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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

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for the War Cabinet.

May 1 9 4 0 .

SECRET. W.M. (40) 138th Conclusions.

Copy N o .

TO B E K E P T

UNDER

LOCK

AND KEY.

I t is r e q u e s t e d t h a t special c a r e m a y be t a k e n t o e n s u r e t h e secrecy of this d o c u m e n t .

WAR

CABINET

138 ( 4 0 ) .

CONCLUSIONS

of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing S. W. 1 , on Saturday, May 2 5 , 1 9 4 0 , at 1 1 - 3 0 A.M.

Street,

Present: T h e R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , P r i m e M i n i s t e r (in the Chair). The R i g h t H o n . N E V I L L E C H A M B E R L A I N , T h e R i g h t H o n . C . R . A T T L E E , M . P . , M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of t h e Council. L o r d P r i v y Seal. The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . G R E E N W O O D , M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r F o r e i g n Minister without Portfolio. Affairs. T h e following were also p r e s e n t : The R i g h t H o n . A . V . A L E X A N D E R , M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y . The Right H o n . Sir ARCHIBALD
SINCLAIR, B t ., M.P., Secretary of

S t a t e for A i r . The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r D o m i n i o n Affairs.

The Hon. Sir ALEXANDER CADOGAN,

The Right Hon. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P., S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r W a r . The Right H o n . Sir JOHN ANDERSON, M . P . , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for t h e H o m e D e p a r t m e n t a n d M i n i s t e r of Home Security.
T h e R i g h t H o n . A . D U F F COOPER, M . P . ,

M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n .
Air Chief Marshal Sir CYRIL L. N.

P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e N E W A L L , C h i e f of t h e A i r Staff. for F o r e i g n Affairs. A d m i r a l of t h e F l e e t S i r D U D L E Y G e n e r a l S i r W . E D M U N D I R O N S I D E , P O U N D , F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d Chief of Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. N a v a l Staff. Major-General A. E. PERCIVAL, A s s i s t a n t Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff (Item 1 ) . Secretariat.
. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. M a j o r - G e n e r a l H . L. I S M A Y . C a p t a i n A. D . NICHOLL, R . N . Mr. W . D . WILKINSON. Lieutenant-Colonel V . DYKES, R . E . M r . E . P . DONALDSON. [21339] B

WAR

CABINET

138

(40).

CONTENTS.

Minute No. 1 Subject. . The Western Front -.Progress of operations. Telegrams between the Prime Minister and M. Reynaud, Calais. Movement of ammunition and stores from base depots in France. The Air Situation . Western Front. Attacks on German shipping. E n e m y attacks on the United Kingdom. The Naval Situation Naval casualties. Demolitions and blockships at Zeebrugge. Reported sinking of Lutzow (ex Deutschland). Promise of Canadian destroyers. Norway ... ... ... Progress of operations. Air R a i d Precautions ... Use of steel shelters. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Page 251

252

253

4 5 6 7 8

253 253 254 254 254

Italy Possible plan for blocking the Suez Canal. Italy Military plans in the event of participation in the war. Italy French proposal for another approach by President Roosevelt to Signor Mussolini. Sir Robert Vansittarfs conversation with a member of the Italian Embassy. N a t i o n a l D a y of P r a y e r ... Service at Westminster Abbey. ... ... ... ...

9 10

255 256

I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n ... ... ... ... ... Security measures. Suggested evacuation of towns on South and South-East Coasts. Restrictions of movement of civil population. France Suggested Italo-German offer of a separate peace. Norway ... ... Swedish proposal for a cessation of hostilities in Northern Norway.

11 12 13 14 15 16

256 256 256 257 257

T h e K i n g of t h e B e l g i a n s U.S.S.R. Appointment of a British Ambassador. B.B.C Action in t h e event of air attack. I n v a s i o n of G r e a t B r i t a i n Security measures. ... ... ... ... ...

258

1. The Prime Minister said t h a t a t a b o u t m i d n i g h t on t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t he h a d h a d a t e l e g r a m from M . R e y n a u d (No. 271 D I P P ) s a y i n g t h a t t h e B r i t i s h A r m y w a s no longer c o n f o r m i n g to G e n e r a l W e y g a n d ' s p l a n a n d h a d w i t h d r a w n t o w a r d s the C h a n n e l p o r t s . A t t h a t t i m e we h a d h a d n o i n f o r m a t i o n of a n y such move (Previous on L o r d G o r t ' s p a r t . A f t e r c o n s u l t i ng t h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l Reference: G e n e r a l Staff, he h a d sen t a replv t o M. R e v n a u d ( t e l e g r am N o 200 W.M. (40) 137th D I P P ) to t h e following effect : Conclusions,
Minute 1.) Telegrams between the Prime Minister and M. Reynaud.

The Western Front. Progress of operations.

W e believed t h a t L o r d G o r t w a s still p e r s e v e r i n g in t h e s o u t h w a r d move. A l l w e k n e w w a s t h a t he h a d been forced by p r e s s u r e on h i s r i g h t flank to place p a r t s of t w o divisions between himself a n d t h e G e r m a n a r m o u r e d forces. S h o u l d w e become a w a r e t h a t e x t r e m e p r e s s u r e h a d compelled a n y d e p a r t u r e from t h e a g r e e d p l a n , we should a t once i n f o r m M. R e y n a u d . L a t e r , however, a Staff Officer h a d r e p o r t e d to t h e W a r Office confirming t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t w o D i v i s i o n s from t h e A r r a s a r e a . N o d o u b t t h e action t a k e n h a d been forced on L o r d G o r t by t h e p o s i t i o n in w h i c h he h a d found himself. Nevertheless, he should a t once h a v e i n f o r m e d us of the actio n w h i c h he h a d t a k e n , a n d t h e F r e n c h h a d g r o u n d s for complaint. B u t t h i s w a s no t i m e for r e c r i m i n a t i o n s . G e n e r a l D i l l h a d been i n s t r u c t e d to send a Staff Officer back to t h i s c o u n t r y w i t h a r e p o r t a t the e a r l i e s t possible moment. I n t h e m e a n t i m e , we m u s t tell t h e F r e n c h t h a t the r e p o r t e d w i t h d r a w a l h a d now been confirmed. ( A t e l e g r a m in t h i s sense w a s d r a f t e d M . R e y n a u d (No. 205 D I P P ) . ) and despatched to

The Lord President of the Council hope d t h a t no h a s t y j u d g m e n t w o u l d be p a s s e d on L o r d G o r t ' s f a i l u r e to keep t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n f o r m e d. T h e r e m i g h t be some e x p l a n a t i o n for h i s a p p a r e n t omission to let u s kno w w h a t h e w a s doing. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff gave t h e W a r C a b i n e t a brief e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n . I t seemed c e r t a i n t h a t L o r d G o r t ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s h a d been almost completely severed. O n l y t h e line to D u n k i r k r e m a i n e d . A force w h i c h h a d been sent o u t from C a l a i s h a d been h e l d u p a t Cassel. A very d a n g e r o u s a t t a c k w a s developing a g a i n s t t h e B e l g i a n A r m y n e a r C o u r t r a i , only a very small n u m b e r of F r e n c h t r o o p s south of t h e g a p h a d as yet crossed t h e Somme, a n d t h e F r e n c h w e r e only h o l d i n g t h e s o u t h e r n p a r t of A m i e n s a n d t h e o u t s k i r t s of P e r o n n e . H e h a d sent a message to L o r d G o r t in t h e briefest t e r m s possible a s k i n g h i m to say w h e t h e r h e w a s (i) a d v a n c i n g on t h e p o r t s , (ii) a d v a n c i n g on A m i e n s , or (iii) fighting i t o u t on h i s p r e s e n t position.
Calais.

The Prime Minister said t h a t he h a d h a d a conversatio n w i t h V i c e - A d m i r a l S i r J a m e s Somerville, w h o h a d l a n d e d a t C a l a i s t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t from a destroyer w h i c h h a d also l a n d e d 60 R o y a l M a r i n e s a n d a q u a n t i t y of a m m u n i t i o n . H e h a d seen t h e Senior N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Officers, w ho h a d been i n good h e a r t a n d w e r e p u t t i n g u p a stou t defence. Only t h r e e of our t a n k s r e m a i n e d , b u t w e h a d accounted for a l a r g e n u m b e r of G e r m a n t a n k s . - I t w a s i m p e r a t i v e t h a t we should hold on to C a l a i s , a n d h e h a d a r r a n g e d for a h e a r t e n i n g message to be sent to o u r forces. A d m i r a l Somerville w a s r e t u r n i n g to C a l a i s t h a t n i g h t w i t h a d d i t i o n a l supplies, i n c l u d i n g t r e n c h m o r t a r s . The Secretary of State for War r e f e r r e d to the F r e n c h official s t a t e m e n t t h a t they w e r e still h o l d i n g C a l a i s . A s t h e r e w e r e 3,000 B r i t i s h t r o o p s a n d only 800 F r e n c h t r o o ps in t h e p o r t , it w a s only f a i r to the B r i t i s h p u b l i c t h a t they should be told t h a t B r i t i s h t r o o p s w e r e p l a y i n g a big p a r t in the g a l l a n t defence of C a l a i s . H e suggested t h a t a n a n n o u n c e m e n t should be m a d e t h a t C a l a i s w a s s t r o n g l y held by a n A n g l o - F r e n c h Force. [21339] B 2

The Minister t h i s effect. Movement of ammunition and stores from base depots in France.

of Information

u n d e r t o o k to issue a s t a t e m e n t to

The Secretary of State for War said t h a t we h a d h a d to supplyt h e B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e from stocks in t h i s country. As a result, our reserves of a m m u n i t i o n i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m h a d been depleted, a n d the Q u a r t e r m a s t e r - G e n e r a l w a s a n x i o u s to make t h e m u p by d r a w i n g on the reserves a t t h e bases in F r a n c e . There w e r e s h i p s a t t h e base p o r t s r e a d y to load these stores a t once. I n view of F r e n c h feeling, however, t h i s course m i g h t p r e s e n t some difficulty. The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t we should a w a i t f u r t h e r news from L o r d G o r t before t a k i n g a decision on t h i s m a t t e r . The W a r Cabinet agreed T h a t , p e n d i n g f u r t h e r news of the s i t u a t i o n E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force, steps should no t w i t h d r a w reserves of a m m u n i t i o n from F r a n c e . I n the m e a n t i m e , the s h i p s should be by in the p o r t s. of the B r i t i s h be t a k e n to t h e bases i n kept standing

2. The Chief of the Air Staff gave the W a r C a b i n e t details of a t t a c k s w h i c h h a d been m a d e d u r i n g t h e d a y by o u r a i r c r a f t on G e r m a n forces in the B o u l o g n e - C a l a i s a r e a , in w h i c h several direct (Previous h i t s h a d been m a d e on G e r m a n columns a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . In Reference: W.M. (40) 137th the evening 24 Blenheims h a d found a l a r g e n u m b e r of vehicles held u p on the r o a d by the d e s t r u c t i o n of the b r i d g e a t Gravelines, Conclusions, b u t it h a d been too d a r k a t t h e t i m e to see the result of t h e i r a t t a c k . Minute 2.) Swordfish a i r c r a f t h a d m a d e a very successful a t t a c k on t a n k s The Western on the C a l a i s - G r a v e l i n e s r o a d d u r i n g the evening, t h r e e t a n k s Front. h a v i n g been set on fire. F i f t y - n i n e heavy bombers h a d been out d u r i n g the n i g h t a t t a c k i n g t a r g e t s i n the r e a r a r e a s of t h e G e r m a n a r m i e s , a n d all h a d r e t u r n e d safety. Columns h a d been bombed i n t h e L o u v a i n Tirlemont area and near Namur. T r a i n movements h a d been a t t a c k e d in t h e R o e r m o n d - C o b l e n z - L u x e m b o u r g - M a a s t r i c h t area. These a t t a c k s h a d been very successful in p a r a l y s i n g all t r a i n movement. D u m p s a n d m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s in t h e R u h r h a d also been a t t a c k e d . A i r c r a f t of t h e F i g h t e r C o m m a n d h a d been very active over the F r e n c h coast a n d the B . E . F . a r e a . T h i r t y enemy a i r c r a f t for c e r t a i n (and more unconfirmed) h a d been shot down. Twelve of our fighters were m i s s i n g, b u t i t w a s probable t h a t not all of the pilots h a d been lost as some of t h e m i s s i n g a i r c r a f t h a d been seen on the n o r t h e r n F r e n c h shore. Attacks on S h i p p i n g in the E m s e s t u a r y h a d been a t t a c k e d . Salvag e German vessels h a d been observed w o r k i n g on t h r e e wrecks in t h e m o u t h of shipping. the E m s , one of w h i c h was t h o u g h t to be a w a r s h i p . One B l e n h e im h a d been lost i n the B i g h t on a reconnaissance. M i n e s h a d been laid in the E m s e s t u a r y , a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g oil t a n k s a t R o t t e r d a m h a d a g a i n been bombed. Enemy attacks A c e r t a i n n u m b e r of enemy a i r c r a f t h a d come in over our on the United shores t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t w i t h o u r own bombers. T h e y h a d n o t Kingdom. been recognised as enemy a i r c r a f t u n t i l they h a d actually d r o p p e d t h e i r bombs, w h i c h h a d fallen in Y o r k s h i r e a n d E a s t A n g l i a , m a i n l y on aerodromes . Some bombs h a d been d r o p p e d on M i d d l e s b r o u g h , b u t t h e d a m a g e a n d casualties were very slight.

The Air Situation.

The Naval Situation. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 137th Conclusions, Minute 3.) Naval casualties.

3. The First Sea Lord i n f o r m e d t h e W a r C a b i n e t of following c a s u a l t i e s to H . M . ships off t h e C h a n n e l p o r t s :

the

Wessexbombed a nd sunk. P o l i s h destroyer Burzahit by 2 bombs b ut r e t u r n i n g to Portsmouth. Vimieraextensive d a m a g e caused by a n e a r miss a n d w i l l r e q u i r e docking.

F r e n c h demolitions at Z e e b r u g ge h a d been expected to be Demolitions and c a r r i e d ou t a t 8 P . M. on the 2 4 t h May. T h e blockships h a d a r r i v e d blockships at in the e a r l y hours of the 2 5 t h M a y a n d h a d been s u n k in the channel, Zeebrugge. but they h a d been unable to get r i g h t u p to t h e lock gates. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) .137th Conclusions, Minute 1.)
Reported sinking of Lutzow (exDeutschland).

Promise of Canadian destrovers.

T h e s u b m a r i n e Spearfish h a d r e p o r t e d t h a t she h a d t a k e n off the crews a n d s u n k t w o D a n i s h fishing vessels on the 20th M a y . T h e D a n e s h a d confirmed t h e t i m e a n d place of her a t t a c k on a G e r m a n w a r s h i p , w h i c h they s t a t e d to have been t h e Lutzow (ex Deutschland). T h e y s a i d she h a d been beached n e a r F r e d e r i k s h a v n , b u t a f t e r being refloated h a d s u n k in K i e l Bay . T h e Greek s h i p Kyma (3,994 tons) h a d been s u n k in the C h a n n e l a p p r o a c h e s ; survivors h a d been picked u p by H . M . S . Enchantress. T h e C a n a d i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d u n d e r t a k e n to send t h e 4 C a n a d i a n destroyers to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs s a i d t h a t he h a d sent a suitable message of t h a n k s to t h e C a n a d i a n Government. T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above statements .

4. The First Sea Lord r e a d the first p a r t of a t e l e g r a m received from L o r d Cork to t h e effect t h a t a n a t t a c k in the N a r v i k Progress of a r e a h a d h a d to be p o s t p o n e d o w i n g to t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the operations. s i t u a t i o n a t Bodo, w h i c h necessitated the d e s p a t c h of a d d i t i o n a l (Previous guns a n d stores. F r e n c h a n d N o r w e g i a n troops, however, w e r e Reference: m a k i n g good progress in the N a r v i k a r e a . L o r d Cork h a d a s k e d W.M. (40) 137th t h a t H . M . S . Resolution, w h i c h h a d r e t u r n e d t o t h i s c o u n t r y for Conclusions, m i n o r r e p a i r s , should r e t u r n to N a r v i k as e a r l y as possible. Minute 4.) T h e coaster Bjarkoy h a d been sunk by a bomb n e a r N a r v i k . T h e s u p p l y ships Balteako a n d Mashobra a n d 4 t r a w l e r s h a d been beached a f t e r d a m a g e . A record of the f u r t h e r discussion, a n d of the conclusions reached, on o p e r a t i o n s i n the N a r v i k a r e a is contained in t h e S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r C a b i n e t Conclusions.
Norway.

T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of t h e s t a t e m e n t by the F i r s t Sea L o r d . 5. I n connection w i t h t h e discussion recorded i n M i n u t e 2, the Prime Minister sai d t h a t t h e bombing by t h e enemy of t a r g e t s in t h i s country should give a welcome s t i m u l u s to a i r - r a i d (Previous p r e c a u t i o n s activities. H e h a d noticed several r e p o r t s in t h e P r e s s Reference: W.M. (40) 118th t h a t A n d e r s o n shelters were n ot being p r o p e r l y used by t h e public. Conclusions, The Minister of Home Security said t h a t the n u m b e r of such Minute 5.) cases w a s almost negligible, a n d t h e P r e s s r e p o r t s were m u c h Use of steel e x a g g e r a t e d . Some cases h a d occurred of t h e m a t e r i a l s for shelters shelters. being left lying about while a w a i t i n g m i s s i n g components. I n other cases, t h e r e h a d been no able-bodied perso n i n t h e household w ho
Air Raid Precautions.

T21339]

could erect the shelter. Local a u t h o r i t i e s h a d been given s t r i n g e n t i n s t r u c t i o n s to remove shelters w h i c h were n o t erected, a n d to give t h e m to other householders wh o w e r e i n need of t h e m . The Prime Minister u r g e d t h a t t h i s w as n o t e n o u g h ; t h e persons responsible should be p u n i s h e d i n some way. T h e G o v e r n m e n t h a d t h e necessary p o w e r s u n d e r t h e n e w A c t . The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d t h e M i n i s t e r for H o m e S e c u r i t y (i) to secure t h a t some f o r m of p e n a l a c t i o n w a s t a k e n a g a i n s t persons who failed to m a k e p r o p e r u se of steel shelters p r o v i d e d for t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n ; (ii) to consider the issue of a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t on t h i s matter. 6. The First Sea Lord said t h a t t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , Italy. Possible plan for M e d i t e r r a n e a n , w ho h a d been given the o p t i o n of blocking the Suez C a n a l to s t o p t h e I t a l i a n a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r Maraglia, had blocking the decided to t a k e no a c t i o n in t h e m a t t e r . Suez Canal.
(Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 137th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n to a s i g n a l received from t h e Commander-in-Chief , M e d i t e r r a n e a n , in w h i c h he s t a t e d t h a t h e i n t e n d e d to a r r a n g e for the s t o p p a g e of I t a l i a n traffic t h r o u g h the C a n a l w h e n t h e s i t u a t i o n a p p e a r e d to h i m to be c r i t i c a l . T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y suggested t h a t t h e Commander-in-Chief should be i n s t r u c t e d to r e f e r to the A d m i r a l t y before t a k i n g such action. The W a r C a b i n e t I n v i t e d t h e F i r s t L o r d of t h e A d m i r a l t y to i n s t r u c t t h e Commander-in-Chief, M e d i t e r r a n e a n , to refer to L o n d o n for i n s t r u c t i o n s before t a k i n g a c t i o n to s t o p I t a l i a n traffic t h r o u g h t h e C a n a l ; a n d to consult w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs before i s s u i n g such i n s t r u c t i o n s .

Italy. 7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n Military plans in to R o m e t e l e g r a m No. 646, d a t e d t h e 2 3 r d M a y , r e p o r t i n g suggestion s the event of as to t h e probable tactics to be a d o p t e d by t h e I t a l i a n N a v y i n the participation in " Coming w a r . " the war. T h e F i r s t L o r d m i g h t t h i n k i t desirabl e to let the N a v a l Staff see t h i s t e l e g r a m . T h e W a r C a b i n e t took n o t e of t h e above s t a t e m e n t.

Italy. 8. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t h e h a d French proposal n ow replied to t h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t P r e s i d e n t for another Roosevelt should be asked to m a k e a n o t h e r a p p r o a c h to S i g n o r approach by M u s s o l i ni (telegram No. 198 D I P P to P a r i s ) .
President Roosevelt to Signor Mussolini. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 137th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

Sir Eobert Vansittarfs conversation with a member of the Italian Embassy.

A t t h e i n v i t a t i o n of a t h i r d p a r t y , a m e e t i n g h a d t a k e n p l a c e between S i r R o b e r t V a n s i t t a r t a n d a member of t h e staff of t h e I t a l i a n E m b a s s y in London. T h e I t a l i a n d i p l o m a t , a l l e g i n g t h a t he a s s p e a k i n g w i t h o u t i n s t r u c t i o n s , h a d s a i d t h a t t h e r e w e r e still g r e a t m a n y influential-people i n I t a l y w h o desired to see a peaceful solution of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n problem. I f H i s M a j e s t y ' s Governm e n t saw t h e i r w a y to m a k e a n a p p r o a c h to the I t a l i a n Government , w i t h a view to e x p l o r i n g t h e possibilities of a friendl y settlement, t h e r e need be no fear of t h e i r m e e t i n g w i t h a rebuff. A f t e r c o n s u l t i n g the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y h a d been a u t h o r i s e d to p u r s u e t h e m a t t e r f u r t h e r . A f t e r some l i t t l e delay (which m i g h t i n d i c a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s between t h e I t a l i a n E m b a s s y a n d Rome), a reply h a d been received by S i r R o b e r t V a n s i t t a n t a c c e p t i n g a n i n v i t a t i o n to a second m e e t i n g . T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y suggested t h a t a t t h i s second conversation S i r R o b e r t m i g h t t a k e t h e line t h a t we h a d c o n t e m p l a t ed m a k i n g a s t a t e m e n t on A n g l o - I t a l i a n relations , b u t h a d a b a n d o n e d our i n t e n t i o n because of the u n h e l p f u l r e p l y w h i c h S i g n o r M u s s o l i n i h a d sent to t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s letter. W e k n e w t h a t the I t a l i a n s h a d become a w a r e t h a t such a s t a t e m e n t h a d been contemplated . S i r R o b e r t m i g h t say t h a t o u r decision not to proceed w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t m i g h t have given r i s e to some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g in I t a l y . W e were now, a s always, w i l l i n g to e n t e r i n t o discussions w i t h t h e I t a l i a n G o v e r n m e n t w i t h a view to p u t t i n g a n end to the difficulties a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w h i c h blocked the p a t h of f r i e n d s h i p between t h e t w o peoples. T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y t h o u g h t , however, t h a t he w a s e n t i t l e d to ask for some a s s u r a n c e t h a t a demarche on h i s p a r t w o u l d n o t meet w i t h a rebuff. Very likely n o t h i n g m i g h t come of all t h i s . Nevertheless, even if t h e r e s u lt were merely to g a i n time, i t w o u l d be valuable. T h e F r e n c h w o u l d c e r t a i n l y be please d w i t h such a move on t h e p a r t of H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government, w h i c h w a s i n line w i t h t h e i r own policy. The Prime Minister s a i d t h a t h e saw no objection to a n a p p r o a c h of the c h a r a c t e r suggested. I t m u s t not, of course, be a c c o m p a n i e d by a n y publicity, since t h a t would a m o u n t to a confession of weakness . I t w as very probable t h a t a t a n y momen t S i g n o r Mussolin i m i g h t p u t very s t r o n g p r e s s u r e on the F r e n c h , w i t h a view to o b t a i n i n g concessions from them. T h e fact t h a t t h e F r e n c h were d e n u d i n g t h e i r I t a l i a n f r o n t i e r of troop s p u t them i n a very w e a k b a r g a i n i n g position.
W a

The W a r C a b i n e t (i) Took note of the above s t a t e m e n t s . (ii) A p p r o v e d the line w h i c h the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y proposed to take. National Day of 9. The Prime Minister r e m i n d e d his colleagues t h a t t h e Prayer. following day , S u n d a y , the 2 6 t h May, h a d been a p p o i n t e d a s a Service at N a t i o n a l D a y of P r a y e r . T h e r e wa s to be a service in W e s t m i n s t e r Westminster Abbey, a t t e n d e d by the K i n g a n d Queen. F o r security reasons, Abbey. however, t h e a t t e n d a n c e of T h e i r M a j e s t i es w a s not b e i n g a n n o u n c e d i n a d v a n c e , n o r were any special a r r a n g e m e n t s being m a d e to invite t h e a t t e n d a n c e of members of both H o u s e s of P a r l i a m e n t . I t was, however, desired to a r r a n g e for the a t t e n d a n c e of as m a n y members of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t as possible. The S e c r e t a r y of t h e W a r C a b i n e t would, therefore, send a w r i t t e n notification of the time of the service to all M i n i s t e r s , i n c l u d i n g U n d e r - S e c r e t a r i e s , a n d inform t h e D e a n of W e s t m i n s t e r h o w m a n y places should be reserved. The W a r C a b i n e t A p p r o v e d the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s suggestion.

Invasion of 10. The Chief of the Air Staff s a i d t h a t t h e V i c e - C h i e f s of Great Britain. Staff h a d p r e p a r e d c e r t a i n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , w h i c h they wished to place before the W a r C a b i n e t, i n r e g a r d t o Security measures. (1) the e d u c a t i o n of t h e publi c as t o t h e a t t i t u d e t o a d o p t in (Previous the event of i n v a s i o n ; Eef erence: (2) t h e evacuation of children , p r e g n a n t women a n d old persons W.M. (40) 137th from the S o u t h a n d S o u t h - E a s t Coasts . Conclusions, Minute 12.) T h e r e w as also t h e q u e s t i o n of the S u n d a y e x o d u s of motor Suggested evacuation of towns on South and South-east Coasts. Restriction of movement of the Civil Population. France.

cars to t h e S o u t h a n d E a s t coasts, w h i c h m i g h t give the enemy a n o p p o r t u n i t y of seizing motor t r a n s p o r t . T h e W a r C a b i n e t a g r e e d :-

T o remit these r e c o m m e n d a t i o ns to a M e e t i n g of M i n i s t e r s a n d Chiefs of Staff to be held a t 5 - 3 0 P . M . t h a t day .

Suggested Italo- to M a d r i d t e l e g r a m No. 225 D I P P , d a t e d t h e 2 4 t h M a y , r e p o r t i n g German offer of a conversation between Queen E n a ' s C h a m b e r l a i n a n d a M e m b e r of a separate peace. the E m b a s s y Staff. T h e C h a m b e r l a i n h a d s a i d t h a t h e h a d l e a r n e d

11.

The Secretary

of State

for Foreign

Affairs

drew attention

from a highly placed F a l a n g i s t , to w h o m the G e r m a n s h a d t a l k e d , t h a t it w a s the G e r m a n p l a n t h a t I t a l y should i m m e d i a t e l y offer a s e p a r a t e peace to F r a n c e , on the basis t h a t she k e p t h e r p r e s e n t E u r o p e a n frontiers, w h i l e I t a l y received T u n i s , a n d S p a i n received G i b r a l t a r a n d F r e n c h Morocco. F r a n c e w a s t o s t a n d a s i d e w h i l e G e r m a n y proceeded to blockade a n d i n v a d e E n g l a n d , w h i c h t h e G e r m a n s were convinced they could do. T h e offer w o u l d be accompanied by a n u l t i m a t u m t h a t I t a l y w o u l d a t t a c k if it w e r e not accepted. T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t .

Norway. Swedish proposal for a cessation of hostilities in Northern Norway. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 135th Conclusions, Minute 9.) The King of the Belgians. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 137th Conclusions, Minute 5.)

12. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t e n t i o n to F o r e i g n Office t e l e g r a m to Stockholm No. 448, d a t e d t h e 2 4 t h May, r e p o r t i n g a message from S i r Cecil D o r m e r t o t h e effect t h a t the N o r w e g i a n G o v e r n m e nt were u n w i l l i n g t o consider t h e S w e d i s h proposal for a cessation of hostilities i n N o r t h e r n N o r w a y . T h e W a r C a b i n e t took note of the above s t a t e m e n t .

13. The Prime Minister i n f o r m e d the W a r C a b i n e t of a message w h i c h he h a d received from A d m i r a l S i r R o g e r Keyes as to t h e movements of the K i n g of the B e l g i a n s . A record of t h e discussion, a n d of the conclusions r e a c h e d , is contained in the S e c r e t a r y ' s S t a n d a r d F i l e of W a r C a b i n e t Conclusions.

14. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t h a t S i r Stafford C r i p p s ' s M i s s i o n to Moscow m a d e it necessary to consider w h e t h e r we should allow t h e p o s i t i o n to c o n t i n u e i n w h i c h w e h a d no A m b a s s a d o r a t Moscow. I t w a s a question of b a l a n c i n g r i s k s , b u t he t h o u g h t t h a t , on the whole, w e o u g h t n ow to have a n (Previous A m b a s s a d o r a t Moscow. T h e a r g u m e n t s in favour of t h i s course Reference: W.M. (40) 132nd w e r e as follows : Conclusions, (i) T h e R u s s i a n s seemed a t p r e s e n t to be in t h e mood t o Minute 8.) welcome a friendly g e s t u r e from us. (ii) T h e y w e r e believed to be sore over t h e absence of a B r i t i s h Ambassador, and it was important that everything possible should be done to give t h e C r i p p s Missio n a c h a n c e of success. T o send a special Mission, b u t not a n A m b a s s a d o r , m i g h t m a k e m a t t e r s worse r a t h e r t h a n better. (iii) I n t h e event of the f a i l u r e of the C r i p p s Mission, it would be m o r e difficult to a p p o i n t a n A m b a s s a d o r t h a n i t w a s now. The Home Secretary asked w h e t h e r t h i s step need m a k e a n y c h a n g e i n the policy a d o p t e d t o w a r d s C o m m u n i s t s in G r e a t B r i t a i n . T h e v i e w t a k e n w a s t h a t no c h a n g e need be made , since t h e Soviet Government treated their diplomatic relations and p r o p a g a n d a a c t i v i t i e s as wholly d i s t i n c t m a t t e r s . The W a r Cabinet agreed T h a t i t w a s desirable to a p p o i n t a B r i t i s h A m b a s s a d o r t o Moscow w i t h o u t delay.

U.S.S.R. Appointment of a British Ambassador.

B.B.C. Action in the event of an air attack.

15. T h e W a r C a b i n e t h a d before t h e m a M e m o r a n d u m by t h e M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e a c t i o n to be t a k e n by t h e B . B . C . i n t h e event of a n a i r a t t a c k on t h i s c o u n t r y ( W . P . (G.) (40) 136).

The Minister of Information s a i d t h a t he h a d r e l u c t a n t l y a c c e p t e d t h e v i e w of t h e A i r Staff t h a t t h e B . B . C . should be r e q u i r e d t e m p o r a r i l y to close down all e x i s t i n g t r a n s m i t t e r s in t h i s c o u n t r y d u r i n g a n a i r r a i d , except for c e r t a i n s h o r t - w a v e t r a n s m i s s i o n s, i n view of t h e d a n g e r of affording direction-finding assistance to r a i d i n g a i r c r a f t . T h e p r o p o s a l s in h i s p a p e r m a d e i t clear t h a t , (Previous a p a r t from t h e o v e r r i d i n g a u t h o r i t y given to the C o m m a n d e r - i n Eef erenee: W.M. (40) 120th Chief, H o m e Forces, to b r o a d c a s t o r d e r s to troops, a n d the i n s t r u c t i o n s to be given by F i g h t e r C o m m a n d H e a d q u a r t e r s for t h e Conclusions, r e s u m p t i o n of t r a n s m i s s i o n s , G o v e r n m e n t i n s t r u c t i o n s to the B.B.C. Minute 3.) w e r e to be g i v e n only t h r o u g h t h e M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n . The Secretary of State for Air t h o u g h t i t would be m u c h b e t t e r to d i s c o n t i n u e b r o a d c a s t i n g a l t o g e t h e r d u r i n g a n a i r r a i d , unless t h e t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s , who w e r e m e e t i n g t h a t afternoon, w e r e able t o a d v i s e t h a t m e a n s h a d been f o u n d to obviate the r i s k of enemy i n t e r f e r e n c e by the issue of false news or a n n o u n c e m e n t s p u r p o r t i n g to issue from t h e B.B.C. itself. If, as seemed likely, it w a s not t e c h n i c a l l y possible to p r e v e n t the enemy from doin g t h i s , t h e r i g h t course w a s t h a t t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , H o m e Forces, should only b r o a d c a s t i n s t r u c t i o n s in code to specified r e c i p i e n t s . . The Secretary of State for War s u g g e s t e d t h a t the a u t h o r i t y given to t h e C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , H o m e Forces, to b r o a d c a s t order s to t r o o p s should n ot be l i m i t e d to the case of p a r a c h u t i s t s l a n d i n g i n t h i s c o u n t r y , b u t should a p p l y i n t h e case of a n enemy l a n d i n g by any means.

B"

The W a r C a b i n e t A p p r o v e d the proposals of t h e M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n , "as set o u t in p a r a g r a p h 4 of h i s M e m o r a n d u m , subject to the modifications suggested a t " A " a n d " B " in the discussion recorded above.

Invasion of Great Britain. Security measures. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 138th Conclusions, Minute 10.)

16. The Lord President of the Council s a i d t h a t he understood t h a t t h e Chancellor of t h e D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r h a d a number of p r o p o s a ls to m a k e w h i c h he t h o u g h t w o u l d be useful w i t h r e g a r d to t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s now i n h a n d for t h e Defence of G r e a t B r i t a i n a g a i n s t hostile a t t a c k . H e w o u l d t h e r e f o r e propos e t h a t the Commander-in-Chief, H o m e Forces, should be i n v i t e d to consult t h e Chancellor of the D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r a t an e a r l y s t a g e . T h e W a r C a b i n e t a p p r o v e d t h e above proposal.

Richmond Terrace, S. W. 1, May 25, 1940.