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INFORMATION AND POLITICAL PERCEPTION

by

JORDAN PENNEFATHER B.A., CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DOMINGUEZ HILLS, 2003 M.A., UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER, 2005

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Psychology 2008

3337221

2009

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This thesis entitled: Information and Political Perception written by Jordan Pennefather has been approved for the Department of Psychology

Dr. Bernadette Park (chair)

Dr. Charles Judd

Date: ____________

The final copy of this thesis has been examine by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline.

HRC protocol # 0707.12

ABSTRACT

Jordan Pennefather (Ph.D. Psychology) Information and Political Perception Directed by Dr. Bernadette Park, Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado at Boulder

Past research into the effect of information on political perception has tended to use survey research, which while allowing strong inferences about external validity is troubled by decreased control of the information that respondents use when forming impressions of the candidates. Moving into the laboratory allows us to examine the effect of the specific information on perceptions. The first study examined how the relevance and diagnosticity of individuating information to judgments of political candidates attitude position on various issues influences perception of the candidates. At Time 1, subjects learned basic information about the candidates (photograph, name, and political party). At Time 2 they learned information that was irrelevant, relevant but nondiagnostic, or relevant and diagnostic of the candidates political stands. Overall subjects projected more to the ingroup candidates. Ingroup projection decreased directionally at Time 2. At Time 1 subjects contrasted the outgroup iii

candidates, at Time 2 projection was non-significant. Overall Democrat subjects agreed more about the candidates positions than Republicans. Polarization of the political parties decreased at Time 2. In the second study subjects learned about an ingroup candidate (Democrat) who held positions on six issues that were consistent with the stereotypic positions of his political party, or were mixed (three consistent and three inconsistent). Additionally, subjects learned that the candidate was either highly endorsed by fellow Democrats (popular), or weakly endorsed (unpopular). Subjects showed preference for the consistent candidate. Additionally, highly affiliated subjects showed a non-significant tendency to use consistency information less when the candidate was popular. The final study examined data from the 1980 and 1988 American National Election Studies (ANES). Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to examine both ideological and issue-specific projection, as well as the impact of self-reported political knowledge on polarization of the two parties. In general the two models demonstrated the tendency of the respondents to project their own political positions towards their own political party. Additionally, we have shown that the respondents contrasted the outgroup partys position from their own. Increased political knowledge led to polarization of the two parties, by increasing perceptions of extremity for both ingroup and outgroup.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 1 Models of Vote Choice...................................................................... 1 Styles of Voting ................................................................................. 3 Party Voting................................................................................... 3 Ideological Voting .......................................................................... 4 Personality Voting ......................................................................... 5 Issue Voting................................................................................... 6 Information Types ............................................................................. 6 Own Position ................................................................................. 6 Party Stand ................................................................................... 9 Candidate Information ................................................................. 10 Endorsement and Popularity ....................................................... 12 CHAPTER 2: STUDY ONE ....................................................................... 17 Projection........................................................................................ 18 Consensus...................................................................................... 19 Polarization ..................................................................................... 20 Strength of Affiliation....................................................................... 21 Method............................................................................................ 23 Subjects ...................................................................................... 24 v

Materials...................................................................................... 24 Procedure.................................................................................... 27 Results............................................................................................ 30 Strength of Affiliation ................................................................... 31 Projection .................................................................................... 31 Consensus .................................................................................. 37 Polarization ................................................................................. 43 Discussion ...................................................................................... 47 CHAPTER 3: STUDY TWO ....................................................................... 50 Consistency .................................................................................... 50 Popularity........................................................................................ 53 Method............................................................................................ 56 Subjects ...................................................................................... 56 Materials...................................................................................... 56 Procedure.................................................................................... 59 Results............................................................................................ 60 Strength of Affiliation ................................................................... 61 Impression Variables................................................................... 61 Projection .................................................................................... 69 Process Variables ....................................................................... 71 Discussion ...................................................................................... 82 CHAPTER 4: STUDY THREE .................................................................... 86 Method............................................................................................ 87

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1980 ANES ................................................................................. 87 1988 ANES ................................................................................. 89 Results............................................................................................ 91 1980 ANES Dataset .................................................................... 91 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Dataset ........................................... 95 Discussion .................................................................................... 105 CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION ...................................................... 108 REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 115 APPENDIX A: PHOTOGRAPHS OF POLITICAL CANDIDATES ....................... 130 APPENDIX B: STUDY ONE POLITICALLY IRRELEVENT STATEMENTS .......... 131 APPENDIX C: STUDY ONE POLITICALLY RELEVENT-UNDIAGNOSTIC STATEMENTS ...................................................................................... 132 APPENDIX D: STUDY ONE POLITICALLY RELEVENT-DIAGNOSTIC STATEMENTS................................................................................................. 133 APPENDIX E: STUDY ONE SELF RATING QUESTIONNAIRE ....................... 135 Section 1: Self-ratings of Personality Traits .................................. 135 Section 2: Political Attitudes, Ideology, and Knowledge................ 136 APPENDIX F: STUDY ONE RATINGS OF POLITICAL CANDIDATES QUESTIONNAIRE ................................................................................. 138 Section 1: Ratings of Candidates' of Personality Traits ................ 138 Section 2: Political Attitudes, Ideology, and Knowledge................ 139 APPENDIX G: STUDY TWO TARGET....................................................... 141 Popular ......................................................................................... 141

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Unpopular ..................................................................................... 141 APPENDIX H: STUDY TWO CONSISTENT TARGET INFORMATION .............. 142 APPENDIX I: STUDY TWO INCONSISTENT TARGET INFORMATION.............. 143 APPENDIX J: STUDY TWO SELF RATING QUESTIONNAIRE ....................... 144 APPENDIX K: STUDY ONE RATINGS OF POLITICAL CANDIDATES QUESTIONNAIRE ................................................................................. 147 APPENDIX L: STUDY TWO RECALL MEASURE ........................................ 152 APPENDIX M: STUDY TWO RECOGNITION MEASURE .............................. 153 APPENDIX N: STUDY TWO SUBTYPING MEASURE .................................. 155 APPENDIX O: STUDY THREE 1980 ANES POLITICAL ISSUES .................. 156 APPENDIX P: STUDY THREE 1980 ANES KNOWLEDGE MEASURES..158 APPENDIX Q: STUDY THREE 1988 ANES POLITICAL ISSUES .................. 159 APPENDIX R: STUDY THREE 1988 ANES IDEOLOGY MEASURE .............. 160

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. 1980 ANES: Loading and structural coefficients: Unstandardized and standardized estimates for Democrat (left) and Republican (Right) respondents................................................................................ 96 Table 2. 1980 ANES: Standardized Residual Covariances for Democrat (Left) and Republican (Right) respondents. ........................................... 97 Table 3. 1988 ANES: Loading and structural coefficients: Unstandardized and standardized estimates for Democrat (left) and Republican (Right) respondents.............................................................................. 103 Table 4. 1988 ANES: Standardized Residual Covariances for Democrat (Left) and Republican (Right) respondents .......................................... 104

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Affiliation. Frequency Distribution of subjects self-rated strength of affiliation to their political party.. ........................................... 31 Figure 2. Projection. Correlation between subjects self-ratings and their ratings of the targets, by ingroup/outgroup and affiliation (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).. ............................................................................. 33 Figure 3. Projection. Correlation between subjects self-ratings and their ratings of the targets, by time and ingroup/outgroup.............................. 35 Figure 4. Consensus. Average agreement between subjects ratings of the targets on the 16 attitude items by time and information condition. . 41 Figure 5. Consensus. Average agreement between subjects ratings of the targets on the 16 attitude items by subjects political party and information condition. ............................................................................. 42 Figure 6. Polarization. Average rating of Democrat targets on the 16 attitude issues minus the average rating of the Republican targets by time and information condition. .............................................................. 45 Figure 7. Polarization. Average rating of Democrat targets on the 16 attitude issues minus the average rating of the Republican targets by subjects political party membership and strength of affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation). ........................................................................... 46 Figure 8. Affiliation Strength. Frequency Distribution of Subjects selfrated strength of affiliation to their political party. ................................... 62 Figure 9. Evaluation. Subjects rated liking of the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation). ............................................................. 63 Figure 10. Voting Likelihood. Subjects rated likelihood of voting for the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).................................. 65 x

Figure 11. Similarity. Subjects rated similarity to the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation). ............................................................. 67 Figure 12. Candidates Affiliation Strength. Subjects rating of the candidates strength of affiliation to the Democratic Party by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation). ............................................................. 68 Figure 13. . Recall. Frequency Distribution of number freely recalled items ...................................................................................................... 72 Figure 14. Recall. Number of freely recalled candidate statements by popularity and consistency conditions.................................................... 73 Figure 15. Recognition. Weighted average of recognized candidate statements by consistency condition and whether the statements were actually mentioned about the candidate (Old) or newly presented (New). ................................................................................... 75 Figure 16. Recognition in the Inconsistent Conditions. Weighted average of recognized candidate statements by whether the candidates statement was consistent or inconsistent on the issue and whether the statement was actually mentioned about the candidate (Old) or newly presented (New). ......................................................................... 77 Figure 17. Valuation across Popularity Conditions. Average decrease in valuation of the issues from Time 1 and Time 2 by consistency condition and whether the issue had been mentioned in the candidate statement (seen) or was not mentioned (unseen).................................. 80 Figure 18. Subtyping. Subjects rated typicality of the candidate for the Democratic Party by popularity, and affiliation (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation)............................................................................................... 82 Figure 19a. 1980 ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Democrat Voters): Model of Democratic Party voters self-ratings on four political issues and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties.......................... 92 Figure 19b. 1980 ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Republican Voters): Model of Republican Party voters self-ratings on four political issues and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties.......................... 93

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Figure 20a. 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Democrat Voters): Model of Democratic Party voters self-ratings on political ideology and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties. . 99 Figure 20b. 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Republican Voters): Model of Republican Party voters self-ratings on political ideology and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties. 100

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

"A share in the sovereignty of the state, which is exercised by the citizens at large, in voting at elections is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law." Alexander Hamilton.

As Alexander Hamilton pointed out, voting in political elections is one of the central rights that Americans have. Voting Americans help to elect representatives who will have the power to shape the country. Whether it is local, state, or national elections, voters are selecting representatives who will have both direct and indirect impact on their lives. Since elections are so important and are the average Americans main form of political participation, it is important to understand how they decide which candidate to vote for. Models of Vote Choice A number of models have been developed over the years to explain voting behavior. One of the earliest was the unconstrained rational voter model (Arrow, 1951; von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1947). This model, borrowed from economic theory, described political decision makers as engaging in value-maximization, that is they examine all the existing information and make the choice that best meets their self-interested goals. This model views voters as omniscient calculators (Lupia, McCubbins, & Popkin, 2000), or ambulatory encyclopedias 1

(Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). The constrained rational model (Downs, 1957) grew from the unconstrained perspective and, while it makes the same assumptions about the processes involved, it does not assume that the voters have the same cognitive capabilities to search out, encode, and recall unlimited information. One of the most popular models of voter decision making in political science was outlined in The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). This model describes voting behavior as early learned social identification. In this model party identification is key to vote choice, and colors later views of candidates from both parties (Sears, 1975; Sears & Funk, 1991). A fourth model, adapted from work on heuristics by Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974) argues that voting is a very complex decision, involving large amounts of information in which mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are often used to simplify the choice. One example of a using a heuristic in the political domain is using the representativeness heuristic to apply stereotypes or schemata about where the political parties stand on issues to form impressions about a specific party member. A final model describes voters as intuitive decision makers (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006) who use low information rationality to make the choice with very little effort (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). This model assumes that voting is more of a semiautomatic response than a careful weighting of the merits of each candidate. This model argues that since most voters do not know much about politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) and few have a real ideology (Zaller, 1992) they do not have the

information or motivation required to make the complex calculations required by the rational models. Styles of Voting What all of these models assume is that voters use some information in their vote decision. The models differ in the amount, and in some cases type of information used to make their choice. Each of these models makes assumptions about the dimensions of the candidate that voters use to make their decisions. The two rational models would argue that voters should vote based on either the candidates political ideology or stance on specific issues. The social identification, heuristic, and intuitive models all suggest that voters use party identification more than specific issues or ideology. The heuristic and intuitive models would also suggest voters use the candidates personality to vote. Party Voting. One way to vote is along party lines. Most Americans are members of one of the two primary political parties, and thus could always vote for the candidates from their own party. Research has demonstrated that this is often the case, with political party being the most powerful predictor of electoral behavior (Belknap & Campbell, 1952; Miller & Shanks, 1996). Party cues help to reduce uncertainty for voters (Goodman & Murray, 2007). However, party membership is not the whole answer. Within primaries there are multiple candidates from the same party, so party membership will not suffice to select a candidate. Even within general elections political party is not the entire answer. According to a recent study, the influence of political partisanship on voting has

been decreasing in strength, with the percentage of voters identifying with one party declining from 73% in the 1950s and 1960 to 61% by 1992 (Holbrook, 1996). This decrease in party identification has been accompanied by a shift from party-centered voting to candidate-centered voting (Wattenburg, 1992). If the candidate does in fact influence the voting process above and beyond the power of the political party, what is it about the candidate that influences these judgments? Ideological Voting. Voters could judge the candidates using their perceptions of the candidates ideology. Ideology provides clues to how the candidate will act in the future and what positions he will take on issues that have yet to emerge (Waldman & Jamieson, 2002). So voters could place the candidates along a continuum from liberal to conservative and select the candidate that most closely matches their own position on this continuum. However, many researchers argue that the average American is not very ideologically sophisticated (Kinder, 1983; Sniderman, 1993). In fact, Bennett (1995) found that the typical American has very limited understanding about what liberalism and conservatism actually mean. More importantly, Dalton (1979) found that only 21% of American voters polled in 1974 and 1975 reported using ideological concepts in their vote decision-making process. If ideology explains only a portion of vote choice this leaves a gap in our understanding of voting behavior. If voters are making candidate-based decisions, and are not simply using ideology, what else can they use?

Personality Voting. Voters may also be using the candidates personalities to inform their decisions (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004). Sears (1969) proposed that American voters use personalities to make their choice of candidates because personalities are often easier to process than candidate platform. Miller, Wattenburg, and Malanchuk (1985) state that candidate image is one of the most important but least understood facets of American politics. Researchers have found that voters look for candidates that are trustworthy (Kaid & Hirsh, 1973), charismatic (Baxter, Young, & Bittner, 1973; see Hellweg, 1995), and competent (Wakshlag & Edison, 1979). Voters who are frequent television news viewer are more likely to rely on candidate personality to make their vote choice (Keeter, 1987). Additionally, less educated individuals are more likely to vote using personality than more educated voters (Abrajano, 2005; Nicholson, Pantoja, & Segura, 2006). Media research has demonstrated that exposure to televised coverage of the 1972 Presidential campaign increased interest in both the candidates personalities and the issues (Hofstetter, Zukin, & Buss, 1978). Other research has shown that the three major networks influenced the issue agenda but had little influence on changing voters views of the candidates personalities (Hellweg, 1995). Many researchers argue that rather than voting based on personality, voting on the issues is the more rational approach (Kinder, 1998). Issue Voting. Downs (1957) argued that voters have specific policy preferences on issues of interest to them and select parties that are closest to their own. Proponents of the rational voter would argue that voting for a

candidate with similar attitudes, especially on issues of importance to the voter is a rational strategy (Shapiro, 1969). An abundance of research has demonstrated that voters tend to select candidates that they view as holding similar attitudes (Brent & Granberg, 1982; Feldman & Conover, 1983; Granberg & Brent, 1974; Judd, Kenny, & Krosnick, 1983; Kendall & Yum, 1984; Kinder, 1978; Krosnick, 1990). So when people vote on the issues, which according to some, is the most rational way to vote, they want to select the candidate they think shares their attitudes (Shapiro, 1969). This raises an important question: how do voters judge where candidates stand on the issues? Information Types There are a several types of information that voters use to form their impressions about political candidates. Voters can use their own stand on the issue. They can use their stereotypes of where the candidates political party

normally stands on the issue. Voters can also use information they have received about the political candidate. Finally, voters can use endorsements from trusted groups or individuals. Let us examine each of these sources of information in greater detail. Own Position. Before voters know anything about the specific candidates position they know where they themselves stand on the issue. A voters own positions on the issue can influence their perceptions of the candidates stand. This process of using ones own attitude to form impressions of candidates stands is known as projection and has been recognized by many researchers as important to how voters form impressions of political candidates (Brent &

Granberg, 1982; Feldman & Conover, 1983; Granberg & Brent, 1974; Judd, Kenny, & Krosnick, 1983; Kinder, 1978; Krosnick, 1990). In their model of voter choice, Conover and Feldman (1982) maintained that projection is a central process in vote decisions, demonstrating that even when the position of the candidates political party is controlled for there is still significant correlation between the voters position and the ingroup candidates position. In fact, Quist and Crano (2003) found that perceived similarity between the voters own position and their impressions of the candidates position predicted over 84% of the variance in voter choice. The typical examination of projection in the political domain has involved examining survey data looking for correlations between the voters self-reported ideology or issue position and their rating of the candidates. For example, Brent and Granberg (1977) examined data from the 1972 American National Election Studies (ANES), a nationally representative sample collected during presidential elections. They calculated the correlations between the respondents self-ratings on the issues (guaranteed jobs, tax reform, Vietnam, inflation, legalizing marijuana, bussing, health insurance, pollution, and womens role in society) and their perceptions of Richard Nixon (Republican) and George McGovern (Democrat). The researchers found significant positive correlation between the respondents own positions and their rating of their preferred candidates positions, and significant, but weaker negative correlation for the nonpreferred candidate. These results have been supported many times, during multiple different elections (Brent & Granberg, 1982; Feldman & Conover, 1983; Judd,

Kenny, & Krosnick, 1983; Kinder, 1978; Krosnick, 1990). Other projection findings in the political domain suggest that projection is greater towards candidates whose policy positions are ambiguous (Kinder, 1978; Granberg & Brent, 1974). Research within social psychology suggests that projection is a robust phenomenon, often operating outside of awareness (Krueger, 2007). It seems to operate as an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, where people use their own position to rate others, based on shared group membership (DiDonato & Krueger, 2007). However, when the person is a member of the outgroup, projection decreases, is non-significant, or reverses, becoming a contrast effect (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Wilder, 1984). Projection is an important phenomenon for understanding impression formation and vote choice. As mentioned above, the majority of research on projection in the political domain has used survey research. The major problem with examining projection in survey data is that the level of correlation between the voter and candidate may be due to a number of other processes rather than just projection, namely persuasion, actual shared issue position, and scale usage (Conover & Feldman, 1982; Krosnick, 2002). Since the surveys are cross-sectional measures of the respondents position and their perceptions of the candidates are taken concurrently, persuasion can influence the respondents position on the issue. Since the respondents exposure to information about the candidate is difficult to

adequately control, prior exposure to a popular candidate could have resulted in a shift in the respondents positions, rather than his or her position influencing perceptions of the candidates position. Additionally, the respondent may be aware of the candidates actual position and actually share it, which would mean the self-candidate correlation is actual shared issue position. Finally, the respondent may prefer one end of the scale to the other, which would also lead to significant self-candidate correlation. However, if this is the case, one would then expect this bias consistently across target candidates regardless of whether they were ingroup members or not. Party Stand. Another source of information that voters have access to before they know anything specific about the candidate is the stereotypic stand of the two political parties on the issue. Once voters know which party the candidate is a member of, they can use their stereotypes about the candidates political party to inform their impressions of the candidate. Research has demonstrated that political party has a large impact on how voters view the candidates (Layman & Casey, 2002; Page & Jones, 1979). When people have information about an individuals group membership they often use stereotypic information about that group to form impressions about specific members of the group (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This is also true with political party membership, where information about where the party stands on issues informs impressions of specific candidates (Golebiowska, 2001). Interestingly, when partisan information about a candidate is known, peripheral information such as candidates attractiveness is absent in ratings of the candidate (Riggle,

Ottati, Wyer, Kuklinksi, & Schwartz, 1992). Political cue theory (Conover, 1981; Conover & Feldman, 1982, 1989; Feldman & Conover, 1983) argues that voters need to make sense of the world, and they develop schemas about political parties in order to understand the political world. They then use this information as an anchor when forming impressions of specific political candidates, which has been demonstrated by a significant correlation between perceptions of the issue position of the candidate and the candidates political party (Conover & Feldman, 1982, 1989; Feldman & Conover, 1983). So knowing a candidate is a Democrat should influence voters judgments about where that candidate stands on issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and the environment, even absent information about that candidates actual position. In fact, party membership is consistently a significant predictor of voting in both experimental and real world elections (for a review see Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). However, party membership is not helpful in distinguishing between candidates during primary elections in which the candidates are all members of the same party. Additionally, voters still defect from party even during the general election so party cannot be the whole story. An examination of ANES data from 1952 to 2004 has shown that on average, 37% of Americans do not see a difference between the parties during Presidential elections, while 46% do not see a difference during midterm election periods (Goodman & Murray, 2007). Candidate Information. Ideally, information about the candidates would be the best form of information to use to inform voters perceptions of what the

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candidates believe. Unfortunately there are a number of problems inherent in using information about candidates to form impressions of their positions. First, information about the candidate is not always relevant to the issue at hand. One might think that this would not be a problem because voters can simply disregard irrelevant information. However, information about the candidate that is not related to the issues will often be used when voters form impressions of the candidates stand on that issue. For example, incidental similarities between oneself and the candidate, such as sharing the same birthday, could potentially influence impressions (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004; Heider, 1958). The second problem is that it is often difficult to gain access to information about the candidates actual positions. There are a number of reasons that this is so. Some researchers argue that it is often in the candidates best interest not to make their issue positions clear (Downs, 1957; Page, 1976; Shepsle, 1972). Additionally, the media devotes little attention to reporting candidate positions, rather it tends to focus on personalities (Graber, 1984; Patterson, 1980). Adding to the problem, many voters are not motivated or interested to seek out information about the candidates positions (Keeter & Zukin, 1983). Finally, efficient assimilation of the new information fails to occur when voters have low motivation, are pressed for time, or have strong prior convictions, and the issues are often complex in modern politics (Lodge & Taber, 2000). However, while some ambiguity about candidates positions is usually if not always present (Waldman & Jamieson, 2003) some researchers argue that access to the

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candidates positions has become easier to obtain (Shively, 1992). The final problem is that even when voters do have access to information about the candidates positions they may not use that information accurately, that is, they may use the information to make inappropriate assessments of the candidates. Research in person perception has demonstrated that in general people are not very accurate in their assessments of other people (DePaulo, Kenny, Hoover, Webb, & Oliver, 1987; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Swann & Gill, 1997). Research in the political domain has demonstrated that when subjects who have made a vote choice based on their self-directed perusal of candidate information are later given all the information about the candidates, 70% of the subjects felt they made the correct vote choice when there were two candidates and only 31% of the subjects felt they selected correctly when there were four candidates; that is, after learning all the candidate information, 30% of voters in two candidate elections and 69% of voters in four candidate elections felt they had made the incorrect choice (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). This is similar to the findings from the ANES from 1980-2000 (see Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). There are also a number of biases that can influence judgments, including halo effects (Asch, 1946; Cooper, 1981), in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979), and others. Endorsement and Popularity The final type of information used in voting is endorsements from trusted groups. This type of information is often used as a shortcut to avoid additional information search. Rather than learning more specific information about the

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candidate, voters can simply rely on the recommendations of close friends, trusted experts (Carmines & Kuklinski, 1990; Mondak, 1993; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991), or trusted groups (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). If the candidate is the most viable to win, especially when it is a primary election, voters may again stop further information search or processing (Aldrich, 1980; Bartels, 1988; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). In fact, voters often vote for a less preferred candidate because their preferred candidate has no chance to win (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, & Rhode, 1992). So the information that voters have about the candidates is the most important factor in their vote choice (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). However, as mentioned earlier, in the real world the amount, type, and access to information differs across elections and between voters. This fluctuation in information makes using survey research to examine the influence of information on impressions of political candidates very difficult. ANES surveys have on occasion taken multiple ratings of candidates across the campaign season, however these are also cross-sectional and the information the respondents had was not controlled (Krosnick, 2002). The purpose of the first two studies of this dissertation was to exert experimental control on the information that the subjects use in their impressions of the candidates. I used this rigorous control to examine how different types of individuating information about the candidates affect perceptions of them. The first study examined how the relevancy and diagnosticity of the individuating

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candidate information to the impression dimension being judged - in this case attitudes to specific issues - influenced perceptions of the candidate. The second study examined how candidate popularity and consistency to the party stereotype influenced impressions. The final study of the dissertation returned to the ANES dataset and examined how self-reported political knowledge influenced voters perceptions of polarization between Democratic and Republican candidates, as well as correlations between the respondents positions and their perceptions of the candidates from each party. As mentioned earlier, before voters know anything about a particular candidates stand on an issue, they know their own position and have a perception about where the two political parties stand. This information can allow the voter to use the more heuristic based decision models; social identification, heuristic, and intuitive. However, what happens when voters receive more information about the candidate? Do voters use the additional individuating information when updating their impressions or do they continue to rely only on their own position and that of the party? One study that examined changes in impressions due to exposure to information about the candidates found that ambiguous political statements decreased the impact of judges own attitudes on their impressions of same-party candidates (Pennefather & Park, 2006). Subjects in this study first indicated their own position on a number of political issues. They were then shown photographs of middle aged white males and were told they were candidates for

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political office. Names and political party were also given for each candidate. Subjects then reported where they perceived each of the candidates stood on the political issues they had earlier reported their own stand on. Next the subjects received short political statements from each candidate. These statements were designed to be undiagnostic about the candidates specific stance on the issues, while appearing to be informative. For example:
Our country is the economic power-house of the world. continue to carry on this tradition. We need leaders who will

Michael Larson will ensure that our countrys

economy remains strong and competitive. He understands the necessity of tightening our countrys borders and increasing national security spending. He is a strong supporter of our men and women serving overseas. Michael Larson is a leader for todays world.

The statements were counterbalanced across political party. At the first rating subjects projected significantly only towards in-group candidates. Once the subjects received the statements the level of projection towards the in-group candidates, while remaining significant, decreased. However, the amount of projection towards the out-group candidates stayed steady at zero. So it appears that when judging the ingroup party candidates, the subjects incorporated the ambiguous individuating information, in that they relied less on their own position. The decrease in ingroup projection raises the question of what in the statements caused the judges to use self-referent stances on the issues less in their impression. Was the decrease in the magnitude of projection towards the in-group candidates due to the relevancy of the information given about the candidates? If the information was relevant and diagnostic, rather than merely relevant but undiagnostic, would the judges have used self-referent information

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even less or is any individuating information about the candidates enough to decrease the projection effect? That is, does any information about the candidates dilute the effect of party information and self-position (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981)?

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Chapter 2: Study One The first study of this dissertation examined the influence of the relevancy and diagnosticity of the information on the use of a voters own position to form their impressions of the candidates (projection), the agreement between the subjects about the candidates positions (consensus), and perceived differences between Republican and Democrat candidates (polarization). I was interested in how learning individuating information affected the use of the early heuristic information (ones own position and stereotypes about the parties) in forming impressions of specific candidates. The subjects first learned basic information about each of the candidates, a photograph accompanied by their name and political party. After rating the candidates positions on eight political issues, using this basic information, the subjects read a short statement about each of them. They either learned information that was irrelevant to judgments about the candidates positions (hobbies, vacations they have taken, favorite song), information that was relevant but undiagnostic of their position (identical to the general statements used in Pennefather & Park, 2006; for example: Michael Larson will ensure that our countrys economy remains strong and competitive.), or relevant and diagnostic (the general statements plus specific issue positions; for example: Michael Larson will ensure that our countrys economy remains strong and competitive by helping large businesses that are the backbone of our economy and making the recent tax cuts permanent.). They then re-rated the candidates positions on the

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eight political issues. The ratings made of the candidates positions on the issues as well as the subjects self-ratings were then used to examine projection, consensus, and polarization. Possible mediation of these effects by the subjects strength of affiliation was also examined. Projection As mentioned in the introduction, voters can use a number of different types of information to form impressions of political candidates. Voters can use their impressions of the candidates political party, specific information about the candidate, and their own position to form their impression about a political candidates position. Use of ones own attitude position when forming impressions about other people is projection, which I examined first. As mentioned earlier, the majority of research examining projection in the political domain has relied on survey research, in which it is difficult to conclude that selfcandidate correlations are in fact projection (Krosnick, 2002). In the current study self-ratings were collected first and the subjects rated previously unknown candidates to eliminate the possibility of persuasion and actual shared position effects. The subjects were expected to project more towards ingroup candidates than outgroup candidates, replicating previous studies (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Wilder, 1984). Additionally, our subjects were expected to project less once they received additional information about the candidates. In an earlier study the statements about ingroup candidates that were relevant to political attitudes, but not diagnostic of the candidates position

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resulted in decreases in projection (Pennefather & Park, 2006). I predicted that this decrease in projection was due to the relevancy of the information, rather than the mere presence of individuating information. Since ambiguous candidate positions lead to greater projection I predicted that projection towards ingroup candidates would decrease in the two relevant conditions but remain stable in the irrelevant condition (Kinder, 1978; Granberg & Brent, 1974). Consensus Consensus was of interest because it can be used as a measure of the application of stereotypes about the candidate. Political Cue Theory (Conover, 1981; Conover & Feldman, 1982, 1989; Feldman & Conover, 1983) argues that stereotypes about the candidates political party act as an anchor when judging the candidate. Additionally, Kennys (2004) PERSON model argues that information shared by judges increases consensus about what the target is like. This information includes stereotypes about the candidate; schemas about the candidates political party. The schemas about where the political parties stand on various issues should be similar between voters regardless of their own political party membership, with the Democratic party consistently seen as liberal on the issues and Republicans with a more conservative position (Feldman & Conover, 1983; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985; Lodge & Hamill, 1986), which should lead to some degree of agreement about where the candidates stand. I predicted that learning individuating information about the political candidates would lead to less use of the subjects stereotypes of the political parties when forming impressions of the specific candidates. Since the

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stereotypes about the parties are highly shared between people, this decrease should be reflected in a decrease in consensus. However, the decrease for the subjects who learned relevant-diagnostic information should be the smallest. This is because the information, while decreasing the use of party stereotype is accompanied by specific information about the candidates actual stands, which as shared information should lead to more consensus than the irrelevant or relevant but undiagnostic information. Polarization The final process examined in the first study is the polarization of the positions of the two parties. Polarization is the tendency for voters to see the Democratic and Republican parties at extreme opposition to one another. For example, during the Vietnam War hawks and doves exaggerated the extremity of the others view (Dawes, Singer, & Lemons, 1972), with doves believing the hawks were more in favor of the war than the hawks themselves claimed, and vice versa. The process of politics itself can also increase polarization. Political deliberation increases polarization, partially due to deferment to individuals with extreme views and a desire to demonstrate party loyalty (Sunstein, 2002). Political primaries lead to polarization, which accelerates during the campaign season (Raven & Gallo, 1965). In addition to polarization of the candidates positions, by extension the voters opinions are also polarized due to political debate between political candidates, which in turn, leads to polarization of public opinion (Zaller, 1992). Our governments policy of public decision making also

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increases polarization, through repeated expression of each parties often diametrically opposed position (Stasavage, 2007). While this measure does not directly address the use of individuating information versus heuristics, it does have a number of interesting and sometimes problematic outcomes. For example, party polarization increases legislative gridlock (Jones, 2001); believing that legislators on the other side of the aisle are more opposed to your positions than they actually are makes compromise much more difficult. Additionally, party polarization decreases splitticket voting, party defection, vote swing, and electoral volatility (Brown & Wright, 1992). The prevalence of polarization within politics and the outcomes it engenders makes it an area of study both interesting and vital. Both increased relevancy and increased diagnosticity of the information were predicted to lead to increased polarization of candidates from the Democratic and Republican Parties. I expected that relevance would increase the use of the subjects existing schemas about the position of the candidates political parties when forming impressions about their position (Conover, 1981). Diagnosticity should increase polarization since the information given was consistent with the positions of each candidates party, which by nature are polarized. Strength of Affiliation. One possible mediator of the processes I investigated (projection, consensus, and polarization) was voters strength of affiliation towards their political party. I predicted that highly affiliated subjects would use their own

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position more when judging both ingroup (increased projection) and outgroup (increased contrast) candidates since highly affiliated subjects should be more likely to incorporate new, stereotypically consistent information into their existing schemas (stereotypes) of the candidates (Shanteau, 1988). Another question that this study addressed is how the judges strength of affiliation to their political party moderates consensus. The tendency for strongly affiliated voters to vote consistently within their party suggests they have a more social identification style of voting, which means that they should agree about what the candidates are like more than weakly identified voters. This should occur because more strongly affiliated judges rely more heavily on beliefs about what each of the political parties is like when judging what the candidates are like (Conover, 1981; Sigel, 1964). The influence of affiliation strength on consensus has not been investigated in any domain, much less within politics, so this examination should be informative to both social and political psychologists alike. It is possible that the more strongly affiliated a person is to a group the more they use stereotypic beliefs about both the in-group and out-group to form impressions of the members of those groups. If that is so, strongly affiliated individuals should agree more with one another than less strongly affiliated group members. This finding, along with the effect of affiliation strength on projection, would support the argument that more affiliated voters rely more on heuristics both their own position and the stereotypic position of each of the parties when forming impressions of political candidates.

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I expected that the subjects strength of affiliation would increase polarization. As mentioned above, more affiliated subjects should rely more on their stereotypes about how each party stands on the issue when forming impressions of where the candidates stand, often with the two parties opposing each other (Conover, 1981; Sigel, 1964). This existing schema of the two parties being opposed to one another should increase polarization of the individual candidates. Additionally, if the more affiliated subjects use their own impression more in judging the ingroup candidates (projection) and the subjects are more extreme on the issues; this should increase the perceived extremity of ingroup candidates, which in turn will increase polarization. Method At pretest subjects rated their own attitudes on eight political issues, as well as their political party membership, strength of affiliation to their party, level of political knowledge, and their personalities. At the experimental session the subjects viewed photographs of 8 political candidates, one half of which were identified as Republican, and the other half as Democrat. They rated where they perceived each of the candidates to stand on each of 8 political issues (two questions per issue). Finally, the subjects were given short statements about each of the candidates that were either irrelevant to the political issues, were relevant to political attitudes but undiagnostic of the candidates actual position, or information that was both relevant and diagnostic. Subjects again made ratings of their perceptions of the candidates attitudes.

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Subjects 119 subjects were recruited from the Introductory Psychology subject pool at the University of Colorado, Boulder and the Psychology Paid subject pool. Subjects were recruited based on their responses to the political membership item on the pre-test questionnaire. 61 self-identified Democrats and 58 selfidentified Republicans were recruited to participate. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (irrelevant, relevantundiagnostic, or relevant-diagnostic). Materials Questionnaires. The core ratings were composed of 10 bipolar personality trait rating items, 16 attitude items, a bipolar measure of liberalismconservatism, and a number of other ratings detailed below. The personality items consisted of two bipolar Likert scales for each of the Big-Five personality dimensions (Norman, 1963). The scales for extraversion were extroverted at one end and shy at the other, and reserved-outgoing; those for agreeableness were disagreeable-agreeable and good natured-irritable, the two conscientiousness measures were trustworthy-untrustworthy and irresponsible-responsible, neuroticism were self-doubting-self-confident and self-assured-insecure, and for culture they were knowledgeable-uninformed and unintelligent-intelligent (see Appendix E). Attitudes were measured using two statements on eight political issues. The eight issues were: abortion, taxation, immigration, gay rights, gun laws, national defense, health care, and energy. For each issue there was one

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statement expressing a conservative viewpoint and one statement expressing a liberal viewpoint. For example, the liberal abortion statement was: I support a womans right to abortion on demand. The conservative abortion statement was: I view abortion as the taking of a human life. When indicating their own position the subjects rated how much they agreed with each statement (Appendix E). When rating the target candidates the subjects indicated where they perceive the candidate to stand on the issue (Appendix F). Overall political ideology was measured using a bipolar measure (see Appendix E). The subjects indicated where they fell along the liberal to conservative spectrum as well as where they perceived each of the target candidates stood. Targets. The targets consisted of 8 black and white photographs of middle-aged white males in suits and ties. The photos were cropped so that only the face and upper torso was visible (Appendix A). Each photograph was randomly assigned a name with 4 identified as Republican and 4 as Democratic candidates. Additionally, the political party identification and the political statements attached to each photograph were counterbalanced across subjects, so that the photographs that were assigned to Democrats in Set-A were assigned to Republicans in Set-B, and those assigned to Republicans in Set-A were assigned to Democrats in Set-B. Experimental Conditions. In the second wave of impression formation, the previously presented target information (including the candidates photograph, name, and party affiliation) were paired with a statement about the candidate.

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Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions, each of which received different statements about the political candidates (see Appendices B, C, and D). While the target photograph was counterbalanced across subjects the names and statements were consistently paired with a candidate from a specific political party. For example, all the statements below were consistently paired with the candidate William McCartell, a Democrat, while the photograph accompanying the name and statement was counterbalanced. The irrelevant statements consisted of four pieces of information that were irrelevant to forming impressions of the candidates political views. For each candidate the statement contained their favorite song, favorite quote, last vacation, and a hobby (Appendix B). For example: William McCartell is an avid golfer and also enjoys refurbishing antique furniture. His favorite song is Thunder Road by Bruce Springsteen. His last vacation was scuba-diving off the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. William McCartells favorite quote is You cant build a reputation on what you are going to do by inventor Henry Ford. The relevant-undiagnostic statements contained ambiguous statements about the candidates political attitudes (see Appendix C). These statements were designed to give the impression of containing attitude information but were actually not informative. For example: Our nation needs to re-examine its priorities. We are at a cross-road in our history and need a leader with the vision to guide us to a better future. William McCartell is the leader to do it. He has plans to refocus our countrys priorities on job creation, education, and health care. William McCartell, defending America.

The relevant-diagnostic statements in fact gave information about where the candidates stood on the political issues, which was always stereotypically 26

consistent with the candidates stated political party membership. Therefore all the politically relevant diagnostic information given to the subjects about the candidates was consistent with the positions that are stereotypically associated with the candidates parties. These statements were identical to the relevantundiagnostic statements except they included two unambiguous position statements (Appendix D). For example: Our nation needs to re-examine its priorities. We are at a cross-road in our history and need a leader with the vision to guide us to a better future. William McCartell is the leader to do it. He has plans to refocus our countrys priorities on job creation, education, and health care. He plans to increase Medicare coverage, and has outlined a universal health care plan. He will focus on keeping our families and our country safe, by bringing estranged nations such as Syria and Iran to the bargaining table. William McCartell, defending America.

As with the first rating period, during the second rating period, the photographs, names, and political party affiliation were present in the upper left corner of each page. However, the political statement was also present at the top of each page to insure the proper target was being judged, as well as allowing the subject to refer back to the information contained in the statements (Appendix F). Procedure Pretest. Prior to recruitment, the subjects completed a pretest questionnaire. The questionnaire included a question about which political party the subject belonged to, which was used for recruitment. The questionnaire also included the personality, attitude, and liberal-conservative ideology measures mentioned above. The subjects answered these items about their own

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personality, political attitudes, and ideology. In addition, the subjects rated their own affiliation to their self-identified political party, their level of political knowledge, and their interest in politics. Experimental Session. Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were informed that they were taking part in a study on the formation of impressions of political candidates. The experimental session took place in an open room with individual carrels for the subjects. During the experimental session, the subjects rated the target candidates at two times (detailed below). These ratings consisted of the personality, attitude, and liberal-conservative ideology measures mentioned above. For this task the subjects indicated their perceptions of each of the candidates personalities, political attitudes, and ideology. In the first wave of impression formation the subjects formed impressions of the candidates using only photographs of the targets and their name and political party. The targets were presented one at a time to the subjects. During the rating period the photograph, name, and party of the target was present on each page of ratings for that target. This insured that the subject was making the ratings for the correct target. Once the subjects were seated the experimenter handed out the first booklet, which contained the photograph, name, and political party of the target candidates. The subjects were told: You will now be forming impressions of the eight political candidates. Inside of the booklet is a page with the photograph, name, and political party of each of the candidates. In a moment you will be told to flip to the first page and form an impression of the candidate. You will have 15 28

seconds to study each page and form an impression of the candidate contained on that page. You will be told when the 15 seconds has elapsed and be instructed to turn to the next candidate. Once you have formed impressions of all the candidates you will rate each of them on a number of personality and political attitude items. Please turn to the first candidate now. After 15 seconds the subjects were told to flip to the next candidate. This continued until the subjects had viewed all eight candidates. After completing the impression formation task the subjects completed the first set of ratings about all of the candidates. The experimenter handed out the second booklet which contained the first target questionnaire. The subjects were then told: You will now make ratings of each of the candidates political attitudes and personalities. On each page of the questionnaire are the photograph, name, and political party of the candidate you are currently rating. There are two pages for each candidate. You will have 15 minutes to complete this questionnaire. Once you have completed the questionnaire please put it face down in front of you. We will move on to the next phase once the 15 minutes have elapsed, so if you complete the questionnaire before the 15 minutes have elapsed please sit quietly. You may now begin.

After completing the first set of ratings the experimenter collected the rating booklet. The subjects then completed the second impression formation task. This task was similar to the first impression task, except that in addition to the photographs, names, and political party of each target candidate the booklet contained the statements about the candidates which differed depending on the condition the subject was assigned to. The subjects had 1 minute to read through each of the statements, with the experimenter telling them when to advance on to the next target. One minute allowed the subjects enough time to comfortably read through each statement. The subjects were told: 29

You will now be reading statements about each of the candidates. On each page of this booklet are the photographs, names, and political parties of each of the candidates that you viewed earlier, as well as a short statement about each of the candidates. You will have one minute to read through each statement and view the photograph. You will be told when to advance to the next page. You will then be asked to re-rate the individuals using your new impressions of them. Please turn to the first candidate. After the subjects completed the second impression formation task they re-rated the candidates, based on the new information they had learned about them. They were told: You will now make a final rating of each of the candidates. The questionnaire is very similar to the previous one. In addition to the photograph of the candidate at the top of the page, the statement about that candidate will also be present so that you can refer back to it to make your ratings if needed. Do not worry about how you previously rated each individual when making your ratings, you will be using new information to form your impression so do not be concerned if you are rating them the same or differently than the time before. You will again have 15 minutes to complete this task. Once you have completed the questionnaire please place it face down in front of you. Once all the subjects had completed the task they were debriefed, thanked for their time, and excused. Results The purpose of Study One was to examine the effect of various types of information on impressions of political candidates attitudes. I examined how the diagnosticity and relevance of information about political candidates influenced the extent to which the judges used their own attitudes to form impressions (projection), their level of agreement about the candidates (consensus), and how differently they rated Democrat and Republican candidates from each other (polarization).

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Strength of Affiliation Before examining the impression variable I will discuss the results of the subjects self reported strength of affiliation to their own party. In general the distribution of strength of party affiliation was normal (Figure 1). Additionally, Democrat subjects reported higher levels of affiliation than did Republican candidates. t(1,119) = 2.89, p < .01 (Means: Democrats = 4.77, Republicans 4.12). Figure 1. Affiliation. Frequency Distribution of subjects self-rated strength of affiliation to their political party.
40 35 Number of Subjects 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Subject Self-Rated Affiliation Strength

Projection Overview. I predicted that projection would be greater to the ingroup candidates (Allen & Wilder, 1979; Clement & Krueger, 2002; Wilder, 1984), and that projection would decrease at Time 2, after the subjects learned information about the candidates, however the more ambiguous the statements were the smaller the decrease.

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Analyses. The projection results were calculated using a multi-level regression. For the first level, a regression was conducted for each subject, predicting ratings of the eight target candidates positions across the 16 attitude items and across the two time periods (for a total of 256 observations for each regression). The first level of the regression included all the within subject variables with the following model: AR = 0 + 1S + 2P + 3T + 4S*P + 5S*T + 6P*T + 7S*P*T + AR represents the judges rating of the candidate on an attitude item, with selfrating for that item represented by S. P is a contrast coded variable indicating whether the candidate is a member of the judges political party (-1 = Outgroup and +1 = Ingroup). The time point (T) when the rating was made is denoted by -1 as Time1 and +1 as Time 2. Finally, all the two-way and the three-way interactions are included. These regressions resulted in a beta for each subject for each of the factors in the model. The second level analyses regressed the resulting slopes onto the two contrast coded experimental condition variables (Irrelevant vs. the average of the two relevant conditions, and Relevant-Diagnostic vs. RelevantUndiagnostic), a contrast code of the judges political party (-1 = Democrat and +1 = Republican), the mean deviated rating of the judges strength of political affiliation and all the interactions1. Results. The betas were analyzed to examine projection effects, specifically the betas that included the subjects self-ratings, specifically 1, 4,

Note: Target-Set (Set-A versus Set-B) did not interact with self-rating or interaction containing self-rating and thus Target-Set was excluded from the analysis.

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5, and 7. I expected both Democrat and Republican judges to show identical projection effects specifically that 1 would not depend on Self-Party, which was indeed the case, t(1,109) = -.66, p = .51. Testing 1 (the effect of self-rating) against zero, the judges used their own political attitudes when forming impressions of the candidates attitudes, t(1, 109) = 8.25, p < .0001. This result supports the first hypothesis that the subjects would project their own attitudes onto the candidates. Examining the beta of the Self-rating X Ingroup/Outgroup factor (4) projection depended on whether the candidate was a member of the judges political party or not, t(1,109) = 6.49, p < .0001, with greater projection towards ingroup candidates. The two-way interaction depended upon the judges strength of political affiliation, t(1,109) = 2.27, p = .03, with the ingroup-outgroup projection difference being greater for more affiliated subjects (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Projection. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients between subjects self-ratings and their ratings of the targets, by ingroup/outgroup and affiliation (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 Projection 0 Lo Affiliation -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 Hi Affiliation Ingroup Outgroup

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I predicted that once the subjects received additional information about the candidates they would decrease the amount of projection. Testing the beta from Self-rating X Time (5) against zero, this did not appear to be the case, t(1,109) = 1.49, p = .14. However, the predicted three-way interaction of projection, time, and ingroup/outgroup was significant, t(1,109) = -2.69, p < .01 (see Figure 3). Examining the simple changes over time for outgroup, projection increased at Time 2, t(1,109) = -2.68, p < .01, with significant contrast (negative projection) towards the outgroup candidates at Time 1, t(1,109) = -2.21, p = .03, and no projection at Time 2, p = .39. Examining the simple change over time for the Ingroup there was no change in projection over time, t(1,109) = -1.41, p = .16. Projection towards the ingroup candidates was significant at both Time 1, t(1,109) = 11.21, p <.0001 and Time 2, t(1,109)= 6.94, p < .0001. While the mean level of projection towards the ingroup decreased between Time 1 and Time 2, this difference was not statistically significant, something that had been predicted. The main prediction was that projection would decrease in the two relevant conditions but remain stable in the irrelevant condition. However, testing the Self X Time beta (5S*T), neither the irrelevant versus the two relevant contrast, t(1,109) = -0.06, p = .95, nor the relevant-undiagnostic versus relevant-diagnostic contrast, t(1,109) = -1.18, p = .24 significantly moderated changes across time in projection.

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Figure 3. Projection. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients between subjects self-ratings and their ratings of the targets, by time and ingroup/outgroup.

0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Time 1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 Time 2 Outgroup Ingroup

In Pennefather and Park (2006) the decrease in projection was only significant for ingroup candidates, however testing the Self X Time beta (5S*T) for only the ingroup candidates neither the irrelevant versus the two relevant contrast, t(1,109) = 0.59, p = .55, nor the relevant-undiagnostic versus relevantdiagnostic contrast, t(1,109) = 0.13, p = .90 significantly moderated the decrease in projection for ingroup candidates with additional information. Finally, examining just the relevant-diagnostic condition the Self X Time interaction was not significant, t(1,39) = -.84, p = .41. In general, neither the relevancy nor the diagnosticity of the information moderated projection. The sole exception was that the more strongly affiliated the subjects were to their political party, the more they projected towards both ingroup and outgroup candidates when the information was irrelevant, t(1, 109) = 2.43, p = .017.

Projection

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As part of our analyses there were a number of non-projection effects. These effects were found examining the betas that did not include the subjects self-ratings, specifically 0, 2, 3, and 6. There was a significant main effect of time (3), t(1, 109) = 2.53, p = .01, wherein all the candidates were rated as more liberal at Time 2. Additionally, examining the intercept beta (0) there was a main effect of the subjects strength of affiliation, t(1,109) = 3.11, p < .01, with more affiliated subjects rating the candidates as more liberal. Again examining the intercept beta, there was a main effect of the first contrast coded condition variable, t(1,109) = 2.20, p = .03, with the subjects in the two relevant conditions rating all the targets as more liberal than subjects in the irrelevant condition. This effect was due to the content of the statements, with no actual political information contained in the irrelevant statements, all of the statements in the relevant condition may have been written as more liberal. There was also a significant interaction of the subjects political party and target party, t(1,109) = 16.78, p < .0001, with Democrat subjects seeing their ingroup members as more liberal. The target party by time beta (6) interacted with the subjects party, t(1,109) = -3.16, p < .01, with the Democrats seeing their ingroup candidates as even more liberal at Time 2. Again this effect was due to the content of the statements. This three-way interaction was further moderated by the second contrast coded condition, t(1,109) = -2.51, p = .01, with Democrats in the relevant-undiagnostic condition seeing their ingroup as even more liberal at Time 2 than Time 1, than the Democrats in the relevant-diagnostic condition. This interaction was moderated by the subjects strength of affiliation, t(1,109) = 2.00,

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p = .05, with low affiliated Democrats showing the above effect more strongly than highly affiliated Democrats. These patterns of findings indicate that in general neither the diagnosticity nor relevance of information influenced the extent to which the judges used their own positions to form impressions of the political candidates in this study. Rather, the judges used their own positions more when making judgments about ingroup candidates than outgroup candidates and this did not depend on the relevancy or diagnosticity of the information they learned about the candidates. In a previous study (Pennefather & Park, 2006) the amount of projection towards the ingroup candidates decreased after receiving relevant-undiagnostic information, while in this study projection towards the ingroup did not change over time. Additionally, there was significant contrast towards the outgroup at Time 1, which became zero at Time 2. Consensus Overview. Next, the influence of the different levels of information on agreement between the subjects about what the candidates were like was examined. The first prediction was that the subjects would show significant agreement about the candidates attitudes. More importantly it was predicted that individuating information would decrease the use of heuristics, which are shared by subjects, resulting in a decrease in the level of consensus about the candidates attitudes. Thus, I predicted that the level of consensus about the candidates would decrease at Time 2 once the subjects learned more individuating information about the candidates and relied less on their

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stereotypes about the parties. The decrease in consensus should be less when the information was diagnostic of actual position, since the shared information in the relevant condition was more predictive of position it may have been used more than the information in the irrelevant condition, compensating somewhat for the decreased use of the party stereotype. Schemas that voters have about the political parties are the most powerful in politics (Conover & Feldman, 1986, 1989; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985; Nicholson, 2005), which may result in high agreement before the individuating information is learned. Analysis. The consensus analyses examined the extent to which the judges agreed about what the candidates were like. The consensus results were calculated first using BLOCKO (Kenny, 1983). BLOCKO is a program for the analysis of dyadic block designs. The current study was a half-block design in which measurements were taken only from members of one group (judgesubjects) about their impressions of the other (target-candidates). BLOCKO allowed us to decompose the variance in ratings into three components: target, judge, and relationship. Target effects measure the average response for a target across judges, that is how much of the total variance in ratings can be attributed to the targets being rated. For example, Candidate X is seen by others as strongly liberal. Thus target effects are a measure of the agreement between the judges about what the targets are like, so in the current study I use absolute target variance as the measure of consensus.

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The judge effects are the measure of the raters general response across targets for a particular item. For example, Judge A may rate the candidates as being strongly liberal. This consistent judgment of others as strongly liberal could be due to a measurement artifact, that is, Judge A tends to use the high end of the scale. More interestingly, judge effects could be a measure of a persons psychological processing of other people. Relationship effects measure the interaction of judge and target effects. The relationship effect is the idiosyncratic perception that a judge has about a particular target. Thus, the relationship effect operates at the dyadic level between a single judge and a single target, while judge and target effects are the average effect across raters and those being rated. Judges sharing party, condition, and target-set were combined into groups, with between eight and eleven judges in each of the 12 party by condition by target-set groups. The variance decomposition, analyzing party and condition differences in consensus was performed. For each group the level of absolute stable variance due to target (consensus) was calculated. The variance decomposition was performed on eight issue constructs; each of these constructs was composed of the two attitude items that address the same issue. After this group level analysis the amount of consensus due to each judge was calculated using a jack-knifing technique (see Park & Judd, 1989), whereby each judge was left out of the BLOCKO analysis and the amount of absolute stable target variance remaining was included in the following formula to find the level of target variance due to each judge (for a group with 11 judges): Vi = (11 * V11)

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(10 * V11-1), where Vi is the ith subjects psuedovalue for a given variance. V11 is the variance estimate from the full sample (one Subject Party X Condition X Target Set group at one Time, in this case having 11 judges) and V11-1 is the variance estimate of the sample excluding that subjects data. I ended up with a measure of each subjects individual contribution to his or her groups consensus for each of the eight attitude constructs at both Time 1 and Time 2. The eight scores at each time were then averaged to create a single measure of attitude consensus at Time 1 and Time 2. These consensus scores were regressed on the two contrast-coded Information Condition variables (Irrelevant vs. the two relevant conditions, and Relevant-Diagnostic vs. Relevant-Undiagnostic), Rating Period (-1 = Time 1 and +1 = Time 2), Subject Party (+1 = Democrat and -1 = Republican), Target Set, and all the interactions. Results. I predicted that the overall level of consensus would differ from zero, indicating that there was agreement overall about the candidates attitudes, which was indeed the case at both Time 1, F(1,120) = 7.16, p < .0001 and Time 2, F(1,120) = 6.00, p < .0001 (see Figure 4). Next, the prediction that individuating information would lead to a decrease in consensus was not supported, F(1,120) = 1.70, p = .19. Neither relevancy (Condition 2 contrast), F(1,120) = 2.29, p = .13 nor diagnosticity (Condition 1 contrast), F(1,120) = 0.79, p = .38, were significant. Therefore the shared stereotypes about the positions of each political party on the issues lead to agreement about the candidates positions when no individuating information was known, which did not change

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when they learned individuating information about each candidate. Increased relevance and diagnosticity of the information did not, in general influence agreement more than the irrelevant information did.

Figure 4. Consensus. Average agreement between subjects ratings of the targets on the 16 attitude items by time and information condition.
0.35 Average Relative Partner Variance 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 Irrelevant Rel-Undiag Inform ation Condition Rel-Diag Time 1 Time 2

However, there was a significant interaction between the subjects party and the first condition contrast-code F(1,97) = 4.29, p = .04, and a marginal interaction between the subjects party and the second condition contrast F(1,97) = 3.70, p = .06. While the Democrat subjects in all the information condition had equally higher levels of agreement than Republican subjects, this difference was less in the relevant-diagnostic condition (see Figure 5). The interaction of the subjects party and first condition contrast depended on time, F(1,97) = 3.66, p = .06. Examining simple changes in the consensus between Time1 and Time 2 for each condition, the change was significant for the subjects in the relevant41

undiagnostic condition, F(1,37) = 4.34, p = .04, but not for the irrelevant condition, p = .78, nor the relevant-diagnostic, p = .53.

Figure 5. Consensus. Average agreement between subjects ratings of the targets on the 16 attitude items by subjects political party and information condition.
0.4 0.35 Average Relative Partner Variance 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 Irrelevant Rel-Undiag Rel-Diag Inform ation Condition Dem Subjects Rep Subjects

Additionally, there was a main effect of target set, with subjects who received the first target set agreeing more about what the candidates were like, F(1,97) = 12.44, p < .001. The target set effect was moderated by time, F(1,97) = 4.42, p = .04, with the difference in consensus between the target sets being larger at Time 2. One possibility for this difference due to target set is that in the first set the Democrat candidates all appeared younger than the Republicans, while in the second set this was reversed. This unintentional difference could have resulted in the use of two different stereotypes when judging the candidates. The first 42

stereotype is the expected one that Democrat candidates are more liberal. The second stereotype is that older people are more conservative. In the first target set both the young-liberal and Democrat-liberal stereotypes and the olderconservative and Republican conservative stereotypes were going in the same direction. In the second target set the two stereotypes were working against each other. If the subjects who received the second target set used the age and political party stereotypes to different degrees the amount of agreement about the candidates in that condition would suffer, leading to a target set difference. Polarization Overview. As mentioned in the introduction there are a number of processes that lead to seeing the candidates from the two parties as holding more extreme attitudes, or polarization. I predicted that both the diagnosticity and the relevance of the information that our subjects received about the candidates would influence how polarized they saw the candidates. I predicted that receiving information about the candidates that was relevant to their attitude positions should lead to increases in perceived polarization. This should have been especially true when the information was diagnostic of the candidates actual position (as well as party consistent), which reinforced the existing stereotypes about each of the parties positions. Specifically, subjects in the two relevant conditions should see the candidates as more polarized than the subjects in the irrelevant condition. Additionally, the subjects in the relevantdiagnostic condition should see more polarization than those subjects in the relevant-undiagnostic condition.

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Analysis. The polarization results were calculated using a General Linear Model (GLM) analysis. First, the attitude items were reverse scored so that they were all scored higher for the liberal end. For each subject the average of the 16 attitude items for each target candidate was calculated. The average of these ratings across time and target party were calculated, which resulted in four scores: Democrat Targets-Time 1, Democrat Targets-Time 2, Republican Targets-Time 1, and Republican Targets-Time 2. These four scores were then included as repeated measures in a GLM, with the two contrast-coded Information Condition variables (Irrelevant vs. the two relevant conditions, and Relevant-Diagnostic vs. Relevant-Undiagnostic), Subject Party (+1 = Democrat and -1 = Republican), subjects strength of affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors in the model. Results. The was a significant main effect for target party, F(1,108) = 285.02, p < .0001, indicating that the subjects perceived polarization between the Democrat and Republican target candidates. This effect was not moderated by the subjects political party membership, F(1,108) = 2.72, p = .10, indicating that both Democrat and Republican subjects perceived the same amount of polarization, though directionally the Democrat subjects showed more polarization. The target party effect was moderated by time, F(1,108) = 9.18, p < .01, with less perceived polarization once the judges learned information about the candidates. This two-way interaction of time and target party was further moderated by a three-way interaction with the second condition contrast,

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F(1,108) = 5.44, p = .02 (see Figure 6). To better examine this effect I ran separate analyses examining the simple change in polarization for each

Figure 6. Polarization. Average rating of Democrat targets on the 16 attitude issues minus the average rating of the Republican targets by time and information condition.
Polarization by Time and Condition
2.5 Average Democrat Minus Republican Rating 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Irrelevant Rel-Undiag Condition Rel-Diag

Time 1 Time 2

condition. The decrease in polarization at Time 2 was significant for subjects in the relevant-undiagnostic condition, F(1,36) = 3.94, p < .001, and marginal for the irrelevant condition, F(1,37) = 1.87, p = .07. However there was not a significant decrease in the relevant-diagnostic condition with more information, F(1,35) = .01, p =.99. As predicted when subjects learned either irrelevant or relevantundiagnostic information they decreased their perceptions of polarization while subjects who learned relevant-diagnostic information did not, demonstrating that the diagnosticity of the information influences how extreme candidates from the two parties are seen. There was a significant three-way interaction between target party, subjects strength of affiliation, and the subjects political party, 45

F(1,108) = 4.82, p = .03. While highly affiliated subjects from both parties showed equally high degrees of polarization, the low affiliated Republicans showed less polarization than low affiliated Democrats (see Figure 7). Finally, there was a main effect of Time, F(1,108) = 6.53, p = .01, with subjects perceiving all of the targets as generally more liberal at Time 2. It could be that the statements were all written to liberally, even those about the Republican candidates.

Figure 7. Polarization. Average rating of Democrat targets on the 16 attitude issues minus the average rating of the Republican targets by subjects political party membership and strength of affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation).

3 Average Democrat Minus Average Republican 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Lo Aff Hi Aff
Dem Subjects Rep Subjects

While the predicted overall polarization difference between the two relevant conditions and the irrelevant condition was not found, as predicted, the subjects in the relevant-diagnostic condition did not decrease the extent to which they polarized the candidates, while subjects in the other two conditions did. 46

Discussion Study One was designed to investigate how relevant and diagnostic information influenced impression formation. I expected that any individuating information, be it relevant and/or diagnostic would decrease the relationship between the subjects own positions and those of the candidates, specifically ingroup candidates. This was not the case; neither type of information significantly changed the extent to which the subjects projected. The subjects did project more towards the ingroup than towards the outgroup. Also, when the subjects learned more about the ingroup candidates than merely their name, political party, and a photograph the amount the subjects projected decreased directionally, but not significantly. On the other hand, when the subjects learned only the basic information about the outgroup candidates the subjects contrasted their positions from their perceptions of the outgroup candidates positions (reverse projection), but after learning individuating information they no longer projected in either direction. In a previous study (Pennefather & Park, 2006) subjects decreased their projection towards ingroup candidates after learning relevant-undiagnostic information about them, however, in the current study projection towards the ingroup did not change significantly, even when only the relevant-undiagnostic condition was examined. The only differences between the current studys relevant-undiagnostic condition and the previous study was the collection of selfratings of the attitude measures at pre-test rather than during the first part of the

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experimental session and the information was not counter-balanced across party. Why the decrease in projection did not attain significance, and differed from the previous investigation will need further examination. Kennys (2004) PERSON model argues that increases in shared knowledge about other people increases agreement between raters. Directionally, the findings supported our predictions that when subjects had very little information, which included party membership of the candidates, they would rely more on the stereotypes of each of the parties. While overall the decrease in consensus was not significant at Time 2, it did decrease significantly in the relevant-undiagnostic condition. In the current study Democrats agreed with one another more than the Republicans regardless of the type of information, but less so when the information was relevant and diagnostic. These results suggest that Democrats have a stronger shared stereotype, about where each of the parties stand on the issues, or use the stereotype more. However, when the information was relevant and diagnostic it appears to have increased the use of the stereotypes by the Republican subjects. The fact that the Republicans agreed less about the candidates could be due to the fact they were less strongly affiliated to their party, t(1,119) = 2.89, p < .01 (Means: Democrats = 4.77, Republicans 4.12) and less politically knowledgeable, t(1,119) = 2.33, p = .05 (Means: Democrats = 4.05. Republicans = 3.59) than the Democrat subjects. As expected the subjects perceived the candidates from the two parties as less extreme once they learned more information about them. This was expected because prior to receiving the information at Time 2, the subjects were

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relying more heavily on their stereotypes about each party, which by nature were polarized. The prediction that the diagnosticity of the information would also influence polarization was supported, with decreases in polarization at Time 2 for the subjects who learned relevant-undiagnostic and irrelevant (marginal) information, but not for those who learned relevant-diagnostic information. Interestingly, Democrat subjects directionally perceived more polarization than did Republican subjects. It is possible that this trend is due to Democrats being more numerous on campus, and thus more powerful, resulting in more perceived polarization by Democrat subjects (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998). It appears that the subjects were using the information rationally in their perceptions of candidate extremity. The relevant-diagnostic information was designed to express party consistent positions, which as mentioned above are the nature of the issues. This information would reinforce existing party stereotypes, which resulted in no change in polarization between Time 1 when they were relying heavily on the party stereotypes and Time 2, when they learned the diagnostic information, which was consistent with the stereotype. It is interesting however, that polarization decreased in the other two conditions, though only marginally in the irrelevant condition. It seems that individuating information, when it does not specifically reinforce the political party stereotypes decreases the use of the polarized party stereotypes. The fact that the decrease was significant for the irrelevant-diagnostic condition could mean that the ambiguous nature of the statements resulted in perceptions of the candidates as more moderate. This would support previous work that suggests that ambiguity

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is the best way to capture moderate and independent voters, especially when the candidates position is substantially different from the median public position (Campbell, 1983; Kinder, 1978). One question these results raise is: how does the consistency of the information influence the impressions? In none of the conditions in Study One did the subjects learn information that ran counter to their existing stereotypes about the candidates. In fact, in the relevant-diagnostic condition the information reinforced the stereotype. The next study examines the impact of consistency on impressions of political candidates.

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Chapter 3: Study Two In Study One the influence that different levels of diagnostic information have on political perception was examined. In that study all the politically relevant information given to the subjects about the candidates was consistent with the positions that are stereotypically associated with the candidates parties. While many political candidates do toe the party line on most issues, it is also the case that there are candidates that express views that are inconsistent with the party norm (Kam, 2005). An interesting question is how voters deal with inconsistent information about political candidates? Consistency A prime example of a candidate that expressed party-inconsistent attitudes was the former Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani. Mr. Giuliani, during his political career expressed liberal views on abortion, gay marriage, and gun control. Interestingly, once he announced his candidacy for president in 2007 he quickly became a favorite for the Republican ticket. This reaction could be expected from fiscal Republicans who may not care as much about social issues; however, even strong social conservatives like Pat Roberts backed Mr. Giuliani. How do political party members deal with party-inconsistent information about their candidates? Social psychologists have long been interested in stereotype consistency and its effect on various impression formation processes. Social psychologists have examined the effects of stereotype consistent and inconsistent information

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on judgments of the group and individuals within the group (Krueger & Rothbart, 1988; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Additionally, researchers have examined the influence of inconsistency on memory, in some cases finding greater recall for inconsistent behaviors (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) and in others finding greater recall for stereotype-consistent events (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979). While these findings seem at odds, Srull, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart (1985) found that while recall for inconsistent behaviors was greater for individuals and meaningful groups, the reverse was true for meaningless groups. Moreno and Bodenhausen (1999) argue that in the face of inconsistent information people typically adopt a defensive stance to protect their stereotypes about the group, but this can be moderated if they are motivated to be accurate. Work in the political domain supports Hastie and Kumars (1979), finding that when the target persons ideology differed from their own, people remembered more inconsistent than consistent information, however when the target had the same ideology as the subject recall for inconsistent information did not differ from that for consistent information (Wnke & Wyer, 1996). In a series of elaborate mock election studies Lau and Redlawsk (2006) showed that their subjects were flummoxed when confronted by a counter-stereotypic outgroup candidate and engaged in more effortful processing, using the rationalcalculation based forms of vote decision making. However, Lau and Redlawsk (2006) did not examine the influence of a counter-stereotypic ingroup candidate.

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Popularity During general elections, when the choice is between a candidate from ones own party and a candidate from the outgroup party I would argue that voters, are motivated less by accuracy, and more by a desire to protect their social identities as members of the party (Moreno & Bodenhausen, 1999). One reason voters may be less accuracy motivated could be the horse race coverage of the elections. Bartels (1988) states that reporting focuses on whos ahead, whos gaining ground, and who was first across the finish line. The horse race only incidentally touches on matters of political substance. Research has supported this, with more media coverage of competition than any other form of information, such as the candidates political positions (Robinson & Sheehan, 1983). This type of coverage influences the perceptions of the public about the candidates, for example voters support for candidates is moderated by their expectations of that candidates chance to win (Bartels, 1988). One prime example of this effect was Jimmy Carter, who was a virtual unknown before the primaries began, but with a good showing in the first caucus gained enough momentum to gain the nomination and eventually the Presidency. As mentioned in the introduction one type of information that voters use to form impressions of political candidates are endorsements by trusted groups (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001) or individuals (Carmines & Kuklinski, 1990; Mondak, 1993; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). How does knowledge that the candidate is supported by a majority of voters from ones own political party influence how people use inconsistent information in their

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impressions? What would happen with a candidate that expressed inconsistent attitudes on some of the issues; would it matter if he was popular or not? I would expect that an inconsistent but popular ingroup candidate would increase the voters use of the party stereotype. Voter should also rely on the endorsements of their ingroup, making it even less likely that inconsistent information will influence impressions. The current study also examined possible mechanisms by which the influence of inconsistent information about candidates is minimized. One possible way to deal with inconsistent information is simply to ignore it. Recent examinations have found that people often do ignore inconsistent information (Erber & Fiske, 1984). If subjects do ignore inconsistent information about the candidates, they should exhibit decreased recall of the inconsistent statements. Research in political science on memory and popularity has shown that voters have greater recall for supported candidates; however this effect is moderated by the type of information, with greater recall for positive than negative items (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Thus popularity should increase recognition in the popular condition, but more so for consistent items. Another way that voters can deal with inconsistency is to subtype the inconsistent individual as the exception to the party (Allport, 1954; Weber & Crocker, 1983). If the subjects are subtyping the inconsistent individual, a task asking the subjects how representative the target candidate is should demonstrate this.

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Voters can also deal with candidates who are inconsistent on issues by changing how much they value the issues, decreasing the importance of the issues the ingroup candidate expressed inconsistent attitudes on, and increasing the importance of those the candidate was consistent on. Asking subjects how important the issues are to them, both before and after learning about the candidates, allows changes in their valuation of the issues due to exposure to inconsistent candidates to be examined. Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, and Boninger (2005) argue that the accumulation of new knowledge influences the importance that people put on the issues. Thus it is possible that when an ingroup candidate, particularly a popular one, expresses inconsistent views on issues the voters may change the importance they place on that issue. The specific predictions of the present study were that subjects would have more positive evaluations, and be more likely to vote for consistent candidates. The same should be true for popular candidates. However, popularity should moderate the influence of inconsistency, with less negative impact of inconsistency when the candidate is popular. The influence of the subjects strength of political affiliation and their political knowledge on how the candidate was perceived was also examined. As for mechanisms, I examined whether these effects were driven by misattribution and failure to encode the information, or subtyping and changes in valuation of the issues.

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Method Subjects 75 subjects were recruited from the Introductory Psychology subject pool at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Subjects were recruited based on their response to a political membership item on the pretest questionnaire. Specifically, subjects were recruited from individuals who responded that they identified themselves with the Democratic Party. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, with 19 in the Consistent-Popular condition, 18 in the Consistent-Unpopular condition, 19 in the InconsistentPopular condition, and 19 in the Inconsistent-Unpopular condition. One subject failed to complete all of the questions and was excluded from analysis. Materials Target. The target was a black and white photograph of a middle aged white male, cropped to show just his upper body and face (Appendix G). The photograph was accompanied by a name, political party membership (Democrat), and nine statements about the candidate. Unlike in the previous study, only one target was used, thus all the subjects received the same photograph, name, and political party information (Democrat). Experimental Conditions. The experimental manipulation crossed the stereotypical-consistency and popularity of the target candidate, and was between subjects. One half of the subjects learned that the candidate held stereotype-consistent attitudes on six issues, as well as three pieces of irrelevant information (i.e. the candidates

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hobbies; see Appendix H). The other half of the subjects learned that the candidate held three consistent and three inconsistent attitudes, as well as three irrelevant pieces of information (see Appendix I). Popularity was manipulated by having half of the subjects from each consistency condition learn that the majority of Democrat voters in the candidates home district supported him: Recently Democrat voters in Stephen Johnsons home district were polled about whom they planned to vote for in the upcoming Congressional primary. 79 percent of registered Democrats stated they would vote for Stephen Johnson. The next most popular Democrat candidate received only 6 percent support.

The other half of the subjects learned that the candidate had little Democratic support: Recently Democrat voters in Stephen Johnsons home district were polled about whom they planned to vote for in the upcoming Congressional primary. Only 6 percent of registered Democrats stated they would vote for Stephen Johnson. The most popular Democrat candidate received 79 percent support.

This popularity information was presented on the same sheet as the photograph, name, and party information (Appendix G). Questionnaires. The core ratings were composed of the 10 bipolar personality trait rating items, 24 attitude items, a bipolar measure of liberalismconservatism, and a number of other ratings detailed below. The personality items consisted of two bipolar Likert scales for each of the Big-Five personality dimensions used in Study One (Appendix J).

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Attitudes were measured using two statements on 12 political issues. Eight of the issues were the same as those used in Study One: abortion, taxation, immigration, gay rights, gun laws, national defense, health care, and energy. The four new issues were: welfare, death penalty, Homeland Security, and drug laws. As with the measures from Study One for each issue there was one statement expressing a conservative viewpoint and one statement expressing a liberal viewpoint. When indicating their own position, the subjects rated how much they agreed with each statement (Appendix J). When rating the target candidate the subjects indicated where they perceived the candidate to stand on the issue (Appendix K). Overall political ideology was measured using a bipolar measure (see Appendix J), with subjects indicating where they fell along the liberal to conservative spectrum as well as where they perceived the target candidate to stand (Appendix K). Subjects rated how important each of the 12 issues were to themselves, as well as self-rated strength of affiliation to party and degree of political knowledge (see Appendix J). Subjects completed a free recall task, in which, they were given a page of blank paper and asked to recall as many of the statements about the candidate as possible. Subjects completed a cued recognition task (Appendix M), in which, they were given a sheet containing all of the political statements previously learned, as well as 18 filler items consisting of 9 items stereotypically consistent with the

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Democratic Partys stand and 9 items stereotypically inconsistent and indicated whether they thought the candidate had made the statement or not, and how sure they were about their choice. This questionnaire also included a subtyping measure, which asked how typical or atypical were the candidates attitudes and beliefs compared to the attitudes and beliefs of the other members of his political party (see Appendix N). Procedure At pretest subjects indicated their own political party membership, their strength of party affiliation, the ideology measure, and their positions on the 24 attitude statements. The political party membership question was used in recruitment (only Democrats were recruited). Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were informed that they were taking part in a study on the formation of impressions about political candidates. The experimental session took place in an open room with individual carrels for the subjects. Once the subjects had been seated the experimenter handed out the first booklet. This booklet included the measures of how important each of the issues was to the subject. After completing the self-ratings the experimenter collected them, and handed out the booklet containing the candidate target information. This included the candidates name, political party, photograph, and the popularity condition information and nine statements about the candidate. Once all the subjects had received their booklet they were instructed as follows: You will now be forming impressions of the political candidate. Inside of the booklet are the photograph, name, political party, and some 59

information about the candidate. This candidate is running for state congress in another state, so you will most likely not be familiar with him beforehand. You will have three minute to read through the statements and view the photograph. Once you have formed impressions about the candidate you will rate him of on a number of personality and political attitude items. Please begin. Once the subjects had viewed and formed an impression about the candidate they were given the rating booklet. They were told: You will now make ratings of the candidates political attitudes and personality. You will have 5 minutes to complete this questionnaire. Once you have completed the questionnaire please close it and flip it over and I will collect it. We will move on to the next phase once the 5 minutes have elapsed, so if you complete the questionnaire before the 5 minutes have elapsed please sit quietly. You may now begin. Next the subjects completed a second self-rating questionnaire, which contained the 24 own attitude measures, self-ideology, and importance of the issues to them. After completing this task the subjects completed the recall task. Finally, the subjects completed the cued recognition and subtyping measures.

Results Study Two was designed to examine the influence of candidate popularity and consistency, as well as the subjects strength of party affiliation and political knowledge on impressions of the candidates attitudes, as well as a number of other impression variables; such as projection of the subjects attitudes onto the candidate, liking of the candidate, likelihood of voting for him, overall perceived similarity, and perceptions of the candidates strength of party affiliation. I predicted that both consistency and popularity would increase all of these variables. I also expected that the popularity of the candidate would moderate the

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consistency effect, with consistency mattering less when the candidate was popular. In addition to examining these impression variables a number of potential process variables to account for these changes were included. As mentioned in the introduction I expected that differences in memory would be responsible for the impression differences, therefore recall and recognition measures were taken. While I did not believe that changes in valuation of the issues, nor subtyping of the candidate would be responsible for the impression differences, these measures were included as well. Strength of Affiliation Before examining the impression variables I will discuss the subjects selfrated strength of affiliation to political party. There were no significant preexisting differences in strength of affiliation due to popularity condition (Means: Popular = 4.58, Unpopular = 4.45) or consistency (Means: Consistent = 4.29, Inconsistent = 4.73), though the distribution of self-rated affiliation was slightly negatively skewed (Figure 8). Impression Variables Overview. The impression variables were examined first; how much the subjects liked the candidate, how likely they were to vote for him, how strongly affiliated they perceived him to be to his political party, and how similar they perceived him to be to themselves. Analyses. For all of the impression variables a regression was performed with the following predictors: contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1

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Popular), contrast coded consistency (-1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions. All of the impression measures were collected after the subjects completed the attitude impression measures, but before they re-rated their own positions (see Appendix K).

Figure 8. Affiliation Strength. Frequency Distribution of Subjects selfrated strength of affiliation to their political party.
30 Number of Subjects 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Subject Self-Rated Affiliation Strength

Evaluation. Evaluation was measured with a single 7-point Likert scale asking how much the subject liked the candidate, ranging from 1 - disliked very much, to 7 liked very much. As predicted there was a significant main effect for consistency, t(1,74) = 4.82, p < .0001, with subjects in the consistent conditions liking the candidates more (Means: consistent = 5.19, inconsistent = 3.82) . The predicted main effect of popularity was not significant, t(1,74) = -0.84, p = .41, nor was the interaction of consistency and popularity, t(1,74) = 1.32, p = .19. The 62

three-way interaction of affiliation, consistency, and popularity was significant, t(1,74) = -2.01, p = .05 (see Figure 9). While highly affiliated subject liked the consistent candidate more than the inconsistent candidate regardless of popularity, less affiliated subjects liked the inconsistent-unpopular candidate as much as the consistent ones (both popular and unpopular). Separate analyses testing the effects at both high and low affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation) were run. The consistency by popularity interaction was significant at low affiliation, t(1,59) = 2.32, p = .02, but not at high affiliation, t(1,59) = -.073, p = .47. Figure 9. Evaluation. Subjects rated liking of the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).

Lo Affiliation
7

Hi Affiliation
7

5 Liking

Liking

C onsistent Inconsistent

Consistent Inconsistent

1 Popular Unpopular

1 Popular Unpopular

Finally, there was a significant interaction of the subjects strength of affiliation and political knowledge, t(1,74) = 2.15, p = .04, with more highly affiliated-highly knowledgeable subjects liking the candidates more overall. I predicted that the subjects would use the consistency information more when the candidate was unpopular. For highly affiliated subjects, directionally 63

the pattern was as expected, though not significantly. Low affiliated subjects showed the opposite effect, with consistency information mattering less when the candidate was unpopular. It is possible that the less affiliated subjects liked a candidate who also appeared to be less affiliated, which could explain why they liked the unpopular-inconsistent candidate so much. It is also possible that they were less motivated to pay attention to the statements about the candidate. Voting Likelihood. Voting likelihood was measured with a single 7-point Likert scale asking how likely the subject was to vote for the candidate, ranging from 1 not at all likely, to 7 very likely. As predicted, the subjects in the consistent conditions were more likely to vote for the candidate t(1,74) = 3.14, p < .01 (Means: consistent = 4.92, inconsistent = 3.61). As with evaluation, the popularity main effect was not significant, t(1,74) = 0.23, p = .82, nor was the consistency by popularity interaction, t(1,74) = 1.02, p = .31. There was a significant three-way interaction of affiliation, consistency, and popularity, t(1,74) = -2.51, p = .02 (Figure 10). Separate analyses testing the effects at both high and low affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation) were conducted. The consistency by popularity interaction was significant at low affiliation, t(1,59) = 2.50, p = .02, but not at high affiliation, t(1,59) = -1.32, p = .19. When the subjects were highly affiliated to their political party they showed the predicted effect, though not significantly; consistency information mattered less when the candidate was popular. When the subject was less affiliated the pattern was reversed; consistency information mattered more when the candidate was popular. High affiliated subjects were directionally less likely to

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vote for an unpopular-inconsistent candidate than an popular-consistent one, while the opposite was true for low affiliated subjects.

Figure 10. Voting Likelihood. Subjects rated likelihood of voting for the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).

Lo Affiliation
7

Hi Affiliation
7

5 Voting Likelihood
Voting Likelihood 5

4 Consistent Inconsistent 3

C onsistent Inconsistent

2
2

1 Popular Unpopular

0 Popular Unpopular

Directionally, but not significantly the highly affiliated subjects again support the prediction that the subjects would use the popularity information more when the candidate was inconsistent. As with evaluation it appears that the highly affiliated subjects were not using the consistency information as much when the candidate was popular, though they were when the candidate was unpopular. The lower affiliated subjects were using the consistency information in both popularity conditions (though in opposing ways). In the popular conditions the low affiliated subjects were using the popularity information as expected, being less likely to vote if the candidate was inconsistent. In the unpopular condition voting likelihood reversed, with the subjects more likely to

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vote for the inconsistent candidate. This result was similar to what was found for evaluation. Perceived Similarity. Perceived similarity was measured using a single 7point Likert scale asking how similar the subject perceived the candidate to be to themselves, ranging from 1 not at all similar, to 7 very similar. The predicted consistency main effect was significant, t(1,74) = 3.86, p < .001 (Means: consistent = 4.73, inconsistent = 3.21). Neither the predicted popularity main effect, t(1,74) = 0.63, p = .65, nor the interaction of consistency and popularity, t(1,74) = 0.57, p = .57 were significant. There was a marginal affiliation main effect, t(1,74) = -1.94, p = .06, in which the more affiliated a subject was, the less similar they perceived the candidate to be to themselves. The more politically knowledgeable the subject was the more similarity they perceived between themselves and the candidate, t(1,74) = 2.68, p < .01. There was a significant affiliation by consistency interaction, t(1,74) = 2.45, p = .02, with low affiliated subjects showing the consistency effect less than highly affiliated subjects. Affiliation also interacted with popularity, t(1,74) = 2.35, p = .02, with high affiliated subjects in the popular conditions seeing the candidate as more similar, while the low affiliated subjects showed the opposite effect. Finally, the affiliation by popularity interaction was moderated by consistency, t(1,74) = -2.66, p < .01 (Figure 11). Separate analyses were run testing the effects at both high and low affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation). The consistency by popularity interaction was significant at low affiliation, t(1,59) = 2.33, p = .02, but only marginally at high affiliation, t(1,59) = -1.74, p = .08. As

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with liking and voting likelihood the highly affiliated subjects directionally, but not significantly supported the hypothesis that when the candidate was popular the consistency information would matter less. However, less affiliated subjects showed the obverse pattern, with greater perceived similarity to the unpopularinconsistent candidate than the popular-inconsistent one.

Figure 11. Similarity. Subjects rated similarity to the candidate by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).

Lo Affiliation
7

Hi Affiliation
7

Perceived Similarity to Candidate

Perceived Similarity to Candidate

C onsistent Inconsistent

Consistent Inconsistent

1 Popular Unpopular

1 Popular Unpopular

Perceived Strength of Targets Affiliation. The strength of the targets affiliation was measured with a single 7-point Likert scale which asked how strongly affiliated the subject thought the candidate was, ranging from 1 very weakly affiliated, to 7 very strongly affiliated. The predicted consistency effect was significant, t(1,74) = 2.95, p < .01, with subjects in the consistent conditions rating the candidate as more strongly affiliated (Means: consistent = 5.30, inconsistent = 4.39). Neither the predicted popularity main effect, t(1,74) = -0.04,

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p = .97, nor the interaction of consistency and popularity, t(1,74) = 1.32, p = .19 were significant. There was a marginal interaction of consistency and popularity with the subjects strength of affiliation, t(1,74) = -1.77, p = .08 (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Candidates Affiliation Strength. Subjects rating of the candidates strength of affiliation to the Democratic Party by consistency, popularity, for low (left) and high (right) affiliated subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).

Lo Affiliation
7

Hi Affiliation
7 Perceived Strength of Candidate Affiliation

Perceived Strength of Candidate Affiliation

C onsistent Inconsistent

Consistent Inconsistent

1 Popular Unpopular

1 Popular Unpopular

Separate analyses testing the effects at both high and low affiliation (+1 and -1 standard deviation) were run. The consistency by popularity interaction was significant at low affiliation, t(1,59) = 2.14, p = .04, but not at high affiliation, t(1,59) = -.53, p = .60. Specifically, both high and low affiliated subjects in the consistent-popular condition perceived the candidate as more affiliated than those in the popular-inconsistent condition. However, the highly affiliated subjects in the inconsistent-popular condition perceived the candidate as affiliated as those in the inconsistent-unpopular condition, while low affiliated subjects saw the inconsistent-unpopular as more affiliated.

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The pattern of results for perceived affiliation strength was not as predicted. Highly affiliated subjects were using the popularity information in both the consistent and inconsistent condition, rather than in just the inconsistent ones, though not significantly. As with the liking, voting, and similarity the inconsistent-unpopular condition had the highest mean among the lower affiliated subjects. The possibility that the low affiliated subjects identified more with low affiliated candidates seems less likely for this dependent variable. Since the task was to determine how affiliated the candidate was to his party, these results are difficult to explain. However, the three-way interaction was only marginal in this case. Projection The extent to which the subjects own attitudes on the issues influenced their perceptions of the candidates position on the issues was examined next. I predicted that both consistency and popularity would influence projection; subjects would project both when the candidate was popular and consistent. I also predicted that these effects would be moderated by the subjects strength of affiliation, with more affiliated subjects showing a larger effect. Possible moderation by the subjects political knowledge was also examined Analysis. The projection results were calculated using a multi-level regression. The first level of the regression predicted the judges ratings of the target candidates positions on the 24 attitude items, using the judges mean centered self-ratings as the predictor. This first level regression was computed

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for each subject, which resulted in a beta for the intercept and self-rating (projection). The resulting slopes were then regressed onto consistency (coded -1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), subjects self-rated strength of affiliation (mean-deviated), subjects self-rated political knowledge (mean-deviated), and all the interactions. Results. The regression using the first level regression self-rating beta examines projection. As expected there was significant overall projection to the candidate, t(1,74) = 6.14, p < .0001. As predicted the subjects in the consistent condition projected more than subjects in the inconsistent condition, t(1,74) = 2.66, p < .01. However, popularity, subjects strength of affiliation, and their political knowledge did not influence projection. There were also a number of non-projection effects. Subjects in the consistent condition rated the candidate as more liberal than those subjects in the inconsistent conditions, t(1,74) = 5.55, p < .0001, as expected. The popularity of the candidate did not influence how liberal he was rated, t(1,74) = 1.14, p = .26. However, the subjects strength of affiliation interacted significantly with popularity, t(1,74) = 2.94, p < .01, with more strongly affiliated subjects in the popular conditions rating the candidate as more liberal. This two-way interaction was moderated by consistency, t(1,74) = 3.17, p = .03. Specifically, more strongly affiliated subjects rated the popular candidate as even more liberal when the candidate was also consistent.

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The more politically knowledgeable subjects rated the candidate as more liberal, t(1,74) = 2.06, p = .04. The more strongly affiliated the subjects the greater their political knowledge influenced their rating of how liberal they perceived the candidate, t(1,74) = 2.52, p < .01. As I predicted, the subjects projected the most towards the popular candidate, regardless of consistency. I also predicted that the subjects would project more towards the inconsistent-popular candidate than the inconsistentunpopular candidate. The subjects did project their own positions more onto the ingroup candidate, even more so when the candidate was consistent. However, the expected popularity effect was not significant. So it appears that the consistency information increased the subjects perceptions of attitude similarity between themselves and the candidate, while popularity did not. Process Variables In addition to examining how consistency and popularity influence impressions, I was also interested in factors which could contribute to these effects. The following analyses examined how consistency, popularity, subjects strength of affiliation, and their political knowledge influenced the recall and recognition of the candidates statements, the subjects valuation of the issues, and subtyping of the candidate. I predicted that differential memory encoding would be responsible for the differences due to consistency and popularity, rather than changes in valuation or subtyping of the candidate (especially in the popular-inconsistent condition). Since the prediction that popularity would moderate consistency only occurred for

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the highly affiliated subjects (directionally) I predicted similar effects for the memory measure for highly affiliated subjects, but not for the valuation and subtyping measures. Recall. The number of correctly recalled statement items that the subjects recorded on the blank sheet during the recall task was calculated. This value was then regressed with contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), contrast coded consistency (-1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. The average number of recalled items was 4.84, with a negatively skewed distribution (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Recall. Frequency Distribution of number freely recalled items.


30 Number of Subjects 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Number of Items Freely Recalled

The main effect of popularity was marginal, t(1,74) = -1.89, p = .06, with subjects recalling more information about the unpopular candidates (see Figure 14). Neither the predicted main effect of consistency, t(1,74) = 1.20, p = .24, nor 72

the interaction of consistency and popularity t(1,74) = -0.68, p = .50 was significant. Figure 14. Recall. Number of freely recalled candidate statements by popularity and consistency conditions.
7

Total number of Items Freely Recalled

C onsistent Inconsistent

1 Popular Unpopular

So while the subjects used the consistency information more when evaluating the candidate, determining voting likelihood, and perceived similarity they did not recall significantly more about candidate when he was consistent. However they did recall somewhat more about the candidate in the unpopular condition than the popular ones. Recognition. The recognition task consisted of the six attitude statements (6 consistent in the consistent condition, or three consistent and three inconsistent in the inconsistent condition) that the subjects had read about the candidates and 18 filler items (nine stereotypically consistent with the Democratic Party and nine inconsistent). For each of these items the subject answered whether or not they had seen it before and on a 3-point scale how sure they were

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about their answer. From these two ratings I calculated a new scale ranging from 1 to 6. The scores were: 1 = very confident not seen 2 = somewhat confident not seen 3 = not at all confident not seen 4 = not at all confident seen 5 = somewhat confident seen 6 = very confident seen For all subjects the average value for both old and new items was calculated. For the subjects in the inconsistent condition, the average for old-consistent, oldinconsistent, new-consistent, new inconsistent items was calculated. For the subjects in the consistent condition, the average for old-consistent and newconsistent items was calculated. These measures were used in three separate models. One model examined old versus new items for subjects in both the consistent and inconsistent conditions. Another model examined old versus new and consistent versus inconsistent items in the inconsistent conditions. A final model examined old-consistent versus new-consistent items in the consistent condition. The first model examined the difference in recognition for the actual statements about the candidates that the subjects read (old items) versus the filler items (new items) across the consistency conditions. The scores for each subject on the old and new items were submitted to a GLM, with contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), contrast coded consistency (-1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. 74

The expected item main effect was significant, F(1,74) = 304.91, p < .0001, with greater recognition of the previously seen items. There was also a marginal item by consistency interaction, F(1,74) = 2.99, p = .09. While subjects in both the consistent and inconsistent conditions had greater recognition of the previously seen items than the new ones, the subjects in the inconsistent conditions showing greater recognition for the previously seen statements. Subjects in the consistent conditions demonstrated greater familiarity for the statements which had not been seen previously (see Figure 15). There was not an item by popularity interaction, F(1,74) < 1, p = .98, nor a three-way interaction of item with popularity and consistency, F(1,74) = 0.23, p = .63.

Figure 15. Recognition. Weighted average recognition of candidate statements by consistency condition and whether the statements were actually mentioned about the candidate (Old) or newly presented (New).
6 Average Weighted Recognition 5 4 3 2 1 0 Consistent Inconsistent Old Items New Items

There were also a number of non-recognition effects (no interaction with item). There was a significant interaction of the subjects political knowledge with 75

both popularity, F(1,74)= 3.9, p = .02, and consistency, F(1,74)= 3.8, p = .02, with more knowledgeable subjects showing greater familiarity towards all the items overall (both new and old items) in the popular and consistent conditions, but their recognition of the old items was not better. The second model examined differences in recognition for subjects in the two inconsistent conditions. The scores for the old-consistent, old-inconsistent, new-consistent, new inconsistent items were submitted to a GLM, with contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. The only recognition effect was the expected main effect of item, F(1,35) = 136.75, p < .0001, with subjects showing greater recognition for the actual candidate statements (see Figure 16). This result is consistent with Srull, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart (1985) that when inconsistent items were present recognition was improved for both inconsistent and consistent items. There were also a number of effects that did not interact with item, which indicate greater familiarity, but not recognition. There was a significant main effect for knowledge, F(1,35) = 5.88, p = .03, with more knowledgeable subjects reporting more familiarity to the items overall (both new and old items). The effect of knowledge was moderated by popularity, F(1,35) = 6.32, p = .03, with the effect of knowledge larger in the inconsistent-popular condition than the inconsistent-unpopular. There was also a main effect for the consistency of the items, F(1,35) = 8.56, p < .01, with greater familiarity, for stereotypically

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consistent items, regardless of whether they were new or old items. This effect was not moderated by item, so there was no differentiation of the effect by whether it had been previously seen (no recognition effect). The three-way interaction of consistency of the item, the subjects strength of affiliation, and popularity condition was significant, F(1,35) = 5.1, p = .03, with familiarity, but not recognition for the consistent items in the popular condition being larger for more affiliated subjects.

Figure 16. Recognition in the Inconsistent Conditions. Weighted average of recognized candidate statements by whether the candidates statement was consistent or inconsistent on the issue and whether the statement was actually mentioned about the candidate (Old) or newly presented (New).
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Consistent Items Inconsistent Items Old Items New Items

The third model examined differences in recognition for subjects in the two consistent conditions. The subjects scores for old-consistent and newconsistent items were submitted to a GLM, with contrast coded popularity (-1

Average Weighted Recognition

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Unpopular and +1 Popular), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. The only significant result was the expected significant main effect of item, F(1,28) = 29.84, p < .0001, with greater recognition for the actual candidate statements (mean = 4.77) than the newly presented items (mean = 3.21) and no other effects. While the recall results do indicate that the subjects encoded the information more when the candidate was unpopular, the recognition results show that they used both popularity and consistency information. The first recognition model demonstrated that overall the subjects encoded the information about the candidate more when he was inconsistent. In the third model, when the candidate was consistent, popularity did not influence recognition. So it appears that when the candidate was inconsistent, the subjects encoded more than when the candidate is consistent. Popularity did not influence the amount of recognition, but did influence recall, with greater recall for unpopular candidates. Valuation. The difference in valuation for each issue between the first rating and the second rating was calculated. For each subject, an average of the differences for the six issues they learned the candidates position on and the six they did not learn anything about was calculated. For the subjects in the two inconsistent conditions the average differences on the three issues that they learned consistent information about the candidate, as well as an average of the differences on the three issues they learned inconsistent information about the

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candidate were calculated. Using these new values three separate models were analyzed to examine how the subjects changed how they valued the issues before learning about the candidate, and after. The first model examined changes in valuation for all subjects on the issues they learned information about, and those they did not. The scores for each subject on the learned and unlearned issues were submitted to a GLM, with popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), contrast coded consistency (-1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. For the first model there were no interactions of issue type with consistency, popularity, or the three-way. Additionally, the four-way interaction of issue type, subjects affiliation strength, consistency, and popularity was also non-significant. There was a significant three-way interaction of issue type (learned versus unlearned), consistency, and subjects political knowledge, F(1,59) = 6.09, p = .02, with more knowledgeable subjects valuing the seen issues more in the consistent conditions (see Figure 17). The second model examined differences in valuation for subjects in the two inconsistent conditions. The scores for the unlearned, learned-consistent, and learned-inconsistent issues were submitted to a GLM, with popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors.

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Again there was no main effect for issue type, nor did it interact with any of the other factors. In fact, the only effect near to significance was a marginal main effect of popularity, F(1,30) = 3.77, p = .06, in which overall subjects in the popular-inconsistent condition (Mean: - .15) decreased their valuation across all issues (both previously seen and unseen) more so than subjects in the popularconsistent condition (Mean: -.09).

Figure 17. Valuation across Popularity Conditions. Average change in valuation of the issues from Time 1 and Time 2 by consistency condition, whether the issue had been mentioned in the candidate statement (seen) or was not mentioned (unseen), and for low (left) and high (right) knowledge subjects (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation). .

Lo Knowledge
0.5 Average Change in Valuation between Time 1 and Time 2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 C onsistent -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 Inconsistent Seen Item Unseen Item

Hi Knowledge
0.5 Average Change in Valuation between Time 1 and Time 2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 C onsistent -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 Inconsistent Seen Item Unseen Item

The third model examined differences in valuations for subjects in the two consistent conditions. The subjects scores for learned and unlearned issues were submitted to a GLM, with contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1

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Popular), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. There was only one significant effect, specifically a two-way interaction of issue type and the subjects political knowledge, F(1,29) = 5.18, p = .03, with more knowledgeable subjects valuing the items mentioned in the candidate statements more than those that that were not. These patterns of results seem to indicate that politically knowledgeable subjects changed their valuation based on which issues were mentioned by the candidate. Specifically, when the candidate was consistent the more knowledgeable subjects valued the issues the candidate supported more than issues not mentioned. This could be because the candidates statements made the subjects own attitudes on the issues more salient, which made these issues seem more important. Subtyping. Subtyping of the target from his political party was measured with a single 7-point Likert scale which asked the subjects how typical they thought the candidate was of the Democratic Party, ranging from 1 very typical, to 7 very atypical. A regression was performed on this measure with contrast coded popularity (-1 Unpopular and +1 Popular), contrast coded consistency (-1 Inconsistent and +1 Consistent), the subjects self-reported mean-deviated political knowledge and strength of party affiliation, and all the interactions as predictors. As predicted there was not a significant main effect for consistency, popularity, or the interaction. The three-way interaction of subjects affiliation

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strength, consistency, and popularity was also not significant. There was a significant two-way interaction of the subjects political knowledge and popularity, t(1,74) = 2.04, p = .05, with more knowledgeable subjects subtyping the unpopular candidate more (see Figure 18).

Figure 18. Subtyping. Subjects rated typicality of the candidate for the Democratic Party by popularity, and affiliation (-1 and +1 Standard Deviation).
7

6 Perceived Typicality of Candidate

Popular Unpopular

1 Lo Knowledge Hi Knowledge

Discussion In Study Two I expected that the candidates popularity would moderate the consistency of the candidate, overwhelming the consistency information when the candidate was popular; only mattering when the candidate was unpopular. I expected that when other members of their political party had already vouched for the candidate, in the form of overwhelming support, the

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subjects would pay less attention to the other information presented about him. Directionally, the highly motivated subjects performed as expected. The subjects did pay close attention to the consistency information. The memory measures showed that our subjects had marginally better recognition of the candidates statements when he was inconsistent. When the subjects learned both consistent and inconsistent statements about the candidate they had greater familiarity of consistent items, but not better recognition for previously seen items. There was a marginal moderating effect of popularity on recall, with greater recall for statements about the unpopular candidate. It appears that to some extent the subjects did rely on the endorsement of his political party members for the popular candidate. In fact, when freely recalling information about the candidate the subjects recalled marginally more of the statements when the candidate was popular. The subjects strength of affiliation to their political party had a large impact on how the subject perceived the political candidate. Highly affiliated subjects showed preference for the consistent candidate. The highly affiliated subjects were more likely to vote for the consistent candidate, saw him as more similar, and liked him more, regardless of popularity. Directionally but not significantly, when the candidate was inconsistent, highly affiliated subjects used the candidates popularity information to a greater extent; liking the unpopularinconsistent candidate the least, were least likely to vote for him, and saw him as the least similar. The less affiliated subjects showed a preference for the outsider, they liked, wanted to vote for, and felt similar to the unpopular-

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inconsistent candidate. However, the less affiliated subjects did not show the same preference for the popular-inconsistent candidate. Regardless of the subjects strength of affiliation they all projected their own attitudes more onto the candidate when the candidate was consistent. The popularity of the candidate did not influence the degree to which the subjects projected. The failure of the predicted pattern of findings to attain significance for the highly affiliated subjects could be due to the nature of the task. The subjects were only learning about a single candidate, so there was no comparison candidate. It could be that if popularity and consistency had been within subject rather than between subjects the addition of more candidates could have led to greater discrimination on the evaluation, voting likelihood, and similarity measures resulting in the predicted pattern attaining significance. However, the results did go in the predicted direction for highly affiliated subjects and bears further investigation. It is also possible that the highly affiliated subjects were not affiliated enough. The sample was drawn from the Introductory Psychology Subject Pool, mostly comprised of first and second year college students. Research on attitude strength has demonstrated that young adults, of which the sample was drawn from, have less consistent attitudes, which are more easily changed than later in life (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989; Visser & Krosnick, 1998). So it is possible that with the sample drawn from a more politically established and active

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population the directional interaction of affiliation strength, popularity, and consistency would attain significance. The previous two studies have examined impression formation of political candidates in the laboratory. The final study was designed to investigate political perception using a representative voting population.

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Chapter 4: Study Three The purpose of the third study was to examine the influence of information and political party membership on perceptions about political candidates and parties in a real-world, representative sample. The previous two studies examined the effect of different types of information on political impressions in the laboratory. The first study examined how the diagnosticity and relevance of information influences projection, consensus, and polarization. The second study explored how the consistency and popularity of a candidate influences projection and a number of other impressions. This final study examined similar questions using the American National Election Study (ANES) data from 1980 and 1988, a nationally representative sample. The specific question examined in this study was how voters political party membership and ideological and issue-specific positions influenced projection2 of their position to the candidates, and polarization of the parties.3 The influence of the voters level of political knowledge on perception of polarization between the Democratic Party and Republican Party was also examined.
2

In survey data the correlation between the respondents own position and their rating of the candidate is not always due to projection (Krosnick, 2002). However, the model of the 1980 data uses an aggregate measure of political attitudes for the self and an aggregate measure across multiple candidates, which should decrease the likelihood that the correlation is due to persuasion effects. The 1988 data measures the correlation between self and other using a single measure of political ideology for the self rating, and an aggregate measure of ideology across target candidates for other. Ideology should be less changeable than individual attitudes. Thus, for the purpose of the current examination the term projection will be used when discussing the selfother correlation. 3 A model of within-party variability was also run on both datasets. However, no significant paths were found, and a repeated measure ANOVA did not find significant outgroup homogeneity effects. Therefore these models were not included in this paper.

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I expected that the processes demonstrated in the laboratory with the undergraduate population would also occur with a real-world sample of voters. Specifically, I expected that voters would project their own positions more towards their own political party. I also predicted that the more ideologically extreme and politically knowledgeable the respondent, the more polarized they would see the parties. Method For this study two datasets from the ANES database were used. A data set with ratings of multiple candidates was needed to examine ingroup-outgroup projection and polarization. The two datasets that fit this requirement best were the 1980 two-wave Presidential election survey, and the 1988 Super Tuesday survey. Each of these surveys will be examined in turn. 1980 ANES Survey. The 1980 ANES was a two-wave panel study, which collected data both before and after the 1980 Presidential election. Pre-election interviews were conducted between September 7, 1980 and November 3, 1980, with postelection interviews conducted between November 5, 1980 and February 7, 1981. The primary sampling unit was the congressional district, with 108 districts selected in a multi-stage probability sample. The sample included 2,249 eligible persons, among whom 1,614 completed pre-election interviews and 1,408 were subsequently re-interviewed after the election. The SEM analysis used data only from registered Democrats (n = 558) and Republicans (n = 298) to examine ingroup-outgroup differences in perceptions, with 758 omitted due to being

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unregistered (n = 148), members of a third party (n = 137), or missing party information (n = 473). Data were collected on electoral participation, voting behavior, public opinion, voter attitudes on numerous issues, and impressions of candidates attitudes on the same issues. The primary reason for using this particular ANES study is the inclusion of questions about multiple targets from each political party on multiple political issues, which allowed us to examine differential projection towards in-group versus out-group candidates. Targets. As mentioned above the 1980 ANES study included questions about multiple targets from both major political parties on multiple political issues. Specifically, there were questions about 3 Democratic targets (Jimmy Carter, Ted Kennedy, and the Democratic Party in general) and two Republican targets (Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party in general). Measures. Four political issues were used in the analyses. The voters own position on the issues as well as where they saw the targets on the issues were used to examine projection and polarization. The issues were guaranteed job security, aid for minorities, tax increases, and governmental services (see Appendix O). Prior to being analyzed the measures were recoded so they scaled liberal to conservative. In addition to the issue measures voters also answered five questions about their level of political knowledge (see Appendix P), which were used to form the latent variable Self-Knowledge. These measures asked the voters about their interest in the campaign, the amount of news they watch, how much

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attention they pay to politics, amount of attention paid to the national polls, and an observation of the voters level of knowledge by the interviewer. Finally, the voters answered whether they were registered to vote, and if so with which party. This measure was then used as the between group measure in the SEM analyses, with voters not registered to vote with one of the two major parties being excluded from the analyses. 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Survey. The 1988 Super Tuesday ANES survey was a two-wave study,

which collected data both before and after Super Tuesday, on which sixteen states held a presidential primary. The first wave of data was collected during the seven weeks prior to Super Tuesday, with a brief follow-up was collected immediately after (2/3 collected in the first week). The primary sampling unit was the congressional district, with 108 districts selected in a multi-probability sample. A total of 2076 interviews were distributed over the seven weeks. The second wave reinterviewed 1688 of the voters. The SEM analysis used data only from registered Democrats (n = 812) and Republicans (n = 452) to examine ingroup-outgroup differences in perceptions, with 812 omitted due to being unregistered (n = 87), members of a third party (n = 271), or missing party information (n = 454). Measures included feeling thermometers and traits, assessment of each candidate's chances of winning his/her party's nomination and the November general election, attitudes on public issues, vote intention and choice, and respondent's age, race, education, occupation, labor union membership, income, and religious affiliation.

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More importantly for the current analysis measures were collected about the voters own political ideology (liberal to conservative) as well as their impressions of seven politicians from each party on the same ideology measure. Additionally, voters were asked a number of questions about their own level of political knowledge. The primary reason for using this particular ANES study is the inclusion of the ideology measure about multiple targets from each political party, which allowed examination of differential projection towards in-group versus out-group candidates. Targets. As mentioned above the 1988 Super Tuesday ANES study included questions about multiple candidates from both major political parties. Specifically, there were questions about seven Democratic candidates (Albert Gore, Michael Dukakis, Gary Hart, Bruce Babbitt, Jesse Jackson, Richard Gephardt, and Paul Simon) and seven Republicans (Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr., Alexander Haig, Pat Robertson, Robert Dole, Jack Kemp, and Pierre Dupont). Measures. The voters own position on the ideology measure as well as where they saw the targets on the same ideology measure were used to examine projection and polarization. The ideology measure was a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 Very Liberal to 7 Very Conservative. In addition to the ideology measure voters also answered four questions about their level of political knowledge (see Appendix Q), which were used to form the latent variable Self-Knowledge. These measures asked the voters about their interest

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in the Presidential campaign, the amount of news they watch, how much attention they pay to politics in newspapers, and amount of interest in politics. Finally, the voters answered whether they were registered to vote, and if so with which party. This measure was then used as the between group measure in the SEM analyses, with voters not registered to vote with one of the two major parties being excluded from the analyses. Results 1980 ANES Dataset The first model used data from the 1980 ANES in which respondents were asked for their own positions on seven different issues (see Appendix O) as well as the positions that the perceived Democrats and Republicans to have on these issues (Democrats in general plus two Democratic candidates, Republicans in general plus one Republican candidate). I started by looking at the degree to which these seven issues represented a single underlying factor, examining through exploratory factor analysis their loadings on the first principle component (using self ratings only). From this analysis it appeared that the following four variables all shared considerable common variance and hence these four were used in our model as indicators of a common underlying factor. The model, as depicted in Figures 19a and 19b, has four latent variables, two exogenous and two endogenous. The exogenous ones are own ideology (with four indicators of own position on each of the four issues) and own political knowledge, measuring this with four indicators (Appendix P). The latent

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Figure 19a. 1980 ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Democrat Voters): Model of Democratic Party voters selfratings on four political issues and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties.
.41 .27

.35

.33

AvgJobDem
e4 e3

e5 e6

JobSelf AidSelf

.68 .63
Avg AidDem

.67 .48 -.01 .45


AvgServDem .48

Democrat Ideology

e8

.69
e1

e18
AvgUnempDem
e21

Self Ideology

.01
e20

UnempSelf

-.24 -.17 -.21

.08
AvgJobRep
e9

.00

.17

e19
Republican Ideology
e17

.72 .72 .49

AvgAidRep

e10

AvgServRep .46 Avg UnempRep

e12

SelfInterest

.31 .31 .39 .14

e22

e16

Polls

.41 .75 .87 Self Knowledge .10 .08

e15

ObsInterest

e14

Info

92

ServSelf

.50

.25

Figure 19b. 1980 ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Republican Voters): Model of Republican Party voters selfratings on four political issues and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties.
.05 .05

-.33

-.37

AvgJobDem
e5 e6

e4

JobSelf AidSelf

.65 .68
AvgAidDem

e3

.59 .48 -.34


AvgServDem .44
e8

Democrat Ideology .43

.53
AvgUnempDem ServSelf

e18
e21

Self Ideology

-.03
UnempSelf

e20

-.16 .71 -.41

-.25
AvgJobRep
e9

-.30 .63 .67 .41


AvgServRep .49 AvgUnempRep
e12

.36

e19
Republican Ideology
SelfInterest

AvgAidRep

e10

e17

.48 .02 .41 .27

e22

e16

Polls

.36 .73 .88 Self Knowledge .38 .47

e15

ObsInterest

e14

Info

93

e1

.40

-.04

endogenous variable were perception of the ideology of the Democrats and perception of the ideology of the Republicans, using each issue as separate indicators of these (and averaging within each issue across the ratings of the party and the candidates). The structural part of the model estimates the partial effects of the two latent exogenous variables (own ideology and subjective knowledge) on the two latent endogenous variables (perceived Democratic ideology and perceived Republican ideology), allowing the disturbances to these two endogenous latent variables to be correlated. Additionally, to account for issue specific variance in the judgments the disturbances to the indicators involving the same issue were allowed to correlate (e.g., disturbances to self-unemployment, Democratunemployment, and Republican unemployment). Finally, a multiple group analysis was conducted, estimating the model simultaneously for respondents who identified themselves as Democrats and those who self-identified as Republicans. I first estimated this model on both groups with no between group constraints on the parameter estimates. Although the resulting goodness of fit
2 Chi square was highly significant, 172 = 388.71 , other measures of goodness-of-

fit that are less influenced by the large sample size used in these analyses suggest that the model is reasonably consistent with the data, CFI = .896, RMSEA =.038. Given this, our next step was to impose measurement invariance between the two groups, i.e., forcing all of the loadings of the indicators on the latent variables for the two groups to be equal between groups. This condition of

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measurement invariance is a necessary one in order to compare structural coefficients between the two groups. The fit indices of the resulting model were very similar to the model that did not impose measurement invariance,
2 184 = 406.29 , CFI = .893, RMSEA = .038. A comparison of the Chi-squares for

these two models indicates that the measurement invariance model does not fit
2 the data significantly less well than the unconstrained model 12 = 17.58, p > .25 .

In Table 1 are the loading coefficients, the standardized loadings, the structural coefficients (with standardized values) and in Table 2 all standardized residual covariances from this model with imposed measurement invariances. As the standardized loadings indicate, all indicators loaded significantly and highly on their respective latent variables. The structural coefficients from own latent ideology reveal significant projection from the self to ones own party among the Republicans (Self-Ideology to Republican-Ideology, standardized value .706, p < .001) but not among the Democrats (Self-Ideology to Democrat-Ideology standardized value -.008, ns). In the case of judgments of the other party, there was significant reverse projection (i.e., contrast) in the case of both Republicans (Self-Ideology to Democrat-Ideology, standardized value -.336, p < .001) and Democrats (SelfIdeology to Democrat-Ideology standardized value -.169, p = .02). In addition to overall ideological projection the covariances between the individual attitude items were examined (see Table 2). For the Democrat respondents there was shared residual measurement error between the self and the ingroup on all the issues; job security (covariance .509, p < .001), minority aid 95

Table 1. 1980 ANES: Loading and structural coefficients: Unstandardized and standardized estimates for Democrat (left) and Republican (Right) respondents. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .0001, and ns = p > .70.

Democrat Unstandardized Estimate P ns ** * *** 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 0.867 0.75 0.411 0.395 *** *** *** 1.015 0.615 0.62 0.921 1 0.75 0.678 0.877 1 0.457 0.75 1 0.84 0.716 0.679 0.669 0.027 0.628 -0.451 -0.406 0.706 0.025 0.533 0.481 0.589 0.444 0.427 0.68 0.647 0.444 0.412 0.669 0.632 0.489 0.876 0.735 0.359 0.409 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** -0.305 -0.336 P ** *** *** ns <-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-Self_Knowledge Self_Knowledge 0.716 0.679 Self_Knowledge 0.84 Self_Knowledge 1 Rep Ideology 0.647 Rep Ideology 1 Rep Ideology 0.877 0.717 0.72 Rep Ideology 0.678 0.489 Dem Ideology 0.75 0.479 Dem Ideology 1 0.676 Dem Ideology 0.921 0.627 Dem Ideology 0.62 0.453 Self_Ideology 0.615 0.504 Self_Ideology 1.015 0.668 Self_Ideology 0.669 0.485 Self_Ideology 1 0.688 Self_Knowledge 0.373 0.312 Self_Ideology -0.14 -0.169 Self_Knowledge -0.202 -0.211 Self_Ideology -0.008 -0.013 Standardized Estimate Unstandardized Estimate Standardized Estimate

Respondent

Republican

Respondent

Dem Ideology

Dem Ideology

Rep Ideology

Rep Ideology

ServSelf

AidSelf

JobSelf

UnempSelf

AvgServDem

AvgAidDem

AvgUnempDem

AvgServRep

AvgAidRep

AvgJobRep

AvgUnempRep

Info

ObsInterest

Polls

SelfInterest

96

AvgJobDem

the issues; job security (covariance .614, p < .001), minority aid (covariance .239, p < .01), government services (covariance .673, p < .001), and unemployment (covariance .659, p < .001). There was also negatively correlated shared error variance for Republican respondents towards the outgroup (Democrats) on government services (covariance -518, p < .001) and unemployment (covariance -.605, p < .001). For Democrat respondents there was no negatively correlated shared error variance, however Democrats did have positively correlated shared error variance towards the outgroup (Republicans) on minority aid (covariance .176, p < .05) and job security (covariance .432, p < .001).

Table 2. 1980 ANES: Standardized Residual Covariances for Democrat (Left) and Republican (Right) respondents. *** = p < .0001.
Democrat Respondents Republican Respondents

Covariance Self-Knowledge Dem Ideology ServSelf AidSelf JobSelf UnempSelf ServSelf AidSelf JobSelf UnempSelf AvgServDem AvgAidDem AvgJobDem AvgEmpDem <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> <--> Self_Ideology Rep Ideology AvgServDem AvgAidDem AvgJobDem AvgUnempDem AvgServRep AvgAidRep AvgJobRep AvgUnempRep AvgServRep AvgAidRep AvgJobRep AvgUnempRep 0.179 -0.186 0.449 0.377 0.509 0.481 0.165 0.176 0.432 0.14 0.092 0.008 0.215 0.004

P 0.006 0.003 *** *** *** *** 0.111 0.038 *** 0.2 0.186 0.886 0.002 0.97

Covariance 0.248 -0.061 -0.518 0.046 0.068 -0.605 0.673 0.239 0.614 0.659 -0.338 -0.019 -0.035 -0.406

P *** 0.279 *** 0.561 0.546 *** *** 0.003 *** *** *** 0.766 0.698 0.002

Turning to the impact of subjective self-knowledge, for both groups, the more knowledgeable the respondent the more they saw Democrats as having liberal ideologies (For Republicans, Self-Knowledge to Democrat-Ideology,

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standardized value -.406, p < .001; For Democrats, Self-Knowledge to DemocratIdeology, standardized value -.211, p = .002). On the other hand among Democrats the more knowledgeable the more Republicans were seen to be conservative in their ideology (Self-Knowledge to Republican-Ideology, standardized value .312, p < .001), but for Republicans, self-knowledge had no impact on the perceived ideology of Republicans (Self-Knowledge to RepublicanIdeology, standardized value .025, ns). Thus it appears that more knowledge on the part of respondents is associated with seeing the outgroup party as more extreme in its ideological beliefs. In sum, in perceiving the outgroup, there is significant reverse projection: As a Democratic respondent is more liberal, Republicans are seen as more conservative; As a Republican respondent is more conservative, Democrats are seen as more liberal. Positive Projection to the ingroup only occurred among Republicans: As a Republican respondent is more conservative; Republicans are seen as more conservative. Looking at subjective self-knowledge, higher values among both Republicans and Democrats is associated with the tendency to see the outgroup party as more polarized (Democrats as more liberal and Republicans as more conservative). 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Dataset The second model used data from the 1988 Super Tuesday ANES in which respondents were asked for their own positions on political ideology, from very liberal to very conservative (see Appendix R) as well

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Figure 20a. 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Democrat Voters): Model of Democratic Party voters self-ratings on political ideology and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties (*** = p < .0001).
.32
Gore

1.00

.46 .22

e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14

e1
Self

1.00 Self Rated


Dukakis Hart

Ideology

.35 *** .20 .33 .25 .39


Mean Dem
Babbitt Jackson Gephardt

.57 .68 .46 .57 .50 .62 .63 .40

e23
Simon

-.15 *** -.13 * -.23 -.10 ns

.62

-.25 ***
.36

Bush

e15
.49
Haig

e16 e22
.11
Robertson

e6
InterestGov

.19

.60 .44
Self-Knowledge

e17
.27
Mean Rep

e5
InterestPres

.17 ***

.79 .70 .06 .33 .52 .52 .56 .80

Dole

e18
.27
Kemp

.58.76

e4
InterestPaper

.75

e19
.32
Dupont

.56

e20
.64
Reagan

e24
InterestTV

e21

99

Figure 20b. 1988 Super Tuesday ANES Structural Equation Model 1 (Republican Voters): Model of Republican Party voters self-ratings on political ideology and their self-rated political knowledge effect on projection and polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties (*** = p < .0001).
.32
Gore

1.00

.43 .31

e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14

e1
Self

1.00 Self Rated


Dukakis Hart

Ideology

-.20 *** .13 .36 .35 .47


Mean Dem
Babbitt Jackson Gephardt

.57 .66 .56 .60 .59 .69 .67 .45

e23
Simon

.23 .25 * -.25

***
-.28 **

.51

-.22 ***
.36

Bush

e15
.32
Haig

e16 e22
.07
Robertson

e6
InterestGov

.17

.60 .41
Self-Knowledge

e17
.19
Mean Rep

e5
InterestPres

.19 ***

.71 .56 .11 .26 .43 .42 .50 .82

Dole

e18
.18
Kemp

.54.73

e4
InterestPaper

.73

e19
.25
Dupont

.53

e20
.67
Reagan

e24
InterestTV

e21

100

as the positions that they perceived Democrats and Republicans to have on ideology (seven Democrats and seven Republicans). The model, as depicted in figures 20a and 20b, has four latent variables, two exogenous and two endogenous. The exogenous ones are own ideology (with the single indicator and no variance on its error term) and own political knowledge, measuring this with four indicators (Appendix Q). The latent endogenous variables were perception of the ideology of the Democrats and perception of the ideology of the Republicans, using the perceived ideology of each candidate as separate indicators. The structural part of the model estimates the partial effects of the two latent exogenous variables (own ideology and subjective knowledge) on the two latent endogenous variables (perceived Democratic ideology and perceived Republican ideology), allowing the disturbances to these two endogenous latent variables to be correlated. A multiple group analysis was conducted, estimating the model simultaneously for respondents who identified themselves as Democrats and those who self-identified as Republicans. I first estimated this model on both groups with no between group constraints on the parameter estimates. Although the resulting goodness of fit
2 Chi square was highly significant, 294 = 626.26 , other measures of goodness-of-

fit that are less influenced by the large sample size used in these analyses suggest that the model is reasonably consistent with the data, CFI = .864, RMSEA =.030. Given this, our next step was to impose measurement invariance between the two groups, i.e., forcing all of the loadings of the indicators on the

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latent variables for the two groups to be equal between groups. This condition of measurement invariance is a necessary one in order to compare structural coefficients between the two groups. The fit indices of the resulting model were very similar to the model that did not impose measurement invariance,
2 309 = 652.15 , CFI = .860, RMSEA = .030. A comparison of the Chi-squares for

these two models indicates that the measurement invariance model does not fit
2 the data significantly less well than the unconstrained, model 80 = 25.89 , p >

.50. Our final step was to constrain the ingroup and outgroup projection paths to be equal to each other. Thus, the Self-Ideology to Democrat Ideology path for Democrat subjects was constrained to be equal to the Republican subjects SelfIdeology to Republican Ideology path (ingroup projection) and the Democrat subjects subjects Self-Ideology to Republican Ideology path was constrained to be equal to the Republican subjects Self-Ideology to Democrat Ideology path (outgroup projection). Additionally, the two paths from the Self-Knowledge latent variable to Democrat Ideology and Republican Ideology were constrained to be equal for both Democrat and Republican subject. The fit indices of the resulting
2 model were very similar to the measurement invariance model, 313 = 655.19 , CFI

= .860, RMSEA = .030. A comparison of the Chi-squares for these two models indicates that the measurement invariance model does not fit the data
2 significantly less well than the unconstrained model, 4 = 3.04 , p > .50.

In Table 3 are the loading coefficients, the standardized loadings, the structural coefficients (with standardized values) and in Table 4 all standardized 102

Table 3. 1988 ANES: Loading and structural coefficients: Unstandardized and standardized estimates for Democrat (left) and Republican (Right) respondents. *** = p < .0001.
Democrat
Unstandardized Estimate P *** *** *** *** 1 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 0.789 0.702 0.334 0.516 0.679 0.813 1.233 0.514 0.561 0.799 *** *** *** *** *** *** 0.543 0.699 1 1.349 1.065 0.986 1.315 1.157 1.376 1 1.081 0.495 0.596 0.679 0.813 1.233 1.016 0.148 -0.11 -0.202 0.227 1 0.729 0.735 0.414 0.6 0.564 0.656 0.553 0.599 0.587 0.685 0.67 0.713 0.565 0.265 0.435 0.425 0.5 0.816 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** -0.21 -0.223 0.223 0.199 *** *** *** *** P <-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-Mean Rep Mean Rep Mean Rep Mean Rep Mean Rep 0.495 0.596 Mean Rep 1.081 Mean Rep 1 Mean Dem 1.376 Mean Dem 1.157 0.626 0.635 Mean Dem 1.315 0.503 Mean Dem 0.986 0.576 Mean Dem 1.065 0.466 Mean Dem 1.349 0.679 Mean Dem 1 0.567 Self-Knowledge 0.699 0.603 Self-Knowledge 0.543 0.441 Self-Knowledge 1.016 0.765 Self-Knowledge 1 0.747 Self-Rating 1 1 Self-Rating -0.11 -0.155 Self-Rating 0.148 0.349 Self-Knowledge -0.21 -0.251 Self-Knowledge 0.223 0.159 Standardized Estimate Unstandardized Estimate Standardized Estimate

Respondents

Republican

Respondents

Mean Rep

Mean Dem

Mean Dem

Mean Rep

LibCon1

InterestTV

InterestPaper

InterestPres

InterestGov

LCGore1

LCDuk1

LCBab1

LCJack1

LCGep1

LCSimon1

LCBush1

LCHaig1

LCRob1

LCDole1

LCKemp1

LCDupont1

LCReag1

103

LCHart1

residual covariances from this model with imposed measurement invariances. As the standardized loadings indicate, all indicators loaded significantly and highly on their respective latent variables. The structural coefficients from own latent ideology reveals significant projection from the self to ones own party among the Republicans (Self-Ideology to Republican-Ideology, standardized value .227, p < .001) and among the Democrats (Self-Ideology to Democrat-Ideology standardized value .349, p < .001). In the case of judgments of the other party, there is significant reverse projection (i.e., contrast) in the case of both Republicans (Self-Ideology to Democrat-Ideology, standardized value -.202, p < .001) and Democrats (SelfIdeology to Democrat-Ideology standardized value -.155, p = .001).

Table 4. 1988 ANES: Standardized Residual Covariances for Democrat (Left) and Republican (Right) respondents. *** = p < .0001.
Democrat Covariance Self-Knowledge Dem-Ideology <--> <--> Self-Rating Rep Ideology -0.167 -0.067 Respondents P 0.012 0.142 Republican Covariance 0.246 -0.154 Respondents P *** 0.001

Turning to the impact of subjective self-knowledge, for both groups, the more knowledgeable the respondent the more they saw Democrats as having liberal ideologies (For Republicans, Self-Knowledge to Democrat-Ideology, standardized value -.223, p < .001; For Democrats, Self-Knowledge to DemocratIdeology, standardized value -.251, p = .001). Additionally, for both groups, the more knowledgeable the respondent the more they saw Republicans as having 104

conservative ideologies (For Republicans, Self-Knowledge to Democrat-Ideology, standardized value .199, p < .001; For Democrats, Self-Knowledge to DemocratIdeology, standardized value .159, p = .001). Thus it appears that more knowledge on the part of respondents is associated with seeing both the ingroup and the outgroup party as more extreme in its ideological beliefs. In sum, in perceiving the outgroup, there is significant reverse projection: As a Democratic respondent is more liberal, Republicans are seen as more conservative; As a Republican respondent is more conservative, Democrats are seen as more liberal. Positive Projection to the ingroup occurred among both Democrats and Republicans: as a Republican respondent is more conservative, Republicans are seen as more conservative and as a Democrat respondent is more liberal, Democrats are seen as more liberal. Looking at subjective selfknowledge, higher values among both Republicans and Democrats are associated with the tendency to see both parties as more polarized (Democrats as more liberal and Republicans as more conservative). Discussion The two models present a consistent view about projection and polarization. In general the two models demonstrated the tendency of the respondents to project their own political positions - both ideological and issuespecific - towards their own political party. Additionally, the respondents contrasted the outgroup partys ideological position from their own ideological position.

105

In the 1988 model the respondents from both political parties projected their own ideology onto their ingroup, and contrasted their ideological position to the outgroup. The 1980 model had slightly different results, in that the Democrat subjects did not show ideological projection towards their ingroup. I believe these differences between the models can be explained by the different measures that made up the Democrat and Republican Ideology latent variables in each. In the 1980 model the latent variables were composed of multiple attitude issues across a few target candidates, while the 1988 model the latent variables were made up of a single indicator of ideology across seven target candidates. The covariances between the issues were controlled for in the 1980 ANES, which led to the lack of projection towards the ingroup for Democrat respondents. Additionally, it is possible that Democrats had a much more varied set of personal issue stands, which were not always liberal (Hayes, Murphy, Johnson, & Bowler, 2008). In general increased political knowledge led to polarization of the two parties ideological position, by increasing perceptions of ideological extremity of both the ingroup and the outgroup. This is interesting because it demonstrates that more knowledgeable voters increased their perception of political polarization by changing their impressions of the ideological extremity of both parties, not merely the outgroup. In the 1988 model knowledgeable respondents from both parties saw both parties as more extreme. In the 1980 ANES dataset there were slightly different results. Specifically the Republican respondents self-knowledge did not increase perceived extremity of the Republican targets.

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Again this difference between the models could be how the ideology was measured in each. It seems likely that overall ideology, as measured in the 1988 model was more susceptible to perceptions of extremity, while the 1980 ideology measure, made up of multiple attitudes regressed more towards the mean.

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Chapter 5: General Discussion The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the influence of different types of information on perception of political candidates. The type and amount of information that individual voters have access to is large and complex. How much information voters think they have is also very flexible; what one voter thinks of as being well informed, another may not. The first two studies were designed to control the amount and type of information that was available, and examine how it impacted impressions. In the final study I did not have this control; I had to use the voters opinion of their political knowledge. Both the laboratory and survey studies gave me an interesting picture of informations role in political perceptions. Before voters know anything about a specific political candidates position on an issue they know their own position. Both the laboratory and survey studies supported previous work that the voters own political position, both ideologically and issue-specific, impact how they perceive the candidates (Brent & Granberg, 1982; Feldman & Conover, 1983; Judd, Kenny, & Krosnick, 1983; Kinder, 1978; Krosnick, 1990). Specifically, people project their own positions onto candidates from their ingroup, and occasionally contrast the outgroup candidates. In Study One neither relevancy nor diagnosticity influenced the amount the subjects projected their own attitudes. Prior to learning individuating information about the candidates the subjects contrasted the outgroup candidates position from the subjects own. There was also contrast in the ANES data, which suggests that

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when individuating information about the candidates is low voters rely more on their heuristics, one of which is to use their own position as an anchor, projecting towards the ingroup and contrasting the outgroup. Study Two demonstrated that candidate consistency, but not popularity increases projection to an ingroup candidate. These data support Conover and Feldmans (1982) argument that projection is a central process in political impression formation, often used as a heuristic when information about the candidate is low or ambiguous. These results inform an important debate within political science about the type and amount of information that a candidate should present to the public during a campaign. Early political scientists have pointed out the tendency of politicians to adopt ambiguous issue positions (Downs, 1957; Key, 1958), while other work has demonstrated that politicians pander to their audience, modifying their position to suit public opinion (Barone, 1997;Lippmann, 1955; Page, 1978). As discussed earlier, many voters want to select a candidate that shares their position on important issues, with theorists viewing this type of voting as rational (Downs, 1957). The projection results from Study One would suggest that issue ambiguity is the best strategy for candidates to adopt; the voters stereotypic views of where the parties stand on the issues overwhelms individuating information about the candidates (Conover, 1981), especially when the information is irrelevant or ambiguous. This is especially true when the audience are not members of the candidates own political party. When subjects in Study One learned information about the outgroup candidate that was not diagnostic of the candidates position, it was either ambiguous or irrelevant, the voters

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contrast of the outgroup candidates positions from the subjects own position disappeared. In the present study, ambiguity did not significantly impact the subjects level of projection towards ingroup candidates. Since there is a strong and reliable relationship between perceptions of attitude similarity and voting behavior (Quist & Crano, 2003) and ambiguity increases or maintains projection of attitude position, ambiguity seems the best strategy for candidates to adopt. One question not addressed in the present set of studies is how ambiguity would impact projection within a primary election, when the goal of the candidates is to individuate oneself from other within-party candidates. It is possible that ambiguity would increase projection in primary elections as well as when comparing both ingroup and outgroup candidates. It is also possible that ambiguity would result in the voter regressing the candidates position towards the middle, which may or may not increase projection depending on the voters own position on the issue. This is an important question and worthy of further exploration. The survey study demonstrated how the voters own political ideology influences how differently they see political candidates from each party. The more ideologically extreme the voters were the more polarized they perceived the two political parties to be. The survey study also revealed that voters who considered themselves to be more knowledgeable about politics also perceived greater political polarization between the parties. In Study One there was less polarization after the subjects received relevant-undiagnostic and irrelevant (marginal) information about the candidates. Much of the candidate information

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presented in the media is ambiguous (Waldman & Jamieson, 2003), is focused on personality rather than position (Graber, 1984; Patterson, 1980), and reports more on the horserace aspect of the campaign than candidate positions (Bartels, 1988). Thus, voters who feel they are more informed about politics may not necessarily be better informed about the candidates positions or even about the candidates in general. In the laboratory the information was all individuating, that is, it gave the subject a better picture of the candidate. Even in Study One, when the information was irrelevant to the candidates attitude positions it still individuated the candidates, which in turn diluted the effect of party position (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981). This dilution led to decreased polarization of the two parties, and a non-significant decrease in projection towards ingroup candidates. However, when the information about the candidate was diagnostic of their political positions and in line with stereotypes about their partys position, the subjects maintained the same level of polarization as they did when all they had was the candidates names, pictures, and political party. So while knowledge about a candidates actual position may maintain or increase perceptions of party extremity, individuating information about political candidates that is irrelevant or undiagnostic seems to decrease polarization. As mentioned in the introduction both political deliberation (Sunstein, 2002) and political primaries (Raven & Gallo, 1965) increase polarization. The decrease in polarization of candidates from the opposing parties after learning either irrelevant or ambiguous information about the candidates in Study One that this increase in polarization during deliberation and primaries is due more to

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stereotypic views of the political parties and less to do with individuating information about the candidates. However, when the information about the candidates positions were clear, polarization remained high which supports findings that repeated expression of each parties often diametrically opposed position increases polarization (Stasavage, 2007). Directionally, the subjects relied less on their stereotypes about the groups when they learned diagnostic information about the candidates, resulting in less consensus. Overall, the Democrats had stronger stereotypes about the parties, agreeing with each other more than the Republicans did, however this was less true for subjects who learned relevant and diagnostic information. It seems that Democrats had a more coherent schema for the political positions of each party on political issues, which they applied when the information was ambiguous. It could be that Democrats used general party ideology to form impressions of specific candidates on specific issues more than the Republicans did (Waldman & Jamieson, 2002). How affiliated voters were to their political parties influenced how they used the candidates popularity and attitude consistency information. Strongly affiliated voters (in the study only Democrat subjects were examined) preferred a candidate that held attitudes that were consistent with the party ideology; that is, liberal Democrats. Directionally when the voter was strongly affiliated and the ingroup candidate was consistent, popularity mattered less, however, when the candidate was inconsistent the more popular candidate was preferred. Less affiliated voters preferred the outsider, the unpopular-inconsistent candidate. It

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seems they identified with the candidate that crossed the party-line on some issues and that wasnt supported by the majority of their fellow party members. Less affiliated voters may have held inconsistent views on some issues and may have preferred a candidate that demonstrated ideological flexibility. Why they did not also support the inconsistent candidate when he was popular is puzzling. It could be that the less affiliated subjects were less motivated to pay attention to the statements about the candidates and the task in general. Regardless of how affiliated voters were to their political party, they project more towards consistent political candidates than inconsistent ones. So while in explicit measure of liking, similarity, and voting likelihood the lower affiliated subjects preferred an inconsistent-unpopular candidate, they still tended to project their own attitudes more on the consistent candidates. How people use information to form impressions about other people is an important question on its own. In the political domain it has even more apparent importance; voters impressions of political candidates can influence how they vote. Selecting a political candidate who shares our political attitudes could be seen as the most rational way to vote (Downs, 1957; Shapiro, 1969). If that is true, then how people use information to form, maintain, and change their impressions of political candidates can in turn inform researchers about how people vote. In the end voting is the average persons main form of political expression. Since I began this dissertation with a quote by one of our nations greatest political thinkers about the importance of voting, it is appropriate to end with another.

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The rational and peacable instrument of reform, the suffrage of the people. Thomas Jefferson.

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Appendix A: Photographs of Political Candidates

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Appendix B: Study One Politically Irrelevant Statements


1- Republican Steven Johnson For his last vacation Steven Johnson took a weeklong horseback tour of Argentina. He enjoys tennis, reading and can often be seen running with his two dogs Jack and Pepper. His favorite song is Good Vibrations by the Beach Boys. Steven Johnsons favorite quote is by Olympic gold medalist Carl Lewis: Life is about timing. 2 Democrat William McCartell William McCartell is an avid golfer and also enjoys refurbishing antique furniture. His favorite song is Thunder Road by Bruce Springsteen. His last vacation was scuba-diving off the Great Barrier Reef in Australia. William McCartells favorite quote is You cant build a reputation on what you are going to do by inventor Henry Ford. 3 Republican Michael Larson Michael Larsons favorite song is Tony Bennetts Blue Velvet. He has been waterskiing for most of his life and recently won an amateur competition. His favorite quote is by Albert Einstein, Anyone who has never made a mistake has never tried anything new. He recently spent a week in Manhattan enjoying great food a number of Broadway plays. 4 Democrat Stan Martin Stan Martins favorite quote is Believe that life is worth living and your belief will help create the fact, by psychologist and philosopher William James. His last vacation was exploring the Mayan ruins south of Mexico City. Stan Martin is a member of a local softball team, and until recently played center for a local over-40 hockey team. His favorite song is Walk the Line by Johnny Cash. 5 Republican David Herring David Herring enjoys all things nautical, including sailing, rowing, and building model boats. His most recent vacation was a tour of the America South, exploring historical sights and enjoying local food and music. David Herrings favorite song is Norwegian Wood by The Beatles, and his favorite quote is A prudent question is one-half of wisdom, by the chemist Francis Bacon. 6 Democrat James Nelson James Nelson recently went on a weekend Napa Valley wine tour, staying in Bed and Breakfasts. His favorite song is You Mean Everything to Me by Neil Sedaka. James Nelson enjoys running and has taken part in a number of half-marathons. His favorite quote is Success is a science; if you have the conditions, you get the result, by novelist, playwright, and poet Oscar Wilde. 7 Republican Dean Hayes Dean Hayes favorite quote is by chemist and microbiologist Louis Pasteur, Let me tell you the secret that has led me to my goal. My strength lies solely in my tenacity. His favorite song is Slip Slidin Away by Paul Simon. Dean Hayes is a musician who co-founded a local jazz quartet. He recently took a California golfing vacation, including two days at Pebble Beach. 8 Democrat Gregory Davis Gregory Davis took his last vacation sailing the Greek Isles on a 45 foot sloop with friends and family. His favorite quote is If you don't know where you are going, you'll end up some place else, by Baseball Hall of Famer Yogi Berra. He enjoys spending time outdoors; fishing, hiking, and camping. His favorite song is The Best is Yet to Come, by Frank Sinatra.

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Appendix C: Study One Politically Relevant-Undiagnostic Statements


1- Republican Steven Johnson In the past few years our country has faced many challenges. We now have a chance to move ahead with confidence, resolve, and hope. We need a candidate who will maintain stability in an unstable time. Steven Johnson is that candidate. He has a plan to create jobs, and improve education. Steven Johnson, keeping our country safe and secure. 2 Democrat William McCartell Our nation needs to re-examine its priorities. We are at a cross-road in our history and need a leader with the vision to guide us to a better future. William McCartell is the leader to do it. He has plans to refocus our countrys priorities on job creation, education, and health care. William McCartell, defending America. 3 Republican Dean Hayes Staying healthy is a concern that every American has. We need to know that if we get sick we will receive the care we need. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. Dean Hayes has plans to change our health care system so that every American will receive the health care he or she needs. Dean Hayes cares. 4 Democrat Gregory Davis It is a travesty that in the most advanced country in the world there are people without health care. We need to develop a system in which every American can receive medical treatment. His goal is to insure that no American will have to go without. He is committed to improving social security. Gregory Davis is ready to help heal America. 5 Republican Michael Larson Our country is the economic power-house of the world. We need leaders who will continue to carry on this tradition. Michael Larson will ensure that our countrys economy remains strong and. He understands the necessity of tightening our countrys borders and increasing national security spending. He is a strong supporter of our men and women serving overseas. Michael Larson is a leader for todays world. 6 Democrat Stan Martin Now is the time to invest in our nations future. We need leaders dedicated to strengthening our economy. Stan Martin is one of those leaders. He is committed to investing in education and health care. He will protect our national security and defend our interests oversea. Stan Martin supports initiatives to increase governmental support of our servicemen and women. Together we can move America forward. 7 Republican David Herring Our world is changing. We are nearing a time when important decisions about our use of energy will need to be made. David Herring is prepared to make those tough choices and has a plan for decreasing our reliance on foreign oil. He has plans for improving health care and restructuring social security. He plans to improve education and the tax system. David Herring, steady leadership in times of change. 8 Democrat James Nelson Energy is the lifeblood of our country. Without it we would stop moving ahead. Our country has become overly reliant on foreign oil. James Nelson has outlined a policy to increase our energy independence. He has plans to revitalize our education system and create a more equitable tax system. James Nelson, dedication, integrity, focus.

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Appendix D: Study One Politically Relevant-Diagnostic Statements


Note: The bolded statements are diagnostic, stereotype-consistent positions on the issues. The statements in the relevant-undiagnostic condition (Appendix C) are identical, with the exception that the bolded statements are left out. The judges will not see the bolding.

1- Republican Steven Johnson (National Security) In the past few years our country has faced many challenges. We now have a chance to move ahead with confidence, resolve, and hope. We need a candidate who will maintain stability in an unstable time. Steven Johnson is that candidate. He is dedicated to protecting our country and keeping our families safe, by increasing the military budget to combat terrorism overseas. He has a plan to create jobs, improve education, and lower the cost of health car. He has a plan to decrease health care costs by making it more difficult to bring frivolous law-suits against doctors and HMOs. Steven Johnson, keeping our country safe and secure. 2 Democrat William McCartell (National Security) Our nation needs to re-examine its priorities. We are at a cross-road in our history and need a leader with the vision to guide us to a better future. William McCartell is the leader to do it. He has plans to refocus our countrys priorities on job creation, education, and health care. He plans to increase Medicare coverage, and has outlined a universal health care plan. He will focus on keeping our families and our country safe, by bringing estranged nations such as Syria and Iran to the bargaining table. William McCartell, defending America. 3 Republican Michael Larson (Economy) Our country is the economic power-house of the world. We need leaders who will continue to carry on this tradition. Michael Larson will ensure that our countrys economy remains strong and competitive by helping large businesses that are the backbone of our economy and making the recent tax cuts permanent. He understands the necessity of tightening our countrys borders and increasing national security spending. He is a strong supporter of our men and women serving overseas. He will improve our energy problems by increasing the use of Americas abundant coal resources. Michael Larson is a leader for todays world.

4 Democrat Stan Martin (Economy) Now is the time to invest in our nations future. We need leaders dedicated to strengthening our economy, by focusing on the under-taxation of large corporations, and increasing tax breaks for the lower and middle classes. Stan Martin is one of those leaders. He will deal with our energy crisis by increasing the use of alternative energy sources such as wind and solar power. He is committed to investing in education and health care. He will protect our national security and defend our interests oversea. Stan Martin supports initiatives to increase governmental support of our servicemen and women. Together we can move America forward. 5 Republican David Herring (Energy) Our world is changing. We are nearing a time when important decisions about our use of energy will need to be made. David Herring is prepared to make those tough choices and has a plan for decreasing our reliance on foreign oil by increasing domestic oil exploration and coal energy capability. He has plans for improving health care and restructuring social security. He will protect our nations security by increasing the budget for the Armed Services and research into new technologies to protect the American military overseas. David Herring, steady leadership in times of change. 6 Democrat James Nelson (Energy)

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Energy is the lifeblood of our country. Without it we would stop moving ahead. Our country has become overly reliant on foreign oil. James Nelson has outlined a policy to increase our energy independence by relying more on alternative renewable energy sources including wind and solar power and seriously restricting oil and gas drilling. He is committed to improving social security and has a plan for making health care available to all Americans. He will redirect money to overseas goodwill projects by focusing on international aid to underdeveloped countries. James Nelson, dedication, integrity, focus. 7 Republican Dean Hayes (Health Care) Staying healthy is a concern that every American has. We need to know that if we get sick we will receive the care we need. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. Dean Hayes has plans to change our health care system so that every American will receive the health care he or she needs, by allowing Americans to deduct health care costs from their income tax. He plans to improve education and the tax system, by abolishing the Estate Tax and decreasing taxes across the board which will have a trickle down effect on the nations economy. Dean Hayes cares. 8 Democrat Gregory Davis (Health Care) It is a travesty that in the most advanced country in the world there are people without health care. We need to develop a system in which every American can receive medical treatment. Gregory Davis has a plan to implement a Universal Health care system and equal drug coverage. His goal is to insure that no American will have to go without. He has plans to revitalize our education system and create a more equitable tax system, by making the tax system more progressive by increasing taxation of the very rich and decreasing corporate loopholes. Gregory Davis is ready to help heal America.

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Appendix E: Study One Self Rating Questionnaire

Section 1: Self-ratings of Personality Traits


Using the scale below, rate yourself on each of the following traits. To what extent would you use each trait to describe this yourself? Circle the number that you feel best describes yourself.

Extroverted

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Shy

Disagreeable

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Agreeable

Trustworthy

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Untrustworthy

Self-Doubting

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Self-Confident

Knowledgeable

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Uninformed

Reserved

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Outgoing

Good Natured

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Irritable

Irresponsible Self-Assured Unintelligent

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Responsible Insecure Intelligent

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Section 2: Political Attitudes, Ideology, and Knowledge.


Below are some statements of possible attitudes for several currently important issues. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each attitude statement? Use the scale below in making your judgments. Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4 Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I support a womans right to abortion on demand. _________ It is important to support equal rights for gays and lesbians. _________ There should be no limitations on the right to bear arms. _________ The United States should engage in more diplomatic discussions rather than using the military _________ HMOs ensure that American health care stays competitive with the rest of the world. _________ The government should move away from oil and invest in alternative energy. _________ I support decreasing taxes on large corporations to increase the nations economic vitality. _________ Our country needs to invest in a universal health care plan. _________ I view abortion as the taking of a human life. _________ Marriage should be reserved for heterosexual couples. _________ Limits on gun sales (including handguns) should be enacted into law. _________ The U.S. should drill almost all of its available oil resources. _________ I support increased spending to support the governments overseas military operations. _________ I believe that tax breaks for big-business hurt the average American.

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Please think about the your overall political stand. To what extent would you say that you are conservative versus liberal? (circle a number on the scale below) Very Conservative Very Liberal ---------------7

---------------1

---------------2

---------------3

---------------4

---------------5

---------------6

What is your political affiliation? Democrat Republican Independent

No Affiliation

How strongly do you identify with your political party? Very Weakly
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5

Very Strongly --------------- ----------------6 7

How knowledgeable are you about politics Very Unknowledgeable


--------------- --------------- -----------------1 2 3 How interested are you in politics? Very Interested ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5

Very Knowledgeable --------------- ----------------6 7

---------------4

---------------5

Not at all Interested --------------- ----------------6 7

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Appendix F: Study One Rating of Political Candidates Questionnaire Section 1: Ratings of Candidates Personality Traits

Steven Johnson Republican Using the scale below, rate the candidate on each of the following traits. To what extent would you use each trait to describe this candidate? Circle the number that you feel best describes the candidate.

Extroverted Disagreeable Trustworthy Self-Doubting Knowledgeable Reserved Good Natured Irresponsible Self-Assured Unintelligent

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---] [---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Shy Agreeable Untrustworthy Self-Confident Uninformed Outgoing Irritable Responsible Insecure Intelligent

138

Section 2: Political Attitudes, Ideology, and Knowledge.


Below are some statements of possible attitudes for several currently important issues. To what extent do you believe this candidate would agree or disagree with each attitude statement? Use the scale below in making your judgments. Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4 Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I support a womans right to abortion on demand. _________ It is important to support equal rights for gays and lesbians. _________ There should be no limitations on the right to bear arms. _________ The United States should engage in more diplomatic discussions rather than using the military _________ HMOs ensure that American health care stays competitive with the rest of the world. _________ The government should move away from oil and invest in alternative energy. _________ I support decreasing taxes on large corporations to increase the nations economic vitality. _________ Our country needs to invest in a universal health care plan. _________ I view abortion as the taking of a human life. _________ Marriage should be reserved for heterosexual couples. _________ Limits on gun sales (including handguns) should be enacted into law. _________ The U.S. should drill almost all of its available oil resources. _________ I support increased spending to support the governments overseas military operations. _________ I believe that tax breaks for big-business hurt the average American. .

139

How likely would it be for you to vote for this candidate? Very Unlikely
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Likely ---------------7

Please think about the candidates overall political stand. To what extent would you say that he is conservative versus liberal? (circle a number on the scale below) Very Conservative
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Liberal ---------------7

How strongly affiliated (attached) to his political party?

Not at all Affiliated


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Affiliated ---------------7

How attractive do you think this candidate is? Very Unattractive


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Attractive ---------------7

How much do you like this candidate?

Dislike Very Much


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Like or Dislike


---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Like Very Much ---------------7

In general how similar do you think this candidate is to you? Neither Very Similar or Dissimilar Dissimilar ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Similar ---------------7

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Appendix G: Study Two Target. Popular:

Recently Democrat voters in Stephen Johnsons home district were polled about whom they planned to vote for in the upcoming Congressional primary. 79 percent of registered Democrats stated they would vote for Stephen Johnson. The next most popular Democrat candidate received only 6 percent support.

Stephen Johnson Democrat

Unpopular:

Recently Democrat voters in Stephen Johnsons home district were polled about whom they planned to vote for in the upcoming Congressional primary. Only 6 percent of registered Democrats stated they would vote for Stephen Johnson. The most popular Democrat candidate received 79 percent support.

Stephen Johnson Democrat

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Appendix H: Study Two Consistent Target Information


- Voted yes on a measure that would allow current illegal aliens the opportunity to participant in Social Security. - Wants to place restrictions on assault weapons and ammunition types. - For his last vacation Stephen Johnson took a weeklong horseback tour of Argentina. - Voted yes to a bill requiring the CIA to report on Guantanamo detainees condition and interrogation methods.

Stephen Johnson Democrat

- Stephen Johnson enjoys tennis, reading and can often be seen running with his two dogs Jack and Pepper. -Wants to invest money into clean energy alternatives such as solar and wind, not dirty technology like nuclear. - Voted no on a measure that would subject federal employees to random drug tests. - His favorite song is Good Vibrations by the Beach Boys.
Stephen Johnson Democrat

- Feels that we need a Constitutional amendment protecting the right of a woman to have an abortion.

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Appendix I: Study Two Inconsistent Target Information


Note: Statements in bold are the inconsistent statements. All other statements are identical to the statements for the consistent target.

- Voted yes on a measure that would allow current illegal aliens the opportunity to participant in Social Security. - Opposes restrictions on assault weapons and ammunition types. - For his last vacation Stephen Johnson took a weeklong horseback tour of Argentina. - Voted yes to a bill requiring the CIA to report on Guantanamo detainees condition and interrogation methods.

Stephen Johnson Democrat

- Stephen Johnson enjoys tennis, reading and can often be seen running with his two dogs Jack and Pepper. - Wants to invest money into efficient energy alternatives such as nuclear, not inefficient ones like solar and wind. - Voted no on a measure that would subject federal employees to random drug tests. - His favorite song is Good Vibrations by the Beach Boys.
Stephen Johnson Democrat

- Feels that we need a Constitutional amendment defining life from conception.

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Appendix J: Study Two Self Rating Questionnaire


Below are some statements of possible attitudes for several currently important issues. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each attitude statement? Use the scale below in making your judgments. Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4 Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I support a womans right to abortion on demand. _________ It is important to support equal rights for gays and lesbians.

_________ Poverty is a large problem in our country and should be addressed by governmental support. _________ There should be no limitations on the right to bear arms. _________ The United States should engage in more diplomatic discussions rather than using the military _________ The death penalty is a deterrent for crime, and will decrease the number of murders. _________ Increased security at the expense of an individuals rights is unacceptable. _________ Illegal immigrants are a drain on our resources, and every effort should be made to deport them. _________ HMOs ensure that American health care stays competitive with the rest of the world. _________ The government should move away from oil and invest in alternative energy. _________ I support decreasing taxes on large corporations to increase the nations economic vitality. _________ I do not mind surrendering some personal freedoms to ensure our countrys safety.

_________ Charities not the government should be responsible for caring for the poor.

_________ Our country needs to invest in a universal health care plan. _________ The death penalty is morally wrong, and does nothing to decrease crime.

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Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4

Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I view abortion as the taking of a human life.

_________ Drug use is a crime and should be treated as such with stiffer penalties.

_________ I believe that immigrant workers should be allowed to become American citizens.

_________ Marriage should be reserved for heterosexual couples.

_________ Limits on gun sales (including handguns) should be enacted into law.

_________ The U.S. should drill almost all of its available oil resources.

_________ I support increased spending to support the governments overseas military operations. _________ Non-violent drug offenders should receive treatment rather than prison time.

_________ I believe that tax breaks for big-business hurt the average American.

Below are some current political issues. Please indicate how important each of these issues is to you. This question is not designed to determine what your position is on the following issues, rather it is designed to determine how important you think the issues are. Use the scale below in making your judgments.

Not at all Important ---------------1

---------------2

---------------3

---------------4

---------------5

---------------6

Very Important ---------------7

_____ Gun Laws _____ Drug War _____ Illegal Immigration _____ Death Penalty

_____ Taxation _____ Foreign Policy _____ Abortion _____ Welfare

_____ Health Care _____ Homeland Security _____ Gay Marriage _____ Energy

145

Please think about your overall political stand. To what extent would you say that you are conservative versus liberal? (Circle a number on the scale below) Very Conservative Very Liberal ---------------7

---------------1

---------------2

---------------3

---------------4

---------------5

---------------6

What is your political affiliation?(Circle one) Democrat Republican Independent No Affiliation

How strongly do you identify with your political party? Very Weakly
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5

Very Strongly --------------- ----------------6 7

How knowledgeable are you about politics Very Unknowledgeable


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5

Very Knowledgeable --------------- ----------------6 7

How interested are you in politics? Very Interested


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5

Not at all Interested --------------- ----------------6 7

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Appendix K: Study Two Rating of Political Candidates Questionnaire

Steven Johnson Democrat Below are some statements of possible attitudes for several currently important issues. To what extent do you believe this candidate would agree or disagree with each attitude statement? Use the scale below in making your judgments. Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4 Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I support a womans right to abortion on demand. _________ It is important to support equal rights for gays and lesbians. _________ Poverty is a large problem in our country and should be addressed by governmental support. _________ There should be no limitations on the right to bear arms. _________ The United States should engage in more diplomatic discussions rather than using the military _________ The death penalty is a deterrent for crime, and will decrease the number of murders. _________ Increased security at the expense of an individuals rights is unacceptable. _________ Illegal immigrants are a drain on our resources, and every effort should be made to deport them. _________ HMOs ensure that American health care stays competitive with the rest of the world. _________ The government should move away from oil and invest in alternative energy.

147

Strongly Disagree ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Agree nor Disagree ---------------4

Strongly Agree ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

_________ I support decreasing taxes on large corporations to increase the nations economic vitality. _________ I do not mind surrendering some personal freedoms to ensure our countrys safety.

_________ Charities not the government should be responsible for caring for the poor.

_________ Our country needs to invest in a universal health care plan.

_________

The death penalty is morally wrong, and does nothing to decrease crime.

_________ I view abortion as the taking of a human life.

_________ Drug use is a crime and should be treated as such with stiffer penalties.

_________ I believe that immigrant workers should be allowed to become American citizens.

_________ Marriage should be reserved for heterosexual couples.

_________ Limits on gun sales (including handguns) should be enacted into law.

_________ The U.S. should drill almost all of its available oil resources.

_________ I support increased spending to support the governments overseas military operations. _________ Non-violent drug offenders should receive treatment rather than prison time.

_________ I believe that tax breaks for big-business hurt the average American.

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For the following questions please circle your answers.

How likely would it be for you to vote for this candidate? Very Unlikely
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Likely ---------------7

Please think about the candidates overall political stand. To what extent would you say that he is conservative versus liberal? (circle a number on the scale below) Very Conservative
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Liberal ---------------7

How strongly affiliated (attached) to his political party?

Not at all Affiliated


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Similar nor Dissimilar


---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Affiliated ---------------7

How attractive do you think this candidate is? Very Unattractive


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 ---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Attractive ---------------7

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How much do you like this candidate?

Dislike Very Much


---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Like nor Dislike


---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Like Very Much ---------------7

In general how similar do you think this candidate is to you?

Very Dissimilar
---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3

Neither Similar nor Dissimilar


---------------4 ---------------5 ---------------6

Very Similar ---------------7

What about this candidate would make you want to, or not want to vote for him? Use the space provided below to answer.

150

Using the scale below, rate the candidate on each of the following traits. To what extent would you use each trait to describe this candidate? Circle the number that you feel best describes the candidate.

Extroverted

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Shy

Disagreeable

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Agreeable

Trustworthy

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Untrustworthy

Self-Doubting

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Self-Confident

Knowledgeable

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Uninformed

Reserved

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Outgoing

Good Natured

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Irritable

Irresponsible

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Responsible

Self-Assured

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Insecure

Unintelligent

[---1---|---2---|---3---|---4---|---5---|---6---|---7---]

Intelligent

151

Appendix L: Study Two Recall Measure


Next we are interested in what statements you can recall about the candidate. In the space below please list as many of the 9 statements that you read, one in each blank. Your recall does not need to be verbatim (word-for-word) but please try to be as complete and accurate in listing each of the 9 statements you read about the candidate as possible.

1) ______________________________________________________________

2) ______________________________________________________________

3) ______________________________________________________________

4) ______________________________________________________________

5) ______________________________________________________________

6) ______________________________________________________________

7) ______________________________________________________________

8) ______________________________________________________________

9)_______________________________________________________________ 152

Appendix M: Study Two Recognition Measure


For each of the following statements please indicate whether or not this statement was used in describing the candidate. Say yes only if the statement matches exactly one used in describing the candidate, not just if you think he would agree with it. Finally, in the second space indicate how sure you are about this. Not at all Confident ---------------1 Yes/No _______ _______ Wants to do all he can to protect Roe vs. Wade. Somewhat Confident ---------------2 Very Confident ---------------3

_______ _______

Has argued that medical marijuana issues should not be decided between patients and doctors, but by the government. Wants to place restrictions on assault weapons and ammunition types. Wants to invest money into efficient energy alternatives such as nuclear, not inefficient ones like solar and wind. Voted yes to a bill requiring the CIA to report on Guantanamo detainees condition and interrogation methods. Voted no on a measure that would allow current illegal aliens the opportunity to participant in Social Security. Feels that we need a Constitutional amendment defining life from conception. Believes we should strengthen existing gun restrictions, and penalize criminal use. Has argued that medical marijuana issues should be decided between patients and doctors, not the government. Voted yes on a proposition to drill for oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

153

Not at all Confident ---------------1 Yes/No _______ _______

Somewhat Confident ---------------2

Very Confident ---------------3

Voted yes on a bill to allow warrantless wiretapping of telephone and electronic communications. Voted yes on a measure that would give foreign Guest Workers the chance to apply for American citizenship. Wants to do all he can to overturn Roe vs. Wade.

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

Voted no on a measure that would subject federal employees to random drug tests. Wants to invest money into clean energy alternatives such as solar and wind, not dirty technology like nuclear. Believes we should repeal existing gun restrictions, but still penalize criminal use. Voted yes on a measure that would allow current illegal aliens the opportunity to participant in Social Security. Voted no to a bill requiring the CIA to report on Guantanamo detainees condition and interrogation methods. Feels that we need a Constitutional amendment protecting the right of a woman to have an abortion. Voted yes on a measure that would subject federal employees to random drug tests. Opposes restrictions on assault weapons and ammunition types.

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

_______ _______

Voted no on a bill to allow warrantless wiretapping of telephone and electronic communications. Voted no on a measure that would give foreign Guest Workers the chance to apply for American citizenship. Voted no on a proposition to drill for oil and gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

_______ _______

_______ _______

154

Appendix N: Study Two Subtyping Measure


Think about your impression of this political candidate. How typical or atypical are his attitudes and beliefs compared to your impression of the attitudes and beliefs of the other members of his political party Very Typical ---------------1 ---------------2 ---------------3 Neither Typical nor Atypical ---------------4 Very Atypical ---------------5 ---------------6 ---------------7

155

Appendix O: Study Three 1980 ANES Political Issues


Note: The first four measures were used in the 1980 ANES model based on the results of the factor analysis. The name of the variable is in brackets along with whether the variable was reverse scored or not. In the model the variables run from Liberal to Conservative. 1. (Job) Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Government see to a job and good standard of living . . 7. Government let each person get ahead on own 2. (Aid) Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups, even if it means giving them preferential treatment. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Government should help minority groups . . 7. Minority groups should help themselves 3. (Serv, Reverse-scored) Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Government should provide many fewer services; reduce spending a lot . . 7. Government should continue to provide services; no reduction in spending 4. (Unemp, Reverse-scored) Some people feel the federal government should take action to reduce the inflation rate, even if it means that unemployment would go up a lot. Others feel the government should take action to reduce the rate of unemployment, even if it means that inflation would go up a lot. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Reduce inflation even if unemployment goes up a lot . .

156

7. Reduce unemployment even if inflation goes up a lot 5. Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Greatly decrease defense spending . . 7. Greatly increase defense spending

6. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose. 1. By law, abortion should never be permitted. 2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman's life is in danger. 3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. 4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. 7. Which of these statements best describes what you would like to see happen over the next three years? Over the next three years, federal income taxes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Should not be cut Should be cut by 10% Should be cut by 20% Should be cut by 30% Should be cut by more than 30%

0. Inap, coded 5,8 or 9 in q.k19 8. Dk 9. Na

8. Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Equal role . . 7. Women's place in home

157

Appendix P: Study Three 1980 ANES Knowledge Measures


Note: All measures reverse-scored in the 1980 ANES model. 1. (Info) Some people don't pay much attention to campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaign so far this year? 1. Very much interested 3. Somewhat interested 5. Not much interested

2. (ObsInterest) Overall, how great was R's interest in interview? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Very high Above average Average Below average Very low

3. (Polls) During the last month, television, newspapers and magazines have reported the results of national polls which measure the popularity of the candidates running for. Have you read or heard any of the results from these national polls taken during the last month? Yes No 4. (Self-Int) Respondent's general level of information about politics and public affairs seemed: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Very high Fairly high Average Fairly low Very low

158

Appendix Q: Study Three 1988 ANES Political Issues


Note: All measures reverse-scored in the 1988 ANES model. 1. (InterestGov) Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all? 1. 2. 3. 4. Most of the time Some of the time Only now and then Hardly at all

2. (InterestPres) How about the presidential campaign? Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the presidential campaign in 1988? 1. Very much interested 3. Somewhat interested 5. Not much interested 3. (InterestPaper) How much attention did you pay to articles in the newspaper about the presidential primary campaigns -- a great deal, quite a bit, some, very little, or none? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A great deal Quite a bit Some Very little None

4. (InterestTV) How much attention did you pay to news on TV about the presidential primary campaigns -- a great deal, quite a bit, some, very little, or none? 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A great deal Quite a bit Some Very little None

159

Appendix R: Study Three 1988 ANES Ideology Measure


We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Think about a ruler for measuring the political views that people might hold, from liberal to conservative. On this ruler, which goes from one to seven, a measurement of one means very liberal political views, and a measurement of seven would be very conservative. Just like a regular ruler, it has points in between, at 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, remembering that 1 is very liberal and 7 is very conservative, or haven't you thought much about this? 1. Very liberal . . 7. Very conservative

160

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