Pascual vs CA Facts

Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (CONSOLACION) and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino (REMEDIOS) are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson (CANUTO). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Navotas. The property, known as Lot 2 was owned by CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO. Each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters. On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan which the Director of Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, and Lot No. 2-E, were placed under CANUTOs name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots. Later, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan ("KASULATAN") where CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. After 2 years, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit ("JOINT AFFIDAVIT") affirming the KASULATAN in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan. CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Register of Deeds who issued to CONSOLACION TCT covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the RTC for "Annulment or Cancellation of TCT and Damages." REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and testament ("LAST WILL") dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot 2. Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from the registration of CONSOLACIONs title. RTC denied Remedios claim and dismissed the case since her action prescribed already. They said she knew about the petitioners adverse title since she testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit which was filed more than 4 years before she filed her case. Furthermore, RTC ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners because CATALINAs LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate. Since Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court. The CA reversed their judgement and held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years for breach of implied trust, not four. Also, the appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted to probate. The Issues

(1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest. HELD:

What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by prescription. Since Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted From Registration of Adverse Title For the 2nd issue. Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest. Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled. Therefore she lacks a cause of action. REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, "until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder." REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots. The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL. This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots. Union Bank v. Santibanez 452 SCRA 228 | Abu

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated. HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows: (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children. The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty. Rafael Maninang and Soledad Maninang, Petitioners Vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Bernardo S. Aseneta Facts: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died leaving a holographic will which provides that all her real and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang, after which a petition for the probate of the will was filed by the petitioner at CFI Quezon City while private respondent on the other hand instituted intestate proceedings at CFI Pasig, Rizal being the adopted child and claims to be the sole heir of the decedent. Both cases were being consolidated in CFI Rizal. A motion to dismiss the Testate case was filed by the private respondent on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he as the only compulsory heir was preterited.

Petitioner in her opposition averred that it is still the rule that in case for probate of the will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will. Trial court as sustained by the Court of Appeals denied the opposition thus this case. Issue: Whether under the terms of the decedents Will, private respondent has been preterited or disinherited and was it a valid disinheritance. Held: The court made a distinction between preterition and disinheritance stating that Preterition consist in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited, while, disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. It continued that by virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of the controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered and opined that the conclusion of the trial court that private respondent was preterited was not indubitable reading it from the face of the will.

Remedios Nuguid, Petitioner Vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz Nuguid, Oppositor Facts: Rosario Nuguid died single without descendants. Surviving her was her parents the oppositor and six brothers and sisters. She left a will wherein the petioner submitted for probate and prayed for the letters of administration be issued to her. On opposition the parents said that by the institution of the petitioner as universal heir of the deceased, compulsory heirs in the direct line were illegally preterited thus the institution is void. Issue: Whether the compulsory heirs of the direct line were illegally preterited. Held: Studying the facts and the law applicable to the case, oppositors received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime neither they were expressly disinherited a clear case of preterition. The one-sentence will of the testator institute the petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the court says that the nullity is complete. There is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Constantino C. Acain, Petitioner Vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Virginia A Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, Respondents Facts: On May 29, 1984 petitioner, one of the children of Segundino Acain who was designated to received all the properties of the testator his brother upon his death who however predeceased said testator, filed a petition for a probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of letters testamentary on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioners and his siblings were instituted as heirs. Motion to dismiss was filed by the private respondents on the grounds that petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings as he is merely a universal heir and the widow and adopted daughter were preterited. Issue: Whether or not private respondents have been preterited. Held: Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or, they are neither instituted as heir nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, preterition may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir and that she is not of the direct line. The adopted daughter however, whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both were deprived of at least their legitime. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents. [G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999] Facts:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and NildaDorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted. This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. Petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictionPetitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro. Held: The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed. The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again reexamine the intrinsic provisions of the same will. Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate. Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

Estate of ramagosa vs. ramagosa Facts: Mariano Sumilang filed petition for the probate of the will of Hilarion Ramagosa which instituted Sumilang as the sole heir. This was opposed by Saturnina Ramagosa alleging that the will was executed under duress and later on alleging that the will was revoked by implication when the testator

sold the parcels of land subject of the will to Sumilang. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss of the oppositors on the ground that it goes into the intrinsic validity of the will hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate be denied

Held: NO The petition for probate is limited to the extrinsic validity that is the testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. The alleged sale in the case at bar is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing, the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. ROBERTS v LEONIDAS G.R. No. L-55509 AQUINO; April 27, 1984 FACTS -Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died.He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce . - He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. - Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. - In that agreement, Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". - It was stipulated that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. - Ethel filed in the CFI an intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.Maxine, filed an opposition and MTD the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. - The intestate court noted that Maxine withdrew that opposition and MTD and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators, pursuant to the Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record. - The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold businesses and shares of stock owned by the deceased. - Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers (not signed by Maxine and her two children), the lower court adjudicated to Maxine of the decedent's Philippine estate and 1/8 each to his four children. - For a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. Then Juanita Grimm Morris, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion. - Before that motion could be heard, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine. - The second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills. - Ethel filed a MTD. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate. HELD We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's MTD. - A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, CC). - The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. - Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs. Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969 FACTS: Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried and leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or sister thereafter, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. De Precilla, niece of the deceased petitioned for probate the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria dated December 1960 and that she be appointed as special administratrix. Various parties opposed the petition contending that the 1960 will was not intended by Gliceria to be her true will and that there was a 1956 will executed by Gliceria were the oppositors were named as legatees. Consequently, Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis an ophthalmologist testified that Glicerias left eye suffered form cataract in 1960 which made her vision mainly for viewing distant object but not for reading prints. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 808 regarding blind testator be followed in the instant case to make Glicerias will valid? RULING: For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was like a blind testator and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code. Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself, is to make the provisions of the will known to the testator, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testators) other senses. Resolution granting motion for reconsideration may 23,1969 This is a motion for the reconsideration of our decision of March 28, 1969, filed by petitioner. In the opinion rendered in that case, we stated: "Petitioner should have been aware that there is no escape from the payment of the corresponding docket fee, otherwise, the Court is not called upon to act on a complaint or petition. Nor does it suffice to vary the rule simply because there is only one decedent whose estate is thus to be disposed of by will that must first be probated. It is not farfetched or implausible that a decedent could have left various wills. Under such circumstances, there is nothing inherently objectionable in thus exacting the payment of a docket fee, every time a will is sought to be probated. Petitioner here could have sought the probate of the will presented by him in the same proceeding. He did not; he filed instead a separate action." While not disputing the correctness of the above principle announced, petitioner, in this motion for reconsideration, would assert that he did not file a separate action "but instead elected to file the probate of the decedent's 1956 Will in the same Sp. Proc. 62618, then pending before the respondent Court." Petitioner's statement of fact is correct. Under the circumstances then, while the doctrine to the effect that a court of justice is not called upon to act on a complaint will petition in the absence of a payment of the corresponding docket fee every time a will is sought to be probated must be considered as subsisting, it finds no application to the present case, as petitioner did not file a separate action but instead sought to have the other will probated in the same special proceedings then pending before respondent Court. He is therefore entitled to have our decision reconsidered. WHEREFORE, the decision of March 28, 1969 is set aside and the petition for certiorari granted, with petitioner being thus entitled to the refund of the second docket fee of P940.00 paid under Receipt No. J-1459986 issued on December 2, 1965, and the order of respondent Court of November 6, 1965 ordering such payment of the second docket fee annulled. Without pronouncement as to costs. Apolonia Banayad Frianela, petitioner, vs. Servillano Banayad, Jr., respondent. (G.R. No. 169700 | July 30, 2009) FACTS: NACHURA, J: This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) of the ROC assailing the Decision of the CA, and the Resolution denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof. RTC (respondent) CA (affirmed/mod) SC (RTC ruling is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction) Following the death of her uncle (Moises F. Banayad), petitioner, who was named as devisee <someone to whom property (especially realty) is devised by will; beneficiary> in the will (November 18, 1985), filed before the RTC- Pasay City. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left to her the following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City; (2) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and (3) all personal belongings. Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills <a document written wholly in the handwriting of the person whose signature it bears> of the decedent, dated September 27, 1989 and September 28, 1989.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of Moises's estate. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moises's real property was concerned. With the denial of her MR in the further assailed Resolution, petitioner elevated the case before SC via the instant petition. ISSUE: HELD: The trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the case WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING WHETHER IT COULD HAVE VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE ON THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING. THE CA ALSO OVERLOOKED THE ISSUE ON THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE TRIAL COURT OVER THE SAID CASE. SC after a meticulous review of the records, finds that the RTC OF PASAY CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER. The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petition. In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moises's holographic will was instituted, Sections 19 and 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 were in force, SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00); SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; and The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises's estate. Thus, FROM A READING OF THE ORIGINAL PETITION FILED, IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED WHICH COURT HAS ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES OR MAY BE RECKONED BY THE COURT, AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN ON APPEAL, AND IS NOT LOST BY WAIVER OR BY ESTOPPEL. Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government. No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings. Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam. In Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial court's denial of the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial court's assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. With the above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Alaban vs. ca Facts:O n 8 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 , r e s p o n d e n t F r a n c i s c o P r o v i d o ( r e s p o n d e n t ) filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament ofthe late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent).On 30 May 2001, theR e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t ( R T C ) , B r a n c h 6 8 , i n P . D . M o n f o r t N o r t h , Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of thew i l l o f t h e d e c e d e n t a n d d i r e c t i n g t h e i s s u a n c e o f l e t t e r s testamentary to respondent.Thereafter, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopeningof the probate proceedings.On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Petitionersthereafter filed a petition w ith an application for preliminaryi n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e C A , s e e k i n g t h e a n n u l m e n t o f t h e R T C s Decision d a t e d 3 0 M a y 2 0 0 1 a n d Orderd a t e d 1 1 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 2 . I n its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed thepetition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failedto avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,p e t i t i o n f o r r e l i e f f r o m j u d g m e n t , o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d i e s through no fault of their own. Petitioners sought reconsideration ofthe Resolution , but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the proper remed y is an annulment of judgment or the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief forjudgement and other appropriate remedies Ruling:S e c t i o n 3 7 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t a l l o w s a n a g g r i e v e d p a r t y t o f i l e a m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l o n t h e g r o u n d o f f r a u d , a c c i d e n t , mistake, or excusable negligen ce. The same Rule permits thefiling of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision orfinal order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or anyo t h e r p r o c e e d i n g i s t h e r e a f t e r t a k e n , a g a i n s t a p a r t y i n a n y c o u r t through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.A m o t i o n f o r n e w t r i a l o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d a p e t i t i o n f o r relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties inthe proceedings where the assailed judgm ent is rendered. In fact,it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, oreven summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief

Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. SalasG.R. No. L-53546; June 25, 1992 Facts: Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personalproperties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. She left a last will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives(b,s,n,n) all herproperties. She designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor.Jesus Fran filed a pet for the probate of Remedios' will. The pet alleged that Rosario wasnot physically well. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Fran on hte third page of the pet.The PRs (sisters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they needed time tostudy the petition bec. some heirs have been intentionally omitted. PRs did not file anyopposition. The pet thus became uncontested. The probate court rendered a decisionadmitting the will to probate. Pet filed an Inventory of the Estate, copies thereof werefurnished to the PRs. A Project of Partition was submitted by hte exec to the court. The PRsstill did not make any objections. TC issued its Order approving the partition. Thereafter,the aforesaid branch(which issued the order) was converted to a Juvenile and DomesticRelations Court.PRs filed with the new branch a MR of the probate judgment and the order of partition.Pets challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring thetestamentary dispos as void. Issue: 1. GAD of respondent Judge. Ruling: 1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared thesubject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein andordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having beenno claim presented despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted aProject of Partition which private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarilysigned and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity through acertification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that privaterespondents did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their OmnibusMotion for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of theirprior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would have been an idle ceremony. Intestate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which isnormally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminatethe proceedings. If private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, theyshould have desisted from performing the above acts and instead demanded frompetitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the will. The sameconclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizingthe Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because privaterespondents were present when the court dictated the said order.

Uy kiao eng vs. Nixon lee Facts:Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against hismother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compelpetitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probateproceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to doso without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of theoriginal holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody theoriginal holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration.Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was den ied. Hence,the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from theappellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondentmoved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside itsearlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographicwill. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no otherrecourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the mainthat the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonialevidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible. Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent. Held: The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, inthe name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal,or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a