BOERSlS

- A;a Tltui DIRECTOR, ^ C :<1ORT L i U ^ j J WORTH, iJ SUBJECT : Txiii bOiiiRS AS .^Iftii^ttS; ^TiiTu

In order to obtain unbiased opinions,

the bibliography has been selected printsipally
from reports of military observers of neutral
countries.
2*

.That were the fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ioe ^oers snd how did such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in fluence the 3oer fighting q u a l i t i e s ? What fight ing methods rtid the .Boers employ ? IVhat weve the a^vanta^es an^ disadvantages of the Boer methods? V/hat was the Boer system of military organization just prior to t?ie oouth African War and during the war ? /hat weaknesses did the tioer system of organization possess ? './hat armament end equipment did the Boers possess prior to the South African Var ? Via6 this armament and equipment added to or improved during the war ? ^S^AHCH L-IARIlATiyiS R-hiLA T IbJ 0 TO

55

TCHARACTERISflCS OS Tlig" 30JBHS,

In studyinp. the 'Joers as fighters it v/ould
seem desirable to first conbider their
fundamental characteristics and then to
trace the relation of such characteristics
and their effects on Boer fighting qualities.
Racially the Boers were descendants "of Dutch
end French (Hueguenot) settlers of South
Africa. This racial mixture gave to them the
characteristics of the phlegmatic, deliberate
hard working and calculating Dutchman and the
revengeful, fighting and somewhat emotional
temperament of the French Hueguenot. This
resulted in a queer mixture of virtues and
failings, the effects of which may be easily
traced thruout the Boer campaigns.
( 2) J3oer Pessimism
fhe Boers were easily depressed. An example
of this characteristic may be found in the
accounts of the Battle of Poplar Grove. After
this action the Boors continued in fllphtalthough
the British were thoroughly exhausted end were
completely out of touch with the !3oer columns.
At that time many of the Boers returned to their
homes expressing a desire to stop the war.
Bloemfontein, was another example of over-
pessimism on part of the Boers. The British

were able to capture Bloernfontein without firing a ohot t (l-18Bt193) (2-16 and 89) (4-764-706) (S-5l) '2) Over confidence and Optimism of the 3oera They were juat ad unduly elate* as they. were depressed.After withstanding repeated attacks by the British at Oolenso^the Boer morale was very high. They were so completely satisfied with this purely defensive action that no thought was given to following up the British; reoonnaisance was stopped and lerpe numbers of officers and men were granted leaves and furloughs, including General Botha,who took a fourteen day leave. (2-64 end 226) (6-Ubl (4) family ties and effects. The Boers were burghers or independent farmers, They had no desire for military l i f e . They only went to v/er to protect their farms and property. Their farms were far apart which caused their families to be thrown on their o n resources for social l i f e resulting in close w family t i e s . Durlnp. the early stares of the war, many families followed t&ir m n into the field & d camped in e n or near the rioer laamere (bivouacs). Obviously this factor did not contribute to offensive warfare but to the con trary we? a deterrent. Ltarinp the l a t t e r part o8 the war " the lioers issued regulations to stop this practice out with only partial success, bndouotedly these close family relationships were, not only detrimental to offensive ec'iion, out also contributed to dicing the !3oer soldier terribly susceptible to homesickness resulting in larp.e numbers of desertions &r\ti chronic absenteeism. (1-246) (2-64, 188, 226, 277) (5) rhlepme t i c ternperament. The phlegmatic temperament of the undoubtedly restricted their offensive operations. They were slow in making decisions and slow in carrying decisions into effect, before the action at Cannes i'ost, w find General de '.let vacillating for four days and e holflinp several coucils of war. There ere .neny examples of thie characteristic nut the most notable may be found in the accounts of the early stages of the war, when the Boers had invested the three towns of IadysmithtlLimberley and ...afeking, here was their opportunity for quick i.nd decisive action, at this time they were more numerous than they could hooe to be at any future date; the .-iritiBh force of 40000 was then unaccustomed to the climate .untried in warfare, end discouraged but the 3oers remained inactive, apparently leckinp the enthusiasm to sweep forward and reap the reward of their successes. (1-246, 258, 196, 199) (2-327,847, 276, 226, 269)
(2-24, 65, 69, )

(6)

&eli PA<^u _CharocrterjLlu. he' !?oera were ""Intensely r e l i p . i o u e . This y c h a r a o t e r i a t i c undoubtedly Influenced t h e i r d i s t a s t e for war and bloodshed. E n t i r e m i l i t a r y u n i t e erip.aped in p r a y e r s and hymns eaoh ni,ht in t h e i r bivouac8 or l a a r e r a . In t h e s e r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s they were led by t h e i r o f f i c e r s . Units f r e q u e n t l y l e f t the l i n e of march t o en^epe in r e l i ?.i ousservj ces Thei r re).i?,i ous s c r u p l e s presented them from en^epin'? in propaganda umi the'j could not understand uric1, were deeply 9 r j e v e - e b 11 e proc ar en d a pun 1 i she .1 by trie 1 -3r.i t i s h thru out the world, .i#ne of t h i s propa ganda s t a t e ! that the uoers were i n c l i n e d to Miuch druTif:enes arid b r u t a l i t y , '.'he ximerioan *il.i tary Attache r e p o r t e d ^to the c o n t r a r y , t h ^ t the 3oer,3 v/ero a very sooer jjoaple &nd t h a t dui'.iriP h i s e n t i r e s t a y of nine months with t h e 3oer armies he eaw hut one drur.Len :3oer. The rooDrt of the Ainerjoan m i l i t a r y i-ttociie al&^. s t a t e d in p a r t ce fol.lov;s l! .-'lie ')oers were as c;uch spr.sled ny the s l a u ^ h u e r of oheir ene^.ie^ i n c i d xi r; t t o th e i r vi c t o r i ea, a(' T>he y we .re P r j o VP d o'j t h e i r CA-TI d e f e a t s " Obviously i t would r e q u i r e nvuch tr^ininf:, d i s c i p l i n e ^nd stroh 1 - prebLi-re to d r i v e EUCQ t r e l i p i o u & l y i n c l i n e d paople i n t o o f f e n f i v e vo r f u r e . ' ,

'.^'JS t i n at eg "ustina tcy was. srn o ther charac te vl s t i c whi oh c or, tri1.uterl t D h i n d e r i n g t h e i r fi^htintf ef f i c i e n c y "'hile anxious tD c o - o n e r t t e in the v/ar t'jiey were Iruitne to pive t h e i r f u l l obedience. (&-i::ic-) y y 1 f o h e . c D n s i d e r ? d a n o e i t i on s e f c t t h e ; w oul d s t u b o o r n l y defend i t Out if for any reason VJiey decided tle.y did not l.H_e the p o s i t i o n they would abandon i t witliort c o n s u l t a n t t h e i r ".leaders or one a n o t h e r , (1-246) (1-243) (2-.:0-vl/ ^n exaraplo of t h a e r'ifiv be found in accounts of the a c t i o n * t i-opler Grove, vfhr-?re t h e r e t i r e m e n t s t a r t e d by ^Pal b u r n e r s h u r r y i n p to t h e i r c a r t s enfi ^ off with t h e i r personal e f f e c t s . ;> simi s i t u a t i o n occured a t iinpolo south of the Tupela v 'iver ( 2-13 -uxnfi 2r3ti) A pain a t Mannas t/ost we find [fiuch o b s t i n a t e wranpllnp in the c o u n c i l e of war held by General de wet (i-l c JG-l l J9) 1 discipline The :3oer Coi.narido^ or m i l i t a r y -4r.its were devoid of i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y &nd were und i s u i ^ l i n e There was an absence of f i g h t i n g d i s c i p l i n e ir tlie erm:; of l e v i e s . (1-111J (2-21) .after Poplar Crove P r e s i d e n t d r a p e r nave oersc orders to shoot anyone who continued in f l i g h t ; but not one o f f i c e r v/ouln carry out the or-.ilerjs. (2-16) At -pion Lop General sotha found a l a r ^ e number

of h i s men bad withdrawn from the f i r h t . It needed e l l >J influence to et 'them back into a c t i o n . ( 2-160) IB At the same b a t t l e , General Cronje refused to order hie men .into action a t ?wi). leaks* ( 2 - 163). There Arare riitny other examples of the lack of d i s c i p l i n e each **s ILe action at ^rakfontein heights (I?-- (<L) ; wholesale d e s e r t i o n s end the absence of penal powere ( 1-111) ' ^-'i8 absence of fighting d i s c i p l i n e south of the Tu^ela lUver (2-2i7) *ncl north of the Tue]a -Uver (2-277).

(1 j In 6o _lte of t h e i r fei l i n g s t the 3oe rs i a d in , food fi-;l.-Uinp q u a l i t i e s , li: t h e i r youth they iiad been Uairht to hunt "with the r i f l e , with a l i m i t e d amount of aninuni ti or. The 3oer youth was bent out with one or two r?vnds of r i f l e trmuni ti on and his r i f l e , sncl or*irec; to or!'* If, u.; ..: " ** v r o r l>ie C^oiily I t r r l e r . ;e waa t a u ^ i t to make pech roir^a of arrmur.ition count f'.:v eoiLetliing. This rF: suited in tl e eve re r e 3oer f becoming avi expert r i f l e phot. ( 1-2M-242) (S-l&y) (2) Their early bush warfare with the n a t i v e s } efl taught t>: em the velue jf ar.bush, the use of cover f c onocJClTien 1 1 s u r p r i s e &n^ the ecjiiomy of force. '.'.Viiey were e'.ijllel in f'.he uonstn-'c ti on of s h e l t e r trenches, &n'i in the hnil'lina of field, f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ancl in remerfcl rerfor:.ed s a t i sfeot orily , thoEe furicti ons of iTiilitfiry scierice w> j uh osn, for }- e Tiost, ot>rtt he h : '.Xi&r-B^eO v;j th co'nnon s e n s e . (1-;^J-!'M2) (3 -13-J J (-nil ex^nole of ar.bush Lodger Jrcel: l-lf.;O) ( 2-114J (2-12^) ('6) '-':: a , we re exne r t s i n ch o oa in ? c e f en a i ve y i p o s i t i o n s antf they invariu.ol;y cornpeller! the B r i t i s h to advance over open r round .from e x t r e m e ranges, These de fen si v^ 'posit Ions , were a l s o , so vh':::>vu, tliat the B r i t i s h ".vere eonipelled to r:\eke wide t a m i n g movenients in .irrier to attack* These turning movements were freciuentlj? f r u s t r a t e d by i3oer mobility, (l-2<i5- ) (2-88 f 8y) (2-126) (S (4) The Bfoers were enflurinp horaemen : and had t h e i r horses excellently t r a i n e d to stand under f i r e without being t i e d . They were a l e o cool under f i r e and d e l i b e r a t e l y adjusted t h e i r s i g h t s as lonp as t h e i r position was s a f e . However t h e i r lack of offensive capacity prevented them from reapinp the f u l l benefit of t h e i r t a c t i c a l s u c c e s s e s . (1-246) (5) The bulk of the ^oer forces were.what we would now term, "mounted i n f a n t r y " . They fully understood the value of mobility and were clever in conforming to t h i s prindlple.They were able to empiace a r t i l l e r y at seemingly i n a c c e s s i b l e h e i p h t s . After the f a l l of Pretoria,General Botha,east of the c i t y , held a defensive l i n e about t h i r t y miles in length with only t h r e e thousand men. To r e s i s t

the British he would aenude part of hla line, converge

rapidly on an isolated British column, defeat it or
drive it Dacsk and then disperse hie troops to resume
their defensive line* Only their extreme mobility made
such tactics possible.
(1-246) (2-119,142.) (2-89,106,103,279,28S.S26)
(3-139)
AH* IV TACTICAL
ft, 3ased on the studies outlined above and other
references indicated at the close of this paragraph,
the tactical cheraoterieticB of the Boer operations
rney be summed up in general ea follows:
(1) (2) (B) (4) Habitually defensive warfare.
Ho fire discipline or cortrolled fire.
Fiphtina unmethodical.
IIo reserves held out. All troops placed in
the first line on commencement of action,
(ft) Excessive extension of fronts.
(6) Artillery dispersed or distribute^ among
troops in small units. Wo artillery
tactical or fire command.
(7) Artillery well concealed.
(8) i/rooer use made of ooverf concealment,
field fortifications etc.
c ( j) Excellent individual rifle marksmanship.
(1C4 Artillery fire accurate.
(11) Indirect fire used by artillery frequently,
(12) All troops capable of p.reat mobility,

(1-242 to 247 incl.) (2-149,and S24-S27 incl)

_ e ORGAiaiiATIOH.
The military organization of theBpers was very
primitive. It was an outgrowth of their wars with the
natives. (2-21.1S1) (1-242). They had no general staff
and their administrative staff could not possibly meet
the requirements of war.
The Orange j'ree State and the Transvaal, had their
own state forces and defense lews respectively, in both
states the only military unit used during the war, (ex cept) the smell state regular forces), was known as the
''Commando". The Commando consisted ef a le^vy of men
from a district under the leadership of en officer called
'Vielfl Cornet" or "Commandant". The ii'ield Cornets or
Commandants were elected by their men in open vote and
the elected officers in turn, took pa*t in nominating
the "enerals. Politics pi eyed a great pert in these
elections. Prominent families furnished a number of officers
cprrespondinp to their political importance, regardless
of the officers efficiency, i'oliticel leaders were more
frequently elected than were military leaders.
(PJ8-1^Q) (3-29)
leader who desired to carry out a plan which his
electors disapproved ran the risk of being cashiered.This
'Sbviously placed leaders subject to the will of their
subordinates end seriously contributed to the lack of
: ^oer offensive operations. V' find an example of this
.e deficiency in the accounts of ^oer actions before LADf l vl. ITTI, In November 1B99 a ?oer council of war decided
.

to undertake offensive operations to d e l i v e r LJ^UITH into the hands of the 3oera. " V e the lower* officere < hn received the decision of the council of war and the orders of the higher corr/nand, they too held a council of wax- and decided t h a i the plan was too difficult to carry out arid that i t would not be executed; further more they did not notify t h e i r superior officers u n t i l twenty four hours l a t e r , which made the scheduled attempt abortive. (1-100,101) touchers between t i e iip.es of 16 and 60 years of a > were l i a b l e to military service, but in both Repub <6 l i c s the law permitted s u b s t i t u t e s , provided that they wsre as pood as t h e i r principals and provided that they were approved by the local M Commandant'1 of t h e i r unit, .71 the s u b s t i t u t e quit the s e r v i c e , the law required that the principal furnish another or report in person, "Durinp the war the power bo approve &ur.o/Li l/utes was taken way fro-ri Die Oorii.-ritjndtints of d i s t r i c t 9 tnfl conferred exclusively on the landrjste . 1 - ) P-101) 14 There wes? no seniority of coiiunand provided for in the f i e l d . Vvhen General de '.Vet l e f t his command at ^/J-;J.J1J.L1T the penersle. were M/ilhout a head. (1-207J The forces, of the Orange j'ree Slate were provided with a "lioofd C O'limtmrt #nt n f an officer placed in command of 3everfil commandos. During the war a number of offices v;ere created, which were not provided for by law, such e? k>ctAnv ^CojiTi.Qn^or't C'enerai" and & number of "Veoht "enerclFi", The r ! /echt Penevale1' exerciser 5 command for li.Tilted periods of time in different party of the theater of war, A number of superior officers were created most of whom tvere without commands towerfl the e:nd of the war, ^or administrative purposes a "Laager Gom^gindant" wea elected in each camp or bivouac. He was a s s i s t e d by a Corporal. (1-^:8,100) Lach :J,oer Republic rfiainteined a regular otcire of Ctate a r t i l l e r y and a State Police force. The dtate ^ r t ^ i l l e r y of the TrariSMttal w-es organized in 1881. I t consisted of horae a r t i l l e r y t f o r t r e s s a r t i l l e r y f f i e l d telegraph, Intendenee (iuartermuster) service f ^edical Department t Instruction Department, smithy en^ rnouhine shops. In 18^9 i t s strength was S7 officers and 541 men. The training was under the supervision of c former (Japtein of the German Army. The soope of training we8 to prepare each enlisted man to be a qualified non commissioned officer within three years and. to prepare the corps to become the nucleus of larger unite in time of eramerpency. - cadet school for a r t i l l e r y officers wee maintained and included a very comprehensive system of i n s t r u c t i o n . The officers of the a r t i l l e r y and of the -Hate Police i^orce were obtained by examination. They were furnished uniforms by the government and promoted by a system of s e n i o r i t y . The enlisted men of the State forces were required to be c i t i z e n s 16 yeers of e#e or more. Thet# enlistments were for three years. They passed to the reserve u n t i l '35 years of ape. Schools of i n s t r u c t i o n were maintain ed for them.

he "Jraime ^ree '"."tate maintained a force similar to that of the Transvaal hut s m a l l e r . The organization training enfl laws were almost i d e n t i c a l v/ith those of the Transveal. The rep'uler forces of both s t a t e s were well d i s c i p l i n e d and well t r a i n e d . ' ! 'helr puns and equipment were at e l l times in excel!ant condition. TuririR the war these forces stood o t t us superior to a l l other 3oer forces. (1-126 to 15 ) i n c l i In addition to trie mobile forces the Boers had permanent f o r t i f i c a t i o n s protecting principally the c i t i * s oftfRJSTOHIAand JOHALULiSBLiRG. The f o r t s pro tecting PRETORIA were tfort Wonderboora on the I/UiGLlESBERO ^AUCifi, Fort Daa-eport on the D A JO T A Sf R RAHGJS, f o r t Sohanskop on tiie DAAiilWT RAiJG^ f and j?ort IQapperfort o * the DAASfORT RAU^ii. These f o r t s x had an extensive oomaanfl of the countryside but p r i n c i p a l l y protected the south side of the c i t y t j?orts Schanskop end U l a ^ e r f o r t were too close to the city Shells passing over the f o r t f e l l into the c i t y . The f o r t a t JOEAiJlIiiSBiiRG was garrisoned by three officers and 3 00 men. It waa of no value in p r o t e c t ing the c i t y from the south. All f o r t s were b u i l t of masonry and sand. They had platforms for puns which "belonpei. to the muzzel loader e r a . There was a plan of defense for each f o r t with carefully prepared maps but no proper flank defenses were provided for. (1-138,159) The Boer Leclical Service was very l i m i t e d . At the outbreak of the war there were only t h i r t y one medical men in the governmental s e r v i c e . There were s i x h o s p i t a l s subsidized by the government. These h o s p i t a l s were located at PRETORIA,JOaiHiJiSSBiiRG,BAR^RTOW, ZLJERi3D0RPfHABHERT33i2lRG and POTCHEi'STROCM. As no proper medical organization existed the RED CROSS took over t h i s work, Oripinally nine s e c t i o n s were sent into the f i e l d and for the evacuation of ambulances base hospi t a l s were e s t a b l i s h e d a t PRETORIAt BARBSRTOil /atUGERSDQRJ?, BiSLilAST^O'CHiS^STROOM, end WTREGHT. Transport sections were formed a t PRETORIA and JOHAUi-i^SBiiRG for conveying sick and wounded f*om r a i l r o a d s t o h o s p i t a l s . Peoples of foreign n a t i o n s , sympathetic with the Boer cause sent volunteer surgeons, nurses and ambulances. These u n i t s were from HollandtGermany.Dutch ^ a s t India, Belgium.Russia,United States and Switzerland. I t may be said t h a t except for the aid of the R^'D G O S and R S foreign medical u n i t e the Boer medical service would have been woefully inadequate, (1-168,169) (1-170-171) k Bureau of I d e n t i f i c a t i o n was established which operated very e f f i c i e n t l y under the R D CROSS a s s i s t e d by & the 3oer Government. Dead arid wounded were quickly i d e n t i fied a f t e r b a t t l e and casualty l i s t printed and d i s t r i b uted throughout the country.Saoh s o l d i e r c a r r i e d an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n card with his name but a f i c t i t i o u s address. The correct address was carried in the I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Bureau. (1-174)

ri

Accord ing to official Boer statements the following numbers were in the field at various times up to the end of Uay 1900; DiBtriot of T A S A 1 R UV A ORAUOE FUSE STATE IviixeS from both 8 t a t e s Colonials ^oreipnere To**l 25411
14BS4
8925
2259
734
52262

It is believed that these figures are approximately

oorrect, although the British War Office estimated
approxiuately 62000 8oer<* were in the field. The above
figures do not represent the numbers in the field at
one and the same time many were on furlough, many
were not called out until late, and those slot, wounded
end absent from other causes must also be deducted. After
the British invaded the Boer Republics many Boers went
home end remained there. It ie believed that the maxi mum Boer strength in the field at any one time was
about 25000 and that this figure was more nearly reached
at the beginning of the war, ^
(1-105)

In the T A S A L every man called was required 3 UV A to be provided with suitable clothing ( which was his civilian clothing ) f a rifle in good order and thirty rounds of ammunition. Wagon transportation was alas required to be furnished by the burghers; (1-106) In the O A G FREE STATS each white tan was required RNE to provide horse,saddle, bridle, r i f l e , thirty rounds of ammunition and eight days provisions, (1-106) Prior to the war the Boer poverhments purchased small arms abroad and sold them to the burghers at cost for cash and on credit, Each burgher was furnished one hundred rounds of r i f l e ammunition by his government. All "burghers equipment was inspected once each year and in the principal towns and d i s t r i c t s , twice each year. These inspections were made by the Field Cornets, who also had the poorer to commandeer military equipment within thfttr district* whenever the emergency required. During the war , commissions were appointed to ascertain the equipment and supplies that were needed and to pro cure such supplies ana equipment ^ miacelleneotiB^ supplies are cohered in another paper by a studuni oi'-.iuer the remarks herein are confined to military equipment. The commissions for obtaining supplies, maintained sub committees to assist in maintaining contact with the field forces. For instance if a man ordered out by his -i?ield Cornet, was short an a r t i c l e of equipment, he obtained an order from his i?ield Cornet for the necscssry article end then obtained the a r t i c l e fcom the representative of a sub-eornmittee, (1-106,108,109)

f.

(iauipment -Continned)

r r i o r to thn w&r the Joera hed 'nade ]rf?e importations

of r i f l e s and r i f l e &nnuniti on% so I h e t tit the bepinning of
the war there wern enough r i f l e s of e l l kinde in the THiu^i //.AL to ermthe burrhere three times over. Between ;.Lay and
September 18cJ9,the hulk of the i-ienry-,.;6rtini r i f l e s were exchanged for the i-..buper r i f l e . The T .\<jio v'^AL also furnished a number of arms to the OrtAii^u --.''Hi. 1 .;T.vr^ end by December 1899 the supply of rifl.ee was exhausted. Bayonets were not leaued or used. (1-115) Kifles were e x c e l l e n t l y kept. (1-116) t txt the outbreak of the war & puotl atook of a^rr.vr1-.111 on was on hand in the TK^JU^V^AL and the Gilt^nL ^ R ^ CT.TTXJ. The princinfol Btock of r i f l e ernmunition in the T^Ui^://^! was stored in magazines at .PRi^TOrfiii and consisted of over iO million rounds. The 0R 4 ;J^ j'Ri-.ci '.i-T^T^ had over t; million rounds on hand and additional amnunition ordered.(1-118-119J The a r t i l l e r y inp ; 1 Dat very of six Crensot 75ram ^ 5 b a t t e r i e s ,4 p.uns each, -Iru.pp ?5!nm 1 hattery 4 .?uns each, .!ordfeldt ?5mra, 4 15i;nn:r ^repsot puns ("Lori*? Toms"J 4 12 O . j.rupp howitzer a. x, 1 15 0... muzzle loader Johannesburg / o r t . 1 15 U... muscle loader mortar ( y 14 /iclierp ^7.5 m puns, m 4 -'.'.nipp S7 m puns n 10 LaxiTi aiachine funs Tor Martini c a r t r i d g e s , 13 i.-ee'rjine puns for Lee I. etford c a r t r i d g e s . 6 Crensot 7 5 n n puns. u (1-1^1) The a r t i l l e r y of like O A OS JPRilii STAffi consisted of RHi the following; 14 T.ruop 75 m p;uns (black powder used) m 6 - 3 i x p oun d er L rms t r o n P PU n a. ?>-Three x^oun^er Armstronp. puns l-;Irnpp quick f i r e r p.ur\* 2-,,aohine puns for i-:crtini c a r t r i d p e s . various runt- captured fcom the B r i t i s h among thertL 7 at 3;Uk:<^ rOoT. (1-144 I The ::ioers never heel s u f f i c i e n t a r t i l l e r y .for counter preparation f i r e s p r i o r to B r i t i s h ettacka.iiach Commando wanted a shere of the a r t i l l e r y attached. As r e s u l t most of i t wes d i s t r i b u t e ! by the pun to various u n i t s . The 3oer a r t i l l e r y f i r e was very eccufcate but tfre shrapnel was frequently defective which cut down the efficiency of f i r e . At the action at MlE^Oi-JTiilJ i\;HL. they placed t h i r t y shrapnel s h e l l s squerely in the midst of the B r i t i s h 61st battery but most of the s h e l l s did not h u r s t . This defect in 3oer a r t i l l e r y a^nmnition wes not known p r i o r to the war due to the small amount a l l o t t e d for a r t i l l e r y p r a c t i c e . The Boer 155 puns outranked any puns of the :3ritish forces, (1-144) (-21) (3-26,27 t 28) of the TH,:r<'. JaJHu consisled of the follow

f.

(Equipment Continuedj

The leers had very few maps, /ery .few accurate surveys of the country were made orior to or during the war, Muririp the war gome hasty surveys and crude ruaps wore made. %e very accurate mop of the vicinity of .tHLTORlA was made by a lieutenant of the State A r t i l l e r y . Vhe '-oers had such a poofl i^lea of topography end knew t h e i r country so well that maps were not e s s e n t i a l to them. (1-180,162,187) The 3oer communications were excellent, The field slpricil units of the repul ir hltate forces were augmented by the civilian telegraph nersonnel . ail eoui pmerit. :3oer < rr camps were connected by telepraph anc- heliograph, a'ull use was made of telegraph l i n e s alon* the railroads end povernment lines across country.During the war special secret l i n e s connected the two Boer s t a t e s . The instruments nserl were ^orse-Uuplejn arid iuadruplex. l>ry cells were earried in the pockets of the personnel in the field. Wet around instruments worked 1? miles end 0 ry S miles. The field sierml eauiprnent was carried on lip.ht O v/epons. Operators usually moved on byoicles or horses and carried the Uorse apparatus. The field l i n e s were of ordinary wire laid on the p.round. Kaffir natives v/ere pene rally used to oarry reels of wire on their backs and these wires were clamped^together by patent ciamps. The use of telegraph was extensive. The Boer c i v i l i a n officials received daily wires of a l l troop monements together with copies of orders by telegraph, iixteneire use was also made of the heliograph, which was success. >i flue to the nature of the climate end country, (1-149,150,151,152.) The Boers were handicaped by lack of ordnance repair shop* and factories for the repair of a r t i l l e r y end small arms and the manufacture of spare p a r t s . Improvised workshops were created after the war started but came into existence so late that the Boers obtained but l i t t l e use of them. The principal shops were the workshops of the South African Railroad Corapeny; Orunberg and Co. , Delfos and Co. f and the dynamite factory at MODDERtfOiiTillU.. The shops of the South African Hailwap. undertook the manufacture of limited quantities of 15 ram ammunition, steel heads for s h e l l s of the IS C puns, time and percussion M fuzes, repair of a r t l l o r y and in addition actually manufactured one 12 Cd howitzer which operated successfully. Delfos l fSros*, and Co, f undertook the manufacture of percussion fuzes and Martini Henry cartridges. They i n s t a l l e d machinery for the manufacture of Mauser cartridges but the i n s t a l l a t i o n was completed too late to be effective. i'he dynamite factory at ^ODDiSH^OllTiiLJ was operated by the 3oer government and engaged chiefly in the manufacture of smokeless powder, charging cartridges and lyddite shells for a r t i l l e r y . (1-158,162,167,168)

4.

C01-1CLU3I0H..

&. -i1rom the foregoing narxative, i t i s believed that we may de-luce the following conclusions: (1) (2) t h a t the bulk of the Boer forces consisted of untrained m i l i t i a ; that considering t ' e efficiency of the email regular forces of the Boer States w may conalti.de that the remainder of e their forces( ie the untrained militia) was capable of be in? converted into a well disciplined fighting force with proper training; that as fiphters the doers were similar to e l l untrained militia; that they le.oked offensive s p i r i t due pagj^jj to characteristics and factors that could/Seen overcome with discipline and training; that their orpaniz&tion was defective due mainly to the lack of trained officers; the leek of a competent staff and to the pernicious system of obtaining officers b election; y that with the exception of small arms and signal equipment, the l3oer equipment was poor and deficient.

(S)

(4)

(5)

LeR.Lutes f Captain, C.ii.C. f (DOh) BIBLIOGRAPHY Ley; (1-140)s 1 . 2. tio.l t e x t (below)

Liilitary Information division, HO.2.2J 'War Department United s t a t e s f July 190g. Cerman O f f i c i a l Account of t h e V/ar i n South Africa. T r a n s l a t i o n by Colonel Hubert I>uCanef R.A. fi.i V9Q. ( m i l i t a r y Information Division t './er Department United s t a t e s 1906. Military Information Division, Uo4f Selected T r a n s l a t i o n s P e r t a i n i n g to the 3oer War, April 1,1905, V/ar Department, United o t o t e e , History of the Boer V/ar by C a s s e l , Three Years of
v

3 .

4 # 5.

m r , by General C h r i s t i a n de V/et.