1.) Equitable Leasing Corp vs.

Suyom, Enena, Tamayo & Oledan Facts: A Fuso Road tractor driven by Tutor rammed into the house cum of Tamayo which resulted in the death of Tamayos son and Oledans daughter. Failure to claim from a criminal case finding Tutor guilty of reckless imprudence, respondents filed a civil case based on quasi delict against Equitable Leasing Corp, the registered owner of the tractor, among others. Equitable contends that it should not be held liable for such damages which arose from the negligence of the driver Fuso Road. That such tractor was already sold to the owner of Fuso Road at the time of the accident. Thus, not having employed driver Tutor, it could not have controlled or supervised him. Issue: WON Equitable should be held liable for damages in an action based on quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who was not its employee. Held: Yes, Equitable should be held liable because it was the registered owner at the time of the accident. The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. ----------------The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. 2.) BA Finance Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992 Facts: Amare, the driver of an Isuzu truck was involved in an accident which caused the death of three persons. Amare was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence. BA Finance was found liable for damages since the truck was registered in its name. BA Finance contends that it should not be held liable since it was not Amares employer at the time of the accident. It also contends that the Isuzu truck was in the possession of Rock Component Phil, by virtue of a lease agreement. Hence, BA Finance wants to prove who the actual/real owner is at the time of the accident, and in

accordance with such proof, evade liability and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle. Issues: 1 WON BA Finance should be held liable. 2 WON BA Finance can escape liability by proving the actual/real owner of the truck. Held: 1 Yes, BA Finance is liable. The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to the third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets. 2 No, the law does not allow him. The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. This may appear harsh but nevertheless, a registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. While the registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused, he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.

3.) Duavit vs. CA, Sarmiento & Catuar G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989 Facts: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. This accident caused injuries to private respondents, thus they filed a case for damages against driver Salbiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership of the jeep but contends that he should not be held liable since Salbiniano is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by Salbiniano without his (Duavit) consent. Issue: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable as an employer when the said vehicle

was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent. Held: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.

4.) Lim & Gunnaban vs. CA & Gonzales Facts: Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Vallarta. Vallarta remained as the holder of a certificate of public convenience and the registered owner of the jeepney. Subsequently, the jeepney collided with a ten-wheeler truck owned by Lim, driven by Gunnaban which resulted in the death of 1 passenger and injuries to all others. Failure to arrive to a settlement with Lim for the repair of the jeepney, Gonzales brought an action for damages against Lim & Gunnaban. Lim denied liability asserting that Vallarte, and not Gonzales, is the real party in interest being the registered owner of the jeepney. He further asserts that an operator of the vehicle continues to be its operator as he remains the operator of record; and that to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is utterly subversive of public policy. Issue: WON Gonzales, an operator under the kabit system (considering that he is not the registered owner of the jeepney), may sue for damages against Lim. Or, WON Gonzales is a real party in interest. Held: Yes, Gonzales may sue. The evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system* does not exist. 1 Neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. 2 The case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in stoppels for leading the

public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. 3 The riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. Thus, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business. ----------------N.B. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, thekabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.

5.) Baliwag Transit Incs (BTI) vs CA & Martinez G.R. No. L-57493 January 7, 1987 Facts: Martinez, claiming to be an employee of two bus lines operating under different grants of franchise but were issued only one ID Number: Baliwag Transit owned and operated by the late Tuazon and Baliwag Transit Inc (BTI) owned by de Tengco, (Martinez) filed a petition with the Social Security Commission to compel BTI to remit his premium contributions to SSS. BTI denied ever employing Martinez, and alleges that he was in fact employed by Tuason who operated a separate and distinct bus line from BTI. The Social Security Commission granted Martinezs petition. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the commission, finding that Tuason was operating under the kabit system; that while Tuason was the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission in his own name; and thus ordered BTI to remit Martinez premiums to SSS.

Issue: WON the issuance by SSS of one ID Number to the two bus lines necessarily indicates that one of them is operating under the kabit system. Held: No. The Kabit System has been defined by the Supreme Court as an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. The determining factor, therefore, is the possession of a franchise to operate which negates the existence of the Kabit System and not the issuance of one SSS ID Number for both bus lines from which the existence of said system was inferred. Thus, it is evident that both bus lines operated under their own franchises but opted to retain the firm name Baliwag Transit with slight modification, by the inclusion of the word Inc. in the case of herein petitioner, obviously to take advantage of the goodwill such firm name enjoys with the riding public. Conversely, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the late Pascual Tuazon, during the time material to this case operated his buses under the Kabit System on the ground that while he was actually the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission (now the Bureau of Land Transportation) in his own name, is not supported by the records.

6.) Philtranco & Manilhig vs. CA & Heirs of Acuesta G.R. No. 120553 June 17, 1997 Facts: Acuesta was riding his easy rider bicycle. One of the buses of Philtranco driven by Manilhig, on the other hand, was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. Subsequently, the engine started which occurred at the time when Acuesta was directly in front of the bus. Acuesta was run over by the bus. Trial court rendered a decision ordering Philtranco & Manilhig to be jointly and severally liable to the Heirs of Acuesta. CA affirmed, holding that Philtranco has a solidary liability with Manilhig under Art 2194 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON Philtrancos liability is solidary (jointly & severally) with Manilhig. Or, WON Art 2194 is applicable. Held: Yes. It had been consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,

direct, and joint and several orsolidary with the driver. solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides:

As to

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employers liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

7.) Tamayo vs. Aquino et al & Rayos 12720 May 29, 1959 Facts:

G.R. Nos. L-12634 and L-

Epifania Gonzales (wife of Aquino) boarded a truck owned by Tamayo, holder of a certificate of public convenience to operate. Allegedly, while Epifania was making a trip aboard the truck, it bumped against a culvert on the side of the road, causing her death. Aquino et al filed an action for damages against Tamayo. Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is owned by Rayos, so he filed a 3rd party complaint against him (Rayos). The CFI ruled that Tamayo is the registered owner, under a public convenience certificate but such truck was sold to Rayos one month after the accident, but he (Tamayo) did not inform the Public Service Commission of the sale. CFI held Tamayo and Rayos jointly and severally liable to Aquino. CA affirmed, holding that, both the registered owner (Tamayo) and the actual owner and operator (Rayos) should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code (solidary). Issue: WON Art 2194 (solidary liability) is applicable; and, if NOT, how should Tamayo (holder of the cert. of public convenience) participate with Rayos (transferee/operator) in the damages recoverable. Held: No, Art 2194 is not applicable. The action instituted in this case is one for breach of contract, for failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict; their

responsibility is NOT SOLIDARY. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured. But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence.

8.) Board of Liquidators vs Exequiel Floro Facts: Melencio Malabanan entered into an agreement with the Board of Liquidators for the salvage of surplus properties sunk in certain waters. They agreed that Malabanan was assigned the right, title and interest in and to all the surplus properties salvaged, and shall therefore pay the Government for such which shall be made monthly. Subsequently, Malabanan filed in the CFI a petition for voluntary insolvency which listed the Board and Exequiel Floro as creditors; as well as several pieces of steel mattings obtained from the waters. The Board claimed that they are the owners of the steel mattings. Floro opposed this and contended that such steel mattings are owned by Eulalio Legaspi by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor, executed by Floro pursuant to a previous contract between Malabanan and Floro. The CFI declared Malabanan as the owner of the steel mattings under his contract with the board, thus, Floro was properly authorized to dispose of the mattings (sale to Legaspi). The Board contends that Malabanan did not acquire ownership over the steel mattings for failure to comply with certain terms of the contract, allegedly constituting conditions precedent for the transfer of title. Issue: WON , based on the contract between Malabanan and the Board, delivery of the surplus properties salvaged (steel mattings)were never intended to be delivered to Malabanan. Held: There is nothing in the terms of the public instrument in question from which an intent to withhold delivery or transfer of title may be inferred.

While there can be reservation of title in the seller until full payment of the price (Article 1478, N.C.C.), or, until fulfillment of a condition (Article 1505, N.C.C.); and while execution of a public instrument amounts to delivery only when from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred (Article 1498, supra), there is nothing in the said contract which may be deemed a reservation of title, or from which it may clearly be inferred that delivery was not intended. The contention that there was no delivery is incorrect. While there was no physical tradition, there was one by agreement (traditio longa manu) in conformity with Article 1499 of the Civil Code.lawphil.net Art. 1499 The delivery of movable property may likewise be made by the mere consent or agreement of the contracting parties, if the thing sold cannot be transferred to the possession of the vendee at the time of the sale .

9.) Abuan vs. Garcia Facts: Laureano Abuan acquired a homestead which was passed to his heirs (plaintiffs) after his death. Plaintiffs then sold the parcel of land to Defendants, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale, thus a TCT was issued to defendants on Aug 7, 1953. Plaintiffs then filed an action to recover the land, alleging that the deed of absolute sale had been executed through fraud, without consideration. But such was settled amicably (that defendants would pay for the land). Claiming that full payment of the land was made by the defendants only after the agreed time, plaintiffs filed an action for legal redemption on Mar 4, 1960. Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs right of action was already barred because the 5-year redemption period had already expired. The court sustained the defendants motion, thus dismissed the complaint. Issue: When should the 5-year period within which plaintiffs can exercise their right of repurchase begin to run? Held: The 5-yr period should begin to run from the date the defendants acquired ownership of the land which was upon the execution of the deed of sale on Aug 7, 1953. * But assuming that the deed of absolute sale was null and void, the date of the Agreement can be considered as the time within which the ownership is vested in the defendants. Such agreement may be

a private instrument the execution of which could not be construed as constructive delivery under Art. 1498 of the New Civil Code. But Art. 1496 explicitly provides that ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. The intention to give possession (and ownership) is manifest in the agreement entered into by the parties, specially considering the following circumstances: (1) the payment of part of the purchase price, there being no stipulation in the agreement that ownership will not vest in the vendees until full payment of the price; and (2) the fact that the agreement was entered into in consideration of plaintiffs desistance, as in fact they did desist, in prosecuting their reivindicatory action, thereby leaving the property in the hands of the then and now defendants as owners thereof, necessarily. This was delivery brevi manu permissible under Articles 1499 and 1501 of the New Civil Code. * Ratio: Art. 1477 of the New Civil Code provides that ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof; and Art. 1496 points out that ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501. Under Art. 1498, When the sale is made through a public instrument as in this case the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. This manner of delivery of the thing through the execution of a public document is common to personal as well as real property. Thus, the 5-year period had already elapsed when plaintiffs filed the action for legal redemption on Mar 4, 1960.

10.) Amigo vs. Teyes Facts: Macario Amigo and his wife executed in favor of their son, Marcelino Amigo, a power of atty granting him (Marcelino) the power to lease, let, bargain, transfer, convey and sell, remise, release, mortgage and hypothecate Marcelino, as atty in fact, then executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of Serafin Teyes but it was stipulated that the vendors would remain in possession of the land within a period of 18 mos. from the date of the sale; and that for such period, the vendors shall remain as lessees of the land. Macario and his wife then donated to their sons, Justino and Pastor, several parcels of land including their right to repurchase the land sold from Teyes. Petitioners were able to pay for the first 6 mos. rentals but

not for the subsequent semesters. Thus, the land was consolidated and a corresponding TCT was issued to Teyes. Justino and Pastor offered to repurchase the land but was refused by Teyes on the ground that the ownership had already been consolidated in him as vendor a retro. Argument: Petitioners contend that, while the attorney-in-fact, Marcelino Amigo, had the power to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase under the power of attorney granted to him, however, the covenant of lease contained in said deed whereby the vendors agreed to remain in possession of the land as lessees is not germane to said power of attorney. Issue: WON the lease covenant embodied in the deed of sale is valid. Held: YES There is nothing unusual in the lease covenant embodied in the deed of sale for such is common in contracts involving sales of land withpacto de retro. The lease that a vendor executes on the property may be considered as a means of delivery or tradition by constitutum possessorium. Where the vendor a retro continues to occupy the land as lessee, by fiction of law, the possession is deemed to be constituted in the vendee by virtue of this mode of tradition. We may say therefore that this covenant regarding the lease of the land sold is germane to the contract of sale with pacto de retro.

11.) Industrial Textile Manufacturing Company of the Phil (Itemcop) vs. LPJ Enterprises Facts: LPJ had a contract to supply 300 bags of cement (which was packed in kraft paper bags) to Atlas per year. Subsequently, the VP of Itemcop asked the Pres of LPJ to cooperate in an experiment to develop plastic cement bags. LPJ agreed, thus, series of experimentations were made in Luzon Cement Factory, but however were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, LPJ considered purchase after few alterations were made. A total of 52,000 bags were delivered. Of which, only 15,000 were used; the 37,000 were considered unfit. Thus LPJ cancelled its order for another 10,000 bags. Itemcop then sent demand letters for the payment but LPJ declared that it did not receive any since it transferred its offices to another place. The 37,000 bags remained in the custody of Luzon Cement (LPJs supplier). Thus, Itemcop may not be expected to just pull out its bags from Luzon Cement, the latter being a stranger to the former. Both parties invoked Art 1502 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON Art 1502 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case. Or,

WON there was an absolute contract of sale, thus LPJ should be held liable for the plastic bags delivered to it. Held: No, it is not applicable. Thus, there was an absolute contract of sale. The provision in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code from which Article 1502 was taken, clearly requires an express written agreement to make a sales contract either a sale or return or a sale on approval. Parol or extrinsic testimony could not be admitted for the purpose of showing that an invoice or bill of sale that was complete in every aspect and purporting to embody a sale without condition or restriction constituted a contract of sale or return. If the purchaser desired to incorporate a stipulation securing to him the right of return, he should have done so at the time the contract was made. On the other hand, the buyer cannot accept part and reject the rest of the goods since this falls outside the normal intent of the parties in the on approval situation. The conditions which allegedly govern the transaction according to respondent may not be considered. Such conditions should have been distinctly specified in the purchase orders and respondents failure to do so is fatal to its cause.

12.) Chrysler Phil Corp vs. CA & Sambok Motors Co. Facts: Chrysler is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembling and sale of motor vehicles. Sambok Motors Co., is a dealer of automotive products with two offices (in Bacolod and Iloilo). Allegedly, Sambok Bacolod ordered from Chrysler various automotive products. Such were delivered to Chryslers forwarding agent (Allied Brokerage), for shipment. The products were loaded on board a vessel owned by Negros Navigation. When Chrysler tried to collect payment, Sambok Bacolod denied ever receiving any. It was only 4 years later when a warehouseman of Negros Navigation found parts of the shipment in their offshore bodega, already deteriorated and valueless. Sambok Bacolod refused to accept the delivery. The trial court found that the act of Sambok Bacolod in refusing to receive the delivery constituted wrongful neglect. On appeal, the CA set aside the judgment of the trial court finding that Chrysler had not performed its part of the obligation under the contract by not delivering the goods at Sambok Iloilo, the place designated in the Parts Order Form (misdelivery). Issue: WON Sambok Bacolod can be faulted for not accepting the deliver. And, who bears the risk of the loss? Held:

NO, under the circumstances, Sambok, Bacolod, cannot be faulted for not accepting or refusing to accept the shipment from Negros Navigation four years after shipment. The evidence is clear that Negros Navigation could not produce the merchandise nor ascertain its whereabouts at the time Sambok, Bacolod, was ready to take the delivery. Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them. Chrysler bears the risk of loss. From the evidentiary record, Negros Navigation was the party negligent in failing to deliver the complete shipment either to Sambok, Bacolod, or to Sambok, Iloilo, but as the Trial Court found, petitioner failed to comply with the conditions precedent to the filing of a judicial action. Thus, in the last analysis, it is Chrysler that must shoulder the resulting loss. The general rule that before, delivery, the risk of loss is home by the seller who is still the owner, under the principle of res petit domino, is applicable in petitioners case. * Misdelivery is not the decisive factor in relieving Sambok Bacolod of liability but non-delivery since the merchandise was never placed in the control and possession of Sambok, Bacolod.