Citizenship case digests BENGZON VS CRUZ (Effect of Repatriation) Facts: Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United StatesMarine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, amongothers, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service inthe U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing marginof 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming thatrespondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives sincehe is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warrantoand declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengsons MR was likewise denied. Issue: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Held: Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the naturalborncitizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of aparticular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of thePhilippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippinecitizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizensthrough naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as theRevised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), andby Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all thequalifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Thedecision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from itspromulgation when the court is satisfied that during the

intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has notbeen convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committedany act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announcedpolicies.Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in themanner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modesby which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Asa mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippinecitizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizenwho wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may behad under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armedforces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in theArmed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to analien; and (5) political and economic necessity.As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath inthe Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalizedFilipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The ruleapplies to Cruzs case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon hisrepatriation.

Cordora vs Comelec
(dual citizenship) FACTS: Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambuntingmade false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election in 2001and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which statedthat, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 andupon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambuntingacquired American

citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand,maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born ofa Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings father petitioned him through INS Form I-130(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to substantiate the charges. TheCOMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced hisAmerican citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed a MRbut was denied, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino. HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwentthe process involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims thatbecause of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insist s thatTambunting is a naturalized American citizen. We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he isFilipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or morestates, a person is simultaneously

considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it isenough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath ofallegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another countryis allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.

(effect of being a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration while having a valid Phil passport) FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien. HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

AZNAR VS COMELEC

(effect of naturalization)
Facts: Petitioner Antonio Co ran for Congressman of the 2nd District of Samar. Private respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was declared winner. Although Ongs mother is a natural born-Filipina, his father was only naturalized as a Filipino when the respondent was already nine years old. Given these facts, petitioner contends that Ong is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore disqualified from being elected Congressman. Issue: WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Ruling: Affirmative. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such. The petitioners argue that the respondents father was not, validly,

CO VS HRET

a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ongs father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

(will re-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law have the effect of restoring domicile in the PH) Facts: Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007. Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Barangay 6), for one year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of LGC Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at Barangay 6. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. However, he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following: CTC from Barangay 6 (March 2006) Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005) Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006) Pending this case, Ty won the elections. COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty. COMELEC En Banc affirmed. Issue:

Japzon v Commission on Elections

WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the Local Government Code. Held: YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.

(who are qualified to avail of repatriation under RA 8171) In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could be

Tabasa vs CA

repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. ISSUE: Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? HELD: He does not. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

(effect of marriage of alien woman to Filipino? before 1987 Constitution) FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her greatgranduncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any

MOY YA LIM YAO V. CIR

Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. ISSUE: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. HELD: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Civil service commission (Can the president remove a presidential appointee who belong to the career service) FACTS:

Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)

Larin, a Revenue Specific Tax Officer under the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR, is convicted of crimes of violation of sec. 268 (4) NIRC and sec. 3 (e) RA 3019 (grave misconduct). Acting by authority of the president, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing issued a memorandum order, creating an Executive Committee to investigate Larins administrative charge. While the investigation was going on, the President issued E.O. 132, streamlining the BIR and abolishing the office of the Specific Tax Service. Afterwards, Larin was found guilty and was subsequently dismissed. However, in the appealed case, SC set aside the conviction of Larin ISSUE: W/N Larin was unlawfully removed from office (1) Does the President have the power to dismiss him? Reorganize the BIR? (2) Was reorganization valid, considering that there was no law enacted by Congress authorizing reorganization by the Executive HELD: SC held that removal as a result of reorganization was done in bad faith. Does the President have the power to dismiss him? Larin is a presidential appointee. As such, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President for the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. However, Larin is a career service officer, therefore, he enjoys security of tenure. Under the Civil Service Decree, career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process. Was the removal for a legal cause under a valid proceeding? SC held that the removal complied with the requirements for procedural due process but that the dismissal was not for a valid cause. The basis used in Larins removal is the criminal conviction against him, but this conviction was later set aside by the Supreme Court upon appeal. Where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case

necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in sch a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit. Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR? Yes, under sec. 48 and 62 of RA 7645, sec. 20, Bk. III of EO 292 (Residual Powers), and PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. But while the Presidents power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. When is there reorganization made in good faith? The general rule is that a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. What are the marks of bad faith in removal as a result of reorganization? Sec. 2, RA 6656 enumerates the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of reorganization: (1) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (2) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (3) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (4) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (5) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in sec. 3 hereof.

Fact: An action for mandamus with damages to declare the abolition of the petitioners position void, and to order the respondent City Mayor to reinstate them to their former positions.

(Can abolition of an office violate security of tenure of the employees)

Briones v. Osmea

Ordinance No. 192 abolished 15 positions in the City Mayors office and 17 positions in the Office of the Municipal Board with an alleged economic and efficient reason for the abolition. Issue: Held: The reason given for the abolition of the positions is untrue, and constitutes a mere subterfuge for the removal without cause of the said appellees, in violation of Civil Service tenures as provided by the Constitution. Prior to the abolition of the positions, the office of the City Mayor no less than 35 new positions calling for an outlay of 68,100pesos per annum. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution dictates that civil service eligibles, who have rendered long and honorable services, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given positions of recent creation, nor should be left at the mercy of political changes.

(Is the attrition law which allows termination of Customs/BIR personnel not able to obtain their performance) August 14, 2008 FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collectionof the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The lawintends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targetsby providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards andIncentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers allofficials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,regardless of employment status.The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and CoordinatingCommittee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIRand the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targetedamount of tax revenue.Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging theconstitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing asystem of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of theBIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only inconsideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invitescorruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials

ABAKADA v. PurisimaG.R. No. 166715,

andemployees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency ISSUES: 1.W/N RA 9335 constitutional? 2.W/N the limitation the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officialsand employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equalprotection. 3.W/N the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President RATIO: 1. Yes.The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it.Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials andemployees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legalbasis and purely speculative.Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel. 2. No. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions - taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. 3. No. RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President infixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of thelaw. Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expectedrespectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC andstated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of theDBCC. DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules andregulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is

UPHELD. Pursuant toSection 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in and effect.