Constitutional Law The Federal Judicial Power The Authority for Judicial Review Marbury v.

Madison Background: Adams appoints justices of the peace for D.C in the final days of his presidency. Signed and approved but commissions not delivered. Jefferson takes office and orders madison not to deliver them Marbury filed suit in the supreme court (by way of the judiciary act of 1789) to compel Madison to show cause why he shouldn't receive the commission. Questions: Did Marbury have a right to the writ that he was petitioning for? Does U.S law allow courts to grant Marbury his writ? If they did, could the Supreme Court issue such a writ? Answers Marshall ruled that because Marbury's commission had been created in accordance with the procedure created by law, he had the right to his writ. Because Marbury had a legal right to his commission, the law should offer him a remedy. It is the court's duty to protect the right's of individuals, even against the president. The supreme court could not grant the writ because the section 13 of the Judiciary act of 1789 (which granted it the right to do so) was unconstitutional. Why? because it extended to cases of original jurisdiction. By extending the court's original jurisdiction to include cases like Marbury's, congress had exceeded its authority. Constitution trumps the act of congress because it is the supreme law of the land. (Article VI). Further Questions on Marbury: How does the Court justify judicial review of executive actions and, according to the Court, when is such judicial review available and when is it not? When the president exercises his political discretion (though himself or actions by his officers) and the action regards the nation and not individual rights, there is no power to to control his discretion (except though the political process). If the president or his officers are bound by duties to to preform certain acts and the rights of others depend on

those actions, the executive cannot exercise unfettered discretion. This review of executive action is justified through the protection of legal rights and the idea that when the executive violates a legal right, the law offers the injured party a remedy. Therefore, there exists a need for judicial review to see whether a legal right was violated. Why does the court find the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional? The legislature improperly adds writs of mandamus as an exercise of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. How does the Court Justify Judicial Review of Legislative acts? Taking into account that the Constitution sits above all other laws, an act by the legislature contrary to the constitution must be void. To do otherwise would be to void the constitution. It is the court's duty to determine what the law is and if the constitution is supreme and an act cannot be reconciled with it, then the court must deem it unconstitutional Authority For Judicial Review of State Judgements Martin v. Hunter's Lesse Background: Two competing land claims for a large piece of northern Virginia. One claim was based on an inheritance from Lord Fairfax, a British citizen (who's right to ownership protected by treaty). The other from a grant by the governor of Virginia. Virginia Court of Appeals rules in favor of Hunter and Supreme Court reverses. VCOA holds that SC lacks the authority lacks the authority to review state court decisions because they stem from a different sovereignty. On appeal again SC says it has the right to review state opinions. Constitution creates SC and gives congress discretion to create lower ones. If congress didn't, SC would only hear limited amount of cases through original jurisdiction. Cohens v. Virginia Background:

Criminal case appealed to the SC, SC says that state courts can not be trusted to protect federal rights because state judges are subject to too many outside influences. Limits on the Federal Judicial Power Interpretive Limits How should the constitution be interpreted? The Second Amendment as an Example. District of Columbia v. Heller Congressional Limits The Exceptions and Regulations Clause Congress can make exceptions and regulations to the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction. Ex Parte McCardle Background: William McCardle was arrested by federal authorities in 1867 for writing and publishing a series of editorials in his Mississippi newspaper. The editorials were sharply critical of Reconstruction. McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was arrested were unconstitutional. McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867 congressional statute that conferred jurisdiction on appeal to the High Court. After hearing arguments in the case, but prior to announcing a decision, the Congress withdrew its 1867 act conferring jurisdiction. Question: May the Congress withdraw jurisdiction from the High Court after that jurisdiction has been given? The Court, speaking through Chase, validated congressional withdrawal of the Court's jurisdiction. The basis for this repeal was the exceptions clause of Article III Section 2. But Chase pointedly reminded his readers that the 1868 statute repealing jurisdiction "does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised." Separation of Powers as a Limit on Congress's Authority. United States v. Klein Background The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) had ruled that a presidential pardon had the effect of

proof one did not support the rebellion. This allowed pardoned individuals to petition for return of property or compensation from the federal government. In response to the decision, Congress passed a statute stating that a pardon was inadmissible as evidence in a claim for seized property. Congress went further and required that if a court find that a pardon was secured without an express disclaimer of guilt (of aiding the rebellion), such finding was to act as a bar to jurisdiction. The estate of the Respondent who was pardoned had received a judgment granting recovery from the Court of Claims. The United States now appeals, arguing that the statute requires dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction. Question Is the statute in question a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Exceptions and Regulations Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? No Reasoning By requiring the courts to make a specific finding of fact in a case over which the court has jurisdiction and then removing the courts jurisdiction after the finding, Congress is not limiting jurisdiction, but rather prescribing a rule of decision for the courts. Congress impaired the presidential pardons by requiring that they be inadmissible as evidence in these cases. The President of the United States has the constitutional authority to pardon offenses. By disallowing the full effect of the pardons, Congress attempted to reduce the Presidents constitutional authority. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society Justiciability Limits Prohibition of Advisory Opinions Opinion of the Justices Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversarial proceeding.

Hayburn's Case making recommendations about pensions not of a "judicial nature". Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. BAckground In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground. Question Did Congress violate separation of powers by requiring federal courts reopen settled cases as part of the FDIC Improvement Act? Reasoning Yes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III

assigns to the courts the "judicial power of the United States" and the power to "say what the law is." According to the Court, this clearly includes "the power to render final judgments," and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as "retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time," Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers. Notes on Advisory Opinions Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace Constitution does not require that a case should be presented by traditional forms of procedure, so long as it's still adversarial. Standing The determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring the matter into court for adjudication. Constitutional Requirements (Injury, causation, redress-ability) Plaintiff must suffer or potentially suffer injury. Injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. Federal Court must be able to provide a remedy. Prudential Standing Requirements May assert only one's own rights. May not sue as a taxpayer with shared grievances of all other taxpayers. Allen v. Wright Facts: In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies taxexempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government

was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright. Question: Did the IRS shirk its enforcement duties and encourage private schools to racially discriminate, thus, harming desegregation efforts in the nation's public schools? Answer Get out of this Court Reasoning: The Court found that the circumstances involved in this case did not warrant federal-court adjudication. Justice O'Connor's opinion argued that the Court could not act since the injuries that the suit identified were not "judicially cognizable" and because they were not "fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS." Citing past precedents, O'Connor found that, by itself, an assertion that the government is not acting in the bounds of the law is not enough to bring a suit to a federal court. To allow so would open the door to a myriad of legal challenges in which the courts would become buried by the minutiae of governing, acting as "continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action." Massachusetts v. EPA Facts: Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these "greenhouse gases" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress

must regulate "any air pollutant" that can "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on "the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it." Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA. Question: May the EPA decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated in the Clean Air Act? Does the Clean Air Act give the EPA authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases? Answer: No Yes Reasoning No and yes. By a 5-4 vote the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled in favor of Massachusetts. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens held that Massachusetts, due to its "stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests" as a state, had standing to sue the EPA over potential damage caused to its territory by global warming. The Court rejected the EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act was not meant to refer to carbon emissions in the section giving the EPA authority to regulate "air pollution agent[s]". The Act's definition of air pollutant was written with "sweeping," "capacious" language so that it would not become obsolete. Finally, the majority ruled

that the EPA was unjustified in delaying its decision on the basis of prudential and policy considerations. The Court held that if the EPA wishes to continue its inaction on carbon regulation, it is required by the Act to base the decision on a consideration of "whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change." Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion argued that Massachusetts should not have had standing to sue, because the potential injuries from global warming were not concrete or particularized (individual and personal). Justice Scalia's dissent argued that the Clean Air Act was intended to combat conventional lower-atmosphere pollutants and not global climate change. Injury Requirements It must be an injury that the plaintiff has suffered or will imminently suffer. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons Facts: In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds. Question: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds meet the threshold requirements

imposed by Article III of the Constitution? Answer No Reasoning No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages. Lujan v. Defender's of Wildlife Facts: The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A

1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law. Question: Do the Plaintiff's have standing to sue? Answer: No Reasoning: No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue. United States v. Hayes Have to live within the gerrymandered district Ripeness There must be a real risk of prosecution Political Question Doctrine:

All the below stem from the court's apparent powerlessness which requires it to rely on its legitimacy Committed to another branch avoiding chaos finality Baker v. Carr Facts of the Case Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state. Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over questions of legislative apportionment? In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. In his opinion, Justice Brennan provided past examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state affairs are conducted. Brennan concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection issues which Baker and others raised in this case merited judicial evaluation. Vieth v. Jubelirer After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of

Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association. The district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed. However, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional. Can voters affiliated with a political party sue to block implementation of a Congressional redistricting plan by claiming that it was manipulated for purely political reasons? Does a state violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment when it disregards neutral redistricting principles (such as trying to avoid splitting municipalities into different Congressional districts) in order to achieve an advantage for one political party? Does a state exceed its power under Article I of the Constitution when it draws Congressional districts to ensure that a minority party will consistently win a super-majority of the state's Congressional seats? Decision: 5 votes for Jubelirer, 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Composition of the House of Representatives In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be

found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a fourmember plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist. Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually. Powell v. McCormack Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him. May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution? Legal provision: Article 1, Section 6, Paragraph 1: Speech or Debate Clause No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers'

debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him. Goldwater v. Carter President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan. Did Congress have a constitutional role to play in the termination of the treaty? Without oral argument ,the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable. Rehnquist led a group of four others who believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. He reasoned that since Congress had not formally challenged Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve. The dissenters were prepared to hear the case. Nixon v. United States Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute. Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution?

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Article 1, Section 3, Paragraph 6 No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." The Federal Legislative Power Congress and the states McCulloch v. Maryland In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. Question The case presented two questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8 Clauses 1 and 18 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are

supreme. . .they control the constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them." Notes: Procedural Posture Defendant appealed a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland finding for plaintiff, who brought suit against defendant to recover certain penalties under a Maryland act imposing a tax on all banks in the state of Maryland not chartered by the Maryland legislature. Overview The Maryland legislature had passed an act to impose a tax on all banks, or its branches, within the state of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature. The defendant, a cashier at the Bank of the United States, had issued notes that were not issued on stamped paper in the manner prescribed by the state act. The plaintiff, State of Maryland, brought suit to recover penalties under the act. The county court found for the plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court reversed holding that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States was a law made in pursuance of the Constitution. Moreover, the court held that the law imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States was unconstitutional and void because the states had no power to burden the operations of the constitutional laws

enacted by Congress Outcome The court reversed the decision to uphold the tax on the Bank of the United States and held that the tax was unconstitutional because the states had no power to burden the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress.
The famous case of McCulloch vs Maryland considered whether Article I, Section 8 gave Congress the power to create a national bank and, if so, whether the state of Maryland could tax it. For nine days, Daniel Webster and former Constitutional Convention delegate Luther Martin jargued the case before the justices of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, found the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the flexibility to create the bank as an aid to carrying out its enumerated borrowing and taxing powers and that Maryland's taxation of the bank violated the Supremacy Clause.

Commerce Power Gibbons v. Ogden A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey challenged the monopoly that New York had granted, which forced him to obtain a special operating permit from the state to navigate on its waters. Question Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce?

Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; Act of February 1793, Section 1, Clause 8 The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. The Federal Executive Power Limits on State Regulatory and Taxing Power The structure of the Constitutions Protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Economic Liberties Equal Protection Fundamental Rights Under Due Process and Equal Protection First Amendment: Freedom of Expression First Amendment: Religion U.S Constitution Preamble Article I The Legislative Branch Legislative Power Vested House of Representatives Senate Elections of Senators and Representatives Rules of The House and Senate Compensation and Privileges of Members Passage of Bills Scope of Legislative Power Limits on Legislative Power

Limits on States Article II The Presidency Election, Installation, Removal Presidential Power State of the Union, Receive Ambassadors, Laws Faithfully Executed, Commission Officers Impeachment Article III The Judiciary Judicial Power Vested Scope of Judicial Power Treason Article IV The States Full Faith and Credit Privileges and Immunities, Extradition, Fugitive Slaves Admission of States Guarantees of States Article V The Amendment Process Article VI Legal Statues of the Constitution Article VII Ratification Amendment 1 Religion, Speech, Assembly, Petition (1791) Amendment 2 Right to Bear Arms (1791) Amendment 3 Quartering of Troops (1791) Amendment 4 Search and Seizure (1791) Amendment 5 Grand Jury, Double Jeopardy, Self-Incrimination, Due Process (1791) Amendment 6 Criminal Prosecutions - Jury Trial, Right to Confront and to Counsel Amendment 7 Common Law Suits - Jury Trial Amendment 8 Excess Bail or Fines, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Amendment 9 Non-Enumerated Rights Amendment 10 Rights Reserved to the States

Amendment 11 Suits Against a State (1795) Amendment 12 Election of President and Vice President (1804) Amendment 13 Abolition of Slavery (1865) Amendment 14 Privilges and Immunities, Due Process, Equal Protection, Apportionment of Representatives, Civil War Disqualification and Debt (1868) Amendment 15 Right Not to be Denied on Account of Race (1870) Amendment 16 Income Tax (1913) Amendment 17 Election of Senators (1913) Amendment 18 Prohibition (1919) Amendment 19 Women's Right to Vote (1920) Amendment 20 Presidential Term and Succession (1933) Amendment 21 Repeal of Prohibition (1933) Amendment 22 Two Term Limit on President (1951) Amendment 23 Presidential Vote in D.C (1961) Amendment 24 Poll Tax (1964) Amendment 25 Presidential Seuccession (1967) Amendment 26 Right to Vote at age 18 (1971) Amendment 27 Compensation of Members of Congress (1992)