Ben-Hur Nepomuceno v. Archbencel Ann Lopez, represented by hermother Araceli Lopez G.R. No.

181258, March 18, 2010 Facts: The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family. Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation against petitioner BenHur Nepomuceno. She was represented by her mother, Araceli Lopez. She assailed that she is theillegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial support along with filial recognition. On the other hand, Nepomucenodenied the assertions reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the National Peoples Army. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel, Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by thetrial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the caseagainst Nepomuceno. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial courtsdecisi on was reversed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-Hur Nepomuceno is established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence. Held: Petition GRANTED. Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, herentitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. Article 195 Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles,the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extentset forth in the preceding article 1. The spouses;2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate andillegitimate children of the latter;4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimateand illegitimate children of the latter; and5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence onestablishing filiation:ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimatefiliation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimatechildren. x x x xART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established byany of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten not eexecuted by petitioner. The note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis

Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarialagreeme nt to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner,the latter not having signed. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of tthechild in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ AQUINO,represent ed by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ Vs RONALD PAUL S. GARCIA, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

Facts: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San JuanDela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino(Do minique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Theyresided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto.Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.AUTOBIOGRAPHY IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREETBRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME ISRAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. xxx AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVETOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL. By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name.In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied) Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that,inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each

illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Issue: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of article 176 of the family code, as amended by r.a. 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his fathers surname. Held: Petition granted. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. Article 176of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioner. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[20] Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELLIN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda.De Carungcong v. People GR No. 181409, February 11, 2010

Facts: Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix. In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87: Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato. Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. Issue: Whether or not Sato has the right to claim deceased mother-in-laws Intestate estate. Held: Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed. Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita. The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives. The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the

dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.