PEOPLE VS ESTRADA FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order

that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the present case are as follows: > Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant) >Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products. > On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void. Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958. Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be

noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement. _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, petitioners, vs. HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, respondent. GONZAGA_REYES, J.: At bench is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Japal M. Guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, ordering the arrest of petitioners without bail in Criminal Case No. 2376 for murder. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder, docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361, was filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against herein petitioners and six (6) other persons1[1] in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao.2[2] The complaint alleged that herein petitioners paid the six other respondents the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen.3[3] Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 19944[4], dismissed the charges of murder against herein petitioners and five other respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of respondent Judge. In an Order dated 13 September 19945[5], respondent Judge ordered that the case, now docketed as Criminal Case No. 2332, be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, respondent judge noted that

although there were eight (8) respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only one (1) of the eight (8) respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the respondent judge reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of murder

against herein petitioners and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a refiling of the murder charge and pursuant to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein.6[6] On December 6, 1994, herein petitioners submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994,7[7] found a prima facie case for murder against herein petitioners and three (3) other respondents.8[8] He thus recommended the filing of charges against herein petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as principals by inducement, and against the three (3) others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son.9[9] On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 199410[10] was filed against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of respondent judge. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his inhibition.11[11] The following day, or on 3 January 1995, the respondent judge issued a warrant12[12] for the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, petitioners filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion13[13] for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice.

A petition for review14[14] was filed by the petitioners with the Department of Justice on 11 January 1995.15[15] Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioners pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition wherein petitioners pray for the following: "1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the implementation and execution of the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 and enjoining the respondent judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 2376 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al. upon such bond as may be required by the Honorable Court; 2. this petition be given due course and the respondent be required to answer; 3. after due hearing, the order of arrest dated January 3, 1995 be set aside and declared void ab initio and the respondent judge be disqualified from hearing Criminal Case No. 2376 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Bai Unggie D. Abdula, et al."16[16] In a Resolution17[17] dated 20 February 1995, this Court resolved to require respondent judge to submit a comment to the petition. The Court further resolved to issue a temporary restraining order18[18] enjoining the respondent judge from implementing and executing the Order of Arrest dated 3 January 1995 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 2376. At the onset, it must be noted that petitions for certiorari and prohibition require that there be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the petitioner.19[19] In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners have no other remedy available to them as there is pending before the lower court an Urgent Motion20[20] praying for the lifting and setting aside of the warrant of arrest. Ordinarily, we would have dismissed the petition on this ground and let the trial court decide the pending motion. However, due to the length of time that the issues raised in the petition have been pending before the courts, it behooves us to decide the case on the merits in order to preclude any further delay in the resolution of the case.

Respondent Japal M. Guiani retired from the judiciary on 16 April 1996. For this reason, respondent is no longer the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 14 of Cotabato City; and the prayer of petitioner as to respondents disqualification from hearing Criminal Case No. 2376 is now moot and academic. Thus, there remain two issues left for the determination of the Court: first, the legality of the second information for murder filed before respondents court; and second, the validity of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioners. With respect to the first issue, petitioners aver that it is the respondent judge himself who is orchestrating the filing of the alleged murder charge against them. In support, petitioners cite five (5) instances wherein respondent judge allegedly issued illegal orders in a mandamus case pending in respondents sala filed against petitioner Mayor Bai Unggie Abdula. These allegedly illegal orders formed the basis for a criminal complaint which they filed on 6 October 1994 against respondent and ten (10) others before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.21[21] In this complaint, herein petitioners alleged that the respondent judge illegally ordered the release of the total amount of P1,119,125.00 from the municipal funds of Kabuntalan, Mindanao to a certain Bayoraiz Saripada, a purported niece of respondent judge. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, in an Order22[22] dated 12 December 1994, found "sufficient basis to proceed with the preliminary investigation of the case" and directed the respondents therein to file their respective counteraffidavits and controverting evidence. From these facts, petitioners argue, it is clear that it is the respondent judge himself who is orchestrating and manipulating the charges against the petitioner. Petitioners further state that respondent judge exhibited extreme hostility towards them after the filing of the said complaint before the Ombudsman. Petitioners claim that immediately after the issuance of the Order of the Ombudsman requiring respondent judge to file his counter-affidavit, respondent allegedly berated petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula in open court when she appeared before him in another case Allegedly, in full view of the lawyers and litigants, respondent judge uttered the following words in the Maguindanaoan dialect: "If I cannot put you in jail within your term, I will cut my neck. As long as I am a judge here, what I want will be followed."23[23] Respondent judge, in compliance with the Order of this Court, filed a Comment dated 3 March 1995.24[24] In this Comment, he argues that petitioners enumeration of "incontrovertible facts" is actually a list of misleading facts which they are attempting to weave into Criminal Case No. 2376 for the purpose of picturing respondent as a partial judge who abused his discretion to favor petitioners accuser.25[25] He claims that the anti-graft charge filed by petitioners against him is a harassment suit concocted by them when they failed to lay their hands on the amount of P1,119,125.00 of municipal funds which respondent had previously ruled as rightfully belonging to the municipal councilors of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Respondent vehemently denies having personally profited from the release of the municipal funds. Moreover, respondent points out that the allegations in the complaint seem to imply that the Vice Mayor of Kabuntalan, Bayoraiz Sarupada, was a party to the mandamus case filed with respondents court when in truth, there was no case filed by the vice mayor pending in his court. Finally, respondent denies berating petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula and uttering the words attributed to him in the petition. According to respondent, the last time petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula appeared in

his sala on December 28, 1994, in connection with the lifting of an order for her apprehension in another case, he neither berated nor scolded her and in fact, he even lifted the said order of arrest. In its Comment with Urgent Motion for the Lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order dated 5 June 1995,26[26] the Office of the Solicitor-General states that petitioners allegation that the respondent judge was biased and prejudiced was pure speculation as no proof was presented that respondent assumed the role of prosecutor. Moreover, the OSG argued that the fact that the respondent judge and petitioners had pending cases against each other did not necessarily result in the respondents bias and prejudice. An analysis of these arguments shows that these should have been properly raised in a motion for the disqualification or inhibition of respondent judge. As previously stated however, the issue as to whether respondent should be disqualified from proceeding with the case has been rendered moot and academic as he is no longer hearing the case against petitioners. As such, there is no need for a prolonged discussion on this issue. It is sufficient to say that in order to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, petitioner must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence.27[27] This is a heavy burden which petitioners have failed to discharge. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.28[28] Petitioners next argue that the act of respondent in motu proprio ordering a reinvestigation of the murder charge against them is another indication of the latters bias and prejudice.29[29] They claim that the filing of their complaint against respondent motivated the latters Order of 13 September 1994 which ordered the return of the records of the murder case to the provincial prosecutor. Furthermore, they posit that the latter had no authority to order the reinvestigation considering that same had already been dismissed as against them by the provincial prosecutor in his Resolution dated 22 August 1994. A review of the pertinent dates in the petition however show that respondent could not have been motivated by the Ombudsmans complaint when he issued the 13 September 1994 Order. Petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula filed the complaint before the Ombudsman of Cotabato City on October 6, 199430[30] or about a month after the issuance of the 13 September 1994 Order. As such, when respondent issued the said Order, the same could not have been a retaliatory act considering that at that time, there was as yet no complaint against him. With respect to the allegation that the respondent had no legal authority to order a reinvestigation of the criminal charge considering that the said charge had been previously dismissed as against them, we hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in doing so.31[31]

It is true that under the circumstances, the respondent judge, upon seeing that there were no records attached to the complaint, could have simply ordered the office of the provincial prosecutor to forward the same. Upon receipt of these records, respondent judge would then have sufficient basis to determine whether a warrant of arrest should issue. However, from the bare terms of the questioned order alone, we fail to see any illegal reason that could have motivated the judge in issuing the same. The order merely stated that the records of the case should be returned to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation or reinvestigation. He did not unduly interfere with the prosecutors duty to conduct a preliminary investigation by ordering the latter to file an information against any of the respondents or by choosing the fiscal who should conduct the reinvestigation which are acts certainly beyond the power of the court to do.32[32] It was still the prosecutor who had the final say as to whom to include in the information.33[33] As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioners only imputed bias against the respondent judge and not against the investigating prosecutor.34[34] Consequently, this imputation is of no moment as the discretion to file an information is under the exclusive control and supervision of the prosecutor and not of respondent judge. Furthermore, petitioners cannot claim that they were denied due process in the reinvestigation of the charges against them as they actively participated therein by submitting their joint counter-affidavit. Petitioners likewise allege that the information charging petitioners with murder is null and void because it was filed without the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor. They note that in the Resolution dated 28 December 1994 and in the corresponding information, it clearly appears that the same were not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor as it was signed only by the investigating prosecutor, Anok T. Dimaraw. Petitioners contention is not well-taken. The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on this matter state that "(n)o complaint or information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor (underscoring ours)." In other words, a complaint or information can only be filed if it is approved or authorized by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. In the case at bench, while the Resolution and the Information were not approved by Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, the filing of the same even without his approval was authorized. Both the Resolution and information contain the following notation:* "The herein Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting himself from this case and Investigating Prosecutor Enok Dimaraw may dispose of the case without his approval on the following ground: That this case has been previously handled by him, and whose findings differ from the findings of Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw; and the victim is a relative by affinity, he being a father-in-law of his son. (Signed) Salick U. Panda Provincial Prosecutor

It must be stressed that the Rules of Court speak of authority or approval by the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor. The notation made by Prosecutor Panda clearly shows that Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw was authorized to "dispose of the case without his approval." In issuing the resolution and in filing the information, the investigating prosecutor was acting well within the authority granted to him by the provincial prosecutor. Thus, this resolution is sufficient compliance with the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court. Having thus ruled on the validity of the information filed against the respondents, we now address the issue as to the legality of the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge by virtue of the said information. On this issue, petitioners, citing the case of Allado vs. Diokno35[35] argue that the warrant for his arrest should be recalled considering that the respondent judge "did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts." As proof, he points to the fact that the information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2, 1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the following day or on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, a clear violation of the guidelines set forth in the Allado case. Respondent, in his Comment, denies any irregularity in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. He argues as follows: "Written authority having been granted by the Provincial Prosecutor, as required by the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of (the) Rules on Criminal Procedure, and there having been no reason for the respondent to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the Information filed, and recognizing the prosecutions legal authority to initiate and control criminal prosecution (Rule 110, Section 5) and considering that the court cannot interfere in said prosecutions authority (People vs. Moll, 68 Phil. 626), the respondent issued the warrant for the arrest of the accused pursuant to paragraph (a), section 6, Rule 112;"36[36] The OSG, in defending the act of respondent judge, argues that the allegation that respondent did not personally examine the evidence is not supported by current jurisprudence. In support, the OSG invokes the pronouncement in Soliven vs. Makasiar37[37] that "(I)n satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses." Moreover, the OSG points out that the judge enjoys a wide degree of latitude in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest depending on the circumstances of each case.38[38] The OSG further argues that the case of Allado vs. Diokno, relied upon by petitioners, has no application in the case at bar considering that in the cited case, the documents submitted before the court failed to establish any probable cause as they were conflicting and contradictory. Significantly, the OSG continues, petitioners could not point out a single flaw in the evidence presented by the prosecutor to negate the existence of probable cause. Finally, the OSG points out that petitioners unfounded allegations cannot prevail over the well-settled rule that official duty is presumed to be regularly performed.39[39]

After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in the contention of petitioners. The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads: "Section 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." (Undersoring supplied.) It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions.40[40] In Soliven vs. Makasiar, this Court pronounced: "What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause." Ho vs. People41[41] summarizes existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows: "Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the

evidence on hand as to enable the His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer." (citations omitted) In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer. To be sure, we cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the respondents examination of the records should be.42[42] The extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as coprincipal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of the victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.42[1 Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.42[2 While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,42[3 Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried. These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able

to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.42[4 Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.0042[5 by a certain Boy Santos,42[6 his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum.42[7 However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.42[8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.42[9 Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretest of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Dodong Bisaya.42[10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him. Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before boarding the tricycle Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses.42[11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.42[12 Del Rosario then went home.42[13 Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.42[14 As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos, Ernesto Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.42[15 The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.42[16 But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence.42[17 We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.42[18 As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.42[19 Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was Boy Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her.42[20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the case, particularly the testimonies of the witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was Jun Marquez who ran after the victims helper and fired at the victim.

Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserted that it was Jun Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle. From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced that Jun Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased by the other man and that this other man could not be Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that Boy Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for Boy Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with Dodong Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that Boy Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.42[27 Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by Boy Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent.42[28 There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment of automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene. On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his participation in the orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his passengers was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;42[29 that the accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime.42[30 We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose or for common and joint purpose and design. Its manifestation could be shown by united and concerted action.42[31 Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.42[32 Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.42[33 In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of

his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape. In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same."42[34 Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.42[35 The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would, be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim.42[36 That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.42[37 It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal. Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.42[38 As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.[39 A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.42[40 Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.42[41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 743842[42 to include "the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:42[43 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro42[44 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide. On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.42[45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this case.42[46 A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.

circumstances of the case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had before him two different informations and resolutions charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value. The circumstances thus require that respondent look beyond the bare certification of the investigating prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the prosecutors determination of probable cause. The inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant of arrest and respondents own admission are circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the fulfillment of this duty. Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 20 February 1995 in favor of petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and execution of the order of arrest dated 3 January 1995 is made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376 is REMANDED to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a proper determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued and for further proceedings.

Lim vs. Felix Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutors certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause. Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and 2.If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions to the existence of probable cause .Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art Initials mandates that x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judge x x. This means that 1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge.2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information(

which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant ).Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion. Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest , Distinguished. T he former is executive in nature and part of a PROSECU TORS JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]

Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. (2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

MANALILI V. COURT OF APPEALS - 280 SCRA 400 Facts: At about 2:10 p.m. of 11 April 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of theKalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, KalookanCity, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which wasthe official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made becauseof information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. Theythen chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When thismale person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselvesas police officers. The policemen then asked

the male person what he was holding in his hands.The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see whatsaid male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espirituto examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushedmarijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents. The male person wasthen brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and wasturned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be Alain Manalili y Dizon. On 11 April 1988, Manalili was charged by Assistant Caloocan CityFiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425. Upon hisarraignment on 21 April 1988, Manalili pleaded not guilty to the charge. With the agreementof the public prosecutor, Manalili was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. After trial indue course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special CriminalCourt, rendered on 19 May 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. Manalili remained on provisional liberty. Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 1989. On 19 April 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court deniedreconsideration via its Resolution dated 20 January 1994. Manalili filed a petition for review oncertiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by anarrest. Held: In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pathim for weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the interest of effective crime prevention anddetection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner,for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. What justified the limited search was the moreimmediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person withwhom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be usedagainst him. It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,excused only by exigent circumstances. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that asearch and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, suchsearch and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987Constitution, gives this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of Peoplevs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search andseizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right againstunreasonable search and seizure. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that inthese cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essentialrequirement. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general ruleagainst a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that therewere many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers to searchthe bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and muchtoo late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stopa suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quowhile obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime tooccur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance thatManalili had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, whichaccording to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as amember of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior wascharacteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason tostop Manalili to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, theyfound marijuana in his possession. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Bayombong Nueva Vizcaya finding accused-appellant Abe Valdez guilty for violation Section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6245). He was accused of planting and (maybe) manufacturing marijuana. During trial, one of the witnesses, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same. The following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, went to the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. The police found

appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants for evidence. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. Meanwhile, the accused-appellant contended that at around 10:00am of September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." He was brought to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine. ISSUE: w/n the warrantless search was lawful. RULING: No. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. In the instant case, it was held that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the SC found that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant. FACTS OF THE CASE: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction. Badua

held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit: (1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and aresident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalizedas an American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the UnitedStates. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba,Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in atthe Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino InternationalAirport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area.Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hardon the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Notsatisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 ReynaldoEmbile, saying Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. She was directed to takeJohnson to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room,accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the womens room,Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gavethe same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile,outside the womens room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of asubstance which was fount by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetaminehydrochloride or shabu. Embile took Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st RegionalAviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnsons passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a total of 580.2 grams; a violationof 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659. On 14 May 1999, theRegional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.Johnson appealed. Issue: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right againstunreasonable search and seizure. Held: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that A peaceofficer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit anoffense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested hascommitted it; and xxx. The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected tocustodial investigation is far from being accurate. The methamphetamine hydrochloride seizedfrom her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airportsecurity procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause byexposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjectiveexpectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Suchrecognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplanehijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengersattempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage aswell as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggestthe presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objectsare. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated withairline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materialsor substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches andseizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetaminehydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissiblein evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise withoutwarrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992]

Facts:On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected withthe 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa andDeogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was anunderground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with theStation Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. Theyfound subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid,the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartmentof Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewedLuzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with BernieMendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza).When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the occupants.Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group lookedfor the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented byDamaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reachedthe house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that shewas a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados sherequested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as theBarangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled Ang Bayan, xerox copiers and acomputer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely,Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When LuzTanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines,Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought themto their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house tothe headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was thelessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, wasoriginally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City withviolation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with thecrime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa yMacabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Suchinformation was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminalcharge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the meritsensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defensecounsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecutions evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter,manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, thetrial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing thelatter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damasoappealed. Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of hishouse. Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to,or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house wherethe M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Evenassuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against himstill will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with therequirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity fromunreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . Therecords show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados,his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establishthe fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damasos helper or if it was true that she was his helper,that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewisefailed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authoritiesintrusion into Damasos dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power tosearch and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforcedwithout transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute isof sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As aconsequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense witha search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damasoshouse at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991] En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time inDecember 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morningof the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up atemporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint inthe said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada weretransporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by theCommanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagadahad in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was ridingwas stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they weremembers of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection,CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedts waist. Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedts waistto be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedts passport and other identification papers. WhenMalmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered,the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turnedout to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was invitedoutside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bearswhich did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officersopened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative sampleswere taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objectsexamined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officersin his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merelyentrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that theAustralian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seatsavailable in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filedagainst Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedtentered a plea of not guilty. After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court foundMalmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 andsentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued warrant. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search ismade pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrestwithout a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the followingcircumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without awarrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined whilehis case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Incases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall beforthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against inaccordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, whenhe was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects fallssquarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantlesssearch incident to a lawful arrest