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A note from the editor . . .

Hello from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri!


The US Army Chemical School is in the process of moving to Fort Leonard Wood to merge with the Military Police School and Engineer School to form the new Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN). Our move is about 25 percent complete with the Directorate of Training Development and the Directorate of Combat Developments already in place. The remainder of the school is scheduled to move in the fourth quarter of 1999. Although many things have changed, some things remain the same. I am still editor of the magazine and Ms. Kathie Troxell still does the design and layout. We are producing the CML, Army Chemical Review, from MANSCEN, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as of this issue. The CML will continue to be published twice a yearJanuary and July. I appreciate your support during this time of change. As always, we need your input; articles, comments, suggestions, or letters to the editor are all welcome. They help us provide you with the professional journal you deserve. Articles may be sent by paper copy, on disc (in Microsoft Word), or e-mail. Appropriate photographs and art are appreciated. (Hard-copy photographs are preferred. Digital photos are acceptable if saved at a dpi/ppi of 200 or more and at 100 percent of actual size. TIFF and JPEG file formats are preferred). Our new phone number and address are listed below. Mattie Kirby Editor, CML, Army Chemical Review Phone: Editor676-5267 DSN or (573) 563-5267 Commercial Designer676-5270 DSN or (573) 563-5270 Commercial Address: Directorate of Training Development ATTN: Mattie Kirby, Editor, CML MANSCEN 320 Engineer Loop, Suite 210 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Commandant MG Ralph G. Wooten Supervisory Editor Dr. JoJo Corkan Editor Mattie Kirby Graphics/Layout Kathie Troxell CML, Army Chemical Review is prepared twice a year by the US Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. CML presents professional information about the Chemical Corps functions related to nuclear, biological, chemical, smoke, flame field expedients, and NBC reconnaissance in combat support. Objectives of CML are to inform, motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for exchange of ideas. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other US Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy or product endorsement. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to CML and its authors. All photographs are official US Army photos unless otherwise noted. SUBSCRIPTIONS: Available through the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9317. Third class postage for CML paid at Anniston, Alabama, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to CML, US Army Chemical School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: DENNIS J. REIMER General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:

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Articles

July 1999

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JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 05429

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The Refitted M93A1 NBCRS (Fox) Shortcomings in Firepower? Stand By!


Digital Unit Training for Chemical Soldiers

Integrating the PDS with the Decontamination Site in Todays Army Blind Pursuit: A New Stivers Print

We Must Protect the Children

The 82d is Smokin

CDTF Moves to the Ozarks

Achieving 360-Degree Smoke Coverage

Training Gets a Boost from New Technology

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Chemical Corps in the 21st CenturyOur Future

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CWC InspectionUp Close and Personal

Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

Sustaining Critical Skills

And the Winner is

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Chief of Chemical

As I sit here writing my last article for CML, as the Commandant of the Chemical School and Chief of Chemical, Im captured by a flood of memories. Operational tempo and personnel turbulence remain at peak activity: our just-concluded meetings in Aberdeen/Edgewood, Maryland; the first steps of our new Maneuver Support Center in Missouri; the closing of facilities at Fort McClellan; work on the digitized division and corps at Fort Hood; the establishment of a Homeland Defense Center at Fort Wood; the Gulf War illness initiative; the new joint (JP 3-11) and multi-service (FM 3-4-1) doctrinal guidance; and, perhaps most important, the new Chemical Corps Vision. In these exceptionally stressful times, I believe it is vital to have a mark on the wall for Dragon Soldiers to follow. There are many paths to the future, but the one outlined in Chemical Vision 2010 has been synchronized with other branch efforts, and represents the way I think we must address the future of our Corps. While no one path can provide for every opportunity or contingency, I believe the inherent flexibility and adaptability of our vision will serve to guide us well over the next decade. The future is based on our past success and as I have visited our Sibert Award winners, the 21st Chemical Company (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 310th Chemical Company (BIDS) at Fort McClellan, Alabama, I am pleased with the condition of our leaders, soldiers, and units. The discipline, talent, pride, and espirit de corps these magnificent soldiers display make me very proud to offer them as the credentials of our success. To each and every one of you who are performing a myriad of missions and taskings so very well, to those whose support of our efforts in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia may have gone unrewarded but not unnoticed, to Dragon Soldiers worldwide, I tell you, very well done! One of the cornerstones of our future success will require the blending of digital and analog units into a cohesive force. We are capturing the lessons learned at Fort Hood as the digital division and digital corps become realities. The doctrine for these operations is currently being placed in FM 3-101-1. This will be a constantly evolving draft throughout the process, to include development of the Joint Contingency Force (JCF). Our intent is to build workable doctrine and then embed it into our family of doctrinal publications rather than produce a single, stand-alone publication for NBC digital operations.
MG Ralph G. Wooten, Chief of Chemical

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Chief of Chemical

Having mentioned our family of doctrinal publications, we are in the final staffing of our new top-of-the-chart publication, Joint Publication 3-11. This publication has undergone extensive review by the joint community and provides overarching guidance at the strategic theater and operational levels of war. As more of our literature makes the transition to joint and multi-service formats, the more we can truly field joint task forces capable of operating in an orchestrated manner. FM 3-4-1, NBC Protection for Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields, provides guidance for the multi-service requirement to operate within an NBC environment. The new FM 3-21 will address the use of Chemical Corps assets in stability operations and support operations. A chapter in this manual will guide the Rapid Assessment Initial Detection (RAID) Military Support Detachments (MSD), which will be the cornerstone for supporting domestic operations when an NBC condition is created or threatened. These are just a few of the many activities in which we are engaged. I am convinced our Corps is more relevant to Americas needs today than at any time in our past. The threat is real, it is significant, and Dragon Soldiers are Americas best defense against it. On a more personal note, let me say that it has been a pleasure serving as your commandant and chief of branch for the last four and one-half years. It has not always been fun, but I can truthfully say it has been challenging, dynamic, and personally rewarding. I have tried to make every decision and fight every battle in the best interest of our Regiment. Many of you have assisted me in these efforts and I thank you. As I conclude this article, I want to recognize two individuals who have had major impacts on our success over the past two years. COL Dan Uyesugi and CSM Jim Van Patten have supported me and our Corps with loyalty, dedication, vision, and commitment. They have my highest praise and gratitude. To the rest of the Regiment, good luck and continued success.

DRAGON SOLDIERS!

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And the winner is . . .


(It could be YOU!)
Each year the Office of the Chief of Chemical sponsors a writing competition. This years winners of the competition are, from left to right: CPT Brant Hoskins, first place; CPT William J. Epolito, second place; and MSG David Zapata, third place.

CPT Hoskins first-place article, Sustaining Critical Skills, begins on page 5. The second-place article by CPT Epolito, CWC Inspection, begins on page 8. MSG Zapatas third-place article, The Chemical Corps in the 21st Century Our Future, begins on page 12.

For details on next years theme and how to enter the competition, see page 7.
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Chemical leadership must ensure . . . that our personnel maintain their readiness and know how to take advantage of these systems. The current sustainment training of battalion staff chemical officers on NBC tasks is not sufficient.

The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

1st Place

Sustaining Critical Skills


By CPT Brant D. Hoskins
The Chemical Corps is making advances in the NBC equipment arena. New systems are being fielded to deal with the constantly changing threat. These systems, if employed properly, will enhance our ability to detect and avoid contamination, decontaminate, and obscure the future battlefield. Chemical leadership must ensure, however, that our personnel maintain their readiness and know how to take advantage of these systems. The current sustainment training of battalion staff chemical officers on NBC tasks is not sufficient. most of your training time in the field. These were great opportunities to learn about the Army and your unit, but your skills as a chemical officer began to rust. As with any skill, time erodes our NBC proficiency if we do not expend energy to sustain it.

The Army directs in FM 25-100, Training the Force, that once we have achieved the required level of proficiency to, repeat critical task training at a minimum frequency necessary to maintain proficiency We are also As with any skill, instructed not to rely on infrequent The skills chemical lieutenants time erodes our peaking to the appropriate level develop in officer basic courses of wartime proficiency. This diminish greatly while serving as NBC proficiency principle applies to every unit and battalion-level staff officers. This if we do not expend individual in the Army. Airborne shortfall seriously degrades the quality of support the Chemical Corps will be energy to sustain it. training is a prime example. Soldiers who have not jumped in more than able to provide in the next conflict in six months must undergo training which weapons of mass destruction will be used. We require determined efforts to ensure consisting of up to a six-hour block of instruction our officers are ready for the next fight. This article on critical tasks necessary to execute their duties to examines skill degradation and recommends possible standard. In addition, airborne soldiers are required solutions to maintain training. to jump once per quarter to maintain proficiency. Another example is the semi-annual sustainment Think back to the time you walked through the door at gunnery densities performed by armor, infantry, and your first unit as the battalion chemical officer. You were field artillery units. Let us take the guidance in well trained and ready to execute your duties as the FM 25-100 and examples from our colleagues and apply chemo. Almost immediately, however, you became inthem to the Chemical Corps. undated with the Unit Status Report, quarterly training briefings, land/range management, and most likely Recently, I submitted a questionnaire to students training schedules. Battle-captain duties consumed in a chemical officer advanced course. Their response

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Several reports from combat training centers reflect how minimal chemical staff training for lieutenants affects performance . . . The cause of this lack of knowledge is the lack of post-OBC training for chemical lieutenants. This situation can be remedied by ensuring we continue to train our junior officers after they leave the schoolhouse.
revealed that, while serving as battalion chemical officers, minimal time was spent on sustainment training. Of the 20 captains questioned, most replied that while serving on a battalion staff, their chemical skills eroded. This was primarily because they focused on other duties. Seven officers indicated they had received no chemical sustainment training while serving on battalion staff. Several officers indicated that the most training they received was in the train-up for and execution of a unit rotation to a combat training center. Of the 15 combat training center rotations, only 9 were directly supported or evaluated by outside chemical experts or observer controllers. Several reports from combat training centers reflect how minimal chemical staff training for lieutenants affects performance. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) NBC experts on the topic of chemical asset employment observed, Virtually no planning or coordination is being done between brigade and subordinate battalion staffs for the integration of chemical assets in support of the task force scheme of maneuver. No plans, use of graphics, trigger mechanisms, and so forth are discussed or coordinated. Relationships such as OPCON or attached are seldom understood Major (P) Chuck McArthur in NBC and the JRTC Experience, asserts that one reason motorized smoke is not used by a majority of units at JRTC is a lack of knowledge at battalion level on how to properly employ it. The cause of this lack of knowledge, is the lack of post-OBC training for chemical lieutenants. This situation can be remedied by ensuring we continue to train our junior officers after they leave the schoolhouse. I recently asked two former NBC observer controllers, (JRTC, NTC), in general, what weaknesses do battalion chemical officers display most often? Each officer provided two answers. The first stated that a large number of chemical lieutenants do not participate in the orders-planning processes. Lieutenants are given additional duties (such as battle captain or sand-table preparation) that preclude effective performance of NBC duties. The second added that officers lack the knowledge of how and when to integrate NBC assets. Additionally, staff chemical lieutenants do not display a great degree of understanding of the capabilities and employment of NBC assets. METT-T determines the best approach for each unit to deal with this training deficiency. Any successful approach must involve three elements. First, the unit commander must support training, all chemical officers must attend, and it must be the priority. Second, training must focus on the tasks performed by junior officers to support their battalions. Third, it must be conducted by the highest possible NBC element to ensure the maximum expertise possible. Listed below are two recommended courses of action. First, provide a computer-driven simulation for all chemical officers from battalion to division levels. Task each officer to produce an NBC annex that includes smoke, decon, and recon support plans for their respective units. The computer simulation allows each officer to exercise these plans, advise commanders, and receive real-time feedback from senior experts. I had the opportunity to participate in one such exercise, IRON DRAGON I, at 1st Armored Division Headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in 1996. My command was reluctant to send me to this training because there were pressing matters in the S3 shop (there always are), but the divisions order was clearevery battalion and higher chemical officer/NCO will attend. It was an excellent training exercise and the first NBC staff training I received in two years. It allowed me to meet contemporaries and chemical experts within the division. Second, a combined series of officer and NCO professional development seminars may be more practical in some areas. Seminar topics may range from

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hazard prediction to NBC annex production or whatever NBC issue has the greatest impact on the unit. In no way am I trying to diminish the contributions our battalion chemical officers are making in the field.

These contributions, however, do not allow junior officers to maintain their NBC proficiencies. Let us recognize that our officers lose some proficiencies while serving in the battalion staffs. We need to take steps now to ensure we are ready for the next fight.

At the time this article was written, CPT Brant D. Hoskins was attending the Chemical Officer Advance Course at Fort McClellan, and was temporarily assigned as the SJL of the 84th Chemical Company, Fort McClellan. Previous assignments include Battalion Chemical Officer, 2/3rd Field Artillery Battalion, Germany; 25th Chemical Company, Recon Platoon Leader, Germany; Brigade Chemical Officer, 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Germany. CPT Hoskins has completed the Chemical Officer Basic Course, the Ranger School, and CAS3. He was commissioned as a 2LT from ROTC at Southern Oregon State with a BS degree in Economics.

Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest


The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest is an official function of the Chief of Chemical. The competition is open to military personnel in all branches and services, including allied nations, and to civilian personnel of any nationality. Each article should be submitted as a double-spaced manuscript, between 500 and 2,500 words in length, and supported by appropriate footnotes, bibliography, and graphics. In addition to the manuscript, submissions should include a cover sheet with the authors name, title, organization, complete address, and a short biography. To ensure anonymity in the selection process, the authors name should not appear in the manuscript itself. The panel will rank submissions on a 100-point scale with up to 40 points assigned for writing clarity, 30 points assigned for relevance to chemical soldiers of the 1990s, 20 points for general accuracy, and 10 points for originality. First-, second-, third-place winners will receive cash awards of $500, $300, and $150, respectively from the Chemical Corps Regimental Association. Certificates of Achievement will be given to all three winners plus those who receive Honorable Mention. All winning essays will be published in the Army Chemical Review. The deadline for the contest is 1 September 1999. Send your entry to: Command Historian US Army Chemical School 320 Engineer Loop, Suite 44 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 Or call Mattie Kirby at (573) 563-5267 or DSN: 676-5267 The Chief of Chemical has approved the theme for the 1999 Writing Contest. It is: What should be the role of chemical units in Homeland Defense?

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The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

2nd Place

Not many chemical soldiers, noncommissioned officers, or officers will get the opportunity to experience a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) inspection firsthand. Hopefully, by sharing my experience during Johnston Islands CWC initial storage site inspection, you will have a better understanding of the inspection process. At the time of the inspection in August 1997, I was assigned as the Chemical Ammunition Company executive officer. Our company was responsible for the storage of Johnston Islands chemical weapons, and therefore played a significant role in the inspection.

CWC Inspection Up close and personal


By CPT William J. Epolito
Overview of the CWC Treaty
The CWC Treaty entered into force on 29 April 1997. The treaty Prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons. Prohibits the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities within 10 years of entry into force. To ensure compliance, each country must submit a declaration containing data on their chemical weapons sites and production facilities. They are also subject to the following inspections conducted by foreign inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the CWC governing body: Initial Inspection: first inspection of a declared site. Routine Inspection: periodic inspection after a sites initial inspection. Challenge Inspection: inspection to verify alleged treaty violations. The treaty also authorizes investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons or riot control agents as a method of warfare. As of 14 August 1998, 168 countries have signed the treaty, and 114 have ratified it. Countries do not have to abide by the treaty until they ratify it.

Overview of Johnston Island


Johnston Island is a remote island located approximately 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. It is approximately two miles long by three-quarters of a mile wide. In 1990, before demilitarization began, Johnston Island stored 6.6 percent of the US chemical weapons stockpile. As of June 1998, over 75 percent of the original stockpile on Johnston Island had been destroyed by incineration. The storage area is controlled by the US Army Chemical Activity, Pacific (USACAP). The demilitarization facility, Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS), is controlled by the

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Photos: Top: JACADS (Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System) Demilitarization Facility; Middle: Sealing of a stucture; Bottom: Inventory of an M23 VX Landmine Structure.
Photos courtesy of CPT William J. Epolito

program manger for chemical demilitarization and operated by Raytheon Demilitarization Corporation.

Pre-CWC Inspection Preparation


We started our intense preparation for the CWC initial inspection in early April 1997 before the treaty went into effect. These preparations included: Preparing our draft facility agreement. This agreement set guidelines for the inspection on Johnston Island. Preparing an operational plan (OPLAN). Preparing an inventory plan and several briefings. The briefings included an information security briefing, a pre-inspection briefing, and a storage structure safety briefing. Coordinating logistical support. Preparing a reference guide. This guide was given to soldiers to help them follow the guidelines of the treaty and our plan. Conducting inspection rehearsals. We conducted two rehearsals before our initial inspection.

Initial Inspection
Johnston Islands initial storage site inspection was conducted from 13 through 18 August 1997. The inspection was only of the storage site because the demilitarization facility is considered a separate site and had already received an initial inspection.

Notification
We were notified on 9 August at 2300, 86 hours before the inspection was to begin. We used this time to conduct final preparations and logistical coordination. One of the major differences between our inspection and that of other sites was that the inspectors were already on the island before we were notified. The OPCW used 6 of the 15 inspectors already conducting continuous monitoring of the demilitarization facility instead of bringing more to the island. On a day-

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to-day basis these OPCW inspectors conduct 24-hour monitoring of the demilitarization process at JACADS to ensure it is in compliance with the CWC treaty.

General Inspection Operations


The six OPCW inspectors formed into three inspection teams of two inspectors each. Two teams conducted inventories while the third team reviewed documents and the draft facility agreement. Each inspection team also had two US On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) personnel with them to serve as liaisons between the inspectors and USACAP and to assist in answering the inspectors questions. To speed up the inventory process, we assigned two USACAP escort teams to each inspection team. The first USACAP escort team was responsible for escorting and briefing the inspectors. Also, we put a USACAP stock control representative with the escort team to verify the inspectors count with our chemical weapons inventory records. The two OSIA personnel with each inspection team also inventoried the structure to provide a third verifying count. The second USACAP escort team was responsible for opening and clearing the next structure to be inventoried. This leapfrog effect cut the time it took to complete the 100-percent inventory in half. Opening and clearing is a 15- to 30-minute process consisting of several strict safety and security actions that, once complete, allow personnel to enter a chemical weapons structure without having to put on their protective masks (everyone must still have their mask within arms reach). After each structure was inventoried, the inspectors sealed it with a special plastic seal. The seal ensured no one could re-enter the structure without the inspectors knowing about it. These seals were removed at the completion of the inspection. To remove a seal before the end of the inspection, the inspectors had to be contacted first to get approval.

a time schedule; they just wanted to inspect as many magazines as they could each day. Once we agreed to their plan, the inspectors asked to inventory several structures that afternoon. At 1517, we gave the inspectors a short tour of the storage site and then they inventoried 4 of the 57 structures. After the inventories, the inspectors conducted facility agreement negotiations and coordinated the next days inspection activities with OSIA and USACAP.

Days Two and Three


For the next two days (14-15 August), the inspectors inventoried the remaining structures. Each day they started at approximately 0830 and ended at 1700. On 14 August, the inspectors inventoried 18 of the 57 structures and tagged three chemical weapons for future sampling. Sampling will occur when the tagged chemical weapon is shipped to JACADS for demilitarization. At that point the laboratory that supports JACADS will analyze the sample under the direct supervision of the inspectors to verify that the chemical weapon contained the agent we said it did. On 15 August, they inventoried the remaining 35 structures and tagged four chemical weapons. The inspectors inventoried more structures this day because many of the structures were empty. On average, each structure took between 10 to 30 minutes to inventory once inside the structure. At the completion of each day, the inspectors, OSIA, and USACAP (including other Army representatives) conducted a meeting to discuss any inspection issues and to coordinate the next days inspection activities.

Days Four and Five


On 16-17 August, the inspectors, OSIA, and USACAP reviewed the inventory results, discussed issues from the inspection, finalized the draft facility agreement, and prepared the preliminary findings report (this document contained the preliminary results of the inspection). On 17 August, with the approval of the instructors, we removed the seals placed on the storage structures.

Day One
The inspection started on 13 August at 1300 with the preinspection briefing. The briefing familiarized the inspectors with administrative, safety, security, and storage operations. At the completion of the briefing we gave the inspectors several required documents in accordance with the treaty. After discussing several administrative issues, the inspectors reviewed and rejected our inventory. Our plan dictated what chemical weapons magazines would be inspected each day for a five-day period based on inventory times from annual inventories and CWC rehearsals. The inspectors did not want to follow

Inspection Completion
On 18 August, the inspectors, OSIA, and USACAP reviewed and made changes to the preliminary findings report. The finalized preliminary findings report was signed at a ceremony at 1630, signifying the official end of the inspection. The inspection verified the storage site declaration submitted on 29 April 1997 with no discrepancies noted.

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Lessons Learned
Here are the key lessons learned from Johnston Islands initial storage site inspection: There is no substitute for a well-thought-out and detailed plan. The USACAP Treaty Compliance Officer, Ms. Janice L. Treadaway, ensured we started extensive planning, coordination, and rehearsals in early April 1997, even before the US ratified the treaty. This paid high dividends when we were notified of our inspection because we were able to concentrate on final coordination and preparation, instead of rushing the planning process at the last minute and overlooking important details due to time limits. Effective communication eliminates many possible conflicts and issues. Many of the issues brought up during the inspection were a result of miscommunication or a breakdown in communication. One good example of this was the improper removal of an OPCW seal. Two demilitarization plant employees needed to get into one of their hazardous waste structures that the inspectors had sealed. They were supposed to notify the inspectors before removing the seal, but they did not because they were not informed of the proper procedures. This communication failure could have resulted in serious consequences, but thankfully it did not. Be flexible throughout the inspection. Inspections never seem to go according to your plan, mainly

because you cannot always accurately predict what the inspectors will do. The key is to make a plan and be flexible to change. A good example of this was when the inspectors rejected our rehearsed inventory plan and presented one of their own. By remaining flexible and making their plan work, we not only satisfied the inspectors, we also impressed them with our can-do attitude.

Conclusion
Hopefully, by sharing my experience during Johnston Islands CWC initial storage site inspection, you now have a better understanding of the inspection process.
At the time this article was written CPT Epolito was attending the Chemical Officer Advance Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama, with a follow-on assignment as the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility Operations Officer, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Previous assignments include Battalion Chemical Officer (ADA Patriot Battalion), Battalion S4 (ADA Patriot Battalion), Battery Executive Officer (ADA Patriot Headquarters Battery), and Brigade Chemical Officer (ADA Patriot Brigade), Fort Bliss, Texas; and Chemical Ammunition Company Executive Officer, Johnston Island. CPT Epolito has completed the Chemical Officer Basic Course, Radiological Safety Course, NBC Reconnaissance (L5-Fox) Course all at Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Airborne School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He was commissioned as a 2LT in the Chemical Corps from ROTC, Clarkson University with a BS degree in Chemical Engineering in May 1994.

New Address - New Location - Same Mission


WARMOD-DOTD DSN: 676-6262, Commercial: (573) 563-6262 e-mail: andersonm@wood.army.mil Address: Commander US Army MANSCEN ATTN: ATZT-DT-WM-C 320 Engineer Loop, Suite 220 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 Warfighter-DOTD DSN: 676-6266, Commercial: (573) 596-0131 ext. 36266 e-mail: pereze@wood.army.mil Address:Commander US Army MANSCEN ATTN: ATZT-DI-WF-C 320 Engineer Loop, Suite 220 Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

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The Chemical Corps Annual Writing Contest

3rd Place

The Chemical Corps in the 21st Century Our Future


By MSG David Zapata Depicting what the Chemical Corps will be like in the 21st century makes one think back to when George Orwell attempted to depict what the world would be like in 1984. You may not get it entirely right but you can help to influence the paths we choose in the future. We can only guess what it will be like in the future. By looking at todays world we can get an inkling of what tomorrow may bring.
Technologys Promise
Proliferation of technologies capable of producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cannot be stemmed. We know this because many of these technologies are dual-use technologies that can be used for peaceful as well as hostile objectives. With dual-use technologies, states can produce needed vaccines, rockets to put satellites into orbit, improve pesticides, harden crops and livestock, improve the health of its citizens, and more. With this in mind, we must be prepared to accept the fact that the threat from WMD will only escalate as nations become increasingly self-sufficient. Just as computers are improving exponentially over short periods of time, so will these dual-use technologies. This can be seen in the everincreasing advances in medicine and microbiology. With all of this improving technology around us we cannot help but benefit. Our future nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense will have to keep up with new and emerging technologies to ensure that we can protect our nation and its interests. These changes in NBC defense will include doctrine, training, organizations, and material improvements consistent with new threats and missions. Increased automation of warning and reporting systems, NBC threat information flow, and situational awareness will aid future commanders in their decision making.

New and Old Doctrine


In the past we have used avoidance, protection, and decontamination as our three principles of NBC defense. The principle of decontamination is expanding to include all aspects of recovery after an NBC incident. In the future it will be called restoration. Future NBC defense doctrine will encompass not only traditional NBC threats but nontraditional threats from toxic industrial materials (TIMs). These TIMs include chemical, radiological, and biological hazards from industrial sources, pollution, and low-level exposure from these hazards over time. These industrial chemicals, through either intentional or accidental release, may pose a hazard to US forces. In many areas where US forces will be deployed, there may be a significant hazard to them from environmental damage or contamination. Joint Service NBC Defense Concept, September 1997 The Chemical Corps role of providing showers during operations will become increasingly important. Showers will not only be used during restoration operations for personal decontamination, but during operations in disaster relief and for personal hygiene in immature theaters. This was evidenced in Bosnia

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In the future, the role of the Chemical Corps in providing smoke and flame operations will diminish considerably if not altogether. These missions, although important in themselves, will take a back seat to the need for NBC defense operations.
when some units went months without proper shower facilities while possibly being exposed to TIMs. Having NBC personnel set up their battalion decontamination apparatus in the shower mode and providing the peacekeepers with the much-needed personal hygiene could have offset the effects of the exposure. In the future, the role of the Chemical Corps in providing smoke and flame operations will diminish considerably if not altogether. These missions, although important in themselves, will take a back seat to the need for NBC defense operations. common doctrine that allowed them to work together. This will be the case in the future. A basic combat unit will be given a mission and will receive whatever assets are needed to accomplish its mission to form a task force. This task force may go heavy (more than a traditional allocation) with chemical defense units if there is a high NBC threat. It may go very light if the only threat is from TIMs. Or, if no NBC threat exists, it may not take any NBC defense units. Key to operating as flexible modular plug-and-play units is ensuring that our basic units are self-contained and self-supporting. We must ensure that they can plug into whatever force they are attached to and operate efficiently. This will require a redesign of the basic chemical platoon and company. Each platoon will have a few more supporters to assist during operations while attached to separate organizations. Chemical companies will train, prepare, launch, and assist their platoons for independent operations. More and more Chemical Company Headquarters will assume the role of liaison and/or augmentation to a division or taskforce staff rather than being an on-the-ground command. They will be command-less OPCON of their platoons, if present at all, during operations.

Training, Leaders, and New Missions


We will see an ever-increasing need to provide support to civilians at home and allies abroad during times of crisis. The Chemical Corps will take the lead in providing training in civil defense and disaster preparedness to civilian and government organizations around the world. Our leaders at platoon level will be called upon to become more independent in their ability to operate on their own. Mid-level managers at all levels will be cut or take the back seat during operations. As we move forward, we may require further reductions in supervision and centralized direction Increased organizational flexibility will enhance our responsiveness. We will seek organizations that can support flexible force packaging and work to smooth the process further. Joint Vision 2010

Equipment
The future will provide advances in detection, identification, protection, and decontamination of NBC hazards. Equipment will be lightweight, small, and dual-use. Near instantaneous real-time detection and identification of NBC hazards will allow early warning, reporting, and tracking of these NBC hazards through sophisticated communications and artificial intelligence architectures. Advanced vaccines and methods of selfprophylaxis will lessen the burden of having to care for NBC casualties. The self-prophylaxis will not be as we have today, man-in-the-loop auto-injectors, but will include implants and devices that will determine casualtys needs and provide the proper dose of medicine automatically without the casualtys or medics intervention.

Organization
The organization of the Chemical Corps and its units will change to be more modular in nature. Units will be designed to be plug-and-play organizations. The traditional habitual relationships units have had in the past with their combat forces will dwindle. Forces will be built and tailored to the mission. In Operation Desert Storm we saw units combined from all theaters of operations to support the central command. These units had no habitual relationship with each other but had

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Standard uniforms will be made of NBC-protective material thus lowering the logistics burden during restoration operations and providing immediate protection in the event of an NBC attack. Decontaminants will become more user-friendly and environmentally safe. There will always be a need for liquid decontaminants, but sorbent and other decontaminating methods and technologies will lessen the need for such. These include peel-off equipment coatings, automatic drive-through car wash decontamination devices, and street cleaner-type vehicles for area/route decontamination.

Future
Ive tried to touch on a little of what the Chemical Corps will look like in the 21st century. We are the Chemical Corps future. Our ideas are what will drive and shape the Chemical Corps as we travel down this path together. Vision is useful only so long as it can be translated into effective decisions, for it is todays decisions that shape tomorrows environment. SOF Vision 2020 The future is in our hands!

At the time this article was written MSG Zapata was the NBC NCO for the Army Special Operations Command. He began his career in the 21st Chemical Company, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He served 9 years with the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) forward deployed in Europe; was an Observer/Controller in the Joint Readiness Training Center, and a senior writer/ instructor for the doctrine office of the US Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. During Operation Desert Storm, MSG Zapata served as NBC NCO and Operations Sergeant for a Joint Special Operations Task Force. In his most recent deployment, MSG Zapata was attached to 1st AD with the Center for Army Lessons Learned in the former Yugoslavia. He is a graduate of various military courses to include Jumpmaster, Tech Escort (J5), NBC Recon (L5), Recondo, Jungle Operations, ANCOC, various NATO NBC courses, the Combat Developments Course, the Training Developers Course, and the US Special Operations Command Acquisition Management Course.

AR-PERSCOM NOTES
Let me introduce myself. I am Major Lawrence W. Meder, the Chemical Career Management Officer for the United States Army Reserve, stationed at the Army Reserve Personnel Command, ATTN: ARPC-OPD-C, at 1 Reserve Way, St. Louis, Missouri, 63132-5200. At AR-PERSCOM our mission is to provide the highest quality personnel life-cycle management and services which result in a trained and ready force in support of the national military strategy. I perform these and other mission tasks for Army Reserve Officers in the Chemical Corps. I am available by phone at 1-800-325-4987. If you are a Reserve officer and we have not spoken yet, call me. If you are an Active Component or National Guard officer pondering life in the Army Reserves, call now and get answers to your questions before you switch service. I am also available through e-mail; my address is: LAWRENCE.MEDER@ARPSTL-EMH2.ARMY.MIL Go Reserves, Go Chemical!

Major Lawrence W. Meder


AR-PERSCOM ATTN: ARPC-OPD-C 1 Reserve Way St Louis, MO 63132-5200

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As of today, only the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been the targets of WMD. Can that be said of the next 50 years?

WEAPONS of MASS DESTRUCTION


AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
By Dr. Burton Wright, US Army Chemical School Historian

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are a phenomenon of modern invention. In centuries past, WMD were the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Famine, Plague, War, and Death). Today, the world is faced with a far more powerful equivalent. An equivalent that can, in seconds or hours, destroy entire nations or even this planet we live on. The age of the atom bomb was the beginning of WMD. On 16 July 1945, at approximately 5:29 a.m. when the first bomb exploded at the Trinity test site, the scientists who made it possible realized they were ushering into the world a new age. They did not know how good or bad this age would be. In the more than five decades after Trinity what they created at Los Alamos has not been used. As of today, only the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been the targets of WMD. Can that be said of the next 50 years? We cannot say. We can only rely on past history for a possible answer. The atom bomb was first developed because the Germans were working on such a device, and given the incredible power that this device was capable of producing, President Franklin Roosevelt quickly followed up a letter by Albert Einstein and launched the Manhattan Project. Under this innocuous name, the race to develop the first atom bomb began. In 1944, as the bomb was near completion, military planners began to consider what targets the bomb might be used against. Since Germany was the principal reason for the development of the bomb, it was considered the first potential target. Early in the war, the allied

leaders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff determined that Germany was a greater danger than Japan and should be defeated first. Intelligence clearly showed Germany had an enormous scientific capability that the Allies had to face inventions such as the V-1, V-2, the jet fighter, huge tanks, special homing torpedoes, and other technological weapons of war. Had Germany not surrendered in April 1945, the first bomb might have been exploded above a German city. When Major General Leslie R. Groves told President Harry S. Truman the bomb had been tested, and worked, Germany had already been defeated. Italy had left the war earlier. The only member of the Tripartite Pact still fighting was Japan. At the time, there were strong and very lively debates among those in charge on whether or not the bomb should be used. One interesting theory was the Fair Warning concept. Simply put, the United States would invite members of the Japanese government and its scientists to the far Northern Pacific. The United States would then detonate an atomic bomb on a remote and uninhabited island so the Japanese could see its power, and would then have a chance to consider whether or not they wanted to continue the conflict. General Groves and most of the scientists vetoed the idea for an obvious reasonif the bomb didnt work or did not have the expected destructive power, then the United States would look stupid and the Japanese would continue the war. Therefore, work on the atomic bomb continued with Japan as its principal target.

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One bomb destroyed an entire city. It would have taken hundreds of B-29s to do the same damage, and more than one mission would have been required. This type of largescale destruction had never been accomplished by humans . . .
The target committee picked five Japanese cities as potential use for the atomic bomb. These cities were picked for specific and scientific reasons. First, they had not been bombed to any extent, so the damage after the drop would be solely attributable to the device. Secondly, these cities had specific geographical anomalies that would enable the scientists to study the blast damage of the bombs for future uses. The two bombs being worked onFat Man and Little Boyused different triggers to cause implosiona plutonium trigger and a dynamite trigger. Since such a device had never been triggered before, no one was sure that either one would work. When the Enola Gay took off from Tinian, the bomb wasnt even armed. They thought it would be wise not to arm the device until the aircraft was far away. If it was armed on takeoff and had an accident, the device could be triggered, causing enormous damage to the facilities on Tinian. The dropping of the first atom bomb on Hiroshima ushered in what was thought to be a new era of WMD. Think of itone bomb destroyed an entire city. It would have taken hundreds of B-29s to do the same damage, and more than one mission would have been required. This type of large-scale destruction had never been accomplished by humansonly naturally occurring hazards such as hurricanes, massive fires, tornadoes, and tidal waves had the same effect. At that time, the United States had a monopoly that gave it unprecedented power to destroy an enemy. There was considerable debate among the scientific community on how to use this new device. Many of the greatest intellectuals in the world had worked on the Manhattan Project, and they wanted to ensure all countries had the same informationthat the US would not maintain this monopoly. Some, like Ted Hall, a brilliant Harvard physicist who was sent to work on the project at the age of 18, took it upon themselves to share the atomic secret with the Soviets. The Soviets, according to newly released information, had a huge spy apparatus at Los Alamos that enabled them in 1949 to detonate an atomic device. The Soviets would have eventually created such a device on their own as would the Japanese or other developed nations. The information they obtained from the Americans simply accelerated the process. The considerations of the use of the atomic bomb were based on its destructive potential, not its tactical capabilities. Such bombs were meant to persuade those still fighting that continued resistance would only bring further ruin from the air. It was a weapon to forcefully persuade by total destruction. Whether the bomb was used to persuade the Germans or the Japanese was not the issue. If one believes history, Japan was bombed because President Truman wanted to impress the Soviets with the new US weapon. In planning for Operation Downfall, the direct assault on Japans home islands, the use of WMD to support the landings was being considered. When the two bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the United States had one more device that could have been put together and used, but it would have taken several months before more bombs could be provided. Thereafter, an indefinite number could be provided about one every two weeks because the logistics system developed at Oak Ridge and other factories created by the Manhattan Project would then be running at full capacity. Had the United States desired to use WMD in support of tactical operations, it would have been possible to do so, but it is doubtful that the Army would have used them. General George C. Marshall was not supportive of dropping the bombs in the first place, and was most reluctant to use WMD. It was not that he was frivolous with the lives of his men, far from it, but he worried about the precedent that was being set and the retaliation that might come to the United States for using WMD.

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Training Gets a Boost From New Technology


By Mr. Daniel Mack The soldiers work quickly and cautiously. The task: To detect biological agents in the atmosphere using the Armys new Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS). The accuracy of the information gathered and transmitted will be crucial to the mission as well as to the health and well-being of troops in the area. First, the soldier uses an ultraviolet aerodynamic particle sizer (UVAPS) to check for particles in the air. Then, he uses Lab training in BIDS processes. a biodetector device (BD) to identify the sample. Although the process takes place in the middle of a potential battlefield, each step is precise and accurate.
The above scenario is repeated often as soldiers train to detect biological warfare agents. Training soldiers to operate complex equipment such as the BIDS has historically been costly and timeconsuming. First, it is difficult for instructors to monitor the trainees progress. Second, using real equipment for training is very expensive; and third, even though real biological agents are not used, the simulants used in training still require the filing of environmental impact statements. The obvious answer to this challenge is to develop a mockup training system that can train soldiers on the equipment in realistic scenarios, inexpensively, effectively, and free from environmental concerns. ITT T Industries (formerly KAMAN Science Corporation) has developed advanced computer simulation technology for training the New P3I BIDS that meets these requirements. ITT, under contract with the US Army program director for biological defense, will build a mockup training system at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The soldiers will be able to operate the BIDS during an integrated, end-to-end biological scenario using computer simulations that are integrated with actual BIDS equipment. As the soldiers learn to test for the presence of biological agents in real-time, the instructors will evaluate their efforts. This will provide state-of-the-art training for chemical soldiers.

A BIDS in the field with camouflage in place. JULY 1999 17

Achieving 360-Degree Smoke Coverage


By CPT Andrew M. Herbst
Background
Producing and maintaining 360-degree smoke coverage is easy to say but difficult to do. As chemical (smoke) platoon leaders, we try to maintain 360-degree smoke coverage of a given target for the desired mission duration regardless of physical or tactical conditions on the battlefield. Current doctrine states that by using cardinal directions and compass-point orientation or by clock orientation, a smoke platoon can shift to another location quickly and safely in order to maintain continuous smoke coverage. This is not the best technique given the complexity of a rapidly changing situation. Furthermore, this technique does not possess effective control measures to limit risk and promote mission success. Adjusting smoke in this manner requires much of the platoon to move in its own smoke, where we often lose control of the mission and put mission accomplishment at risk.
Grid System Technique

ProceduresPlatoon Leader
1) Map Reconnaissance. Prior to departing the tactical assembly area, conduct a map reconnaissance to identify the objective and smoke target boundary. In accordance with FM 3-50, Smoke Operations, the boundary must surround the target by five times its size to prevent the enemy from saturating the entire smoked area with fire. The objective and smoke target boundary combine to form the objective area. 2) Grid Planning. Begin the Grid System Technique during your leaders reconnaissance. Once you reach the primary smoke control point where you can survey the area best, divide the objective area into grid boxes. Choose easily identifiable natural or man-made features, such as roads or trails, to segment the area. If these are not present, then the squad leaders who accompany you on the reconnaissance will mark their locations with either pickets, chem-lites, or engineer tape. The area within each grid box provides a smoke sector for a squad or the platoon.

The Grid System Technique is a better way to achieve 360-degree smoke coverage. This system accomplishes two objectives. First and foremost, it nearly guarantees 100-percent continuous and uninterrupted smoke coverage of the target. It also uses effective control measures that provide a safe and reliable method for moving smoke elements during adverse weather or tactical conditions.

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3) Grid Identification. Once you feel confident that you have divided the area into manageable smoke sectors, identify each grid with a letter and number. The letter-number grid identifiers follow chronological sequence in a counterclockwise fashion starting with the s e c t o r closest to the primary smoke control point, for example, A1, B2, C3, D4. CML

4) Moving into Position. Initially, designate a squad as the main effort (1SQD). It moves from the objective rally point (ORP) directly to its primary sector. Their position is based solely on the wind direction taken during the leaders reconnaissance. The squad designated as the supporting effort (2SQD) remains in the ORP until 1SQD makes a subsequent wind check in the objective area. If the wind direction has not changed since the leaders reconnaissance, then 1SQD will remain in hide positions and report the wind direction to you every five minutes. If the wind has changed direction, however, 1SQD will move to a sector where it can best cover the objective area and report its position to you. You then order 2SQD to move to its designated sector and to remain in hide positions until you give the order to initiate smoke. (See Figure 1, right.) 5) Adjusting Smoke. Your three objectives for adjusting smoke are to (1) conduct the adjustment quickly, (2) maintain smoke on target during the adjustment, and (3) conduct the adjustment safely. You observe the objective area from the primary smoke control point. From this vantage point, you can see the effects of your units smoke on the target area. When the wind direction changes to 45 degrees and the platoon can no longer cover the target, order 1SQD to displace to H8 where the target area can be covered better. Simply radio the squad leader the adjustment. It is standard for squad leaders to take the most direct route to the alternate sector, as long as they do not cross into the other squads sector. Once 1SQD is in position, it is safe to move 2SQD to point A1, where it can better support the mission. (See Figure 2, right.)

Figure 1

The bridge is the smoke target. Wind direction is 360 degrees. Each squad has three smoke vehicles. The boundaries and trails have good trafficability. The boundary corners were marked by the squad leaders during the leaders reconnaissance. 1SQD is the main effort and 2SQD is the supporting effort. Each smoke vehicle carries two smoke pots. The platoon leader is located at the smoke control point (SCP), and the platoon sergeant is on the smoke line between the smoke squads.

Figure 2

The wind direction has changed from 360 to 45 degrees. First, 1SQD is moved to H8 to avoid having 2SQD enter its sector while they are still there. (This would be unsafe.) Once 1SQD is set in H8, 2SQD is ordered to move into A1. As standard practice, smoke pots are employed by 1SQD during their displacement to maintain smoke on target. Radio: 1SL this is PL, move to Hotel Eight, over. PL this is 1SL, wilco, over. 1SL this is PL, out. 1SL employs smoke pots and moves on the most direct route (1) to H8, gets set, and reports to his PL. PL this is 1SL, I am set, over. 1SL this is PL, roger out. The same radio procedure is followed to move 2SQD to A1, (2).
At the time this article was written, CPT Andrew M. Herbst was assigned as a Chemical Officer Basic Course Tactical Air Command Officer. CPT Herbst has a BA in Biological Science. His source of commission is Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of the Chemical Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. Previous assignments include Commander, 101st Chemical Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 82d Airborne Division NBCC Director, and Division Artillery Chemical Officer, Fort Bragg, and dual-purpose Platoon Leader, Berlin Brigade.

Conclusion

The Grid System Technique is the most effective method for adjusting smoke on the modern battlefield. It is nearly foolproof, because it involves all the units leaders in mission planning, preparation, and execution. The squad leaders, who are responsible for marking all of the smoke sectors, gain a clear understanding of what is expected of them from the beginning of the smoke operation through its completion. When the task force commander chooses smoke as a combat multiplier, you can feel confident that your technique for maintaining smoke on target is effective in nearly all weather and tactical conditions.

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Photo courtesy of the Hensel Phelps Construction Co.

The new CDTF complex at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as it appeared on February 17, 1999.

CDTF Moves to the Ozarks


By MAJ George Heib
On 19 August 1999, the US Army Chemical School will train its last military student in the Chemical Defense Training Facility or CDTF at Fort McClellan, Alabama. For more than 12 years the CDTF staff has provided a realistic training experience designed to create Chemical Veterans, while instilling confidence and credibility for more than 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians. In June 1995, recommendations of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission required the closing of Fort McClellan, Alabama, and the relocation of the US Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. In addition, the commissions recommendation stated that the CDTF would continue to operate at Fort McClellan until such time as the capability to operate a replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood existed. Prior to beginning construction, the installation had to have Missouri State Air and Storm Water Permits, complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and obtain an approved Department of Defense (DOD) site safety submission. Construction began 26 May 1997. After three and one-half years of environmental and safety planning, facility design, and construction, the US Army Corps of Engineers, Kansas City District, turned the facility over to the Chemical School on 1 February 1999. The new $28 million facility covers 13 acres and includes 72,000 square feet of administrative, security, storage, and training space.

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Filter Room

General floor plan of the training and storage sections of the new CDTF complex.

Service Gallery and Training Bays Service Parking

Equipment Storage Area

Medical Room Mechanical Room Lab Dock Service Area

Hot and Cold Laundries Equipment Storage/Destruction Area Receiving/Disposal Staging Area

Mens and Womens Lockers and Facilities Equip. Storage I.P.E. Drying

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In preparation for the facility turnover, the CDTF advance party, led by CPT Kent Soebbing, Operations Officer, arrived at Fort Leonard Wood in September 1998 to supervise the final stages of construction, finalize government equipment and supply requirements, and complete the waste disposal and operations and maintenance contracts. By December 1998, the first instructors were assigned led by MSG William Gunter, Chief Instructor. On 4 January 1999, the Chemical School took receipt of the administrative building. Later in the week, the newly mobilized operations and maintenance contractor, EG&G Defense Materials Incorporated, moved in and began their contract phase-in. Over the next few months, the newly formed CDTF staff received supplies and equipment, set-up training bays, reviewed SOPs, and participated in training events at Fort McClellan to learn instructor skills firsthand. Additionally, the CDTF participated in the initial Chemical Weapons Convention inspection of Fort Leonard Wood. By mid-April, the advance party completed all tasks in preparation for its Pre-Operational Safety Survey. Designed by The Benham Group, St. Louis, Missouri, the new facility incorporates an operational concept similar to the Fort McClellan design. The facility includes emergency backup generators, a negative pressure system with continuous air monitoring, redundant air filter systems, waste water containment and neutralization, and an earthquake and tornado-proof design. Additionally, the new design incorporates the latest innovations in technology and lessons learned in operation at the Fort McClellan CDTF.

The new facility has no thermal treatment unit for the on-site treatment of solid and liquid wastes. The installation will ship all special 3X decontaminated wastes to a federally approved offsite incinerator. The new facility is completely automated and utilizes a Y2K-compliant Honeywell Direct Digital Control System, which increases the staff s safety and operational monitoring capability. Design improvements increased the training and laboratory floor space. The design team added a training bay to accommodate joint service training devices. The laboratory staff received additional floor space to include a separate dry or non-toxic laboratory with its own ventilation hood and separate storage and balance rooms. Also, the designer expanded the glove box to accommodate two-person toxic-agent operation. With the conclusion of the facility agreement with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at The Hague, the new facility and staff will be ready to begin toxic-agent operations by mid-August 1999. The Chemical School will continue to provide DODs only toxic chemical agent training experience at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. It will ensure the Army of the 21st century remains chemically trained and ready.
MAJ Heib is the Director of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Prior to this assignment, he served as the forward Chemical School Relocation Officer on the Fort Leonard Wood BRAC Transition Office staff overseeing all aspects of the schools move. Other assignments include chemical platoon, company command, and battalion executive officer with experience as a chemical staff officer on battalion, brigade, division, corps, and theater army staffs.

Did you know?


Major (later Colonel) Earl J. Atkisson was an Engineer Officer at the beginning of World War I when he was given the critical duty of creating the 30th Engineer Regiment (Gas and Flame). The 30th was sent to France where they were trained by the British Armys Special Brigade and renamed the 1st Gas Regiment.

The Personnel Proponency Office is currently developing a plan for COAC students to complete a masters degree program. Please view the Personnel Proponency webpage for updates. http://www.mcclellan.army.mil/usacmls/prop/prpindex.htm 22 CML

The 82d is Smokin

Staff photo by Justin Carlson

Members of the 21st Chemical Company work with a civilian manager to test a smoke system on Sicily Drop Zone. The system was heavy-dropped for the first time.

By Tanya S. Biank Staff writer, Fayetteville Observer-Times, Fayetteville, North Carolina


Even armies with all the high-tech weapons systems they can field have a hard time defeating one of the oldest battlefield tacticssmoke. In October 1998, the 82d Airborne Divisions 21st Chemical Company became the first unit in the Army equipped with the new Infrared and Visual Smoke System. The company has 18 units of the system, called the M56 Smoke Generator. Traditionally, smoke has been used in battle to blind and confuse the enemy, camouflage troop movements and maneuvers, and decoy the enemy. But the Armys new system does much more. The M56 offers the division a unique capability to defeat smart weapons and to screen itself from sensors, said Lt. Col. Thomas Woloszyn, the 82d Airborne Divisions chemical officer. The system is the Armys first smoke generator that can defeat infrared weapons systems. The Armys old M157A2 system had only visual capability. Ground-up graphite in the M56 smoke absorbs thermal energy that smart weapons systems need to function. It acts like a sponge sucking up energy, said John Green of the Smoke/Obscurants Office, where the system was developed. The smoke generator system took eight years to develop. Greens office is part of the US Army Soldier, Chemical and Biological Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The smoke generator can be placed on the back of the M1113 Humvee, which is also new. The system costs $145,000. Over the next five years, 267 systems will be fielded in units throughout the Army. Fort Bragg soldiers say the new system is easier to operate than the old. On the old ones, we had to play and tinker with them to keep them running, said Cpl. Kevin Cox of the 21st Chemical Company. We can adjust the fog level without worrying about the engine overheating.

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Staff photo by Justin Carlson

The modified Humvee, called an M1113, carrying the M56 smoke generator, descends slowly to the drop zone. It is held by three parachutes after being dropped from a C-130.

The system can produce 90 minutes of smoke without refueling. One smoke generator system can blow enough smoke to cover 50 football fields. The question for the 82d unit was whether it could survive being air-dropped from a C-130. In October, soldiers with the 21st Chemical Company got a chance to find out. Beneath three huge cargo parachutes, a brand new 10,380-pound M1113 Humvee with the M56 Smoke Generator System strapped to its back floated to the ground at Fort Braggs Sicily Drop Zone. The vehicle and generator landed in one piece, albeit with a cracked windshield. Once on the ground, getting the vehicle off the rigging platform took a bit of muscle. Soldiers, who had parachuted in, pushed, shoved, jumped on, and rocked the vehicle to no avail. The driver revved the engine. The Humvee wouldnt budge. And to complicate matters, the system landed on a slope. A Red Cross truck finally came to the rescue and pulled the Humvee off its rigger platform. After a few minutes, the Humvee looked like a rocket ready to blast off as white billows covered the drop zone. Our mantra is, if you cant see it, you cant hit it, Green said.

Congratulations!
21st Chemical Company, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 310th Chemical Company, Fort McClellan, Alabama The Sibert Award winners for 1998
The Sibert Award is presented annually to the best company-sized chemical unitone to an Active Component unit and one to a Reserve Component unit. The award covers a calendar year, so we have just selected the winners for 1998. To apply for the award, each unit submits a packet IAW Regimental Regulations to its MACOM. Each MACOM selects its best and forwards their packet to the USACMLS, where the directors and their Sergeants Major vote the best of the best. and

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Protection of children during war is a major concern for government planners of all nations. Children are, after all, the future of any nation. As a result, the advent of chemical weapons led to the adoption of several forms of protection for children and at least a few innovative ideas.

WE MUST PROTECT THE CHILDREN!


By MAJ Robert D. Walk
Child protection in World War II consisted of air-purifying respirators (APRs) and human-powered air-purifying respirators (PAPR). This article explores protection for infants, young children, and older children used by the Germans and Americans during World War II and describes current trends in child protection. plywood frame, the side is rolled up, and the elastic straps are attached. The attending parent pumps the bellows 15 times a minute to push fresh air through the filter on the inside of the cradle to the infant and continues until the All Clear signal is given. Gaskettchens were manufactured and distributed throughout Germany for use in case of a chemical attack. They were probably adopted in the late 1930s. Late in the war, examples of this apparatus were captured and tested by Allied forces. American tests of the apparatus in 1945 showed that it was a usable, although bulky, device. These tests showed no real advantage over the standard US Infant Protector. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the perceived threat of continued attacks against the Hawaiian Islands was high. Such attacks could conceivably include chemical weapons. COL Unmacht, chemical officer for the Department of Hawaii (and the territory of Hawaii), sent a request for childrens masks to Washington, DC on 18 December 1941, but none were available. As a result, COL Unmacht, in conjunction with the Hawaiian Surgeons Office, set about to create infant protection equipment from resources within the Hawaiian Department. The result of these efforts was a box respirator and a protective hood for infants. The box respirator was never produced in quantity. The protective hood for infants was known as the Bunny Mask because COL Unmacht found that adding ears

Infants
Infants represent a challenge to protection efforts. Their body size and composition change constantly. They grow by leaps and bounds. Not only are infants small and cute, they defy all efforts to get them to follow instructions! One can only imagine trying to put a respirator on a struggling, colicky 3-month old. Thus, a protective apparatus had to be built to contain the entire body, not just the head. However, an infant lacks air intake potential to overcome a filters resistance, so fresh air must be continually provided to prevent suffocation. The Germans designed a baby cradle for infants Gaskettchen. This is a human-powered airpurifying respirator. The cradle consists of a plywood frame, a rubberized white fabric cover with view port, a German Volksmaske 37 filter, and a hose that connects the Gaskettchen to a bellows unit. To accommodate needed parent-child interaction, the Gaskettchen has a built-in gloved mitten. To use the respirator, the infant is inserted into the protector on the

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Photo courtesy of Major Robert D. Walk

German infant protector, Gaskettchen with doll in place. The attached glove hangs in front of the doll.

Photo courtesy of Major Robert D. Walk

Closed Gaskettchen showing the window and bellows. The attending parent pumped the bellows 15 times per minute to circulate fresh air in the unit. 26 CML

and easier to carry. The US Infant Protector, M1, was to the hood and wiggling them put a sense of play destandardized in 1945. into children that could entice them to wear the After the war, technology of synthetic materials protective hood. advanced quickly. As a result, the M2 Infant Protector The mask was locally designed, tested, and produced (Civil Defense designation: CDV-815) was made of using available materials. The mask had an inner and outer vinyl and shaped like a GI pup tent. The protector was bag, an eyepiece for viewing, and a drawstring. The outer meant for children up to 4 years old. The design bag was constructed from felt or denim allows for the diffusion of air through enclosed filters impregnated with CC-2 (chloramide powder) in in sufficient quantity to provide ample oxygen to the paraffin. The inner bag was muslin impregnated child and eliminate the need for an air pump. with paraffin. The eyepiece was scrap celluloid from The tent-shaped protector has three large filters on the old x-ray negatives. Inside the hood was a small breathing pad made of a double layer of two long sides of the protector with heavy Turkish toweling that was one clear viewport covering the dampened with a 5 percent sodium remaining area. An exterior metal phenolate solution prior to use. All frame supports the tent and a seams were double stitched. shoulder carrying strap is attached This was a multifunction mask to the frame. The child is inserted that served as an infant protector into the protector through an apron (entire infant placed into the hood), on the front; the apron is rolled up toddler protector (tied around the and sealed with snaps onto the waist), and youth (under 5 years) frame. The viewport allows Mom mask (tied about the neck). The and Dad to see the baby and the mask was issued with a small bottle baby to look out. Toys can be of sodium phenolate and Bulletin placed in the protector to keep the Number 5 (Directions for Use of baby occupied. Bunny Masks), published on May 14, Finally, the protector was designed 1942. This mask, an air-purifying for mass production using the latest respirator, was produced in quantity manufacturing technology. This within the Hawaiian Department. The reduced its cost to about $25 and first 3,000 masks were issued in theoretically would allow the average Hawaii in June 1942, with deliveries American to purchase one easily. This completed to the outer islands by protector was adopted as standard in December. A total of 37,643 masks were 1960 but was not produced in quantity issued within the territory in the United States. of Hawaii. To meet the needs of the continental Young Children United States, several designs were examined, including box respirators. Young children, ages 2 to 6, also Ultimately, the Office of Civil Defense represent a serious challenge to the designed, adopted, and produced the defense planner. As with an infant M1 Infant Protector. This is an the child is constantly growing, but is impermeable, rubber-coated, layered German Gasjaeckchen still not able to completely follow fabric bag with an acetate viewport instructions! The child is very enerfor the baby. An external hoop maintains the shape getic and will not sit still long; thus the protective and the protector is sealed with a drawstring cord. The apparatus should be built to contain the torso. baby is inserted into the bottom of the protector and As with infants, it is best, although not required, to the drawstring is pulled and tied. The attending provide air in an over-pressure mode. Infant parent pumps air using a rubber, accordion-styled protectors could also be used to protect toddlers bellows unit through an M1 Training Filter to and young children, as long as the child fits in the the infant. To ensure adequate air for the child, the protector. bellow must be pumped about 15 times per minute. The Germans designed the Gasjaeckchen for Like the Gaskettchen, the M1 Infant Protector is children up to the age of about 4. The Gasjaecka human PAPR. In comparison to the German cradle chen was a hood for older children who could not protector, the US Infant Protector is lighter in weight be fitted with the adult civilian gas mask. The hood

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is manufactured of rubberized white fabric with arms, an oval viewport for the child to look through, and a hose connected to a bellows unit to provide the air. A German standard Volksmaske 37 canister is installed inside the hood which is attached to the hose. Commonality of many parts with the Gaskettchen made maintenance of both easier. The hood fits over the torso of the child and ties around the waist and wrists with a drawstring. As with the Gaskettchen, the Gasjaeckchen must be constantly supplied with air by the parent pumping the bellows. Like the other German and American World War II efforts, the Gasjaeckchen is a human PAPR. These protectors were stored throughout Germany in air-raid Photo courtesy of Federal Emergency Management Agency. shelters. Like the cradle, the Gasjaeckchen was sent to the United Prepared for an attack, children wear the CD V-805 masks. States and evaluated by American Gas Mask, Small Child, was issued with the M2 scientists. This protector included such good ideas that Noncombatant Canister and the M1 Noncombatant scientists recommended a child and infant protector Carrier, M2-2-1. The mask was an adaptation using its best design points (arms, waist tie, and of the M1 Noncombatant Gas Mask to fit the smaller pumped air) be designed in the United States. face of a child. To allow for a small childs face size, One idea acted upon in the United States for the M2 mask only has one eyelens (similar to later protecting young children during World War II was M14/M24/M25-series masks). A smaller filter (the the Mickey Mouse (Disney) mask. On January 7, M2) is also used to reduce weight and bulk. In tests, 1942, one month after the Pearl Harbor attack, the with proper coaching and good salesmanship by the owner of the Sun Rubber Company, T.W. Smith, Jr. leader, most young children could be induced to and his designer, Dietrich Rempel (with approval of wear the gas mask for extended periods. Walt Disney), presented the design of the Mickey Mouse Gas Mask for children to Major General William N. Porter, Chief of the Chemical Warfare Older Children Service (CWS). After approval of the CWS, Sun Rubber Products Company produced sample masks Older children represented less of a problem for review. This mask, made of injection-molded in protection than smaller children. Their faces are colored plastic, complete with mouse ears, looks larger, they are more disciplined, and their lung like Mickey Mouse! They are APRs. The hope was capacity is greater. Thus, if small masks are available, that the design of the mask was such that children older children can more likely be fitted with would carry it and wear it as part of a game. This adult-styled respirators. PAPRs are not required, but would reduce the fear associated with wearing the are preferred. gas mask and would, hopefully, improve their wear Again, the quick-thinking Hawaiian Department time and, hence, survivability. A few Mickey Mouse masks came up with a solution. Utilizing stocks of the were manufactured, but studies showed the key to standard M1 Training Gas Masks (only manukeeping children in masks was adult interaction, factured in a universal size later called medium), not mask design. they developed a modified mask for older children. Another World War II mask, the M2-2-1 Small The M1 mask was modified with the addition of a Childs mask, was developed from the M1-series rubberized material to the chin and sides to fit Noncombatant Gas Mask. The M2 Noncombatant children. These masks were a stopgap measure used

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by the Hawaiian forces to ensure protection of children until a supply of childrens masks could be obtained from the United States. These modified training masks were developed immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack in order to protect the island population. A total of 78,000 masks were modified and issued. Later in the war, the M1A2-1-1 Noncombatant Mask was available in five sizes, including a childs size. This mask was the second alteration of the basic M1 Noncombatant Gas Mask (M1A2) with the M1 Noncombatant Canister and the M1 Noncombatant Carrier (M1A2-1-1). The mask had two celluloid eyelenses, an outlet valve, and a filter attached and built into the mask. It was designed for mass production. This mask, developed before the war by Edgewood Arsenal, was a major US success story. Mass production of the mask by firms throughout the United States was such a success that production was stopped after more than 8 million were produced. Postwar, development of Noncombatant Protective Masks continued. The M16 Noncombat Protective Mask (Civil Defense designation CDV-800) was designed in six sizes. Sizes 1 and 2 (using the E3R3 Noncombat Filter) were designed for use by small children but were not procured. With improvements in plastics technology, a low-cost mask, the M22 (Civil Defense designation CDV-805) was developed and fielded. At the time, it was an amazing advancement. The filters were integrated into the cheeks of the mask as part of the production process. It is easy to use, provides low resistance to breathing, and takes up little space in storage. Manufactured in six sizes, the mask can be used by anyone over the age of 4. The vinyl M18 face piece is stored in a vinyl M16 carrier with instructions for use written on the outsidecomplete with pictures showing how to put the mask on. A modern design, the M22 Noncombatant Mask was designed to use the latest manufacturing technology and deliver a mask to the public for $2 to $3 per mask. Starting in 1960, thousands were manufactured. The mask was declared obsolete in 1987. The

manufacturing equipment was held in storage until the 1990s and then destroyed.

Current Trends
The current trend in young childrens protection is to provide them with PAPR. This eliminates the need for a good mask fit because the PAPR provides an overpressure in the mask; thus airflow is always out. Modern PAPRs use electric air pumps and provide improved protection for the child over the older human PAPRs. This provides the only major improvements over the basic protection concept used in the US M1 Infant Respirator, German Gaskettchen, and German Gasjaeckchen. Israel, concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, issues a hood with PAPR for children ages 3 to 8, called the Bardas Magen, and a protective suit with PAPR for infants, called the Shmartaf. For those of us in America, there are several examples available on the commercial market. For older children, the PAPRs are still preferred, but children have sufficient lung capacity to use an APR. The only problem with APRs is fit; hence the PAPRs are preferred because of their higher protection factor. There are many APRs available in childrens sizes, including masks from the former Soviet Union and Israel.

Conclusion
This article examined child protection efforts using APR and PAPR by the German and American governments during World War II and looked at current trends in child protection. Advancements in technology have replaced the human PAPRs of World War II with relatively inexpensive batteryoperated PAPRs for the 1990s. The basic concept remains the sameprovide clean air to children to ensure their survival in a contaminated atmosphere. Children are the future of the nation and the world. They must be protected!

At the time this article was written, Major Robert D. Walk was the Weapons of Mass Destruction Individual and Instructor Training Officer at the US Army Reserve Command. His education includes a Master of Science Degree in Environmental Engineering from the University of Oklahoma, a Masters of Business Administration from Long Island University, and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of New Hampshire. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College (Resident and Correspondence), the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Chemical Officers Advanced Course, and the Chemical Officers Basic Course. Previous assignments include Commander, 184th Chemical Detachment; Commander, HHC, 59th Ordnance Brigade; Acting Commander, 1st Battalion, 377th Regiment, 95th Division (Institutional Training); S-3, 1st Battalion, 377th Regiment, 95th Division (Institutional Training); S-3, 197th Ordnance Battalion; Chemical Officer, Readiness Group Stewart; and Chemical Officer, 60th Ordnance Group.

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If the National Training Center is coaching the concept for integrating the PDS and the decontamination site, the Chemical Corps should take the lead in putting this concept into doctrine.

Integrating the PDS with the Decontamination Site in Todays Army


By CPT Jeanie M. White
The proponent for the Patient Decontamination reduce NBC contamination levels to a negligible risk Site (PDS) has not been clearly identified in either before the patient receives medical treatment. FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, or FM 8-10-4, From my experience as a decontamination platoon Medical Platoon Leaders Handbook. Both field leader, when one individual was contaminated, the manuals state that a PDS must operate under the immediate response was to request decontamination supervision of medical personnel to ensure no further support. All equipment and personnel were transported injury is caused to the patient by the decon to the decontamination site whether or not the process. Chemical School-trained personnel are not contaminated elements had casualties. Unless the PDS mentioned. It has been my experience through three is collocated, that contaminated casualty would be sent to the nearest ambulance exchange point rotations at the National Training Center that integrated, collocated decontamiIntegrating the two containing the PDS, which could be kilometers away. nation and patient decontamination sites sites would cause Integrating the two sites would work more efficiently to support the less confusion on cause less confusion on the locations of brigade, although it is not currently in our doctrine. the locations of both both areas and limit the spread of contamination on the battlefield. (The According to FM 3-5, a deconareas and brigade would maintain control of dirty tamination site on the battlefield is where limit the spread routes.) This would reduce loss of either operational or thorough decon is contaminated casualties due to confusion conducted to reduce NBC contamination of contamination of the PDS location. The decontamination levels from equipment and personnel while on the battlefield. platoon leader maintains command still in a contamination vapor environment, and control (C 2 ). C 2 controls access or to negligible risk levels to restore combat power dependent on METT-T. from one link-up point over one net for the There are two techniques to both decon processes: collocated sites guiding the contaminated parties into their Thorough decon consists of detailed equipment and respective sites. The logistics push package for both detailed troop decon, while operational decon consists of sites is collocated in the reconstitution area, which makes vehicle washdown and MOPP gear exchange. A resupply more readily available for the next mission. patient decontamination site is where the patient The decontamination platoon is set to facilitate decontamination team decontaminates casualties to quick turnaround of casualty collection transportation

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and logistics vehicles that are contaminated. Finally, with the sites collocated, the brigade will receive a more accurate report of actual contamination via an NBC 5 Report (area of actual contamination). This report is sent by the decontamination platoon leader after the mission for both sites is completed. This procedure ensures the brigade avoids the contaminated area. If the National Training Center is coaching the concept for integrating the PDS and decontamination sites, the Chemical Corps should take the lead in putting this concept into doctrine. The Medical Service Corps or the Chemical Corps must make this concept doctrine and teach it in our Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools as a joint effort to clarify who is responsible for what. If this does not happen, the operational experience of successful integration will linger in SOPs forever. Units have benefited greatly from the integrated PDS/ decontamination site concept according to executive summaries provided by CPT Chesney (National Training

Center Chemical Company Trainer), whose decontamination platoons were task-organized and postured to conduct effective integrated PDS/decontamination operations. If we are to train as we fight, the integrated concept must be trained at home station for the brigade combat team to reap the benefits on the battlefield.
At the time this article was written, CPT Jeanine M. White was attending the Chemical Officer Advanced Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama. After graduation, she will report to Fort Carson, Colorado. CPT White graduated from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga in 1994 with a BS in Psychology. Her previous assignments as an officer include; Battalion Chemical Officer for 1/1AV, Brigade Chemical Officer for 4 BDE AV and 1 BCT, 1 ID (MECH), and Decon Platoon Leader/XO for HHC, 1 EN BN at Fort Riley, Kansas. She has attended three rotations to NTC (1 as BN Chemo, 1 as BDE Chemo, and 1 as Decon Plt Ldr) and a BCTP in Germany as BDE Chemo. She is a 1994 graduate of the Chemical Officer Basic Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

A new print by Don Stivers

Image size: 16 1/2 x 26 For purchase information and order form, see page 34.

BLIND PURSUIT
SMOKE IN THE SHENANDOAH
The beginning of May 1862 heralded a low point in Confederate fortunes: Yorktown had been evacuated, as had Williamsburg; Norfolk had to be abandoned; and the Confederacys first ironclad, the Virginia, was scuttled to keep her from Federal hands. One high point, however, had come from their renowned Stonewall. Thomas J. Jackson had won a victory in the Shenandoah Valley at McDowell, Virginia. Union General George B. McClellans Peninsula Campaign was succeeding in spite of his own cautiousness and Northern troops were approaching Richmond from the east. Union General Nathaniel P. Banks felt the need to reinforce his army after the Battle of Kernstown. While technically a Confederate defeat, Kernstown drew more Union troops to the Shenandoah Valley, turning McClellans well-orchestrated advance along two borders of Virginia into a dangerous, uncoordinated, two-pronged shuffle. Then came the Battle of McDowell on May 8,1862. In terrain too mountainous to use artillery, the two armies infantry slugged it out, toe-to-toe. Though Jackson lost more men, the Federals, under General Robert C. Schenck, began a retreat with the brilliant Confederate cavalry commander, Turner Ashby, and his troopers snapping at their heels. By May 10, Jacksons infantry with the famous Stonewall Brigade in the lead caught up to Schenck. In desperation, the Union troops set fire to the thick woods, cleverly laying down a smoke screen. A member of Jacksons staff recalled that, Soon the sky was overcast with volumes of smoke, which almost hid the scene, and wrapped every distant object in a veil, impenetrable to the eyes and telescopes of the officers alike. Jackson, always the consummate warrior, admired the subterfuge. He declared this smoke was the most adroit expedient to which a retreating army could resort to embarrass pursuit, and that it possessed all the disadvantages of a night attack. Don Stivers most recent print portrays Jacksons pursuit of the Federal army, which was stalled by a unique tactic not usually associated with the American Civil Wara smoke screen.

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Digital Unit Training for Chemical Soldiers


By SFC Richard A. Alker
The Army is in transition to the 21st centuryArmy XXI. Task Force XXI laid the foundation for this transition which involves experimentation with a digitized brigade. The Army Warfighter Experiment focused at the division and corps levels. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is breaking ground for digitized division- level operations. Division XXI changes the organizational structures and the way we fight as part of Army XXI. Some of the changes made which will impact future NBC operations include: Relocating the heavy division chemical company. Consolidating organic decontamination assets (for operational decontamination) in division support commands forward support companies (located with maneuver battalions). Assigning Fox reconnaissance platoon to the Division Reconnaissance Squadron. Fielding new equipment (Fox Block 1, JWARN, and MICAD). The Chemical Corps must readdress its current training procedures and policies with regard to training chemical soldiers to work in a digitized unit. Digitization enhances lethality, survivability, sustainability, and tempo using Army Battle Command System (ABCS), advanced communication equipment and positioning systems, high technology weapons, multipurpose sensors, and vehicle-mounted detectors. A typical scenario would be at company, platoon, or section level (see figure below). A detector (M8A1, M21, or AN/VDR-2) receives indicators of an attack/hazard that the MICAD transmitter (attached to the detector) sends up to 5 kilometers (line of sight) to the MICAD receiver in the company command post. At the command post, the MICAD receiver sends information to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), which formats an NBC 1 Observers Report using JWARN and auto-forwards the report to the Battalion Tactical Operation Center (TOC). At the battalion TOC, the report is sent to the Maneuver Control System (MCS) and auto-forwarded to the brigade TOC and division tactical who prepares an NBC 2 Evaluated Data Report, NBC 3 Immediate Warning Report, and the contamination overlay. The end result is that an NBC 1 Report is received at the division tactical command post without a soldier initiating it (autonomous NBC Warning and Reporting System). This article proposes a training plan for chemical soldiers assigned to digital units. Training must be structured to combine live and simulated training. This training plan requires a coordinated effort combining the US Army Chemical School, gaining unit, and self-development.
DIVISION NBCC D-MAIN/TAC1 CP

SATELLITE RELAY

BRIGADE TOC

TFXXI NBC INITIATIVES (JWARN/MICAD/IMETS)

NE OFFUTT AFB M1A1/2, M2, AND M3 WITH MICAD IMETS M21 RASCAL WITH MICAD ASAS AN/VDR-2 WITH MICAD MCS (JWARN) MCS (JWARN)

Note: Weather data is compiled at Offutt AFB, NE and made available by satellite relay.

BIDS M8A1 ALARM WITH MICAD SOLDIERS WITH NBC PAGERS


2 FBCB2

MCS (JWARN)

(JWARN)

B
BATTALION TOC
2 FBCB2 (JWARN)

M93A1 FOX BLOCK 1

COMPANY TOC

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The Chemical Corps must orchestrate an aggressive fielding plan for equipment upgrades, complex operating systems, and the integration of existing equipment. At the installation level, there currently is a lack of military personnel with any experience in operating the systems listed on the previous page. The train-up effort is further hampered by the lack of opportunities to train (unavailability of equipment) requiring much longer periods to become proficient at battle tasks, and limited tests (checking specific functions, not all). New initiatives have created a demand for soldiers with high levels of computer skills. Soldiers must have basic knowledge of modern NBC equipment, automation, and Microsoft Office programs to be efficient in a digital unit. Individual skills can be improved through self-development. As a soldier receives advanced technical training, the soldier becomes more valuable to the success of the unit. The instructional training base must include the courses listed in the following table.
Institutional Training Requirements Captains Career Course Officers Basic Course (OBC) Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) Basic NCO Course (BNCOC) One-station Unit Training (OSUT) MCS
* ** OPER OVER

FBCB2
OPER OVER

ANBACIS JWARN
OPER OVER OPER OVER

IMETS
OPER OVER

MICAD ANALOG
OPER OVER NBCWRS

**

X X X X X X

X X X X

X X X X

X X

X X X X X X X X

X X

* Limited MCS/FBCB2 operator instruction must be provided to understand how NBC systems (ANBACIS, JWARN, IMETS, and MICAD) are integrated. ** An MCS/FBCB2 overview must be provided to understand how NBC systems (ANBACIS, JWARN, IMETS, and MICAD) are integrated. Installations supported by Project Managers and equipment Field Office Representatives are responsible for providing personnel and resources to train new soldiers and sustain unit battle-task proficiency. Installation training must include the courses listed in the table below.
Installation Training Requirements Staff Officers (O3 and above) Officers (O1-O2) Senior Staff NCOs (E7 and above) Staff NCOs (E5-E6) Soldiers (E1-E4) MCS
*OPER SYS MAN TECH *OVER

FBCB2 X X X X X X

MICAD
OVER

*OPER *OVER OPER

X X X X X

X X X X

* The MCS/FBCB2 operator and overview instruction must include ANBACIS, JWARN, IMETS, and MICAD operation/overview. Brief description of Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) courses listed above: OPER: Operator course provides detailed instruction on all aspects of equipment use. SYS MAN: System Managers course provides information to manage/troubleshoot ATCCS terminals and LAN.

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TECH: UNIX Technicians course provides detailed programming information to troubleshoot ATCCS UNIX programs. OVER: Overview course highlights capabilities and key features. Installations must establish division-level training facilities equipped with ATCCS. Availability of a properly equipped facility and technical support is essential to the success of MCS and FBCB2 training. The Chemical Corps must implement the following changes to meet the demands of Army XXI. Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for primary functions (battle tasks) including digital and analog operations and integrate nondigital units into digital operations. Ensure the most current equipment information is available and incorporated into institutional and installation programs of instruction (POIs). Update school POIs on using digitized products during the IPB process and the employment of digitized chemical units. Establish an additional skill identifer for each ATCCS system and associated course. The success of Army XXI is measured by our ability to prepare soldiers to conduct operations as digital warfighters. Soldiers and technology are our most valuable resource. As leaders we have the responsibility to ensure our soldiers are educated and ready to fight and win in a digitized division.

THE CHEMICAL CORPS REGIMENTAL ASSOCIATION PRINT ORDER FORM


The Chemical Corps Regimental Association (CCRA), in honor of the Chemical Corps 80th Birthday, has commissioned a limited edition Regimental Print by renowned military artist Don Stivers. The print portrays Stonewall Jacksons May 1862 pursuit of the Federals after the Battle of McDowell and their subsequent escape through their use of smoke. Prints are currently available and orders will be accepted until the edition is sold out. NAME:__________________________________________________________________ STREET ADDRESS:___________________________________CITY:__________________STATE:______ZIP:________ ***NOTE*** UPS will not deliver to a P.O. Box (P.O. Box Orders will be returned) PHONE NUMBER (W/AREA CODE):_______________________________________ Number of Prints ordered: CCRA Limited Edition Print Shipping Charges (up to 6 prints) Alabama orders Credit Card orders QTY_____ @ $125.00 per print $15.00 for up to 6 prints 4% sales tax 4% service charge $___________ $___________ $___________ $___________

***NOTE*** All orders are final Total Payment $___________ Example: Print ($125) + Shipping ($15) + AL Order ($5.60) + Credit Card ($5.82) = $151.42 Example: Print ($125) + Shipping ($15) + Credit Card ($5.60) = $145.60 Please check one: ____ Assign me my print number(s) as determined by CCRA ____ I request print number(s) _________________. If the number(s) I request are not available, I will be assigned a different number(s) as determined by the CCRA. Mail form and remittance to: Chemical Corps Regimental Association, Inc. Office of Proponency ATTN: Regimental Print 320 Engineer Loop Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929

Make checks payable to: Credit card charge:

CCRA ___MC ___VISA

Card Number: _________________________________ Expiration: ___________________________________ Signature: ____________________________________

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Making a Better Chemical Corps in the 21st Century:

The Refitted M93A1 NBCRS (Fox) Shortcomings In Firepower?


CPT Norma J. Honaker Introduction
As a platoon leader and later as executive officer of 51st Chemical Company, a Fox-pure company during the mid-90s, my fellow platoon leaders and I agreed on one major shortcoming of the Fox self-protection. In addition to its silhouette (often confused with enemy armored vehicles) and its tedious mission sometimes requiring slow speeds in unsecured territory, the Fox was Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) equipped with the M240 machine gun. The USACMLS, more specifically the Directorate of Combat Developments, is reconsidering the TO&E and doctrine of this relatively new system. Three proposals are currently on the table and initial conferences propose both a short-term and a long-term solution to the Foxs protection deficiencies. I will introduce the options under consideration and highlight excerpts from the field input received from chemical officers and NCOs throughout the Army. the original choice because it is an area weapon and was to somehow keep the Foxes out of a direct fight. The program manager Fox team leader, Mike DAndries, reiterated this, stating that both TACOM and the Armor School suggested using the .50 caliber machine gun as the Foxs main weapon system, but the Chemical School disagreed based on the concerns summarized above. The USACMLS believed that commanders would misuse, or alternatively use, this asset as so many other chemical assets, including personnel, have been misused throughout modern history. The assumption was that commanders would see the weapons system and place the hard-to-replace Fox and its crew into direct fire, possibly even offensive situations. LTC Robert Harbs, S3 of the 464th Chemical Brigade, provided an excellent example of such a situation: During a recent wargame, the controllers were planning to send an MP and Fox platoon to counter an OPFOR SOF insertion into the Corps rear. They were under the impression the Fox was armed with a .50 cal MG and could be used as an offensive weapon system to bring the heavy firepower of the .50 to bear on this situation. After two days of discussions with the controllers, the MP brigade S3 and I were able to convince them the Fox was not equipped for this mission and was purely a defensive weapon. We also indicated the number of Fox vehicles was limited on the battlefield and that each has a specialized recon

History
The original version of the Fox, the Operation Desert Storm M93 or XM93, received the M240 machine gun without a front sight post. During the fielding of the systems after 1991, approximately half of the systems arrived at the unit configured in this manner, while the other half were given the M240E1 MG with a front sight post. According to Major Jon Drushal, USACMLS Doctrine Writer, the M240 MG was

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mission with a highly trained and difficult-toreplace crew. We conceded that if a Fox was in the area and the MPs needed support, the Fox could be made available. The point here is that mounting a .50 cal on the Fox may seem attractive but situations like I just described will come up and well have to address the issue of the Fox as an offensive or defensive system. LTC Harbs lived the Chemical Schools fear of Fox misuse; this situation is the reason why the Fox now has the M240 MG.

squad (two vehicles). This gives the squads greater survivability by allowing them to break contact in an undesirable engagement. The doctrinally correct employment of Fox in a minimum of two supports this option best of all options under consideration. The Fox is a vehicle that routinely operates either along the front-line trace far behind lead elements of maneuver unit formations, where the direct and indirect fire threat is extensive, or along MSRs where the principal threat is small but heavily armed forces intent on severing/blocking our line of communications.

Options
The first school of thought is to leave the system as it is currently configured. Supporters of this idea believe the M240 MG should stay without a front sight post. This would allow the crew to use it as an area weapon while preventing misuse by maneuver commanders. Thanks to the input from the field by Fox platoon leaders, field grade supporters of the system, and NCOs who have worked with the system throughout the decade, this option is no longer a consideration. LTC Bob Neumann, Command Chemical Officer of the United States European Command, states the risks associated with not improving the current system: We must assume that we will be fighting on a nonlinear battlefield. With this in mind, a Fox team sent to recon a rear area or route could encounter an enemy force. I would not normally assign a combat force to overwatch these Foxes. Additionally, the Foxes operating in the Corps rear would not be supported by a combat force. Each Fox team must have sufficient combat power to break contact and survive. We cannot burden commanders with the need to be watched and escorted every time we conduct a recon mission. The second school of thought is a complete upgrade of the systems through the replacement of the M240 MG currently on half of the fielded systems with the M240E1. This option allows the crews to protect themselves and allows the unit commanders to actually track their crews training proficiency by allowing them to qualify with the weapon, an option not available with the current M240s. The third school of thought is a complete upgrade of the systems by replacing the M240 MG and M240E1 MG with a .50 cal MG or MK-19 at a minimum of one per

Decision
The US Army Chemical Corps doctrine discussion and the resulting conference propose both a shortterm plan and a long-term plan. A time line for the implementation of either plan remains unfinished. The units will begin to exchange their M240s for M240E1s at an unspecified time. The Strac manual contains M240E1 MG qualification tables, and crew qualification and vehicle adaptations will result in changes to the Fox-specific 3-series FMs. This short-term solution provides crews with the necessary ability to aim and engage, increasing their survivability. The long-term solution is in its infancy. The current choice of the .50 cal MG requires much planning. This upgrade requires another refit of Fox systems (current refit of the system is ongoing at Anniston Army Depot) with a mount as yet undesigned. It is likely that designers will draw heavily on current and tank mounts for the TC hatch. The cost is unknown at this time. Even this is not a total solution. The issue of remote firing capability remains unsolved for the Military Polices own MK-19s. Project Manager Small Arms is currently working to develop a remote capability for the MPs, and similar technology will likely provide a solution for a Fox squad leaders decision about weighing concerns of the overpressure system with those of the need to break contact rather than engaging the enemy.
At the time this article was written CPT Norma Honaker was attending the USACMLS Chemical Officer Advanced Course at Fort McClellan, Alabama. CPT Honakers previous assignments include platoon leader and executive officer, 51st Chemical Company; Squadron Chemical Officer Regimental Support Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; and executive officer, Company C, 82d Chemical Battalion. She is a graduate of the Chemical Officer Basic and L-5 ASI Course.

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Stand by!!!
By SGM Ronald G. Loeder STAND BY! That was the command that echoed across the air as the 82d Airborne Division and Fort Bragg prepared to greet the Regimental Command Sergeant Major of the Chemical Corps, CSM James E. Van Patten.
CSM Van Patten exiting 34-foot tower.

On 16 and 17 February, CSM Van Patten visited the 83d Chemical Battalions 101st Chemical Company and the 82d Airborne Divisions 21st Chemical Company. He also addressed the enlisted soldiers of Fort Bragg and attended an 82d Airborne Division Joint Readiness Training Exercise. After leading the 21st Chemical Company on a brisk 4-mile run, CSM Van Patten attended a demonstration at the divisions advanced airborne school that highlighted all aspects of an airborne operation. MSG Baldwin of the division chemical section presented the briefing, which included prejump training, marshalling area control officer (MACO) briefings, rigging procedures, and jumpmaster pre-inspection (JMPI) procedures. Upon completion of the demonstration, CSM Van Patten donned his ballistic helmet and parachute harness. MSG Mack, Division Chemical Operations Sergeant, performed a Jumpmasters final inspection of CSM Van Pattens equipment and gave his personal seal of approval. Then, looking up and swallowing hard, CSM Van Patten began his climb to the top of the 34-foot airborne tower. With his eyes on the horizon and his hand over the end of the reserve parachute, the command sergeant major executed his best exit posture out of the tower. Elated by the thrill of his first jump, the command sergeant major continued his visit with a better understanding of the airborne chemical soldiers perspective. Impressed with the overall professionalism and candor of the soldiers of the 21st Chemical Company, CSM Van Patten presented his personnel coins to four of them. As he departed, the command sergeant major expressed his sincere appreciation for the past two-days activities and the professional manner in which the chemical troopers of Fort Bragg execute their duties.

CSM Van Patten listens to briefing at 82d Airborne Division Advanced Airborne School. JULY 1999

Keep your feet and knees together. Airborne!

37

Book Reviews

By USACMLS Command Historian, Dr. Burton Wright III.

Nazi Science: Myth, Truth, and the German Atomic Bomb Mark Walker, New York: Plenum Press, 1995
Much has been written about the German development of the atomic bomb. In some books, the Germans were very near development of a device similar to the ones dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Others say the Germans were some distance from development of a functioning bomb. In the past few years, several books have been written by scholars seeking to explain the role of Dr. Werner Heisenberg in stopping or side-tracking the German bomb. Indeed, Dr. Heisenberg himself took much of the credit for ensuring that Hitler did not have this weapon at his disposal. In a book written in 1995, author Mark Walker goes one better. He focuses on not only the German atomic bomb, but Nazi science in general. It is an interesting story. As the communists did in Russia, the National Socialists took over the scientific community. However, they did it more by infiltration than by the direct methods used by the Russian communists. In the opening pages of the book, the author explains in some detail how German sciencethat is physics and associated disciplinesran prior to the war. The early part of the book deals with the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Prior to World War II, this was one of the most respected scientific organizations in Europe. Mr. Walker shows how the Nazis took control of this scientific organization and molded it to their own views. Like art and culture, Hitler and his supporters had a unique point of view. This was later translated into a view of science. Many National Socialists were not members of the lower and less educated classes; a number of them were well educated. A principle supporter of the National Socialist German Workers Partys takeover of science was Dr. Johannes Stark, who epitomized the idea of Aryan science versus Jewish science. It was just this type of bigotry that forced Einstein to leave Germany and come to the United States. He was not the last Jewish scientist to find work in America. Many of the principal brains behind the Manhattan Project were Jews. People like Stark and his Deutsches Physik (German Physics) crippled the enormous capability of German scientific accomplishment during World War II. During that conflict, even with some of their best and most articulate brains working for the other side, German science managed to develop rockets, special torpedoes, jet aircraft, robot tanks, anti-aircraft rockets, submarines with greater depth and speed than any on the Allies side, and other and smaller weapons that are now standard in most of the armies of the world.

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Half of the book deals with the fight within the scientific community to avoid absorption into the Nazi scientific mold. Although the author shows there was resistance, eventually the Nazis won, and German science fell into step. The author then focuses on Werner Heisenberg and his work with the German atomic project. His view is somewhat different from some of the latest literature he doesnt believe Heisenberg actually stopped the atomic bomb because of his principles but, perhaps, because he didnt quite know how to do it. In any event, the author takes the view that this sabotage of the program is probably overdone. He takes Heisenberg to task, and probably properly so, for acting as a spokesman for Nazi ideas and culture. Remember, Albert Speer built a great reputation after World War II on the idea that he knew nothing of the Holocaust and was not a willing supporter of it. Yet, in recent work by historians, documents have come to light that show Speer had knowledge of the Final Solution well before the end of the war, and that as the chief city planner of Berlin, Speers office delivered hundreds of Jews into the hands of the Gestapo. It would be very difficult now for someone like Heisenberg and Speer to claim that their hands were clean of such atrocities. The last chapter is very interesting. After the war, the major German nuclear scientists were debriefed at a location in England called Farm Hall. Their debriefings were transcribed and the author read them. From these, he makes some interesting deductions about whether or not the Germans could have built the bomb had they been given the material and personnel that the United States used (120,000 workers and up to $5 billion). Of even more interest is the attitude of the scientiststhat is, did they want to build a bomb? Even the Farm Hall transcripts do not give us a solid answer. Clearly, though, they understood just as well as those American scientists at Los Alamos that what they were ushering into this century was a weapon of terrible destructive potential. The Germans were just as scared of the future as the Americans. This book is written in a good style that generally keeps your interest. In the recitation of the mundane that is much of the book, one can conceptualize how science was used for evil in the Third Reich. If the purpose of the book was to ensure we understand how this can be done, it has succeeded admirably. Reading Nazi Science is worth the time. We should take heed of the lessons it teaches us.

BLOOD AND WATER: SABOTAGING HITLERS BOMB Dan Kurzman, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997 One of the most important operations of the war was the British and American efforts to stop the development of the German atomic bomb. No one can say how history would have been changed if the Germans had managed to give Hitler the ultimate weapon of its time. Although he apparently did not want to use the chemical and biological weapons that had already been developed, Hitler might have used this weapon had any been available. Blood and Water: Sabotaging Hitlers Bomb is a well-written and researched book by the prolific author Dan Kurzman. Other books have been written on this subject, some by participants themselves, but this book does a good job of covering the initiation of the effort before World War II to its end. The title is appropriate. Much blood was spilled to stop the development and manufacture of deuterium oxide or heavy water. This chemical was a possible moderator for the development of a chain reaction, the first step in the development of the atomic bomb. The author takes the reader from the first stirrings of the idea of an atomic bomb through the attempt by the Germans to acquire large amounts of heavy water through the Norwegian company at Vemork that made the heavy water. At first, the Allies (the British and the French) attempted simply to buy the water right out from under the Germans. This worked until the Germans conquered Norway in 1940. This brought the plant at Rjukan under their control to make heavy water for the atomic experiments being conducted by the famous German physicist, Dr. Werner Heisenberg. Recently, there have been a number of new books written on the part this man played in the development or nondevelopment of the atomic bomb. Some believe he was silently holding the project back to ensure Hitler would never have the bomb. Others think he was a nationalist and was working to give Hitler that weapon. Hiesenberg made the decision that heavy water was to be the only moderator for the Germans experiments, and that made it a high priority for the Allies to stop its production. A survey team of four Norwegian patriots was dropped into Norway to prepare the way for a team of engineers that would make the actual assault on the Norsk factory. Their operation was given the curious title of Grouse. First, Special Operations Executive (SOE) was tasked to set up a commando raid on the factory at Rjukan called Operation Freshman. This ended in disaster when the two gliders carrying the commando

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team crashed and killed many; more than 20 who survived the crash fell into the hands of the Germans and were later executed. Next, an incredible attack, carried out by less than a dozen Norwegian saboteurs, crippled the plant by blowing up an important part of the heavy-water process. Called Operation Gunnerside, these enormously brave men bought the British and Americans more time because the Germans had the heavy water plant up and running within a few weeks after the attack. Because of the attack, the Germans decided to move the stock of heavy water to Germany, and it was moved under heavy guard from the Norsk Plant down to a ferry. In a lapse of security, the ferry was relatively unguarded. Two saboteurs boarded the ferry Hydro and placed time charges in the ships vitals that would sink the ferry when it was at the deepest part of the lake1,300 feet. Those planning the assault knew that when it was carried out, the Germans and their Norwegian allies would take reprisals against the population, but the decision was made, and the Hydro sank, on cue, in the middle of Lake Tinn. The heavy water canisters, so vital to the German nuclear research, rest on the bottom of the lake to this day. The sacrifices made by the Norwegians halted the Germans development of the atomic bomb. As the author relates in Blood and Water, this was one of the epic struggles of the war and was essential to its successful outcome.

I recommend Blood and Water as a must read for all who are interested in knowing the complete history of one of the pivotal intelligence operations of the war. The author introduces the reader to a number of the main characters of the story. They spring to life in the pages of the book. If you look in the back of the book, you will find the author thoroughly researched this episode of the war against the German nuclear bomb. He interviewed numerous people with direct knowledge of this operation more than five decades ago. This book shows what courage and love of country can do when the chips are down and sacrifices need to be made. Any effort to hamper the development of weapons of mass destruction by nations that would use them for destruction is not wasted. The heroes of Telemark may be the first among many to come forward in the future to stop experiments on weapons even more powerful than the atomic bomb. History sometimes has a nasty habit of repeating itself. If this book interests you, the author has written other books that are also interesting to include the tragedy of the sinking of the cruiser Juneau and the loss of the five Sullivan brothers in the Pacific. Its title is fittingLeft to Diebecause the task force that the Juneau was part of did not stop to pick up survivors and did not inform higher commanders of the sinking until the ships reached port. By that time, only a few of the ships crew were still alive.

TAPS
The flag has been furledsignifying the closure of the post known to many as the Military Showplace of the South. On 20 May 1999 at 0900 on Gullion Field, Fort McClellan held its official post-closure ceremony. Numerous citizens from the community, distinguished visitors, local officials, past commanders, and employees attended the ceremony. Regiment for the past 20 years and home of the Military Police Corps and Regiment for the past 24 years.

Fort McClellan was the home of the Chemical Corps and

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