Volume 15: Number 3

August 2008

RISK WATCH
Navigation and Seamanship
1 Ballast blacklist dismissed by investigators as a cause for bulker grounding 3 Apparent misuse of inshore traffic zones 3 X-Band, S-Band

The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited

Ballast blacklist
Dismissed by investigators as a cause for bulker grounding.
The May 2008 edition of Risk Watch dealt with the grounding of the PASHA BULKER in detail as recounted by the State investigation into the incident. The Federal Department responsible for investigations (The Australian Transport Safety Bureau ATSB) has now published its report, which largely reflects the findings of the State report on the actions of the Master of the PASHA BULKER. The report goes into a little more detail on the part played by the coal terminals ballasting requirements in the grounding, and, at the same time, has some interesting criticism of the Port Authority albeit not in regard to any possible ballasting blacklist. Whereas the summary of the report states that initiatives by the coal terminal operators, relating to improving the performance of ships with regard to their de-ballasting time, may have influenced the decisions of some Masters not to ballast their ships for heavy weather, the report did not find that these measures were a contributing factor to the casualties. Whilst the report is critical of those vessels which did not take heavy weather ballast, it also points to the results of a questionnaire of all vessels at the anchorage, in which only three of the Masters who responded cited concerns about ballast within the terminals

Safety
5 Fire onboard poor ship board practices result in uncertainty and delay in dealing with a fire in the cargo hold 5 Rescuers continue to die in significant numbers

Containers and Cargoes

6 Problems loading hot cement clinker in bulk 7 More cement cargo problems 7 Beware bankrupt cargo interest

Regulatory update
8 Brazilian coastal trade foreign crews beware

Miscellaneous
8 Publications

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 15: Number 3: August 2008

Navigation and Seamanship

Ballast blacklist continued

vessel suitability list (the so called blacklist). The report notes that; The vessel suitability initiative may have heightened concerns of some Masters at the time of the incident because their ships being assessed as unsuitable for loading would effectively penalise their ships. Nevertheless, the report agreed with the berth operators that they do not penalise the vessels but rather operate an approval process based on ship performance. Although the ATSB acknowledge that the existence of the vessel suitability list would result in pressure on the Master and the crew to provide explanations about an unsuitable assessment of their ship, the report however states that this was a problem of perception. The evidence does not confirm that, at the time of the incident, there were any compelling reasons why the terminals ballasting requirements would prevent Masters from taking heavy weather ballast. In support they refer to the example of those 3 ships whose berthing schedule on the 7/8 June coincided with the deteriorating weather. None of the Masters of these three ships indicated concerns about ballasting and all put out to sea in good time. Further, the evidence does not confirm with certainty that ships which got into difficulty on the 8 June, including PASHA BULKER, were not appropriately ballasted for heavy weather because of concerns about the berth operators ballasting requirements. The ATSB was clear in stating that; In any case, the responsibility for ensuring a ship is appropriately and safely ballasted at all times rests with its Master. Although the ATSB declined to criticise the coal terminal operators, it did recommend that the port authority and the Vessel Traffic Information Centre (VTIC) take measures to address ten safety issues. The issues identified included: the advisory role of the VTIC was not properly understood by the Masters of a number of ships, the port authoritys incident control system was not activated early enough, offers of help to the PASHA BULKER by the VTIC were made at a late stage in extreme weather conditions, VTIC advice was limited to Masters of only those ships that were dragging their anchors, and VTIC did not cancel the scheduled berthing of any ship even after the weather conditions had become severe. For its part the port authority has undertaken to provide Masters of ships at Newcastle anchorage with regular weather broadcasts when a Bureau of Meteorology weather warning is in place. Unless the local port authority/VTIC clearly indicates that they will give prompt and comprehensive advice as to when the anchorage becomes unsafe, it would seem sensible for Masters to assume that no such advise will be provided, and to act on their own initiative. The full article is available on the ATSB website
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investiga tion_reports/2007/MAIR/pdf/mair243_001.pdf

Apparent misuse of inshore traffic zones the UK Maritime & Coastguard Agency recently published a Mariners Guidance Note (MGN 364) on the routeing of vessels through the English Channel with special attention on the use, or rather misuse, of inshore traffic zones, (ITZs).
It seems that the coastguard may be taking a much closer look at vessels misusing the ITZs in the Dover Strait. At the same time, the UK Hydrographic Office has republished BA Chart 5500, Mariners Routing Guide English Channel and Southern North Sea. Navigators will be aware that under Rule 10 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, the vessel, unless it is shorter than 20 metres in length, is required to use the appropriate traffic lane and, by Rule 10(d)(ii), can only use the inshore traffic zone (ITZ) when en route to or from a port or any other place situated within the ITZ or to avoid immediate danger. MGN 364 usefully expands upon Rule 10(d) by stating that the high traffic density within a traffic lane is not sufficient reason to justify the use of an inshore traffic zone irrespective of the apparent absence of traffic within that ITZ. Nor is restricted visibility, with or without high traffic density, sufficient reason to justify the use of an inshore traffic zone. However, the guidance note goes on to say that vessels may use an ITZ where necessary to seek shelter from weather, but reminds navigators that in so doing they may encounter vessels heading in any direction. Navigators should note that neither the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) nor HM Coastguard (Dover) can grant permission for vessels to use the English ITZ in contravention of Rule 10(d). If Masters do decide to use the English ITZ they must report this fact to CNIS/Dover Coastguard. MGN 364 reminds navigators that vessels are tracked and recorded by radar and AIS through the Dover Strait, and that any vessel found contravening the Collision Regulations (impliedly emphasising contravention of Rule 10(d)) will be reported to their Flag State or, if arriving at a UK port, may be liable to prosecution. Navigators regularly utilising the traffic separation schemes in the Dover Strait and Southern North Sea would find Section 4 of MGN 364 especially useful as it highlights and clarifies how vessels should navigate in some of the worlds busiest crossing points and high traffic concentration areas.
http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcgamnotice.htm?textobjid=59809BACB29DBED8

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 15: Number 3: August 2008

Navigation and Seamanship

X-Band, S-Band very early in their careers, navigators are instructed on the difference between X-Band and S-Band radars. The difference is easily understood and fundamental to efficient radar watch-keeping.
The detailed circumstances surrounding a collision recently suffered by a Britannia Member illustrates the consequences of navigators failing to keep the fundamentals of radar watchkeeping in the forefront of their mind. The Members fully loaded bulk carrier was proceeding north-easterly in open water. An experienced Second-Officer was in charge of the morning 8-12 watch and reported variable visibility throughout the watch, being poor at times with showers and drizzle. Noticing that the forward mast-head light appeared scattered and diffused, he estimated visibility in the region of 1 nautical mile (nm); this was confirmed by the 12-4 watch. The deck log book had recorded rough to moderate sea and swell with overcast sky and, inaccurately, moderate to good visibility. Throughout the morning 8-12 watch no vessels were sighted either visually or by radar. However, within 5 minutes of the afternoon (12-4) watchkeeper taking over the watch, the look-out visually sighted a light on the port side. The light was diffused and indistinct but it did appear to be close. The 12-4 watch-keeper immediately put the vessel on hand steering and started taking bearings of what now appeared as 2mast head lights and a green light, thought to be side lights, along with deck lights astern. The 12-4 watch-keeper assessed that there was no time to take a series of bearings and ordered starboard helm followed shortly by hard to starboard the duty officer was then disturbed by a call from the duty engineer asking why an increased load had come on to the main engine. The watch-keeper ended that call abruptly and attempted to call the Master but mistakenly called the Chief Officer and reported the close quarters situation. The watch-keeper then went to the port side of the bridge and flashed the approaching vessel with an Aldis signal lamp and then tried to raise the vessel on channel 16 VHF. There was no response. As his own vessel began to swing to starboard, both vessels approached very close and subsequently were parallel. The watchkeeper assessed that it was necessary to go hard to port in order to swing the stern away from the other vessel. Unfortunately, this order was given too late and contact was made midships. A second contact was made further aft. The contacts were thought to be slight. Soon after, VHF contact was made with the other vessel and details were exchanged. Significant fault could be attached to the other vessel, especially as it appeared that the other vessels total lack of action to avoid the collision resulted from the watch-keeper being asleep, (a fact admitted by the radio officer in exchanges with our Members vessel.) It is however useful to address the faults of the 8-12 watch-keeper on board the Members vessel. The 8-12 watch-keeper, when questioned, was clearly aware of the advantages of S-Band radar during conditions of rain and similarly was familiar with the proper use of rain clutter and sea clutter adjustments. However, only the X-Band radar was turned on throughout the watch and there is evidence that the rain and sea clutter were not adjusted appropriately for the prevailing conditions.The other vessel was relatively large at 449 grt and 43m in length.The steel construction of the other vessel should have made an easily distinguishable target on the S-Band radar if the rain and sea clutter were adjusted appropriately. It is perhaps worth noting that the X-Band radar was fitted with ARPA and therefore was perhaps favoured during ocean passage, when only one radar was usually utilised. The usefulness of the ARPA function perhaps led to the advantages of the S-Band radar being overshadowed by the convenience of the X-Band radar. There was no explanation for the watch-keepers failure to adjust the clutter appropriately and simple oversight is presumed. It should be noted that the 12-4 watch-keeper did adjust the X-Band radar for sea and rain clutter immediately upon taking over the watch, but still did not observe the fishing vessel. He did not utilise the S-Band radar but in any event had no time to do so. It appears that the S-Band radar was the only means by which the vessel could have been located by radar. It was not switched on however. Navigators are reminded of Rule 5 of the Collision Regulations (COLREGs);proper lookoutby all available means During periods of rain and drizzle the 12-4 watch-keeper had correctly assessed the visibility to be in the region of 1 nm. The Masters standing orders clearly stated that he should be called in the event of visibility falling to 3 nm. This was not done. If it had been then the possibility exists that the Master would have come to the bridge and checked that the correct radar were being utilised and that clutter adjustments had been made. Masters should be aware of a possible reluctance in junior officers to call the Master irrespective of standing orders. Masters should encourage junior officers to call them even if this, ultimately, proves to be unnecessary. One further point. None of the watch-keepers seemed to have considered the need for sound signals, in accordance with COLREGs Rules 34-36.

Safety

Fire on board poor ship board practices result in uncertainty and delay in dealing with a fire in the cargo hold.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ASTB) has recently issued a report into the fire on board the BBC ISLANDER whilst off Dampier in August 2007. The report highlighted that failures in onboard safety management and training can result particularly in the event of an emergency in potentially dire consequences. The BBC ISLANDER is a general cargo ship that had previously loaded deck cargo requiring brackets to be welded on to the hatch covers. Subsequently those brackets required removal and a fitter was assigned to remove them with oxyacetylene cutting equipment. The fitter accidently cut a hole in the hatch cover and sparks fell into the cargo hold causing palletised cargo to catch fire. The Master quickly decided to fill the hold with CO, however his entire supply of CO was soon exhausted with little apparent effect. He then decided to notify the Harbour Master and requested more CO and that the ship be allowed alongside. Two days later the vessel berthed and the local fire and emergency services utilised more CO, but still the fire remained alight.Thereafter, cargo was removed to reach the seat of the fire so that fire hoses could be utilised, but the fire persisted. Expansion foam was utilised to flood the hull. Still the fire persisted. Eventually, four days after the fire began, it was extinguished by utilising an off-shore supply vessels fire monitor to flood the cargo hold with 700 tonnes of sea water. It appears that: The ships officers had not compiled accurate or complete cargo stowage plans. Apart from being in breach of SOLAS requirements, this also meant that the Master and crew did not have the proper information concerning the location and type of the different dangerous goods on board to allow them to deal with the emergency efficiently.

Rescuers continue to die in significant numbers

Coincident with the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report on fatalities on board three separate vessels in the last year, the Marine Accident Investigators International Forum (MAIIF) has identified a large number of fatalities in the shipping industry world-wide which relate to work in confined or enclosed spaces. The investigation by the MAIIF has revealed 129 fatalities and 123 injuries resulting from entry into confined spaces since 1991. The three specific investigations by the MAIB into the VIKING ISLAY, the SAGA ROSE and the SAVA LAKE illustrate the tragedy of the initial deaths often being multiplied by the highly understandable, but nevertheless lethal, human instinct to help a colleague in danger. All three incidents involved either ballast tanks or void/store spaces which had become depleted of oxygen. In the VIKING ISLAY a third seaman, improperly entering the space in order to rescue two collapsed seafarers, died along with his colleagues. In the SAVA LAKE and the SAGA ROSE, seafarers were again tempted into the enclosed/confined spaces in order to rescue their fellow seafarers. Fortuitously the Chief Officer on the SAVA LAKE having entered the space, recognised the danger and turned back. On the SAGA ROSE, the motor man collapsed whilst attempting a rescue; thankfully he was rescued following a prompt and efficient rescue operation and made a recovery. It cannot be over emphasised how critical it is that seafarers, upon noticing the collapse or unusual behaviour of a fellow crew member whilst in any confined or enclosed space, resist the temptation to assist by entering that space. The MAIB report into VIKING ISLAY has already been published and the other two reports will be available shortly through the MAIB website. Such reports could usefully be distributed amongst all crew members who are likely to enter enclosed spaces by virtue of their duties.
http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/SB208.pdf

Although there was a safety management system requiring a hot work permit, the crew had not been trained or supervised in the implementation of that procedure. Additionally, the fitter could not read English and hence could not understand its requirements in any event. Accordingly, no continuous fire watch was maintained inside the cargo hold.
The incident illustrates what all good officers know; without training and supervision it is unlikely that safety management systems will be implemented properly. The report also highlighted that the shore firefighters had little experience in responding to, or fighting, shipboard fires.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investiga tion_reports/2007/MAIR/pdf/mair245_001.pdf

Britannia RISK WATCH

Volume 15: Number 3: August 2008

Containers and cargoes

Problems loading hot cement clinker in bulk the Club managers have been assisting Members with two cases where the loading of hot cement clinker, in excess of 100 degrees centigrade, has posed a safety hazard and risked damage to vessel hold paint coatings.
The remedy of course is to wait for it to cool down before loading, but this too gives rise to costs and delay that may be the subject of later dispute between owner and charterers. This article seeks to highlight some of the issues involved. The background is that cement clinker is often loaded directly from the processing plant where it is baked at high temperatures. This may have two problematical effects upon the vessel. The first is that unless holds are coated with temperature resistant coatings- typically glass fibre the hold paint coatings will be damaged, as may the ballast tank coatings. The second and more important problem is that the temperature of the IFO in double bottom fuel tanks may be raised above the flash point with attendant risk of explosion. In one of the cases that we saw, the paint coatings were severely damaged, and bubbled off over large surface areas, requiring complete re-painting of the affected holds, with attendant downtime. Expert advice received by the Club is that for vessels not equipped with a temperature resistant hold coating, the means to avoid these risks is to equip the vessel with suitable thermometers capable of measuring temperatures up to 200 C. Prior to loading, the Master should verify the temperature of the clinker presented at ships side by physically measuring temperatures within the bulk of the stow in barges or lorries. No cargo in excess of the FP of the IFO should be accepted, and cargo in excess of 80 C should be allowed to cool before loading. Protest letters should be issued as necessary. Many cement clinker load ports are well used to taking these precautions, and their protests will be minimal. During loading of cement clinker, double bottom tanks should remain filled as long as longitudinal stress, trim and draft permit, as these provide boundary cooling to fuel tanks and holds. Throughout the loading ships staff should continue to monitor temperatures as cargo is brought to the vessels side, and any over-heated cargo should be rejected until it has cooled sufficiently. A record must be kept showing where temperatures are taken, by what means, by whom, times and of course temperatures. The practice of trying to admix the cargo using grabs in an attempt to cool it has little value in so far as hold coatings are concerned, as the damage is done whilst loading.The only sensible preventive measure is to not permit overheated cargo to be loaded as described above. The alternative to the above is to upgrade the hold coatings to an alkyd based heat resistant coating of a type that will tolerate loading at temperatures up to 160 C without damage to the coating. Such coating may have an aluminium or glass pigment that is designed to withstand the much higher temperatures encountered when cargo is loaded direct from the bake house or kiln. The charterer stated, in one of the cases handled here, that the risk of heating bunkers in tanks adjacent to very hot cargo, up to their flashpoint, was minimal, since the atmosphere would be too rich for ignition within the tank, and further there was no source of ignition within the tank. The expert advice in response was that vapour may vent on to the deck via the air pipes of each of the fuel tanks. The vapour leaving the tank may well still be above the flashpoint. On deck there are plenty of sources of ignition. Stevedores smoking, mobile phones, nonintrinsically safe lighting, motors, radios, etc. Any of these could cause ignition of the vapour on deck. Provided the flash screens in the air pipes are intact it is not likely that a major fire would result. However if the flash screen is inefficient then there could be a blow back into the tank.

The question of who is liable for damage to coatings and loss of time in such cases will be a complex one. Under a time charter it may often be the responsibility of charterers to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo at their risk and expense. But this may not absolve the Master of his duties to supervise the loading insofar as it impacts on the safety of the vessel, and where the Master fails to intervene when it is clear that a cargo is hot enough to damage the tank coatings, this too will impact on the parties respective liabilities for the consequences. Other charter clauses that may be relevant are the Clause Paramount incorporating the Hague Rules which provide that the vessel is not to be employed in the carriage of dangerous or injurious cargo. A Member cannot be certain that his experts view may go unchallenged in any subsequent arbitration. The lawyer instructed for our Members on one of the above cases advised: In relation to the decision not to load cargo above 80 C, I should hope that an arbitrator would accept that, given the safety issues involved, neither the Master nor owners should be criticised for refusing to load said cargoes until they had cooled. Further there may be issues relating to the ability of the hold paint to tolerate cargoes in excess of 80 C. There is a risk that owners may be found liable if it is found that the paint in the hold should have been able to withstand higher temperatures. These factors underline the importance of Members knowing in detail about the coatings in the vessel holds, and the manufacturers guidelines for what they can withstand, before fixing cargoes of this type. Where Members seek expert guidance before loading and before damage to the vessel has occurred, this will do much to mitigate possible subsequent losses that may be the subject of lengthy and expensive litigation.

Beware bankrupt cargo interest

Those Members operating liner services would especially be aware of the expense and nuisance generated by cargo which is uncollected by reason of cargo receivers becoming bankrupt. The Association has recent experience of the difficulties which Member's agents face when confronted with the need to dispose of the uncollected cargo and at the same time the complex and powerful legal rights given to Court-appointed administrators of an insolvent company. In the subject case cargo had not been collected for over 6 weeks, in which period the Member had sent several warnings and notices to the receiver that a lien would be enforced and the cargo disposed of. None of those notices received an answer but shortly thereafter a firm of accountants contacted the Member by telephone advising that they were the administrators of the consignee company, which was in financial difficulty. The administrators requested extra time to arrange their own sale of the cargo. Members agent agreed to give the administrators a week to do so on the express understanding that the lien would be exercised (i.e. they would force the sale of the goods) if the administrators failed to pay Members by that date. The existence of the Administration Order was only referred to in oral telephone communication and the time extension agreed by e-mail. The administrators did not explain that they were appointed by the Court or what their powers were nor did they request any further extension of time. The deadline passed without any further contact from the administrator and the Members accordingly arranged the sale of cargo to salvage buyers to defray their own cost. After the administrators became aware of the sale they accused Members of acting in contempt of Court by breaching the Administration Order. They subsequently brought proceedings against the Members in that regard. The Member argued that the administrators had failed to properly serve the statutory notice of their appointment. The legal issues were complex and rather than embark on an expensive legal battle the claim was settled on a negotiated basis. The salutary lesson to be learned is that Members and their agents, when contacted by anyone purporting to be a Court appointed administrator of an insolvent consignee concerning uncollected cargo should be very wary of assuming contractual rights of sale and if in any doubt whatsoever should seek the assistance of the Association and/or lawyers.

More cement cargo problems

The Association continues to have problems with cement cargoes that have hardened because of leaking ballast tanks. The price of cement has risen significantly in line with most commodities in recent years but the cost of any cargo damage is quite often overshadowed by the significant operational difficulties in loosening and disposing of hardened cement cargoes. Masters and crew are reminded of the importance of pressing up all ballast tanks adjacent to cargo holds destined to receive cement, and to closely inspect those holds for any signs of leakage. Particular attention should be paid to vent pipes and sounding pipes passing through the hold. Inspecting holds on a ballast voyage may be quite difficult and cherry pickers are rarely available to Chief Officers inspecting the upper reaches of a hold, and it is recognised that inspection of piping can be especially difficult. A somewhat old fashioned practice amongst deck officers was to carry binoculars whilst working cargo alongside for the purpose of inspecting derrick and crane rigging. Given the difficulties that arise from the smallest of leaks, deck officers may consider this practice when undertaking the pre-load inspection of holds.

Britannia RISK WATCH

Tindall Riley (Britannia) Limited New City Court 20 St Thomas Street London SE1 9RR Tel +44 (0)20 7407 3588 Fax +44 (0)20 7403 3942 www.britanniapandi.com

RISK WATCH is published by The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, and can be found at www.britanniapandi.com/publications The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited is happy for any of the material in Risk Watch to be reproduced but would ask that written permission is obtained in advance from the Editor.

Regulatory update

Brazilian coastal trade foreign crews beware

We are grateful to our correspondents in Santos, Brazil, Pandibra McLintock, for this advice about crew visas in Brazil. The immigration authorities in Brazil are currently insisting that crews of foreign ships working in the coastal trade for more than 30 days must have a full working visas. Such visas are quite difficult to obtain and can only be issued from consular offices outside Brazil. This rule is, in fact, inconsistent with Brazilian law on the subject, which does allow foreign crews to work in the coastal trade without full working visas. However, the immigration authorities nevertheless insist on the visa requirement. In order to challenge the immigration department, it is necessary to start legal proceedings, which inevitably means that ships can face delays. While such disputes are being resolved, crew members could also face forced repatriation by the authorities. Members are advised to check carefully with local agents to make sure that they are aware of the current situation and visa requirements in Brazilian ports to avoid any possible problems with the immigration authorities.

Miscellaneous

Publications
Integrated Bridge Systems Volume 1 Radar and AIS By Dr Andy Norris

From 1 July 2008, all new radars required mandatory AIS integration; this combined use of data is an innovative example of the power and capability of modern shipboard technology to display two completely separate systems on the same display. While much effort has gone into ensuring the AIS, radar and chart information is consistent, with uniform symbols and a standard resolution, operators still need guidance and instruction.

This new book by Dr Andy Norris and published by the Nautical Institute builds on the basic radar theory and target tracking knowledge that seagoing officers already have while looking ahead into the future where New Technology (NT) radars will provide significantly enhanced performance. For more details and order information please go to:
http://www.nautinst.org/press/pdf/radarAIS.pdf or www.nautinst.org

Editors message We are always looking for ways to maintain and increase the usefulness, relevance and general interest of the articles
within Risk Watch. Please forward any comments to: rwatched@triley.co.uk