FAILURE OF INLET LINE TO HOT SEPARATOR GAS COOLER IN GAS OIL

HYDRO-DESULPHURISATION UNIT

M. Vinayakumar,
DGM ( Engineering )
Mangalore Refinery and
Petrochemicals Limited

Background

A Gas Oil Desulphurisation Unit at MRPL experienced failure of an inlet pipeline
to hot separator gas cooler. This paper deals with the incident, probable causes
of failure and recommendations for corrective and preventive action.

Details of the Unit

The Gas Oil Hydro- desulphurisation Unit has a design throughput capacity of
30,000 BPSD, and treats sour gas oil. The unit was commissioned in September
1999. The original design feed stock comprises a mix of straight run HGO (2 wt%
S); 370C (-) cut VGO (2.2 wt% S) and Visbreaker Naphtha (1 wt% S). As per
original design conditions, de-sulphurised Gas Oil should have a sulphur
specification of 0.05 wt% maximum, and a flash point of minimum 38 C.

This unit receives the feed oils and the H
2
gas from the phase 1 and 2 refinery
complex along with utilities. Products and other process streams are returned to
the refinery. Lean Amine and other chemicals are received from the refinery.
Rich Amine is returned to the refinery Amine Treatment Unit for regeneration.
Sour gas is sent to the refinery sour fuel gas header for treatment. Sour water is
sent to the refinery Sour Water Stripping Unit. The plant flare piping is connected
to the refinery flare network. Treated GasOil is used as HSD blend stock. Wash
water injection is done upstream of hot gas separator cooler for removal of
deposits and is removed from the system at the stripper receiver.

The unit underwent a catalyst change during a shut down in April 2006. The new
catalyst is intended to reduce the sulphur content of de-sulphurised gas oil to
50ppm, to bring the diesel product in line with improved fuel specifications.

A flow chart of the relevant section of the unit is attached as Annexure A. Failure
occurred at the inlet to Hot Separator Gas Cooler EC45501

Incident

Gas Oil Hydro Desulphurisation Unit ( GOHDS) was in normal operating
condition on July 9, 2006 operating at 125 CuM/Hr. The operating staff heard a
loud noise at around 5:45 PM and witnessed a spray of hydrocarbon and gases
from the air cooler platform area. Simultaneously, control room personnel noticed
the drop in pressure and initiated emergency shut down proceedings. Unit
personnel also operated sprinkler system available in the air cooler area to
contain the leak. Their immediate actions of shutting down the unit and fighting
the emergency ensured that the situation was brought under control swiftly.

There was no fire or any injury to any person. Subsequently it was noticed that
the inlet line to the air cooler was found to have a rupture on the vertical portion,
below a water injection point. No other damage was observed.





General Information of the inlet line.

The design conditions of the line are given below:

Line size at the point of rupture - 6
Design Pressure - 64 Kg/sqcmg
Design Temperature - 160
0
C
Operating pressure - 53 Kg/sqcmg
Operating temperature - 136
0
C
Material of construction (of line ) - A106GrB to NACE
MR0175
Provided thickness - Sch 80 (10.97 mm +-
12.5%)
Water injection rate - ~7 CuM/ Hour

Observations :

1. A thin lip type of opening was noticed at a location below the water
injection point on the South side inlet. The opening approximately oval in
shape with dimensions of about 150 * 65 mm.














2. Thinning of pipe was observed at the region of failure. This thinning is
localised, with severe thinning limited to only the region of failure.
3. The elbow below the failed location ( at a distance of about 800 mm from
the center line of wash water injection ) had shown some amount of
thinning, along the line of water injection ( and not on the outer radius of
the elbow )
4. Thinning was also noticed on the vertical spool below water injection on
the North side inlet.
5. As per P&ID, the water injection nozzle projected into the middle of the
process piping. A variance to this was noticed at site on both North and
South inlet
Location of
failure
Sout
Air Cooler EC45501
Water injection
Water injection
North
6. The condition of both the tees were satisfactory, both visually and on
thickness measurements.
7. No deposits were observed in both the line. Material scraped off from the
internal surface of the North side and south side pipes showed sulphide
salts of ammonia and iron. No chloride salts were detected.




INSTALLATION OF WATER INJECTION PIPE




At the failure location (South inlet) On North side inlet

(Viewed from below after cutting the pipe)


Operational History

As per operational history, the unit was operating steadily at around 200 CM / Hr
till 1700 Hrs. Afterwards, the feed was brought down to 125 CuM / Hr due to
process disturbance in Crude Distillation Unit 2. Minor fluctuations in pressure
and temperature were noticed during this reduction in load .

A continuous water wash of about 7 CuM /Hr had been maintained at the inlet of
EC45501. The unit uses a mixture of fresh DM water and LP condensate as
wash water.

Process Analysis of the area

Prior to Catalyst Change After Catalyst Change
Design Operating
conditions
(six months
average)
Design Operating
conditions (2
months
average)
Feed rate,
Cu M / Hr
198.7 ~213.4 200 ~200
Feed
Composition,
Volume %
HS HGO-
78%
HS VDO
17%
VBU
Naphtha
4%
HSHGO+VD
O 60.55%
BH GO
26.89 %
HS LGO
12.56%
HS HGO- 50%
HS VDO
25%
HS LGO
25%
HSHGO+VDO
78%
HS LGO 6%
BH GO - 16%

Feed
Sulphur, %
1.97 1.04 1.74 1.22
Feed
Nitrogen
content, ppm
Left blank in
Basic Engg
package
< 148.86
ppm
369 ~ 141.9 ppm
composite
Product
Sulphur,
ppm
500 < 500 40 ~ 50
Pressure,
Kg/ Sqcmg
53 51.5 53 51.5
Temperature
- Air Cooler
inlet ,
0
C
136 Not
historised
136 141.9*
Temperature
- Air Cooler
outlet,
0
C
55 51.4 55 50.81
Wash water
quantity,
CuM
7 7.43 No specific
recommendati
ons from
catalyst
vendor or
licensor
7
Wash Water
as % of feed
3.5 3.45 --------------- 3.5
Wash water
source
DM water + LP condensate stored in an open tank
Wash water
required for
operating
conditions (
Calculated
now,)**
1.99 CuM/Hr

0.93 v%
4.62 CuM/hr

2.31 v%
1.78 CuM/Hr

0.89 v%

* (average of 5 days prior to the failure , Previous history not recorded )
** Maximum permitted NH
4
HS concentration in sour water = 5 wt% assumed.

Inspection history of the line

The line has been periodically thickness surveyed by inspection department. The
last thickness survey was done in four months prior to the failure

The points selected by Inspection on the straight spool are

Adjacent to the pipe to tee weld
Adjacent to the pipe to elbow weld
Elbow












Weld
Thickness survey
points
690 mm
between welds
Water injection nozzle
Failure

The thickness on the pipe at the surveyed locations were satisfactory (minimum
of 9.95 mm), with in the manufacturing tolerance of the pipe ( 10.97 +- 12.5% ).
The elbow on the failed side had a minimum thickness reading of 9.73 mm,
which again was with in manufacturing tolerance.

Subsequent to the failure, the thickness of failed spool piece (about 690 mm
long) was mapped extensively and the readings are indicating localised thinning.
The regions regularly surveyed continued to show healthy readings even after
failure.

Cause of failure

The immediate cause of the failure is the localised corrosion of the South side
inlet line. The line in the failed area has thinned sufficiently to cause a failure.
From the analysis of data, it appears that there have been no operational
abnormalities or major deviations in operating parameters, which could have
caused a failure.

Known causes of corrosion in reactor effluent circuits

As the effluent from the reactor cools down, Ammonia (NH
3
) combines with
Hydrogen Sulphide (H
2
S) to form Ammonium Bi-sulphide (NH
4
HS). In the
absence of liquid water, NH
4
HS condenses directly from the vapour phase to
form a crystalline solid, which can cause rapid plugging of the air cooler. Since
Ammonium Bi-sulphide is soluble in water, the precipitated solids can be washed
away by injecting water ahead of the air cooler. However, aqueous NH
4
HS is
highly corrosive, and if left uncontrolled can cause corrosion. Several factors
influence the corrosion rate.

a. Adequate quantity of wash water is to be used. The quantity of water
injected depends upon the quantity of Ammonium Bisulphide likely to
be formed in the effluent. This in turn depends on the de-nitrification
and de-sulphurisation levels in the reaction process.
b. Presence of oxygen in the wash water aggravates corrosion. By
design, the unit uses DM water + LP steam condensate stored in a
vessel open to atmosphere. A sample of water drawn from the vessel
showed Oxygen level of 5 ppm. However, opinions on the permitted
levels of Oxygen vary from 50 ppm to 0.05 ppm
1,2
. Several refiners
operate at an Oxygen level of 20 ppb to 50 ppb
3
, though API
recommended practice
4
states a desired level of 15 ppm of Oxygen in
wash water.
c. Location of water injection point is to be selected in such a way that
most of the water should vapourise immediately on injection. If
chlorides are likely to be present in the effluent stream, about 20% of
the water injection should remain as liquid to take care of dew point
corrosion from hydrochloric acid.
d. Symmetry of inlet and outlet piping ensures that the wash water is
evenly distributed. Such a symmetrical piping is present in GOHDS.
e. In addition to the above, the water injection quills have to be properly
selected and designed. As per P&ID as well as fabrication drawings,
the water injection point quill was to be at the center of the pipe aligned
along the direction of flow at the centre of the pipe

Analysis of failure


a. It has been calculated ( as per
1
) and concluded that adequate
quantity of water (7 CuM / Hr) has been injected before and after
catalyst change for the actual quality of GOHDS feed. As per
calculations, about 60% the injected water is remaining in liquid phase.
b. It was observed that , the injection quill had been incorrectly mounted.
The incorrect mounting of the injection point allows the water to flow
along the wall of the pipe. The effect of the incorrect mounting is likely
to equivalent to providing a simple stub in, with water impinging on the
wall of the pipe. As the water flows down along the wall of the pipe, it
can get concentrated with NH
4
HS from the process gas. The area that
has corroded the maximum must be the area that has seen the highest
concentration of aqueous NH
4
HS. The pattern of thinning of the pipe
is suggestive of this mechanism. (Theory postulates that above a
particular threshold concentration, a metal ammonium complex is
formed which breaks down the protective layers on steel surface
allowing bare metal to react with Ammonium bisulphide-
2
). Increase in
velocity breaks down the protective layers faster.
c. A 1998 API survey
4
of 24 refineries reported two areas for corrosion in
inlet piping immediately around the water injection point and in the
headers before REAC. In this study, API has mentioned that around
the injection point, water impingement has been a problem. When
excessive vapourisation occurs, the amount of liquid water remaining
could be too low and this results in concentrated aqueous salt
corrosion. A 1996 survey by UOP, presented at a NACE
5
seminar has
analysed failures of different failures of reactor effluent circuits at 45
US refineries and had come across only one failure of inlet piping,
where it was concluded that the failure occurred due to a local boil
dry condition, which presumably concentrated the salts. A similar
phenomenon could have occurred in the current case also.
d. The failure does not appear to be due to erosion, since the areas
immediately adjacent to the quill where the water impinges has not
corroded. Rather, the corrosion appears to be along the line of flow of
water, as is indicated in the thickness readings.
e. Oxygen in wash water may have aggravated the corrosion, though the
extent of contribution could not be established due to lack of
supporting data.
f. Wash water, adequate for the operating conditions, has been used
prior to and after catalyst change.

Recommendations for corrective and preventive actions

a. As an immediate measure, the wash water injection point has been
corrected as per P&ID requirements. However, at the point of injection,
about 60% of water is expected to be in liquid state. Hence it is
possible that the problem of corrosion could be transferred to the next
location where the water comes in contact with the pipe wall, in this
case the down stream elbow. The area is to be monitored till a pattern
is established.
b. In addition, the licensors opinion is to be sought on
1. possibility of thinning on the elbow, as described above
2. addition of any inhibitor which can protect the surface
downstream of the injection point .
3. changes in quill design , for better distribution of water (a slightly
different design has been provided elsewhere in the refinery )
4. whether continuous washing can be replaced with intermittent
washing, since the quantity of precipitated NH
4
HS appears to be
low.
c. Current practice on quantity of wash water injection and frequency of
injection (continuous) is to be maintained, awaiting process licensors
views.
d. Commence a periodic analysis of sour water from cold separator to
establish the concentration of ammonium salts. Troublesome
corrosion is not expected at concentrations less than 8 wt% in sour
water
5
.
e. Revise the operating procedure to include washing with vast excess of
water (say, 3 times the normal flow), once in 15 days, to remove any
formation of salt deposits downstream of injection area.
f. Recheck the requirement of wash water each time a major process
change (ex: product quality change, feed quality change) is effected.
g. Alternate source of wash water with nil oxygen should be being
considered. Either stripped sour water or BFW are likely sources.
h. Correctness of installation of all injection points and health of
connected piping in the refinery should be re-checked.
i. Correctness of installation of injection quills should be a pre-
commissioning check for all new units




References cited in the report:

1. Turner J, Corrosion Control in wash water systems, Hydrocarbon
Processing, June 1997
2. Kane R.D et al, Corrosivity in refinery sour water systems, Petroleum
Technology Quarterly, Summer 2001
3. Publication 932-A, A study of corrosion in hydroprocess reactor
effluent aircooler systems, American Petroleum Institute, September
2002.
4. Recommended Practice 932-B, Design, Materials, Fabrication,
Operation and Inspection of Guidelines for corrosion control in
hydroprocessing reactor effluent systems, American Petroleum
Institute, July 2004
5. Singh, A., Harvey, C. Corrosion of Reactor Effluent Air Coolers,
Corrosion 97, NACE International, Paper No: 490

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