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Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory Author(s): Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman Reviewed

work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), pp. 352-381 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381582 . Accessed: 21/12/2012 13:07
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SURVEY ARTICLE

Return of the Citizen: A Surveyof Recent Work on CitizenshipTheory and Norman WillKymlicka Wayne
I. INTRODUCTION There has been an explosion of interestin the concept of citizenship among politicaltheorists.In 1978, it could be confidently stated that "the concept of citizenshiphas gone out of fashion among political thinkers"(van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9). Fifteenyears later, citizenship has become the "buzz word" among thinkerson all points of the politicalspectrum(Heater 1990, p. 293; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. x). There are a numberof reasons forthisrenewedinterest citizenin ship in the 1990s. At the level of theory,it is a natural evolution in politicaldiscoursebecause theconceptof citizenship seems to integrate the demands ofjustice and community membership-the centralconcepts of politicalphilosophyin the 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to ideas of individualentitlement the on one hand and of attachmentto a particularcommunity the other. on Thus it may help clarify what is reallyat stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians. Interestin citizenship also been sparkedbya numberof recent has political events and trends throughoutthe world-increasing voter apathy and long-termwelfare dependencyin the United States, the resurgence of nationalistmovementsin Eastern Europe, the stresses created by an increasingly multicultural and multiracial population in WesternEurope, the backlash against the welfarestate in Thatcher's England, the failureof environmental policies thatrelyon voluntary citizencooperation, and so forth. These events have made clear that the health and stability a of moderndemocracydepends, not only on thejustice of its 'basic structure'but also on the qualitiesand attitudes itscitizens:' forexample, of

1. Rawls says thatthe "basic structure" societyis the primary of subjectof a theory ofjustice (Rawls 1971, p. 7; Rawls 1993, pp. 257-89). Ethics104 (January 1994): 352-381 ? 1994 by The University Chicago.All rights of reserved. 0014-1704/94/0402-1492$01.00

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competingforms and how theyview potentially theirsense of identity of national, regional, ethnic, or religious identities;their abilityto fromthemtolerateand work togetherwithotherswho are different selves; their desire to participatein the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authoritiesaccountable; and to theirwillingness show self-restraint exercisepersonal responsiaffect in bility theireconomic demands and in personal choices-which Withoutcitizenswho possess these theirhealth and the environment. to qualities, democraciesbecome difficult govern,even unstable.2As freedom are only of Habermas notes, "the institutions constitutional worthas much as a population makes of them"(Habermas 1992, p. 7). then,thatthereshould be increasingcalls for It is not surprising, and conduct of 'a theoryof citizenship'that focuses on the identity and roles. loyalties, individualcitizens,includingtheirresponsibilities, There are, however,at least two general hazards in this quest. First, the scope of a 'theoryof citizenship'is potentiallylimitless-almost everyproblemin politicalphilosophyinvolvesrelationsamong citizens or between citizensand the state. In this surveywe tryto avoid this theorists on danger byconcentrating twogeneralissuesthatcitizenship claim have been neglecteddue to the overemphasisin recentpolitical and institutions-namely,civic virtuesand philosophy on structures citizenshipidentity.3 arisesbecause there The second danger fora theoryof citizenship concepts which are sometimes conflated in these are two different that discussions: citizenship-as-legal-status, is, as full membershipin a particularpoliticalcommunity;and citizenship-as-desirable-activity, of is where the extentand qualityof one's citizenship a function one's participationin that community. believe that an As we shall see in the next section,most writers adequate theoryof citizenshiprequires greateremphasis on responsibilities and virtues. Few of them, however, are proposing that we in should revise our account of citizenship-as-legal-status a way that would, say, stripapathetic people of theircitizenship.Instead, these authors are generally concerned with the requirementsof being a 'good citizen'. But we should expect a theoryof the good citizen to be relativelyindependentof the legal question of what it is to be a fromthe metacitizen, just as a theoryof the good person is distinct physical (or legal) question of what it is to be a person. While most
among governin promotion 2. This mayaccount forthe recentinterest citizenship [1990]; Senate Citizenship Encouraging ments (e.g., Britain'sCommissionon Citizenship, [1991]; Senate of Canada, Canadian Citizenship: Revisited Citizenship of Australia,Active [1993]). SharingtheResponsibility 3. One issue we will not discuss is immigrationand naturalizationpolicy (e.g., Brubaker 1989; van Gunsteren 1988).

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in theorists respect this distinction developing theirown theories,we shall discuss in Section IV a fairlywidespread tendencyto ignore it others'theoriesof citizenship-for example, by conwhen criticizing with trasting theirown 'thick'conception of citizenship-as-activity an opponent's 'thin' conception of citizenship-as-status. II. THE POSTWAR ORTHODOXY it Beforedescribing new workon citizenship, is necessaryto outline the in thatis implicit much postwarpolitical quicklythe viewof citizenship theoryand that is definedalmost entirelyin termsof the possession of rights. expositionof thispostwarconceptionof citiThe mostinfluential is zenship-as-rights T. H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class," writtenin 1949.4 According to Marshall, citizenshipis essentiallya matterof ensuringthateveryoneis treatedas a fulland equal member of society. And the way to ensure thissense of membershipis through according people an increasingnumber of citizenshiprights. Marshall dividescitizenshiprightsinto threecategorieswhichhe sees as having taken hold in England in three successive centuries: civil rights,which arose in the eighteenthcentury; political rights, and social rights-for example, century; whicharose in the nineteenth to public education, health care, unemploymentinsurance, and old(Marshall age pension-which have become establishedin thiscentury And withthe expansion of the rightsof citizenship, 1965, pp. 78 ff.).5 he notes, there was also an expansion of the class of citizens. Civil and politicalrightsthathad been restricted whiteproperty-owning to Protestant men were graduallyextendedto women,the workingclass, Jews and Catholics,blacks,and other previouslyexcluded groups. requiresa liberalFor Marshall,the fullest expression citizenship of democraticwelfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political,and social rightsto all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a fullmemberof society, able to participatein and enjoy the common life of society.Where any of these rightsare withheldor violated, people will be marginalizedand unable to participate. because of This is oftencalled "passive" or "private"citizenship, itsemphasis on passive entitlements the absence of any obligation and

to of 4. Reprintedin Marshall (1965). For a conciseintroduction the history citizenship, see Heater (1990) and Walzer (1989). is. 5. It is oftennoted how idiosyncratically English thishistory In manyEuropean years,and oftenin reverse countriesmostof thisprogressoccurredonlyin the past fifty order. Even in England, the historicalevidence supports an "ebb and flowmodel" of citizenshiprights,rather than a "unilinear" model (Heater 1990, p. 271; Parry 1991, p. 167; Held 1989, p. 193; Turner 1989).

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and withgood to participatein public life.It is stillwidelysupported,6 reason: "the benefitsof privatecitizenshipare not to be sneezed at: and freeprosperity, theyplace certainbasic human goods (security, dom) withinthe grasp of nearly all, and that is nothing less than a human achievement"(Macedo 1990, p. 39). fantastic has thisorthodoxpostwarconceptionof citizenship Nevertheless, come-inreasingly under attackin the past decade. For the purposes set The first focuses two we of thisarticle, can identify setsof criticisms. on the need to supplement (or replace) the passive acceptance of responsibilities withthe activeexerciseof citizenship rights citizenship political participation, and virtues,including economic self-reliance, These issues are discussed in Section III. and even civility. definition The second set focuseson the need to revisethe current of citizenship accommodatetheincreasingsocial and culturalpluralto providea commonexperience, ismof modernsocieties.Can citizenship Is and identity, allegiance forthe membersof society? itenough simply excluded groups on an equal basis,or are special to include historically measures sometimesrequired? This issue is discussed in Section IV. III. THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND VIRTUES OF CITIZENSHIP State and of A. The New RightCritique Social Citizenship theWelfare critiqueof the postwarorthopowerful, The first, and mostpolitically doxy came fromthe New Right'sattackon the idea of "social rights." These rightshad always been resistedby the right,on the grounds withthe demandsof (negative)freedom thattheywere (a) inconsistent and inefficient, (c) stepsdown or (desert-based) justice, (b) economically 'the road to serfdom'.But in the public's eye, these argumentswere outweighedby seen as eitherimplausibleor, at any rate,as justifiably defenseof the of considerations socialjustice or by a citizenship-based welfarestate such as Marshall's. One of the revolutions in conservative thinking during the to Thatcher/Reaganyearswas the willingness engage the leftin battle over the domain of social citizenshipitself.Whereas Marshall had argued that social rightsenable the disadvantagedto enter the mainexercisetheirciviland politicalrights, streamof societyand effectively the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity among the poor, withoutactually improvingtheir life chances, and
6. When asked what citizenshipmeans to them, people are much more likelyto This is truein Britainas well as the United States, than responsibilities. talkabout rights althoughthe Britishtendto emphasize social rights(e.g., to public education and health care), whereas Americans usually mention civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech and religion) (King and Waldron 1988; Conover et al. 1991, p. 804). For most people, citizenshipis, as the U.S. Supreme Court once put it, "the rightto have rights"(Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 102 [1958]).

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created a culture of dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfarestate has itselfperpetuated the problem by reducing citizens to passive dependentswho are underbureaucratictutelage.According to Norman Barry,there is no evidence thatwelfareprogramshave in factpromoted more active citizenship(Barry 1990, pp. 43-53). The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship certainobligationsis a underestimated the extent to which fulfilling In precondition being accepted as a fullmemberof society. particufor the lar, by failingto meet the obligationto support themselves, longterm unemployed are a source of shame for societyas well as themcommon obligationsis selves (Mead 1986, p. 240).7 Failure to fulfill as much of an obstacle to fullmembershipas the lack of equal rights. In these circumstances, obligate the dependentas othersare obli"to welfare gated is essential to equality,not opposed to it. An effective [policy]must include recipientsin the common obligationsof citizens ratherthan exclude them" (Mead 1986, pp. 12-13). According to the New Right, to ensure the social and cultural and focus integration the poor, we must go "beyond entitlement," of to instead on theirresponsibility earn a living.Since the welfarestate the discourages people frombecoming self-reliant, safetynet should should have obligations be cut back and any remainingwelfarebenefits tied to them. This is the idea behind one of the principalreformsof programs,which require the welfaresystemin the 1980s: "workfare" to the welfarerecipientsto workfortheirbenefits, reinforce idea that citizensshould be self-supporting. This New Rightvision of citizenshiphas not gone unchallenged. For example, the claim that the rise of an unemployed welfareof underclass is due to the availability welfareignores the impact of and sits uncomfortably with the fact global economic restructuring, that many of the most extensivewelfarestates (in Scandinavia, e.g.) have traditionally enjoyed among the lowest unemploymentrates. to Moreover, criticscharge, it is difficult findany evidence that the New Right reformsof the 1980s have promotedresponsiblecitiaimed to extend the scope of marketsin peozenship. These reforms tax ple's lives-through freertrade,deregulation, cuts,the weakening of trade unions, and the tighteningof unemploymentbenefits-in and self-reliance, part in orderto teach people the virtuesof initiative, self-sufficiency (Mulgan 1991, p. 43). arguablymade posInstead, however,manymarketderegulations sible an era of unprecedented greed and economic irresponsibility, as
7. For evidence that there is a set of social expectationsthat Americans have of each other, and of themselves,that must be fulfilled people are to be perceived as if full membersof society,see Mead (1986, p. 243); Shklar (1991, p. 413); Moon (1988, pp. 34-35); Dworkin (1992, p. 131).

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evidenced by the savingsand loan and junk bond scandals in America (Mulgan 1991, p. 39). Also, cuttingwelfarebenefits, fromgetting far the disadvantaged back on their feet, has expanded the underclass. Class inequalities have been exacerbated, and the workingpoor and unemployedhave been effectively "disenfranchised," unable to participate in the new economy of the New Right (Fierlbeck 1991, p. 579; Hoover and Plant 1988, chap. 12).8 For many,therefore, New Rightprogram mostplausibly the is seen not as an alternative accountof citizenship as an assaulton the very but As principle citizenship. Plantputsit,"Insteadof accepting of citizenship as a politicaland social status,modern Conservatives have sought to reassert role of the market the and have rejectedtheidea thatcitizenship of confersa statusindependent economic standing" (Plant 1991, p. 52; cf. Heater 1990, p. 303; King 1987, pp. 196-98). B. Rethinking Social Citizenship Given these difficulties withthe New Rightcritiqueof welfareentitlements,most people on the leftcontinue to defend the principlethat fullcitizenshiprequiressocial rights. For the left,Marshall'sargument in that people can be fullmembersand participants the common life of societyonly if theirbasic needs are met "is as strongnow . .. as it ever was" (Ignatieff1989, p. 72). However, many on the leftaccept of that the existinginstitutions the welfare state are unpopular, in and dependence, and to part because theyseem to promote passivity "facilitatea privatist retreatfromcitizenshipand a particular'clientalization'of the citizen'srole" (Habermas 1992, pp. 10-11; cf. King 1987, pp. 45-46). and personal reHow then should the state fosterself-reliance The left has responded ambivalentlyto issues such as sponsibility? 'workfare'.On the one hand, the principleof personal responsibility and social obligationhas alwaysbeen at the heartof socialism(Mulgan 1991, p. 39). A duty to work is, afterall, implicitin Marx's famous slogan, "From each according to his talents,to each according to his needs." Some people on the left,therefore, express qualified accepif and tance of workfare, it "givesboth responsibility the power to use it" (Mulgan 1991, p. 46). On the otherhand, mostpeople on the leftremainuncomfortable with imposing obligationsas a matterof public policy.They believe that the dependentare kept out of the mainstreamof societybecause
8. Some people on the righthave recognized this danger with a purely marketbased conception of citizenshipand have sought to supplementit withan emphasis on See the discussionof the BritishConservativeparty'scitizenvolunteerism and charity. ship rhetoricin Fierlbeck (1991, p. 589), Andrews (1991, p. 13), and Heater (1990, p. 303).

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of a lack of opportunities,such as jobs, education, and training,not because of any desire to avoid work. Imposing obligations,therefore, is futileif genuine opportunitiesare absent,and unnecessaryif those opportunities present,since the vastmajority people on welfare are of would prefer not to be (King 1987, pp. 186-91; Fullinwider1988, pp. 270-78). Ratherthan impose an obligationto work,the leftwould tryto achieve fullemployment for through, example, worker-training programs.So while the leftaccepts the general principlethatcitizenship involves both rightsand responsibilities, feels that rightsto it participatemust,in a sense, precede the responsibilities-that is, it is onlyappropriateto demand fulfillment the responsibilities of afterthe rightsto participateare secured. A similarrejectionof the New Right'sview of citizenshipcan be found in recent feministdiscussions of citizenship.Many feminists accept the importance of balancing rights and responsibilities indeed,Carol Gilligan'sfindings suggestthatwomen,in theireveryday moralreasoning,preferthe language of responsibility the language to of rights(Gilligan 1982, p. 19). But feminists have grave doubts about the New Right rhetoricof economic self-sufficiency. Gender-neutral talk about "self-reliance" oftena code forthe view thatmen should is financiallysupport the family,while women should look after the household and care for the elderly,the sick, and the young. This reinforces, ratherthan eliminates, barriersto women's fullparticithe pation in society.9 When the New Right talksabout self-reliance, boundaries of the the "self" include the family-it is familiesthatshould be self-reliant. Hence, greater"self-reliance" consistent is with,and mayeven require, greater dependency within the family.Yet women's dependence on men withinthe familycan be everybit as harmfulas welfaredependency, since it allows men to exercise unequal power over decisions regarding sex, reproduction,consumption,leisure, and so on (King 1987, p. 47; Okin 1989, pp. 128-29). Since perceptions of responsibilitytend to fall unequally on share the left'sview thatrightsto participate women, many feminists must, in a sense, precede responsibilities. wish to Indeed, feminists expand the listof social rights, order to tacklestructural in barriersto women's full participationas citizensthat the welfarestate currently ignores,or even exacerbates,such as the unequal distribution doof mesticresponsibilities (Phillips 1991a, 1991b; Okin 1992). Given the
9. The New Right's emphasis on self-relianceputs women in a double bind. If they stay home and care for their children,they are accused of failingto live up to theirdutyto be self-supporting. of (Hence the stereotype irresponsible welfaremothers.) If they seek to earn a living,however,they are accused of failingto live up to their familyresponsibilities.

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equal citizenand public responsibilities, difficulty combiningfamily of ship forwomen is impossibleuntilworkplacesand career expectations and are rearranged to allow more room for familyresponsibilities (Okin 1989, until men accept theirshare of domesticresponsibilities pp. 175-77). it However, if rightsmust precede responsibilities, seems we are back to the old view of passive citizenship.Yet the left,as much as the right,accepts the need for change. The most popular proposal is to the decentralizeand democratize welfarestate-for example, bygiving local welfareagencies more power and making them accountable to talk theirclients(Pierson 1991, pp. 200-207). Hence the now-familiar of "empowering"welfarerecipientsby supplementingwelfarerights of with democraticparticipatory rightsin the administration welfare programs. leftview of social This is the centraltheme of the contemporary Whetherit willworkto overcome welfaredependencyis citizenship.10 difficult say. Service providershave often resistedattemptsto into crease their accountability(Rustin 1991, p. 231; Pierson 1991, pp. 206-7). Moreover, there may be some tension between the goal of to and increincreasingdemocratic accountability the local community to asing accountability clients(Plant 1990, p. 30). As we discuss in the next section,the leftmay have excessive faithin the abilityof democraticparticipationto solve the problemsof citizenship. C. The Needfor Civic Virtues could be made Many classicalliberalsbelieved thata liberaldemocracy by secure, even in the absence of an especially virtuous citizenry, and creatingchecksand balances. Institutional proceduraldevicessuch as the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature,and federalism would all serve to block would-be oppressors. Even if each person withoutregard forthe common good, pursued her own self-interest, would check another set of privateinterone set of privateinterests ests. However, it has become clear that procedural-institutional
is on 10. Anotherthemein recentleftwriting citizenship the importanceof constitutionalrights.Indeed, the left'sreconciliationwithliberal rights"is one of the major 199 phenomena of our times"4(Phillips lb, p. 13; Andrews1991, pp. 207-11; theoretical Sedley 1991, p. 226). 11. Kant thoughtthat the problem of good government"can be solved even for a race of devils" (quoted in Galston 1991, p. 215). Of course, other liberalsrecognized the need for civic virtue,including Locke, Mill, and the BritishIdealists (see Vincent and Plant 1984, chap. 1). See also Carens (1986) and Deigh (1988), who argue that extensiverange of positivesocial duties and principlesgrounda fairly basic liberalrights includingthe obligationto make good use of one's talents,to vote, and responsibilities, and to aid in the defense of one's country, the of to fulfill responsibilities one's office, as well as the duty to protectand educate one's children.

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are mechanisms to balance self-interest not enough, and that some is level of civicvirtueand public-spiritedness required (Galston 1991, pp. 217, 244; Macedo 1990, pp. 138-39). Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible decisions:the statewillbe unable to provideadequate personal lifestyle health care if citizensdo not act responsibly withrespectto theirown health, in termsof a healthydiet, exercise, and the consumptionof liquor and tobacco; the state will be unable to meet the needs of children,the elderly,or the disabled if citizensdo not agree to share thisresponsibility providingsome care fortheirrelatives;the state by cannot protect the environmentif citizens are unwillingto reduce, reuse, and recyclein theirown homes; the abilityof the government to regulatethe economycan be underminedifcitizensborrowimmodto erate amountsor demand excessivewage increases; attempts create a fairersocietywill flounderif citizens are chronicallyintolerantof difference and generallylackingin what Rawls calls a sense ofjustice (Rawls 1971, pp. 114-16, 335). Withoutcooperationand self-restraint in these areas, "the abilityof liberal societiesto functionsuccessfully diminishes"(Galston 1991, p. 220; Macedo 1990, p. 39). progressively In short,we need "a fuller, richerand yetmoresubtleunderstanding and practice of citizenship,"because "what the state needs from the citizenry cannot be secured by coercion,but onlycooperation and in self-restraint the exercise of private power" (Cairns and Williams 1985, p. 43). Yet there is growing fear that the civility and publicof spiritedness citizensof liberaldemocraciesmaybe in serious decline (Walzer 1992, p. 90).12 An adequate conceptionof citizenship, therefore, seems to require a balance of rightsand responsibilities. Where do we learn these virtues? The New Rightreliesheavilyon the marketas a school of virtue, But there are other answers to this question. -As we just noted, one of 1. The left and participatory democracy. the left'sresponses to the problemof citizenpassivity to "empower" is citizens by democratizingthe welfare state and, more generally,by dispersingstate power throughlocal democratic institutions, regional assemblies,and judicable rights.However, emphasizing participation does not yet explain how to ensure thatcitizensparticipateresponsior bly-that is, in a public-spirited, ratherthan self-interested prejudiced, way.
12. According to a recent survey,only 12 percent of American teenagers said to votingwas important being a good citizen.Moreover,thisapathyis notjust a function of youth-comparisons withsimilarsurveysfromthe previous fifty years suggestthat "the currentcohortknowsless, cares less, votes less, and is less critical itsleaders and of institutions than young people have been at any timeover the past fivedecades" (Glendon 1991, p. 129). The evidence fromGreat Britainis similar(Heater 1990, p. 215).

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on too narrowly the Indeed, as Mulgan notes, "by concentrating need to devolve power and on the virtuesof freedom,issues of responsibility have been pushed to the margins"(Mulgan 1991, pp. 40-41). by Empowered citizensmay use theirpower irresponsibly pushing for afford,or by voting benefitsand entitlements theycannot ultimately themselves breaksand slashingassistanceto the needy,or by "seektax ing scapegoats in the indolence of the poor, the strangenessof ethnic of minorities,or the insolence and irresponsibility modern women" (Fierlbeck 1991, p. 592). Following Rousseau and J. S. Mill, many modern participatory democratsassume that political participationitselfwill teach people responsibility and toleration.As Oldfield notes, theyplace theirfaith "as in the activity participation the means wherebyindividualsmay of Politicalparbecome accustomed to performthe duties of citizenship. ticipation enlarges the minds of individuals,familiarizesthem with interestswhich lie beyond the immediacyof personal circumstance and environment,and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention" (Oldfield 1990b, p. 184). Many people on the lefthave triedin thisway to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship"by dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself,"which in turn has led to the "advocacy of collectivedecisionmakingas a resolutionto all the problemsof citizenship"(Held 1991, this faith in the p. 23; cf. Pierson 1991, p. 2O2).13 Unfortunately, educative functionof participationseems overlyoptimistic(Oldfield 1990b, p. 184; Mead 1986, p. 247; Andrews 1991, p. 216). thatcitizenship Hence thereis increasingrecognition responsibiliintoleft-wing theory(Hootiesshould be incorporatedmoreexplicitly verand Plant 1988, pp. 289-9 1; Vogel and Moran 1991, p. xv; Mouffe 1992a). But it seems clear that the lefthas not yet found a language of responsibility it is comfortable that with,or a set of concretepolicies to promotethese responsibilities.'4 -The modern civic republican traditionis 2. Civicrepublicanism. an extremeformof participatory democracy largelyinspiredby Machiavelli and Rousseau (who were in turnenamored withthe Greeks and Romans). It is not surprisingthat the recent upsurge of interestin citizenshiphas given civic republicans a wideraudience.
13. See Arneson (1992, pp. 488-92) for a range of potential conflictsbetween democratic proceduresand socialistgoals. As Dworkinnotes,thereis a danger of making democracy"a black hole into which all other politicalvirtuescollapse" (1992, p. 132). 14. The left neglected many of these issues for decades, on the ground that a concern with "citizenship"was bourgeois ideology.The very language of citizenship was "alien" (Selbourne 1991, p. 94; van Gunsteren 1978, p. 9; Dietz 1992, p. 70; Wolin 1992, p. 241; Andrews 1991, p. 13).

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The featurethatdistinguishes civicrepublicansfromotherparticipationists,such as the left-wing theoristsdiscussed above, is their for value of politicalparticipation the particiemphasis on the intrinsic pants themselves.Such participation in Oldfield'swords,"the highis, that est formof human living-together mostindividualscan aspire to" (Oldfield 1990a, p. 6). On this view, political life is superior to the merelyprivatepleasures of family, neighborhood,and professionand so should occupy the centerof people's lives. Failure to participatein politicsmakes one a "radically incompleteand stuntedbeing" (Oldfield 1990b, p. 187; cf.Pocock 1992, pp. 45,53; Skinner1992; Beiner 1992). As its proponentsadmit,thisconceptionis markedly odds with at both citizenship the way mostpeople in the modernworldunderstand and the good life. Most people find the greatesthappiness in their family life,work,religion,or leisure,not in politics.Politicalparticipaneeded tion is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome,activity to ensure that governmentrespects and supports their freedom to This assumption pursue these personal occupations and attachments. that politicsis a means to privatelifeis shared by mostpeople on the left(Ignatieff1989, pp. 72-73) and right(Mead 1986, p. 254), as well as by liberals (Rawls 1971, pp. 229-30), civilsocietytheorists (Walzer 1989, p. 215), and feminists (Elshtain 1981, p. 327), and definesthe modern view of citizenship. In orderto explain the modernindifference politicalparticipato tion,civicrepublicansoftenargue thatpoliticallifetodayhas become impoverished compared to the active citizenship of, say, ancient Greece. Politicaldebate is no longermeaningful and people lack access to effective participation. But it is more plausibleto view our attachment privatelifeas a to resultnot of the impoverishment publiclifebut of the enrichment of of in privatelife.We no longerseek gratification politics because our pqrsonal and social lifeis so much richerthan the Greeks'.There are many reasonsforthishistorical change,including riseof romantic the love and and the nuclearfamily increased (and itsemphasison intimacy privacy), prosperity (and hence richerformsof leisure and consumption), the Christiancommitment the dignityof labor (which the Greeks deto spised),and the growingdislikeforwar (whichthe Greeksesteemed). Those passive citizenswho preferthe joys of familyand career to the duties of politics are not necessarilymisguided. As Galston has put it, republicans who denigrateprivatelife as tedious and selfabsorbed show no delightin real communitiesof people, and indeed are "contemptuous"of "everydaylife" (Galston 1991, pp. 58-63). 15

15. Civic republicansrarelydefendtheirconceptionof value at length.For example, afterassertingthatpoliticallifeis "the highestformof human living-together that

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3. Civilsociety theorists. -We shall use the label 'civilsocietytheorists'to identify recent developmentfromcommunitarianthought a in the 1980s. These theoristsemphasize the necessityof civility and self-restraint a healthydemocracybut deny that eitherthe market to or politicalparticipationis sufficient teach these virtues.Instead, it to is in the voluntaryorganizationsof civil society-churches, families, unions,ethnicassociations, cooperatives, environmental groups,neighborhood associations, women's support groups, charities-that we learn the virtuesof mutual obligation.As Walzer puts it, "the civility that makes democraticpolitics possible can only be learned in the associational networks"of civil society(Walzer 1992, p. 104). Because these groups are voluntary, failureto live up to the responsibilitiesthat come with them is usually met simplywith disapproval rather than legal punishment. Yet because the disapproval comes fromfamily, friends, colleagues, or comrades,itis in manyways a more powerfulincentiveto act responsiblythan punishmentby an impersonal state. It is here that "human character,competence, and capacityfor citizenshipare formed,"for it is here that we internalize the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation and learn the voluntaryself-restraint which is essential to trulyresponsiblecitizenship (Glendon 1991, p. 109). It follows, therefore, thatone of the first obligationsof citizenship is to participatein civilsociety.As Walzer notes, 'Join the association of your choice" is "not a slogan to rallypoliticalmilitants, and yetthat is what civil societyrequires" (Walzer 1992, p. 106). The claim that civilsocietyis the "seedbed of civicvirtue"(Glendon 1991, p. 109) is essentially empiricalclaim, for which there is an littlehard evidence one way or the other. It is an old and venerable view,but it is not obviouslytrue. It may be in the neighborhood that we learn to be good neighbors,but neighborhood associations also teach people to operate on the "NIMBY" (not in mybackyard)principle when it comes to the location of group homes or public works. the is Similarly, family often"a school of despotism"thatteaches male dominance over women (Okin 1992, p. 65); churches often teach
mostindividualscan aspire to," Oldfieldgoes on to say,"I shall not argue forthismoral point. It has in any case been argued many timeswithinthe corpus of civicrepublican writing"(1990a, p. 6). But many criticshave argued thatthese earlier defensesreston sexism and denigrationof the private sphere (e.g., Vogel 1991, p. 68; Young 1989, p. 253; Phillips 1991b, p. 49) or on ethnicexclusiveness(Habermas 1992, p. 8). Skinner's argument seems to be that while political participationmay only have instrumental value for most people, we must get people to view it as if it has intrinsic value, or else they will not withstandinternal or external threatsto democracy(Skinner 1992, pp. 219-21). For discussions of the relationshipbetween republican conceptions of the good and liberalism,see Dworkin (1989, pp. 499-504), Taylor (1989, pp. 177-81), Hill (1993, pp. 67-84), and Sinopoli (1992, pp. 163-71).

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and intoleranceof other faiths;ethnic groups deferenceto authority oftenteach prejudice against other races; and so on. Walzer recognizesthatmostpeople are "trappedin one or another where the 'civility' subordinaterelationship, theylearned was deferenhe tial rather than independentand active." In these circumstances, says, we have to "reconstruct" the associational network"under new conditionsof freedom and equality."Similarly, when the activities of some associations "are narrowly conceived, partial and particularist," then "they need political correction."Walzer calls his view "critical associationalism"to signify that the associations of civil societymay need to be reformedin the lightof principlesof citizenship(Walzer 1992, pp. 106-7). But this may go too far in the other direction.Rather than supliportingvoluntaryassociations,this approach may unintentionally in cense wholesale intervention them. Governmentsmust of course interveneto protectthe rightsof people inside and outside the group if these rightsare threatened.But do we want governments reconto structchurches, for example, to make them more internallydemocratic,or to make sure that their members learn to be independent rather than deferential?And, in any event, wouldn't reconstructing or churches,families, unions to make themmoreinternally democratic to start underminetheiressentially uncoerced and voluntary character, which is what supposedly made them the seedbeds of civic virtue? Civilsocietytheorists demand too much of thesevoluntary associationsin expectingthemto be the main school for,or small-scalereplica of, democraticcitizenship.While these associations may teach civic virtue, that is not their raison d'etre. The reason why people join churches,families,or ethnicorganizationsis not to learn civic virtue. It is, rather,to honor certainvalues and enjoy certainhuman goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of citizenship. Joininga religiousor ethnicassociation may be more a matterof fromthe mainstreamof societythan of learning how to withdrawing participate in it. To expect parents, priests,or union members to organize the internallifeof theirgroups to promotecitizenshipmaximally is to ignore why these groups exist in the firstplace. (Some associations,like the Boy Scouts, are designed to promotecitizenship, but theyare the exception,not the rule.)'6 A similarissue arises withtheorists "maternalcitizenship," of who focus on the family,and motheringin particular,as the school of

16. Also, it is difficult see how even reconstructedgroups could teach what to some regard as an essentialaspect of citizenship -namely, a commonidentity sense and of purpose (Phillips 1991b, pp. 117-18). We discuss thisin Sec. IV below.

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responsibility virtue.AccordingtoJean Elshtainand Sara Ruddick, and to mothering teaches women about the responsibility conservelifeand protectthe vulnerable,and these lessons should become the guiding principles of political life as well. For example, motheringinvolves a "metaphysicalattitude" of "holding," which gives priorityto the protection existing of relationships over the acquisitionof new benefits (Elshtain 1981, pp. 326-27, 349-53; Ruddick 1987, p. 242). This has obvious implicationsfor decisions about war or the environment. does not involvethe However, some critics argue thatmothering or same attributes virtuesas citizenshipand that there is no evidence that maternal attitudessuch as "holding" promotedemocraticvalues egalitarianism, and the such as "active citizenship,self-government, exercise of freedom" (Dietz 1985, p. 30; Nauta 1992, p. 31). As Dietz bua puts it, "An enlighteneddespotism,a welfare-state, single-party reaucracyand a democraticrepublic may all respectmothers,protect children'slives and show compassion forthe vulnerable"(Dietz 1992, p. 76). theories.Both maternal This criticism parallelsthatof civilsociety feminists and civil societytheoristsdefinecitizenshipin termsof the virtuesof the privatesphere. But while these virtuesmay sometimes and may be necessary for good citizenship,they are not sufficient, sometimesbe counterproductive. 4. Liberalvirtue -Liberals are oftenblamed forthe current theory. and imbalance betweenrights and responsibilities, not withoutreason. on Liberal theorists the 1970s and 1980s focused almostexclusively in of to thejustification rightsand of the institutions secure these rights, of believe without to attending the responsibilities citizens.Manycritics thisimbalance,since the liberal thatliberalsare incapable of righting or rendersthe conor commitment liberty neutrality individualism to cept of civic virtueunintelligible (Mouffe 1992a). work on the importance However, some of the most interesting of civicvirtueis in factbeing done by liberalssuch as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston. Accordingto Galston,the virtues required for responsible citizenship can be divided into four loyalty; social (ii) groups: (i) general virtues:courage, law-abidingness, virtues:independence,open-mindedness;(iii) economic virtues:work to adaptability economic and ethic,capacityto delay self-gratification, virtues:capacityto discernand technologicalchange; and (ivypolitical respect the rightsof others,willingnessto demand only what can be of to willingpaid for,ability evaluate the performance those in office, ness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991, pp. 221-24). It is the last two virtues-the abilityto question authorityand the willingnessto engage in public discourse-which are the most distinctive components of liberal virtuetheory.The need to question arises in part fromthe factthat citizensin a representative authority

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democracyelect representatives who governin theirname. Hence, an importantresponsibility citizens is to monitorthose officialsand of judge theirconduct. The need to engage in public discourse arises fromthe factthat the decisionsof governmentin a democracyshould be made publicly, throughfree and open discussion.But as Galston notes, the virtueof public discourse is notjust the willingness participatein politicsor to to make one's views known. Rather, it "includes the willingnessto listenseriouslyto a range of viewswhich,given the diversity liberal of societies,will include ideas the listeneris bound to findstrange and even obnoxious. The virtue of political discourse also includes the willingness set forth to one's own viewsintelligibly candidlyas the and basis fora politicsof persuasionratherthan manipulationor coercion" (Galston 1991, p. 227). Macedo calls this the virtue of "public reasonableness." Liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state or preferences make threats. Moreover,thesereasons mustbe "public" reasons, in the sense that they are capable of persuading people of different faithsand nationalities.Hence it is not enough to invoke Scripture or tradition.'7Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understandand accept as consistentwith their status as free and equal citizens. It requires a conscientiouseffort distinguishthose beliefswhich are mattersof to private faithfrom those which are capable of public defense and to see how issues look from the point of view of those with differing religious commitments and cultural backgrounds(cf. Phillips 1991b, pp. 57-59).18 Where do we learn these virtues?Other theorists have examwe ined relied on the market, family, the associationsof civilsociety the or to teach civic virtue.But it is clear that people will not automatically learn to engage in public discourse or to question authority any of in these spheres, since these spheres are oftenheld togetherby private discourse and respectfor authority. The answer, according to many liberal virtue theorists,is the systemof education. Schools must teach children how to engage in the kindof critical reasoningand moralperspective thatdefinespublic reasonableness. As Amy Gutmann puts it, children at school "must
17. See the discussion of the "principle of secular motivation"in Audi (1989, p. 284). 18. This showswhycivilsociety theorists mistaken think are to thatgood citizenship can be based on essentiallyprivatevirtues.The requirementof public reasonableness in political debate is unnecessaryand undesirable in the private sphere. It would be absurd to ask churchgoersto abstain fromappealing to Scripturein deciding how to run theirchurch.

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learn not just to behave in accordance with authoritybut to think if ideal critically about authority theyare to live up to the democratic of sharing political sovereigntyas citizens." People who "are ruled a only by habit and authority . are incapable of constituting society .. of sovereigncitizens"(Gutmann 1987, p. 51).19 However, thisidea thatschools should teach childrento be skeptical of political authorityand to distance themselvesfrom their own when engaging in public discourseis controversial. culturaltraditions leads chilTraditionalists object to it on the grounds thatit inevitably in dren to question tradition and parentalor religiousauthority private life. And that is surely correct. As Gutmann admits, education for democratic citizenship will necessarily involve "equipping children withthe intellectualskillsnecessaryto evaluate ways of life different fromthatof theirparents,"because "many if not all of the capacities necessaryfor choice among good lives are also necessaryfor choice among good societies"(Gutmann 1987, pp. 30, 40). Hence, those groups which rely heavily on an uncriticalaccepruled out, "are bound tance of tradition and authority, whilenotstrictly attitudes to be discouraged by the free,open, pluralistic, progressive" which liberal education encourages (Macedo 1990, pp. 53-54). This is whygroups such as the Amish have soughtto removetheirchildren fromthe school system. This createsa dilemmaforliberals,manyof whom wishto accommodate law-abiding groups like the Amish. Some liberals view the demise of such groups as regrettablebut sometimesinevitablein a democratic society(Rawls 1975, p. 551; but see Rawls 1988, pp. 26768). Other liberals,however,want to adjust citizenshipeducation to minimizethe impact on parental and religiousauthority. Galston,for example, argues that the need to teach children how to engage in public discourse and to evaluate political leaders "does not warrant the conclusion thatthe statemust (or may) structure public education on to fosterin childrenskepticalreflection waysof lifeinheritedfrom parents or local communities"(Galston 1991, p. 253). However, he admits that is is not easy for schools to promotea child's willingness her "unswerving withoutundermining to question politicalauthority belief in the correctness"of her parents' way of life. This parallels the dilemma facingcivilsocietytheorists. They face the question of when to intervenein privategroups in order to make on them more effective schools of civicvirtue;liberalvirtuetheorists, the other hand, face the question of when to modifycivic education
19. Public schools teach these virtuesnot only throughtheircurriculumbut also races and "by insistingthat students sit in their seats (next to studentsof different religions),raise their hands before speaking, hand in theirhomeworkon time . . . be good sportson its playingfield" (Gutmann 1987, p. 53).

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in the schools in order to limit its impact on private associations. Neither group has, to date, fullycome to grips withthese questions. D. Conclusion: Responsible Citizenship PublicPolicy and In mostpostwarpoliticaltheory, fundamentalnormativeconcepts the were democracy(forevaluatingprocedures)andjustice (forevaluating outcomes). Citizenship,if it was discussed at all, was usually seen as derivative democracy of and justice-that is, a citizenis someone who has democratic rights and claimsofjustice.There is increasingsupport, however,from all points of the politicalspectrum,for the view that citizenshipmust play an independentnormativerole in any plausible political theoryand that the promotionof responsible citizenshipis an urgentaim of public policy. And yet a striking feature of the currentdebate is the timidity withwhich authors apply theirtheoriesof citizenshipto questions of public policy.As we have seen, there are some suggestionsabout the sorts of institutions policies that would promote or enforce the or virtuesand responsibilities good citizenship.But these tend to be of the same policieswhichhave long been defendedon groundsofjustice or democracy.The leftfavored democratizing the welfarestate long before theyadopted the language of citizenship, just as feminists favored day care and the New Rightopposed the welfarestate.It is not clear whetheradopting the perspectiveof citizenshipreally leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiarperspectivesof justice and democracy. We can imagine more radical proposals to promote citizenship. If civility important,why not pass Good Samaritan laws, as many is European countrieshave done? If politicalparticipation important, is why not require mandatoryvoting, as in Australia or Belgium? If is public-spiritedness important, whynot require a period of mandatorynational service,as in mostEuropean countries?If public schools help teach responsible citizenship,because theyrequire children of different races and religionsto sit togetherand learn to respecteach other,why not prohibitprivateschools? These are the kinds of policies which are concerned specifically withpromotingcitizenship, ratherthanjustice or democracy. few Yet authors even contemplate such proposals. Instead, most citizenship theorists eitherleave the question of how to promotecitizenship unanswered (Glendon 1991, p. 138) or focus on "modest"or "gentle and relatively unobtrusiveways" to promote civic virtues(Macedo 1990, bemoan the excessivefocus pp. 234, 253).20While citizenshiptheorists

20. For other accounts of the "unobtrusive"promotion of citizenship,see Habermas (1992, pp. 6-7), Hill (1993), and Rawls (1993, pp. 216-20).

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given to rights, theyseem reluctantto propose any policies thatcould be seen as restricting those rights. There may be good reasons for this timidity, it sits uneasily but withthe claim thatwe face a crisisof citizenshipand thatwe urgently need a theoryof citizenship.As a result,much recentworkon citizenship virtuesseems quite hollow. In the absence of some account of legitimateand illegitimate ways to promote or enforce good citizenship, manyworkson citizenshipreduce to a platitude:namely,society would be betterif the people in it were nicer and more thoughtful. Indeed, it is not clear how urgent the need to promote good citizenshipis. The literatureon citizenshipis full of dire predictions about the decline of virtue, but as Galston admits,"culturalpessimism is a pervasivethemeof human history, in nearlyeverygeneration" and (Galston 1991, p. 237).22 If thereare increasingcrimeand decreasing votingrates,itis equally truethatwe are moretolerant, morerespectful of others'rights, and more committedto democracy and constitutionalism than were previous generations(Macedo 1990, pp. 6-7). So it remains unclear how we should be promotinggood citizenshipand how urgent it is to do so. IV. CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE Citizenshipis notjust a certain status,definedby a set of rightsand responsibilities. is also an identity, expression of one's memberIt an ship in a political community.Marshall saw citizenshipas a shared identity thatwould integrate previously excluded groupswithin British societyand provide a source of national unity.He was particularly concerned to integratethe workingclasses, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded them fromthe "common culture" which should have been a "common possession and heritage" (Marshall 1965, pp. 101-2).23

21. For example, Mouffecriticizesliberalismfor reducing citizenship"to a mere legal status,settingout the rightsthat the individual holds against the state" (1992a, p. 227) and seeks to "reestablishthe lost connection between ethics and politics,"by understandingcitizenshipas a form of "political identity that is created through the identification withthe respublic" (p. 230). Yet she offersno suggestionsabout how to promote or compel this public-spirited participation, and insists(against civic republicans) thatcitizensmust be free to choose not to give priority theirpoliticalactivities. to Her critique of liberalism,therefore,seems to reduce to the claim that the liberal is conception of citizenship-as-legal-status not an adequate conceptionof good citizenship, which liberals would readilyaccept. Many critiquesof liberal citizenshipamount to the same unenlighteningclaim. 22. Indeed, we can find similar worries about political apathy in 1950s political and even in Tocqueville. sociologists, 23. See the discussion of citizenship's"integrativefunction"in Barbalet (1988, p. 93).

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It has become clear,however,thatmanygroups-blacks, women, Aboriginal peoples, ethnic and religious minorities,gays and lesbians-still feel excluded fromthe 'commonculture',despitepossessing the common rightsof citizenship.Members of these groups feel excluded not onlybecause of theirsocioeconomicstatusbut also because of theirsocioculturalidentity-their 'difference'. An increasing number of theorists,whom we will call 'cultural pluralists', argue that citizenship must take account of these differences. Cultural pluralistsbelieve that the common rightsof citizenship, originallydefinedby and forwhite men, cannot accommodate the special needs of minoritygroups. These groups can only be integrated into the common culture if we adopt what Iris Marion Young calls a conception of "differentiatedcitizenship" (Young 1989, p. 258). On thisview,membersof certaingroups would be incorporated into the politicalcommunity not only as individualsbut also through the group, and their rightswould depend, in part, on their group membership. For example, some immigrantgroups are demanding special rightsor exemptionsto accommodatetheirreligiouspractices; historically disadvantaged groups, such as women or blacks, are demanding special representationin the political process; and many national minorities(Quebecois, Kurds, Catalans) are seeking greater if withinthe larger country, not outright powers of self-government secession. These demands for "differentiated citizenship" pose a serious challenge to the prevailing conception of citizenship.Many people regard the idea of group-differentiated citizenshipas a contradiction in terms.On the orthodox view,citizenshipis, by definition, matter a of treatingpeople as individualswithequal rightsunder the law. This is what distinguishesdemocraticcitizenshipfrom feudal and other premodern views that determined people's political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership. Hence, "the organization of or societyon the basis of rights claimsthatderivefromgroup membership is sharplyopposed to the concept of societybased on citizenship" (Porter 1987, p. 128). The idea of differentiated citizenship, therefore, is a radical developmentin citizenshiptheory. One of the most influential theorists cultural pluralismis Iris of Marion Young. Accordingto Young, the attemptto create a universal whichtranscends is conceptionof citizenship group differences fundabecause it oppresses historically excluded groups: "In mentallyunjust a society wheresome groups are privilegedwhileothersare oppressed, insistingthat as citizenspersons should leave behind theirparticular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves the privilege;forthe perspectiveand interests the only to reinforce of privilegedwill tend to dominate thisunifiedpublic, marginalizing or

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silencingthose of other groups" (Young 1989, p. 257).24Young gives two reasons why genuine equality requires affirming ratherthan ignoring group differences.First,culturallyexcluded groups are at a disadvantage in the politicalprocess, and "the solution lies at least in part in providinginstitutionalized means for the explicitrecognition and representation oppressed groups" (Young 1989, p. 259). These of procedural measures would include public fundsforadvocacy groups, guaranteed representationin political bodies, and veto rightsover specificpolicies thataffect group directly a (Young 1989, pp. 261-62; 1990, pp. 183-91). excluded groups often have distinctive needs Second, culturally which can only be met through group-differentiated policies. These includelanguage rights Hispanics,land rights Aboriginal for for groups, and reproductive rightsforwomen (Young 1990, pp. 175-83). Other includegroup policieswhichhave been advocatedby culturalpluralists libel laws for women or Muslims,publiclyfundedschools for certain religiousminorities, exemptionsfromlaws thatinterfere and withreligious worship,such as Sunday closing,animal-slaughtering legislation or forJews and Muslims, motorcycle helmetlawsforSikhs(Parekh1990, p. 705; 1991, pp. 197-204; Modood 1992). Much has been written for regardingthejustification these rights and how they relate to broader theories of justice and democracy. Young herselfdefendsthem as a response to "oppression,"of which she outlines fiveforms:exploitation,marginalization, powerlessness, culturalimperialism, and "randomviolenceand harassmentmotivated by group hatred or fear" (Young 1989, p. 261). It would take us too or far afield to consider thesejustifications the various objections to them.25 Instead, we willfocus on the impactof these rightson citizenship identity. Criticsof differentiated citizenshipworrythat if groups are encouraged by the very termsof citizenshipto turn inward and focus on their 'difference'(whetherracial, ethnic,religious,sexual, and so of on), then "the hope of a larger fraternity all Americanswill have to be abandoned" (Glazer 1983, p. 227). Citizenshipwill cease to be
from is "constructed 24. See also Pateman's discussionof how citizenship currently so men's attributes, capacities and activities," that citizenshipcan only be extended to women "as lessermen" (1988, pp. 252-53; cf.James 1992, pp. 52-55; Pateman 1992). citizenship(a) violatesequality: grant25. Criticshave objected thatdifferentiated ing rightsto some people but not others on the basis of theirgroup membershipsets up a hierarchyin which some citizensare 'more equal' than others; (b) violates liberal neutrality: the role of the state in mattersof culture should be limitedto maintaining thereis no principledway to determine a fairculturalmarketplace;and (c) is arbitrary: status.For a discussionof these objections,see which groups are entitledto differential (1989, 1991), Glazer (1983), Taylor (1991; 1992a, pp. 51-61), Hindess (1993), Kymlicka Phillips (1992), and Van Dyke (1985).

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"a device to cultivatea sense of communityand a common sense of purpose" (Heater 1990, p. 295; Kristeva 1993, p. 7; Cairns 1993). Nothing will bind the various groups in societytogetherand prevent the spread of mutual mistrust conflict or (Kukathas 1993, p. 156). Criticsalso worrythat differentiated citizenshipwould create a "politicsof grievance." If, as Young implies, only oppressed groups are entitled to differentiated citizenship,this may encourage group leaders to devote theirpoliticalenergyto establishing perceptionof a disadvantage-rather than workingto overcome it-in order to secure theirclaim to group rights. These are seriousconcerns.In evaluatingthem,however,we need to distinguish kinds threedifferent kindsof groups and threedifferent of group rights, whichboth Young and her critics tendto run together: (a) special representation rights(fordisadvantagedgroups); (b) multiculturalrights(for immigrant and religious groups); and (c) self-governmentrights(fornational minorities). Each of these has verydifferent implicationsfor citizenshipidentity. Specialrepresentation rights. -For many of the groups on Young's list,such as the poor, elderly, African-Americans, gays,thedemand and for group rightstakes the formof special representation withinthe politicalprocess of the larger society.Since Young views these rights as a response to conditionsof oppression,theyare mostplausiblyseen as a temporarymeasure on the way to a societywhere the need for no special representation longer exists.Societyshould seek to remove the oppression, therebyeliminatingthe need for these rights. Self-government -In some of Young's examples, such as the rights. reservationsystemof the American Indians, the demand for group rightsis not seen as a temporary measure, and it is misleadingto say that group rightsare a response to a form of oppression that we hope someday to eliminate. Aboriginal peoples and other national minorities like the Quebecois or Scots claim permanentand inherent rights,grounded in a principle of self-determination. These groups are 'cultures','peoples', or 'nations', in the sense of being historical more or less institutionally communities, complete,occupyinga given homeland or territory, sharinga distinct These language and history. nations find themselves within the boundaries of a larger political but claim the rightto govern themselvesin certain key community, matters,in order to ensure the full and free development of their culture and the best interestsof their people. What these national minoritieswant is not primarily betterrepresentationin the central of governmentbut, rather,the transfer power and legislative jurisdictions fromthe centralgovernmentto theirown communities. Multicultural -The case of Hispanics and other immigrant rights. groups in the United States is different again. Their demands include public supportof bilingualeducation and ethnicstudiesin schools and

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exemptions from laws that disadvantage them, given their religious practices. These measures are intended to help immigrantsexpress and theirculturalparticularity pride withoutits hamperingtheirsuccess in the economic and politicalinstitutions the dominantsociety. of Like self-government rights, these rightsneed not be temporary, because the cultural differencesthey promote are not something we hope to eliminate. But unlike self-government rights,multicultural rightsare intendedto promoteintegration into the largersociety,not self-government. Obviously, these three kinds of rightscan overlap, in the sense that some groups can claim more than one kind of group right. If differentiated citizenshipis definedas the adoption of one or more of these group-differentiated thenvirtually rights, everymodern democracyrecognizes some formof it. Citizenshiptoday "is a much more differentiated far less homogeneous concept than has been and presupposed bypoliticaltheorists"(Parekh 1990, p. 702). Nevertheless, most cultural pluralistsdemand a degree of differentiation not present in almostany developed democracy. Would adopting one or more of these group rightsundermine A the integrative functionof citizenship? closer look at the distinction between the three kinds of rightssuggests that such fears are often misplaced. The factis that,generallyspeaking,the demand for both representationrightsand multicultural rightsis a demand for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded want to be included in the larger society,and the recognitionand accommodationof their'difference' is intendedto facilitate this. The rightto special representation just a new twiston an old is idea. It has alwaysbeen recognizedthata majoritariandemocracy can In systematically ignorethevoicesof minorities. cases whereminorities are regionallyconcentrated,democraticsystemshave responded by intentionally drawingthe boundaries of federalunits,or of individual is to constituencies, create seats wherethe minority in a majority (Beitz 1989, chap. 7). Cultural pluralistssimplyextendthislogic to nonterriwho may equally be in need of representation torialminorities, (e.g., women, the disabled, or gays and lesbians). There are enormous practical obstacles to such a proposal. For to example, how do we decidewhichgroupsare entitled such represenand how do we ensure that their'representatives' in fact are tation,26
26. Accordingto Young, "Once we are clear thatthe principleof group representationrefersonlyto oppressed social groups,thenthe fearof an unworkableproliferation of group representation should dissipate"(1990, p. 187). However,her listof "oppressed groups" would seem to include 80 percent of the population-she says that "in the groups are oppressed in one or more of these United States today,at least the following ways: women, blacks, Native Americans,Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-

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accountable to the group?27But the basic impulse underlying representationrightsis integration, not separation. mostmulticultural Similarly, demandsare evidence thatmembers of minority groups wantto getintothemainstream society. of Consider the case of Canadian Sikhs who wanted to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) but, because of theirreligious requirement to wear a turban, could not do so unless theywere exempted from the usual dress code regarding headgear. The fact that these men wanted to be a part of the RCMP, one of Canada's "nationalsymbols," is ample evidenceof theirdesireto participate thelargercommunity. in The special right they were requesting could only be seen as promoting,not discouraging,theirintegration.28 Some people fear thatmulticultural rightsimpede the process of integrationfor immigrantsby creating a confusing halfwayhouse between their old nation and citizenshipin the new one. But these worries seem empiricallyunfounded. Experience in countries with extensivemulticultural programs,such as Canada and Australia,suggest that firstand second-generation immigrants who remain proud of their heritage are also among the most patrioticcitizensof their new country(Kruhlak 1992).29Moreover,theirstrongaffiliation with

speaking Americans,Asian Americans,gay men, lesbians,working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentallyand physicallydisabled people" (1989, p. 261). In short, everyone but healthy,relatively well-off, relativelyyoung, heterosexual white males. Even then, it is hard to see how this criterionwould avoid an 'unworkable proliferation', since each of these groups has subgroups that mightclaim their own rights.In the case of Britain,e.g., "the all-embracing concept of 'black' people rapidly dissolved into a distinction between the Asian and Afro-Caribbeancommunities,and then subsequentlyinto finerdistinctions betweena wide variety ethnicgroups. What of in this contextthen counts as 'adequate' ethnicrepresentation?" (Phillips 1992, p. 89). Nevertheless,many political parties and trade unions have allowed for special group representation withoutenteringan escalatingspiralof demandsand resentment (Young 1989, pp. 187-89). 27. "There are few mechanismsfor establishingwhat each group wants.... Accountability alwaysthe otherside of representation, is and, in the absence of procedures forestablishing whatany group wantsor thinks, cannotusefully we talkof theirpolitical representation"(Phillips 1992, pp. 86-88). In the absence of accountability, might it be more appropriate to talk of consultationthan representation. 28. This is in contrastto many Aboriginal communitiesin Canada who, as part of their self-government, have been tryingto remove the RCMP fromtheirreserves and replace it with a Native police force. Of course, some demands for multicultural rightsalso take the formof withdrawalfromthe larger society,although this is more likelyto be true of religioussects (e.g., the Amish) than of ethniccommunitiesper se. 29. Moreover,a proliferation such demandsis unlikely, of sincetheyusuallyinvolve clear and specificcases of unintended conflictbetween majorityrules and minority religiouspractices.And since proof of oppression is neithernecessarynor sufficient to claim these rights,there is littleriskthat theywill promotea politicsof grievance.

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their new countryseems to be based in large part on its willingness notjust to toleratebut to welcome culturaldifference.30 rights, however,do raise deep problemsfortraSelf-government and While both representation ditionalnotionsof citizenshipidentity. multicultural rightstake the larger political communityfor granted reflect and seek greaterinclusion in it, demands for self-government and, indeed, a desire to weaken the bonds withthe larger community and permanence. If democracyis question its verynature, authority, raises the question the rule of the people, group self-determination claim thattheyare of who 'the people' reallyare. National minorities whichwere of distinct peoples, withinherentrights self-determination not relinquished by their (sometimes involuntary)federationwith othernations withina largercountry.Indeed, the retainingof certain spelled out in the treatiesor constitutional powers is often explicitly agreementswhich specifiedthe termsof federation. therefore, the most complete case of are rights, Self-government sincetheydividethe people intoseparate'peodifferentiated citizenship, and territories, powers of selfrights, ples', each withits own historic withits own political and each, therefore, community. government, citizenship can serve an inteIt seems unlikelythatdifferentiated grative function in this context. If citizenshipis membership in a then in creatingoverlappingpoliticalcommunipoliticalcommunity, rightsnecessarilygive rise to a sortof dual citities,self-government zenship and to potential conflictsabout which communitycitizens identify with most deeply (Vernon 1988). Moreover, there seems to be no natural stopping point to the demands for increasingself-government. If limited autonomy is granted, this may simply fuel the withnothingshort leaderswho willbe satisfied ambitionsof nationalist nation-state.Democratic multination of their own undifferentiated unstable for thisreason. statesare, it would seem, inherently It might seem tempting,therefore,to ignore the demands of national minorities,keep any reference to particular groups out of the constitution, and insist that citizenship is a common identity shared by all individuals withoutregard to group membership. This
30. Of course, liberalscannot accept a group's demand to practiceits religiousor culturalcustoms if these violate the bIasicrightsof the membersof these groups (e.g., on clitoridectomy, restrictions exit). It is importantto distinguishwhat we can call "internal"and "external"group rights.Internal rightsare rightsof a group against its own members,used to force individualswithinthe group to obey traditionalcustoms External rightsare rightsof the group against the largersociety,used to or authority. provide support for the group against economic or politicalpressure fromoutside for rightsare almost cultural assimilation. In western democracies,group-differentiated with liberal demoalways external rights,since internalrightsare clearlyinconsistent craticnorms. See Kukathas (1992) and the replyin Kymlicka(1992).

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is often described as the American strategyfordealing withcultural pluralism. But with a few exceptions-such as the (mostlyoutlying or isolated) American Indian, Inuit, Puerto Rican, and native Hawaiian populations-the United States is not a multination state. It faced the problem of assimilatingvoluntaryimmigrants,not of incorporating historicallyself-governingcommunities whose homeland has become part of the larger community.And where it was applied to national minorities-for example, American Indians-the 'common citizenship' strategy has oftenbeen a spectacular failure, as even its supporters admit (Walzer 1982, p. 27; cf. Kymlicka 1991). Hence, many of these groups are now accorded selfgovernment rightswithinthe United States. Indeed, there are veryfewdemocratic multinationstatesthatfollow the strict'common citizenship'strategy. This is not surprising, because refusingdemands for self-government rightsmay simplyaggravate alienation among these groups and increase the desire for secession (Taylor 1992a, p. 64). Hence, demands for self-government raise a problem for proponents of both common citizenship and differentiated citizenship. Yet remarkably little attention has been paid, by either defenders or critics,to this form of differentiatedcitizenship (or to the most common arrangement for instantiating self-government rights, namely, federalism).32 What,then,is the source of unityin a multination Rawls country? claims thatthe source of union in modernsocietiesis a shared conceptionofjustice: "Althougha well-ordered is society dividedand pluralistic . . . public agreement on questions of political and social justice supports ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association" (Rawls 1980, p. 540). But the factthat two national groups share the same principlesof justice does not necessarilygive them any strong reason tojoin (or remain) together, ratherthanremaining(or splitting into) two separate countries. The fact that people in Norway and Sweden share the same principlesofjustice is no reason for them to regret the secession of Norway in 1905. Similarly, the fact that the anglophones and francophonesin Canada share the same principles ofjusticeis not a strongreason to remaintogether, sincethe Quebecois rightly assume that their own national state could respect the same principles.A shared conception ofjustice throughouta politicalcommunitydoes not necessarilygenerate a shared identity, alone a let

31. In any event, the state cannot avoid giving public recognitionto particular group identities. Afterall, governments mustdecide whichlanguages) willserve as the officiallanguage of the schools, courts,and legislatures. 32. For a surveyof philosophical work on federalism, Norman (1993b). see

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shared citizenshipidentity thatwillsupersede rivalidentities based on ethnicity (Nickel 1990; Norman 1993a).33 It seems clear, then,thatthisis one place wherewe reallydo need a theoryof citizenship, just a theoryof democracy not orjustice. How can we construct commonidentity a country a in wherepeople notonly belong to separate politicalcommunitiesbut also belong in different ways-that is, some are incorporated as individuals and others through membership in a group? Taylor calls this "deep diversity" and insiststhat it is "the only formula"on which a multinationstate can remain united (Taylor 1991). However, he admits that it is an open question what holds such a countrytogether.34 Indeed, the greatvariancein historical, cultural,and politicalsituations in multinationstates suggests that any generalized answer to thisquestion willlikelybe overstated.It mightbe a mistaketo suppose that one could develop a general theoryabout the role of either a in common citizenshipidentity a differentiated or citizenshipidentity promotingor hinderingnational unity (Taylor 1992b, pp. 65-66). Here, as with the other issues we have examined in this survey,it remains unclear what we can expect froma 'theoryof citizenship'.

33. If governmentswish to use citizenship identityto promote national unity, therefore, theywill have to identify citizenship,not only withacceptance of principles based perhaps on a of justice but also with an emotional-affective sense of identity, manipulation of shared symbolsor historicalmyths.For a discussion of this strategy, see Norman (1993a). 34. European philosophers are confronting increasingly these dilemmas as they and the formof citizenship seek to understandthe nature of the European Community it requires. Habermas and his followers argue thatEuropean unitycannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures,and languages thatcharacterized successful nation-states. Instead,European citizenship mustbe foundedon a 'postnational' constitutional patriotism based on shared principlesofjustice and democracy(Habermas 1992; Berten 1992; Ferry 1992). Others, however,argue thatsuch a basis forunityis too 'thin'.As Taylor France and the United notes, even the model experimentsin constitutional patriotism, States, have always also required many of the trappings of nation-states, including and ideals of historical and quasi-ethnicmembership foundingmyths, national symbols, (Taylor 1992b, p. 61; cf. Lenoble 1992; Smith 1993). Accordingto Taylor, it is not for philosophers to definea priorithe formof citizenshipthat is legitimateor admissible. whichappear significant the people themRather,we should seek formsof identity to selves (Taylor 1992b, p. 65; Berten 1992, p. 64).

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