ManipulabilityTheoriesofCausation Thebasicideabehindthemanipulabilityoragencyaccountofcausationsays'AneventAisacauseofadistinct eventBjustincasebringingabouttheoccurrenceofAwouldbeaneffectivemeansbywhichafreeagentcould bringabouttheoccurrenceofB.

' This approach is distinct from observationoriented empiricism in that it acknowledges and takes seriouslythefactthathumansubjectshaveaccesstotheworldnotjustasobserversbutalsoasagentswhoare capableofinterveningintheprocessesoftheworldatwill.Thisapproachisusedbothbyphilosophersof causation(vonWright,Collingwood,Woodward,Gasking,MenziesandPrice)butisalsoadvocatedbynon philosophers(e.g.CookandCampbellonexperimentaldesign,andothersoneconometrics,structuralequations orcausalmodeling)Theirrespectiveaspirationsmaybeverydifferentfromeachother. Menziesandpricedevelopthisbasicideawithanumberofmodifications:Theirsisanindeterministc, probabilistic(unlikevonWright's)accountofcausality(withdeterminismasalimitingcase).Theyusetheidea ofagentprobabilities(AP): theAPofBconditionalonAistheprobabilitythatshouldenterintothecalculationsofarational agentwhoseabilitiesconsistinthecapacitytorealizeofpreventAandwhosegoalsturnentirelyon B. APisthenconstruedintermsofitsroleindecisiontheory,itembodiesthebasisofaformalanalysisofthe meansendsrelation.APcircumventssomeproblemsofaverynaiveversionoforthodoxprobabilitytheories suchasspuriousevidentialdependenciesofcausesandeffects,andbetweenjointeffectsofcommoncauses, becauseitabstractsawayfromtheevidentialimportofaneventbycreatingforitanindependentcausalhistory. Tinkeringwithaneffectwillforexamplenotinfluenceitscause.AndwhenforexampleXandYarebotheffects of an underlying cause Z then X and Y will be positively correlated but when we conditionalize on the realizationofXbyafreeactthenthecorrelationdisappearsandhencewecansaythatXdoesnotcauseY. TherearefourmainobjectionstothistheorythataccordingtoMenziesandPricecanbeaddressedby drawingthecomparisonwiththeorthodoxdispositionaltheoryofcolorasasecondaryquality:forsomethingto beredisforittobedisposedtolookredtoanormalobserverunderstandardconditions: 1. Agencyaccountsconfusetheepistemologyofcausationwithitsmetaphysics:Whilewemayfindout about causation through intervention and experimentation, this doesn't mean that such actions are constitutiveofcausation. ButthisobjectionpresupposestheideaofcausationassomethingintrinsicwhileAPsaysthatjustasthe conceptofcolorasasecondaryqualityisexplainedbyourrelationtoourexperienceasobservers,the conceptofcausationisexplainedbyourexperienceasagents,makingcausationanextrinsic,relation concept,andcausationthusbeingasecondaryquality. 2. Agencytheoryofcausalityisacirculartheory: ifAisacauseofadistincteventBjustincase bringingaboutAwouldbeaneffectivemeansforanagenttobringabout(=cause)B,then'causality' seemstobeusedinthedefinitionof'causality',for'bringingabout'(intheformeroccurrenceofthe term)seemstobeamatterofcausationitself. Butthesameobjectioncouldbelaunchedagainsttheideathat'redistolookredtoanormalobserver under standard conditions'. And both the color and causality theories are not circular because the conceptscanbeintroduced/learnedbyostensivedefinition,andsothereisanappealtosomething,some experience,independentoftheconceptofcolororcausation.Weexperiencesuccessfromearlyoninthe

externalworldinourtryingtoachieveourendsbyactinginonewayratherthananother.(Successful) actionisconceptuallypriortocausation.Thisapproachthenturnthetheoryintoareductiveanalysisof causality,basedonourexperienceandsuccessesofachievingourendsintheexternalworld. 3. Thereareunmanipulablecauses: wecan'tbringaboutearthquakesbutwe'dstillwanttospeakof causesforearthquakes. Butasimilarproblemholdsinthecaseofcolor:insomecircumstancesweareunabletoseee.g. somethingasredwhilewehavestrongreasontothinkthatthephysicalfeaturesofthatobjectwould disposeustoseeitasredunderothercircumstances.Theanswerinboththecolorandthecausalitycase ishadbyanalogicalreasoning:whenanagentcanbringaboutoneeventasameansofbringingabout anotherdistincteventwe'dsaythisisbecauseofcertainintrinsic(noncausal)featuresofthesituation involved.Whenwethenencounteradifferentsituationwithapairofeventswhichresemblestheearlier situationwithrespecttotherelevantfeaturesweinferthatthetwoeventsarecausallyrelatedtherejust astheywereintheearliersituation,evenifinthiscasewecan'tmanipulatesuchanevent.Inthecaseof earthquakes we can for example make models and then manipulate one event in the model (the 'movementofcontinentalplates')tocreateanotherevent(the'earthquake') Onepossibleproblemwiththisresponseisintherequirementthatwecanspecifywhat'similar'means herewhichafterallisthebasisforouranalogicalreasoning.I'llgetbacktothisbelow. 4. Agency accounts make causation an unacceptably anthropocentric phenomenon: in a situation withoutagentstherewouldbenocausalrelations.Andthat'ssilly. Butthesameproblemappliesinthecaseofcolorandit'snotcalledadispositionaltheoryfornothing:it states that if a normal observer/agent were present and were to observe/manipulate/bring about the object/eventunderstandardconditionsitwouldlookred/hewouldbeabletobringaboutthefirstevent asameansofbringingaboutthesecondevent. Amoresophisticatedformoftheobjectionwouldsayifthereareagentswithpowersmuchdifferent (muchmorelimitedforexample)fromourown,thencausalrelationswouldbemuchdifferent,which seemstoimplyanuntowardkindofrelativitytothesephenomena. Butcausationismuchdifferentintermsofdegreefromcolor,makingitconsiderablemoreobjective:if wecanuseanalogicalreasoningasmentionedinresponsetothethirdobjectionthendifferencesin degree betweendifferentpossibleagentsintermsofbeingabletomanipulate don'tseemtoresultin differencesinsuspectedcausalrelations:whenweareverylimitedinourabilitytomanipulateevents thenthatdoesn'tmeanthatonlythoseeventswecanmanipulatearerelatedcausallybutalltheevents thatwecanwithgoodreasonimaginethroughanalogicalreasoningtobemanipulable.Thusaslongas wehavesomecapacityformanipulationofeventswecaninfercausalrelationsbetweenmanyifnotall ofthesameeventsthatbeingswhohavegreaterpowersofmanipulationcanmanipulate.Thisreplystill doesnotmakecausalityunderstoodasasecondaryqualitywhollyobjective,butperhapstherequirement forsuchcompleteobjectivityissimplynotwarranted,thoughthatmaybehardtoswallow. Theotherproblemwiththisresponsehoweveristhatitmaynotbethatobvioushowwecangofrom someverylimitedpowersthatallowustohavetheconceptofcausalitytomuchmorecomplexor relevantlydissimilarkindsofcausality. InresponsetoMenzies'andPrice'sproposedsolutionstotheseobjections,andingeneral,thereareatleasttwo moreobjections: 5. Howdoweformanoncircularbasisforanalogicalreasoning? Asmentionedabove,weneed somenotionofsimilaritybetweenthesituationinwhichweareabletomanipulateaneventAto

bringabouteventBinonesituationandtheascriptionofacausalrelationbetweeneventsCandD in another situation wherein we cannot manipulate these events. Menzies and Price see these similaritiesintermsofcertainintrinsic,physicalandnoncausalpropertiesoftheeventsinquestion. But(a)forexampleinthecaseofmodels,itisnotatallclearthatthecausalprocessesinthemodel arealsothecausalprocessesatwork(orprimarilyatwork)inthereallifesituation.Moreover,b)the inference seems to presuppose the notion of 'causal process' which would then, according to Woodward,notbeareductiveanalysis.Anotionofresemblanceisrequiredthatcanbecharacterized innoncausalterms. ButIdon'tquiteunderstandthisobjection:AsImentionedaboveMenziesandPriceholdthatwe learntheconceptofcausalitythroughostensivedefinitiononthebasisofoursuccessinachieving ourendsintheexternalworld. Actionisconceptuallypriortocausation.Nowifwesuccessfully manipulateaneventAtobringabouteventBinasituationwethensaythatAisacauseofB.And thenthroughanalogicalreasoningonthebasisofperceivedintrinsicpropertieswethinkthatthereis and hence postulate the same type of causal relation in a situation with two events we cannot manipulate.Wemaybewrongintheinference(re(a)),butthefactthatwearefallibledoesnotmean thatthenotionofcausationwelearnedinitiallyisnotgroundedinourearlysuccessesinachieving ourendsinthatsituationintheworld(re(b)). Inotherwords,Woodwardseemstometoconfusethebasisonwhich(e.g.sharedphysical,intrinsic properties)wethinkwehavegoodreasontomaketheanalogicalinferencefromasituationwitha causalrelationbetweenmanipulableevents to acausalrelationbetweenunmanipulableeventsin anothersituation,withtheinferenceitself('thesamecausalrelationisatplay')andthensaysitis impossibletodothisinanonreductiveway,buthehasnotactuallygivenanargumentwhythe formercannotbestatedinnoncausalterms,whileitis(trivially)truebutirrelevantthatthelatteris givenincausalterms. Toputthesituationinlogicoconceptualchronologicalterms:throughmypowersofagencyIhave becomefamiliarwithacertaincausalrelation(whichisareductiveaccountofthatcausalrelation, asspecifiedabove).IthenseeasituationwitheventsthatIobviouslycannotmanipulatebutthat seemtohavesomeintrinsicproperties(onwhateverlevelofabstractionorconcreteness)incommon withtheeventsthatIamfamiliarwiththroughmyagency.Itheninferthatthesametypeofcausal relationholdsinthesituationinwhichIcannotmanipulatetheevents.(obviouslyinrealitythis processwillbemuchmoremuddledandoverlapping:Ican see thecausalrelationinthetarget situationdirectlywithoutmakingaconsciousinference.IjustseeitassuchbecauseIamfamiliar withthecausalrelationandthefeaturesoftheeventsinthatsourcesituationandIseethosefeatures inthetargetsituationaswell.Seeingthefeaturesandseeingthecausalrelationmayprettymuch occuratthesametime,althoughonecanconceptuallyseparatethem) Moreover,evenifthisinfactwasimpossible(perhapsexactlybecause'seeingthefeaturesandseeing thecausalrelation'areinseparablenotjustinexperiencebutalsoconceptually(i.e.oneneedstouse causalnotionstodescribethesharedfeatures))itisstillthecasethatIlearnedaboutthecausal relationinthefirstplacethroughmyearlierpower(andsuccessfulexercise)ofagencyandthusthat thecausalrelationcanbegivenareductiveaccountthroughostensivedefinition.Thefactthatthis (tacitorexplicit)knowledgetheninturninfluencesmyperceptionoffeaturescommontothesource andtargetsituationandmakesmeinferthatthesametypeofcausalrelationholdsinthetarget situationdoesnotmeanthatthecausalrelationitselfcannotbestatedinreductivetermsviamy initialfamiliaritywithit,whetherwearetalkingaboutthecausalrelationasitoccursinthesource

ortargetsituation(inthelattercaseitisreducibleviatheformercaseandtheanalogicalinference). Myinferencemaybeincorrect,butreliabilityisnotthesamethingasreduciblity.I'mconfused. Inanycase,theaboveisnottosaythatIdisagreewiththeideathatevenreducibilityinthesenseof #2aboveisimpossible,justthatIdon'tunderstandWoodward'sargumentinthis#5. 6. Spuriouscauses:thepersistenceofacorrelationbetweenAandBwhenAisrealizedasa'freeact' (eitherinthelibertarianorsoftdeterministsense)isnotsufficientfor'AcausesB.' a)thefreeactitselfcanbecorrelatedwithanunderlyingcommoncauseC(barometerexample) b)ifwerequirethatsuchscenariosarenotadmissible,thenwestillhaveaproblembecauseeventA thatisbroughtaboutbyafreeactcanbepositivelycorrelatedwitheventBviaaroutethatdoesnot gothroughA(thefreeactofadministeringaplacebobringsabouteventA(patientsingestingthe drug)thatispositivelycorrelatedwitheventB(enhancingrecoveryofpatients)althoughthefreeact thatbringsaboutAalsobringsabouteventBbutnotthroughtheingestionoftheplacebo(A)but throughthebeliefinthepatients(eventD).IwillturnnexttoWoodward'sproposedsolution. Woodwardwantstocharacterizethenotionofaninterventioninsuchawaythatnoreferenceismadetothe variableintervenedonanditseffects.HethenalwaysdefinesaninterventionIonavariableXwithrespecttoa secondvariableYsoastobeabletocharacterizewhatitisforXtocauseY.Thisinterventionmustsatisfythe followingconditions: M1:ImustbetheonlycauseofX M2:ImustnotdirectlycauseYviaaroutethatdoesnotgothroughX(placeboexample) M3:IshouldnotitselfbecausedbyanycausethataffectsYviaaroutethatdoesnotgothroughX (barometerexample) M4:IleavesthevaluestakenbyanycausesofYexceptthosethatareonthedirectedpathfromItoY (shouldthisexist)unchanged NowiffsuchaninterventiononX(meetingthefourcriteria)ispossiblethenXisacauseofY. Acoupleofpointsareinorderhere: A) theinterventionneednotbecarriedoutbyahumanbeing.Nothingintherequirementsdemandsthat. Andsointerventionthrough'naturalexperiments'ispossibletoo.Andsoitsolvesproblem#4above. B) a'freeact'(asindicatedin6a,6b)neednotsatisfytheconditionsforanintervention.Thebroadernotion ofinterventiondoesthensolveproblems6aand6b. C) theformulationisacounterfactualone(asisMenzies'andPrice's)inthatitdoesnotrequirethatthe interventionhasactuallytakenplaceforustobeabletosaythatXcausesY.Itneedonlybepossible. Moreaboutthatlastbitbelow. D) thisnotionofaninterventionisclearlynotreductive(socircumventingproblems#2and#5)fornotonly is the relation between an intervention and the variable on which it intervenes a causal one, the requirementswithrespecttotherelationwithYarealsocausal.Woodwardholdsthatthisnonreductive characterofhisapproachstillgivesinterestingresultsanddoesnotmakehisapproachtrivial:a)while theapproachpresupposesknowledgeaboutsomecausalrelationsandaboutcorrelationalinformation, withthatknowledgewecancharacterizewhatitisforadifferentrelationtobecausal.Thegoalisnotto reducecausalitypersetononcausalelements,buttocharacterizearelationthatwedonothavesuch causalinformationabout.Moreover,itcouldbethatwehaveanotionofatypeofcausalnotionsuchas totalornetcausesandthenuse that notiontocharacterizeother causalnotion types suchasdirect causes. E) AsaresultofDWoodward'stheorydoesnotseecausalityasasecondaryquality(thusavoidingproblem

#1).Still,thereissomewhatofasubjectivistelementinhistheoryinthathehesaysthatanintervention hastobe possible andthenthingshingeonthequestionwhetherthisterm'possible'canbegivenan objectivemeaning:howdowegivethetruthvaluesofthecounterfactualstatementsonwhichcausal claimsarebased?Ifthereisasubjectivistelementinthis,thenhisisnotawhollyobjectiveaccount. What problems are there for Woodward's approach? 3. Woodward does not require interventions to be done or even to be doable by humans and so in a sense he circumvents problem #3 above. But his alternative has problems of its own. I mentioned that for him an intervention need not be actual, but may just be possible. The problem with this is that there are different meanings to the term 'possible': Interventions in the Woodwardian sense may not always be possible in practice: the conditions cannot always be met, and in some types of situation it is hard to imagine how they could possibly be met at all given our laws of nature. Should we count such interventions as possible then? Is 'possible' only a requirement of non-contradiction, or does it also require that the same laws of nature obtain? If the former, then does Woodward's theory still tell us anything of interest? If the latter, then are we for example allowed to imagine other laws of nature than the ones that now 'govern' the world? And should we assume similar initial conditions? If the latter and not the former, then given determinism possible coincides with actual. If alternatively either some laws of nature can be changed to some extent or some initial conditions may be different, then which ones and why? And can't there be counterexamples to those conditions as well, giving rise new versions of problem #6? Woodward seems to take the very weak conception of possible as something logically possible, but also seems to want to put some constraints on it (which, if they depend on subjective considerations such as 'plausibility' or 'seriousness' introduce a subjectivist element to his account of causation after all, though not in the reductive, secondary quality sense of Menzies and Price). Anyway, his job with regards to this bit seems quite hopeless and so sucks to be him.