MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS on July 19, 2011 Agz Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First Policy National

nal Patrimony Qualified Filipinos FACTS : Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that: Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing); Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares. HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter-productive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former. **Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. (nag kabuang ko pangita og net cafe) paita. CASE 2 3. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (PBMCI) -Ces June 5, 1973 FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (respondent). Petitioner decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang on on March 4, 1969 to express grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig

Police. Those participating in the demonstration were workers in the 1st shift, regular 2nd and 3rd shifts. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, respondent called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional rights to freedom of expression, speech and petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business, which may result to loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they continue with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated its appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not participate in the demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to withdraw, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for violation of the No strike and No lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial relations for being filed two days late. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioner's constitutional rights to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances should be upheld over the companys right to property. - Yes. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. The companys right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances which are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to mans enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. The companys loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers' fight for their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. 2. Whether or not the mass demonstration of the PBMEO was a violation of the companys No strike and No lockout rule. - NO. The demonstration was not a violation of the No strike and No lockout clause but was in fact a valid exercise of the workers constitutional rights to express their grievances against the Pasig police, not against the company. 3. WON there was a justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners by the respondent and the CIR. - NO. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a persons constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of its jurisdiction, which rendered its decision in favor of the company null and void. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVIL WHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT. When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purpose of justice requires it. 4 People v. Marti JM Facts: Andres Marti (appellant) and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them 4 gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. Andres informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland". Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. However, he refused, assuring that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment

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Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars. Thereafter, Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act and was convicted. Issue: Whether or not the evidence had been obtained in violation of appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and the same should be held inadmissible in evidence . May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant''s constitutional rights, be invoked against the state? Held: We hold in the negative! The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows: 1.) the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals. The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication. WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents. FACTS:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. 31 July 1989 - Catolico received a memo from WATEROUS VP-GM Emma Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice and warned her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department. In another memo - a WATEROUS Supervisor warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." 29 January 1990 a WATEROUS Control Clerk informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP): Catolico overpriced the 10 bottles of Voren Tablets (from P320 to P384) she purchased from YSP and pocketed the P640.00 overprice. Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. . As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension. Catolico requested access to the file for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. Catolico explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. March 5, 1990 - WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memo notifying Catolico of her termination. May 5, 1990 - Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision, the Labor Arbiter found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension "representing 30 days work." Petitioners appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside. In its decision, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights. HELD: NO. Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.

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Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. The difference in price may be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order. Assuming that there was an overcharge, the purchase orders were recommended, verified and approved by the WATEROUS management. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI VS. PAL This is a case of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claimed that he was illegally dismissed. He argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282 of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. Facts: - Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands 5'8" with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds. - The weight problem dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave (Dec. 29, 1984 to Mar 4, 1985) to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the standards, prompting another leave without pay (Mar 5, 1985 to Nov 1985). - Petitioner met the required weight, and was allowed to return to work. But his weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from (Oct 17, 1988 to Feb 1989). - April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates - February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. Instead of losing, weight, he was overweight at 215 pounds. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained. - October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator personally visited petitioner to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner gained 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager. - Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given to him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. - Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks - April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June

26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks. - When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Still, way over the ideal weight. On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence - June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately. Issues: I. WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; II. WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE"; III. WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED. IV. WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A SPEARATION PAY Ruling: I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. An employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA: The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the "other causes analogous to the foregoing." By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. Petitioner invoked the Nadura v. Benguet case, he says his dismissal is illegal: The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL. In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner's claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and selfdiscipline. II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.

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Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) - Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job - Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it. Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal. Both arguments must fail. First, the Constitution, the Labor Code,and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ. Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employee's Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance." Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. The law leaves no room for common carrier. Thus, it is standards of PAL show its obligations imposed upon it carrier. mistake or oversight on the part of a only logical to hold that the weight effort to comply with the exacting by law by virtue of being a common

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality. The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized jurisdiction. But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings. IV. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay. Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule. Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice," or based on "equity." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee. Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month's pay for every year of service. It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving. We are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade. 7. FILOTEO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996) - Construction of the Constitution and Bill of Rights By Bai Monisa Gampong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Facts: A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished of these is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was extracted through torture, and that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner, the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed is likewise motu propio addressed by the Court in this Decision. Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Along with his co-accused Martin Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Gerardo Escalada. Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Exand civilians Ricardo Perez, Liwanag, Severino Castro and

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The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL. Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him. We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "the element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-andavoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondent's failure to comply." It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."

On May 3, 1982, in Meycauyan, Bulacan, the said accused, two of whom were armed with guns, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the following: 1) 2) 3) 4) Postal Delivery Truck Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers Treasury Warrants

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount. On separate dates, Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at large. Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution. Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution. Issue 1. 2. 3. Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him? YES Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible? NO Was petitioners warrantless arrest valid and proper? Any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?YES What crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed? ROBBERY Ruling: Uncounselled Waiver SC finds that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioners extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime. Petitioner contends that SC erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Courts admission in evidence of his extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases upholding the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel especially where the statements are replete with details and circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness. We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel. The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families. (underscoring supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said: We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught: The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined inMorales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of judge-made laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of the same Code which states that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means. Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the RPC provides that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law Hence, petitioners vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983. The admissibility of petitioners uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. The waiver must also be categorical and definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.

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4. 5.

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right but petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section, still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel. It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course. Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. in other words, he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions. 9 Taxicab Operators v. BOT 1982 By Monica Katherine Juezan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION FACTS: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances; WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis; WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis should be adopted; WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments; NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations: 1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit: 1980 Model 1974 1981 Model 1975, etc. All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission. For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as

those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading. On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. ISSUES: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular. It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data aand information that may be desired by the BOT. On Equal Protection of the Law As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable.

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CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

The Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed 11 DECS v San Diego - Lobaton Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and Director of Center for Educational Measurement, petitioners, vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants -- and of lawyers who may prove better as plumbers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FACTS:

1.) The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The constitution also provides that every person has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. 2.) The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. There would only be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals. Petition GRANTED, decision of respondent court REVERSED. Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD (Police power) By Joseph Madriaga in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Facts: R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432 became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: The senior citizens shall be entitled to twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. . .The establishment may claim the discounts as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, that the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and nonprescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that [t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. Issue: Whether or not the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. Held:Yes, the law is a legitimate exercise of police power of the State. Reason: The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development. Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children. Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act: ... (f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership. To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest

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Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree in Bachelor of Science in Zoology. A check with the Department of Education showed that he took and flunked the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) four times and was applying to take a fifth examination. DECS rejected his application following its rule that: A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. To compel his admission to the test, private respondent went to the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, invoking his constitutional rights to freedom and quality education and challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. Respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition, holding that San Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. HELD: (On Police Power) In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the SC upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. (Said rationale should also be applied to the case at bar.) As to the contention that private respondent has been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power, the same holds no bearing. The police power of the state is said to be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Lawful subject: It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. Lawful method: The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor -- one cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. Hence, no arbitrary exercise of the police power in this light. (Minor Issues)

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the antihypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores. Petitioners computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income,the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount. Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. (13) MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. G.R. NO. 135962 (March 27, 2000) kijiPetitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (Government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila) Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc (Government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila and the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.) Facts: Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic and that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be

demolished. BAVA then, filed a case for injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public. Held: No.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City, is illegal. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents. Nature of Case Petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive Order No. 566 (EO 566) and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR). Facts:

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June 11 and 12 2006 - the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. June 2006 - licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. June 19 2006 - the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. August 18 2006 - the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on August 22 2006. Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board Examinations. September 8 2006 - President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. November 3 2006 - the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR) In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. In a letter dated 3 January 2007, Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. hairman Puno also wrote that petitioner's comments and suggestions would be considered in the event of revisions to the IRR. In view of petitioner's continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate the IRR, Chairman Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007, invited petitioner's representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007. In accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue, petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR. Petitioner also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman Puno's statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering of the registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and the requirement for reviewers to have five years' teaching experience instead of five years' administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a categorical answer to their request for the suspension of the IRR. The CHED did not reply to the letter. On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR.

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations8 praying for a ruling: (1.) Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the coverage of the CHED; (2.) Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and PRC-recognized professional associations with recognized programs, or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and (3.) Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722 (RA 7722) limiting the CHED's coverage to public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in post-secondary educational institutions.

Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest. (Emphasis supplied) In implementation of this resolution, COMELEC sent identical letters to various publishers of newspapers all members of the PPI, directing them to provide free print space to the COMELEC to be used by candidates for the senatorial field to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. PPI now comes to the court seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of Resolution No. 2772 on the grounds that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. It also sought to declare the letter directives of the COMELEC void for requiring publishers to give free "COMELEC Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. On April 20, 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining COMELEC from implementing the assailed resolution. The OSG in its comment representing the COMELEC alleged that the resolution did not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in newspapers as it does not provide any administrative of criminal sanction for noncompliance with the resolution. According to the OSG, the resolution merely provided for guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of COMELEC space. The OSG further maintains that Section 8 of the resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the COMELEC over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure the fair, impartial and credible election. During the oral hearing, the COMELEC clarified that the resolution and the letter directives were not intended to compel those members to supply COMELEC with free print space, rather, they were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to the COMELEC during the 1992 elections. On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation which attached a copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995 which clarified the previously issued resolution. Issue: Whether or not Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a valid exercise of power of eminent domain. Held: No. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional. Ruling: The power of eminent domain is one of the fundamental and eminent powers of the State. Power of eminent domain is usually understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign to appropriate, not only public but private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose. Eminent domain is the act in which property can be seized from a citizen with due compensation. In other words, the state can take over someone's land if they give a monetary compensation, as long as there is a true reason for such an action. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of

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October 8 2007 - the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring petitioner's request to exclude independent review centers from CHED's supervision and regulation to the Office of the President as the matter requires the amendment of EO 566. To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No. 566. October 26 2007 - petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. April 23 2008 - a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support of the Petition and a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR), Professional Review and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA), CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA review centers operating in Manila (collectively, petitionersintervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566 and the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rulemaking power. ** These are the main issues in the case. However, the focus on our topic is on the issue ofPolice Power. Held: Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex - the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers. In case the other issues will be asked... (1) The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722. The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. Therefore, it is unconstitutional. (2) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO(invoked by the OSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED's quasilegislative power. 15. PPI v. COMELEC (Pasquin) Facts: On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772, Sections 2 and 8 of which read, Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012

eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. The taking of a private property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. As for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Court ruled that the issue on its constitutionality is not yet ripe for judicial review for lack of actual case or controversy. Telecom v. COMELEC By BonChe Verana Quibo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete TELECOM v. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioners Telebab and GMA Network incorporated are questioning the validity of Section 92, B.P No 881 the Omnibus Election Code with respect to broadcast media. SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as Comelec Space wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (print ads) SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign. (tv air time) Petitioners claim that such provision of the Omnibus Election Code takes property without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause[6] and the eminent domain provision[7] of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. Question on Standing: Telebab has no standing, GMA has. GMA as a broadcasting network, directly suffers loss as part of the effects of Section 92. ISSUE: Whether there is property taken by the government in implementing Section 92 of B.P 881 RULING: In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving free air time. The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that air time is finished product which, it is said, become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their production. But air time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,[ which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary

privilege of using them. Consequently, a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. It is noteworthy that 49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should be considered as part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their respective franchises or permits. There is no reason to suppose that 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to render under 4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioners franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the COMELEC. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. 17 Estate of Suguitan v City Sagarino SC 3rd DIVISION G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000 HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent. DECI SI ON GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners prayed for the reversal of RTC Pasigs Order that (1) declared that the City of Mandaluyong has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with existing improvements thereon (TCT No. 56264 Registry of Deeds, Metro Manila District II) for the public use or purpose upon payment of just compensation, and (2) directed the parties to submit to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to be appointed as Commissioners. October 13, 1994 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a RESOLUTIONauthorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center. January 20, 1995 Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. March 13, 1995 the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds (1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. October 24, 1995 the trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.

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 November 14, 1995 the trial court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the DEPOSIT of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property. December 15, 1995 the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 14, 1995. July 28, 1998 the court granted the assailed order of EXPROPRIATION. ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong must exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ORDINANCE as required by 19 RA 7160, and not by means of a mere RESOLUTION. HELD: A. EMINENT DOMAIN Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ORDINANCE, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided,further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. B. ORDINANCE vs RESOLUTION Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the LGU concerned: 1. An ORDINANCE is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ORDINANCE is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with

the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised. C. EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages: (1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; (2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensationfor the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. D. IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) OF EMINENT DOMAIN Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR (of Eminent Domain) which provides that: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its (local) chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings. 19 of RA 7160 prevails over IRR which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI of IRR, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance. SC cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power. However, SC ruling in this case does not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has complied with all other legal requirements. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 18 ESTATE vs. CITY OF MANILA By Bembem Sarno in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete FACTS:Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). On November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, they filed ejectment complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said respondents. Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed to the RTC and to the CA but both appeals were denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in 1998. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against respondents Abiog and Maglonso,respondent City filed a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation)]of the properties of petitioners. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent SBMI. The complaint was based on Ordinance No. 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land. According to the ordinance, the said properties were to be distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were the occupants of the said parcels of land who (had) been occupying the said lands as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years. Thus, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties forP10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. Respondent City prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on the current tax declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the deposit with the trial court of the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid value.

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On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties (including as well as representing herein respondents Abiog and Maglonso), filed a motion for intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for injunction. Respondent SBMI alleged that it had a legal interest over the subject matter of the litigation as its members were the lawful beneficiaries of the subject matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting the occupants of the subject properties. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an order on the ground that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual (sic), consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that may or may not be granted. On the day SBMIs motion for intervention was denied, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for lack of merit. On June 6, 1995, the trial court allowed respondent City to take possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount of P1,542,793, based on the P10,285,293.38 offer by respondent City to petitioners which the trial court fixed as the provisional amount of the subject properties. On October 3, 1995, the Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed.[15] The trial court held that expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners were in fact willing to sell the subject properties under terms acceptable to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for reconsideration was denied. However, on January 27, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as valid respondent Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain over petitioners properties. There can be no interpretation of the letter of the defendantappellee other than that the valid and definite offer of the plaintiffappellant to purchase the subject property was not accepted or turned down. The lower court held that the defendants-appellees were actually willing to sell, in fact, some of the tenants have already purchased the land that they occupy. However, we agree with the plaintiff-appellant that the contracts entered into by the defendantsappellees with some of the tenants do not affect the offer it made. The plaintiff-appellant was not a party in those transactions and as pointed out, its concern is the majority of those who have no means to provide themselves with decent homes to live on. What followed were incidents leading to the filing of the petition for certiorari against the resolution of the Court of Appeals which essentially sought to enjoin the petitioners from enforcing the final judgments against respondents Abiog, Maglonso and SBMI (hereinafter, respondent occupants) in the ejectment cases. Maglonso filed for a protective order but was not granted. Thgereafter, SBMI sought for the same o stop the execution of the final and executory judgments in the ejectment cases against them. On September 4, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to set aside as ineffective and/or null and void the said August 19, 1998 resolution. But the Court of Appeals denied the same enjoining JBL and herein petitioners from disturbing the physical possession of all the properties subject of the expropriation proceedings. On 27 January 1998, we held that the plaintiff-appellant validly exercised its power of eminent domain and consequently may expropriate the subject property upon payment of just compensation. The record before us shows that on 6 June 1995, the lower court allowed the plaintiff-appellant to take possession of the subject property upon filing of P1,542,793.00 deposit. The property to be expropriated includes the same properties subject of the ejectment cases against the intervenors. There is nothing in the record that would show that the order of possession was ever set aside or the deposit returned to the plaintiff-appellant. in insisting that its offer was valid and that the amount it deposited was sufficient, respondent City reiterates the reasons cited by the Court of Appeals. According to respondent City, there is nothing in the Local Government Code of 1991 which requires the offer to be made before enacting an enabling ordinance. The actual exercise of the power of eminent domain begins only upon the filing of the complaint for eminent domain with the RTC by the Chief Executiv e and not when an ordinance pursuant thereto has been enacted. It is therefore safe to say that the offer to purchase can be made before the actual filing of the complaint, whether that is before or after the ordinance is enacted. ISSUE: WON the respondent cuty may legally expropriate the subject properties HELD: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law depends on whether the City complied with the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned and must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of the legislature, a local government unit can only exercise powers granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of the constitutional power of control of Congress over local government units, the latter being mere creations of the former. When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied on its powers granted by Section 19 of the Local Government Code

of 1991]and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program.]Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the conditions and standards prescribed by RA 7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that: Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, that abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. [italics supplied] In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals,]we held that the above-quoted provisions are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public use. We find that herein respondent City failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Respondent City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, respondent City in its pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of Appeals was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners. We also take note of the fact that Filstream is substantially similar in facts and issues to the case at bar. In that case, Filstream acquired a favorable judgment of eviction against the occupants of its properties in Tondo, Manila. But prior thereto, on the strength of Ordinance 7818 (the same ordinance used by herein respondent City as basis to file the complaint for eminent domain), respondent City initiated a complaint for expropriation of Filstreams properties in Tondo, Manila, for the benefit of the residents thereof. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and the City opposed the same. The trial court denied the motion. When the judgment in the ejectment case became final, Filstream was able to obtain a writ of execution and demolition. It thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation complaint but the trial court denied the same and ordered the condemnation of the subject properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied Filstreams petition on a technical ground. Thus, the case was elevated to this Court for review of the power of the City to expropriate the Filstreams properties. Meanwhile, the occupants and respondent City filed in separate branches of the RTC of Manila several petitions for certiorari with prayer for injunction to prevent the execution of the judgments in the ejectment cases. After the consolidation of the petitions for certiorari, the designated branch of RTC Manila dismissed the cases on the ground of forum-shopping. The dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts dismissal and granted respondents prayer for injunction. Filstream appealed the same to this Court, which appeal was consolidated with the earlier petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the main expropriation case. Due to the substantial resemblance of the facts and issues of the case at bar to those in Filstream, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in said case. To quote: The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction is but a mere incident to the actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties in this case over the disputed premises. In order to determine

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whether private respondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of discord. Due to the fatal infirmity in the Citys exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation must necessarily fail. Considering that the consolidated cases before us can be completely resolved by the application of our Filstream ruling, it is needless to discuss the constitutionality of Ordinance 7818. We herein apply the general precept that constitutional issues will not be passed upon if the case can be decided on other grounds. In view of the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation and the favorable adjudication of petitioners appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals on the expropriation of the subject properties, the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the Court of Appeals resolutions (allowing respondent occupants to intervene and granting their motion to enjoin the execution of the executory judgments in the ejectment cases) becomes moot and academic. 19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons By Mac-mac Sinsona in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete 19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons Facts: - Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its purposes are to acquire, install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and distribution systems within the boundaries of the District. - Petitioner wanted to acquire a five square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of respondents property covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City. - Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latters property. Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioners proposal. - After the negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution No. 015-20049 which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). - November 10, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the five square meter portion of respondents property. - February 7, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent of the current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter. The trial court granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. - Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot. - July 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting respondents petition. It ruled that the board resolution which authorized the filing of the expropriation complaint lacked exactitude and particularity which made it invalid; that there was no genuine necessity for the expropriation of the five square meter lot and; that the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the value of the property contravenes the judicial determination of just compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was rejected. Issue(topic - eminent domain): Whether or not petitioner may exercise the power of eminent domain. Held: Yes! - Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. - As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often does, delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of the numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D. No. 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of eminent domain. - A corporation does not have powers beyond those expressly conferred upon it by its enabling law. Petitioners charter provides that it has the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in it. All the powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board and that any executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and redelegated by the board to any of its officers or agents for such

purpose. Being a corporation, petitioner can exercise its powers only through its board of directors. - For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely:first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved on February 27, 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-200432 authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondents lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated February 28, 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case "against the owner of the five square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended." - The letter not only explicitly debunks respondents claim that there was no authorization from LWUA but it also identifies the lot sought to be expropriated with sufficient particularity. It is settled that the validity of a complaint may be questioned immediately upon its filing through a motion to dismiss or raised thereafter as an affirmative defense. However, there is no need to further belabor the issue since it is established that petitioner has the legal capacity to institute the expropriation complaint. - Anent the second issue involving the issuance of a writ of possession, a discussion on the various stages in an expropriation proceeding is necessary. The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 897434 . It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession. - In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second is the determination of just compensation. - Petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional payment directly to respondent during a hearing which it had failed to attend. Petitioner, then, deposited the provisional payment with the court. The trial court did not commit an error in accepting the deposit and in issuing the writ of possession. The deposit of the provisional amount with the court is equivalent to payment. - Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that "upon compliance with the guidelinesthe court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project." Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation caseis entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974. - It is mandatory on the trial courts part to issue the writ of possession and on the sheriffs part to deliver possession of respondents property to petitioner pursuant to the writ. WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 26 July 2006 and Resolution dated 28 September 2006 are REVERSED. The ORDERS of the Regional Trial Court dated 01 April 2005 and 9 May 2005 are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is further DIRECTED to immediately REMIT the amount of P17,500.00 to respondent and to REQUIRE the sheriff to implement the writ of possession. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 20 Republic v de Castellvi - Solis By Revelen Radam Solis in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete 20 Republic v de Castellvi Solis G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees. FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding. The land owned by defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, was occupied by the Republic from July 1947 under a contract of lease, which was renewed yearly. In 1956, before the contract expires on June 30, plaintiff sought to renew it but defendant refused. When the AFP, particularly the Philippine Air Force, refused to vacate the lot owned by Castellvi after the termination of the contract, the defendant informed the AFP, through a letter to the Chief of Staff, that the heirs of the property had decided not to renew the contract of lease of the property in question because they have decided to subdivide the land to be sold to the general public. Furthermore, she demanded that the

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property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter and that the property be returned in the same condition prior to the occupancy of the AFP. The Chief of Staff refused alleging that it was difficult for the Air Force to vacate the property since there are permanent installations and other facilities erected and established therein amounting to almost P500,000.00. It was also alleged that the acquisition of property by means of expropriation proceedings is subject to recommendation to the President. The defendant brought the suit to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the ejectment of the Philippine Air Force from their land. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed, on June on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against Carmen vda, de Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun, over two parcels of land. The Republic, among other things, alleged: that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed (1) that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; (2) that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, (3) and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10. After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959. On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation. After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of the Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961. The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961. In December 1961, the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time. On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended. Both Castellvi and Toledo-Guzon did not insit on appeal. ISSUE: Whether the taking be reckoned from the year 1947 or 1959. HELD: Taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain. (1) The expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement

the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. (3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee. (4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP. (5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. 21 NPC v CA - Soriano By Renie Jay Soriano in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete G.R. No. 113194 March 11, 1996 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANGONDATO, respondents. Facts: In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21, 995 sq.m land, a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use of the NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the Philippines dated Dec. 3, 1974. NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance of P40.00 per sq.m. Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property and that he is not privy to any agreement between NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment to the city cannot be considered as payment to him. Later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the subject property belongs to Mangondato.

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On July 13, 1990, NAPOCORs National Power Board (NAPOCORs board) passed Resolution No. 90-225 resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m for only a 12, 132 sq.m portion of the property plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. However, said resolution was deferred to allow the NAPOCORs regional legal counsel to determine whether P100.00 per sq.m is the fair market value. On August 14, 1990, NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of P40.00 per sq.m plus 12% from 1978 pending the determination whether P100.00 per sq.m is the fair market value. NAPOCORs regional legal counsels findings state that Mandondatos property is classified as industrial which has a fair market value of P300.00 for those along the national highway and on the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions, NAPOCOR has to pay not less than P300.00 per sq.m. NAPOCORs board on May 17, 1991 passed Resolution No. 91-247 resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m for the property excluding 12% interest per annum. In a letter dated December 17, 1991 and February 4, 1992, Mandondato disagreed with Resolution No. 91-247. At the same time, to get partial payment, he asked that he be paid in the meantime, P100.00 per sq.m without prejudice to pursuing his claim for the proper and just compensation plus interest thereon. On February 12, 1992, NAPOCORs general counsel filed a memorandum for its president finding no legal impediment if they, in the meantime were to pay Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m without prejudice to the final determination of the proper and just compensation. On March, 1991, the parties executed a Deed of Sale where NAPOCOR paid Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m excluding interest and without prejudice to Mandondatos pursuance of claims for just compensation and interest. In a letter dated April 20, 1992, Mangondato asked for the payment of P300.00 per sq.m plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. However, NAPOCORs board passed Resolution No. 92-121 granting its president the authority to negotiate for the payment of P100.00 per sq.m for the land plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 less payments already made. On July 7, 1992, Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil case against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property described in the complaint as Lots 1 and 3 of the subdivision plan, the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the surrender of the property, and other related costs. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed before the lower court a Civil Case which is a Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato over the subject property. Upon agreement of the parties, the two cases were ordered consolidated and appointed Atty. Saipal Alawi representing the lower court, Atty. Connie Doromal for NAPOCOR and Atty. Alimbsar Ali from City Assessors Office to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation. On July 28, 1992, Commissioner Doromal filed his report recommending a fair market value of P300.00 per sq.m as of November 23, 1978. On August 6, 1992, Commissioners Alawi and Ali filed their joint report recommending a fair market value of P1000.00 per sq.m as of 1992. After receiving the reports and comments from the parties, the court denied Mangondatos request for recovery of possession of the property but ordering NAPOCOR to pay monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 up to July 1992 with 12% interest per annum and condemning the property in favor of NAPOCOR effective July, 1992 upon payment of P1000.00 per sq.m as a just compensation. Two issued raised by the petitioner: 1) THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE PROPERTY IS ITS VALUE IN 1992, WHEN THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED, AND NOT ITS VALUE IN 1978, WHEN THE PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY PETITION. 2) THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION AT P1,000.00 PER SQUARE METER INSTEAD OF P40.00 PER SQUARE METER. Issues: 1) At what point in time should the value of the land subject of expropriation be computed: at the date of taking or the date of filing of the complaint for eminent domain? Side issue: When is there Taking of Property? 2) What is the fair market value of the property? Rulings:

1) The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of complaint, as follows: Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to, be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint The general rule however, admits of an exception where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. In Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled that ". . . the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements." Following the above doctrine, in the case of Municipality of La Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, ". . . the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law guarantee's just compensation. It would be an injustice to him certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection; the increment in price would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness." Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was the case in Caro de Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owner's land arising from the expropriation, as indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by petitioner's use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4, 17 it has the burden of proving its claim that its occupancy and use not ordinary inflation and increase in land values was the direct cause of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992. Side issue: This Court has defined the elements of taking as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the following words: A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. 2) The fair market value as held by the respondent court is the amount of P1000.00 per sq.m. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present the evidence on the issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within the recognized exceptions, which is not the situation in this petition, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as to valuation of the subject property. In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation provided under Section 4 of Rule

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67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that, indeed, such general rule should in fact be observed in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED, except as to the interest on the monthly rentals. which is hereby reduced from twelve percent to the legal rate of six percent (6%)per annum. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. 22- NPC v. Gutierrez 193 SCRA 1 (1991) By Janina Marie Sto.Domingo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete FACTS: Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively. Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of its transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against the herein defendants on January 20, 1965. The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties. Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES. RULING: The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that: Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable. On the issue of ownership being claimed by petitioner in the event that the price of P5.00 per square meter be sustained, it is well settled that an issue which has not been raised in the Court a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Petitioner only sought an easement of right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator. 23. NPC v. Ibrahim (2009) -Jennidy-

FACTS:

Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim and Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-square meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without respondents knowledge and consent, took possession of the subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground tunnels. The tunnels were used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NPCs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime in July 1992. Thus, on October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NPC pay damages and vacate the subterranean portion of the land, but the demand was not heeded. Hence, on November 23, 1994, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of land and damages against NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 1298-94. RTC After trial, the RTC rendered a decision,2 the decretal portion of which reads: 1. Denying [respondents] prayer for [NPC] to dismantle the underground tunnels constructed beneath the lands of [respondents] in Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278; 2. Ordering [NPC] to pay to [respondents] the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters of land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of 21,995 square meters atP1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for the remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6% interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid; 3. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] a reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of the total area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978 or a total of P7,050,974.40. 4. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and 5. Ordering [NPC] to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs RTC modified its judgment hereby rendered: 1. Reducing the judgment award of [respondents] for the fair market value of P48,005,000.00 by [P]9,526,000.00 or for a difference [of] P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of [P]4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the filing of the case until paid. 2. Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein [respondents] Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to [respondents]. 3. Ordering [NPC] embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs. CA Lucman Ibrahim and NPC then filed their separate appeals with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57792. On June 8, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision,7 setting aside the modified judgment and reinstating the original Decision, amending it further by deleting the award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and attorneys fees. To satisfy the judgment, respondents filed with the RTC a motion for execution of its August 7, 1996 decision, as modified by the CA. On November 13, 2007, the RTC granted the motion, and issued the corresponding writ of execution. Subsequently, a notice of garnishment was issued upon NPCs depositary bank. On May 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision,10 dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari. Rejecting NPCs argument, the CA declared that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 intended NPC to pay the full value of the property as compensation without ordering the transfer of respondents title to the land. According to the CA, in a plethora of cases involving lands traversed by NPCs transmission lines, it had been consistently ruled that an easement is compensable by the full value of the property despite the fact that NPC was only after a right-of-way easement, if by such easement it perpetually or indefinitely deprives the land owner of his proprietary rights by imposing restrictions on the use of the property. The CA, therefore, ordered NPC to pay its admitted obligation to respondents amounting to P36,219,887.20.11 SC

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NPC is now before us faulting the CA for dismissing the formers petition for certiorari. It also prayed for a TRO to enjoin respondents and all persons acting under their authority from implementing the May 30, 2008 Decision of the CA. In its July 9, 2008 Resolution,12 this Court granted NPCs prayer, and issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the assailed CA Decision. In the main, NPC insists that the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land taken. It stresses that this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 168732 is replete with pronouncements that the just compensation awarded to respondents corresponds to compensation for the entire land and not just for an easement or a burden on the property, thereby necessitating a transfer of title and ownership to NPC upon satisfaction of judgment.NPC added that by granting respondents motion for execution, and consequently issuing the writ of execution and notice of garnishment, the RTC and the CA allowed respondents to retain title to the property even after the payment of full compensation. This, according to NPC, was a clear case of unjust enrichment. ISSUE: W/N the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land taken. HELD: NO! [NPC], by its selective quotations from the Decision in G.R. No. 168732, would have Us suppose that the High Court, in decreeing that [NPC] pay the full value of the property as just compensation, implied that [NPC] was entitled to the entire land, including the surface area and not just the subterranean portion. No such inference can be drawn from [the] reading of the entirety of the High Courts Decision. On the contrary, a perusal of the subject Decision yields to this Court the unmistakable sense that the High Court intended [NPC] to pay the full value of the subject property as just compensation without ordering the transfer o[f] respondents title to the land. This is patent from the following language of the High Court as quoted by [NPC] itself: In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that [NPC] only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.14 As we explained in Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:16 The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. The Supreme Court, in Republic v. PLDT thus held that: "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.1avvphi1 In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals19 and National Power Corporation v. Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corporation,20 this Court sustained the award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment. 24 NPC v IBRAHIM 2007 Faizah Tejero Topic: What may be taken This case is about plaintiffs Mr. Ibrahim and his co-heirs complaint against NAPOCOR or the National Power Corporation. NAPOCOR built underground tunnels under the parcels of land owned by the

plaintiffs without their knowledge and consent. One of the plaintiffs was denied a permit to build a well because it is dangerous. NAPOCOR argued that the subsoil is not part of the property of the plaintiffs. FACTS:

o On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, and other Maruhoms, instituted an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur. o In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land described in Survey PlanFP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square meters each respectively. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the latters Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City. o On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as MarawiCity lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages. o The RTC ruled that the plaintiffs be given just compensation. However, this first judgment of the RTC was modified as it gave NAPOCOR the right to the parcels of land which the plaintiffs strongly averred. o The CA modified the RTCs ruling by deleting the moral damages and reducing the attorneys fees. 1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market value of P48,005,000.00 by 9,526,000.00 or for a difference byP38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of 4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the filing of the case until paid.

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2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.

o The case was elevated to the SC. Ruling of Supreme Court:

This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation to respondents, and, by extension, the basis for computing the same. The threshold issue of whether respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.

o Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were constructed does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any case, petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom, had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below respondents property could not have caused damage or prejudice

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to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely conjectural and speculative. The contention lacks merit.

o The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the Court. In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the application of the exceptions to the above rule. o Consequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a wellknown principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.

All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that preponderantly plaintiffs have established the condemnation of their land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at Saduc, Marawi City by the defendant National Power Corporation without even the benefit of expropriation proceedings or the payment of any just compensation and/or reasonable monthly rental since 1978.[12]

In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible.[13] This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.[14]

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In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the subterrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment, thus: Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from the evidence they have already existing residential houses over said tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either destroyed said houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by plaintiffs? From the evidence, an affirmative answer seems to be in order. The plaintiffs and [their] co-heirs discovered [these] big underground tunnels in 1992. This was confirmed by the defendant on November 13, 1992 by the Acting Assistant Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project (Exh. K). On September 16, 1992, Atty. Omar Maruhom (co-heir) requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to construct a motorized deep well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh. Q). He was refused the permit because the construction of the deep well as (sic) the parcels of land will cause danger to lives and property. He was informed that beneath your lands are constructed the Napocor underground tunnel in connection with Agua Hydroelectric plant (Exh. Q-2). There in fact exists ample evidence that this construction of the tunnel without the prior consent of plaintiffs beneath the latters property endangered the lives and properties of said plaintiffs. It has been proved indubitably that Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Lake Lanao has been formed by extensive earth movements and is considered to be a drowned basin of volcano/tectonic origin. InMarawi City, there are a number of former volcanoes and an extensive amount of faulting. Some of these faults are still moving. (Feasibility Report on Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger, Consulting Engineers, Architects and Economists, Exh. R). Moreover, it has been shown that the underground tunnels [have] deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value. On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah Islamic Bank for the expansion of the operation of the Ameer Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said land (Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank in its letter of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O) stating that: Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot consider your loan application due to the following reasons, to wit: That per my actual ocular inspection and verification, subject property offered as collateral has an existing underground tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is traversing underneath your property, hence, an encumbrance. As a matter of bank policy, property with an existing encumbrance cannot be considered neither accepted as collateral for a loan.

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property.[15] Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due process of law.[16]

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.[17] Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.[18] Petition DENIED. Decision of the CA affirmed. 25- REPUBLIC v. PLDT By Aeje S. Timosan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendantappellant.

Facts:

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of Posts: SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the following powers and duties: (a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radiotelegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter be established to provide telecommunication service in places requiring such service;

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(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; (c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by said system; (d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the international telecommunication service in agreement with other countries desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and (e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the International Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handled in the international service, and those that may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and adhered to by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an order for the defendant: (1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone communication between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign countries until further order of this Court.

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The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180).

It is said that after trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. Issue: Whether or not Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) may be compelled to enter into such agreement. Held: The Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, but the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way (Guys, this is the case doctrine jud kunuhay nalibog pud ko sa iyang gi-yawit. Basta mao na). Reasoning:

After its creation, in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission

On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.

The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation---Then, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the operations of said Bureau. Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it from serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the

Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance of telephone connections by the defendant company

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Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724). The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its contract are likewise untenable for the following reasons: First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. The PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inabilities to meet the demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides: SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: (Act 3436) 3. Third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216). The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines. Note: It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done. But this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service agreed upon. 4. The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves to the Government: the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of its telegraph system thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall have the right to place additional crossarms and wires on the poles of the grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the Director of Posts and the grantee; the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said section could not refer to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes. However, there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more than one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter. Hence, so long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased, there is no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires of the government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of communication. Conclusion: In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes "parasitically with its own telephone services. Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it is well-known that defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just compensation for the services rendered to the Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved,

the objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise. The decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. 26 Carlos Superdrug v DSWD (2007) By Jamel Macacua in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Carlos Superdrug v Department of Social Welfare and Development(2007) This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments. On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003), amending R.A. No. 7432 (the Old Senior Citizens Act), was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo which became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) provides that: The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: 1. the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; The establishments may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. On November 12, 2004, the Department of Health issued Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. Among other issues, petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to just compensation. RULING No. petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer

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full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Other issue: Whether or not section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 has constitutional basis. Yes. RA 9257 is in accord with the states policy to provide social justice in all phases of national development and to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children. 28. LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANESBALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents. FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." This was granted by thecourt. After denial of petitioners, motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law, thus they challenged the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224.

Issue: WON the "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is for a public purpose. HOLDING: Yes. Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not of "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public character." "Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1) Citing the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, the term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use". Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater may only of the inhabitants of the country." 29 ESTATE V PHIL. EXPO By El Dinamita in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ VS PHILIPPINE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE jan 16, 2011. -Deither -petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of: +CA dated March 25, 1998 and January 14, 1999. +which ordered the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B while setting aside the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the said Regional Trial Court which ordered the peaceful turnover to petitioner Estate of Salud Jimenez of said Lot 1406-B. FACTA: xxxMay 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three parcels of irrigated rice land in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, (29,008 sq ms), is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. xxxJuly 11, 1991 the trial court upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. xxxOctober 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. xxxPEZA appeals to CA Meanwhile petitioner wrote two letters offering two proposals, namely: + Withdrawal of private respondents appeal with respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and loss of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent. + The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot. January 4, 1993,Private respondents Board approved the proposal and the compromise agreement was signed by private respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay

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Jardiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. xxxThe Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. xxxAugust 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. xxxHowever, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. xxxAugust 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. PEZA moved for its reconsideration. xxxDecember 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner, corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to petitioner. xxxNovember 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the trial court. Petitioner filed its Comment on January 16, 1998. xxxMarch 25, 1998Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, ratiocinating thus: A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and if a party fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code which provides: If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision dated March 25, 1998. However, public respondent in a Resolution dated January 14, 1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors, to wit: ERAT: WON THE CA ERRED IN ENTERTAINING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF RC. WON THE CA ERRED IN INTERPRETING ORIGINAL DEMAND TO MEAN FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION. WON ART 2041 WILL APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR WON THE RESPONDENT HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO EXPROPRIATE THE SUBJECT LOT 1406-B AND THE SAME WAS FOR VALID PUBLIC PURPOSE (-topic) RULING: The supreme court ruled in favor of the respondent ON APPEAL FORCERTIORARI It appeared that on August 11, 1997, respondent received the Order of the trial court dated August 4, 1997 annulling the compromise agreement. On August 26, 1997, the last day for the filing of a notice of appeal, respondent filed instead a motion for reconsideration. The Order of the trial court denying the motion for reconsideration was received by respondent on November 23, 1997. The reglementary period to appeal therefore lapsed on November 24, 1997. On November 27, 1997, however, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that appeal is the proper remedy inasmuch as the Order dated August 4, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is a final order that completely disposes of the case. Besides, according to petitioner, respondent is estopped in asserting that certiorari is the proper remedy inasmuch as it invoked the fifteen (15) day reglementary period for appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration on August 26, 1997 and not the sixty (60) day period for filing a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as of procedure are involved However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.

ON EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal. In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial could only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and executory. ON ARTICLE 2041 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE petitioner assails the interpretation by the Court of Appeals of the phrase original demand in Article 2041 of the New Civil CoDE. Article 2041 provides that, If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand The incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by petitioner of respondents authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to petitioner. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. This Court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in interpreting original demand to mean the fixing of just compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to petitioner. . Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive respondents Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of the expropriated Lot 1406-B. -After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner inconsistently contends that said article does not apply to the case at bar inasmuch as it is only applicable to cases where a compromise has not been approved by a court. In the case at bar, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner insists that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should apply. - The applicability of art 2039 and 1330 will not change the outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. ON PUBLIC PURPOSE -This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. the public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: xxxxxx- the court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

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xxxxxx- In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare. THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. The power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, EXERCISING OF POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character. xxxxx In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent. ----->Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however, grant the petitioners prayer for the return of the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De Villaroya to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot where this Court ruled that under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. However, the said statement was not the ruling in that case. As in other cases where there was no prompt payment by the government, this Court declared in Sorsogon that the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delay be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this decision. However, this Court also stressed and declared in that case that In cases where land is taken for PUBLIC USE, PUBLIC INTEREST, however, must be considered. In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the petitioner. importante diri anf PUBLIC PURPOSE. Gi pose lang nako ang uban topic bcg ma chambahan og question. love, diet. 31 Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu 413 SCRA 502 (2003) Facts:

expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner (The above stated are principles. Murag mao ni ang point sa PUBLIC USE nga topic) Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority36 is correct in stating that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial courts underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue to be in operation" when it granted the complaint for eminent domain and the airport discontinued its activities. The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin37 to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. 32 Reyes vs. NHA By Jade Canada and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Page 2 Public Use Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA) 365 SCRA 494; GR No. 147577 Facts:

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National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 situated in Lahug, Cebu City for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport. To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport. In 1991, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was opened for incoming and outgoing flights. Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920, but they were not heeded. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: W/N petitioners can exercise the right of repurchase over the said land. Held: Of course! In the case of Reyes vs. CA, Supreme Court ruled that if the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If it is expropriated for a public street and the

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few years later, petitioners alleged that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held:

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

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The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. 33 Republic vs. CA By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Republic vs. CA 383 SCRA 611 (2002) Facts:

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-ininterest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order where the plaintiff has to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; However, the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. Issue: Whether the state has validly exercised its power of eminent domain. Held:

confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. However, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.[10] These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.[11] In determining public use, two approaches are utilized the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and thesecond is public advantage or benefit.[12] It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. However, the points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 34 Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada -jeff By Jefferson Pond Victoriano and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada Facts:

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The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.[7]Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely

Subject of this case is Lot No. 88, with an area of 1,017 square meters, located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter.

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

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The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport. Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal. Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of the Republic. The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport. From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex , while a portion thereof was occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88. In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. The specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. Aggrieved, petitioners (MCIAA) interposed an appeal to the CA. After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007. Issue: Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise settlement between them and the Government Holding: The petition is DENIED. Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to them. Reasoning: It is well settled that the taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the question of whether respondents were able to establish the existence of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase

Lot No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned, we rule in the affirmative. 35 EPZA vs Dulay By Kyrie Dea Maia and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete EPZA vs Dulay April 29, 1987 FACTS In 1979, the President issued a proclamation for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) in Lapulapu, Mactan City, Cebu. The area included four (4) parcels of land owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. EPZA offered to purchase the land but they failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.

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EPZA filed with the trial court of Cebu a complaint for expropriation pursuant to P.D. 66 which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. The trial court issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take immediate possession of the premises, issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation. The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. Three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. EZRA filed MFR on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. Trial court denied the MFR. ISSUE * Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533(**fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or the market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower) valid and constitutional? RULING P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. The prior P.Ds Nos. 76, 464, 794 having the same method of determining just compensation are also unconstitutional. SC: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the mentioned decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The doctrine enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the LapuLapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. 36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio By Marxzxz Yap in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete 36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio 360 scra 230 (2001) (Page 2, When should just compensation be fixed?) Facts: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato

CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

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. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision. Held: With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was also the property owner who brought the action for compensation against the government after 25 years since the taking of his property for the construction of a road. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: [W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., just not only to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay for it. 37 NPC vs. Ibrahim- Silos By Mitchai Silos in 1st yr 2nd Doc Delete NPC VS. IBRAHIM G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

an action against petitioner NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur. NAPOCOR contended that the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may be necessary for the same. It further contended that such easement did not involve any loss of title or possession. Another of the errors assigned by petitioner NAPOCOR is that assuming that it is liable to pay just compensation, it should be made to pay the value of the land from the time it constructed the tunnels. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for the acquisition of the easement over their land. 2. When should just compensation be fixed? RULING: 1. Yes. The manner in which the easement was created by NAPOCOR violated the due process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. Landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. 2. In the present case, to allow NAPOCOR to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their property. Secondly, the improvements introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an increase in the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could be reached. Policy: The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceeding.Such as in the case of: Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled that the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay) from which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements. Simply stated, the exception finds the application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated.

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Sem

CASE

DIGEST

POOL Edit

FACTS: Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents' (Ibrahim and his co-heirs) knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of the latters lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. Ibrahim thus instituted

38 Tan v. Rep 523 S 203 2007 By Ran Datukon in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete E. Just Compensation 1. When should just compensation be fixed? Tan vs. Republic 523 S 203 (2007) Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner herein, is the registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 7,161 square meters located at the southern bank of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City. Her ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 78188 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. She acquired this property from the San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) as shown by a document denominated Irrevocable and Exclusive Special Power of Attorney dated April 6, 2001, whereby she assumed SADCs obligation of paying all imposable taxes due said land. In consideration of such assumption and for value she stepped into the shoes of SADC free to exercise such rights and prerogatives as owner of the subject property, including the right to collect and demand payment for the sale and/or use of the subject land or any portion thereof, by and from any person or entity. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation, organized and existing pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 representing in this case the Republic of the Philippines, herein respondent. Among the properties PEA manages is the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road (Coastal Road), also known as the R-1 Expressway. Prior to the transfer of the property to petitioner by SADC, or on March 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter the latters property, then covered by TCT No. 439101, for the purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA also proposed to SADC to

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start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latters property. SADC replied authorizing PEA to enter the property, subject to the condition that the latter should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. PEA then directed its contractor, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, to enter the property and begin the necessary engineering works on the Coastal Road. PEA requested SADC either to donate or sell the property to the government. SADC replied by offering to sell the property to PEA. SADCs asking price was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house and other improvements thereon that were destroyed during the construction of the Coastal Road. PEA informed SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but only the 1,131 square meter portion above sea level. PEA then asked SADC to submit proofs of ownership and costs of the improvements which were demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the parties. However, for the past twenty (20) years, they failed to reach an agreement. On April 6, 2001, petitioner Julita Tan acquired the property from SADC. PEA has been collecting toll fees from the road users in the average amount of P1,039,404.85 per day, as shown by a document denominated Traffic Count of the Year 2002. Despite its collection of huge toll fees, PEA continuously refuses to pay petitioner any compensation. On October 20, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to order PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal valuation of the BIR. This was opposed by PEA. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. PEA timely filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order. PEA then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The CA decided in favor of PEA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; the CA denied the same. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the just compensation for petitioners property should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in 1985 when petitioner entered the subject property. Held: The SC ruled that the CA erred in ruling that PEAs taking of the property occurred in 1985 and that the compensation should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in that year. Section 9, Article III of the Constitution specifically mandates that Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In City of Manila v. Estrada, we held that compensation means an equivalent for the value of land (property) taken. The use of the word just is to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. Thus, Estrada defined just compensation as a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Then in Manila Railroad Co. v.Caligsahan, we held that to be exactly just, the compensation should be estimated at the time of the taking. Subsequently, in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. PEAs entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous owner, was not for the purpose of expropriating the property. Records show and as stressed by Mr. Justice Renato C. Dacudao of the CA in his Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA to enter the land on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a letter dated May 28, 1985, requested SADC to donate or sell the land to the government. On October 22, 1985, SADC responded, offering to sell the land to PEA for P1,288,980.00, plus P400,000.00 representing the value of the improvements destroyed by PEA when it entered the property. However, since 1985 up to the present, no agreement has been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner who acquired the property from the latter. While PEA has been earning huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for the use of her property in violation of her right as an owner. The above circumstances clearly show that when PEA entered petitioners land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of expropriating it. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed, there was no intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject property. It could have simply exercised its power of eminent domain. Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides, among others, that upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. It bears reiterating that in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent, through PEA, upon the filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter.

39 HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO By Sigrid G. Mier in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete 1. When should just compensation be fixed? HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO (Air Transportation Office) G.R. No. 162779 June 15, 2007 This is a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated August 20, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72404, which reversed the Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800. FACTS:

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Sometime in 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead provision of Act No. 2874[3] a parcel of land consisting of about 22 hectares situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued on the land, in the names of the Pidacanspouses. In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation Office or ATO) used a portion of the said property as an airport. Upon the death of the Pidacanspouses in 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The ATO also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airports runway. The spouses heirs namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for the use of the occupied premises. However, they were told that payment could not be made because the property was still in their parents name. With the loss of the owners copy of OCT No.2204, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri filed a petition for the issuance of another owners duplicate. On February 23, 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T7160 was issued in favor of the heirs. The heirs presented TCT No. T7160 and the death certificates of their parents to the ATO, but the latter still refused to pay them. The heirs claimed that they were entitled to payment of rentals plus the value of the property. The ATO countered that the heirs were not entitled to any payment, either of the value of the land or of the rentals because the property had been sold to its predecessor, the defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter. The ATO claimed that even if it failed to obtain title in its name, it had been declaring the property for taxation purposes. The heirs subsequently filed with the RTC a complaint against the ATO for payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for its use and occupation. The ATO, in turn, filed a complaint for expropriation, which was dismissed on the ground that it would be absurd for the ATO to expropriate a parcel of land it considered its own. On September 12, 1994, the trial court promulgated a Decision ordering the ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at P89 per square meter. The ATO appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in fixing the value of the property on the basis of its present value. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC Decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The appellate court also ruled that just compensation should be determined as of the time the property was taken for public use. After trial upon remand of the case to the court of origin, judgment was rendered anew as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Expropriating the actual area occupied by the defendant Air Transportation Office of the plaintiffs property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling Two Hundred Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Seven (215,737) square meters, in favor of defendant; 2. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs the amount of Three Hundred Four ((P304.00) Pesos per square meter for the area herein expropriated which totals to Sixty Five Million Five Hundred Eight (sic) Four Thousand Forty Eight (P65,584,048.00) Pesos with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from February 1, 2001, until the same is fully paid. 3. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the subject property cited in item No. 1 above, computed as follows: Three Thousand Fifty Eight Pesos and Forty Centavos (P3,058.40) from 1957 to 1977; Four Thousand Twenty Two Pesos and Sixty five Centavos (P4,022.60) from 1978 to 1979; Six Thousand Thirty Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P6,034.50) from 1980 to 1984; Nine Thousand Six Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P9,699.60) from 1985 to 1991; Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred thirteen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P17,913.60) from 1992 to 1994;

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Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred Eighty One Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P37,181.80) from 1995 to 1997; Fifty Four Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Eight Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P54,658.60) from 1998 to January 31, 2001; or a total monthly rentals, from January 1, 1957 to January 31, 2001, of Six Million Two hundred Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five Pesos and Forty Centavos (P6,249,645.40) with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, until the same is fully paid; 4. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs ten (10%) per cent of the amount involved as and for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and 5. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay the costs of suit. The ATO once again appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in its assailed Decision reversed the trial courts ruling. The heirs moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Aggrieved, the heirs filed the instant petition. ISSUE: When should just compensation be fixed? HELD: In the instant case, it is necessary to resolve the issues concerning the taking of the subject property, the time when the taking took place and the appropriate value of just compensation.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners private property was converted into an airport by respondent ATO. As a consequence, petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept of expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed on petitioners private land. As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking. In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using petitioners property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners. In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As for the fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount arrived at by the commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39 per square meter, constitutes just compensation to petitioners. However, the trial courts award of rental payments to petitioners is not supported by evidence on record and must be deleted. To justify such award, the purported contract of lease must first be proven by competent evidence. Lastly, the interest accruing fixed by the trial court at the rate of 12% per annum is not consistent with law and should be reduced to the legal interest rate of 6% per annum. PETITION IS GRANTED. The Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows: 1. The actual area occupied by respondent ATO covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling 215,737 square meters is declared expropriated in favor of the ATO. 2. The ATO is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P304.39 per square meter for the area expropriated, or a total of P65,668,185.43 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from February 1, 2001, until the same is fully paid. 40-Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines By Mae Bungabong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines September 7, 2000 Facts:

Land Bank released a preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 in cash and bond. Leaving the balance of to P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with RA 6657. The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated December 17, 1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court on December 4, 1997 and a notice of garnishment was served on the Land Bank on December 17, 1997. On December 22, 1997, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order declaring that the Land Bank had complied with the writ of execution and ordered the same to release the amount of P44,749,947.82 to petitioner and the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment. The Land Bank remitted the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court on December 24, 1997 and released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court, praying that the payment of the compensation be in proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the amounts in the Decision representing the interest payments. Before the motion could be resolved by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion for release of the balance of the garnished amount. He claimed that the payment of P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank Bonds was not acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash or certified check. The respondent Land Bank, on the other hand, opposed the motion, contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied on December 24, 1997. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank moved for a reconsideration of the said Order, maintaining that the payment was properly made in Land Bank Bonds. On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to hold the Land Bank in contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount in cash or certified check. Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge, resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it ruled that: To summarize, the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount of P49,241,876.00. The Order of March 20, 1997 as well as that of December 22, 1997 should be reconsidered. It goes without saying that the payment of just compensation must be made in accordance with Sec. 18, Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure The Court finds no merit in the motion to cite in contempt of court the Land Bank of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the [p]laintiff the [c]ash [b]alance of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND EIGHTY-FOUR and 37/100 (P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16) PESOS in government instruments or bonds to fully satisfy the Judgment herein in the amount of forty-nine million two hundred forty one thousand eight hundred seventy six (P49,241,876.00) pesos, Philippine currency as just compensation due the plaintiff. Petitioner appealed to CA: The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the trial court. The appellate court opined that the Order merely ascertained the mode of compensation for petitioner's expropriated properties, as decreed in the final judgment, and was issued pursuant to the court a quo's general supervisory control over the process of execution. Thus, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review of Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was proper. Held/Ruling: It is proper thus; there is no merit for this petition. All told, we hold that the appellate court was correct in sustaining the propriety and the efficacy of the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno. In the exercise of her supervisory powers over the execution of a final and executory judgment,[i][14] such as her August 12, 1997 Decision, special circumstances attending its execution impelled her to issue the Order clarifying the terms thereof. Reasoning: The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment.

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Edgardo Santos who is the plaintiff Trial Court, sitting as an Agrarian Court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206 for the determination of just compensation regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. The Court rendered its decision for such case fixing the amount of P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares, respectively, and situated at Pinit, Ocampo, Camarines Sur which are portions of the agricultural lands. And ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the plaintiff the amount of FORTY-FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINE-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE AND 34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS, Philippine currency, in the manner provided by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the said just compensation.

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The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated compensation to the petitioner "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657."[ii][9] There is certitude with regard to this assertion. The confusion in the present case, which required the issuance of the assailed Order, arose from petitioner's belief that the Land Bank had obligated itself to pay in cash the compensation due him. This fact can allegedly be gleaned from its compliance with the December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and December 19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment[iii][11] ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform.[iv][12] Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment. Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with RA 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the requiredproportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39. We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in cash; after all, his compensation was long overdue. However, we cannot grant his Petition because it is not sustained by the law. In this regard, we recall the Court's explanation in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:"It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the specter of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today." Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are 'negotiable at any time.' The other modes, which are likewise available to be landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. 41. Reyes vs. NHA By Alexand Rhea Villahermosa in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete 41. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority ( NHA ), Villahermosa Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filedcomplaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it

entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose. Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. 42 Republic vs CA By Shiela Basadre in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land in Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. This property was previously occupied by lessee, "Voice of America" and now occupied by Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. Out of the total area of 544,980 square meters, 76,589 square meters are owned by Luis Santos, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings,an order was issued by the court:

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for the condemnation of the whole property consisting of 544,980 square meters; for the payment to defendants just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid; In 1984, or more than five years after the decision of the court, the respondents did not receive payment for just compensation which lead them to file a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. The Bulacan RTC ordered for the payment of the said property amounting to P1,058,655.05 but this was not complied with and so the respondents filed an action directed to the provincial treasurer of Bulacan for release P72,683.55, representing the share of the deposit made by petitioner in 1969. This was granted by the trial court. Despite the 1984 court order, no payment was received by the Santos heirs and no action was taken on their case. On 16 September 1999 the petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court but the Santos heirs, opposed the manifestation and motion. They submitted a counter-motion: to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative

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to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, The decision of 26 February 1979 was declared to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription. The RTC ordered the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs. ISSUE: W/N the unpaid landowners are allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the expropriated property. RULING: No. Unpaid landowners are not allowed to recover the expropriated property as an alternative remedy. In the case of Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be In the case of Alfonso vs. Pasay City, the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State. Respondents can only claim just compensation. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.[25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[26] In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[29] Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. Private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. 43. Republic v. Lim By Aziraphale Zheng in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL Edit Doc Delete From Philamie Soria September 5, 1938- the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the CFI of Cebu involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered under Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia Denzon respectively. October 19, 1938- Republic took possession of the lots after depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank. May 14, 1940- the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. April 5, 1948- An entry of judgment was made In 1950- Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it

denied knowledge of the matter. The claim on the said lot by another heir, Nestor Belocura was likewise denied September 20, 1961- the Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. Valdehueza and Panerio were issued the titles with the annotation subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value. July 31, 1962- The successors in interests claim were favored by the court declaring them as the owners because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The records do not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-ininterest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money. It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained. However, because of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. Valdehueza and Panerio appealed the decision but the Supreme Court held that the properties could no longer be recovered. Although they remained the registered owners because of the Republics failure to pay the compensation, the remedy left is to demand payment of the fair market value. Can such payment still be made and, if so, in what amount? The payment of just compensation is no longer proper at this point. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact the annotations contained the right of the National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market value of the same. 1964- Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. A new TCT was issued in Lims name. August 20, 1992- respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the Republic. RTC- declared plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. CA- sustained the decision of the RTC ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefore pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early asMay 14, 1940 HELD: One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of hisprivate property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,of our Constitution mandates: " Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation. The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings was entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

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CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

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It is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of the two lots in question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation. Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner. Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institutes. And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments of military personnel. Respondent is entitled to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

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CONSTI II Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as

1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest 2011-2012