SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF MSC POLITICS AND COMMUNICATION AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE JANUARY

21, 2013 BY: FELICITY TAN m.f.tan@lse.ac.uk

The emergence of political branding is good for democracy.

Branding, the hallmark of modern political communications, is viewed as ersatz ideology especially in electoral contexts: a sales pitch during the political point of sale where voters are consumers and candidates are products (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Scammell, 2007, p. 176). It reduces political information to symbols and images constructed on the basis strategic marketing research, and so enables the shifting of shallow ideological roots for electoral gain (Dean & Croft, 2009; Scammell). Political branding is thus often derided as a means to an end, and is seen to narrow the political agenda to the detriment of democratic processes (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011). Such arguments against political branding, however, do not appear to fully apply to a dysfunctional democracy like the Philippines (Dressel, 2011, p. 53), as recent trends in elections there suggest. In the Philippines, often characterized as a cacique democracy (Anderson, 1988), the rise of modern political branding represents a decisive shift in voter mobilization and government responsiveness that has the potential to shrink the countrys democratic deficits (Hedman, 2010a).

The increasing robustness of market-driven branding in Philippine elections indicates the weakening ability of political machines to deliver votes based on kinship networks, nonideological alliances and coercion. Fueled by the rise of mass media, modern political branding challenges the primacy of clientelist command votes by activating market votes that are more responsive to the electorate (Teehankee, 2006). Its practice also indicates decreasing barriers to entry in the political arena, opening doors for political outsiders to construct counternarratives to politics as usual (Bionat, 1998). An examination of recent presidential elections shows the dependence of weak political brands on patronage and bossism, which is at the core of the crisis of Philippine democracy (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 281). And as evident in the 2010 race, the injection of political branding as something new in Philippine politics

necessitates some form of responsive ideology that can foster reflexive governance (Hedman, 2010a). Because political machines continue to dominate local elections due to higher incidences of poverty and less access to media in remote regions (Bionat), the analysis here will be limited to presidential races in the post-dictatorship era. Even so, the emergence of modern political branding in the Philippines, while not without the risks posited in mature democracies, represents shifts in voter mobilization that feed from and into increasing public demand for platforms and serious debate, challenging the old order of cacique politics, and signaling a departure from what has thus far been an unrepresentative democracy.

From Feudal to Mass Politics: Political Branding and the rise of the Market Vote

Political brands are unique, identifiable symbols and associations embodied in names or trademarks that serve to differentiate between political actors, notably as candidates during elections (Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Brands are a form of condensed meaning (O'Shaughnessy, 2002 cited in Mitsikopoulou) summarizing ideas and attributes packaged in a single product: the candidate. A political brand is thus the psychological representation of the candidate from the point of view of the voter, an affinity known as brand equity (Scammell, 2007, p. 177). In the Philippines, brand equity may be outcomes of patron-client relationships, inherited from nonpolitical contexts or, most recently, manufactured from readings of the public mood. As such, a modern political brand is not just an identifier but an identity that needs to be designed, positioned and driven to grow through the segmentation and targeting of the electoral market (McDivitt, 2003 cited in Marsh & Fawcett, 2011). Political branding in the modern sense is thus the strategic construction of an emotional connection representing the electorates rational and irrational preferences in candidate selection (Scammell) and can be viewed as a new form of voter mobilization, usually in the absence of distinct political ideologies.

Voter mobilization in the Philippines has historically been dominated by the dynamics of feudal politics from which command votes are drawn (Teehankee, 2010, p. 118): Bloc votesare gathered and delivered through *a network of+ political machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and gatekeepers.

Command votes are a result of and often used to justify electoral manipulation that cascade from and into a political system variously referred to as caciquism, bossism and clientelism, or more descriptively, guns, goons and gold (Quimpo, 2010, p. 51; Thompson, 2010a). Because name recognition has long been among the most crucial metrics for candidate selection, coupled with the winnability factor of bailiwick networks, Philippine brand politics in the traditional sense can be associated with political dynasties: some 160 families to which nearly 20 percent of all Philippine legislators since 1907 belong (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p. 134; Perron, 2009; Teehankee, 2007). An enduring feature of Philippine politics, these clans utilize the mileage of their family name, bolstered by their alliances, socio-economic stature and access to state resources, to actively pursue elected office (Teehankee, 2007). Their consolidated power form political machines expressly built to mobilize and influence electoral outcomes for the protection of economic and personal interests (Teehankee). Political scions dispense patronage in exchange for votes, and when their economic bases are weak or threatened, their machines enable fraudulent and coercive tactics to secure their election (Perron, 2009; Teehankee).

The ascendancy of mass media and increasing urbanization after Martial Law have been linked to the declining influence of traditional brands as such on the electorate (Hedman, 2010a; Teehankee, 2010), but have not been sufficient to supplant the primacy of command voting. Instead, it appears it is the emergence of a new kind of political brand coinciding with the rising influence of mass media that began to change the political game in the post-dictatorship era. The victory of political newcomer Fidel Ramos over traditional powerhouses in the 1992 presidential race is credited to a well-oiled political machine that backed him, bestowed via the incumbents endorsement (Teehankee, 2006). In the following elections, however, movie icon Joseph Estrada captured the presidency with double the votes of his closest rival, a classic clientelist, command-vote politician with a nationally recognizable family name (Thompson, 2010b, p. 9; Table 1). Estrada targeted his campaign to the largest segment of the emergent vote market: classes D and E or the masa, representing 90 percent of the population (Social Weather Stations, 2011; Teehankee, 2010). Despite being a political veteran with his own machinery, Estrada is typically considered a political outsider (Dressel, 2011). It was his strong brand equity an extreme popularity among the lower classes sourced from his proletariat movie persona that attracted political networks into his fold (Hedman, 2001; Teehankee,

2006; Thompson, 2010b). Popularly known as Erap, an anagram of the Tagalog word for buddy, Estrada sealed his affinity with the poor with the slogan Erap para sa mahirap (tr. Erap is for the poor) (Hedman, 2010b). He actively circumvented traditional clientelist networks, preferring media to machinery as his primary campaign strategy (Thompson, 2010a; 2010b). Splitting bailiwicks across the archipelago, the Erap brand soundly crushed command-vote dominance with market votes, signaling the emergence of the modern political brand as a force to contend with.

Powerful brands, political legitimacy and the democratic deficit

The democratic deficit in the Philippines boils down to the governments failure to respond to pent-up demands and pressures from below, fueled and exacerbated by patronage politics (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 259) that the implications of political branding appear to address, even if limitedly. Political branding does not necessarily promise an end to elite democracy; Estradas pro-poor brand was after all a pseudo-populist appeal, where populism is an alternative form of pro-capitalist governance featuring cronyism and perfunctory alliances with leading leftists (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25). Modern brands do however offer political legitimacy in terms of voter mandate, especially among the masa. Political legitimacy is understood by the lower classes as bestowed by the people through elections, itself seen as the legitimate democratic process of representation and, more crucially, as a mechanism of expressing their power (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p. 101). A legitimate electoral victory, which recent election trends suggest is achieved through strong, insurmountable brands, is thus a pre-requisite in bridging the democratic deficit.

The crippling effects of command voting on political legitimacy and, ultimately, democracy, is perhaps most evident in the stolen election of 2004 (Teehankee, 2010, p. 115), which likewise highlights how voter mobilization strategy depends largely on a candidates brand or lack thereof. If political branding is understood as image and personality politics (Mitsikopoulou, 2008), then 2004 victor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos brand was at sea, despite various makeover attempts (Teehankee; Thompson, 2010b, p. 10). In the absence of a political brand that would attract market votes, Arroyo a political veteran, daughter of a former president

and member of the landed elite actuated clientelism to win enough command votes to crush the market votes of her populist challenger, another cinema idol who sought to replicate the Estrada juggernaut" (Thompson, pp. 9-11). Through years of dispensing political patronage, including with state funds and to powerful warlords and politicos, Arroyo machinated largescale fraud that involved bribing election officials, extensive voter disenfranchisement and hundreds of extrajudicial killings, to pad a lead of just over one million votes in the official tally (Desuasido, 2006; Table 1).

Both the Estrada and Arroyo governments have been classified as predatory (Quimpo, 2010), but Estrada had what Arroyo lacked: support from the heretofore-underrepresented masses. Estrada had secured nearly 40 percent of the vote in 1998 thanks to the numerical strength of the poor, garnering more votes than his next two challengers combined, and twice the votes Ramos won in 1992 (Table 1). In contrast, Arroyos controversial victory rendered her so distrusted and despised that many Filipinos sayin public that they do not recognize her as president (Desuasido, 2006, p. 53). Thus, while Estradas plunderous presidency was infamously short-lived, the masa considered him their legitimate leader, with many thousands of them counter-protesting the middle class-led Edsa Dos demonstrations that ultimately unseated the popular president in 2001 (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005). Edsa Dos was hailed as a triumph in demanding government accountability, but it also exposed the gap between political forces and the will of the poor and marginalized (Hutchcroft & Rocamora). Manifesting in 1998 and again in 2001, the connection the Erap brand established with the masses unleashed the voice of the electorate (Scammell, 2007, p. 190). If voters willingness to assert their choice whether by ballot or street is an expression of democracy (Mangahas, personal communication, 2012), then despite the glaring deficiencies of Estradas presidency, the pull factor of his brand (Teehankee, 2010, p. 117) had at the very least loosened the constraints to democratic participation.

Narratives, Megacepts and Public Opinion: Branding in the 2010 Elections

The 2010 presidential contest presented an opportunity to address layers of democratic and legitimation crises by providing an institutional mechanism of replacing Arroyo (Teehankee,

2010, p. 115) and by correcting the flaws of Estradas branding strategy. By the 2010 election cycle, public opinion polling had become a social fact in Philippine electoral politics, acting as fever chart*s+ to guide and shape campaign strategies (Bionat, 1998, p. 145; Hedman, 2010b). Media influence, judging by record advertising expenditures, also reached a fever pitch (De Los Reyes, 2010). Through the politics of public opinion, Noynoy Aquino cultivated his winning brand not only on the basis of demographics but the issues circulating in the public sphere (Hedman, 2010b). His reflexive brand strategy played a decisive role in producing a national leader elected by the largest plurality since 1986, with a wide margin and, crucially, dominating across all regions and social classes (Hutchcroft, 2010; Figures 1.1-2). The hopes embodied in the new Aquino presidency have rendered the 2010 elections a watershed for Philippine democracy and potentially its future (Dressel, 2011, p. 530).

One explanation for Aquinos landslide victory in 2010 is the cycle of clientelism, populism and reformism in Philippine politics (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25), but closer examination suggests that brand politics was a key factor in determining the next phase of the cycle, as in 1998 and 2004. Indeed, reformist Aquino and fellow contender, populist senator Manuel Villar, ranked among the top brands of 2010 alongside consumer goods (Mangahas, 2010). Villar outspent and outjingled Aquino ten-to-one, even amassing the countrys largest political machine to complement his market-vote appeal (De Los Reyes, 2010; Thompson, 2010b, pp. 16-17). On the other hand, Aquino, the son of democracy heroes, had the built-in advantage of a metanarrative of family and nation, the Aquinos and the Philippines (Hedman, 2010b, p. 111). Four months before the election, Aquino and Villar were statistically tied in the opinion polls (Figure 2). While both candidates employed degrees of hybridization in voter mobilization, ultimately, how people feel about the candidates would decide the election (Rocamora, 2010, p. 88; Thompson, 2010b).

Establishing emotional connections is a hallmark of political branding, and one way brands build such relationships is by creating a set of promises and expectations catering to voters needs and wants, thereby encouraging participation (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Dean & Croft, 2009). Among masa voters in the Philippines, expectations of dedication to the service of the people is the primary notion of leadership; hence, because they evoke assurances of strong will and guidance in public service, image and personality rank as the top criterion for candidate

selection (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, pp. 19-21). Consequently, Aquinos and Villars brands took the form of megacepts easily appreciable core issue*s+ that engage the electorate (Bionat, 1998, p. 85). These megacepts and the promises they imply are projected via narratives and images, which voters then use to gauge character traits that signal these leadership values (Institute of Philippine Culture; Mitsikopoulou, 2008). They were also projected in colors: orange and yellow to represent Villar and Aquino, respectively, and the ideals they embodied (Bayos, 2010). Aquinos brand was predicated on his parents political legacy, a heritage that bestowed on him a clean and honest pro-democracy image (Thompson, 2010b, p. 15). Public grief over his mothers death furthermore transformed into political capital for the relatively obscure senator, who declared his candidacy amidst the unraveling of the Arroyo regimes irregularities (Abinales, 2011; Thompson, p. 14). With a family name* that evoke*d+ magic (Magno, 2009), an untainted image and political events in his favor, the Aquino brand had the makings of a credible reformist narrative backed by a strong, anticorruption megacept. In contrast, self-made billionaire Villar, a shrimp vendors son, constructed a rags-to-riches narrative intended as an aspirational, relatable, pro-poor megacept directly targeting the masa as well as Aquinos lofty heritage (Rocamora, 2010, p. 87; Thompson, 2010b). He effectively communicated that he identified with the plight of the poor (Ilagan, 2010). Building on Estradas populist success, Villar developed an applied populism involving sponsoring game-show segments that televised his generosity, offering a foretaste of his promised benevolence as...president (Thompson, p. 17). Their brands appealed to the competing strains of populism and reformism that run deep in the veins of public opinion (Thompson, p. 18).

From a branding perspective, Aquinos ability to respond to the popular pulse tipped the election in his favor. Over the campaign period, opinion polls revealed competing clamors for pro-poor representation and incorrupt leadership, and to a lesser degree, competency (Table 2). Villar drummed up a pro-poor message and capitalized on his generally acknowledged competency (Rocamora, 2010). In contrast, Aquinos slogan Kung walang corrupt walang mahirap (tr. if there is no corruption, there is no poverty) linked the dominant voter concerns of corruption and poverty, reflected his incorrupt image, and was flanked by a solid reformist

Referencing the Aquino franchise, Thompson notes: Filipinos also appear to believe that there are such things as good dynasties (2010b, p.15).

narrative. Brand narratives are deliberately left unfinished for voters to adopt as their own (Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Aquinos compelled voters to help him combat corruption through the promise of participatory governance enshrined in his platform, A Social Contract with the Filipino People, ironed out by a policy unit representing a spectrum of civil society actors (Rocamora, 2010). Finally, exploiting Villars refusal to seriously engage with the booming anticorruption discourse, the Aquino campaign branded the billionaire Villarroyo Arroyos real candidate (Abinales, 2011; Cabreza, 2010). On May 10, 2010, Villar captured only 16 percent of the vote and promptly conceded (Abinales).

Political events may have set the stage for his victory, but the uphill battle against the populist narrative strongly suggests Aquino needed to translate political capital into votes, by communicating to voters the authenticity of his core values and the associated promises: the Noynoy [Aquino] phenomenon (De Quiros, 2009) was successful political branding in action. Viewed in terms of brand strategy (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011), the Aquino brand was defined based on democratic ideals and the public zeitgeist, communicated through a credible image and narrative, and managed such that his campaign megacept is sustained in governance. The final aspect is paramount to the potential of political branding in fostering democracy. Where Estradas brand was window dressing, Aquinos has for the most part proven authentic (Thompson, 2010b, p. 19), and authenticity is necessary if branding is to improve democracy (Marsh & Fawcett). While democracy is in general difficult to measure, Aquinos recent 78 percent approval rating across all sectors of society seems to indicate he is on the right path: the Daang Matuwid (tr. the un-crooked path), it seems, of his current governance campaign (Pulse Asia, 2012; Ubac, 2013). While this is a positive illustration of how political branding constitutes the new permanent campaign (Scammell, 2007), it should be noted that Aquino is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election.

Conclusions

This paper aimed to (1) establish the pull factor of political branding on the electorate as the preferable means of voter mobilization against a backdrop of caciquism; and (2) demonstrate that when reflexive and authentic, political branding can make inroads in consolidating

democracy. Clientelism diminishes government representation and responsiveness, feeding a crisis of legitimacy in the national leadership and for democracy as a whole (Dressel, 2011, p. 539), as seen in Arroyos case. By rallying market votes, political branding presents an opportunity to narrow the democratic deficit. It fuels a positive shift in the expression of consumer power (Scammell, 2007, p. 177) as opposed to that of political machines, evident in Estradas popular election and the mass demonstrations against his ouster. Indeed, the emotional appeals that define political branding, widely discounted as cognitive shortcuts for making uninvolved decisions (Dean & Croft, 2009, pp. 134-135), seem to instead invigorate the Philippine electorate. And while it can be argued that the preponderance of brand messaging may affect voter preferences, it could equally be argued that, contrary to claims that branding erodes political discourse (Dean & Croft), megacepts pull specific issues to the surface, encouraging public debate of the political agenda. It appears, for instance, that the brand wars in 2010 allowed voters to seriously deliberate the narrative that would determine the next six years. Furthermore, by engaging with public opinion, Aquino was able to craft a brand that responded not only to the size but the needs of the electorate, creating a summary of expectations (Mitsikopoulou, 2008, p. 354) that his runaway plurality mandates him to deliver. Authenticity is key if political branding hopes to engender democratic renewal.

Political branding, however, is no magic bullet. Politics continues to be deeply local for market votes to supplant command votes altogether. Hybridization still exists in national campaigns, including Aquinos. Aquino is further accused of engaging in cronyism, and faces criticism for his failure to address parts of the democratic agenda, including income inequality and gaps in the freedom of information (Abinales, 2011). It will take the reconfiguration of the countrys political structures and a realignment of mindsets to eliminate the factors underlying the democratic crisis (Dressel, 2011). Nevertheless, political branding seems to foster citizen participation, national debate and government reflexivity that in the Philippines are necessary, albeit not sufficient, conditions for democratic consolidation. The elections in May 2013 may reveal whether its transformative potential can be sustained.

APPENDIX: Tables and Figures

Table 1 Presidential Election Results 1992-2010

1992 Ramos 5,342,521 (23.6%) 1998 Estrada 10,722,295 (39.9%) 2004 Arroyo 12,905,808 (39.9%) 2010* Aquino 15,208,678 (42.08%) Santiago 4,468,173 (19.7%) DeVenecia 4,268,483 (15.9%) Poe 11,782,232 (36.5%) Estrada 9,487,837 (26.25%) Other Candidates

Roco 3,720,212 (13.8%) Other Candidates

Villar 5,573,835 (15.42%)

Source: Teehankee (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Table 2

Pre-Election Survey: Voter Preferences for National Positions May 10, 2010 Elections (Reason for Choosing Presidential Preference)
October 22-30, 2009 Not corrupt / clean record 21% Can do something 14% Cares for the poor 12%
Source: Pulse Asia (2009a, 2009b, 2010)

December 8-10, 2009 Cares for the poor 27% Not corrupt / clean record 21% Good person 12%

February 21-25, 2010 Not corrupt / clean record 26% Cares for the poor 22% Can do something 14%

Figure 1.1 May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for President May 10, 2010 Elections (By Socio-Economic Class, in %)
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 44 44 35 23 14 13 6 Class ABC 23 21 15 6 Class E Actual Total Vote on May 10* 26.25 15.42 42.08 Aquino Estrada Villar Other Candidates Undecided

19 18 13 6 Class D

Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Figure 1.2 May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for President May 10, 2010 Elections (By Region, in %)
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 43 26 12 10 9 National Capital Region 20 18 15 6 Balance Luzon 47 41 25 12 8 7 Visayas 39 30 15 13 3 Mindanao Actual total vote on May 10* 42.08 Aquino 26.25 15.42 Estrada Villar Other Candidates Undecided

Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

Figure 2 National Surveys: Voting Preferences for President May 10, 2010 Elections Philippines, December 2009 to May 2010 (Aquino and Villar, in %)
50 40 30 20 10 0 Dec 5- Dec 27- Jan 21- Feb 24- Mar 19- Mar 28- Apr 16- May 2- Actual 10, 28, 24, 28, 22, 30, 19, 3, 2010 vote on 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 May 10*
Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)

46 27

44 33

42 35

36 34

37 28

37 29

38 26

42

42.08

19

15.42

Aquino Villar

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