1.

FACTS

REPUBLIC vs. KAWASHIMA TEXTILE

2.

W/N the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization can be collaterally attacked in a petition for a certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer.

On Jan 24, 2000, Kawashima Free Workers Union (KFWU) filed with the DOLE Regional Office, a Petition for Certification Election to be conducted in a bargaining unit composed of 145 rank & file employees of Kawashima Phil. The Union attached to this petition a Certification of Creation of Local/Chapter issued on Jan 19 by the same DOLE Office, stating that KFWU submitted the Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation PTGWO and a Report of Creation of Local/Chapter. Kawashima Phil, respondent, filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that KFWU did not acquire any legal personality because its membership of mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees, which violated Article 245 of the Labor Code, and because it failed to submit its books of accounts. May 2000, Med-Arbiter found that KFWUs legal personality was defective, hence it DISMISSED the petition for certification election. It was found out that 27 of the 145 employees were supervisory employees and because of this, the Med-Arbiter held that it has not attained the status of a LLO. It held that the Union must first exclude the supervisory employees from its membership before it can attain the status of a LLO. The Union appealed the decision to DOLE, which reversed the said decision and ordered the conduct of a certification election. DOLE held that while Article 245 declares supervisory employees ineligible for membership in a labor organization for rank-and-file employees, the provision did not state the effect of such prohibited membership on the legitimacy of the labor organization and its right to file for certification election. Neither was such mixed membership a ground for cancellation of its registration. As to the failure of KFWU to file its books of account, the DOLE held that such omission was not a ground for revocation of union registration or dismissal of petition for certification election, for under Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order No. 9, a local or chapter like KFWU was no longer required to file its books of account. Then CA reversed again, saying that the union, having both R&F members and supervisory members, cannot qualify as a LLO. ISSUES 1. W/N mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in a union is a ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification election.

RULING 1. NO. RA 9481, enacted on June 14, 2007, made several amendments to the LC. Such as in Article 245-A,which provides that The inclusion as union members of employees outside the bargaining unit shall not be a ground for the cancellation of the registration of the union. Said employees are automatically deemed removed from the list of membership of said union." It also provided that "Art. 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. - A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. And in Art. 258-A, it states that the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose a pertition for certification election. However, R.A. No. 9481 took effect only on June 14, 2007; hence, it applies only to labor representation cases filed on or after said date. As the petition for certification election subject matter of this case was filed by KFWU on January 24, 2000, R.A. No. 9481 cannot apply to it. Instead, the law and rules in force at the time of the filing by KFWU of the petition for certification election on January 24, 2000 is R.A. No. 6715. Thus, the former law provides that when there is a comingling of supervisory and R&F employees in a single labor organization, it cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. Unless they are separated. HOWEVER, this provision was amended in 1997. The creation of a LOCAL or a CHAPTER was recognized if a charter certificate was issued by a federation or national union. To create a union or chapter however, there is no need to submit a list of its members. This led the court to decide that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code. The Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny

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recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its individual members. 2. NO. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

2. G.R. No. 77395 November 29, 1988

Facts: On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, filed with the Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and existing corporation employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit sought in the petition for the issuance of an order authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election. Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times, no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. During the scheduled hearing they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers. Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate labor unions; (2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit

or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to petitioner union's two letters to the proprietor/ General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986 and May 8, 1 986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union president, vice-president and three other active members of the local unions for which an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others, (1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular employees; (2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working; (3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union. The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his order. Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila, which denied the appeal and the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the instant petition received in this Court by mail. The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice Issue: Whether or not the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate bargaining unit? Held: This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees". Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed in dealing

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with respondent company, one consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality of interest. Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner corporation in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro division is engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees. Definitely, they have very little in common with the employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements of classification according to employment status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

After giving him an opportunity to be heard, Teng was informed of his termination from the team. He filed an illegal dismissal case with the Regional Arbitration Branch 6 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Is there merit to the case? Ruling: Yes. We understand petitioners in asserting that a basketball organization is a team-based enterprise and that a harmonious working relationship among team players is essential to the success of the organization. We also take into account the petition of the other team members voicing out their desire to continue with the team without Teng. We note likewise the sentiments of the players and coaching staff during the meeting of Feb. 4, 2001 stating how they felt when Teng abandoned them during a crucial Game Number 5 in the MBA championship round. Petitioners rely heavily on the alleged effects of Tengs actions on the rest of the team. However, such reaction from team members is expected after losing a game, especially a championship game. It is also not unlikely that the team members looked for someone to blame after they lost the championship games and that Teng happened to be the closest target of the teams frustration and disappointment. But all these sentiments and emotions from Negros Slashers players and staff must not blur the eyes of the Court from objectively assessing Tengs infraction in order to determine

3. Negros Slashers, Inc., et. al. vs. Alvin L. Teng, G.R. No. 187122, Feb. 22, 2012
RESPONDENT Alvin Teng was a professional basketball player. Before the expiration of his contract with Laguna Lakers on Dec. 31, 2001, he was traded and/or transferred to petitioner Negros Slashers. On Game Number 4 of the Metropolitan Basketball Association (MBA) Championship Round, Teng had a below-par playing performance. Because of this, the coaching staff decided to pull him out of the game. He then sat on the bench, untied his shoelaces and donned his practice jersey. On the following game, Game Number 5 of the Championship Round, he called up to say he was sick and did not play.

whether the same constitutes just ground for dismissal. The incident in question should be clear: Teng had a below-par performance during Game Number 4 for which he was pulled out from the game, and then he untied his shoelaces and donned his practice jersey. In Game Number 5, he did not play. As an employee of the Negros Slashers, Teng was expected to report for work regularly. Missing a team game is indeed a punishable offense. Untying of shoelaces when the game is not yet finished is also irresponsible and unprofessional. However, we agree with the Labor Arbiter that such isolated foolishness of an employee does not justify the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioners could have opted to impose a fine or suspension on Teng for his unacceptable conduct.

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Other forms of disciplinary action could also have been taken after the incident to impart on the team that such misconduct will not be tolerated. xxx In the case at bar, the penalty handed out by the petitioners was the ultimate penalty of dismissal. There was no warning or admonition for respondents violation of team rules, only outright termination of his services for an act which could have been punished appropriately with a severe reprimand or suspension.

respondent conspired with Lingad in making fraudulent entries disguised as error corrections in the banks computer.Thats why the petitioner filed several criminal complaints for qualified theft against Lingad and the respondent with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lubao, Pampanga. Thereafter, citing serious misconduct tantamount to willful breach of trust as ground, it terminated the respondents employment. But respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in San Fernando City, Pampanga. In the said complaint, the respondent, to bolster his claim that there was no valid ground for his dismissal, averred that the charge against him for qualified theft was dismissed for lack of sufficient basis to conclude that he th conspired with Lingad. The respondent sought an award for separation pay, full backwages, 13 month pay for 2004 and moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision sustaining the respondents claim of illegal dismissal thus ordering the petitioner to reinstate the respondent to his former position and awarding the latter backwages. The LA opined that the petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence that there was a valid ground for the respondents dismissal. The NLRC rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the LA. The NLRC held that it was sufficiently established that only Lingad was the one responsible for the said misappropriations However, the CA held that the respondent is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement and backwages to be computed from the time of his illegal dismissal until the finality of the said decision. The CA agreed with the LA and the NLRC that the petitioner failed to establish by substantial evidence that there was indeed a valid ground for the respondents dismissal. Nevertheless, the CA held that the petitioner should pay the respondent separation pay since the latter did not pray for reinstatement before the LA and that the same would be in the best interest of the parties considering the animosity and antagonism that exist between them. Issues: Whether or not Rommel J. Manabat was illegally dismissed and will be entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and payment of backwages. Ruling: This Court notes that the LA, the NLRC and the CA unanimously ruled that the respondent was illegally dismissed. Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by substantial

4. Bank of Lubao vs. Manabat, G.R. No. 188722, February 1, 2012

Facts: Sometime in 2001, Rommel J. Manabat (respondent) was hired by petitioner Bank of Lubao, a rural bank, as a Market Collector. Subsequently, the respondent was assigned as an encoder at the Bank of Lubaos Sta. Cruz Extension Office, which he manned together with two other employees, teller Susan P. Lingad (Lingad) and May O. Manasan. As an encoder, the respondents primary duty is to encode the clients deposits on the banks computer after the same are received by Lingad. In November 2004, an initial audit on the Bank of Lubaos Sta. Cruz Extension Office conducted by the petitioner revealed that there was a misappropriation of funds in the amount of P3,000,000.00, more or less. Apparently, there were transactions entered and posted in the passbooks of the clients but were not entered in the banks book of accounts. Further audit showed that there were various deposits which were entered in the banks computer but were subsequently reversed and marked as error in posting. The respondent, through a memorandum sent by the petitioner, was asked to explain in writing the discrepancies that were discovered during the audit. Respondent submitted to the petitioner his letter-explanation which, in essence, asserted that there were times when Lingad used the banks computer while he was out on errands. Administrative hearing was conducted by the banks investigating committee where the respondent was further made to explain his side. Subsequently, the investigating committee concluded that the

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evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with those of the LA. Such factual findings are given more weight when the same are affirmed by the CA. We find no reason to depart from the foregoing rule. Here, Court agree with the CA that the relations between the parties had been already strained thereby justifying the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in favor of the respondent. Undoubtedly, the petitioners filing of various criminal complaints against the respondent for qualified theft and the subsequent filing by the latter of the complaint for illegal dismissal against the latter, taken together with the pendency of the instant case for more than six years, had caused strained relations between the parties. considering that the respondents former position as bank encoder involves the handling of accounts of the depositors of the Bank of Lubao, it would not be equitable on the part of the petitioner to be ordered to maintain the former in its employ since it may only inspire vindictiveness on the part of the respondent. Then the refusal of the respondent to be re-admitted to work is in itself indicative of the existence of strained relations between him and the petitioner. The backwages that should be awarded to the respondent should be modified. Employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. But if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Thus, it is but fair that the backwages that should be awarded to the respondent be computed from the time that the respondent was illegally dismissed until the time when he was required to report for work, i.e. from September 1, 2005 until May 4, 2007. It is only during the said period that the respondent is deemed to be entitled to the payment of backwages.

employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, respondent union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent union. The parties both advert to certain provisions of the existing CBA. After the meeting called by the union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the union, while others refused. Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted their membership. Respondent union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership and called them to a hearing regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment. After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent informed petitioner of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties. Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of petitioner BPI. Respondent Union filed a motion for reconsideration, but the voluntary arbitrator denied the same. It appealed to the CA and the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, this petition. Issue: May a corporation invoke its merger with another corporation as a valid ground to exempt its absorbed employees from the coverage of a union shop clause contained in its existing CBA with its own certified labor union Employment Contracts

5. BPI VS BPI EMPLOYEES UNION

Facts: The BSP approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, and FEBTC. This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the SEC on April 7, 2000. Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPIs rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file

Significantly, too, the Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger dated April 7, 2000 did not contain any specific stipulation with respect to the employment contracts of existing personnel of the nonsurviving entity which is FEBTC. Unlike the Voluntary Arbitrator, this Court cannot uphold the reasoning that the general stipulation regarding transfer of FEBTC assets and liabilities to BPI as set forth in the Articles of Merger necessarily includes the transfer of all FEBTC employees into the employ of BPI and neither BPI nor the FEBTC employees allegedly could do anything about it. Even if it is so, it does not follow that the absorbed employees should not be subject to the terms and conditions of employment obtaining in the surviving corporation. The rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor

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contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the parties. A labor contract merely creates an action in personam and does not create any real right which should be respected by third parties. This conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer to select his employees and to decide when to engage them as protected under our Constitution, and the same can only be restricted by law through the exercise of the police power.(BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010) Equality)

Labor Assistant Secretary Trajano sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of 141 members of the INK. Trajano opined that petitioners are "bereft of legal personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative." Hence this petition for certiorari RULING: The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union. The INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect. The Court GRANTED the petition for certiorari and the petitioners are DECLARED to have legally exercised their right to vote, and their ballots should be canvassed and, if validly and properly made out, counted and tallied for the choices written therein.

6. REYES vs TRAJANO
G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992 FACTS: A certification election was authorized to be conducted by the BLR among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. They provided for votes to be cast, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, for (c) a third choice: "NO UNION." Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election. The final tally of the votes showed the following results: TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1, CHALLENGED 141. The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification elections." The INK employees made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes. They filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEU-OLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization. . . ."

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7. National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009 Facts: A certification election was conducted on June 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of Holiday Inn. Petitioner and another union (HIMPHLU) refer the case back to Med Arbiter to decide which among those votes be opened and tallied. 22 votes were segregated because; (1) eleven were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal is still pending before CA, (2) six were cast by those already occupying supervisory positions; and (3) five were cast by probationary employees, and pursuant to the CBA, such employees cannot vote. The Med Arbiter ruled to open the votes cast by dismissed and by those holding supervisory employees. The union appealed to SOLE, arguing that the vote of probationary employees should likewise be opened and tallied. The SOLE affirmed the decision of Med Arbiter. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification election should be allowed to vote. Ruling: The court ruled in affirmative. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. FErrer-Colleja, 180 SCRA 749, holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. Petition is granted. The decision of CA is annulled and set aside.

8. PANUNCILLO V. CAP PHIL., INC.

Facts: In order to secure the education of her son, petitioner procured an educational plan (the plan) from respondent which she had fully paid but which she later sold to Josefina Pernes (Josefina) for P37,000. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be effected, however, petitioner pledged it for P50,000 to John Chua who, however, sold it to Benito Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to Gaudioso R. Uy for P60,000. Having gotten wind of the transactions subsequent to her purchase of the plan, Josefina, by letter of February 10, 1999,4 informed respondent that petitioner had "swindled" her but that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long as petitioner pay the amount involved and the interest. Acting on Josefinas letter, the Integrated Internal Audit Operations (IIAO) of respondent required petitioner to explain in writing why the plan had not been transferred to Josefina and was instead sold to another. Respondent thereupon terminated the services of petitioner by Memorandum. Petitioner thus filed a complaint14 for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, damages and attorneys fees against respondent. The Labor Arbiter, while finding that the dismissal was for a valid cause, found the same too harsh. He thus ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to a position one rank lower than her previous position. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Decision of October 29, 2001, reversed that of the Labor Arbiter, it finding that petitioners dismissal was illegal and accordingly ordering her reinstatement to her former position. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Held: Yes. By petitioners repeated violation of Section 8.4 of respondents Code of Discipline, she violated the trust and confidence of respondent and its customers. To allow her to continue with her employment puts respondent under the risk of being embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits from customers similarly situated as Josefina, et al. Clearly, respondent exercised its management prerogative when it dismissed petitioner. Before terminating the services of an employee, the law requires two written notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the other to inform him of his employers decision to dismiss him. As to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be heard, and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing.

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9. Picop Resources Incorporated (PRI) v. Taeca, G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010
FACTS: On February 13, 2001, respondents Anacleto Taeca, Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime Campos, Geremias Tato, Martiniano Magayon, Manuel Abucay and fourteen (14) others filed a Complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner PICOP Resources, Incorporated (PRI), Wilfredo Fuentes (in his capacity as PRI's Vice President/Resident Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel (in his capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor), Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), Atty. Wilbur T. Fuentes (in his capacity as Secretary General of SPFL), Pascasio Trugillo (in his capacity as Local President of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.- SPFL [NAMAPRI-SPFL]) and Atty. Proculo Fuentes, Jr.[6] (in his capacity as National President of SPFL). Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5) years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. On October 16, 2000, PRI served notices of termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of acts of disloyalty committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the freedom period during the effectivity of the CBA. A Notice dated October 21, 2000 was also served on the Department of Labor and Employment Office (DOLE), Caraga Region. Respondents then accused PRI of Unfair Labor Practice punishable under Article 248 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Labor Code, while Atty. Fuentes and Wilbur T. Fuentes and Pascasio Trujillo were accused of violating Article 248 (a) and (b) of the Labor Code. ISSUES: I WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVELY (sic) BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) CAN BE GIVEN ITS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL ITS TERMS AND CONDITION INCLUDING ITS UNION SECURITY CLAUSE, EVEN BEYOND THE 5-YEAR PERIOD WHEN NO NEW CBA HAS YET BEEN ENTERED INTO.

II WHETHER OR NOT AN HONEST ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION AND/OR CONCLUSION OF LAW FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, REVISED RULES OF COURT.? HELD: 1. Petitioner is mistaken.

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via Rule 65 or Petition for Certiorari has been settled as early as in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission.[11] This Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that this action should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.[12] Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902[10] (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. [13] 2. We now come to the main issue of whether there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondents.

Petitioner's argument is untenable. Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," union shop," "maintenance of membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain

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agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.[15] However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.[16] As to the first requisite, there is no question that the CBA between PRI and respondents included a union security clause, specifically, a maintenance of membership as stipulated in Sections 6 of Article II, Union Security and Check-Off. Following the same provision, PRI, upon written request from the Union, can indeed terminate the employment of the employee who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member. Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union. However, as to the third requisite, we find that there is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to terminate the employment of the respondents. We will emphasize anew that the power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. This, however, is not without limitations. The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor.[25] An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. Under Republic Act No. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation

was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. But if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision. Moreover, respondents, having been compelled to litigate in order to seek redress for their illegal dismissal, are entitled to the award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.[26] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

10. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms [SMCC-SUPER], Zacarrias Jerry Victorio Union President v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation
G.R. No. 169717, March 16, 2011 Del Castillo, J. FACTS: The Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region. The respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union. The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the Charter Certificate, "Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization," and "Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas" were not executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the Labor Code in relation to Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997. The union registration was, thus, fatally defective. The Med-Arbiter further held that the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file employees of respondent company. As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.

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ISSUE: Whether the legal personality of the petitioner union may be collaterally attacked. HELD: NO. Petitioner union correctly argues that its legal personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. Ruling: There was a valid dismissal on the ground of redundancy. There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater than what is reasonably required to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position becomes redundant when it is rendered superfluous by any number of factors such as over-hiring of workers, decrease in volume of business, or dropping a particular product line. Among the requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant such as but not limited to: preferred status, efficiency, and seniority. The records show that ETPI had sufficiently established not only its need to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization, but also the existence of redundancy in the position of a Senior Technician. It was decided that, in the judgment of ETPI management, the specialized functions of a Senior Technician whose sole function was essentially the repair and servicing of ETPIs telecommunications equipment was no longer needed since the Business and Consumer [Accounts] Department had to remain economical and focused yet versatile enough to meet all the multifarious needs of its small and medium sized clients. It is inconceivable that ETPI would effect a company-wide reorganization of this scale for the mere purpose of singling out Culili and terminating him. What ETPI did was to abolish the position itself for being too specialized and limited. SC finds Culilis dismissal was for a lawful cause and not an act of unfair labor practice, ETPI, however, was remiss in its duty to observe procedural due process in effecting the termination of Culili. In Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana, SC observed that the requirement of law mandating the giving of notices was intended: not only to enable the employees to look for another employment and therefore ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding income, but more importantly, to give the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of termination. With regard to the impleaded corporate officers, they cannot be held liable for acts done in his official capacity because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members. To pierce this fictional veil, it must be shown that the corporate personality was used to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act, or to evade an existing obligation, or to

11. Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011
Facts: Nelson Culili was employed by Eastern Telecommunications a Senior Technician. In 1998, due to business losses, ETPI was compelled to implement a Right-Sizing Program which consisted of two phases: the first phase involved the reduction of ETPIs workforce to only those employees that were necessary and which ETPI could sustain; the second phase entailed a company-wide reorganization which would result in the transfer, merger, absorption or abolition of certain departments of ETPI. Among the departments abolished was the Service Quality Department. As a result, Culilis position was abolished due to redundancy. Upon filing a complaint, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding ETPI guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, which was affirmed by the NLRC. However, the Court of Appeals found that Culilis position was validly abolished due to redundancy. It was highly unlikely that ETPI would effect a company-wide reorganization simply for the purpose of getting rid of Culili. Also, ETPI cannot be held guilty of unfair labor practice as mere contracting out of services being performed by union members does not per se amount to unfair labor practice unless it interferes with the employees right to self-organization. Issue:

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confuse a legitimate issue. In illegal dismissal cases, corporate officers may be held solidarily liable with the corporation if the termination was done with malice or bad faith. Culili has failed to prove that his dismissal was orchestrated by the individual respondents herein for the mere purpose of getting rid of him. Hence, the dismissal is declared valid but Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. is ordered to pay petitioner Nelson A. Culili the amount of P50,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process, in addition to the mandatory separation pay required under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

Issues: 1. WON the act of signing an authorization for certification election before the freedom period is an act of disloyalty 2. WON Article 256 of the Labor Code applies in the case. Held: 1. No. The acts of private respondents are not enough proof of a violation of the Union Security Clause which would warrant their dismissal. The mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election before the freedom period does NOT necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty, considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the freedom period. We are constrained to believe that an "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election." It is clear that the actual Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May 18, 2000. Thus, it was within the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21, 2000 until May 21, 2000. Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents right to self-organization 2. YES. Petitioner insists that it is Article 253 that applies in this case. Article 253 of the Labor Code provides that the terms and conditions of a CBA remain in full force and effect even beyond the 5year period when no new CBA has yet been reached. PICOP claims that private respondents violated this provision when they campaigned for, supported and signed FFWs petition for certification election on March 19 and 20, 2000, before the onset of the freedom period. It is Article 256 that applies. Based on the provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them. Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is

13. PICOP RESOURCES INC. V. DEQUILLA (2011)

PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), Represented in this Petition by MR. WILFREDO D. FUENTES, in his capacity as Senior Vice-President and Resident Manager, Petitioner, vs. RICARDO DEQUILLA, ELMO PABILANDO, CESAR ATIENZA and ANICETO ORBETA, JR., and NAMAPRI-SPFI, Respondents. Facts: Private respondents were regular rank and file employees of Picop Resources and members of NAMAPRI-SPFL, a duly registered labor organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank and file employees. The company and the union had a CBA. Atty. Fuentes, the National President of the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor, advised PICOP to terminate about 800 employees due to acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for the certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) on March 19 and 20 of 2000, which was before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Based on the CBA, the freedom period would start on March 22, 2000. Their acts constitute an act of disloyalty against the union which is valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. Thus, PICOP issued a memorandum directing the employees concerned to explain within 72 hours why their employment should not be terminated due to alleged acts of disloyalty. Upon receiving their letters, PICOP endorsed them to Atty. Fuentes who then requested the termination of 46 employees found guilty of disloyalty. PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31 out of the 46 employees. Private respondents were among the employees dismissed. They filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney's fees.

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a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or compromised. Time and again, we have ruled that we adhere to the policy of enhancing the welfare of the workers. Their freedom to choose who should be their bargaining representative is of paramount importance. The fact that there already exists a bargaining representative in the unit concerned is of no moment as long as the petition for certification election was filed within the freedom period. What is imperative is that by such a petition for certification election the employees are given the opportunity to make known of who shall have the right to represent them thereafter. Not only some, but all of them should have the right to do so. What is equally important is that everyone be given a democratic space in the bargaining unit concerned.

1.

authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose 2. secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting 3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned. Such requirements were not complied with as there were no individual written check off authorizations; thus, the employer cannot legally deduct thus the assessment. The union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyers and accordingly, reimbursement should be charged to the unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.

14. Gabriel, et al v. Secretary of Labor

G.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000. FACTS: Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the Solidbank union, the collective bargaining agent for the Solidbank corporation. Private respondents are members of said union. The unions EB decided to retain the services of their counsel in connection with negotiations for a new CBA. A general membership meeting was called where majority of union members approved a resolution confirming the decision to engage the services of the unions counsel, Atty. Lacsina. The resolution provided that 10% of the total economic benefits that may be secured be given to the counsel at attorneys fees. Also it contained an authorization for Solidbank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the first lump sum of payment of benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents issued a complaint for illegal deduction. ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorneys fees. HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. They are:

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15.

16. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004
Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years which will expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members stating that they have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers. Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. the unions proposal was submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of affectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its employee to self-organization.

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