Legal Ethics Digests: Block C 2012

LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS
INTRO 1. 2. 3. 4. Banogan v. Zerna Ledesma v. Climaco Cui v. Cui Alawi v. Alauya
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Raquel G. Kho Chua v. Mesina Soriano v. Dizon Stemmerik v. Mas De Ysasi III v. NLRC Cordon v. Balicanta
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 1. 2. 3. 4. In re Tagorda Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo Canoy v. Ortiz Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 4 A lawyer shall participate in development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice. CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve highest standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties. 1. 2. 3. 4. Suarez v. Platon Ramos v. Imbang Catu v. Rellosa PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support t he activities of the integrated bar. 1. 2. 3. 4. In re Galang In re Arthur M. Cuevas Samaniego v. Ferrer Arnobit v. Arnobit 5. St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz 6. Advincula v. Macabata
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CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reyes v. Chiong Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro Alcantara v. Pefianco Camacho v. Pagulayan Torres v. Javier Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. Cayetano v. Monsod Cambaliza v. Cristobal-Tenorio Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR Aguirre v. Rama Judge Laquindanum v. Quintana
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon Rivera v. Corral Johnny Ng v. Alar Fudot v. Cattleya Land Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Berbano v. Barcelona Sebastian v. Bajar Hegna v. Paderanga Plus Builders v. Revilla Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. 1. Foodsphere v. Mauricio 2. Suspension of Atty. Bagubayao CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. 1. Hilado v. David 2. Nakpil v. Valdes 3. Hornilla v. Salunat

4. 5. 6. 7. Northwestern University v. Arquillo Quiambao v. Bamba Heirs of Falame v. Baguio Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Licuanan v. Melo Posidio v. Vitan Lemoine v. Balon Re: Atty. Maquera Reddi v. Sersbio De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence in him. CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Hernandez v. Go PANELCO v. Montemayor Sps. Adecer v. Akut Belleza v. Macasa Overgaard v. Valdez Angalan v. Delante Santon-Tan v. Robino Somosot v. Lara
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law. 1. Briones v. Jimenez 2. Pena v. Aparicio
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS INTRO

BANOGAN V. ZERNA FACTS The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was held, had operated against the petitioners. The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran where it was held: ... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied). A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense. ISSUE HELD YES. This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike that itigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the
W/N petitioners are already barred by laches.

judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

CUI V. CUI FACTS The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation) Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the convenio or of his brothers assumption of the position. Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of Jesus. ISSUE HELD Antonio should be the Hospicios administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio. The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education. The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset. Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

ALAWI V. ALAUYA FACTS Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. ISSUE HELD He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANON 1

RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO

CHUA V. MESINA FACTS Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building (Burgos Property) owned by Mesinas family, and another property (Melencio Property), also owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses constructed their house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq. m. The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00. After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to settle it within two years. Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio property. Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated. Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs. Mesina. Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio property for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio, the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986 alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and difference with herein complainants and their corespondents and he had no sufficient evidence against them. Some years later, Mesina approached the Chua spouses and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a written undertaking dated May 2, 1990. In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part of 1991. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio property was being offered for sale to
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the public. The spouses Chua and complainant Marcelina Hsia thus filed a complaint against Mesina for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Reconveyance of Real Property. ISSUE Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct? HELD This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating. Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty. Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed dishonesty. As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. In fine, respondent violated his oath of office and, more specifically, Canon 1, Rules. 1.01 and Rules 1.02.

SORIANO V. DIZON FACT A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have: a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor; b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident; c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery); d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty); e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?); f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!) ISSUE/S (1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude (2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment? HELD (1) Yes. Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer. (2) Yes. His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!) Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

DE YSASI III V. NLRC FACTS Petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there. Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. His recuperation lasted over four months. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984. During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon. ISSUES (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. HELD: The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients. In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

CORDON V. BALICANTA
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANONS 2 & 3

IN RE TAGORDA

ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO FACTS A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isnt served in any way by the prohibition. ISSUE HELD Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyers name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazineetc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar. Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

CANOY V. ORTIZ

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANONS 4, 5 & 6

SUAREZ V. PLATON

RAMOS V. IMBANG FACTS In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only. The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). HELD Attorney Imbang is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides: Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function. Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 14. xxx The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.

CATU V. RELLOSA FACTS Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner brought the case to court. Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of impropriety. IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa violated Rule 6.031 and RA 67132. The committee recommended Rellosas suspension from practice for 1 month. ISSUE W/N Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 HELD No. Rule 6.03 applies only to a lawyer who has left government service. Rellosa was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. As such incumbent, the proper law that governs him is RA 71603, which actually allows him to practice his profession. However, being a public official, he is also governed by Revised Civil Service Rules, which requires him first to obtain a written permission from his department head who is the Sec. of DILG. This he failed to do. SC ruled that Rellosa violated the lawyers oath (to uphold and obey law), Rule 1.01 (lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), and Canon 7 (lawyer shall uphold integrity and dignity of the profession), for a lawyer who disobeys law disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. SC punished Rellosa with 6 months suspension and strongly advised him to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. __________ Hofilena question: under RA 6713, are lawyers allowed to practice their profession? Answer: Yes, RA 6713 says if the constitution or law allows it Public officers however are subject to Civil Service Rules which state that should they engage in private practice of their profession, they should first secure a written permission from their department head.
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in service 2 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees 3 Local Government Code of 1991

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation. After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUE W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza? HELD NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03. The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al. The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect. It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides' carries the

danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As aforediscussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.

IN RE GALANG

IN RE ARTHUR M. CUEVAS FACTS Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was precluded from taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the Supreme Court This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a result of hazing. Cuevas was charged with Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May 1995 May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and attached to his petition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character. ISSUE May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character? HELD Yes. Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.

SAMANIEGO V. FERRER

ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT FACTS Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary power over him. Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they bore 12 children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was impelled to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery. Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he caused the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Report: The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. It averred that an indefinite suspension is not recommended because respondent supports himself through the practice of law and that it would be cruel deny him of this at this time when he is already advanced in age. HELD The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for

any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of his license. Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges against him, irresistibly suggesting that they are true. Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should therefore be disbarred.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERISTY ETC V. DELA CRUZ

ADVINCULA V. MACABATA FACTS Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty. Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents occurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved in. in both incidents, Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her off in a public street. Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2 nd kissing incident. Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this was due to his feelings toward Advincula. ISSUE Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment? HELD The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character. Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral. Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her. While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful. (The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)

REYES V. CHIONG FACTS Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually, Xu discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes, who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty. Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for the dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty. Reyes then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit, alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC referred the case to the IBP. ISSUE W/N the civil complaint was groundless W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the civil complaint HELD Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint. IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they were not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was improper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension SC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some alternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true. Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of Salangas decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case was also available if it was indeed filed without basis. Relevant Provisions: Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.

DALLONG-GALICIANO V. CASTRO

ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN FACTS AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics HELD YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics. In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel. Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar. *In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

TORRES V. JAVIER

LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO FACTS Tolentino, with the help of Labiano, was pirating the clients of Labiano by offering, in some instances, a 50K loan. ISSUE Is it an encroachment on the professional practice of Labiano, thereby violating rule 8.02 which provides that, A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer,? HELD Yes. Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees for his service. In this case, promise of a loan.

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

CAYETANO V. MONSOD FACTS Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Aquino for the position of COMELEC Chairman in 1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on the ground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Despite Cayetanos opposition, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsods nomination. ISSUE Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson? HELD YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of Monsods employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. His job involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank and a business conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant and he also worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in election law. Also, he sat as a member of the Davide Commission in 1990. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. PADILLA, J., dissenting: There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law."

1. Habituality 2. Compensation 3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law. 4. Attorney-client relationship. CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO FACTS Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a prior existing marriage Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libellous affidavits against a Makati City counselor. Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a senior partner in her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office letterhead which included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an atty, 3) appearance in court as counsel. HELD Guilty of malpractice. Violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law Rule 9.01: a lawyer shall not delated to any unqualified person the performance of a task that may only be performed by members of the bar in good standing Even though Cabliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through with the investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding. There is no private interest affected such that desistance of the complainant will terminate the proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from those unfit to practice law.

AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION V. CIR FACTS This case involves a controversy over Attorneys Fees for legal services in the CIR. On 1956, Arceo + 47 other members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged a complaint agains Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM) for unfair labor practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act. On Nov 1962, the CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers and it became final on March 1963. On June 1963, the CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute the backwages of the complainant workers Atty. Fernandez filed a Notice of Atty.s lien amounting to 25% of their money claim (PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyes requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%. Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.s Fees shall be divided equally by him, Atty. Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNIONs president. There are other matters in this case regarding Jurisdiction but the one related to Legal Ethics is on the issue on Atty.s Fees ISSUE W/N IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY SHARE IN THE ATTORNEYS FEES. HELD NO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement that the UNION President should share in the Atty.s Fees. The UNION President is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.s Fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. RULE 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except: a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement;or b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement

AGUIRRE V. RAMA FACTS Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar, charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning mayoralty candidate. On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate). The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. OBCs Report and Recommendation The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. Respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Such unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. HELD Respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of law and was thus denied admission to the Philippine bar. 1. SC agreed with the finding of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar. - Respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and signed as counsel in the pleadings - was also retained as counsel of mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and of party REFORMA LM-PPC *all these took place before Respondent took his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys 2. What constitutes the practice of law - The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts - all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal

instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. - any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. - perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. - render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. * respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. 3. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. - limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. - A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. - although respondent passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.

JUDGE LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANONS 10 & 11

FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON FACTS This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty. Villalon. It started from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the case against Fernandez. In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to help him in a case against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the help of Fernandez. In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in buying Palacios Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who allegedly had a Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of Donation was registered. Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed against Fernandez. However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in taxes. In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation. Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining Atty. Villalons argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no duty to include the fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only the clients operative facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the complaint. The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely point out during the trial. Fernandez appealed the case. ISSUE W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. HELD None. Case against Villalon is dismissed. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings. However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her clients opponent. She (Villalon) is not duty bound to build the case for her clients opponent, Fernandez. The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. Client Palacios informed her that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration. Also, it was not registered and was not the basis of the transfer of title of Palacios property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is not a necessary evidence/fact to their case.

RIVERA V. CORRAL

JOHNNY NG V. ALAR FACTS The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng Company against its employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive their service incentive leave pay from their employers due to the latters claim that the employees conducted a strike at the Companys premises which hampered its ingress and egress. The case was referred to the labor arbiter and the latter found that the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the labor arbiters decision. In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to support his complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim involved in the case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute grave abuse of discretion. Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the latter violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language against an opposing counsel and before the courts. In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the canons found in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to in the rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondents counter-complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the lawyers of the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when they filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action and when they deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case. The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the complainant did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a similar conduct will be committed again. ISSUE W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration. However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant, the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit: The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.

FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND FACTS De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the ponente of the decision, received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out 10M to JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna said that Justice Tinga abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also said that the case was prioritized for resolution and that Mr. Chan had prior knowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision was promulgated. However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling their case with Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. However, he denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme Court ISSUE W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt. HELD Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt. Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but such conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice has also been considered to constitute indirect contempt. A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary to his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public's trust in, the judicial system. This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the court. It is a long recognized and respected right of a lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear the badges of falsehood while the common version of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the hallmarks of truth. De La Serna's declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it.

BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN FACTS There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private prosecutors representing the government were repeatedly absent or unprepared. This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private prosecutor was unhappy with the dismissal and accused the judge of favoritism and gross ignorance of the law. The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and through him filed a case against the judge. this subsequent reached the supreme court. HELD The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer was found to be the one behind the case (against the judge) not the congressman. The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a stern warning as well as fined for 2500php by the court. Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the justice system (ie office of the court administrator / IBP) not with your congressman or other non-judicial people.

BERBANO V. BARCELONA
FACTS Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty-in-fact for their pending casevwith the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K, he will cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking from relatives who were with her. There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and Atty. Barcelona regarding the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a pay-to-cash check for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona to give him P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by Atty. Daens nephew while Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty. Daens because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to return the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors adopted the Commissioners findings but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for 6 years. ISSUE HELD Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Berbanos Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence, the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment. Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16 (Rule 16.01). Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of the Court (to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty. Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty. Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.). Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections (related to Canon 12). W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred

SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR FACTS Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the DAR who represented Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of a land owned by Sebastians spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. RTC dismissed this due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar again filed another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DAR Adjudication Board which raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics. The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the complaint lodged against her. After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally submitted her Comment which was alleged to not confront the issues raised against her. The Court required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and was later ordered to show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for such failure. The Court referred the case to the IBP for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that Bajar be SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of law. However, Bajar continued to practice law despite the decision claiming that she did not receive a copy of the order. ISSUE HELD YES. Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that an important factor in determining the existence of forumshopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[72] Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice. It is evident from the records that respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in theEjectment case. In this case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Whether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HEGNA V. PADERANGA FACTS Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the Baclayon spouses for 10 years but during this period the Panaguinip spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation, stealth and strategy (FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed a shop for which he filed a forcible entry case. Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory damages for illegal occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of the spouses they sent a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable settlement which he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001 which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff. Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar confidant for deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a possible denial of justice. He also filed criminal charges against Atty. Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for falsification of public documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony and perjury. His grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didnt reflect any change of ownership & (3) the Notarial Register Book showed tampering and erasures. The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of prima facie evidence of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty. Paderangas defense alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner and that he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to correct mistakes so that entries will speak the truth. The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was improper in light of the letter handwritten by Respondents clients, written in Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership of properties. In addition, there were several instances where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offering settlement and it was only when he denied them that he received the Third Party Complaint. ISSUE HELD Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly which constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility so given 1 year suspension. His nonregistration of the sale transaction so it would not appear in the records of the BIR, the City Assessor or the Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that he would not pay for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell; or place them in his childrens name, and avoid paying estate and inheritance taxes upon his death. Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire the property of his client which is in litigation. violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The act of non-registration of
W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle to Atty. Paderanga?

the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar for others to emulate.

PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA FACTS In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondents clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainants rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients lost cause, respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary eviction by the complainant. He posited that he was only being protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono. HELD It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts complained of were committed out of his overzealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in

mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.

FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ FACT Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal. Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the day before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension. 30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for Extension, this time, because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days extension. 20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse that because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more time to conclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!) Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the resolution denying the appeal all together. However, instead of informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment. ISSUE Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct, tantamount to violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his disbarment? HELD Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment. The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption that each motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of informing himself of the Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to salvage the appeal. Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that his motion for extension of time will be granted. Motions for extension of time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame. A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should inform the client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study the situation and work out a solution. To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the time he received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of the same. He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that respondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing complainant of the status of the case.
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANONS 13 and 14

FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO FACTS Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr. Cordero bought canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver spread canned good. When Mr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the canned good was infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence of the parasites. BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos, where the latter demanded P150k. Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos threatening to bring up the matter to the media. Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid he was involved with, which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened to publish it if they didnt pay the amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a Kasunduan between the two, where Foodsphere agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that Foodsphere advertise in Mauricios tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint. The Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD dismissed the complaint against Foodsphere. Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an Advertising Contract asking the latter advertisements of various media (which were a lotand expensive!) owned by Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill, Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to proceed with the publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show (Batas ng Bayan) held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its liver spread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same topic. Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the discrediting remarks that he has been making against the company. Foodsphere also filed the present administrative complaint against Mauricio to the IBP, where he was ordered not to make any more statements on the matter. Notwithstanding the pending cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against Foodsphere and discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension. ISSUE/S W/N Mauricios suspension was valid. HELD YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years. Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of Rule 13.02 Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBPs orders that he discontinue with his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere and its products. This is a clear and conscious violation the Code of Professional Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of the bar. NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.

SUSPENSION OF ATTY. BAGUBAYAO FACTS Administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5144: People v. Luis Plaza. Plaza was accused of murdering a policeman. Criminal case was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Buyser. Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that evidence presented was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide but not murder. Counsel for Plaza filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail, but Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo (who was in charge of the case) objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder was not subject to bail (Rules of Court). Judge Buyser inhibited himself from trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail. Case was transferred to Judge Tan, who fixed the amount of bail at P40k. Instead of availing of judicial remediess, Bagabuyo caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting the bail in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out. In the article, Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is non-bailable, but admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak. He claims that the former judge found the evidence to be strong. He stated that he was not afraid to be cited for contempt because it was the only way for the public to know that there are judges displaying judicial arrogance. RTC directed Bagabuyo (and the writer of the article) to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court with its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentations. Bagabuyo refused to explain and the RTC held him in contempt of court, sentencing him to 30 days in jail (he posted a bail bond and was released). Despite this, Bagabuyo presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS and again, attacked the integrity of Judge Tan. In the radio interview, Bagabuyo called Judge Tan a liar, ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law. RTC required Bagabuyo to explain and show cause why he should not be held in contempt and be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 11.05 and Rule 13.02). Bagabuyo denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed. He said that he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order. He justified his response to the interview (at the instance of his friend) as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was made without malice. RTC found his denials lame, held him in contempt, and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the case was transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant, which recommended the implementation of the RTCs order of suspension. ISSUE W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility YES HELD Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of the law. Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities.

Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press conference and submitted to a radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge Tan. Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article, which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.

HILADO V. DAVID FACTS - Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house & lot between Assad and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese occupation - Assads counsel is Atty. Francisco - Mrs. Hilados counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo - Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because Mrs. Hilado consulted her about the case and even turned over some documents to Atty. Francisco - Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado regarding the same case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent Mrs. Hilado in the case and he thinks that the action against Assad will not prosper - Mrs. Hilados counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco - Atty. Franciscos version of the story: o Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he refused to become her counsel because he thinks that the action will not prosper o Days later, Atty. Franciscos assistant, Atty. Agrava, informed him that Mrs. Hilado left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco instructed Atty. Agrava to return the expediente because they will not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado o Later, the firms stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter allegedly dictated by Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why they refuse to take the case o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Franciscos office. Afterwards, Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer fee - Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco other than those in plaintiffs complaint and there was no attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motion to disqualify is denied. ISSUE Hilado HELD Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado was to obtain Atty. Franciscos personal service as a lawyer - Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the purpose is to obtain professional advice or assistance and the attorney permits, then an attorneyclient relationship is established - Formality is not essential - Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorney-client relationship which precludes accepting opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what type of information was received - Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance to administration of justice - Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still considered as professional service, besides an information imparted to a member of a firm is made available to the entire firm - Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assads counsel Ratio: Rule 15.02 a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client
W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs.

NAKPIL V. VALDES FACTS Valdes is Jose Nakpils accountant, consultant and lawyer. Nakpil got interested in the purchase of a summer residence in Baguio but due to lack of funds, he asked Valdes to buy it for him and hold it in trust. Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the title issued in his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses estate. And, Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate. Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in Joses inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were charged under his name. The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes family realty corp. Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also, handled the claims of Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC. ISSUE w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the code of professional ethics HELD Yes. The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is. Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and probable adverse outcome. The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against for the other side. The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he was absent for quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case. The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist. Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing requirement for the practice of law. A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal profession.

HORNILLA V. SALUNAT FACTS Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real properties of PPSTA corporation. Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of Directors. Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest. ISSUE Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? HELD No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting interest and is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal party. The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO FACTS Northwestern University filed an administrative case against Atty. Arquillo for representing conflicting interests in a NLRC case. The complaint alleges that Atty. Arquillo appeared as counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent (Castro) in the labor case. Atty. Arquillo, as a defense, contended that the petitioners and respondent he represented in the labor case belonged to the same side as the latter party was absolved from liability. Hence, there was no conflict of interests. ISSUE HELD YES. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the respondents. W/N Atty. Arquillo represented conflicting interests.

QUIAMBAO V. BAMBA

HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO FACTS Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the services of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty. Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact; and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case. Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in the said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996. However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage. Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they were impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio. The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the dismissal of this case. ISSUE HELD Yes, he violated the rule. Rule 15.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest that which his duty another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The clients confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment. The protection given to a client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it is immaterial whether such employment was paid, promised or charged for. As defense counsel in the first civil case respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the inconsistent
W/N Atty. Baguio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondents rights as co-owner. The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydios death or through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to the of Lydio. And while plaintiffs have never been respondents clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydios ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.

PACANA V. PASCUAL-LOPEZ FACTS Pacana was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. Pacana earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to Precedent. Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed but it didnt push through. After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from Lopez asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about. Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued sending her money for the case. Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows: Dear Butchie, Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer. -----------I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. ----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ---Candy When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him. Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred her. ISSUE Whether or not Lopez had violated Rule 15.03 on representing conflicting interests. HELD

Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest. Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel.

LICUANAN V. MELO

POSIDIO V. VITAN FACTS Posidio engaged the services of Vitan in a Testate Proceeding of the deceased Nicolasa Arroyo to which she paid Php 20,000.00 as legal fees. However, Vitan withdrew his appearance in the said case thus, Posidio had to engage the services of another lawyer. Six years after, Vitan contacted Posidio and told her that he has with some tax declarations and other documents purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa Arroyo, but was not included in the inventory of properties for distribution. He convinced complainant to file another case to recover her share in the alleged undeclared properties and demanded P100,000.00 as legal fees. After several months, however, respondent failed to institute any action. Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondent refused despite repeated demands. The lower court ruled in favor of Posidio and ordered Vitan to return the Php 100,000.00 and pay an additional Php 20,000.00 as interest and damages. In compliance, Vitan issued a Prudential Bank check that was dishonored later on. Despite being sent a notice of dishonor and the repeated demands to pay, Vitan refused to honor his obligation. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report finding Vitan guilty of violating the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in defrauding his client and issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same. The IBP penalized Vitan with a reprimand with stern warning that a similar misconduct will warrant a more severe penalty. ISSUE HELD The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. However, they find that the penalty of reprimand is not commensurate to the gravity of wrong committed by Vitan. In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P100,000.00 as legal fees for filing additional claims against the estate of Nicolasa S. de Guzman Arroyo. However, he failed to institute an action, thus it was imperative that he immediately return the amount to complainant upon demand. Having received payment for services which were not rendered, respondent was unjustified in keeping complainants money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite complainants repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay any man for money and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand. The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Whether or not Vitan should be penalized?

LEMOINE V. BALON FACTS Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance. His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balons services as his counsel Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee. Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon. Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies. Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine, however, he gave no evidence to such turnover ISSUE W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD YES. According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21. Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount to Lemoine. It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when demanded upon him. Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the fund. The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule 16.03, presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees, but rather he can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case, Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon. It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%.

SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and ordered disbarred.

RE: ATTY. MAQUERA

REDDI V. SERSBIO

DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO V. LUMASAG

WILSON CHARM V. PATTA-MOYA

JERRY T. WONG V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II FACTS Jerry Wong as owner of a business selling agricultural and veterinary products retained the services of Atty. Moya for the purpose of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Sometimes also, Atty. Moya handled personal cases of Wong and his wife. Later, Atty. Moya asked financial help from Wong for the construction of his house and the purchase of a car. Wong purchased a car on installment basis for Atty. Moya. Wong issued postdated checks to cover the payment of the car while Atty. Moya issued checks in favor of Wong to reimburse him for purchasing the car. The checks issued by Wong were encashed by Transfarm (car seller) however, the checks issued by Atty. Moya in favor of Wong were dishonored for the reason account closed. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Moya refused to replace the dishonored checks. Atty. Moya also introduced Wong to Quirino Tomlin from whom the construction materials for his house was obtained. He bought this on credit but Atty. Moya filed to pay this indebtedness causing embarrassment to Wong. Atty. Moya also handled a case of the Wong spouses against Berting Diwa. Judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses and as satisfaction of the judgment, Diwa paid P15, 680.50. Atty. Moya as the counsel of the spouses received the payment but did not inform them. The Wongs only found out about the payment of money when they got hold of the Manifestation with Prayer to Terminate Proceedings. The IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Moya to file his answer to the complaint for disbarment filed by Wong. Atty. Moya filed 3motions for extensions (after the 1 st motion was granted and the time had elapsed, he filed another one and so on and so forth). Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Dismiss. The IBP-CBD denied the motion to dismiss and required him to file an answer. Atty. Moya filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. He then filed for an extension to file his answer which was granted but with a warning that no further extension requests will be entertained. When the time to elapse was near he filed a Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File Answer but the IBP-CBD did not accept this hence he was declared in default after failing to file his answer. The IBP-CBD ordered both parties to file their position papers because a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in 2years from the date of the professional misconduct which in this case occurred in 2002 and that it was already 2005. Atty. Moya did not file any pleadings at all. The IBP recommended that Atty. Moya be suspended for 1year. The IBP Board of Governors modified this and suspended Atty. Moya for 2years. ISSUE Whether or not the suspension of 2years is justifiable? HELD Yes! 1) Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks. He did not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct. 2) The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial conditions. He should not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial reverses he should have explained this with particularity and not though generalized and unsubstantiated allegations.

3) Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that the same had already been transmitted to the complainant. 4) His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. 5) It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. 6) As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year suspension. However, in this case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings.
LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS CANONS 17 and 18

HERNANDEZ V. GO FACTS Sometime in 1961, Hernandezs husband abandoned her and her son Shortly thereafter, creditors of Hernandez s husband demanded payment of his loans Hernandez, fearful of mortgage foreclosures and aware of a impending claim suit, engaged the legal services of Atty. Go Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors Also, Atty. Go persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged to creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said lots Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as agreed upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth millions Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years ISSUE HELD YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17 Atty. Go violated Canon 16 His acts acquiring for himself Hernandezs lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the honor of the legal profession Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell the same Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light Atty. Go was ordered disbarred. W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

PANELCO V. MONTEMAYOR

SPS. ADECER V. AKUT

BELLEZA V. MACASA FACTS On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000. The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt. On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court. Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense. Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer. Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did. HELD Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa is disbarred Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such undertaking imposed upon him the following duties: CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx xxx xxx CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied. A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his client with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the

prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest. A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.19 If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case. The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer: The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation. In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.

OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ FACTS Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez. They entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus case) and 2 cases filed against him (Other Light threats and violation of the Anti-Violation against women and their children act). Overgaard sent $16, 854 to Atty. Valdez via telegraphic bank transfer. 4 months after, Overgaard demanded for a report on the status of his cases. In spite of many phone calls and emails, Valdez couldnt be reached. Hence, Overgaard inquired on his own, and discovered that Valdez didnt file his entry of appearance in any of the cases, that a counteraffidavit was required from him, and that the criminal cases against him have already been arraigned and warrants were issued for his arrest. He was constrained to find a new lawyer. Overgaard then wrote again and tried to locate Valdez to demand the return of documents entrusted to the latter, as well as the $16K payment. No word was heard from Valdez. Overgaard filed a case with the IBP for Valdezs dismissal for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The IBP required Valdez to file an answer, but he did not comply. He also failed to attend the hearing and was declared in default. Later, a clarificatory hearing was set, but Valdez never showed. IBP found him guilty of violating canons 1, 15, 16, 17, and 18 and his penalty was a 3-year suspension and he was ordered to return Overgaards money. HELD SC agrees with the findings of IBP, but declared that Valdez be disbarred for falling below the standards required of lawyers. Canon 18 provides that a lawyer must serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 requires a lawyer to not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence will make him liable. Valdez should indeed be liable because he was not just incompetent, he was useless; not just negligent, he was indolent; and rather than helping his client, he prejudiced him. He abandoned his client and left him without any recourse. It was a clear evasion of duty. Also, his failure to act on the disbarment case against him, without any explanation, is a clear evidence of negligence on his part. Rule 18.04 requires that a lawyer keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within reasonable time to the clients request for information. Despite Overgaards efforts, Valdez avoided his client and never bothered to reply. Clearly, the rule was violated.

ANGALAN V. DELANTE
FACTS This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the Samal Tribe against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility particularly Canons 16 and 17. The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971, Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to the Spouses Eustaquio. When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his name. Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of recovering their property. Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property. Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the amicable settlement, the complainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as repurchase price which the spouses accepted. However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the property. Respondent Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid. When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover the property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that respondent transferred the title of the property to his name. Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared void, (2) title issued in the name of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent be made to pay damages. As defense, respondent alleges that: 1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without any intention to pay him back or at least offer an explanation as to how they would be able to repay him 2. That the couple did not really engage his services as counsel for an annulment suit against Navarro Eustaquio 3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was a valid sale and not a mortgage 4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delantes former client who is now residing in New York. But after 11 years, the buyer did not return to the Philippines anymore so he authorized Atty. Delante to have the property in his name upon refund of the purchase price. Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Court charging respondent with gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag of the IBP found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of governors approved but increased the penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year. ISSUE Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their knowledge, consent and against their will? HELD YES. The Court is not impressed with Atty. Delantes defenses. Angalan and complainants went to respondents office not to seek advice about borrowing money but to engage his services for the purpose of recovering their property. First, after Angalan and complainants went to respondents office, respondent filed a complaint with the CFI praying that the Spouses Eustaquio reconvey the property to Angalan and complainants. Second, in the complaint, respondent stated that, "by reason of unwarranted refusal on the part of the defendants to reconvey the property to plaintiffs, the latter have been constrained to engage, and in fact have engaged, the services of counsel." Third, respondent issued a receipt to complainants stating that he "RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 88 | B l o c k C 2 0 1 2 Justice Hofilena

PESOS (P1,200.00) representing full payment of professional services in regard to the recovery of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan (Samal)." Fourth, in respondents letter dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer of complainants. As to his claim regarding his former client purchasing the property
1. Amicable settlement there was an agreed repurchase price to which both parties agreed to 2. Letter to the barrio captain the lawyer stated that complainants repurchased the property
3.
from the Spouses Eustaquio. (This will inform you that the Heirs of Angalan Samal have already redeemed their property through me from Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since September, 1978.) Insufficient proof Respondent did not give any detail or proof to substantiate his story the name of the alleged client, an affidavit of the alleged client, the old passport of the alleged client showing immigration stamps, or any form of correspondence between him and the alleged client. The Court agrees with the observation of Commissioner Hababag that respondents "vain attempt to salvage his malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief and acceptance."
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name. Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer. The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SANTOS-TAN V. ROBINO

SOMOSOT V. LARA FACTS Atty Gerardo Lara represented Ofelia Somosot in a collections case against Golden Collections Marketting Corp. Golden Collections filed interrogatories and request for Admission Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be sent directly to Mrs. Somosot At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about the P27,000 in unpaid attys fees Nov. 2001, Atty Lara was appointed as a consultant in the Board of Investment, a government position Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office was locked and according to the security guard, they had moved office without leaving a forwarding address. Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs Somosot, but they couldnt be reached Lara filed his Withdrawal of Appearance in court, without the required conformity of his client, Somosot, because she could be located. This was denied. Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosots new office was in Pasig, he called her where he advised that she should find another Lawyer. She informed her that she already did. September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosot giving him one last chance to give her a reason not to instigate a disbarment suit against him. ISSUE W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot. HELD Yes. Atty Laras services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the Interrogatories and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to rule against Mrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried to address the Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not. He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about the Interrogatories and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he learned that he had been appointed into a government position. Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldnt be a reason for him not to inform his client about the cases development He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment in a government office; and two, Somosots refusal to pay his fees. He could have secured her conformity to the withdrawal of appearance when they talked on December 2001, but because he failed to do so, he remain as counsel of record.

BRIONES V. JIMENEZ

PENA V. APARICIO FACTS Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the NLRC against Pena, President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation pay. Pea rejected the claim. Thereafter, Pea sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client. The letter also contained threats against the company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the companys business license. Pea filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Pea had allegedly failed to file his position paper and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC. Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against Pea in the amount of P400M for filing false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Pea likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process. ISSUE HELD Yup! First of all, the SC found that Pea actually submitted his position paper. In addition, disbarment proceedings are sui generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any rate, Pea actually submitted a certification against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the supposed defect in the original complaint. Now to the merits Canon 19, a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, this shows that a lawyers duty to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice. Rule 19.01, a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against the adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyers client. This is exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case. Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail disbarment but also possible criminal prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Pea. He also stated that the writing of demand letters is standard practice. SC ruled that Atty. Aparicios assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Pea and force the latter to accede to his clients claims. The letter even implied a promise to keep silent about the said violations if the claim is met. While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found in this case. W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his clients interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.

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LEGAL ETHICS DIGESTS

INTRO 1. 2. 3. 4. Banogan v. Zerna Ledesma v. Climaco Cui v. Cui Alawi v. Alauya