EURASIA ABOVE ALL Manifest of the Eurasist movement Crisis of ideas in contemporary Russia In our Russian* society - specially

in the social and political sphere at the beginning of the new millennium a deficiency of ideas is painfully felt. The majority of the people - including governors, politicians, scientists, workers - are guided in life, in political choice by a set of momentary factors, casual concerns, transient ephemeral calls. We are quickly losing any general representation about the sense of life, about the logic of history, about the problems of man, about the destiny of the world. Existential and social choice has been substituted by aggressive advertising. In the place of meaningful and accountable political ideology stands some effective (or ineffective) PR. The outcome of the struggle of ideas is defined by the volume of investments in entertainment. Dramatic clashes of peoples, cultures and religions are turned into shows inspired by transnational corporations and oil holdings. Human blood, human life, human spirit became statistical abstraction, consumer cost, at its best - demagogic figure of speech in mellifluous and ambiguous humanitarian lamentations, hiding a double standard. In the place of totalitarian uniformity, a totalitarian indifference has come. The majority of political parties and formalised social movements pursue tactical purposes. Practically nowhere can be found an explicit and consequent ideology capable to snatch man from a state of sleepy indifference, to make life worth living. Americanism and the need for alternative The most rigorous - but at the same time most harmful world-view project has been formulated by consequent liberals. These forces, geopolitical oriented towards the US and the West, take as a sample for copying the American politics, American economy, American type of the society, American culture, American civilisation ideal. This camp has its dignity - their project is logical and consistent, its theory and practice are linked. But also logical are world evil, death, dissolving, division and loss of organic wholeness. The liberals say a decisive yes to that uniform world, confused, vain, individualist, oligarchic, deprived of any moral, spiritual and traditional orienting points, which the US - world superpower strive

to create on a planetary scale, understanding their technological and economic superiority as a mandate for a privately-owned hegemony on a planetary scale. This Americanisation of Russia, of the whole world, this slavish submission to the new world gendarme - gendarme of shows obviously is not very much pleasant to many people. But this opposition more often appears only emotionally, fragmentarily, inconsistently. Peoples and whole socio-political movements are inertially satisfied with the old thongs, with the residuals of different, more harmonious and noble epochs, with anything at least in some way differing from the atlantist tsunami which drags along the remains of our own Russian civilisation. The hostility to the American way of life, to the famous new world order is a fully positive quality, which should be greeted with favour anywhere we meet it. But it is not enough. An active counterproposal, a realistic, concrete and capable alternative is indispensable for us. Conditions at the beginning of the millennium are considerably new. And those who want a different future, rather than that controlled chaos and neon-light disintegration imposed on us by America, are compelled not only to say no, but also to formulate, to put forward, to demonstrate and to defend a different, our own, civilisation Plan. The most massive, most generalising world-view offering such an alternative to the American hegemony, to the unipolar world, to the triumph of West, is Eurasism.

The founding-fathers of Eurasism Historically, Eurasism existed for 20 years as an attempt to interpret to the logic of socio-political, cultural and geopolitical development of Russia as a uniform and basically continuous process from Kiev Rus' to the USSR. The eurasists have detected behind the dialectics of national destiny of the Russian people and the Russian State a unitary historical mission, differently expressed at the various stages. One major thesis of early eurasists (count N.S.Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky) sounded like this: The West against mankind , i.e. the nations of the world blossoming complexity of cultures and civilisations against the unitary, totalitarian Western pattern, against the economic, political and cultural domination of the West. Russia (both ancient, and orthodox-monarchic, and Soviet) saw the eurasists as a stronghold and avant-garde of this world process, as a citadel of freedom against the unidimensional hegemony on mankind of an irreligious, secularised, pragmatical and egotistical excrescence - the Western civilisation, claiming for supremacy and for juridical, material and spiritual domination. On this basis the eurasists accepted the USSR as a new - paradoxical - form of the original path of

Russia. Disapproving atheism and materialism in the cultural sphere, they recognised behind the external facade of communism the archaic national features, behind Soviet Russia the legitimate geopolitical heritage of the Russian mission. Being consequent and convinced Russian patriots, the eurasists came to a conclusion about the inadequacy of the traditional forms, in which the National Idea in Russia was vested during the last centuries. The Romanov motto Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality - was only a conservative facade hiding behind itself quite modern contents, basically copied from Europe. Soviet patriotism expressed the national idea in class terms, which neither grasps the essence of the civilizational problem, nor did recognise the meaning of the historical mission of Russia. The secular nationalism of the Romanov was but a formal imitation of the European regimes. Soviet patriotism ignored the national element, broke off the connection to traditions, swept aside the Belief of the fathers. A synthetical new approach was indispensable. Such approach was also developed within the framework of eurasist philosophy, within the social and political movement of the eurasists. The founding-fathers of Eurasism for the first time gave the highest possible estimation to the multi-national (imperial) nature of the Russian State. They were especially attentive to the Turkish factor. The role of the heritage of Gengis-Khan, trustee of the Tatar statehood assimilated by Moscow in the XVI century, was seen as a decisive turn of Russia to the East, to its origins, to its own values. In the orthodox legend just this epoch is linked to the Sacred Rus', to the transformation of Moscow in the Third Rome (after the fall of Tsargrad and the end of the Byzantian Empire). The mission of the Sacred Rus' was expressed in the self-assertion of its own Eurasian culture, of an original social system, distinct in its main features from that path followed by the countries of the Roman Catholic and Protestant West. Russia was conceived by the eurasists as the avant-garde of the East against the West, as a forward defence line of traditional society against modern, secular, ordinary, rationalised society. But in the centuries-old struggle for preserving a cultural ego, Russia differently from other Eastern societies actively acquired experience of the West, adopted the techniques it applied, borrowed some methods - but every time with the only purpose to confront the West with its own weapons. In modern language, this is called modernisation without westernization. Therefore Russia also managed longer than other traditional societies to effectively counter the pressure of the West. From this the eurasists came to a major conclusion: Russia needs not simply to go back to its roots, but to combining a conservative and a revolutionary new start. Russia must actively modernise, develop, partially open to the surrounding world, but strictly saving and hardening its own identity. Therefore some called the

eurasists as the orthodox Bolsheviks. Alas, historically, this remarkable movement was not appreciated in due measure. The impressing successes of Marxist ideology made the refined conservative-revolutionary perspective of the eurasist ineffective, superfluous. By the end of the 30s, the original impulse of the eurasist movement, both in Russia and among the Russian emigration, had definitively died away. The relay race of the Eurasist idea was run henceforth not so much by politicians and ideologists, how much by scientists (first of all the great Russian historian Lev Gumilyov). Neo-eurasism The dramatic events of the last decades in Russia, all over the world, have made again the eurasists ideas urgent, essential. The West coped with its most serious civilizational opponent the USSR. Marxist ideology suddenly lost its appeal. But a general new alternative to westernism and liberalism (which today are embodied in their fullest development by the US and American civilisation - from which even the Europeans, the grandparents of the world monster, begin to feel nervous) has not appeared yet. And could not appear anyway. The separate pieces - pre-Revolutionary nationalism, clericalism, the all-inertial sovietism or the extravagant imagination of ecologism and leftism - could not turn into a united front. There was no common world-view base, no common denominator. The occasional rapprochement of positions of the opponents to globalism and Americanisation did not result in a true synthesis of world-views. In this moment the most attentive minds, the purest hearts and the most flaming souls were converted too to the Eurasist heritage. In it they discerned a saving source, a germ of that doctrine, that ideology, which ideally met the requirements of the present historical moment. Neo-eurasism began to be built as a social, philosophical, scientific, geopolitical, cultural current since the end the 80s. Distancing from the heritage of the Russian eurasists of the 20-30s, having incorporated the spiritual experience of the staroobryad tradition of Russian Orthodoxy, being enriched by the social criticism of Russian populists and socialists, having interpreted in a new way the achievements of the Soviet stage of domestic history, and at the same time having mastered the philosophy of traditionalism and conservative revolution, geopolitical methodology and original revolutionary doctrines of the new left (i.e. those intellectual currents, which were elaborated in the West, but directed against the dominant logic of its development) Neo-eurasism became the most serious

world-view platform in modern Russian society, acquiring the form of complete scientific school, of a system of social and cultural initiatives. Neo-eurasism laid the bases of modern Russian geopolitics, gained a strong personnel potential of supporters in government structures and ministries and offices linked to the military sector, basing on eurasist geopolitics many serious operational international, military and economic projects. Neo-eurasism influenced modern domestic politology, sociology, and philosophy. Neo-eurasism gradually became a relevant conceptual instrument of Russian state monopolies requiring a strategic pattern for developing a long-term strategy of macroeconomic activity, depending not from momentary political processes, but from historical, geographical and civilizational constants. Neo-eurasism laid the basis of the whole set of vanguard currents in youth culture, gave a vivifying impulse to creative, passionate development of the whole direction in art. Neo-eurasism had a strong impact upon political parties and movements in modern Russia - we find large borrowings from neo-eurasist ideological arsenal in the programmatic documents of Unity, KPFR [Communist Party], OVR [Otetchestvo-Vsyo Rossiya], LDPR [Liberal-democratic Party], the movement Russia and of a series of smaller movements and parties. However these borrowings remain fragmentary, combined with other sometimes heterogeneous and even contradictory elements (all this makes large Russian parties rather tactical, de-ideologized formations created for the solution of short-term, local political problems). The new social and political subject The time has come to make the following step, to add eurasism a concrete social and political dimension. Neo-eurasist ideology gradually exceeded the level of pure theoretical elaboration. The new government of Russia is seriously engaged in the solution of strategic problems facing the country, and is obviously not satisfied with the primitive and destructive recipes imposed by the West and the bearers of Western influence in Russia: it needs a world-view and social and political support. The present authorities, their specificity, their social image, considerably differ both from the post-Soviet period and from the times of uncritical passion for

reckless liberalism. A new state world-view, a new domestic pattern of politcorrectness have ripened. This is testified by that persevering search of a National Idea in which the authorities are today engaged. If the usual political and party system is suitable for the decision of momentary problems (though we consider it as inadequate even in the narrow pragmatical sense), in an medium-term perspective (let alone a long-term strategic sight) it has no chance at all, and requires radical reforming. The existing system evolved during the process of demolition of the Soviet model and its substitution by a liberal-democratic pro-Western formation. But today neither the former, nor the latter is acceptable for Russia. And furthermore, it is inappropriate in the face of the very difficult situation the country is confronted to a consequence of ludicrous policies previously followed. What we need are parties and movements based on a world-view, reflecting the interests of concrete strata of the population, merged with the people, educating, training and defending it, instead of exploiting the trust (and naivety) of the masses for the sake of private or group benefit. All conditions have blossomed for the appearance of a rigorous Eurasist movement in new Russia. And those who stood at the origins of Neo-eurasism, who formed the theoretical premises and bases of Russian geopolitics, eurasist philosophy, conservative-revolutionary politology and sociology, who spent years fighting for the ideals of Eurasia, for the revival of the Russian people and our Great Power - those made the decision to form the new social and political movement EURASIA. Who shall be the participants to the movement Eurasia? To whom are we addressing the call to enter and to back our movement? To each Russian, educated and not, influential and the last of the dispossessed, to the worker and to the manager, to the needy and the well-off person, to the Russian and the Tatar, to the orthodox and the jew, to the conservative and the modernist, to the student and to the defender of the law, to the soldier and the weaver, to the governor and the rock-musician. But only to the one who loves Russia, who cannot think of himself without it, who has realised the necessity of a severe effort, which is required from all of us so that our country and our people remains on the map of the new millennium (from which they persistently attempt to erase us), to the one who wants, passionately wants, that all of us at last would raise in a mighty power, would cast away from our common organism its parasitic excrescence, would tear the veil of mental mist, would affirm above the country, the continent, the world

our solar Russian ideals - ideals of Freedom, Equity, Fidelity to the Origins. Radical Centre The movement Eurasia is founded on the principles of radical centre. We are neither leftists nor rightists, we are neither slavishly compliant to the authorities, nor oppositionists at any cost, barking with a reason and without . We realise that todays authority in Russia, the President of Russia Vladimir Vladimirovic Putin requires help, support, solidarity, cohesion. But at the same time blind submission to the leaders, uncritical connivance to authority only because it is authority, are today not less (if not more) pernicious than straight rebellion. We are centrists to the extent that the President and the authority act for the sake of the Power, for the sake of the people. And not in a populist and transient way, but in a medium and long-term perspective. Here again we will be for the President fervently, radically, up to the end, not paying attention to small inaccuracies, accepting all hardships and difficulties, which will arise since Russia will seriously be set by the purpose of rescuing itself and all the rest of the world from the terrible threat creeping from the West. Anything more centrist than our unconditional and total support to the patriotic power-building of the authority (even in its most unpopular actions) simply could not be. So, our forerunners, the Eurasists, supported the hated orthodox fundamentalist and Marxist regimes because they confronted the West the worst of evils. But our radical centrism is not passive. We clearly realise that the present authority in Russia according to the logic of things has no (and can not have) clear representation of the fundamental strategic purposes, of the philosophical and spiritual dramatic problem which is born by the new millennium - terrible, risky, threatening, problematic, misunderstood during centuries of bloody battles and cruel sufferings In this sense the authority today is lost and requires help, orienting points, landmarks, specifying which is the task of the people, its most active, strong-willed, clever, idealistic, patriotic side (this also should gather in our movement, to become its core). Here the roles are changed, and now is the turn of the authority to listen to the voice of Eurasia. This voice is not the servile yes, sir? of condescending and artificial parties, good for chairs and tv-screens. It is the mighty radical appeal of the earth, the vote of generations, the cry from the depths of our spirit and our blood. Priorities of the Eurasia movement

Our movement spreads the Eurasist principles to all levels of life. In the religious sphere it means constructive solid dialogue between the creeds traditional for Russia, - Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism. The Eurasian branches of world religions have many differences from those forms which have taken roots in other regions of the world. There is a common style of eurasist spiritual view, which, however, does not eliminate at all differences and originality of tenets. This is a serious and positive basis for rapprochement, mutual respect, mutual understanding. Due to the Eurasist approach to religious questions many inter-confessional frictions can be bypassed or arranged. In the sphere of foreign policy, Eurasism implies a wide process of strategic integration. Reconstruction on the basis of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] of a solid Eurasian Union (analogue to the USSR on a new ideological, economic and administrative basis). The strategic integration of internal spaces of the CIS should be gradually spread also to wider areas to the countries of the Moscow-Teheran-Delhi-Beijing axis. An eurasist policy is invoked to open for Russia an exit to the warm seas, not through war and sufferings, but through peace and open friendly co-operation. Eurasist policies towards the West implies prioritary relations with the European countries. Modern Europe - as against the epoch when the founding-fathers of Eurasism acted does not represent anymore the source of world evil. The quick political events of the XX century contributed to transfer this doubtful record even more west-ward - to Northern America, to the US. Therefore at a present stage Russia can find in Europe strategical partners interested in the revival of its former political power. Eurasist Russia should play the role of deliverers of Europe, but this time from the American political, economic and cultural occupation. The eurasist policy of Russia is directed towards active co-operation with the countries of the Pacific region, first of all with Japan. The economic giants of this area should see in the eurasist policies of Russia the orienting point for a selfsupporting political system, and also for a strategic potential of resources and new markets. At a planetary level Eurasism means active and universal opposition to globalisation, is equal to the anti-globalist movement . Eurasism defends the blossoming complexity of peoples, religions and nations. All anti-globalist tendencies are intrinsically eurasist.

We are consequent supporters of eurasist federalism. This means a combination of strategic unity and ethno-cultural (in definite cases economic) autonomies. Different ways of life at a local level in combination with strict centralism in the basic moments, linked to State interests. We should revive the traditions of the Russian people, contribute to the recovery of Russian demographic growth. And most important, awake in the people its intrinsic organic spirituality, morale, high ideals, living and fervent patriotism. Without the prioritary revival of the Russian nation, the eurasist project has no chance to become a reality. Understanding this fact is the base of our world-view. Eurasism in social sphere means the priority of the public principle above the individual, subordination of economic patterns to strategic, social problems. The whole economic history of Eurasia proves that the development of economic mechanisms here happens according to an alternative logic than the liberalcapitalist, individualist patterns of personal benefit which evolved in the West on the basis of Protestant ethics. The liberal logic of management is alien to Eurasia, and despite enormous efforts there is no way to break this deep-rooted feature of our people. The collective, communitarian principle of governing the economy, the contribution of the criterion of equity in the distribution process all this represent a steady feature of our economic history. Eurasism insists on a positive account and evaluation of this circumstance, and on this basis gives preference to socially-oriented economic patterns. Eurasism implies a positive re-evaluation of the archaic, of the ancient. It fervently refers to the past, to the world of Tradition. The development of cultural process is seen by Eurasism in a new reference to the archaic, to the insertion of original cultural motives in the fabric of modern forms. The priority in this area is given back to national motives, to the sources of national creativity, to the continuation and revival of traditions. Being a new and fresh world-view, just having taken a definite form, Eurasism primarily addresses to youth, to the people whose consciousness has not been spoiled yet by random jumps from one inadequate ideological pattern to another, even less adequate. The eurasist ideal is the strong, passionate, healthy and beautiful man (instead of the bastard cocaine-addict of mondialist discos, the halfassed gangster or the slut for sale). We are in the condition to offer different, positive values, instead of the cult of ugliness and pathology, instead of the cynicism and servilism before the surrogates of world shows. We shall not allow our children to be killed, violated, degraded, perverted, sold or chained to a needle.

Our ideal is a celebration of physical and spiritual health, force and worthiness, faith and honour. The movement Eurasia can become a reality only in the event that many people will gather around it. Much can be done even by a single man, but, as Lautramont said, everyone should care for poetry! To an even greater extent everyone should care for Eurasia! Now everything depends on our efforts. Nobody is promising just victories, raise of welfare or entertainment industry shares. Ahead stays daily laborious work, often invisible from the outside. Ahead stay difficulty and battle, loss and labours, but ahead also stay pleasure and Great Purpose! Program of the Socio-political Movement EURASIA Russia has reached a relevant historical threshold. It is necessary to cast a look on the path behind, to realise its place in the present world, to mark the next steps. New challenges for Russia, new strategic orienting points, new purposes Russia faces a set of new historical challenges. Today more than ever before it is necessary to affirm in a new form priorities, purposes, constants of the historical path of Russia and to correlate them with the shapes of that new world in which we shall live in the next millennium. Traditions. Fundamental directions of development of Russia as State, people, society Addressing to the future, we must give a pondered estimation of our past. This past more than once in Russian history has been rewritten in a favour of this or that ruling ideological group. Today, leaving the era of ideologies behind, we are obliged to sum up the landmarks of our historical path as much as possible objectively and impartially beyond ideological preferences, outlining the most important features and leaving aside the details. To this purpose there are today all reasons and conditions. This freedom from untouchable dogmas and obligatory clichs is possibly the most positive achievement of young Russian democracy.

` The eurasist choice There is no doubt that Russia has its own path. Its external forms constantly vary, sometimes in dramatic turnarounds. But in every epoch a common line is traced the eurasist direction, the eurasist substance of Russian history. Much can be questioned in considering our past, future and present. But the eurasist Idea is not subject to doubt. Russia is Eurasia, and this predetermines its geographical, cultural, civilizational, strategic and economic life. Assertion of a special civilizational mission The eurasist identity of Russia constitutes the substance of our historical mission. Russia has its own image of the logic of history, of the Truth of the world. The search for this Truth and its affirmation is the content of national historical life. Loyalty to this Truth was defended by our ancestors, many generations of Russian people, Russians giving their lives on the altar of Fatherland. To defend this mission is our duty, also beyond the present moment. It is our historical covenant. Russia has only an eurasist future Our future must be planned and built according to the common landmarks of our history. Any attempt to depart from this road, to refuse its predestination, means the end of our historical being. Russia has either an eurasist future, or none. We are for idealism (cult of the truth) The cultural forms of national life vary through the centuries. But the idea of a society of Equity and Good was always saved as a constant. Cultural feature of the Russians is traditionally the aspiration to a high ideal and some kind of neglect of the sphere of material benefits. A heightened feeling of idealism and universalism can be distinguished at the most different stages of Russian history. The ideal of sacrifice was initially understood in Christian terms, as a special liability of the Russians to the Christian Tradition, entrusted to them. In the Soviet period the same Russian idealism was understood in a secularised way, as the ethics of heroical service to the principles of social justice and universal equality. Is is characteristic, that the basic conflicts in Russian history passed not between supporters of idealistic systems and pragmatists, but almost exclusively between

two idealistic camps, in different ways and with a different degree of intensity defending idealistic, sometimes even utopian models, variedly expressed and formulated. The cultural style of the Russians through the whole course of history is characterised by a dynamic rethinking in a national key of aesthetic and stylistic elements borrowed from different cultural contexts, their creative and original elaboration, their skilful insertion into a particular specifically Russian context. Freedom of creative adapting and assimilation of borrowed scales of values, doctrines and symbols discovers the openness of the Russians to the ethnic variety surrounding them. The loyalty to its own national origin, reshaping anything borrowed into a unique and unrepeatable typical Russian product, vice-versa, demonstrates the constancy of the cultural type, its national specificity and stability. Our idealistic conformation implies that the set of our ideals is also the set of our purposes: Our ideal of own self-consciousness - We are a special people, a special world, a special geopolitical formation As an historical community (people), as a unique economic and social organism, as a special geopolitical formation, we represent a complete self-supporting system entered in the common planetary equilibrium of civilisations, cultures, peoples, religions and states. To affirm and to save our multivariate originality is our major task. - We are against the repetition of mistakes We are simply obliged to not retry the bloody mistakes of our ancestors, having taken in the new millennium all the best of our national history. In the new conditions, the limit to rough mistakes and sharp departures from our destiny has been reached. The fatality of some definite mistakes repeatedly made by our ancestors has become obvious. Our task is not retrying the most rough of them. We have to accept our destiny, to realise it and triumphally to affirm before the world the RUSSIAN TRUTH. - We are for succession

The succession of civilizational policies and strategies distinguishes wise peoples from senseless ones, mature states from adventurist ones. The most various classifications of the historical periods of Russian history converge in saying that the Russian people (being rather young in comparison to the majority of the European ethnoses), nevertheless has left youth behind, and is characterised by a deep attention to its destiny, a more mature estimation of its position in the world. The wise state reflects about its historical predestination, about the combination of traditions and vanguard innovative paths more and better than the adventurist, temporary, transient state. Russia has clearly approached to the necessity of a new deep comprehension of its ego.

Our ideal of internal political construction: organic democracy, eurasist federalism The eurasist political model must be founded on the imperative of participation of the society in adopting the founding historical decisions, on genuine peoples government. The participation of the people to its own destiny so is defined a genuine democracy. This participation can be realised in various ways. As Russia represents a massive strategic formation, the management of its strategic potential must be concentrated in the hands of a small group or distinct personalities, no matter how they are called president, monarch, High council, leader etc. Such personification of authority does not contradict the principle of organic democracy in the event that the communal vector of activity of the highest State personalities (or group of persons) corresponds to the reference direction of historical development, and is based on the constants of national life. Thus, criterion for evaluating the adequacy (or inadequacy) of the head of the State must not simply be his efficiency in fulfilling his functions and official duties, but first of all his loyalty to the great project of the people, his being at the service of the historical mission of the State. At a basic level, organic democracy supposes a wide and flexible system of self-government correlated to cultural, religious and professional traditions of concrete collectives. Somewhat it is possible to see in this pattern an analogy to the Soviets (councils). Here must act the principles of direct democracy, the mechanisms of collective elaboration of decisions having local political significance and inscribed in concrete regions. Between the strategic unitary principle of the supreme authority and the differentiated plurality of autonomous groups at a local level, there must exist a flexible system of political co-ordination in the person of bodies of the executive

and legislative authority of an intermediate level, realising the co-ordination between the will of the communities and the strategic line of the central administration. The cohesion will be mostly effective in the event that the highest State authorities will control only those aspects of political life, which have strategic meaning, such as: - preserving territorial integrity of the State; - ensuring its sovereignty and independence; - planning the development of strategic sectors of industry and economy; - ensuring juridical norms to the citizens; - asserting the interests of Russia across the globe etc., but in the remaining non-strategic questions the many public local formations will be granted the highest autonomy, independence and right to define the parameters of political life at a local level. - eurasist centrism The politological identity of Russia predetermines that vector of political worldview which must be accepted as an axis of the political Centre. This vector supposes the combination of principles of social justice rule and social economy (left-wing economy, socialism) with values of conservatism and cultural traditionalism in the pure political orientation of the State (right-wing politics, conservatism). This combination of left and right-wing elements in the definition of the Russian idea of political Centre is the opposite of the way similar elements are combined in the liberal politics of the West, where the political Centre is founded on the combination of the free market (right-wing economy, liberalcapitalism) with modernism, innovation and antitraditionalism in the political sphere, but also at the level of ethics, culture, religion (left-wing politics, progressism). Around the fundamental line of the eurasist political Centre, political flanks directions can dynamically be developed right and left-wing, i.e. parties, fractions and different political formations disagreeing in this or that direction from the centrist line. Yet they will be limited by their loyalty to the common historical project of Russia, fully reflected in the position of the Centre. The transition beyond a definite limit toward alternative politological models will be equivalent to political marginalisation. Thus the tolerance of the Centre in relation to even the most extreme, extremist and extravagant projects (close to the liberal politological pattern) will depend directly on the intensity of geopolitical confrontation with atlantism. If the situation in international life will be favourable to Russia, the political tolerance to liberal and extremist political formations will increase. In the

difficult times of active confrontation, this tolerance, vice-versa, must become minimal. - third path The combination of moderately socialist elements in economy and conservative statalist traditionalist of the tendencies in politics is conventionally called as third path model, in order to distinguish it both from usual socialism (the Marxist version, which offers a combination of left-wing economy and the left-wing politics), and rightist dictatorial regimes (where political conservatism is combined with market mechanisms and absolute power of a financial oligarchy). The third path, in its different interpretations, most exactly corresponds to the political history of Russia. Moreover, an attentive analysis of the shifts between the rightist and leftist regimes in Russian history finds that these revolutionary processes streamed around of a common axis, some of them departing from it, some of them turning closer. This axis represents just that absolute political Centre - until now never plainly manifest - whose politological the configuration is identical to the third path model. Hence, choosing the political system of the third path as fundamental shall be the thoughtful, responsible, fatal step toward the definitive adoption by Russia of its leading role as the most general, universal and allinclusive alternative world-view in the political field. And if such transition to the theory of the third path will indeed take place, this will mean liquidating the basic reasons of the dramatic revolutionary confrontations, of the cruel destructive revolutions and extremist unrest which coloured Russian political history in a bloody tone. The third path is the only guarantor from forthcoming revolutions, civil wars and revolts, which again can divide Russia between conflicting camps in the event that such choice will not take place. The thoughtful and clear adoption of that model - which has been the hidden core of Russian political history - as the basic tendency of political Centre will mean real political consent, long-term stability and internal political peace. - eurasist federalism The scale of historical mission of Russia, necessary to prevent the establishment of the new world order and to oppose to it a global alternative, implies the creation of such internal political system as much as possible open for involving in the eurasist block other peoples and states with diverse cultural, civilisational, political, religious and economic history. For this purpose the general political structure of Russia must be as much as possible close to the model of the forthcoming eurasist continental formation. It means building the system of

eurasist federalism, whose main feature must be combining strategic unity at the level of central administration and wide diversity of political, social, legal and economic organization of the forming parts. Eurasist federalism supposes a political and administrative system considerably different from the pattern of nation-state on which the modern western powers are based. In a nation-state there are strict political centralism, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, universal requirement of a uniform juridical, constitutional, political and economic system. The nation-state is supposed to represent a uniform monocultural block composed of atomized citizens, enjoying the equal juridical status before the unitary state system. Eurasist federalism is based on completely different reasons. It precisely shares two concepts strategic unity and wide ethno-cultural, regional pluralism. The state is politically unitary, in the sense of accomplishing a unique historical mission, a common geopolitical great project. But this unity does not apply to a usual country, but to a whole civilisation; here we have no ordinary state formation, but the liberation of a democratic empire of a new kind. Therefore solidarity at a level of planetary destiny is accompanied by the broadest differentiation at the level of the constituent parts, of advanced cultural and religious autonomies. Even in its present shape, Russia has saved distinctly federative features, basic signs of an empire made of a whole constellation of extremely heterogeneous regions in the ethnic, social, cultural and geographical sense. Each region represents a self-supporting system with a lot of unique, unrepeatable features. This specificity as an ethnic, social, juridical and communitarian mosaic must be mirrored also at the political level, as a wide federal association of collective subjects differing in status and level. At the basic definition of units of federal space must not lay administrative and territorial descriptions (as in centralist nation-states), but a flexible system of criteria taking into account the whole complex of cultural, social, historical, economic, ethnic identity must lay. And the federal subject, playing a structuring role in the formation of the State, must replicate the federative-democratic pattern also at an internal level, i.e. represent the not the narrow analogue of a small scale nationstate (as it happens in the case of newly formed republics separated from Russia, of national and territorial-administrative formations aspiring today to raise to political autonomy, down to separatism), but of a mini-empire with the broadest spectrum of internal collective subjects, being structured, in turn, as the subject of the great federation. And so on, down to self-ruling working collectives, executive boards of local communities and councils. Such internal federative system will facilitate Russias strategic union with the different powers, potential participants of the continental eurasist block. In case of conclusion of such unions, the federative principle will be saved inviolable, but the

configuration of the federative room will be extended (in the event that the strategic integration will be very tight). All territorial controversies, fully or partially preventing the establishing of tight allied mutual relation between neighbouring states will thus be solved. If for instance Russias neighbouring countries and potential participants to the eurasist block will go on developing federalism inside their states, the dimensions of the Eurasist Union organically and naturally will begin to expand, since the presence of wide cultural and religious autonomies will not weaken the traditional states, constantly threatening separatism and military conflicts, but, vice-versa, will strengthen the strategic block, in which many small peoples and cultural ensembles will have the longawaited chance of reunification into an organic whole and by that become a binding element, having changed today's (destructive) geopolitical mission into its opposite. For multinational Eurasia such wide federalist approach would be the ideal solution. In an even more remote perspective, eurasist federalism could become an attractive political pattern across the globe, representing the political alternative to the mondialist levelling of the new world order. Our ideal of geopolitical strategy for Russia The highest geopolitical priority for Russia in the forthcoming century (millennium) is the creation of an eurasist strategic block with a flexible and differentiated world-view and a multilevel membership as a counterweight to atlantist and mondialist tendencies on a global scale. As against the previous epoch, the axis of such block must be neither a worldview [weltanschauung] neither a specific economic or political system, but geopolitical and strategic principles, civilisational imperatives. Russia must definitely understand itself as the geographical axis of history, as the core of Eurasia, with full responsibility to affirm at the new stage and in new terms the global extent of its historical and civilisational destiny (taking into account mistakes and deviations of previous historical periods). - the multipolar world In a long-term perspective it is necessary to be guided by the aim of creating a genuinely free and fair multipolar world, organically forming around different cultural, civilisational, social and historical centres. The riches of mankind is directly linked to the variety of civilizations, which must not only be saved, but also newly asserted. Eurasia itself, in the best periods of its history, was

distinguished for this imperial variety, where strategic and geopolitical unity was combined with a constellation of organic and cultural autonomous parts. The eurasist pole initially must be formed as a civilisation stronghold of liberation, so that the forthcoming multipolarity becomes for Eurasia the natural and desirable result of the temporary return to the bipolar pattern. Hence, the same structure of the new eurasist block must initially bear in itself the germs of cultural pluralism, of differentiation, of variety, of blossoming complexity. In such case the forthcoming advent of a genuinely multipolar world will be the organic continuation of the eurasist line, opposed to the unifying unidimensional logic of atlantism. - eurasist strategic unions The realisation of the eurasist project implies a series of steps aimed at increasing the strategic significance and the self-supporting weight of Russia. No other State, for geopolitical reasons, is able to become the axis of the eurasist block. Russia holds a geographically central place in Eurasia, and has a strategic potential, sufficient for ensuring the successful start of integration processes at the first stage. For Russia it is vitally necessary to be guided in external and domestic policy by the one and only imperative, to which all remaining ones must be subordinated the creation of the Eurasist Union. - minimal size: the post-Soviet integration The minimal scale of the eurasist integration, or its first stage, must become the strategic reunification of CIS countries (former Soviet republics) in a common strategic construction, united by the consciousness of common geopolitical concerns and common strategic and civilisational destiny. The integration of CIS countries into a new, more solid strategical formation must be based on global geopolitical tasks, instead of momentary social and economic interests or combination of forces within political lites. The fatal meaning of the Eurasist Project is so great, that it incomparably exceeds the balance of practical pluses and minuses originating from such integration, of obviously stands well above the political and psychological portraits of contingently ruling leaders and parties. The geopolitical integration of CIS (which is possible since the first stage, except for those states too deeply involved in atlantist mechanisms) must be realised as the execution of the eurasist destiny, instead of arbitrary act of any political or ideological grouping. For this reason, the unity of geopolitical purposes must consolidate among themselves both ruling regimes and

opposition, both the establishment lite and the revolutionary counter-lites. The history of mankind, the chance of establishing a multipolar world depends on the real integration of CIS. Hence, narrow political dissent must retreat in second plan before the grandiosity of this project, and politicalsocial conflicts objectively inevitable in any society must not extend in any case to the sphere of the general strategic course, which under no circumstances can be held hostage by interparty struggles or social frictions. In this precise way the geopolitical succession of US atlantist lite (which one disputing sometimes rather roughly tactical questions, political problems methods, decisions) never put into question what in America is called Manifest Destiny, i.e. clear predestination. Eurasia, according to its own parameters, has a similar vocation and predestination, as much global, but with the opposite sign. And the accomplishment of this eurasist predestination must gather the CIS ?lite at the first stage of the new affirmation of the eurasist block. - continental block The following stage of the Eurasist Project, which can be realised of in a parallel way to the strategic integration of CIS, is the creation of a unitary strategic association with eurasist States vitally interested in building an alternative to autocratic planetary domination of the US and the countries of the atlantist West. Such countries are some Arabian states of Near East and Northern Africa, Iran, India, China, and other Far Eastern countries included in the Pacific zone. These countries have their ancient culture, advanced religious systems, and a complex and particular social and political structures. Their economic way of life represents an original germination of formations and systems. The majority of these countries have their own historical project expressed in the terms of civilizational, cultural, political, social and national originality. Not always this project harmoniously corresponds to the projects of neighbouring powers and civilizations, but they are united in the opposition to atlantist universalism, in the denial of liberal mondialist levelling, in the refusal autocratic domination of the US. On the basis of the principle of common negation, all these elements can be involved in the large scale continental block. In the coming future, from this picture of highly differentiated plurality, a multipolar reality can be formed on the basis of a common Eurasist Path. - union with Europe and Japan

Integration within the framework of CIS, the creation of the eurasist strategic block represent the preliminary steps towards an active planetary strategy of Eurasia, without which a strategic civilisational alternative will not have sufficient stuffing. The following stage (which, in its basic features, can be prepared with no delay and in a parallel way to the other two) is activating a geopolitical line toward Europe and Japan. Europe and Japan represent the two major strategic coast zones, the control upon which ensures to atlantism (the US) a steady supremacy over a potential eurasist civilisation. For this reason, the final destiny of Eurasia will depend on the successful neutralisation of Europe and Japan, from their exclusion from US strategic control, and their subsequent including in the pan-eurasist project. Only once such dimension will be reached including Europe and the whole Pacific region together with Japan the Eurasist Project will be quite complete and is able to exert a decisive effect on planetary processes. - purpose: civilisation promotion of a new multipolar planetary reality The global geopolitical task of Russia consists in the creation of a multipolar world, in the strategic promotion of such world. The transition to it, as to a pluralist and differentiated alternative to unidimensional atlantist mondialism, will be possible only in the course of the realisation of all three stages of the Eurasist Project. A multipolar free world, with a blossoming complexity of cultures and civilisations here is the highest geopolitical ideal of Russia, its vocation, its predestination. Our ideal of geoeconomic strategy of Russia: self-sufficiency of large spaces - eurasist principle of economic pluralism The eurasist economic model is based on a principle opposite to liberal universalism, to the postulates of the so-called classical school of economics. Each historical community has its own unique history of economic development, its own special structure as economic organism. The system of criteria according to one economic efficiency is valued, the parameters of success or failure, cannot be separated from the historical, social and cultural context of a given society. The thought of the western classic school of economics comes from the wrong supposition of unidirectional economic development for all peoples and states, only with miscellaneous paces. On this

belief is based the representation about the doubtless advantages of the western economic pattern, as the most advanced stage in realisation of the economic pattern common to all peoples. Being pushed by this belief, the West felt itself legitimated to act as the economic arbitrator across the globe, imposing to anyone else that system of economic criteria, which reflects the logic of development of economic systems of western countries. The eurasist economic pattern will come from the opposite principle the impossibility of evaluating the economic systems of the various peoples starting from general abstract criteria and separately from historical and cultural reality. Against the economic monism of the liberal political economy, the eurasist world-view exposes the concept of an economic plurality. In practice it means that the world economic system consists of separate sovereign economic units developing according to their internal logic and unsuitable to be assessed proceeding from any general theory. Precisely just as it is impossible to demonstrate on the basis of abstract criteria the superiority of one culture over another, the truth of one faith in comparison with a different faith, the supremacy of one race above another, so it is impossible to justify the supremacy of one management system above another, since it would mean obliterating the original economic history of each concrete people and state. The traditional economic complexes of archaic nations are perfectly efficient, balanced and adequate within the framework of their historical and cultural context, as well as the advanced industrial technological complexes of the Western world. Economic and management specificity mirrors cultural peculiarity. The task of the eurasist economy is to warrant within its domain the sovereignty, conservation and organic development of all present economic systems reflecting the cultural-historical path of concrete peoples. The economic plurality of the eurasist pattern mirrors at an economic level that principle of multipolarity, to which eurasist geopolitics are oriented. - creation of advanced self-sufficient economic systems of the mixed kind (plurality of regimes) The economic vector of development of Russia must be organically adjusted to the basic geopolitical and strategic orienting point of its development, i.e. with the Eurasist Project. It is perfectly clearly, that following abstract dogmas of purely economic ideologies be it Marxism or liberalism withdraws Russia from its destiny in labyrinths of scholastics and civil conflicts. Moreover, liberalism, as well as Marxism, insists on economic unification, on

the levelling of management processes. The natural development of the economy of Russia in the future must be realised on the basis of a complex approach taking into account both economic and non-economic factors. The strategic imperative of the eurasist line requires the edification of the economy in a regime of expanded self-sufficiency, prospectively on a continental scale. It is the neo-keynesian pattern of economic isolation or the updated version of the customs union. This economic pattern supposes the partial openness of economy (concerning the strategic allies) and the existence of economic barriers against the economic systems of countries belonging to the antagonist strategic block. The second imperative of development of the Russian economy is the requirement of a due plurality of regimes, the differentiated combination of various economic systems from state control (in strategic areas) to the free market (in small and medium production, trade system, services) through miscellaneous systems of collective management (cooperatives, joint-stock companies etc.) . - keynesism for Eurasia, eurasist economic isolation The economic pattern most suitable to modern Eurasia in view of establishing a civilisational factor is the keynesian pattern, centrally placed for respecting the strategic priorities of the eurasist ensemble of states and nations. In defining the orientation of economic reforms, emphasis must be put not simply on the achievement of the highest economic efficiency, but on the general civilisational and social context, in whose interest these reforms must be realised according to the logic of things. And since this context in its basic vectors is not simply different, but in many respects opposite to the liberal atlantist system, to the new world order, a major problem is the creation of an eurasist economic island, possessing relative self-sufficiency. It implies a paternalistic economic variant, indispensable through the whole period of economic development of Eurasia. Thus the development of the basic sectors of industry, information systems, agriculture and especially of high technology must be the main task of the central authority, responsible for strategic issues. Market elements, completely indispensable in a number of sectors of the economy small and medium production, sphere of services etc. must be combined with the public sector. The problem of employment must be solved at strategical state level, and not just at market level. The parasitic class of the rentiers must be marginalised to the benefit of productive social groups of businessmen and workers receiving a wage in the private and state enterprises (so-called wage-earners).

- eurasist finance It is necessary for Russia to create its own currency in a common planetary financial context. This is possible in three ways: 1) pegging it to the dollar (being de facto the world reserve currency), 2) pegging it to the currencies of other large geoeconomic regions (European or Pacific), 3) creating its own financial system within the framework of a vast eurasist customs union - the so-called eurasist rouble. The first alternative disappears for strategic reasons, as it makes the eurasist economy of Russia dependent from the atlantist geopolitical pole (that means suicide). The second and third alternatives can be realised in a parallel way with a the prioritary perspective solution of the eurasist rouble. The warranties of the eurasist rouble cannot only stay in our industrialeconomic structures, but in the whole aggregate of geopolitical, resource and strategic potential of Eurasia, with a special emphasis on the sphere of Russian nuclear weapons and other innovative military technologies, assessed as a financial equivalent of the extent of power potential. Exactly according to such logic of US achieved supremacy in the post-war world within the capitalist camp have, having translated their strategic force superiority in the equivalent financial domination of the dollar as the world reserve currency, and just as a result of such operation - having provided a solid base for strong economic growth. Within the framework of the eurasist strategic block Russia can quite reasonably repeat the given schema and peg its currency, the eurasist rouble, to the conservation and development of its military strategic potential, seen as a warranty of freedom and independence for other eurasist powers from the neo-colonial dictatorship of the new world order. - fourth zone, pragmatical involvement in world virtual economy Major economic task of Russia is the creation of a self-supporting, autarchic, closed economic zone within the limits of Eurasia. The eurasist fourth zone along with the existing three: American, European and Pacific must reunite in a common economic space the territory of CIS countries, and a number of East Europe and Asian countries interested to strategic independence in front of the economic pressure of the rich North. Potential participants of the fourth zone can be countries with various economic systems, which implies an economic integration at miscellaneous paces depending on the specificity of the given region or country. The fourth economic zone must be guided by prioritary interaction with the neighbouring

economic spaces European and Pacific - with the long-term purpose of opposing American hegemony across the globe and normalising the economic balance on the territory of the whole planet. Even the first steps toward the realisation of the fourth zone will change the economic balance between highly technological, industrial regions and regions richly endowed with resources, breaking the univocal domination of the rich North and the colonial exploitation of the poor South. - involvement in planetary geoeconomical processes with the purpose to give them an eurasist civilisational direction The financial and economic system of Russia can not ignore the forming of a virtual economy at a world level, the translation of economic potential into the sphere of information technology and electronic stock exchanges. In a distant perspective, the eurasist policy course must result in the relativization (and even deletion) of such virtual financial system and in the returning to the priorities of real sectors, long-term investments and concrete production of material goods, to the transition from virtual capital to real, creative and organising management. But at a transitory stage Russia must participate in the world virtual economy, by delegating to special broker groups under strict strategic control of the highest state authorities, in order to assimilate the most recent technologies and whenever possible to readdress global trends in a direction strategically amplifying the positions of the eurasist geoeconomy. Our ideal of strategy of industrial development of Russia - informatization The creation of the fourth zone requires a radical modernisation of the domestic industry, the large-scale and systematic introduction of advanced technologies in key spheres of strategic production. At the roots of such modernisation must lay the system of informatization, communication and transport, which constitutes the axial reality of the post-industrial stage of development of the economy. Due to large-scale informatization, many organisational problems of production, merchandising and allocation, and also processes of economic integration and work allocation within the framework of the eurasist zone will be successfully solved. Thanks to technological flexibility, informatization can be introduced both in hi-tech processes and in some traditional spheres of the economy, everywhere multiplying the efficiency. Planned and universal informatization must become a

strategic priority of the State. In the issue of creating a solid system of eurasist customs union, informatization will play a central role, and the success of such union will depend to no small degree on it. - regionalisation Integration processes in the eurasist economy must be accompanied by increasing significance of the single regions and increasing extent of their administrative and economic independence. Industrial zones must be integrated in a communal eurasist economic field not by way of decrees, but through organic and natural horizontal connections reproducing on an economic level the federative system. The control from the centre must encompass exclusively the strategic spheres, set general economic parameters, but the concrete ways of accomplishing the general tasks of industrial development must be decided at a local level. - creation of self-contained industrial cycles linked to local spaces The allocation of work within the framework of the fourth zone does not imply the centralisation of production management. The large industrial areas must be based on the use of local infrastructures and resource potential. Such organisation of partially self-contained industrial cycles linked to local systems is indispensable for increasing the solidity of the pan-eurasist economic pattern and raise the level of industrial safety. The industrial complexes in such situation must become the core of social ensembles in view of the ethnic, demographic, religious and cultural specificity of the population. - ecological qualification of industrial productions The environmental factor must be included among the basic priorities in expert estimation of industrial projects, and its evaluation is also indispensable in the issue of restructuring existing productions. The probability of an ecological catastrophe in the present conditions increases, and in this situation the conservation of the eco-system becomes a major element of strategic safety. http://www.evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=455

Home Page | Eurasian theory in 4 maps | Eurasian Common House | Eurasian Manifest | Eurasian Path | Eurasian Vision | Millstones of eruasianism | Structure A.Dugin The Eurasian Idea What is Eurasianism today? What forms the concept of Eurasia? -- Seven senses of word Eurasianism -- Evolution of notion of Eurasianism

Changes in the original meaning of Eurasianism Different terms lose their original meaning though their daily use over the course of many years. Such fundamental notions as socialism, capitalism, democracy, fascism have changed profoundly. In fact, they have turned banal. The terms "Eurasianism" and "Eurasia" also have some uncertainties because they are new, they belong to a new political language and intellectual context that is only being created today.

The Eurasian Idea mirrors a very active dynamical process. It's meaning has become clearer throughout history but needs to be further developed. Eurasianism as a philosophical struggle The Eurasian Idea represents a fundamental revision of the political, ideological, ethnic, and religious history of mankind, and it offers a new system of classification and categories that will overcome standard cliches. The Eurasian theory went through two stages - a formational period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the XX century by Russian emigrant intellectuals (Trubeckoy, Savickiy, Alekseev, Suvchinckiy, Iljin, Bromberg, Hara-Davan etc.) followed by the historical works of Leonid Gumilev and, finally, the constitution of neoEurasianism (second half of 1980's to the present). Towards neo-Eurasianism Classical Eurasian theory undoubtedly belongs to past and can be correctly classified within the framework of ideologies of the XX century. Classical Eurasianism might have passed, but neo-Eurasianism has given it a second birth, a new sense, scale, and meaning. When the Eurasian Idea arose from its ashes, it became less obvious, but has since revealed its hidden potential. Through neo-Eurasianism, the entire Eurasian theory has received a new dimension. Today we cannot ignore the large historical period of neo-Eurasianism and must try to comprehend it in its modern context. Furthermore, we will describe the various aspects of this notion.

Eurasianism as a global trend Globalization as the main body of modern history In the broad sense, the Eurasian Idea and even Eurasia as concept do not strictly correspond to the geographical boundaries of the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian Idea is a global-scale strategy that acknowledges the objectivity of globalization and the termination of "nation-states" (Etats-Nations), but at the same time offers a different scenario of globalization, which entails no unipolar world or united global government. Instead, it offers several global zones (poles). The Eurasian Idea is an alternative or multipolar version of globalization, but globalization is the currently the major fundamental world process that is deciding the main vector of modern history. Paradigm of globalization - paradigm of Atlantism Todays nation-state is being transformed into a global state; we are facing the constitution of planetary governmental systems within a single administrativeeconomic system. To believe that all nations, social classes, and economic models might suddenly begin to cooperate on the basis of this new planet-wide logic is

wrong. Globalization is a one-dimensional, one-vector phenomenon that tries to universalize the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic, religious, and national structures into one system. It is a Western European historical trend that has reached its peak through its domination of the United States of America. Globalization is the imposing of the Atlantic paradigm. Globalization as Atlantism absolutely tries to avoid this definition. Proponents of globalization argue that when there will be no alternative to Atlantism and that it will stop being Atlantism. The American political philosopher F. Fukuyama writes about the "end of History," which actually means the end of geopolitical history and the conflict between Atlantism and Eurasianism. This means a new architecture of a world system with no opposition and with only one pole - the pole of Atlantism. We may also refer to this as the New World Order. The model of opposition between two poles (East-West, North-South) transforms to the center-outskirt model (center West, "rich North," outskirt - South). This variant of world architecture is completely at odds with the concept of Eurasianism. Unipolar globalization has an alternative Today the New World Order is nothing more than a project, plan, or trend. It is very serious, but it is not fatal. Adherents of globalization deny any alternative plan for future, but today we are experiencing a large-scale phenomenon - contraglobalism, and the Eurasian Idea coordinates all opponents of unipolar globalization in a constructive way. Moreover, it offers the competing idea of multipolar globalization (or alter-globalization). Eurasianism as pluriversum Eurasianism rejects the center-outskirt model of the world. Instead, the Eurasian Idea suggests that the planet consists of a constellation of autonomous living spaces partially open to each other. These areas are not national-states, but a coalition of states, reorganized into continental federations or "democratic empires" with a large degree of inner self-government. Each of these areas is multipolar, including a complicated system of ethnic, cultural, religious and administrative factors. In this global sense, Eurasianism is open to everyone, regardless of ones place of birth, residence, nationality or citizenship. Eurasianism provides an opportunity to choose a future different from the cliche of Atlantism and one value system for all

of mankind. Eurasianism does not merely seek the past or to preserve the current status quo, but strives for the future,acknowledging that the worlds current structure needs radical change, that nation states and industrial society have exhausted all their resources. The Eurasian Idea does not see the creation of a world government on the basis of liberal-democratic values as the one and only path for mankind. In its most basic sense, Eurasianism in the XXI century is defined as the adherence to alter-globalization, synonymous with a multipolar world. Atlantism is not universal Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlantism and Americanism. The pattern of Western-Europe and America has many attractive features that can be adopted and praised, but, as a whole, it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical context along with other civilizations and cultural systems. The Eurasian Idea protects not only anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures. It is a kind of "poliversum" that provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlantism, along with other civilizations, because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland. The Eurasian Idea promotes a global revolutionary idea The Eurasian Idea on a global scale is a global revolutionary concept, called upon to be a new platform for mutual understanding and cooperation for a large conglomerate of different powers: states, nations, cultures, and religions that reject the Atlantic version of globalization. If we analyze the declarations and statements of various politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals we will see that majority of them are adherents (sometimes unaware) of the Eurasian Idea. If we will think about all of those who disagree with the "end of history" our spirits will be raised and the failure of the American concept of strategic security for the XXI century connected with constituting the unipolar world will be much more realistic.

Eurasianism is the sum of the natural, artificial, objective, and subjective obstacles on the path of unipolar globalization; it offers a constructive, positive opposition to globalism instead of simple negation. These obstacles, however, remain uncoordinated in the meantime, and proponents of Atlantism are able to manage them easily. Yet, if these obstacles can somehow be integrated into a united force, they will be can be integrated into something united and the likelihood of victory will become much more serious. Eurasianism as the Old World (continent) The New World is a part of the Second Old World or a more specific and narrow sense of the word Eurasianism applicable to what we call the Old World. The Notion of the Old World (traditionally regarding Europe) can be considered in a much wider context. It is multi-civilizational super space, inhabited by nations, states, cultures, ethnicities, and religions connected to each other historically and geographically by dialectic destiny. The Old World is an organic product of human history. The Old World is often opposed to the New World, the American continent, discovered by Europeans and transformed into a platform for an artificial civilization, where European projects of modernism were created. It was built based upon human-produced ideologies as a purified civilization of modernism. The United States was the successful creation of the "perfect society," formed by intellectuals from England, Ireland, and France, while the countries of South and Central America remained colonies of the Old World. Germany and Eastern Europe were less influenced this idea of a perfect society. In the terms of Oswald Spengler, dualism between the Old and New World can be brought to opposites: culture-civilization, organic-artificial, historical-technical. The New World as Messiah As a historical product of Western Europe during its evolution, the New World very early on realized its "messiah" destiny, where the liberal-democratic ideals of the Enlightment were combined with the eschatological ideas of radical protestant sects. This was called the theory of Manifest Destiny, which became the new symbol of belief for generations of Americans. According to this theory, American civilization overtook all cultures and civilizations of the Old World and in its current universal form, it is obligatory for all nations of the planet.

With time, this theory directly confronted, not only the cultures of the East and Asia, but came into conflict with Europe, which seemed to the Americans to be archaic and full of prejudice and antiquated traditions. In turn, the New World turned away from the heritage of the Old World. Directly following WWII, the New World became the indisputable leader in Europe itself with the "criteria of verity" of others. This inspired a corresponding wave of American dominance and at a parallel time the beginning of a movement that seeks geopolitical liberation from the brutal, transoceanic, strategic, economic, and political control of the "elder Brother. Integration of the Eurasian continent In the XX century, Europe became aware of its common identity and step by step started to move towards the integration of all its nation into a common union, able to guarantee full sovereignty, security, and freedom to itself and all members. The creation of the European Union became the most important event that helped Europe restore its status as a world power alongside the United States of America. This was the response of the Old World to the excessive challenge of the New World. If we consider the alliance of the USA and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European development, European integration under the aegis of the continental countries (Germany, France) may be called European Eurasianism. This becomes more and more obvious if we take into consideration the theory of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals (S. de Goll) or even to Vladivostok. In other words, the integration of the Old World includes the vast territory of Russian Federation. Thus, Eurasianism in this context may be defined as a project of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic integration of the north of Eurasian continent, considered the cradle of European history and the matrix of European nations. Parallel with Turkey, Russia (alike ancestors of the Europeans) is historically connected with the Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus nations. Russia gives the integration of Europe an Eurasian dimension in both the symbolic and geographic senses (identification of Eurasianism with continentalism). During last few centuries, the idea of European integration has been proposed by the revolutionary faction of European elites. In ancient times, similar attempts were

made by Alexander the Great (integration of the Eurasian continent) and Genghis khan (founder of historys largest empire). Eurasia as three great living-spaces, integrated across the meridian Three Eurasian belts (meridian zones) The horizontal vector of integration is followed by a vertical vector. Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical geographical belts (meridian zones) from North to South. Both American continents will form one common space oriented on and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine. This is the Atlantic meridian zone. In addition to the above zone, three others are planned. They are the following: Euro-Africa, with the European Union as its center; Russian-Central Asian zone; Pacific zone Within these zones, the regional division of labor and the creation of developmental areas and corridors of growth will take place. Each of these belts (meridian zones) counterbalance each other and all of them together counterbalance the Atlantic meridian zone. In the future, these belts might be the foundation upon which to build a multipolar world: the number of poles will be more than two; however, the number will be much less than the number of current nation-states. The Eurasian model proposes that the number of poles must be four.

Great spaces The Meridian zones in the Eurasian project consist of several "Great Spaces" or "democratic empires." Each possesses relative freedom and independence but is strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian zone. The Great Spaces correspond to the boundaries of civilizations and include several nation-states or unions of states. The European Union and Arab Great Space, which integrates North, TransSaharan Africa and the Middle East, form Euro-Africa. The Russian-Central Asian zone is formed by three Great Spaces that sometimes overlap each other. The first is the Russian Federation along with several countries of the CIS - members of the Eurasian Union. Second is the Great Space of continental Islam (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). The Asian countries of the CIS intersect with this zone. The third Great Space is Hindustan, which is a self-dependent civilization sector. The Pacific meridian zone is determined by a condominium of two great spaces (China and Japan) and also includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, and

Australia (some researchers connect it with the American meridian zone). This geopolitical region is very mosaic and can be differentiated by many criteria. The American meridian zone consist of the American-Canadian, Central, and North American Great Spaces. Importance of the fourth zone The structure of the world based upon meridian zones is accepted by most American geopoliticians who seek the creation of a New World Order and unipolar globalization. However, a stumbling block is the existence of the Russian-Central Asian meridian space: the presence or absence of this belt radically changes the geopolitical picture of the world. Atlantic futurologists divide the world into the three following zones: American pole, with the European Union as its close-range periphery (EuroAfrica as an exemption) and the Asian and Pacific regions as its long-range periphery. Russia and Central Asia are fractional, but without it as an independent meridian zone, our world is unipolar. This last meridian zone counterbalances American pressure and provides the European and Pacific zones ability to act like self-dependent civilization poles. Real multipolar balance, freedom, and the independence of meridian belts,Great Spaces, and nation-states depend upon the successful creation of a forth zone. Moreover, its is not enough to be one pole in a two-pole model of the world: the rapid progress of the United States of America can be counterbalanced only by the synergy of all three meridian zones. The Eurasian project proposes this four-zone super-project on a geopolitical strategic level. Eurasianism as Russian-Central Asian integration Moscow-Teheran axis

Fourth meridian zone - Russian-Asian meridian integration. The central issue of this process is the implementation of a Moscow-Teheran axis. The whole process of integration depends on the successful establishment of a strategic middle and long-term partnership with Iran. Iranian and Russian economic, military, and political potential together will increase the process of the zone integration, making the zone irreversible and autonomous. The Moscow-Teheran axis will be a basis for further integration. Both Moscow and Iran are self-sufficient powers, able to create their own organizational strategic model of the region. Eurasian plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan The integration vector with Iran is vitally important for Russia to gain access to warm-water ports as well as for the political-religious reorganization of Central Asia (Asian countries of CIS, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Close cooperation with Iran presumes the transformation of the Afghani-Pakistani area into a free Islamic confederation, loyal both to Moscow and Iran. The reason this is necessary is that the independent states of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the continuing source of destabilization, threatening neighboring countries. The geopolitical struggle will provide the ability to implement a new Central-Asian federation and transform this complicated region into one of cooperation and prosperity area. Moscow-Deli axis Russian-Indian cooperation is the second most important meridian axis in the integration on the Eurasian continent and collective Eurasian security systems. Moscow will play an important role, decreasing the tensions between Deli and Islamabad (Kashmir). The Eurasian plan for India, sponsored by Moscow, is the creation of a federation that will mirror the diversity of Indian society with its numerous ethnic and religious minorities, including Sikhs and Muslims Moscow-Ankara The main regional partner in the integration process of Central Asia is Turkey. The Eurasian Idea is already becoming rather popular there today because of Western trends interlaced with Eastern. Turkey acknowledges its civilization differences with the European Union, its regional goals and interests, the threat of globalization, and further loss of sovereignty.

It is strategically imperative for Turkey to establish a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and Iran. Turkey will be able to maintain its traditions only within the framework of a multipolar world. Certain factions of Turkish society understand this situation - from politicians and socialists to religious and military elites. Thus, the Moscow-Ankara axis can become geopolitical reality despite a long-term period of mutual estrangement. Caucasus The Caucasus is the most problematic region to Eurasian integration because its mosaic of cultures and ethnicities easily leads to tensions between nations. This is one of main weapons used by those who seek to stop integration processes across Eurasian continent. The Caucasus region is inhabited by nations belonging to different states and civilization areas. This region must be a polygon for testing different methods of cooperation between peoples, because what can succeed there can succeed across the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian solution to this problem lies not in the creation of ethnic-based states or assigning one nation strictly to one state, but in the development of a flexible federation on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences within the common strategic context of the meridian zone. The result of this plan is a system of a half-axis between Moscow and the Caucasian centers, (Moscow-Baku, Moscow-Erevan, Moscow-Tbilissi, MoscowMahachkala, Moscow-Grozny, etc.) and between the Caucasian centers and Russia's allies within the Eurasian project (Baku-Ankara, Erevan-Teheran etc.). Eurasian plan for Central Asia Central Asia must move towards integration into a united, strategic, and economic block with the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Union, the successor of the CIS. The main function of this specific area is the rapprochement of Russia with the countries of continental Islam (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan). From the very beginning, the Central-Asian sector must have various vectors of integration. One plan will make the Russian Federation the main partner (similarities of culture, economic and energetic interests, a common strategic security system). The alternate plan is to place the accent on ethnic and religious resemblance: Turkic, Iranian, and Islamic worlds. Eurasian integration of post-soviet territories

Eurasian Union A more specific meaning of Eurasianism, partially similar to the definitions of the Eurasian intellectuals of 20-30s of the XX century is connected with the process of the local integration of post-soviet territories. Different forms of similar integration can be seen in history: from the Huns and other (Mongol, Turkic, and Indo-European) nomad empires to the empire of Genghis khan and his successors. More recent integration was led by the Russian Romanov Empire and, later, the USSR. Today, the Eurasian Union is continuing these traditions of integration through a unique ideological model that takes into consideration democratic procedures; respects the rights of nations; and pays attention to the cultural, lingual, and ethnic features of all union members. Eurasianism is the philosophy of integration of the post-Soviet territory on a democratic, non-violent, and voluntary basis without the domination of any one religious or ethnic group. Astana, Dushanbe, and Bishkek as the main force of integration Different Asian republics of the CIS treat the process of post-soviet integration unequally. The most active adherent to integration is Kazakhstan. President of

Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev is a staunch supporter of the Eurasian Idea. Kyrgyz and Tajikistan similarly support the process of integration, though their support less tangible in comparison with Kazakhstan. Tashkent and Ashabad Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan oppose the integration process, trying to gain the maximum positive results from their recently achieved national sovereignty. However, very soon, due to the increasing rate of globalization, both states will face a dilemma: to lose sovereignty and melt into unified global world with its domination by American liberal values or to preserve cultural and religious identity in the context of the Eurasian Union. In our opinion, an unbiased comparison of these two options will lead to the second one, naturally sequential for both countries and their history. Trans-Caucasian states Armenia continues to gravitate towards the Eurasian Union and considers the Russian Federation an important supporter and conciliator that helps it to manage relations with its Muslim neighbors. It is notable that Teheran prefers to establish a partnership with ethnically close Armenian. This fact allows us to consider two half-axis - Moscow-Erevan and Erevan-Teheran -as positive prerequisites of integration. Baku remains neutral, but this situation will drastically change with the continued movement of Ankara towards Eurasianism (it will immediately affect Azerbaijan). Analysis of the Azerbaijani cultural system shows that this state is closer to Russian Federation and post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia than to religious Iran and even moderate Turkey. Georgia is the key problem of the region. The mosaic character of the Georgian state is the cause of serious problems during the construction of a new national state that is strongly rejected by its ethnic minorities: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria, etc. Furthermore, the Georgian state does not have any strong partners in the region and forced to seek a partnership with the USA and NATO to counterbalance Russian influence. Georgia is a major threat, able to sabotage the very process of Eurasian integration. The solution to this problem is found in the Orthodox culture of Georgia, with its Eurasian features and traditions. Ukraine and Belarus - Slavic countries of the CIS

It is enough to gain the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to succeed in creation of the Eurasian Union. The Moscow-Astana-Kiev geopolitical triangle is a frame able to guarantee the stability of the Eurasian Union, which is why negotiations with Kiev are urgent like never before. Russia and Ukraine have very much in common: culture, language, religious, and ethnic similarities. These aspects need to be highlighted because from the beginning of Ukraines recent sovereignty Russophobia and disintegration have been promoted. Many countries of the EU can positively influence the Ukrainian government, because they are interested in political harmony in Eastern Europe. The cooperation of Moscow and Kiev will demonstrate the pan-European attitudes of both Slavic countries. The above-mentioned factors pertain to Belarus, where integration intentions are much more evident. However, the strategic and economic status of Belarus is less important to Moscow than those of Kiev and Astana. Moreover, the domination of a Moscow-Minsk axis will harm integration with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which is why integration with Belarus must proceed fluently without any sudden incidents - along with other vectors of the Eurasian integration process. Eurasianism as Weltanschauung The last definition of Eurasianism characterizes a specific Weltanschauung: a political philosophy combining tradition, modernity, and even elements of postmodernism. This philosophy has as its priority traditional society; acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (without separating from traditional culture); and strives for the adaptation of its ideological program to postindustrial, informational society, which is called postmodernism. Postmodernism formally removes counter positions of tradition and modernism, disfranchising and making them equal. Eurasian postmodernism, on the contrary, promotes an alliance of tradition and modernism as a constructive, optimistic, energetic impulse towards creation and growth. Eurasian philosophy does not deny the realities discovered by the Enlightment: religion, nation, empire, culture, etc. At the same time, the best achievements of modernism are used widely: technological and economic advances, social guarantees, freedom of labor. Extremes meet each other, melting into a unifying harmonic and original theory,

inspiring fresh thinking and new solutions for the eternal problems people have faced throughout history. Eurasianism is an open philosophy Eurasianism is an open, non-dogmatic philosophy that can be enriched with new content: religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, national geography, culture, strategic and political research, etc. Moreover, Eurasian philosophy offers original solutions in specific cultural and lingual contexts: Russian Eurasianism will not be the same as French, German, or Iranian versions. However, the main framework of the philosophy will remain invariable. Principles of Eurasianism The basic principles of Eurasianism are the following: differentialism, the pluralism of value systems versus the conventional obligatory domination of one ideology (American liberal-democracy first and foremost); tradition versus suppression of cultures, dogmas, and discoveries of traditional society ; rights of nations versus the "gold billions" and neocolonial hegemony of the "rich North"; ethnicities as values and subjects of history versus the depersonalization of nations, imprisoned into artificial social constructions; social fairness and human solidarity versus exploitation and humiliation of man by man.

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF EURASIST POLICY

1. Three patterns (Soviet, pro-Western, Eurasist) In modern Russia there exist three basic, reciprocally conflicting patterns of state strategy both in the sphere of foreign policy, and in the field of domestic policy. These three patterns form the modern system of political co-ordinates in which any political decision of the Russian government, any international step, any serious social, economic or juridical problem is decomposed. The first pattern represents the inertial clich of the Soviet (mainly later Soviet) period. It has somehow taken roots in the psychology of some Russian managing systems, often unconsciously, pushing them into adopting such or such decision on the basis of the precedents. This pattern is supported with the relevant argument: It worked earlier, it will work also now. It concerns not only those political leaders who consciously exploit the nostalgic complex of the Russian citizens. The Soviet reference pattern is much wider and deeper than the structures of the KPFR [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], which now stands at the rim of executive power, far from the decisional centres. Everywhere politicians and officials, formally not identifying themselves in any way with communism, are guided by it. It is an effect of education, life experience, formation. In order to understand the substance of the undergoing processes in Russian politics, it is necessary to admit this unconscious sovietism. The second pattern is the liberaldemocrat, pro-American one. It started taking shape with the beginning of perestroyka and became some kind of dominant ideology in the first half of the 1990s. As a rule, the so-called liberal-reformers and the political forces close to them identify themselves with it. This pattern is based on choosing as system of reading of the American socio-political device, copying it on the Russian ground and following US national interests in international issues. Such pattern has the advantage to allow to lean on the quite real foreign present, as against the virtual domestic past around which the first pattern gravitates. The argument here too is rather simple: It works for them, it will work for us too. Here it is important to stress that we are not simply talking about foreign experience, but about the orientation towards the US, as to the flagship of the successful Western capitalist world. These two patterns (plus their manifold variations) are diffusely represented in Russian politics. Since the end of the 1980s all basic world-view conflicts, discussions and political fights takes place between the bearers of these two views.

The third pattern is much less known. It can be defined as eurasist. We are dealing here with much more complex operations, than simply copying the Soviet or American experience. This pattern refers both to the domestic past and to the foreign present in terms of differentiation: it derives something from our political history, something from the reality of modern societies. The eurasist pattern recognises that Russia (as a State, as a people, as a culture) is an autonomous civilisation value, that she should save its uniqueness, independence and power in that that became, having put at the service of this purpose any doctrine, system, mechanism and political technique which can to this encourage. Eurasism, in this way, is an original patriotic pragmatism, free from any dogmatics - be it Soviet or liberal. But at the same time, the wideness and flexibility of the eurasist approach do not prevent this theory from being conceptually systematic, possessing all the marks of an organic, consequent, internally consistent worldview. As the two former orthodox patterns show their unfitness, eurasism becomes more and more popular. The Soviet pattern operates with obsolete political, economic and social realities, it exploits nostalgia and inertness, it lacks a sober analysis of the new international situation and the real development of world economic trends. The pro-American liberal pattern, in turn, can not be realised in Russia by definition, being an organic part of another civilisation, alien to Russia. This is well understood in the West too, where nobody disguises their preference to see not a prospering and safe Russia, but, on the contrary, a weakened Russia, submerged in the abyss of chaos and corruption. Therefore today the eurasist pattern becomes most urgent, most demanded by the society. So we must take a closer look at it.

2. Eurasism and Russian foreign policy Let us formulate the basic political principles of modern Russian eurasism. We shall start from foreign policies. As in every political field, also in foreign policy eurasism proposes to follow the third path - neither sovietism, nor americanism. It means that Russian foreign

policies should not directly reconstruct the diplomatic profile of the Soviet period (rigid opposition to the West, recovering a strategic partnership with rogue countries - North Korea, Iraq, Cuba etc.) while at the same time it must not blindly follow the American advisors. Eurasism offers its own foreign policy doctrine. Its essence can be summarised as follows. Contemporary Russia can be saved as an autonomous and independent political reality, as a valuable subject of international policy, only in the conditions of a multipolar world. Consenting to the unipolar American-centred world is impossible for Russia, since in such world she could be but one of the objects of globalisation, inevitably losing her independence and originality. The opposition to unipolar globalisation, the assertion of the multipolar pattern is the major imperative of contemporary Russian foreign policies. This condition must not be put into doubt by any political forces: and from this follows that the propagandists of American-centred globalisation inside Russia must be (at least morally) delegitimized. The construction of the multipolar world (vital for Russia) is feasible only through a system of strategic alliances. Russia alone cannot cope with this problem, not disposing of sufficient resources for complete autarchy. Therefore her success in many respects depends on the adequacy and activity of her foreign policy. In the modern world there are some geopolitical subjects which, due historical and civilisation reasons, also are vitally interested in multipolarity. In the situation now taking shape these subjects represent Russia's natural partners. They are divided in some categories. The first category: powerful regional formations (countries or group of countries), whose relations with Russia can be conveniently expressed by the term complementary. It means that these countries own something vital for Russia, while Russia owns something extremely indispensable for them. As a result, such strategic exchange of potentials strengthens both geopolitical subjects. To this category (symmetrically complementary) belong the European Union, Japan, Iran, India. All these geopolitical realities can quite reasonably claim to a role of autonomous subjects in conditions of multipolarity, while American-centrism deprives them of this possibility, reducing them to mere objects. As the new Russia cannot be presented as an ideological enemy (that which ensured the US their major argument for drawing Europe and Japan into their orbit, and confounded the USSR into being pulled together with Islamic Iran in the cold war period), the imperative of complete subordination of these countries to American geopolitics is

practically no more substantiated with anything (except for historical inertia). Hence, the contradictions between the US and the powers reciprocally complementary to Russia will be continuously aggravated. If Russia will prove to be active and will substantiate with her potential the multipolar trend, finding for each of these geopolitical formations the right arguments and differentiated conditions for strategic alliance, the club of the supporters of multipolarity can become mighty and influential enough to efficiently achieve the realisation of its own project of future world system. To each of these powers Russia has what to offer - resources, strategic potential of weapons, political weight. In exchange Russia will receive, on the one hand, economic and technological sponsorship on behalf of the European Union and Japan, on the other hand - political-strategic partnership in the South on behalf of Iran and India. Eurasism conceptualises such foreign-policy course and substantiates it by the scientific methodology of geopolitics. The second category: geopolitical formations being interested in multipolarity, but not being symmetrically complementary to Russia. These are China, Pakistan, the Arab countries. The traditional policies of these geopolitical subjects have an intermediate character, but strategic partnership with Russia is not their major priority. Moreover, the eurasist alliance of Russia with the countries of the first category strengthens the traditional rivals of the countries of the second category at the regional level. For example, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have serious contradictions with Iran, as China with Japan and India. On a broader scale, the relations of Russia with China represent a special case, complicated by demographic problems, by the heightened interest of China to the scarcely populated territories of Siberia, and also the by absence at China of a serious technological and financial potential able to positively solve the major problem for Russia of technological assimilation of Siberia. All the countries of the second category are delivered before necessity to manoeuvre between America-centred unipolarity (which does not promise anything good for them) and eurasism. With regard to the countries of this category Russia must act with the utmost caution - not including them in the eurasist project, but at the same time aiming at neutralising as much as possible the negative potential of their reaction and

actively countering their active inclusion in the process of unipolar globalisation (for which there are enough reasons). The third category represents the countries of the Third World which do not possess enough geopolitical potential to claim even to the status of limited subjects. Concerning these countries Russia should follow differentiated policies, contributing to their geopolitical integration in zones of common prosperity, under the control of the mighty partners of Russia within the Eurasian bloc. This means that in the Pacific zone it is convenient for Russia to favour the strengthening of the Japanese presence. In Asia it is necessary to encourage the geopolitical ambitions of India and Iran. It is also necessary to contribute to expanding the European Union influence in the Arab world and Africa as a whole. The same states which are included into a traditional orbit of Russian influence must naturally remain there or be brought back into it. To this effect the policy of integration of the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to the Eurasian Union is directed. The fourth category: the US and the countries of the American continent laying under US control. The international eurasist policies of Russia must be oriented to show by any means the US the inconsistency of the unipolar world, the conflicting character and irresponsibility of all process of American-centred globalisation. Rigidly and actively (using to this purpose, first of all, the instrument of the Eurasian alliance) opposing such globalisation, Russia should on the contrary support the isolationist tendency in the US, saluting with favour the limitation of US geopolitical interests to the American continent. The US, as the strongest regional power, whose circle of strategic interest is disposed between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, can even be a strategic partner for an eurasist Russia. Moreover, such America will be extremely desirable for Russia, as she will limit Europe, the Pacific region, and also the Islamic world and China, in case their aspiration were to follow a path of unipolar globalisation on the basis of their own geopolitical system. And if unipolar globalisation will keep being staged, it is Russia's interest to back the anti-American mood in Southern and Central America, using, however, a much more flexible and wider world-view and geopolitical device than Marxism. In the same channel lays the policy of priority work with anti-American political circles in Canada and Mexico. Possibly also using in this direction the lobbyist activity of the Eurasian diasporas in the US.

3. Eurasism and domestic policy

Eurasism in domestic policy means following some major directions. The integration of CIS countries into a united Eurasian Union is the major strategic imperative of eurasism. The minimal strategic volume indispensable for starting a serious international activity to the creation of a multipolar world is not the Russian Federation, but the CIS taken as a single strategic reality, fastened by a single will and a common civilisation purpose. The political system of the Eurasian Union in the most logical way is founded on the democracy of participation (the demotia of the classical eurasists), the accent being not on the quantitative, but on the qualitative aspect of representation. The representative authority should mirror the qualitative structure of the Eurasian society, instead of the average quantitative statistical indicators based on the efficiency of pre-election shows. Special attention should be given to the representation of ethnoses and religious confessions. The democracy of participation must be organically integrated with a definite fraction of individual responsibility as much as possible expressed in strategic areas. The Supreme Leader of the Eurasian Union must concentrate the common will to the achievement of power and prosperity of the state. The principle of the social imperative should be combined with the principle of personal freedom in a proportion essentially differing as much from liberaldemocratic recipes, as from the impersonal collectivism of the Marxists. Eurasism supposes here the preservation of a definite balance, with a significant role of the public factor. In general, the active development of the social principle is a constant feature of the Eurasian history. It is shown in our psychology, ethics, religion. But as against the Marxist patterns the social principle should be affirmed as something qualitative, differentiated, linked with the concrete national, psychological, cultural and religious setting. The social principle must not suffocate, but strengthen the private principle, giving it a qualitative background. The qualitative understanding of the social factor allows precisely to define the golden mean between the hyperindividualism of bourgeois West and the hyper-collectivism of socialist East. In the administrative system eurasism insists on the model of eurasist federalism. This supposes choosing as the basic category for building the Federation not the territories, but the ethnoses. Having separated the principle of ethno-cultural autonomy from the territorial principle, eurasist federalism will

forever liquidate the same reasons for separatism. So as a compensation the peoples of the Eurasian Union receive the possibility of maximal development of ethnic, religious and even, in some definite issues, juridical independence. The undoubted strategic unity in eurasist federalism is accompanied by ethnic plurality, by the emphasis on the juridical element of the rights of the peoples. The strategic control of the space of the Eurasian Union is ensured by the unity of management and federal strategic districts, in whose composition various formations can enter - from ethno-cultural to territorial. The immediate differentiation of territories into several levels will add flexibility, adaptability and plurality to the system of administrative management in combination with rigid centralism in the strategic sphere. The Eurasian society should be founded on the principle of a revived moral possessing both common features and concrete forms linked to the specificity of the ethno-confessional context. The principles of naturalness, purity, restraint, respect for the rules, liability, healthy life, righteousness and truthfulness are common to all traditional faiths of Eurasia. These undeniable moral values must be given the status of state norms. Scandalous social vices, impudent and public violation of moral foundations should be ruthlessly rooted out. The armed forces of Eurasia and the power ministries and offices must be considered as the strategic skeleton of the civilisation. The social role of the militaries should increase, it is necessary to restore their prestige and public respect. On the demographic plan is indispensable to achieve the proliferation of the Eurasian population, morally, materially and psychologically encouraging having many children, making of it the Eurasian social standard. In the field of education it is necessary to strengthen the moral and scientific education of youth in the spirit of faithfulness to historical roots, loyalty to the eurasist idea, liability, virility, creative activity. The activity of the informational sector of the eurasist society must be based on the strict observance of civilisation priorities in making light upon domestic and foreign events. The principles of formation and intellectual and moral education should be set above the principles of entertainment or commercial benefit. The principle of freedom of speech must be combined with the imperative of liability for the freely spoken words.

Eurasism supposes the creation of a society of a mobilisation kind, where the principles of creation and social optimism should be the standard of human life. The world-view should uncover the potential possibilities of the man, enabling everyone - overcoming (internal and external) inertia and limitation - to express his unique personality in the service of society. At the basis of the eurasist approach to the social question lays the principle of a balance between state and private. This balance is defined by the following logic: all scale, related to strategic sphere (military-industrial complex, education, safety, peace, moral and physical health of a nation, demography, economic growth etc.) is controlled by the State. Small and medium production, the sphere of services, personal privacy, the entertainment industry, the sphere of leisure etc. are controlled not by the State but on the contrary by personal and private initiative (except for those cases when the latter conflicts with the strategic imperatives of eurasism in the global sphere).

4. Eurasism and the economy As against liberalism and Marxism, eurasism considers the economic sphere to be neither autonomous nor determining for socio-political and state processes. According to the eurasists' belief, economic activities are only a function of various cultural, social, political, psychological and historical realities. We might express the eurasist relation to the economy, rephrasing the Gospel truth: " not the man for the economy, but the economy for the man ". Such relation to the economy can be called as qualitative: the thrust is done(made) not on formal digital indexes of economic growth, a significantly wider spectrum of indexes is allowed, in which the economic force is clean is considered in a complex with others, predominantly having social character. Some economists (in particular Joseph Schumpeter) already tried to introduce qualitative parameters into economics, separating the criteria of economic growth from those of economic development. Eurasism sets the issue from an even wider perspective: what matters is not only economic development, but economic development combined with social development. The eurasist approach to the economy can be expressed as a simplified scheme in this way: state regulation of the strategic branches (military-industrial complex, natural monopolies and similar) and maximal economic freedom for medium and small business.

The major element of the eurasist approach to the economy is the idea of the decision of a significant number of Russian national-economic problems within the framework of the eurasist foreign policy project. Is present in view of what. Some geopolitical subjects vitally interested in the multipolarity of the world - first of all, the European Union and Japan - have a huge financial-technological potential, whose engaging can sharply change the Russian economic climate. At the present stage it is regretfully necessary to acknowledge that there are no sufficient resources in Russia for (even relative) autarchy. Therefore investments and other kinds of interaction with the advanced economic regions is vitally necessary to us. This interaction should be initially plotted on the logician by more volumetric, rather than is narrow economic relations - investment, credits, import-export, energy deliveries etc. All this should be set in the wider context of common strategic programs - such as the joint assimilation of fields or the creation of unified Eurasian transport and information systems. In some sense Russia must lay the burden of the revival of its economic potential to the partners of the club of supporters of multipolarity, actively using to this purpose the possibility to offer extremely convenient joint transport projects (the Trans-Eurasian main) or vital energy resources for Europe and Japan . A relevant problem is also the return of capital to Russia. Eurasism creates very serious reasons to this purpose. The confused Russia of the period of liberal reforms (beginning in the 1990s), completely turned to the West, referring to herself with distaste, immersed in the psychosis of privatisation and corruption, and the eurasist, patriotic, state-oriented Russia of the beginning of the XXI century are diametrically opposite political realities. Capital fled a weak and collapsing Russia. In a Russia set on a path of strength and recovery, capital must return. In the Western countries most of the capitals taken out from Russia can neither be saved nor increased. In the beginning of the 1990s, the West looked with approval at Russian capital flight (mainly of criminal origin), considering according to the cold war logic that the weakening of post-communist Russia would play in the hands of NATO countries. Now the situation has sharply changed, and in the present conditions serious problems will arise (they already have, indeed) for the owners of illegal capitals in the West The eurasist logic means the creation of the most favourable conditions to the return of these capitals to Russia, which in itself will provide a serious impulse to the development of the economy. Contrary to some purely liberal abstract dogmas,

capital moves back faster to a state with strong, accountable authority and precise strategic orienting points, rather than to an uncontrollable, chaotic and unstable country. 5. Eurasian path Eurasism is the pattern most precisely responding to the strategic interests of modern Russia. It gives the answers to the most difficult questions, offers an exit to the most entangled situations. Eurasism combines openness and attitude to dialog with fidelity to historical roots and consequent assertion of national interests. Eurasism offers a consistent balance between the Russian national idea and the rights of the many peoples inhabiting Russia and more widely Eurasia. Some definite aspects of eurasism are already being used by the new Russian authorities oriented to a creative solution of the difficult historical problems Russia has to face the in new century. And every time this happens, efficiency, effectiveness, serious strategic results speak for themselves. The integration processes in the CIS, the creation of the Eurasian Economic Commonwealth, the first steps of the new foreign policy of the Russian Federation concerning Europe, Japan, Iran and the countries of the Near East, the creation of a system of Federal districts, the strengthening of the vertical line of power, the weakening of the oligarchic clans, the policy of patriotism and statehood, the increase of responsibility in the work of the mass media all these are relevant and essential elements of eurasism. For the time being these elements are intermingled by the inertial trends of the other two patterns (liberal-democrat and soviet). And yet it is perfectly clear that eurasism is steadily moving to its zenith, whereas two other patterns conduct only rear-guard fight. Enhancing the role of eurasism in Russian politics is an evolutionary and gradual process. But the time has already come for a more attentive and accountable learning of this really universal theory and philosophy, whose transformation into political and world-view practice is under our eyes. Aleksandr Dugin, ph.d. leader of the All-Russian Political Social Movement "Eurasia" June 2001

http://www.evrazia.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=421

Analytical department of the Movement EURASIA MILESTONES OF EURASISM Eurasism is an ideological and social-political current born within the environment of the first wave of Russian emigration, united by the concept of Russian culture as a non-European phenomenon, presenting among the varied world cultures an original combination of western and eastern features; as a consequence, the Russian culture belongs to both East and West, and at the same time cannot be reduced neither to the former nor to the latter. The founders of eurasism N.S. Trubetskoy (1890-1938) filologist and linguist P.N. Savitsky (1895-1965) geographer, economist G.V. Florovsky (1893-1979) historian of culture, theologian and patriot G.V. Vernadsky ( 1877-1973) historian and geopolitician N.N. Alekseev - jurist and politologist V.N. Ilin historian of culture, literary scholar and theologian. Eurasisms main value consisted in ideas born out of the depth of the tradition of Russian history and statehood. Eurasism looked at the Russian culture not as to a simple component of the European civilization, as to an original civilization, summarizing the experience not only of the West as also to the same extent of the East. The Russian people, in this perspective, must not be placed neither among the European nor among the Asian peoples; it belongs to a fully original Eurasian ethnic community. Such originality of the Russian culture and statehood (showing at the same time European and Asian features) also defines the peculiar historical path of Russia, her national-state program, not coinciding with the WesternEuropean tradition. Foundations Civilization concept The Roman-German civilization has worked out its own system of principles and values, and promoted it to the rank of universal system. This Roman-German system has been imposed on the other peoples and cultures by force and ruse. The Western spiritual and material colonization of the rest of mankind is a negative

phenomenon. Each people and culture has its own intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logics. Russia is an original civilization. She is called not only to counter the West, fully safeguarding its own road, but also to stand at the vanguard of the other peoples and countries on Earth defending their own freedom as civilizations. Criticism of the Roman-German civilization The Western civilization built its own system on the basis of the secularization of Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), bringing to he the fore such values like individualism, egoism, competition, technical progress, consumption, economic exploitation. The Roman-German civiilization founds its right to globality not upon spiritual greatness, as upon rough material force. Even the spirituality and strength of the other peoples are evaluated only on the basis of its own image of the supremacy of rationalism and technical progress. The space factor There are no universal patterns of development. The plurality of landscapes on Earth produces a plurality of cultures, each one having its own cycles, internal criteria and logics. Geographical space has a huge (sometimes decisive) influence on peoples culture and national history. Every people, as long as it develops within some given geographical environment, elaborates its own national, ethical, juridical, linguistic, ritual, economic and political forms. The place where any people or state development happens predetermines to a great extent the path and sense of this development up to the point when the two elements became one. It is impossible to separate history from spatial conditions, and the analysis of civilizations must proceed not only along the temporal axis (before, after, development or non-development, and so on) as also along the spatial axis (east, west, steppe, mountains and so on). No single state or region has the right to pretend to be the standard for all the rest. Every people has its own pattern of development, its own times, its own rationality, and deserves to be understood and evaluated according to its own internal criteria. The climate of Europe, the small extension of its spaces, the influence of its landscapes generated the peculiarity of the European civilization, where the

influences of the wood (northern Europe) and of the coast (Mediterraneum) prevail. Different landscapes generated different kinds of civilizations: the boundless steppes generated the nomad empires (from the Scythians to the Turks), the loess lands the Chinese one, the mountain islands the Japanese one, the union of steppe and woods the Russian-Eurasian one. The mark of landscape lives in the whole history of each one of these civilizations, and cannot be either separated form them or suppressed. State and nation The first Russian slavophiles in the XIX century (Khomyakov, Aksakov, Kirevsky) insisted upon the uniqueness and originality of the Russian (Slav, Orthodox) civilization. This must be defended, preserved and strengthened against the West, on the one hand, and against liberal modernism (which also proceeds from the West), on the other. The slavophiles proclaimed the value of tradition, the greatness of the ancient times, the love for the Russian past, and warned against the inevitable dangers of progress and about the extraneousness of Russia to many aspects of the Western pattern. From this school the eurasists inherited the positions of the latest slavophiles and further developed their theses in the sense of a positive evaluation of the Eastern influences. The Muscovite Empire represents the highest development of the Russian statehood. The national idea achieves a new status; after Moscows refusal to recognize the Florentine Unia (arrest and proscription of the metropolitan Isidore) and the rapid decay, the Tsargrad Rus inherits the flag of the Orthodox empire.

Political platform Wealth and prosperity, a strong state and an efficient economy, a powerful army and the development of production must be the instruments for the achievement of high ideals. The sense of the state and of the nation can be conferred only through the existence of a leading idea. That political regime, which supposes the establishment of a leading idea as a supreme value, was called by the eurasists as ideocracy from the greek idea and kratos, power. Russia is always thought of as the Sacred Rus, as a power [derzhava] fulfilling its own peculiar historical

mission. The eurasist world-view must also be the national idea of the forthcoming Russia, its leading idea.

The eurasist choice Russia-Eurasia, being the expression of a steppe and woods empire of continental dimensions, requires her own pattern of leadership. This means, first of all, the ethics of collective responsibility, disinterest, reciprocal help, ascetism, will and tenaciousness. Only such qualities can allow keeping under control the wide and scarcely populated lands of the steppe-woodland Eurasian zone. The ruling class of Eurasia was formed on the basis of collectivism, asceticism, warlike virtue and rigid hierarchy. Western democracy was formed in the particular conditions of ancient Athens and through the centuries-old history of insular England. Such democracy mirrors the peculiar features of the local European development. Such democracy does not represent an universal standard. Imitating the rules of the European liberaldemocracy is senseless, impossible and dangerous for Russia-Eurasia. The participation of the Russian people to the political rule must be defined by a different term: demotia, from the greek demos, people. Such participation does not reject hierarchy and must not be formalized into party-parliamentary structures. Demotia supposes a system of land council, district governments or national governments (in the case of peoples of small dimensions). It is developed on the basis of social self-government, of the peasant world. An example of demotia is the elective nature of church hierarchies on behalf of the parishioners in the Muscovite Rus.

The work of L.N. Gumilev as a development of the eurasist thinking Lev Nikolaevic Gumilev (1912-1922), son of he Russian poet N.Gumilev amd of the poetess A.Akhmatova, was an etnographer, historian and philosopher. He was profoundly influenced by the book of the kalmuck eurasist E.Khara-Vadan Gengis-Khan as an army leader and by the works of Savitsky. In its own works Gumilev developed the fundamental eurasist theses. Towards the end of his life he

used to call himself as the last of the eurasists.

Basic elements of Gumilevs theory

The theory of passionarity [passionarnost] as a development of the eurasist idealism; The essence of which, in his own view, lays in the fact that every ethnos, as a natural formation, is subject to the influence of some energetic drives, born out of the cosmos and causing the passionarity effect, that is an extreme activity and intensity of life. In such conditions the ethnos undergoes a genetic mutation, which leads to the birth of the passionaries individuals of a special temper and talent. And those become the creators of new ethnos , cultures and states; Drawing the scientific attention upon the proto-history of the nomad empires of the East and the discovery of the colossal ethnic and cultural heritage of the autochtone ancient Asian peoples, which was wholly passed to the great culture of the ancient epoch, but afterwards fell into oblivion (Huns, Turks, Mongols, and so on); The development of a turkophile attitude in the theory of ethnic complementarity.

ETHNOS in in general any set of individuals, any collective: people, population, nation, tribe, family clan, based on a common historical destiny. Our GreatRussian ancestors wrote Gumilev in the XV, XVI and XVII century easily and rather quickly mixed with the Volga, Don and Obi Tatars and with the Buriates, who assimilated the Russian culture. The same Great-Russian easily mixed with the Yakuts, absorbing their identity and gradually coming into friendly contact with Kazakhs and Kalmucks. Through marriage links they pacifically coexisted with the Mongols in Central Asia, as the Mongols themselves and the Turks between the XIV and XVI centuries were fused with the Russians in Central Russia. Therefore the history of the Muscovite Rus cannot be understood without the framework of the ethnic contacts betwen Russians and Tatars and the history of the Eurasian continent.

The advent of neo-eurasism: historical and social context The crisis of the Soviet paradigm In the mid-1980s the Soviet society began to lose its connection and ability to adequately reflect upon the external environment and itself. The Soviet models of self-understanding were showing their cracks. The society had lost its sense of orientation. Everybody felt the need for change, yet this was but a confused feeling, as no-one could tell the way the change would come from. In that time a rather unconvincing divide began to form: forces of progress and forces of reaction, reformers and conservators of the past, partizans of reforms and enemies of reforms.

Infatuation for the western models In that situation the term of reforms became in itself a synonym of liberaldemocracy. A hasty conclusion was inferred, from the objective fact of the crisis of the Soviet system, about the superiority of the western model and the necessity to copy it. At the theoretical level this was all but self-evident, since the ideological map offers a sharply more diversified system of choices than the primitive dualism: socialism vs. capitalism, Warsaw Accord NATO. Yet it was just that primitive logics that prevailed: the partizans of reforms became the unconditional apologists of the West, whose structure and logics they were ready to assimilate, while the enemies of reforms proved to be the inertial preservers of the late Soviet system, whose structure and logics they lesser and lesser could catch. In such condition of lack of balance, the reformers / pro-westerners had on their side a potential of energy, novelty, expectations of change, creative drive, perspectives, while the reactionaries had nothing left but inertness, immobilism, the appeal to the customary and already-known. Just in this psychologic and aesthetical outfit the liberal-democratic policy prevailed in the Russia of the 1990s, although nobody had been allowed to make a clear and conscious choice.

The collapse of the state unity

The result of reforms was the collapse of the Soviet state unity and the beginning of the fall of Russia as the heir of the USSR. The destruction of the Soviet system and rationality was not accompanied by the creation of a new system and a new rationality in conformity to the national and historical conditions. There gradually prevailed a peculiar attitude toward Russia and her national history: the past, present and future of Russia began to be seen from the point of view of the West, to be evaluated as something stranger, transcending, alien (this country was the reformers typical expression). That was not the Russian view of the West, as the Western view of Russia. No wonder that in such condition the adoption of the western schemes even in the reformers theory was invoked not in order to create and strengthen the structure of the national state unity, but in order to destroy its remains. The destruction of the state was not a casual outcome of the reforms; as a matter of fact, it was among their strategical aims.

The birth of an anti-western (anti-liberal) opposition in the post-Soviet environment In the course of the reforms and their deepening, the inadequacy of the simple reaction began to be clear to everyone. In that period (1989-90) began the formation of a national-patriotic opposition, in which there was the confluence of part of the Soviet conservatives (ready to a minimal level of reflection), groups of reformers disappointed with reforms or having become conscious of their anti-state direction, and groups of representatives of the patriotic movements, which had already formed during the perestroika and tried to shape the sentiment of state power [derzhava] in a non-communist (orthodox-monarchic, nationalist, etc.) context. With a severe delay, and despite the complete absence of external strategic, intellectual and material support, the conceptual model of postSoviet patriotism began to vaguely take shape.

Neo-eurasism Neo-eurasism arose in this framework as an ideological and political phenomenon, gradually turning into one of the main directions of the post-Soviet Russian patriotic self-consciousness.

Stages of development of the neo-eurasist ideology 1st stage (1985-90)

Dugins seminars and lectures to various groups of the new-born conservative-patriotic movement. Criticism of the Soviet paradigm as lacking the spiritual and national qualitative element. In 1989 first publications on the review Sovetskaya literatura [Soviet Literature]. Dugins books are issued in Italy (Continente Russia [Continent Russia], 1989) and in Spain (Rusia Misterio de Eurasia [Russia, Mystery of Eurasia], 1990). In 1990 issue of Rn Gunons Crisis of the modern world with comments by Dugin, and of Dugins The Paths of the Absolute [Puti Absoljuta], with the exposition of the foundations of the traditionalist philosophy. In these years eurasism shows right-wing conservative features, close to historical traditionalism, with orthodox-monarchic, ethnic-pochevennik [i.e. linked to the ideas of soil and land] elements, sharply critic of leftwing ideologies.

2nd stage (1991-93)

Begins the revision of the anti-communism, typical of the first stage of neoeurasism. Revaluation of the Soviet period in the spirit of nationalbolshevism and left-wing eurasism. Journey to Moscow of the main representatives of the New Right (Alain de Benoist, Robert Steuckers, Carlo Terracciano, Marco Battarra, Claudio Mutti and others). Eurasism becomes popular among the patriotic opposition and the intellectuals. On the basis of terminological affinity, A.Sakharov already speaks about Eurasia, though only in a strictly geographic - instead of political and geopolitical sense (and without ever making use of eurasism in itself, like he was before a convinced atlantist); a group of democrats tries to start a project of democratic eurasism (G.Popov, S.Stankevic, L.Ponomarev). O.Lobov, O.Soskovets, S.Baburin also speak about their own eurasism.

In 1992-93 is issued the first number of Elements. Eurasist review. Lectures on geopolitics and the foundations of eurasism in high schools and universities. Many translations, articles, seminars.

3rd stage (1994-98): theoretical development of the neo-eurasist orthodoxy

Issue of Dugins main works Mysteries of Eurasia [Misterii Evrazii] (1996), Conspirology [Konspirologija] (1994), Foundations of geopolitics [Osnovy Geopolitiki] (1996), The conservative revolution [Konservativnaja revoljutsija] (1994), Knight Templars of the Proletariat [Tampliery proletariata] (1997). Works of Trubetskoy, Vernadsky, Alekseev and Savitsky are issued by Agraf editions (1995-98). Creation of the Arctogaia web-site (1996) www.arctogaia.com. Direct and indirect references to eurasism appear in the programs of the KPFR (Communist Party], LDPR [Liberal-democratic Party] e NDR [New Democratic Russia] (that is left, right, and centre). Growing number of publications on eurasist themes. Issue of many eurasist digests. Criticism of eurasism from Russian nationalists, religious fundamentalists and orthodox communists, and also from the liberals. Manifestations of an academic weak version of eurasism (prof. A.S.Panarin, V.Ya.Paschenko, F.Girenok and others) with elements of the illuminist paradigm, denied by the eurasist orthodoxy then evolving towards more radically anti-western, anti-liberal and anti-gobalist positions. Inauguration of a university dedicated to L.Gumilev in Astan [Kazakhstan].

4th stage (1998-2001)

Gradual de-identification of neo-eurasism vis--vis the collateral politicalcultural and party manifestations, turn to the autonomous direction (Arctogaia, New University, Irruption [Vtorzhenie] outside the opposition and the extreme left and right-wing movements. Apology of staroobrjadchestvo [Old Rite]. Shift to centrist political positions, supporting Primakov as the new premier. Dugin becomes the adviser to the Duma speaker G.N.Seleznev. Issue of the eurasist booklet Our Path [Nash put] (1998). Issue of Eurasist Irruption [Evraziikoe Vtorzhenie] as a supplement to Zavtra. growing distance from the opposition and shift closer to the governments positions. Theoretical researches, elaborations, issue of The Russian Thing [Russkaja vesch] (2001), publications on Nezavisimaja Gazeta,

Moskovskij Novosti, radio broadcasts about Finis Mundi on Radio 101, radio broadcasts on geopolitical subjects and neo-eurasism on Radio Svobodnaja Rossija (1998-2000). 5th stage (2001-2002)

Foundation of the Pan-Russian Political Social Movement EURASIA on radical centre positions, declaration of full support to the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin (21 April 2001). The leader of the Centre of Spiritual Management of the Russian Muslims, sheik-ul-islam Talgat Tadjuddin, adheres to EURASIA. Issue of the periodical Evraziizkoe obozrenie [Eurasist Review]. Appearance of the Jewish neo-eurasism (A.Eskin, A.Shmulevic, V.Bukarsky). Creation of the web-site of the Movement EURASIA - www.eurasia.com.ru Conference on Islamic Threat or Threat to Islam?. Intervention by H.A.Noukhaev, Chechen theorist of the islamic eurasism (Vedeno or Washington?, Moscow, 2001]. Issue of books by E.Khara-Davan and Ya.Bromberg (2002). Process of transformation of the Movement EURASIA into a party (2002).

Basic philosophical positions of neo-eurasism

At the theoretical level neo-eurasism consists of the revival of the classic principles of the movement in a qualitatively new historical phase, and of the transformation of such principles into the foundations of an ideological and political program and a world-view. The heritage of the classic eurasists was accepted as the fundamental world-view for the ideal (political) struggle in the post-Soviet period, as the spiritual-political platform of total patriotism. The neo-eurasists took over the basic positions of classical eurasism, chose them as a platform, as starting points, as the main theoretical bases and foundations for the future development and practical use. In the theoretical field, neo-eurasists consciously developed the main principles of classical eurasism taking into account the wide philosophical, cultural and political framework of the ideas of the XX century. Each one of the main positions of the classical eurasists (see the chapter on the

Foundations of classical eurasism) revived its own conceptual development. Civilization concept Criticism of the western bourgeois society from left-wing (social) positions was superimposed to the criticism of the same society from right-wing (civilizational) positions. The eurasist idea about the rejecting the West is reinforced by the rich weaponry of the criticism of the West by the same representatives of the West who disagree with the logics of its development (at least in the last centuries). The eurasist came only gradually, since the end of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, to this idea of the fusion of the most different (and often politically contradictory) concepts denying the normative character of the Western civilization. The criticism of the Roman-German civilization was thoroughly stressed, being based on the prioritary analysis of the Anglo-saxon world, of the US. According to the spirit of the German Conservative Revolution and of the European New Right, the Western world was differentiated into an atlantic component (the US + England) and into a continental European component (properly speaking, a Roman-German component). Continental Europe is seen here as a neutral phenomenon, liable to be integrated on some given conditions in the eurasist project. The spatial factor Neo-eurasism is moved by the idea of the complete revision of the history of philosophy according to spatial positions. Here find their trait-dunion the most various models of the cyclical vision of history, from Danilevsky to Spengler, from Toynbee to Gumilev. Such principle finds its most pregnant expression in traditionalist philosophy, which denies the ideas of evolution and progress and founds this denial upon detailed metaphysical calculations. Hence the traditional theory of cosmic cycles, of the multiple states of Being, of sacred geography, and so on. The basic principles of the theory of cycles are illustrated into detail by the works of Gunon (and his followers G.Georgel, T.Burckhardt, M.Eliade, A.Corbin). A full rehabilitation has been given to the concept of traditional society, either knowing

no history at all, or realizing it according to the rites and myths of the eternal return. The history of Russia is seen not simply as one of the many local developments, but as the vanguard of the spatial system (East) opposed to the temporal one (West).

State and nation Dialectics of national history

It is led up to its final, dogmatical formulation, including the historiosophic paradigm of national-bolshevism (N.Ustryalov) and its interpretation (M.Agursky). The pattern is as follows: The Kiev period as the announce of the forthcoming national mission (IXXIII centuries); Mongolian-Tatar invasion as a scud against the levelling European trends, the geopolitical and administrative push of the Hoard is handed over to the Russians, division of the Russians between western and eastern Russians, differentiation among cultural kinds, formation of the Great-Russians on the basis of the eastern Russians under the Hoards control (XIII-XV centuries); The Muscovite Empire as the climax of the national-religious mission of Rus (Third Rome) (XV-end of the XVII century); Roman-German yoke (Romanov), collapse of the national unity, separation between a pro-western lite and the national mass (end of the XVIIbeginning of the XX century); oviet period, revenge of the national mass, period of the Soviet messianism, re-establishment of the basic parameters of the main muscovite line (XX century); Phase of troubles, that must end with a new eurasist push (beginning of the XXI century).

Political platform Neo-eurasism owns the methodology of Vilfrido Paretos school, moves within the logic of the rehabilitation of organic hierarchy, gathers some nietzschean

motives, develops the doctrine of the ontology of power, of the Christian Orthodox concept of power as katechon. The idea of lite completes the constructions of the European traditionalists, authors of researches about the system of castes in the anciet society and of their ontology and sociology (R.Gunon, J.Evola, J.Dumzil, L.Dumont). Gumilevics theory of passionarity lays at the roots of the concept of new eurasist lite. The thesis of demotia is the continuation of the political theories of the organic democracy from J.J. Rousseau to C.Schmitt, J.Freund, A.de Benoist and A.Mueller van der Bruck. Definition of the eurasist concept of democracy (demotia) as the participation of the people to ist own destiny. The thesis of ideocracy gives a foundation to the call to the ideas of conservative revolution and third way, in the light of the experience of Soviet, Israeli and Islamic ideocracies, analyses the reason of their historical failure. The critical reflection upon the qualitative content of the XX century ideocracy brings to the consequent criticism of the Soviet period (supremacy of quantitative concepts and secular theories, disproportionate weight of the classist conception). The following elements contribute to the development of the ideas of the classical eurasists:

The philosophy of traditionalism (Gunon, Evola, Burckhardt, Corbin), the idea of the radical decay of the modern world, profound teaching of the Tradition. The global concept of modern world (negative category) as the antithesis of the world of Tradition (positive category) gives the criticism of the Western civilization a basic metaphysic character, defining the eschatological, critical, fatal content of the fundamental (intellectual, technological, political and economic) processes having their origin in the West. The intuitions of the Russian conservatives, from the slavophiles to the classical eurasists, are completed by a fundamental theoretical base. (see A.Dugin, The Absolute Homeland [Absoljutnaja Rodina], Moscow 1999; The End of the World [Konets Sveta], Moscow 1997; Julius Evola et le conservatisme russe, Rome 1997). The investigation on the origins of sacredness (M.Eliade, K.G.Jung, C.Levi-Strauss), the representations of the archaic consciousness as the manifestationist paradigmatic complex laying at the roots of culture. The

reduction of the many-sided human thinking, of culture, to ancient psychic layers, where are concentrated fragments of archaic initiatic rites, myths, originary sacral complexes. Interpretation of the content of rational culture through the system of the ancient, pre-rational beliefs (A.Dugin, The evolution of the paradigmatic foundations of science [Evoljutsija paradigmalnyh osnovanij nauki], Moscow 2002). The search for the symbolic paradigms of the space-time matrix, which lays at the roots of rites, languages and symbols (H.Wirth, paleo-epigraphic investigations). This attempt to give a foundation to the linguistic (SvitycIllic), epigraphic (runology), mythological, folkloric, ritual and different monuments allows to rebuild an original map of the sacred concept of the world common to all the ancient Eurasian peoples, the existence of common roots (see A.Dugin Hyperborean Theory [Giperborejskaja Teorija], Moscow 1993. A reassessment of the development of geopolitical ideas in the West (Mackinder, Haushofer, Lohhausen, Spykman, Brzeszinski, Thiriart and others). Since Mackinders epoch, the geopolitical science has sharply evolved. The role of geopolitical constants in the XX century history appeared so clear as to make of geopolitics an autonomous discipline. Within the geopolitical framework, the concept itself of eurasism and Eurasia acquired a new, wider meaning. Fome some time onwards, eurasism, in a geopolitical sense, began to indicate the continental configuration of a strategic (existing or potential) bloc, created around Russia or its enlarged base, and antagonist (either actively or passively) to the strategic initiatives of the opposed geopolitical pole atlantism, at the head of which at the mid-XX century the US came to outplace England. The philosophy and the political idea of the Russian classics of eurasism in this situation have been considered as the most consequent and powerful expression (fulfilment) of eurasism in its strategic and geopolitical meaning. Thanks to the development of geopolitical investigations (A.Dugin, Foundations of geopolitics [Osnovye geopolitiki], Moscow 1997] neoeurasism becomes a methodologically evolved phenomenon. Especially remarkable is the meaning of the Land Sea pair (according to Carl Schmitt), the projection of this pair upon a plurality of phenomena from the history of religions to economics. The search for a global alternative to mondialism (globalism), as an ultramodern phenomenon, summarizing everything that is evaluated by eurasism (and neo-eurasism) as negative. Eurasism in a wider meaning becomes the conceptual platform of anti-globalism, or of the alternative globalism. Eurasism gathers all contemporary trends denying globalism any objective

(let alone positive) content, it offers the anti-globalist intuition a new character of doctrinal generalization. The assimilation of the social criticism of the new left into a conservative right-wing interpretation (reflection upon the heritage of M.Foucault, G.Deleuze, A.Artaud, G.Dbord). Assimilation of the critical thinking of the opponents of the bourgeois western system from the positions of anarchism, neo-marxism and so on. This conceptual pole represents a new stage of development of the left-wing (nationalbolshevik) tendencies existing also among the first eurasists (Suvchinskij, Karsavin, Efron), and also a method for the mutual understanding with the left wing of anti-globalism. Third way economics, autarchy of the great spaces. Application of heterodox economic models to the post-Soviet Russian reality. Application of F.Lists theory of the custom unions. Actualization of the theories of S.Gesell. F.Schumpeter, F.Leroux, new eurasist reading of Keynes.

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