based on the same topological concepts, but they represent damage in alternative ways. In fact, the power loss and impact on the population are only the weighted versions of the connectivity loss. As regards the weights, almost 80% of power plants have nominal power rating less than 100 MW (max. 5706 MW), and almost 60% of distribution substations cover less than 100 000 people (max. 3.35 million). Since frequency distributions of the chosen weights are extremely skewed, we can only observe minor changes in the nal value of the performance measures. Next, we found that the dependence of the electricity network on the gas network introduces an extra vulnerability to the electricity network response under seismic hazard. This dependency effect shifts the fragility curves slightly to the left; meaning that the higher strength of coupling induces the chosen damage state with the same probability at the smaller PGA. For example, there is 50% probability of exceeding the 20% (respectively 50, 80%) of connectivity loss occurring at 0.11 g (respectively 0.09, 0.08 g) less PGA when increasing the strength of coupling for full range (01). But the dependency effect does not interfere with the general behaviour of the network response; i.e. the shapes of the network fragility curves are similar. So, the network fragility curves are very steep for minor damage states, whereas the slopes of the fragility curves decrease when observing more extensive damage states. Such behaviour was seen already in the case of the independent
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe
dep

dep

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75

electricity network. Consequently, the narrower curves and the gentler slopes indicate a smaller dependency effect as the damage state increases. The inuence of coupling behaviour captured in the network fragility curves can be explained vis--vis some topological characteristics of the dependent electricity network: (1) Physical interdependency. We assumed one-to-one connection between two networks. For each gas-red power plant in the electricity network there is one adjacent vertex in the gas network. The spread of damage from one network to the other is certainly dependent on the number of connections among the networks. Thus, in the electricity network, only gas-red power plants directly suffer the disturbances in gas supply. Such physical interdependency dictates slow damage propagation from one network to the other. This is observed by the slight shift of the fragility curves, which is controlled by the strength of coupling. (2) Gas-red power plants are a minor fraction of source vertices. Gas-red power plants in the European electricity network represent only 18.6% of all the source vertices. So, even at high hazard levels, the damage due to the dependency effect cannot exceed 18.6% of connectivity loss. Besides, sources in the European electricity network represent more than half of all the vertices (51.2%). Based on the denition of the connectivity loss, we can say that the higher the fraction of sources in the network, the smaller is the effect of failure of one source on the connectivity loss. (3) Gas-red power plants are one-degree vertices. One-degree vertices do not lie on any path between sinks and sources. If we eliminate a one-degree vertex we will not disconnect any sink from its sources except in the case when that vertex is the source or sink itself. Elimination of the gas-red power plants raises the connectivity loss due to its role as the source, but it does not change the topology and, consequently, neither does the response of the transmission part of the electricity network. 6.4.1. Betweenness centrality attack versus seismic hazard and strength of coupling. In this chapter we will explore the relation between two topological measures: betweenness centrality [20] and connectivity loss measures. The failure of gas-red power plants results in an increase in connectivity loss, which is an indication of the dependency effect of interconnected networks. However, there are other vertices whose failure has a higher inuence on the connectivity loss. These are vertices that are on the path of many connections between sinks and sources which can be identied by the betweenness centrality measure. The higher the betweenness centrality measure of a vertex, the more often the vertex lies on the shortest paths between all pairs of vertices, whereas betweenness centrality considers all the shortest paths, connectivity loss checks only the shortest paths between sources and sinks; we conjecture that the elimination of the vertices with higher betweenness centrality would accelerate the connectivity loss. Knowing that one-degree vertices (such as gas-red power plants) have betweenness centrality zero whereas all other vertices in the transmission part of the electricity network have betweenness centrality greater than zero, then one will understand why the direct earthquake failures of the high beetweenness centrality vertices mask the implicit increase of the connectivity loss due to the dependency effect. In order to support the above idea, we compare the response of the electricity network under seismic hazard and interdependency effect to that under betweenness centrality attack. This attack strategy is dened as successive removal of the vertex with the highest betweenness centrality ranking, and where betweenness centrality is recalculated for each new damaged network iteration. These results are presented in Figure 9 with the connectivity loss on the ordinate and the fraction of the removed vertices on the abscissa. But note, we consider seismic hazard level and strength of coupling as the parameters of the third and the fourth parametric dimensions. In all the situations presented in Figure 9, the connectivity loss increases with the fraction of removed vertices. So far, the fastest increase appears in the case of the betweenness centrality attack because it is topologically biased toward the most important vertices for the connectivity of the network. This is not the case in the seismic hazard because the elimination of the vertices has
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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K. POLJANSEK, F. BONO AND E. GUTIRREZ

Figure 9. The European electricity network: comparison of connectivity loss between the betweenness centrality attack and seismic hazard (average values of all the simulations in one series) with different strength of coupling (left) and vertex betweenness centrality (right).

no relation with the connectivity of the network, but it is conditioned by the geographical position of the vertices on the seismic hazard map. Next, we can follow trends of connectivity loss along increasing hazard level or along the increasing strength of coupling. Notice that the connectivity loss increases faster with increasing hazard levels than with higher strength of coupling. Moreover, at the lower hazard levels the increasing strength of coupling causes a higher increase in the connectivity loss than at the higher hazard level. Both of the above are the main arguments of what was stated earlier, namely that earthquake failures mask the increase in the connectivity loss due to the dependency effect. Besides, we can also conrm that the average number of the removed vertices increases not only with the hazard levels, but also with the strength of coupling. 6.4.2. Geographical spread of damage. Until now, we have observed the performance of the network as one macroscopic structure. We notice that the averaging procedure incorporated into the denitions of the performance measures lters out extreme damage concentrated on a certain geographical location. Yet, using GIS we can relate the results with the Thiessen polygons (areas covered by each of the distribution substations) which become the nal object of the analysis and visualization. We calculated the power loss for each of the distribution substations of the electricity network and we assigned its value to the corresponding Thiessen polygon. We have calculated results for different hazard levels and different strengths of coupling but have presented them as the average value of all the simulations executed in one series. Furthermore, we multiply the population in each Thiessen polygon by the distribution substations power loss, and so obtain the absolute value of the population affected for each of the Thiessen polygons. Finally, the spatial distribution of both performance measures, power loss of the distribution substations, and the affected population (Figure 10) shows the geographical spread of damage at a European-wide level. Here, in contrast to the overall damage assessment, different performance measures reveal the vulnerability levels of different parts of the network. The areas of highest power loss are in southeast Europe (as expected according to the seismic hazard map), and within those areas the highest impact on the population is located in the urban zones. We also notice that extreme values for the affected population do not coincide with the highest values of power loss. It appears, for example, in the Netherlands, where a locally not so branched electricity transmission network, generates large Thiessen polygons of high population density; it is for this reason that a large population is assigned to only a few distribution substations. To summarize, the results for the affected population are a combination
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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Figure 10. Comparison of the inuence of the strength of coupling and PGA factor on the power loss and the affected population for all distribution substations of the European electricity network.

of the population density, the size of the Thiessen polygons and all the factors that inuence the power loss of a given distribution substation. 7. CONCLUSIONS A GIS-based probabilistic reliability model was developed in order to generate network fragility curves of spatially distributed interconnected network systems subjected to natural hazards. The method was successfully applied to encompass the geographic distributions of both the infrastructure and the natural hazard; specically, we analyzed the interconnected European gas and electricity transmission networks in such a manner that the gas-red power plants form the physical connections between the two types of networks. The network interdependency model combines gas-source supply stream fragility curves and strength of coupling in order to follow (in a topological sense) the propagation of failures resulting from seismic vulnerability of the gas network and how they affect the topology of the electricity network. We have analysed these failures in terms of performance measures of network response; i.e. connectivity loss, power loss, and impact factor on the affected population, which are based on
Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe

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K. POLJANSEK, F. BONO AND E. GUTIRREZ

topological metrics. These metrics have been used for macroscopic damage evaluation (condensed in the form of network fragility curves), and also for the local examination of the damage status of each and every electricity distribution substation in the electricity network. The network fragility curves for independent networks highlight the higher seismic vulnerability of the gas network compared to that of electricity. The reason is because gas elds are connected to the main gas network along long (hence vulnerable) pipelines. The dependence of the electricity network on the gas network introduces an additional seismic vulnerability of the electricity network over and above the explicit seismic vulnerability of its structural components. This dependency effect causes a slight shift in the network fragility curves toward the smaller hazard levels without changing their shape. The high slopes of the network fragility curves are an intrinsic network characteristic, be it independent or otherwise. These slopes decrease with increasing network damage states and, consequently, we can observe a decrease in the dependency effect. Thus, dependent network fragility curves capture many topological characteristics of the electricity network: that the propagation of damage is slow due to one-to-one connection between gas-red power plants and their adjacent gas distribution vertices; that because gas-red power plants cover circa 20% of power generation capacity for Europe as a whole, their failure cannot cause a power loss major than this (even at the extreme cases of hazard levels); and nally, that the elimination of the gas-red power plants cannot reduce the connectivity of the transmission part of the electricity network because these power plants correspond to one-degree vertices. For the same reason, seismic-induced failures of the other elements of electricity networks mask the damage that results from the dependency effect; moreover, the masking effect becomes even more pronounced with increasing hazard levels. Furthermore, a geographical distribution of the damage at the European level shows, as expected from the seismic hazard map, that the highest direct damage is located in southeast Europe. Nevertheless, it also reveals that the impact factor on the population is highest in the Netherlands that is possibly due to the local (chain-like) topology of the electricity transmission network combined with a high population density. However, we cannot conclude from our analysis that the apparent low vulnerability dependence of electricity on gas-red generation is so clear cut. For example, the recent geopolitical crises between Russia and Ukraine highlighted another coupling mechanism between the gas and the electricity systems. So, if the gas supply is cut off, some direct users (heating devices at home or industry) of natural gas can switch their energy source. As a consequence, the switch to electricity would cause an extra load in the electricity system. Such extra vulnerabilities, although outside the scope of our structurally biased hazard analysis can, in principle, be equally well studied using the same probabilistic and GIS techniques described above. Modeling the vulnerability of widely dispersed critical infrastructure networks has become a necessary but difcult task due to the geographic extent, large number of connected components and interdependencies between networks. Our approach provides a probabilistic estimate of the performance of infrastructures exposed to catastrophic events, and can be used to identify the most vulnerable parts of the network. Such network models can not only be used for design and planning of infrastructures, but also for better allocation of funds to mitigate their vulnerability to natural hazards. It is worth mentioning that only growing awareness and knowledge of the existing vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems will eventually increase the investments needed to increase resilience.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The results presented in this paper are based on the work supported by MANMADE Project contract no. 043363 of the 6th EU Framework Programme (FP6) dealing with diagnosing vulnerability, emergent phenomena, and volatility in man-made networks.
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2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Earthquake Engng Struct. Dyn. 2012; 41:6179 DOI: 10.1002/eqe