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Democratization

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Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest for democracy
Theodor Tudoroiua a Center for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Canada Online publication date: 24 January 2011

To cite this Article Tudoroiu, Theodor(2011) 'Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest for

democracy', Democratization, 18: 1, 236 264 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.532628 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.532628

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Democratization Vol. 18, No. 1, February 2011, 236 264

Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldovas difcult quest for democracy
Theodor Tudoroiu
Center for International Peace and Security Studies, Montreal, Canada (Received 28 January 2010; nal version received 25 May 2010) This article examines the state of and perspectives on democracy in the Republic of Moldova. The fall of its communist authoritarian regime in 2009 sometimes compared to a colour revolution went against the trend toward heavy authoritarianism now visible in the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, the regime change in Moldova does not necessarily imply a process of genuine democratic consolidation. This article argues that the future course of the Moldovan polity will be decided by structural domestic and geopolitical factors different from those that produced the regime change. Most of these structural factors do not favour democratization. Moldovas only chance to secure a genuinely democratic trajectory may therefore be dependent on its relationship with the European Union (EU). The article argues that nothing short of a process of accession to the EU can modify factors that are likely to prevent democratic consolidation. In its absence, the article contends that Moldova will either develop a Ukrainian-style hybrid regime or return to its authoritarian past. Keywords: Moldova; democratization; democratic consolidation; transitology; Commonwealth of Independent States; European Union

Introduction The worsening state of democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a subject explored already by a rich literature. During the last decade, analysis has focused mainly on regime1 change and the weakness of civil society. By illuminating these important elements, this research has led to a better understanding of the post-Soviet political evolutions. However, in recent years analysts have seldom scrutinized the deeper level of structural causes2 that have helped prevent development of the civic sector and hence democratization. This makes difcult a comprehensive explanation of undemocratic trends in the CIS. The Republic of Moldova provides an interesting case study. Its 1992 2001 hybrid regime3 was followed by a semi-consolidated authoritarian4 one

Email: tudoroiu@hotmail.com

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that lasted until 2009. The country is today at a crossroads as the recent democratic opening might either evolve toward genuine democratization or follow the disappointing course of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of their colour revolutions. In order to understand the Moldovan trajectory and predict its future, analysis of civil society and regime change are undoubtedly important. But they are only part of a more complex phenomenon. This article tries to show that domestic as well as geopolitical factors have made the citizens of Moldova tolerant toward authoritarian practices and reluctant to develop civic engagement. The ensuing weakness of civil society has prevented the development of a consolidating democracy. After 2001, this allowed the communists to build a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. The latter acted against the civic sector, thus preserving the conditions allowing its own survival. A favourable conjunction of circumstances created the present democratic opening but did not modify the structural factors that prevent the democratization. The article explores the possible ways of taking advantage of this opening in order to break the vicious circle and put Moldova on a denitely democratic trajectory. The article has the following structure: the next section makes a brief critical assessment of the orientation of the recent research on the post-Soviet democratization. The three sections that follow present Moldovas past, portray the 2001 2009 communist authoritarian regime, and describe the situation created by its fall. The subsequent section discusses the Moldovan transitology. Finally, a European Union (EU) accession scenario is examined. The conclusion summarizes the articles main ndings. Avoiding the regime change trap In its 1999 2000 Nations in Transit report,5 Freedom House found no consolidated or semi-consolidated democracy in CIS. There were ve hybrid regimes (including Russia), four semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, and three consolidated ones.6 The picture was hardly positive. During 2003 2005, the colour revolutions seemed to indicate a wave of genuine democratization. However, the situation depicted in the 2009 report was considerably worse than the one 10 years earlier. Consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies continued to be absent. But the hybrid regimes had shrunk from ve to two (Ukraine and Georgia) and the semi-consolidated authoritarian ones from four to two (Moldova7 and Armenia). All the other eight republics had by then consolidated authoritarian regimes.8 Still, this trend has become clear to researchers only recently. During the early 2000s, they grew interested in hybrid regimes. The number and the dynamics of these regimes in the post-Soviet area led many analysts to believe that a trajectory toward or away from ideal-type endpoints like democracy or autocracy can no longer describe the CIS republics correctly.9 Consequently, the study of hybrid regimes replaced the transitology paradigm that was predominant in the 1990s.10 Then, the colour revolutions triggered a new focus on regime change11 and democracy promotion.12 It was common to

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state in Ukraine (. . .) the severe crisis (. . .) of 2004 (. . .) brought in its wake a fundamental regime change (italics added).13 Today it is obvious that the regime changed but the type of regime did not. From 1999 to 2009 before, during, and after the Orange Revolution Ukraine had only hybrid regimes.14 When the lack of genuine democratization became clear in the second half of the 2000s, the post-Soviet regime changes were compared with the swings of a pendulum toward and away from democracy.15 But even that was wrong. The Commonwealth of Independent States has now eight consolidated authoritarian regimes, the biggest number since the fall of the USSR. Moreover, none of them is threatened by serious crisis. It can be concluded that there is a long-term trend toward heavy authoritarianism in the CIS area that was able to override the colour revolutions and imposed itself as the dominant characteristic of the region. Unfortunately, in recent years the causes of this phenomenon have seldom been explored beyond the weakness of civil society and failure of democracy promotion. It seems that most researchers are reluctant to return to the transitology of the 1990s despite the obvious merits of that approach. A notable exception is the February 2007 special issue of East European Politics and Societies. Analysing the domestic determinants of democracy, its authors take into consideration a large number of factors.16 The problem is that no differentiation is made between the structural causes that favour or block the process of genuine democratization and the more supercial elements that facilitate or hamper only the regime change (possibly within the same category of regimes). Apparently, most researchers are today so inuenced by the decade-long study of regime change that they cannot put it aside even when they should concentrate exclusively on the profound causes of democratization. The consequence is that they have not predicted or explained the trend toward consolidated authoritarianism in the CIS. That is a trap this article tries to avoid. The post-independence evolution of Moldova and its present situation are not analysed in a regime change perspective. What I am trying to assess are the fundamental structural causes that will either let Moldova fall into the trap of the CIS general trend or allow it to follow a genuinely democratic trajectory.

Moldova, a country of unfortunate paradoxes Moldova is famously the only country in eastern Europe in which major disputes exist among political and cultural elites over the fundamentals of national identity.17 The eastern (and poorer) half of the Principality of Moldova became a province of the Russian empire in 1812. Later, a process of Soviet social engineering changed deeply its ethnical and social composition. By 1989, the Moldovans represented only 64.5% of the population, against 13.9% Ukrainians and 13% Russians.18 Their language, while identical to Romanian, was called Moldovan. Most of their elites had been eliminated or denationalized. And their identity-quest would soon create an array of diverging ideologies:

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The pan-Romanian view, (. . .) strongest among the cultural intelligentsia, sees Moldovans merely as a regional group of (ethnic) Romanians (. . .). The Eurasianist view, espoused above all by most of Moldovas Russian-speaking minorities and the Transnistrian separatist regime, (. . .) see Moldova as part of the post-Soviet space (. . .) The dominant position in Moldova has been Basarabism, which advocates Moldovan independence, a balance between Eastern and Western orientations and a compromise between the previous views on national identity. Moldovanism bridges both Eurasianist and Basarabist views. We can identify a neo-Soviet Eurasianist Moldovanism (. . .) and a Basarabist Moldovanism.19

During the last two decades, identity matters have been politicized and instrumentalized in a way that has hampered seriously the countrys unity and stability. Things were further complicated by the 1992 Transnistrian civil war. Ethnic entrepreneurs of the former Soviet elite exacerbated the fears associated with the dismantlement of the USSR. The Kremlin instrumentalized the crisis in order to preserve its regional inuence. An armed conict ensued, leading to the creation of a de facto independent Transnistrian republic. It also helped maintain Chi inau in the Russian sphere of inuence. In turn, this isolated Moldova from the process of Europeanization that allowed its western neighbours to join the European Union. This represents only a part of the countrys bleak picture. The newly independent Moldova experienced also a traumatic economic downfall. Between 1991 and 1993 production dropped by 60% and purchasing power by 80%.20 Throughout the 1990s, real GDP fell on average by 10% per year. Moldova became the poorest country in Europe and poorer than any other former Soviet republic except Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.21 By 2001, the average wage was under $2 per day.22 Massive emigration ensued. Out of a total of around 4 million, the number of Moldovans working abroad in most cases, illegally has been variously estimated between 600,000 and 1 million.23 900,000 seems to represent the most likely gure.24 Accordingly, remittances grew steadily from 7.1% of the GDP in 1998 to 36.2% in 2007, turning Moldova into the worlds second remittance recipient (in relative terms).25 This led to a certain improvement of the overall economic situation. However, it also diminished seriously the available workforce at home, which in turn hampered the domestic economic growth. Predictably, identity disputes, civil war, and dramatic poverty had serious consequences for Moldovan political life. After a brief period of hegemony, the nationalist, pro-Romanian Popular Front ceased to be a signicant political force in the aftermath of the 1992 Transnistrian defeat. Its former ally, President Mircea Snegur, became for a time an advocate of Moldovanism.26 In 1996 he was defeated by the openly pro-Russian Petru Lucinschi. The new president was unable to improve the economic situation and unwilling to try to consolidate Moldovas weak democracy. But he tried to increase his own authority by replacing the semi-presidential system with a strong presidential one. His rivals succeeded in blocking this plan and, on the contrary, created a fully parliamentary regime with an indirectly elected president.27 In 2001, as a consequence of the economic

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collapse and continual inghting,28 the electorate voted massively for Vladimir Voronins Party of the Communists, which won 71 of the parliaments 101 seats.29 It was for the rst time in the post-communist world that a self-proclaimed communist party was back in power. The vertical of the power: communist rule, 2001 2009 The 1992 2001 Moldovan political system was a typical hybrid regime.30 Lucan A. Way analysed it as a case of pluralism by default, in which political competition was not due to a robust civil society, strong democratic institutions, or democratic leadership but simply to incumbent incapacity. Moldovan politics remained competitive only because the government was too polarized and the state too weak to monopolize political control in an international environment dominated by democratic powers.31 But after the 2001 election the communists became strong enough to build a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime characterized by
the overlap between state and political party structures; the concentration of all the levers of power in the hands of the President and a small circle of intimates; (. . .) the limitations and infringements of basic rights and freedoms of citizens; the control of the public and private mass-media and the harassment of the few independent ones; the quasi-voiding of sense of the very act of justice by subordinating the judiciary to the political power; (and) the subordination and seizure of the business environment.32

Moreover, the 2001 electoral platform was pro-Russian and included the return of Soviet-era symbolism and rhetoric as well as a U-turn on economic reforms.33 However, from the very beginning the communists had to face massive public protest against their planned changes, especially in the education system (such as making Russian-language instruction mandatory in lower grades). They reacted brutally and went as far as banning the main opposition party from political activity for 30 days and threatening with dismissal the teachers and sometimes the parents of students involved in anti-communist demonstrations. But this generated highly negative domestic and international responses that were potentially dangerous for a yet unconsolidated regime. Voronin chose to downscale his plans for change. The re-sovietization and anti-reformism continued to be promoted, but the most contested measures were cancelled.34 This limited responsiveness to societal demands was the rst sign that the communist leadership was not simply following the examples of Belarus or Uzbekistan. A more ambiguous, soft authoritarian regime would be built. It is important to note that I call this regime communist simply because its creators have used this label to identify themselves. But this is denitely not classical, totalitarian communism. It is a neo-communist regime representing an effort to mirror the totalitarian past with the limited instruments of authoritarianism. Similarly to the undemocratic constructs of Ion Iliescu in Romania (1990 1996) and Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria (1995 1997), Vladimir Voronin and his associates tried to preserve and restore

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communist structures, methods, and personnel but not the all-encompassing totalitarian framework of the Soviet era.35 Their ideology included elements of classical communist rhetoric and advocated redistributive social and economic policies.36 At the practical level, however, this did not prevent prominent communists becoming extremely rich. The fortune of the presidents own son, Oleg Voronin, is estimated probably exaggeratedly at no less than 2 billion US dollars.37 Any comparison with Soviet communism is therefore inappropriate. The regimes relative moderation was encouraged also by external factors. One of Voronins main electoral promises had been the settlement of the Transnistrian crisis through the creation of a special relation with Moscow. Russia reacted favourably and put forward the 2003 Kozak Memorandum. But this plan was imposing the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria until 2020 and gave to the Transnistrians and the Gagauz the means to block any major Moldovan constitutional and political change. Voronin initially accepted the plan but changed his mind due to erce public protest. The Chi inau-Moscow relation further worsened in late 2003, when Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan blocked Moldovas accession to their planned Common Economic Space.38 At that point, Moldova witnessed a surprising development labelled by Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu Panainte the revolution in the head of Vladimir Voronin.39 In a speech at the 2004 Istanbul North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit, the Moldovan president asked for the rst time for the departure of the Russian troops from Transnistria. Coming from a pro-Kremlin communist, this was totally unexpected. At that time, the colour revolutions were changing the political geography of the former Soviet Union while the European Union (EU) was launching its ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy. Taking advantage of these new circumstances, the Moldovan communists adopted an openly pro-European Union position. They created a partnership with the instigator of the anti-Voronin 2002 protests, the pro-Romanian Christian Democratic Popular Party, and won the 2005 election with a programme claiming unconditional support for EU accession, reform, and democracy.40 For a time, they appeared to succeed in convincing most observers of their genuine interest in change. But nothing happened beyond the rhetorical level. Assessing the effects of the EU-Moldova Action Plan, Dumitru Mnzarari could ask ironically An Unnished Task or a Complete Failure?41 The communist defeat at the 2007 local election made Voronin aware that his openness to the West affects the very foundation of his power.42 New restrictions were imposed in 2007 2008 on the press and the political parties. Hoping to relegitimize his regime, Voronin turned again to Russia in order to reach a settlement of the Transnistrian conict. By early 2009, the authoritarian trends associated with what the opposition and the civic activists in Chi inau called the vertical of the power reached their climax. It was only in the eld of economic reform that the Greceani government honoured previous commitments. In fact, in 2008 2009 Moldova even became one of the six lowor lower-middle-income global top economic reformers.43 Yet, before the 5 April 2009 parliamentary elections the polls suggested a support of only

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35 40% for the communists. They nevertheless secured 60 of the 101 parliamentary seats. Of course, even today there is no unquestionable and generally accepted proof of large scale rigging. The oppositions contrary claims could therefore be considered simple allegations. But they were credible enough to ignite large scale youth protest. It started during the evening of 6 April and took mass pro portions the next day. In fact, the centre of Chi inau became the scene of two separate events. One was a peaceful mass demonstration demanding new elections and the investigation of the alleged fraud. The other was a violent movement that occupied the lower oors of the presidency building and then assaulted the parliament while the police remained surprisingly passive. While unable to produce any evidence in support of their claims, the anti-communist activists and mass media insisted that the violence was instigated by Voronins agents provocateurs who failed to take control of the more numerous, peaceful demonstration. For their part, the communists made the equally unsupported claim that the riots were orga nized by the opposition as part of a Romanian-orchestrated coup detat. The Romanian ambassador and journalists were expelled and visas were imposed on Romanian citizens entering the country.44 That night, the police started to arrest hundreds of people. The arrests continued during the following days. The government and the opposition made again opposing statements. The former claimed it was looking for the perpetrators of the violence while the latter saw the arrests as targeting peaceful protesters. What cannot be contested (due to the ndings of an international inquiry) is the fact that out of the nearly 700 detained protesters, at least 300 suffered beatings, sleep deprivation, and verbal abuse.45 Two of the victims died while in custody with marks of violence on their bodies. Many of the detained persons claimed that the police tried to obtain by force confessions proving that the violence was instigated by opposition political parties and Romanian agents. The General Prosecutor of Moldova nevertheless stated in July 2009 that Romania was not involved in the protests.46 In any case, in the short term the repression created an atmosphere of general fear among the anticommunist activists. Some protesters even went into hiding. The communists had the situation fully under control and were prepared to rule the country for four more years. Change, hope, and uncertainty At rst, the April protests were perceived as igniting a Moldovan colour revolution. But their rapid suppression and the communists success in intimidating the opposition and the civil society offered a picture closer to the June 2009 Iranian election and failed protests. Still, the situation would change fundamentally in less than ve months. Ironically, this was due to a procedural detail. Voronins party had secured a solid majority of 60 parliamentary seats. But they needed 61 votes to elect the countrys president. The communists made all possible efforts to get the missing golden vote from the opposition MPs. Opposition leaders even spoke of attempted bribery and blackmail.47 But this failed and Voronin decided to

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respect the electoral law: early elections were called for 29 July 2009. This time, the communists secured only 48 seats. The rest was divided between the Our Moldova Alliance (7 seats), the Liberal Party (15), the Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova (18), and the Democrat Party of Moldova (13). These four parties created the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) whose 53 seats allowed it to form a coalition government. On 11 September 2009, the new president of the parliament, Mihai Ghimpu (a former founding member of the Popular Front, now head of the Liberal Party) became Moldovas acting president. On 25 September, Romanian-educated Vladimir Filat, the leader of the Liberal Democrat Party of Moldova, was voted prime-minister.48 His government started to implement a resolutely pro-democracy and pro-Western programme. It rapidly improved relations with Romania and initiated a campaign intended to bring Moldova closer to EU accession. Domestically, it launched the dismantling of the communist-built vertical of the power. For their part, the communists faced a number of defections. The rst was that of the prominent Marian Lupu. President of the parliament between 2005 and 2009, he was expected to replace Zinaida Greceani as Prime Minister. But disputes with Voronin made him leave the party in early June 2009. He joined the Democrat Party whose electoral support immediately increased from 2.97% to 12.54%.49 Four more communist MPs led by Vladimir Turcan, followed later by a fth one, left the party on 15 December 2009. They joined eventually the extra-parliamentary party United Moldova.50 However, it seems that despite these crises Voronin and his close associates such as Mark Tkaciuk, the communists ideologue and grey eminence,51 were able to preserve their strict control of the party. At rst view, due to all these developments Moldova experienced an apparently fundamental change and appeared to be following a genuinely democratic trajectory. But optimism might be premature. First, the ruling alliance was unable to secure the eight votes it needed to elect a president. The communists stated that new early parliamentary elections must be held. The government coalition passed a law imposing a one-year interval between two consecutive early elections and used this delay to prepare a constitutional reform modifying the election of the president. Heated debate ensued, mainly because the Alliance for European Integration wanted to change the constitution without holding new parliamentary elections. The communists and some legal experts opposed this plan, claiming it is unconstitutional. On 9 March 2010 the leaders of the AEI decided to call before 16 June a referendum for the reform of the constitution while rejecting early elections.52 But on 12 March the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (the Venice Commission) recommended that the Republic of Moldova hold early parliamentary elections and give up the idea of organizing a constitutional referendum.53 The president of the European Commis sion, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, as well as other European ofcials asked Moldova to implement these recommendations.54 Finally, the AEI decided to accept holding early elections. Overall, the situation is far from clear and the communists are very vocal in condemning the alliances moves. This and the social

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consequences of the economic crisis might allow them to win the early elections if these are held in the following months. Secondly, the new ruling coalition is fragile. There are few ideological afnities between the liberal parties and the Democrat Party of Moldova. Until now, Marian Lupu has constantly rejected the communists proposals for a government coalition. But he might change his mind if tensions appear inside the present alliance. Overall, the situation remains unclear. The democratic forces have the chance of consolidating their rule, giving the resolute impulse Moldova needs in order to follow the European trajectory of its Western neighbours. But at the same time, the communists are strong enough to challenge their rivals. This might result in an unstable political situation similar to that of Ukraine since the Orange Revolution. The key of this dilemma is not in the hands of the politicians in Chi inau. The nal outcome will be decided most likely by the structural factors affecting the Moldovan society itself. Moldovan transitology The troubled evolution of Moldovan democracy is well illustrated by the Freedom House quantitative assessment of political rights and civil liberties shown in Figure 1.55 During 1992 1993 the Transnistrian crisis caused a deterioration of the situation in comparison with the nal years of the Soviet Union. The country started to democratize effectively only in 1994. By 1998, it reached the score of 3.0 representing the limit of the partly free category. But the situation stabilized at that level, with no further improvement. The communists coming to power was immediately followed by a worsening of the score, which stabilized again at the clearly partly free level of 3.5 before the nal degradation of 2008. It was only the end of the authoritarian regime that triggered an improvement of the situation. Overall, Figure 1 closely mirrors the evolution described in the previous sections and supports their qualitative assessments. But in order to understand the causes of this evolution, the analysis has to go beyond the factual level related with the Moldovan polity. It has to identify the structural determinants that explain the countrys trajectory and allow the assessment of its democratic perspectives. Sometimes simply called democratization, transitology is the sub-eld of comparative politics studying the transition toward democracy. During the last four decades, it has identied a number of conditions that inuence greatly the process of democratization. The rst one is national unity.56 It is difcult to build democracy in a country plagued by violent secessionist movements. Indeed, the war in Transnistria and the de facto independence of this region affected seriously and durably Moldovas politics and democratization. It is interesting, however, to note a major difference from similar cases. Civil wars and especially ethnic ones usually help create and maintain ultra-nationalist regimes that are incompatible with democratization. This is what happened in Tiraspol but not in Chi inau. The 1992 defeat led to the marginalization of the nationalist Popular Front. The new leadership adopted a very moderate attitude

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Figure 1. Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties average scores for Moldova, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 10 Central and East European countries (1990 2009). Source: Freedom House. Country Ratings and Status by Region, FIW 19732009; and Freedom in the World 2010: Global Data.

on ethnic matters. The autonomy of the Gagauz region is frequently mentioned as an example of very generous treatment of an ethnic minority. Another interesting aspect was noted by Lucan A. Way in his assessment of Moldova as a case study of pluralism by default. During the 1990s, the tensions over national identity were severe enough to undercut efforts by any single group to monopolize political power in the country. Consequently, they helped prevent the creation of an authoritarian regime.57 But Way equally emphasizes the fact that such tensions also prevent the consolidation of a stable and effective democratic government.58 Indeed, the Transnistrian conict diverted the Moldovans attention and efforts away from the democratization process that should have been their main preoccupation in the early 1990s. Instead of following the democratic and pro-Western trajectory of the Baltic republics, Moldova was caught in the trap of local warfare and crisis management. Later, the Transnistrian crisis was instrumental in the very dismantlement of the pluralism by default. The communists 2001 landslide electoral victory and the ensuing creation of their authoritarian regime were largely facilitated by Voronins credible promises to put an end to the secession due to good relations with Moscow (and ideological afnities with Tiraspol, one might add). Even today Transnistria remains a serious problem. Given the nature of the regime in Tiraspol, it is clear that a suddenly democratic and

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Westernized Moldova would lose any chance of recovering the secessionist region. This is a price that many Moldovans are not ready to pay precisely because they have been told for almost two decades that reunion with Transnistria and not Europeanization is Moldovas most important goal. Socio-economic development represents another factor. Lipset was the rst to state that economic development modifying the social structure in a way favourable to the growth of the middle class leads to a change of the political culture that supports democratization and democratic consolidation.59 This theory can easily explain, for example, the obvious differences between the post-communist democratization of Visegrad and Balkan countries.60 I have already mentioned that Moldova is the poorest country in Europe. A more complex analysis can be made on the basis of the Human Development Index (HDI).61 With a HDI of 0.720, Moldova ranks 117 out of 182 countries, between Vietnam and Equatorial Guinea. Its score is less than the CIS average (0.764) and considerably lower than the average HDI of the 10 post-communist countries that became members of the EU (0.877).62 This means that the population is affected by poverty, health problems leading to reduced longevity, and low education. One can easily conclude that Moldova is hardly the ideal place for the development of a prosperous and numerous middle class. Things are worsened by the economic polarization of the society. The inequality of income or wealth can be assessed with the help of the Gini coefcient.63 According to the estimates of the United Nations Development Programme, its value for Moldova is 0.356. This means that inequalities are higher than the CIS average (Gini coefcient 0.3485) and signicantly higher than in the 10 states of Central and Eastern Europe (0.3159).64 In a society that already has a low level of human development, high income inequalities can only lead to a social structure which consists of a very small elite and a huge mass of impoverished citizens. In between, there is little place for the middle class. This numerically reduced middle segment cannot impose its values on the rest of the society, which makes democratization unlikely. While acknowledging its importance, Lipset did not focus on the political culture itself. In a different approach, Gabriel Almond and Simon Verba saw it as the very engine of democratization.65 It is clear that important differences exist between the political cultures of the post-communist countries and these differences were used to explain the diverging democratic trajectories of Central Europe, the Balkans, and the CIS.66 Moldova is not an exception. First, in terms of historical cultural factors, it was ruled from 1812 to 1917 by the tsars. The Russian absolutist empire helped create and maintain a political culture that would later hamper democratization.67 Secondly, religion equally played a role, separating Catholic and Protestant Central Europe from the Orthodox East and South-East. Orthodoxy, to which Moldova belongs, is frequently presented as creating a cultural environment less favourable to democracy and market economy.68 Thirdly, there is the inuence of the pre-communist democratic experience. As part of Romania, Moldova did have such an experience between the two World Wars. But the Romanian democracy was hardly a consolidated one and its

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echo in the peripheral province of Bessarabia was even weaker. Fifty years later, nobody could remember it. Fourthly, the harshness of the communist repression cannot be ignored. In Moldova the imposition of communism during and after the Second World War was particularly brutal. The Soviet invasion forced a signicant part of the intelligentsia and the middle class to ee to Romania. Those who remained became the target of Soviet deportation plans. To give just two examples, on the night of 12 to 13 June 1941, 8500 Moldovan counter-revolutionary activists and 33,000 members of their families were to be deported. Some were lucky enough to escape arrest, at least in the short term. But 22,848 were effectively banished to Kazakhstan and West Siberia. Between 5 and 7 July 1949, 11,253 more families (35,796 persons) were also deported, mainly to Siberia.69 Many of them would never return. They were replaced by migrants from other parts of the USSR who had been formed under communism and contributed to the complete sovietization of the Moldovan political culture. By 1989, the latter didnt bear any resemblance with its Central European counterpart. It can be concluded that the nineteenth-century historical inuences, the Orthodox religion, the limited pre-communist democratic experience, and the harshness of the communist repression led to the creation of a political culture that could only hamper Moldovas democratization. The situation has been aggravated by the massive emigration of recent years. Out of a total of around 4 million, as many as 900,000 Moldovans work abroad frequently in remote countries such as Italy and Portugal. Their remittances help the country survive, but they seldom return to Moldova and are unable to take part in its social and political life. This means that many active and open-minded Moldovans cannot bring their contribution to the development of the political culture of their homeland. The latter remains dominated by the older, Soviet-educated generation that shares conservative and undemocratic convictions. This is illustrated by the anti-communist mass demonstrations of 7 April 2009 that mobilized a large number of very young people. At that time, many of the adults that would have most likely joined them were abroad. This generational imbalance also explains the strong Soviet nostalgia revealed by the opinion polls. In November 2009, 48.6% of the Moldovans were regretting the dismantlement of the USSR while only 32.4% did not. The impact of this dismantlement on Moldova was perceived negatively by 51.65% of the respondents and positively by only 22.6%. Moreover, 40.3% wished the reestablishment of the USSR and of the former socialist system (32.2% did not) and 43.7% would have voted for the return of the Republic of Moldova back in a totally or partly restored USSR. Only 29.9% would have voted against.70 Overall, the negative consequences of Moldovas conservative political culture are reected clearly in the weakness of the civil society that is analyzed below. Another factor used frequently to explain the transition to democracy is represented by institutional variables. In general, parliamentary systems are considered more favourable to democratic consolidation than presidential ones. In the post-communist case, it is claimed that the danger comes from the existence of a strong leader that can take advantage of a presidential system to impose a

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non-democratic evolution.71 Many CIS leaders such as Lukashenka and the Stalinist Central Asian dictators illustrate this theory. However, it is not certain that the constitutional system represents an independent variable. Usually, it is only an instrument created by the dictator-to-be to serve his political objectives.72 In Moldova, at the end of his presidential tenure Petru Lucinschi did try to create a strong presidential system intended to increase his power. Most probably, he was regarding this move as the rst step of an authoritarian construct. But his plans failed and a fully parliamentary system was adopted. Still, the new constitutional framework did not favour democracy. That same year, the communists came to power and created their own authoritarian regime. Institutional variables are therefore unable to provide an explanation of Moldovas undemocratic evolution. Another factor is related to the voluntarist approaches taking into consideration the role of the elites. With respect to Moldova (as well as Russia and Ukraine), Philip G. Roeder expressed the opinion that the socio-economic factors and the political culture are not signicant, as they cannot explain the democratic transition of the early 1990s. The latter could only be explained by the negotiation process that accompanied the fall of communism.73 This might be exaggerated, but it does not imply that the role of the elites can be ignored. In Moldova, only the leaders of the Popular Front in the early 1990s and those of the liberal parties in the late 2000s did not belong to the Soviet political elite. From 1993 1994 to the 2009 change, the country was dominated by the former members of the USSR state and party apparatus. This included all the three presidents and most of the ministers and MPs. Despite claiming different ideological afliations, they all shared the old Soviet undemocratic mentalities. This had visible consequences on their domestic and foreign policy choices. In fact, most of the CIS republics were in the same situation. Consequently, their elites acted differently from those of Central Europe, hampering, blocking, or reversing the democratization process. The fact that most of Moldovas new government is formed by non-members of the Soviet nomenklatura is therefore an important development for the democratization process. However, these newcomers are far from representing the majority of the Moldovan political or economic elite. The nal major factor is the international one. The transition to democracy seldom takes place in states completely isolated from the outside world. In most cases, international determinants including geopolitical ones can be easily identied. Moldova is no exception. From the very beginning, Moscow was clearly interested in maintaining it within its sphere of inuence. Russia supported militarily the Transnistrian secession and then became the biased referee of the peace process. It still refuses to retreat its forces stationed in Transnistria despite Yeltsins commitment at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit. The terms on which it may agree to settle the crisis are well illustrated by the 2003 Kozak Memorandum (see above). Given the already mentioned importance of the Transnistrian question for most of the Moldovan citizens, Moscow is able to inuence considerably the political scene in Chi inau through the simple manipulation of the puppet government in Tiraspol.

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Beyond the instrumentalization of the Transnistrian crisis, Moscow has also made visible efforts to project its inuence inside Moldova itself. Using Moldovan printed media, local publication of popular Russian newspapers, and internet-based platforms, Moscow conducted an efcient propaganda campaign that discredited NATO, the United States, Western Europe, as well as pro-Western and proRomanian local politicians.74 In addition to other reasons (such as history), this explains why in July 2009 no less than 51.8% of the Moldovans considered that Russia should be their countrys most important strategic partner. The much less active European Union was supported by only 26.2% of the population. Moreover, while the then Moldovan president Voronin was trusted by 44.4% of the respondents, the Russian president Medvedev was trusted by 73.4% and Vladimir Putin by 77.9%. Unsurprisingly, accession to NATO was supported by a meagre 20.7% and rejected by 46.4%. The United States were preferred as Moldovas most important strategic partner by only 2% of the population.75 And this is far from exhausting Moscows arsenal. When the Moldovan communists came to adopt a rather pro-Western stance, the Russian National Security Council, the Russian government, and the State Duma decided to use a complex pressure mechanism against Moldova (and Georgia). The most visible measure was the 2006 banning of the Moldovan agricultural and wine imports. Chi inaus dependence on Russian gas was also fully exploited. It should be noted that the rst set of measures targeted the economic interests of the Moldovan elites. The second affected seriously the conditions of living of the common people.76 Voronins 2007 pro-Russian turn was therefore hardly surprising, and that turn was precisely a move that allowed the communists to reinforce their authoritarian regime. It is true that, after the leadership change in Chi inau, it was the new ruling coalition and not the communists that received moderate Russian support. But this seems to be a tactic move intended to prevent Moldova from adopting a Georgian-type foreign policy stance. Moscow has simply no interest in supporting democracy per se and it clearly shares more afnities with the party of Voronin than with its democratic adversaries. Contrary to Russia, the United States has always avoided any serious involvement in Moldova. Despite Washingtons supportive rhetoric, there is no sign of a major change of attitude. Neighbouring states such as Romania and Ukraine have played an equally minor role. Most likely, they will preserve this largely neutral approach. The only international actor that has already started to show an increasing interest in Moldova is the European Union. Its past actions were rather unsuc cessful, but the new political context in Chi inau creates the favourable conditions for a major change. This will be analyzed in the following section. For now, it can be concluded that the problems related to national unity, the low level of socio-economic development, the political culture inherited from the communist and pre-communist past, the dominant role of the Soviet elites, and the Russian inuence have all hampered the development of the Moldovan democracy. Building a hierarchy of these factors is rather difcult because their effects are interrelated. The political culture could be considered the key element as it

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inuences directly the countrys politics. But the Moldovan political culture itself has been inuenced negatively by the Transnistrian secession, Lipsetian factors, Soviet elites, and Russian propaganda. The comparison with other post-Soviet republics can be also misleading as the combinations of factors at work in different countries are not necessarily the same. To give an example, in socio-economic terms Belarus performs better than Moldova while its democracy score is lower. But it would be difcult to claim on this basis that Moldovan poverty did not contribute indirectly to the creation of Voronins regime. The above mentioned factors led Moldovas citizens to remain tolerant toward authoritarian practices and reluctant to civic engagement. Indeed, even in November 2009 (that is, some months after the fall of the communist authoritarian regime), 56.8% of the Moldovans did not believe that the will of the people rules in the Republic of Moldova. Only 24.5% thought that it does. When asked to what extent can people like you inuence on the important decisions to be taken at national level?, almost two thirds of the respondents (63.3%) answered that only to a small or very small extent. Only 18.4% believed they could really inuence such decisions. And 42% (against 42.3%) were convinced that the elections were not free and fair, despite the recent democratization process.77 Such convictions generate a passive attitude that can be easily exploited by authoritarian regimes. The reduced level of civic engagement and the implicitly weak Moldovan civil society represent an even bigger problem. It is widely accepted that the degree of democratization of a country is directly related to the development of its civil society.78 Consolidated democracies have highly developed civil societies while the authoritarian regimes are characterized by weak ones. In fact, dictators are frequently aware of the lethal threat represented by a strong civic sector and do everything in their power to stop and reverse its development. The extreme case is represented by the totalitarian regimes that completely destroy civil society in order to ensure full control of their citizens. The USSR was such a regime. Consequently, Moldova inherited from the Soviet era a no-civil society situation. It is true that some cultural associations played an important role in the mobilization of the population during the Perestroika years (as did ecological groups in Bulgaria). Yet, in 1992, there were only 38 registered Moldovan non-governmental organizations (NGOs).79 Afterward, civic development was hampered by the structural conditions mentioned above. In addition, the communists were aware of the danger represented by the civil society and made efforts to block its development. They were especially hostile to the Chi inau-based pro-democracy think tanks and claimed that the NGOs which perform activities and implement projects that are foreign-nanced represent a potential threat to the national security.80 They also tried to clone important civil society organizations. This is why after 2001 there were two labour unions, two journalists unions, two writers unions, etc.81 The fall of the authoritarian regime changed fundamentally the attitude of the authorities but other negative aspects persist. Out of the 7000 Moldovan NGOs registered at both the national and local levels82 it is estimated that only around

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200 are active. 22% of the NGOs have not prepared any project during the previous two years. 15% have prepared only one or two projects. 36% have not implemented any project. More than 59% do not have an employee, while 76% of them have never used temporary employees. Only 7% of the NGOs have a development strategy and only 8% are efcient in attracting nancial resources (most of which are international).83 In geographical terms, 98% of the NGOs are located in the capital and only 1% in the countryside, despite the fact that 53% of the Moldovans live in rural areas. More disturbing, most of the Moldovan NGOs are based on vertical relations. The structures that are envisaged to promote democratic values at national level are dominated by authoritarian leaders that do not tolerate any internal opposition. The replacement through election of the leaders seems to be incompatible with the huge majority of the Moldovan NGOs.84 This negative assessment of the Moldovan civic sector is conrmed by the comparison with other post-communist states made on the basis of quantitative data provided by two independent sources. First, there is the NGO Sustainability Index computed yearly by United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Index uses a seven-point scale, with seven indicating an extremely low level of development and one a very advanced NGO sector.85 Since 2000, when Moldova entered the Index, the average of the 10 Central and East European countries uctuated between 2.6 and 2.7 until 2003 and between 2.82 and 2.85 afterward. This places the region in the consolidation phase of development. Moldova and the Commonwealth of Independent States belong to a completely different category. Except for a slight initial improvement, the CIS average remained at 4.48 4.66. The index for Moldova started at 4.6 and then uctuated between 4.2 and 4.3. This is better than the CIS level. But the development of the Moldovan civic sector remains far below that of Central and East Europe as mid-transition states with a score between four and ve have their NGO sustainability minimally affected by local practices and policies.86 A second assessment is provided by Freedom House, whose Nations in Transit annual reports compute a Civil Society Index based on a one to seven scale similar to that used in Figure 1. From 1999 to 2009, the average for the New EU Members improved slightly from 2.15 to 1.73 (in 2005) and then uctuated around 1.8. The situation of the Commonwealth of Independent States worsened slightly but constantly from 4.81 to 5.13. The value for Moldova uctuated between 3.75 and 4.00.87 This is better than the CIS average but unsatisfactory when compared with Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, despite minor differences, USAID and Freedom House concur in providing a similarly pessimistic assessment of Moldovas civic sector. Its situation is one of the best in the CIS area but far below that of the countrys western neighbours. This can only have negative consequences for the countrys democratic perspectives. The difcult situation of the non-governmental organizations is paralleled by low levels of civic engagement, trust, and tolerance. To give just an example, a social capital comparative inquiry found that the percentages for low/middle/ high trust in other people were 49.0/26.6/24.4 in Moldova against 41.9/22.8/

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35.3 in Romania. The tolerance of public meetings was 3.7 against 4.3. The tolerance of neighbours was 3.8 against 4.2.88 In terms of social capital, Romania is one of the laggards of Central and Eastern Europe and this is reected in its difcult post-communist democratization. Moldovas more difcult situation can hardly provide reasons for optimism. To conclude, a specic set of domestic and external structural factors caused a weak civil society and a reduced level of social capital. In turn, this made genuine democratization impossible. This is why Moldova experienced the hybrid regime of the 1990s and the semi-consolidated authoritarian regime of 2001 2009. Once again, it is important not to mix the fundamentally different categories of democratization and regime change. The latter can take place due to a favourable conjunction of circumstances. Indeed, democratic political forces have been in power in Chi inau since autumn 2009. But this does not guarantee Moldovas democratic future. Elsewhere in the CIS, the initially promising coloured revolutions were not followed by democratic consolidation. Genuine democratization cannot take place as long as the structural factors that have prevented it for two decades remain unchanged. In the case of Moldova, there is no visible modication of these factors. In terms of national unity, the secession of Transnistria and the identity dilemma it embodies can only be worsened by the existence of a pro-Western government in Chi inau. Poverty is increasing in part due to the recent world nancial crisis. Political culture will likely not change as long as a signicant number of the most active and open minded Moldovans choose to emigrate. The Soviet elites and their like-minded descendants are still dominant. And Moscow is making visible efforts to preserve its sphere of inuence. The conclusion is dismal. Left to itself, the country will not democratize genuinely despite all the efforts of its well-intentioned present leaders. In order to have real change, Moldova needs a major external impetus. Europeanizing Moldova? Given the elements presented in the previous section, there appears only one major development that could create a fundamentally new dynamic. For some years, the European Union has shown increased interest in Moldova. The fall of the commu nist regime created the conditions for a new beginning of the Chi inau-Brussels relation. Ideally, this could lead to a revolutionary change. Bilateral relations were initiated in 1994 with the signing of a modest European Union-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It entered into force only in 1998. In June 2001, Chi inau also became member of the EU-initiated Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. But Moldovas importance continued to be perceived in Brussels as marginal. Between 1991 and 2006, the EU assistance amounted to only E300 million.89 However, an important development was the launching of the European Unions European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).90 This was a major step in the EU eastern policy. Within the new framework, an ambitious joint ENP Action Plan was adopted in February 2005 by the

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EU-Moldova Cooperation Council. The European Union also increased its presence in Moldova. In October 2005, a full European Commission Delegation was opened in Chi inau and, in addition, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was appointed EU Special Representative for Moldova.91 At that time, Voronin had adopted a resolutely European discourse. Brussels preferred to ignore his authoritarian practices, hoping that closer ties would lead implicitly to gradual democratization. Instead of putting pressure on the communist leadership, Jacobovits successor, Dr Kalman Mizsei concentrated his efforts on the settlement of the Transnistrian crisis. It is true that a success in this aspect would have increased considerably the prestige of the European Union in Moldova and the surrounding region. But a precondition for this success was political stability in Chi inau. Consequently, the EU Special Representative supported constantly the communist government despite its undemocratic actions. After the April 2009 riots he went as far as trying to temper the EU ambassadors anti-communist criticism. He also tried to convince the opposition parties to give the communists the vote they needed to elect a president and remain in power.92 Needless to say, this paradoxical attitude was counterproductive. The Transnistrian crisis could not be solved while the communists took advantage of the situation to delay indenitely the implementation of their own commitments. As the Action Plan came to an end, major deciencies concerning the judicial reform, the freedom of media, and the business climate had not been addressed.93 Moldovas attitude changed completely under the new ruling coalition. Its very name the Alliance for European Integration as well as its political programme show that its members understand fully the opportunity offered by Brussels open ness. The new leaders in Chi inau have not spared any occasion of pressing the EU ofcials to offer Moldova an enhanced status. The incumbent European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita FerreroWaldner, visited the Moldovan capital in November 2009 and expressed the EU support for Moldovas European aspirations.94 The negotiations for a new Association Agreement started on 12 January 2010. That same day the European Union chief negotiator, Gunnar Wiegand, stated that Moldova is prepared for the conclusion of this agreement.95 At the Moldova Partnership Forum, jointly hosted on 24 March 2010 by the European Commission and the World Bank and attended by the Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, the new EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, described Moldovas government as a reliable partner with a coherent strategy of reforms and clear targets. He also mentioned a 75% increase in the EU contribution for 2011 2013, with more funds to come. Consequently, Moldova now receives the second-largest share of EU aid per capita. Moreover, this is only a part of the massive $2.6 billion half of it in the form of nonreturnable grants pledged by international donors. The European Commissioner also stated that talks on a Moldova-EU free-trade agreement and the Moldovans visa-free travel in the European Union would start shortly.96

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The problem, however, is that Brussels is not offering an explicit path to EU accession. The experience of other post-communist states shows that only such a carrot leads to full compliance with EU conditionality. This implies profound political and economic reforms as well as the adoption of the acquis communautaire.97 The post-communist countries that underwent this complex and demanding process were transformed radically. Even in the case of laggards such as Romania and Bulgaria, democratization became irreversible. Much has been said and written on the socialization process affecting both the elites and the society of the candidate states. What is mentioned much more seldom is the fact that the process of accession changes or overrides the very structural factors that otherwise hamper or block the democratization process. In the case of Moldova, the rst obstacle is represented by national unity and identity disputes. But out of the large number of Moldovans that have acquired Russian or Romanian citizenship, many did it simply in order to work abroad. For them, a common gastarbeiter identity blurred previous differences. The scale of this mutation would increase considerably if all Moldovans (including the Transnistrians) were offered the perspective of a European identity. This might help moderate diverging trends and, ideally, start a process leading to the creation of a common, balanced identity that would make present disputes irrelevant. The second factor is low socio-economic development. EU membership brings typically an important increase in trade and investment. In the 1990s, Central European economies benetted greatly from their accession perspectives. There was a considerable raise in wages that triggered a visible increase of the standard of living. In the 2000s, when high wages made those countries less competitive, the investors moved some of their production to Romania, initiating a similar process. If Moldova starts credible accession negotiations, investments can only increase. In time, they might reach a signicant level. The ensuing socio-economic development would activate a Lipsetian process favouring genuine democratization. Thirdly, EU accession means frequent and massive contacts with Western individuals, ideas, and values. Especially in a small country like Moldova, this can only bring an important change of the political culture. Compliance with the EU democratic conditionality would also contribute to this change. Fourthly, the Soviet-era elites would be socialized in a new, more protable European environment. Of course, the new EU members still dominated by their previous communist elites, such as Romania or Bulgaria, are not the champions of reform or democracy. But they demonstrate that appropriate incentives can make these elites respect the rules of democracy and give up any authoritarian project. In fact, it is not difcult to understand that becoming a Berlusconi-style prosperous European elite is more attractive than remaining the old-style nomenklatura of impoverished and isolated Moldova. Fifthly, it is clear that Russia is not ready to relinquish its inuence on Moldova. But after accession, this inuence could take a form similar to that existing in present Bulgaria. While important in the elds of culture, trade, investment, and foreign policy (as well as organized crime, one might add), it has little or no impact on the state of local democracy and represents an acceptable modus vivendi for both Europe and the Kremlin.

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Of course, this deus ex machina perception of the European Union could seem overoptimistic. Anastasios Giamouridis even wrote an article on The New European Myth of EU enlargement. Adopting a rationalist perspective that emphasizes the importance of economic factors, Giamouridis formulates an interesting criticism of the accession process on a point that might be of importance for Moldova. He claims that the current EU accession process is to a great extent based on an obsolete model developed in the 1970s and 1980s to accommodate the accession needs of more advanced and industrialized economies.98 This model has not been designed to assist the transition from central planning to market economies. Consequently, the structure of incentives and constraints imposed on the candidates economic and regulatory policies may be inappropriate for countries facing acute development and reconstruction problems. Postcommunist countries can thus nd themselves in a position where they would do better if they disregarded EU directives and policies.99 This could explain certain differences between the more developed Central European states on the one hand and economically less advanced Romania and Bulgaria on the other. Due to its low level of development, Moldova could nd itself in an even more critical situation. Another aw of the enlargement process was identied by Tom Gallagher. He used the Romanian case to expose the EU incapacity to project its institutions and norms in unfamiliar terrain.100 In Bucharest, the main challenge was represented by a political elite that was cynical and amoral to an extent unusual even in the former Soviet satellites.101 These highly motivated and resourceful people created a trans-party alliance designed to channel public money into private hands.102 Consequently, instead of choosing the way of genuine reforms, the Romanian political elite adopted a range of rituals and initiatives which were essentially nothing but public relations gimmicks in order to satisfy Eurocrats.103 On their side, the European ofcials have caved in to this resourceful and predatory group that exploited the unwieldy multi-layered system of decision-making in Brussels to join the European club on its own limited agenda.104 Old political structures which had blocked reform were left substantially unchanged. The economy remained under the inuence of a narrow set of forces. The absorption of European values, norms, and decision-making procedures was effective only at a supercial or declaratory level.105 Overall, the process of Europeanization was replaced by a process of pseudo-Europeanization or Euro-Balkanism.106 For Gallagher, this is one of the biggest setbacks for democracy seen in Europe since 1945.107 Much of this criticism is undoubtedly justied. But two important points have to be made. First, despite the aws described by Giamouridis and Gallagher, all new members including Romania are now better in terms of democracy and market reform than before the beginning of the accession process. In certain cases the improvement is still modest, but it is nevertheless an improvement. Secondly, it is most likely that the EU learned its lesson and will not repeat past errors.108 The Romanian experience will certainly be used when dealing with CIS countries.

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It can be concluded that, despite past difculties, the European Union has the key to ending Chi inaus problems. At the same time, Brussels political will to act in this direction is not strong enough to allow Moldovas accession. Of course, the organization has a limited absorption capacity. But the Moldovans represent less than 1% of the Unions population. The reason for EU reluctance is the fear that creating a CIS precedent would stimulate similar demands from other post Soviet republics. Aware of that, Chi inau supported by Bucharest is trying to exploit its membership of the EU-initiated Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. From the very beginning, the latter was perceived by the Moldovans as a backdoor to EU membership as it breaks the association between Chi inau and the CIS area.109 A diplomatic tour de force might put Moldova in the same category as the Western Balkans and allow it eventually to start accession negotiations. This seems to be the countrys only chance to secure a genuinely democratic trajectory.

Conclusion Despite the optimism caused by the 2009 dismantlement of the communist semiconsolidated authoritarian regime, Moldova is most likely experiencing only an ephemeral and imperfect democratic parenthesis. There are serious structural problems concerning national unity, low level of socio-economic development, political culture inherited from the communist and pre-communist past, dominant role of the Soviet elites, and Russian inuence. These factors prevent the development of civil society and block implicitly the countrys genuine democratization. Of course, this does not mean that Chi inau will necessarily follow the CIS general trend toward heavy authoritarianism. A Ukrainian-style hybrid regime is equally possible. But without an external impetus, Moldovas democratic consolidation is unlikely. The present democratic leadership can break the vicious circle of the last two decades in only one way: by convincing the reluctant European Union to open the accession door. This would help modify the very structural factors that prevent democratization, thus putting the country on a pro-European and pro-democracy course. Chances are slim, but diplomatic mastery abroad and ambitious reforms at home might convince Brussels that Moldova performs better than Montenegro and Bosnia and should be included in the same category of candidate countries. Nothing short of this can change Moldovas troubled destiny. Notes
1. A brief intuitive denition of political regime was formulated by Marcus Alexander: regime signies a set of rules of the game by which elites compete; in this view regimes are not always static, and the extent to which they are democratic or authoritarian changes gradually over time (Alexander, Democratization and Hybrid Regimes, 931). A more elaborate denition is provided by Svend-Erik Skaaning: political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of

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2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

ultimate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts (extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power (extension and character of division of powers control and autonomy) (Skaaning, Political Regimes and Their Changes, 15; for a review of the literature see pp. 315). For denitions and reviews of the literature on the structural causes of democratization and democratic consolidation see Doorenspleet, The Structural Context of Recent Transitions to Democracy, 31121; Gasiorowski and Power, The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation; Mller and Skaaning, The Three Worlds of Post-Communism, 299 302. According to the Freedom House denition, the hybrid regimes are electoral democracies that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are fragile and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Methodology. See also Diamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes; Bogaards, How to Classify Hybrid Regimes. The semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes attempt to mask authoritarianism with limited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to meet even the minimum standards of electoral democracy. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Methodology. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 9. The consolidated authoritarian regimes are closed societies in which dictators prevent political competition and pluralism and are responsible for widespread violations of basic political, civil, and human rights. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Methodology. The 2009 ratings reect the period 1 January through 31 December 2008. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 10. Hale, Regime Cycles, 134. Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 6. For a review of the literature on regime change see Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 811. For a recent review of the literature on democracy promotion see the August 2009 special issue of Democratization 16, no. 4 (2009). Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 7. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables, Table 9. Gelman, From the Frying Pan, 7. See Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova, Democracy, 13 17. King, The Moldovans, 229. Skvortsova, The Cultural and Social Makeup, 163. March, From Moldovanism to Europeanization, 6034. See also King, Marking Time, 6082, and Heintz, Weak State, Uncertain Citizenship. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 99. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 37. Hensel and Gudm, Moldovas Economic Transition, 90. Culic, Eluding Exit and Entry Controls, 151. Chiriac, Republic of Moldova, 150. Institutul pentru Dezvoltare si Initiative Sociale Viitorul, Political & Security State watch, 96. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 34. Roper, Regionalism in Moldova, 116.

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Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 43. Panainte, Moldova. At the Crossroads, 96. See note 3. Way, Weak State and Pluralism, 455. See also Way, Pluralism by Default in Moldova. Panainte, Moldova. At the Crossroads, 96. Crowther, Moldovas Post-Communist Transition, 42. Ibid., 434. For a discussion of this subject see Gallagher, Building Democracy in Romania, 392, and his quoting of Romanias former president Emil Constantinescu. See Partidului Comunistilor din Republica Moldova, Statutul PCRM and Progra mul PCRM. Oleg Voronin face business n Romania. Ziarul de Garda, April 10, 2009; Oleg Voronin are o avere cat jumatate din PIB-ul Moldovei. Business Magazin, April 16, 2009; Voronin, cel mai bogat, corupt, cinic si autoritar. Ziarul de Garda, August 3, 2009. Munteanu et al., Moldova, 228. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 100. March, From Moldovanism to Europeanization, 601. Mnzarari, EU-Moldova Action Plan. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 101. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Doing Business 2010, 2. Ibid., 113 15. Bencomo, Entrenching Impunity. Ghinea and Panainte, The Political System, 114. Ibid., 118. See also the interview given by Vlad Filat, president of the Democrat Liberal Party, Comunistii au vrut sa ia presedintia cu 2 milioane de euro. Evenimen tul Zilei, July 25, 2009. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: UE poate sa ajute Moldova sa-si construiasca viitorul. Timpul, November 27, 2009. e-Democracy, Partidul Democrat din Moldova. Racu, Patru comuni ti au parasit frac iunea PCRM; e-Democracy, Partidul Moldova Unita. Vulcan, Interviu cu eminen a cenu ie de la Chi inau, Mark Tkaciuk. AIE a decis: Constitutie noua prin referendum, fara alegeri anticipate. Moldova Azi, March 9, 2010. http://www.azi.md/ro/story/9845 (accessed May 20, 2010). European Commission for Democracy through Law, Amicus Curiae Brief; AllMoldova, March 16, 2010. Barosso: Moldova to Implement the Recommendations of Venice Commission. Jurnal de Chi inau, March 24, 2010. A one-to-seven scale is used, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. 3.0 is the limit for partly free states and 5.5 for not free ones. Rustow, Transition to Democracy, 350. Way, Pluralism by Default in Moldova, 137. Ibid., 138. Lipset, Some Social Requisites; for a recent update see Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins. Lewis, Democratization, 410. For details see United Nations Development Programme, The Human Development Index. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2009.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

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91. 92.

The Gini coefcient can range from 0 to 1. A low Gini coefcient indicates a more equal distribution while higher Gini coefcients indicate more unequal distribution. See World Bank, Measuring Inequality. United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2009, Gini Index. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. See Blokker, Multiple Democracies; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka, Democracy and Political Culture. Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka, Democracy and Political Culture, 85 98. Enev, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy; Wiarda, Development on the Periphery, 188 90. Polian, Against Their Will, 121 3, 168 9. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2009). Bunce, Comparative Democratization, 711; Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova, Democracy, 14 15. Elgie and Zielonka, Constitutions and Constitution Building, 47. Roeder, The Rejection of Authoritarianism, 23. Mnzarari, Russian Foreign Policy, 42 4. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (July 2009). Mnzarari, Russian Foreign Policy, 18 9; 27. Institutul de Opinii Publice, Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2009). For a review of the literature see Petrova, Civil Society, 12845. Marin and Trdea, Dimensiunea capitalului social, 72. Ibid., 74. Ibid. USAID, The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index, 164. Cenusa, Consolidarea societaii civile, 19 21. t Marin and Trdea, Dimensiunea capitalului social, 72 4. USAID, The 2008 NGO Sustainability Index, 1. Ibid., 15, 165, 252. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Tables. See also Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009, Moldova, 369. Badescu, Sum, and Uslaner, Civil Society Development, 2224. Commission of the European Communities, EC Country Strategy Paper, 10. A detailed presentation of this policy is available on the internet site of the Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova, http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_ moldova/2_en.shtml (accessed May 20, 2010). For further details see Popescu, The EU in Moldova, 9. Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova, http://www.delmda.ec.europa. eu/eu_and_moldova/index_en.shtml (accessed May 20, 2010). Ghinea and Panainte, Moldovas Relations, 125 6. In the opinion of Mizsei, contesting the results of the vote and holding new elections would have had negative consequences by preventing the government from ghting the effects of the world economic crisis (Kalman Mizsei: Este nevoie de o mpacare na ionala. Timpul, April 15, 2009). In a 5 May article the Special Representative criticized the violation by the police of elementary human rights and the governments use of terms such as criminals and fascists against the opposition. But he equally condemned the abusive language of the opposition and asked it to stop unsubstantiated allegations about the course of events on April 7 and wild exaggerations about the nature of the elections (Mizsei, Kalman, Time for Change and Reconciliation. OMEGA, May 5, 2009). Basically, he saw a balance between the communists feeling that the opposition wanted to steal their victory with illegal means and the opposition side wounds

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over the alleged election abuses as well as over policy violations (Ibid.). Consequently, during their research visit in Chisinau, Cristian Ghinea and Sergiu Panainte were amazed by the lack of trust and by the frustration manifested by the opposition and by the anti-Voronin journalists and activists against Kalman Mizsei. The same authors claim that the Chisinau and Brussels EU Commission staff shared a critical view of Mizseis position (Ghinea and Panainte, Moldovas Relations, 126). Mnzarari, EU-Moldova Action Plan. Benita Ferrero-Waldner: UE poate sa ajute Moldova sa-si construiasca viitorul. Timpul, November 27, 2009. Moldova este pregatita de negocierile pentru semnarea Acordului de asociere cu Uniunea Europeana. Hotnews Moldova, January 12, 2010. http://hotnews.md/ articles/view.hot?id=302 (accessed May 20, 2010). Lobjakas, Moldova Impresses EU With Reform Agenda. See Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Grabbe, The EUs Transformative Power; Schimmelfennig, European Regional Organizations. Giamouridis, Only through Enlargement, 195. Ibid. Gallagher, Romania and the European Union, 14. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 15. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 11, 3. Ibid., 15. It is logical to believe that this concerns also Mizseis actions. Basarabia ramane la periferia Uniunii Europene. Ziua, June 3, 2006.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

Notes on contributor
Theodor Tudoroiu is an associate researcher at the Montreal Centre for International Peace and Security Studies. He works mainly on subjects related to the democratization of post-communist states. His most recent publication in this eld is Post-Communist Democratization Revisited: An International Relations Approach, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11, no. 1 (2010).

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