Kimberley Hoff 5 Dec 2012 PAR 116 IRAC Brief #3 Case Name: Turner v. General Motors Corp.

Citation: 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). FACTS In April 1971, Robert Turner suffered a rollover accident in his 1969 Chevrolet Impala. The proximate cause of the accident was a failed attempt to pass a slow-moving truck, completely unrelated to any design element of the car. However, during the rollover, part of the cars roof collapsed and greatly contributed to Turners injuries from the accident, paralyzing his hands and legs. James Barron, a design engineer who had helped develop the 1969 Impala, testified that he had informed General Motors of the potential dangers of the roof design and advocated including a roll bar as a standard feature, despite the increased manufacturing cost. General Motors declined to take his advice, as industry custom at the time was to include a roll bar only as an optional feature. Turner sued General Motors for damages under strict liability. The trial court filed findings of fact that the roof design was responsible for the extent of Turners injuries but also a conclusion of law holding that the manufacturer was not liable because the design defect was not the but for proximate cause of the accident but merely an aggravating factor. General Motors plea of privilege was sustained. ISSUE Is a manufacturer strictly liable for a defective product when the defect was not the proximate cause of injury but contributed to the severity of the damage? RULE A manufacturer may be liable, even under strict liability, for a defective product that contributes to the severity of damage from an accident that occurs in the course of intended use of the product. ANALYSIS The trial courts findings of fact established that the circumstances of the accident were known, as was the contribution of the defective roof design to Turners injuries. The case hinged on whether or not the plaintiff had a legitimate claim against General Motors for failing to design a crashworthy car, defined as a car that could withstand normal hazard conditions. Precedent on this question was split between the holdings of Evans v. General Motors Corporation1 (that the intended purpose of a car does not include participation in collisions and that the manufacturer had no duty to design a crashproof car) and the holdings of Larsen v. General Motors Corporation2 (that a manufacturer has a duty to design a product free of defects which would render it unsafe for its intended use and collisions are an incident risk of normal and expected of use of a car). Texas precedent had favored a narrow construction of the standard of intended use, holding that injuries from faulty cutoff switches3 or sharp tail fins4 were outside of the ordinary use of a vehicle and the manufacturer could not be held liable. The rule of Kerby
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359 F.2d 822 (7 Cir. 1966). 391 F.2d 495 (8 Cir. 1968). 3 Muncy v. General Motors Corp., 367 F.2d 493 (5 Cir. 1966). 4 Kahn v. Chrysler Corporation, 221 F.Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963).

v. Abilene Christian College5, allowing the plaintiff to seek recovery despite contributory negligence that increased his injuries but did not cause the accident, was held not to apply to the defendant. As in Willis v. Chrysler Corporation6, the appellate court found that there was no obligation to design a crashproof vehicle but agreed with South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison7 that the manufacturer has a duty to correct design flaws when operation accidents are foreseeable and unreasonably risky. The court held that normal use of a car includes the unavoidable incidence of collisions and a defect that produces injuries but does not directly cause an accident is still violating duty of care. It used the balancing test for negligence established in Dreisonstock v. Volkswagenwerk8, considering purpose of vehicle, cost of change, and contribution to overall safety in determining what design changes could be considered reasonable precautions. Given the testimony of James Barron, the court found not only General Motors but the entire American auto industry to be negligent in roof design given the foreseeability of rollover accidents and the unreasonable risk created. CONCLUSION Although General Motors adhered to customary roof design principles, because the custom itself was unreasonably dangerous given the inherent collision risk of normal use of a car, it was still responsible for injuries aggravated by the defective design. Judgment of trial court reversed, General Motors plea of privilege overruled.

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503 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1973). 264 F.Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967). 7 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 8 489 F.2d 1066 (4 Cir. 1974).