Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy Author(s): Sophie Botros Reviewed work(s): Source: Phronesis, Vol.

30, No. 3 (1985), pp. 274-304 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182234 . Accessed: 05/03/2012 16:54
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Freedom, Causality,Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy

SOPHIE BOTROS

Introduction

The philosophyof the early Stoics is all too often interpretedin modern terms:their determinism been comparedto Laplace's,'theirviews on has causality represented as Humean2and their account of freedom and This tendencymay seem responsibility characterized soft determinist.3 as innocuous enough, even if one judges as misguidedattempts at giving ancient thinkersa coat of modernanalyticvarnish.But, as we shall see, is at analyticrespectability onlypurchased a priceandmuchthatis bizarrely originalin the Stoic theoriesis lost as a consequence. I am not however suggestingany radicalrevisionof recent interpretawhichI merelyaim to tions of the Stoic accountof causality,in discussing for provide the necessarybackground the subsequentdiscussionof Stoic freedomwhichis my mainconcern.On the latterissue, misunderstanding of the Stoic texts is acute and extensive. Remarkably,there is an almost to total failure (apparentlystretchingback to the ancientcommentators) recognizethat philosopherswho were concernedwith both determinism and freedom could treat these topics in virtualisolationfromeach other. Consequently, interpretationsalmost invariably reflect some kind of sensed conflict between the two ideas. Some commentators(amongst
I S. Sambursky,Physicsof the Stoics (London, 1971), p. 58. All furtherreferencesto this work are given as Sam: PS. 2 R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame (London, 1980), p. 66. All furtherreferences to this work are given as Sor: NCB. 3 R. Sorabji, 'Causation, Laws and Necessity' in Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. Schofield, Burnyeatand Barnes(Oxford, 1980), pp. 280-282.All furtherreferencesto thisworkare given as Sor: DD; A. Long, 'Freedom and Determinismin the Stoic Theory of Human Action' in Problems in Stoicism, ed. Long (London, 1971), pp. 173-199. All further references to this work are given as Lg: PIS. See also P. L. Donini, 'Fato e Volunta Umana in Crisippo', Atti dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino 109, 1974-5, 1-44.

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them, St. Augustine,Cityof God, V, 10) held, for instance,that the Stoics More often, simplyexemptedthe act of choice fromcausaldetermination. commentators,recognizingthe all-inclusivenatureof Stoic determinism, disagree as to whether the early Stoics were uncompromising anti-libertarians(Taylor,4 Aune5)or merelysoft determinists of (Long,3Sharples6) a ratherlame (Sorabji3) even disingenuous(Alexanderof Aphrodisias,7 or Nemesius8)kind. I shall try to show however that the possibilityof a conflict between freedom and determinismnever clearly occurredto the Stoics since by modern standards(and even by those of ancientcommentators,9 writing only two to four hundredyears later) they had a defective conceptionof freedom. In particular,I shall suggest that they cannot be construedas precursors soft determinism,either in the versionoriginallyassociated of with Moore, Schlickand Ayer (the most frequentinterpretation amongst contemporary commentators) in its more recentformulation Davidor by son.10 thusdemonstrating attemptsto interpretearlyStoicdoctrines In that in terms of modern philosophical categories are for the most part misguided,I hope indirectly restoreto earlyStoicthoughtits strangeness to andoriginality,whilstmy analysismayalso possiblyoffer new insightsinto currentaccountsof freedomand determinism.

in Encyclopaediaof Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards(London, 1967) II, p. 360. s 'Possibility', in Encyclopaediaof Philosophy, VI, p. 420. 6 Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London, 1983), p. 9. Sharples asserts that since 'Chrysippuswas concerned to preserve human responsibilityin the context of his deterministic system ... his position is one of "soft determinism"'. But the soft determinist and typicallyadmitsa primafacie incompatibilitybetween freedom/responsibility determinism and then shows how this can be overcome. No such admission, or subsequent strategy, is, as we shall see, apparentin the work of the early Stoics, with the possible exception of the Dog Tied to Waggon Analogy attributed to them by Hippolytus (cf. section 3). 1 De Fato, 14. All furtherreferences to this work are given as Alex: DeF. 8 De Natura Hominis, 35. All further references to this work are given as Nem: NH. 9 See Alexander in De Fato and Plutarch in De Stoicorum Repugnantiis.All further references to the latter work are given as P1:deSR. 10 G. E. Moore, Ethics(Oxford, 1947), ch. 6; A. J. Ayer, PhilosophicalEssays (London, 1959), ch. 12; M. Schlick, Problems of Ethics (New York, 1962), pp. 149-151; D. Davidson, see particularly'Freedomto Act' in Actions and Events(Oxford, 1980), p. 75.
4'Determinism',

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1. Causality, Determinism and Necessity

The early Stoics were, as is well known,extremedeterminists. Thisdeterminism was associatedwith a theory of causationwhich entailed that i) every event has a cause; 'they hold that not one of the thingsin the world eitherexists or comes into beingwithouta cause'(Alex: DeF, 22) andthat ii) given the same antecedentconditionsthe same outcome must ensue (sometimes referred to as a regularitythesis, see Sor: NCB, 66). The followingremark,amongmanyothers (see also P1:DeSR, 1045,b, c, and Nem: DeNH, 35) suggeststhat they took (i) to imply(ii):
... there is an impossibilityin things turningout in a certainmannerat one moment and not so at another, in as much as all the same contingenciesarise concerningthe cause and that of whichit is the cause... If (thingscould turnout in differentways in different circumstances) ... then there (would be) motion without cause. (Alex: DeF, 22).

This belief that no event can occurunlessthere exist sufficientantecedent conditionsfor its occurrenceis often thoughtto be what led the Stoics to envisage events as parts of an inexorable Causal Chain stretching as throughoutspace and time, referredto by Chrysippus 'the continuous Chain of things that exist' (Galen) and characterizedby Alexander as follows:
the priorevents are causes of those followingthem, and in this mannerall thingsare bound together, and thus nothingcan happenin the Cosmos whichis not a cause to something else following it and linked with it... (DeF, 22).

But how exactlyis the notionof causalnecessity implicitin passagessuchas Alexander's above to be understood? According to modern causal -I of conditions theireffects. necessitarians, causesare not merelynecessary For this would jeopardizethe possibilityof prediction,being compatible with the occurrenceof randomevents. For instance, on the 'necessary B condition'view, A could be said to cause B, even if, quite inexplicably, sometimes failed to follow A. Consistencywith determinism,therefore, requiresthat causesbe both necessaryandsufficient,in the circumstances, for their effects. Could such an analysishowever really capturethe sense in which the It earlyStoicstook causalrelationsto be necessary? mightperhapsseem so sincemoderncausalnecessitarians attempt(as Humedidnot) to distinguish the causalfrommereaccidental sequencesof eventsby interpreting expres" For this kind of account, see G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Causalityand Determinism'in Causationand Conditionals,ed. Sosa (Oxford, 1975), p. 63.

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sion 'necessaryandsufficientcondition'counterfactually. Thusif A causes B, then (i) B wouldn't have occurred, if A hadn't occurred(necessary condition) and (ii) if B hadn't been going to occur, A wouldn't have occurred(sufficientcondition). But the Stoics said similarthings:on the one hand, events 'depend by necessity on their causes' (Alex: DeF, 22) and, on the other (as in Sambursky'sgloss on a passagefrom Alexander)'every time A is restored,B mustfollow' (PS, 54). Even so one maydoubtwhetherthe Stoic accountof causationis adequatelyrepresentedin termsof the modernaccount.For, first, modernwriterstake the sourceof causalnecessityto lie ultimatelyin specificlaws of naturewhichsustaincounterfactuals those above. But like since the Stoics mentionedno lawsof suchspecificcontent, theirnotion of causalnecessitywould have been independentof the existenceof any laws of nature. Again, whilst the modernaccountmay in some sense legitimizetalk of causal necessitationit remainslogicallypossible on this, as on almostany post-Humean account, for an event which has so far always caused a particular event suddenlynot to do so. Forcauseandeffect are regarded(at least under some description) as logically distinct events. But Hume's separation of causal from logical necessity underminedthe traditional assumptionthat causation involved an indissolublemetaphysicaltie between events. Yet surely some version of this latter assumptionis to be expectedin the workof philosophers whomthe Humeandistinctionwas to unknown? I shall not howeverpursuethe issueof whetherthe earlyStoicsregarded causes as, for instance, actively constraining their effects (though Fitzgerald'searly translationof Alexander's De Fato: ScholartisPress, London, 1931,suggeststhatthey did);norshallI questionthe metaphorical statusof Stoic claimsthat effects are boundor fettered to their causes, or that the whole chain of consequencesof a particularevent lay dormant, coiled up (cf. Aulus Gellius's'coilsof fate' andCicero's'unwinding rope'12) in the event itself, only waitingto be inexorablyunravelled.But the related distinctionbetweennaturaland artificialdivinationposes interestingquestions both aboutthe natureof theirnotionof causalnecessityandaboutthe possiblegenesis of early Stoic fatalism.Consider,for instance,the following passage:
12 De Divinatione, I, LVI, 127: SVF II, 944. All further referencesto the De Divinatione are given as Cic: DD. The Aulus Gellius quotation is from his Noctes AtticaeVII, II, 5. All furtherreferences to this work are given as Aul. Gell: NA.

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Since all things happen by fate, if there were a man whose mind could discern the inner connections of all causes, then surely he would never be mistaken in any predictionhe mightmake. For he who knowsthe causes of futureevents necessarily knows what every future event will be. But since such knowledgeis possibleonly to a god, it is left to man to predict the futureby means of certainsignswhich indicate what will follow them. 13

into What exactly is signified by the contrastbetween the gods' insight'4 causes, whichleadsto infallibleknowledgeof the future,andmen'sfallible basedon signsandomens ('the inspectionof entrails,lightnings predictions precede, and portents'(Cic: DD, II, XI, 26) which, thoughthey regularly are not causallyrelated to the events they presage?Perhapsthe contrast points towardthat long out-modedparadigmof causalexplanationwhich one succeeding another triesto go beyondthe brutefactof eventsregularly '5 to by makingthe causalrelationsomehowtransparent the understanding. Did the Stoicsperhapsenvisagethe godsas seeingnot justwhatwillhappen (as do men) but why, due to their perceptionof the inner natureof the connectioninvolved,it musthappen?And was it thusthe peculiarwaythe Stoics construedcausalitythat slanted their determinismin the fatalistic that will happenmusthapdirectionexpressedby their adage 'everything pen' (Aulus Gellius)?'6 Whilst it is impossibleto answer these questionsconclusively,central commentators,such as Cicero, assertthat there were close links between to the Stoic affirmation therewere 'eternalcausesthatforbidanything that fall out otherwisethanit will fall out' (Cic: DeFato, XI, 26 - XII, 28), their fatalismand their belief in divination.Accordingto Cicero, theirfatalism was dependentupon theirbelief in divination('if', he states, 'the theoryof divinationis correct, then the potency of fate will be proven"7),whilst
13 CompareWittgenstein(Tractatus 5.1362): 'future(actions) cannotbe knownnow. We could only know them if causalitywere an inner necessity like that of logical deduction'. It is tempting to suggest that it was because the Stoics, unlike the early Wittgenstein, regardedcausalityas an 'inner necessity' that they held that futureevents can be known now. 14 Cicero says that humanbeings can only achieve such insightwhen the soul is 'inspired by frenzy or set free by sleep' (DD, I, LVI, 128 and LVII, 130; 11,Xi, 27). to ,s But the conception of a causal relationthat was thus transparent the understanding lingered on in the kind of account given by philosopherslike Prichardand Campbellof the relation between the willing subject and the world. 16 NA, VII, II, 5; see also Alex: DeF, 16 'the things that must be will be' and Cic: DD, I, LVI, 126 'Nothing occurs that was not to be'. 17 De Fato, V, 10-VI, 12. All furtherreferences to this work are given as Cic: DeF. See also Cic: DD. II. VIII. 21.

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for divination,requiring its cogencythat propositionsabout futureevents be alreadytrue (or false) at the time of prophecy,was in turnonly possible (for the Stoics linked the truth of bivalencywith their causal theory'8) because future events were held to be causally determined, and thus necessitated,by statesof affairsexistingat the time of prophecy.('Apollo', writesCicero, 'couldnot have foretoldthe fate of Oedipusif therewere no causes foreordainedin the natureof thingsmakingit necessaryfor him to murderhis father'.19) of course the Stoics may have been first conBut vincedof the validityof divination,withits fatalisticimplications,and then soughtto upholdbivalencyand the necessityof the GreatCausalChainin order to support their prior belief in divination, and not vice versa as suggestedabove. It may even be that the Stoics held that the successionof events in the GreatCausalChainwas necessary,not becausethey regardedcausationas itself a quasi-logical relation,but becausethey envisagedfate as a god who deliberatelyimposedthis causalorderupon events. Calcidius,for instance (in a passageperhapstoo easily dismissedas metaphorical) representsthe Stoics as arguingthat if the gods can foretell futureevents, includingeven 'the movementsof ourminds',thisis becausetheiroccurrence fromthe was very beginning decreed (decreta) by fate 'for if fate had not decided beforehand the prophets would not have had access to its plan' (ad Timaeum,ep. 160). The Stoicposition,as so faroutlined,thoughin certainrespectsunacceptable today, remainsbroadlyrecognizable a type of causaldeterminism. as Even Calcidius's account,despitethe implicitpersonification fate, refers of to a causalchain, the definitivefeatureof deterministic theory. There are other passages, however, expressingStoic pantheism and thus perhaps even morealiento contemporary thoughtthanCalcidius's personifiedfate, which do not mention a causalchain. Alexander, for instance, writes that the Stoics identified fate with 'nature'and with 'the reason accordingto whichthe Whole is organized', assertingit to be a god:
present in all that is and comes to be and in this way employ(ing) the individual nature of everything for the organizationof the Whole. (DeF, 22)

18 Cicero (DeF, C, 21) writes that the Stoics rejected the (Aristotelian) claim that not every propositionis either true or false since this suggested that some future events may not have present causes. 19 DeF, XIV, 33. See also Cic: DD, II, XLIX, 102-LXIII, 130.

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as the Plotinusrepresents Stoicview by wayof an analogy:fate is described 'the principleof the universe... from which all things are deduced... and which pervadeseverythingas cause' and
produces the universe, not only all the other things that come into being but even our thoughts... just as in an animaleach parthas a movementwhichcomes not from itself, but from the rulingpart of the soul which is in it. (SVF, II, 946)

Since these passages appear to be an attempt at explainingthe same ones, but this time in terms of phenomenaas the previousdeterministic kind of teleologicalprocess, involvingthe idea of the universeas an some organicunitypossessedof a rulingprincipleworkingtowardthe continued integrationand well-being of the Whole, there appearsto be a radical in incompatibility the Stoic accountof causation,unlesswe assumethat a teleologicalaccountcan in principlealwaysbe reducedto a deterministic one. Moreover, these passages suggest that the Stoic's fatalismwas an the expressionof his feeling of powerlessnessas he contemplated immensityof thisWholeof whichhe wasonly a minutepart- a feelingnevertheless of mitigatedby the identification his personalendswiththoseof the Whole. Despite these teleologicaland pantheisticaspects,I shallhoweveras far in commentators takingthe earlyStoicsto as possiblefollow contemporary modernkind,and of have been extremecausaldeterminists a recognizably just apparent how incompleteour underwill leave it to becomegradually standingof their theoriesof freedomand action will remain,if we ignore these more ancient, if less dominant,elements in theirthought.
2. Freedom and Alternative Possibilities

Whatkindof accountof freedomwouldbe viableagainstthis unpromising assume that freedom Now most philosophers20 deterministbackground? possibilitiesof action, if not of choice (as the strict involves alternative requires),and it mightseem, as moderncommore stringently libertarian mentatorshave generallyassumed,that the Stoicsmustalso finda sense in whichactions, not actuallyperformed,were nonethelesspossible. And at first sight it might appearthat they did providefor just such unactualized no scholarsdistinguish less possibilities.For, in spite of theirdeterminism,
20 See e.g. P. van Inwagen 'It seems to be generally agreed that the concept of free will should be understoodin termsof the power or abilityof agentsto act otherwisethanthey in fact do': 'The Incompatibility Free Will and Determinism',in FreeWill,ed. Watson of (Oxford, 1982), p. 49. See also Moore, o.c., p. 126, and P. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, 1954), p. 273.

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than four senses in which, for the Stoics, an event, or action, which will never actuallyoccur, is nonethelesspossible. One of these senses of possibilitywas cast in termsof propositionsand theirtruthvaluesandis irrelevant thisdiscussion.As to the othersenses, to in the second, an event, or action, was held to be possible if nothingwas known that mightpreventits occurrence(thoughif it will not occur then, for the Stoics, causesalreadyexist whichpreventit - Alex: DeF, 10:SVF II 959), while in the third,an actionor event is possible'if', as Alexanderputs it, 'it is not preventedby circumstances from happening'(DeF, 10: SVF II 959). A fourth kind of possibility,apparentlyadopted by the Stoics from Philo, resemblesour notion of naturalpower or capacity.Philo'sexample however,of a piece of wood whichcan be burntbut neverwill be since it is lying on the ocean bed, illustratespassive, ratherthan active, power. It is howeverthe thirdaccountof possibilitywhich,as we shallsee, when linked with Chrysippus'sdistinction between the external and internal causes of human action (Cic: DeF XVIII, 41 - XIX, 43: SVF II 974) providesthe most apparently persuasivegroundsfor claimsthat the Stoics held similarviews to modernsoft determinists2 the questionof freedom on andresponsibility. shalltryto showhoweverthatthe Stoicsdid not utilize I this last notionof possibility theiraccountof freedom,andthatanyclaim in thatthey were soft determinists, whichis basedon thissupposition,is false. I start however with some general objections to the view that the Stoics exploited any notion of possibilityin their accountof freedom. This will also give me an opportunitybriefly to refute an attemptto use the Stoic notion of naturalpowerto claima resemblance betweenthe Stoic position and modernsoft determinism. Now a close scrutinyof the relevantpassages(Alex: DeF, 10; Cic: DeF, VII; P1:DeSR, 1055e)suggeststhatthe Stoicdefinitionsof possibilitywere presentedsolely as a means of refutingDiodorus Cronus'sclaim (in the famousMasterArgument)thatonly whatis true, or willbe true, is possible, and that they were not attemptsto safeguard some notionof freedom. It is not even clear whether Diodorus himself drew the kind of deterministic implicationsfrom his argumentthat mighthave threatenedfreedom.2' Yet the early commentatorsinterpreted(what was for them) the Stoic failureto establisha sense in whichevents whichdo not actuallyoccurare neverthelesspossibleas implyingthatwe cannothave free will, thusgiving the impressionthat the Stoic definitions of possibilitywere themselves
21 It has been suggested for instance that his interest was solely in the productionof an extensional logic (Robert Blanche, cited by Sorabji, NCB, 104).

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deployedto preservefreedom.Thus, for instance,Alexander,in originally againstDiodorus the 10thchapterof De Fatorejectedthe Stoic arguments and in the next chapterinferredthat as a consequencethe Stoics robbed men of theirfreedom. Likewise,Cicero,havingexaminedthe Stoics'reply to Diodorusin chapterVII of his De Fato,concludesin chapterIX thattheir theirclaims chainof causes'bothinvalidated insistenceupon'aneverlasting about possibilityand ruled out humanfreedom. the But the examplesused by Ciceroin chapterVII to illustrate sense in which,for the Stoics, 'thingswhichwill not be are also "possible"' (et quae non sint futuraposse) betrayno hint of an intentionon his partto connect that themwithStoicfreedom,withe.g. the Stoics'assertion humanactionis (p'7tLLv,'in our power'or, as Cicerorendersit, 'in nostrapotestate'.Even 'couldbe broken, to the exampleof the jewel which,according Chrysippus, even if it never will be' (...ut frangihanc gemmametiam si id numquam futuramsit) shows only that the Stoics, like manyof today'sdeterminists, acknowledgedthat objects could have powers which might never be actualized. The example does not even attributethese powers to human beings; for the assertionthat some jewel has a (passive) potentialityfor breakingdoes not entailthatanyhumanbeingpossessesthe (active)power to break it. to Suppose,however,thatthe Stoicsdidattribute us a capacityregardless of whetherit was ever exercised. We still could not infer (as does Long22 with regardto Cicero'sexample) that it follows that the Stoics held, in a thatwe couldsometimes sense similarto that of modernsoft determinists, the surrounding have done otherwisethanwe did. For, despiteambiguities of ascriptions freedom determinist word 'could'as it occursin modernsoft it at least reflectscommonusagein as far as it neverdenotesmere capacity prevent to act, i.e. withoutregardto whetheror not externalcircumstances the exercise of the capacity. givenin chapters10and 11of Turningnow to Alexander,the impression, his De Fato, that the Stoic attackon Diodorus'seliminationof possibility was linked with a defence of the notion of freedom, is so completelyat variancewith other passagesin his work as to seem incorrect.For both in chapters13and 14he stressedthatthe Stoicnotionof freedom,or of whatis (p' qitv, did not involve alternativepossibilitiesof action. 'Doing away with men's possessionof the power of choosing and doing opposites',he to writes, '(the Stoics) say that whatis attributable us is whatcomes about throughus'.
22

In correspondencewith me.

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But thistextualevidencemightbe thoughtinconclusive,andAlexander's of interpretation the Stoics, in chapters13 and 14 of his De Fato has been I disputed.23 turn therefore to consider the more specific question mentioned above whichconcernsthe Stoics'thirdnotionof possibility('whatis fromhappening').Did Chrysippus this not preventedby circumstances use notion of possibilityin developingthe distinctionbetweenthe externaland internalcausesof action, on whichhe based his accountof freedom(or of 'what is in our power')? Did it seem as crucialto him, as to modernsoft determinists,to show that certain actions are possible though they will neveroccur(sincethe 'eternalcausalnexus'forbidsit), whilstthe opposites If of actionsthatwill occurare not necessarily impossible? so, then perhaps he, like manymodernsoft determinists, soughtto analyzefreedomin terms of alternative possibilities of action, even within a deterministic framework. The details of such an accountmightbe workedout as follows. For any action M, M is (1) possible if it is not preventedby circumstances from occurring.M is (2) impossible if it is prevented by circumstances from occurring.M is (3) necessaryif it is preventedby circumstances from not occurring, and M is (4) non-necessary(i.e. -M is possible) if it is not preventedby circumstances from not occurring.This can be expressedin the form of a squareof oppositionas follows:
M is prevented by circumstances from not occurring(3) M is not prevented by circumstances from occurring(1) M is prevented by circumstances from occurring(2) M is not prevented by circumstances from not occurring(4)

Next consider the key passage in which Cicero attributes to Chrysippus the distinction between the external and internal causes of action:
If auxiliaryand proximate(external) causes are not in our power it does not follow that even impulse (and the action that follows upon it) is not in our power ... this conclusion will hold against those who so introduce destiny that they (also) annex necessity;but it will not hold againstthose who distinguishantecedent (i.e. auxiliary and proximate) causes from perfect and principal ones... For although assent cannot occur unless aroused by a sense-presentation (i.e. without an external cause), yet ... assent (the internal cause of action) has this as its proximate not principalcause ... Just as someone who pushes a drumforwardgives it a beginning
23 See C. Stough, 'Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility'in The Stoics, ed. Rist

(Berkeley, 1978), pp. 203-227, and M. Reesor, 'Necessity and Fate in Stoic Philosophy' also in Rist, pp. 187-202. Both these attempts to challenge Alexander's interpretation, however, seem philosophicallyconfused.

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of movement, but not its capacityto roll, so the visualobject whichpresentsitself ... will markits image on the mind;but assent will be in our power(sed adsensionostra erit in potestate) and ... once it has been given an external stimulus (extrinsicus pulsa) it will move itself for the rest by its own force and nature(quod reliquumest, suapte vi et natura movebitur). (DeF, XVIII, 41 -XIX, 43: SVF I1974)

between I will now attemptto renderthis distinctionmade by Chrysippus an action'sexternaland internalcausesin termsof my previousaccountof possibility sucha wayas to producea versionof freedomwhichresembles in that of modernsoft determinism. Suppose that M is the action of drinkingbrandy. Then (1) M is not prevented by circumstancesfrom occurring,and is thus possible, if no externalobstaclespreventan agent Y from M-ing. But Y may still not M and becausehe lacksthe desire. Y maydislikebrandy so not drinkit. In this becauseit lacks case, the actionM, thoughpossible,will not be performed an internalcause, i.e. in Stoic terms,Y does not assentto its performance will andfeels no impulseto performit. The Stoicsoft determinist therefore Y's M-ingis i-n power claimthat Y could24 have M-ed, if he hadchosento,25 and thus Y is free with regardto M. (But whateverY does is still entirely determined.) fromoccurring,and is thus impos(2) M is preventedby circumstances sible if externalobstaclesprevent Y from M-ing. SupposeY likes brandy but is unableto take the glassfromthe table becausehis handsare bound. We mightsay that the fact that Y's handsare boundis, in Stoic terms,the can externalcause of Y's not M-ing.The Stoic soft determinist then claim that Y could not have M-ed, even if he had chosen to, M-ingis not in Y's power and thus he is unfreein regardto M. from not occurring,and is thus (3) M is prevented by circumstances necessary, if external circumstancespredominateover the agent's own desire, i.e. in Stoic terms, the force that comes fromthe agent himself,in dominatedby anotherthat, M. producing ThusY maybe so pathologically of irrespective his own desires,he does whateverthe otherorders.He may, for instance,drinkthe brandythoughhe loathesit, and knowsit is badfor
24 Perhapsreferenceto Y's physicalcapacityto pick up the glass is also required picking if up the glass is to be describedas a 'real'alternativefor Y. But not all writers,particularly those concerned with the political dimension of the concept of freedom, would agree, and, in any case, I wish to present the simplest version of the theory. a 25 I take it that choosing to act in a given way is not for the soft determinist conditionof possessing, but only of exercising, the power to act in that way. Consequently'He could have M'd if he'd chosen to' might be less misleadinglyrendered as 'He could have M'd but didn't choose to'.

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him. Or supposethat Y is an alcoholicandthatthe verysightof the brandy causeshim to gulp it down, despitehis resolutionto resistit. In both cases, the Stoic determinist say thatY could not have done otherwise,even if will he had chosen to. It is not in Y's powerto refrainfromM-ingand thusY is not free in regardto M. Finally(4), M is not preventedby circumstances fromnot occurring, and is thus non-necessary,if externalcircumstances not predominateover do the agent's own desires in producingM. Suppose that Y is neither dominatedby his friend,noran alcoholicandcouldhaveresistedthe brandyif he had chosen to. Here it is in Y's power to refrainfrom M-ingand thus Y is free in regardto M. Now it will be noted that in (1) and (2) freedom and its absence are construedin termsof whetheror not there exist constraints whichprevent an individualfrom acting in a certainway, whilst in (3) and (4) they are construedin termsof whetheror not the individual's action is compelled. Both partsof this readinghoweverpresentinsuperabledifficulties. The mainproblemwiththe firsthalfof the readingis thatit misconstrues the Stoics' notion of an externalcause as understoodby Cicero. For this
refers specifically to the sense-impression (cavTaoL(ca 6pRT,uxx) which

provides us with an incentivefor action (see also Plutarch:DeSR, 10561057), and not to an obstacle which preventsour acting and thus limits freedom. In the earlierexample,Y's seeing the brandywouldcount as the external cause of his lifting the glass and drinking. But if there is no provisionin the accountof freedomattributed Ciceroto Chrysippus by for the case of an individualwho is preventedfrom actingin a certainway by the presenceof obstacles(cf. (2) above) then the claimthat we could have acted otherwise,and are thus free, becausethere exist no such constraints to our actions (cf. (1) above) loses its point. The significanceof this objection moreover is, I believe, neither narrowly terminologicalnor confined to Cicero's readingof the Stoics. For thereis little evidenceelsewherein the ancientcommentaries the early that Stoics, unlike so many later thinkers, ever construed freedom and its absencein termsof whetheror not there exist hindrances action. One of to the nearest approximations this idea is the following view, though it to seems to have been attributedto the Stoics in this explicit form only by Nemesius:
And whenever none of the external things given by fate resists (our) impulse (to walk), then walkingwill be completely in our power and we surely will walk. (NH, 35)

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Alexander, by contrast, in one of the fullest discussionsof early Stoic freedom to have survived (DeF, particularly13), typicallytreated the question of whethercertainmovementswere in our power as a question aboutwhetherthese movementshad theirsourcein us (whetherthey were literally 'movement(s) from (our)selves' ?t ?(XVuruGv and not XiV0LV) whether,once initiated,these movementsmightencounterexternalobstacles. But isn't Nemesius'spoint at least implicitin Alexander'sassertion that a stone (to whose behaviourhe is comparinghuman action) must unless obstructed(tR9&v6;og fall when dropped?But the ito&lovTog) context surrounding phrasesurelymakesclearthatAlexander's this intention is to emphasizethe rigorousnecessity which, on the Stoic account, governsthe stone's movement(and, by implication, humanaction),rather than to cite an instancewhere movementis not in the stone'spower. in Furthermore Alexander'sown list of 'thingsnot in our power'(DeF, 11), he includes'eternalthings'(i.e. the motionof the heavenlybodies),the past, states of affairsthat are inevitable,and whateveris contingentuponmen'sactions;but he does not mentionactionsthatwe wouldbe prevented from performingif we tried to performthem.26 Indeed it may perhaps appear symptomaticof just how far the early Stoics were from linkingthe idea of constraintwith the issue of freedom that even when the late Stoic Epictetus2" eventuallyextendthe expresdid sion 'in ourpower'to actionsthatwe couldperform'withouthindrance', he understood termin a verydifferentwayfrommodernsoft determinists. this For Epictetus (ratherlike Wittgensteinin the Tractatus like modern and libertarians) appliedthe termonly to activitythat we could neverconceivably be hinderedfrom performing,and since even simple bodily movements (not to mention complicatedaction sequences)could not pass this stringenttest, willingalone remaineda candidatefor this description. Turning now to the second half of the reading, a cursoryglance at Cicero'sformulation Chrysippus's of distinctionbetweenthe externaland internalcausesof action (see againp. 283) mightseem to suggestthat, for Chrysippus,an action is in our power, and thus free, providedour assent and impulseare its 'principal' causes. So it mightbe thoughtthat Chrysippus would have wanted to deny that an action is in our power where externalforces predominateover assent and impulse(cf. my (3) above). But, as Alexanderobserved(in a claimwhichis neitherpurelyempirical nor purelyconceptualin contemporary terms), for the Stoics, our actions
26 I am grateful to Dr R. Sharplesfor drawingmy attention to this point.
27

The Discourse and Manual (Oxford, 1916).

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occur only 'through us' (6t'i,uiv)

and therefore only as causal conse-

quences of our assents and impulses:

For, since not otherwise would the things produced by the creature'sagency take place, if the creaturehad not acted accordingto impulse, but are produced according to its assent and initiative, while they are not so when assent is lacking, they say these things are in the creature'spower. (DeF, 14)

And Cicero goes on to stress in the key quotation (as does Plutarch elsewhere, see DeSR, 1056, b, c) that the necessaryprecursors action, of though requiringexternal arousal, can never be wholly determinedby externalforces;indeedthey wouldseem to represent,relativeto the latter, independentforces, possessingin some sense a momentumof their own ('quod reliquumest, suaptevi et naturamovebitur')of whichactionis the culmination. As Aulus Gellius asserted, even when we are apparently easily provoked by external stimuli into wrongdoingwe are nevertheless responsible,on the Stoicview, for whatwe do; for externalstimulicannot, even in these cases, usurpthe specialanddecisive28 of will (assent)and role impulsein producingand sustainingaction (NA, Bk. 7, II, 11-15). It is not merelythatexternalforcesarecausallyinsufficient bringabout to action, as Cicero sometimessuggests(cf. his denial, in the continuation of the key passage, DeF, XVIII, that the external stimulus is a 'causa necessaria'or 'necessitating cause' of action) but, far more radically,as is apparentfrom the Greek, that they are not the rightkind of cause to play this crucialrole. Plutarch,for instance,characterized externalstimulus the (on Chrysippus's view) as atxLov JtQoxaTaQxLx6v(a mere 'predisposing' cause) as opposed to avcTo-mXi (as, in its 'self-sufficiency'and aLTLov 'independence',is assent). And this, givenour knowledgeof the etymology of the Greek terms (which howevercannot be adequatelytranslatedinto English)indicatesfairlyconclusivelythattwo mutually exclusivecategories
of cause are here at issue.29' 30
2 Aulus Gellius is not, like Cicero, merely explaininghow action is produced;he is also trying to account for the variation in individual response to stimuli in terms of the different 'qualities of mind'. 29 For an illuminatingdiscussion of these different kinds of cause, see M. Frede, 'The OriginalNotion of Cause' in DD, pp. 217-249. 30 I have ignored Cicero's contention that Chrysippus's distinction was expressly designed to allow the Stoics to 'escape necessity yet retain fate' since Chrysippus's distinctioncan be adequatelyformulatedwithout referenceto a suppositionwhich, given the weight of contraryevidence, includingCicero's own testimony elsewhere in the De Fato, seems implausible,namely that the early Stoics understoodby 'fate', not the whole Chain of Causes, but only a part of it.

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external causes however could never conceivablypreIf Chrysippus's dominate over assent and impulse in producingaction, then we are left without an exampleof what it would be for an action to 'be preventedby or, from not occurring' in other words, for an action to be circumstances claimin (4) compelled(cf. (3) above). But then the typicalsoft determinist above that an individualcould have done otherwise, and is thus free, becausehis actionswere not compelledceases to be intelligiblewithinthe Stoic framework. distinctionbetweenthe So far my contentionhas been that Chrysippus's externaland internalcausesof actionwas not an attemptto ensurethat, in some sense, we could sometimesact otherwisethanwe do, and in this way possibilities,fromthe clutchesof to rescuefreedom,as entailingalternative Obscureas theirconceptionof freedommaystill be, we Stoicdeterminism. salvaging can at leastbe certainthatthe earlyStoicsdidnot thinkit required in this way. Neverthelessthey were concernedto meet the chargethattheir the fatalismexcludedhumaninfluenceuponevents, anddid so by asserting not causalindispensability only of assentand impulseto action,but also of responseto the famous actionto certainkindsof outcome,cf. Chrysippus's Lazy Argument(Cic:De F, XXX; Calcidius:ad Timaeum,ep. 160). Their reply however to the provocative counsel of inaction (on the groundsthat if only those thingswill occurthat are fated to occurthen our it effortsare in vain) only furtherservesto underlinefate's inexorability: is that inconceivable,says Chrysippus, Milo shouldwrestlewithoutan opponent 'for"he willwrestle"is complex(and)withoutan opponentthereis no also wrestling'.But, since Milois fatedto wrestle,it is necessarily fatedthat he will have an opponent. Likewise, Oedipuscannot be conceivedunless but LaiusandJocastahave intercourse; sinceit is fatedthatOedipuswillbe conceived, it follows that Laius and Jocasta are also fated to have intercourse. We can now perhapsattempta firstshot at statingthe differences,as so far revealed, between the early Stoic and the modern soft determinist and accountsof freedomandresponsibility, suggestwhythese accountsare so easily and frequentlyconfused.The Stoic accountcomprisestwo inter('in connected parts. Human action, or what is icp'f,upv our power'), is from mere happeningin termsof its specialcausalstructure, distinguished of which assent and impulse(the nearestequivalentsof the soft determinists' 'choice'and 'desire')are the most importantconstituentelements. The chargethat Stoic fatalismrulesout humaninfluenceupon events is of then answeredby assertingthe causalindispensability action to certain kinds of outcome. But, it would seem, the only power grantedto us by
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in Chrysippus, his replyto the LazyArgument,is the powerto do whatwe mustdo in orderthat destinybe accomplished.It is perhapshardlysurprisand ing then thatthe Stoicpositionhaspuzzledcommentators, haseven led to charges of disingenuousness;for, disregardingthe teleological, and possiblyalso the necessitarian,overtones, it is preciselythis way of representing the humansituationin a determinedworldthat harddeterminists it as exploitin orderto showhow implausible is to regardthe individual free in such a world.3' Now the modern soft determinist,like the Stoics, asserts that actions caused by our choices or desiresare in our power. But, unlikethem, he is not here elucidatingthe causal structureof action in general (i.e. as opposed to mere happening),but is distinguishing actions which are, from this those whichare not withinour power. Moreover,in construing distinction in termsof whetheror not we are compelledto act as we do (or, with omissions,whetheror not we are preventedfromdoingwhatwe fail to do) he attemptsto representthe powerthus accorded(or denied) us as entailing, even within a deterministicframework,that we could do otherwise than we do or, in other words, that we are presentedin some sense with alternativepossibilitiesof action.32 Thusit is that, underone ambiguous misleading and formulation, soft the deterministaccount of freedom may seem to resemble that of the early Stoics. But to substantiatethe claim that these ancientthinkersweresoft determinists,in anythinglike the traditional sense, it wouldbe necessaryto show, not just that the Stoicshappened propounda theoryof possibility, to as well as of freedom,but thatthey usedthis accountof possibility(whether i.e. explicitly, like Moore and Ayer,'0or implicitly,like Schlick,'0 merely throughthe ideas of compulsionandconstraint) show how men maystill to be regardedas free in a determinedworld. No moderncommentatorhas yet demonstratedthat such a connectionexists between the Stoic theories of freedom and possibility. To concludethis sectionwithjust one example(but Long is another,see PIS, 189) considerSorabji(NCB, 71) who, referringto what he calls 'the arguments designedto showthatthereis roomfor alternative possibilities', writes that 'the Stoic retreat from necessity constitutes one of several
3' S. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time (New Haven, 1967), assumes without question that

Chrysippus,in his reply to the Lazy Argument, is propoundinga fatalismwhich entails that 'no man has free will'. 32 For a clear statement of these connections see J. Thorp, Free Will (London, 1980), p. 32; or see Ayer himself (o.c.).

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strategies for avoiding the unfortunateimplicationsof determinismfor for morality'(andthuspresumably a conceptionof actionas in ourpower). to Myanalysishas, I hope, alreadyshownthatthisis preciselywhatremains be proved.
3. Willing Co-operation with Necessity: Two Interpretationsof the Dog Tied to Waggon Analogy

to In a strikingfragmentattributed Hippolytus,however,both Chrysippus andZeno are saidto have drawnan analogybetweenthe situationof a dog tied to a waggon and that of men in relation to fate. This analogy is significantbecause, in contrast to everythingsaid so far, it appearsto suggest that, far from believing that determinismposed no threat to freedom, the early Stoics may have regardedthe human situation in a determinedworld as primarilyunfree. Freedom could be achieved, but only by voluntarilyconsentingto do whatwe must in any case do:
These men (Chrysippusand Zeno) maintainedthat everything was in accordance by using the following illustration.Suppose a dog to be with fate (xa0'diLuaQ1cELvrv) tied to a waggon. If he wishes to follow, the waggonpulls him and he follows, so that his own power and necessityunite (literally:doing what is in his free power together with necessity JtOLCOVxaL T6 afrreor0'GLov iET&a &vadyx-g). But if he does not Tjg wish to follow, he will be compelled anyhow. The same is the case with mankind also. Even if they do not wish to follow, they will be absolutelyforced to enter into the fated event. (SVF 1I, 975)33

One way of construingthis passage would remove it entirely from the controversy.This is to representit as context of the free will/determinism content,in a concernedwith how we can be free, in the sense of spiritually worldin whichdesiremustoften be unsatisfiedand sufferingis inevitable. The solutionproposedby the Analogy,on thisreading,is simplyto accept34 these unfortunate aspectsof the humancondition.A rathersimilarreading is that of Long who sees it as advice to the individualto be realisticin the pursuanceof his goals (PIS, 192). This readingmightseem attractivesince it evades conceptualand other difficultiesto whichthe passageis, as we will see (and as Long notes, PIS, 193), otherwise subject. It also reflects the concern of early Stoic moral
One other passage suggests a similarview: St. Augustine (City of God, V, 8) quotes these lines from Seneca's translationof Cleanthes'Hymn: 'Fate leads the willing, drags the reluctantfeet'. 34For a discussionof this obscure notion, see my 'Acceptanceand Morality'Philosophy, 58, 1983, 433-453.
33

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philosophy with the relation between happiness and the possession of health and material goods.35There is in addition the suggestion of a continuitybetween the earlyand late Stoics, suchas Epictetusand Seneca, who were preoccupiedwith the problemof attainingfreedom, whichthey both regardedas a matter of how to come to terms with life's inevitable limitationsand disappointments. that However, the earlyStoic affirmation happiness,the rewardof living 'in agreementwith nature'did not lie in the possessionof materialgoods does not appearto have been advancedas a solutionto the questionof how
to deal with suffering and loss, regarded as somehow especially inevitable.

to Moreovertheirexhortations 'live in agreementwith nature',ratherthan implyingthat individualsshould adopt a certainattitudetowardunavoidable misfortune,seems to have referredto the observanceof a code of conductwhich 'befits'or is 'natural'to men as rationalbeings. The mainobjectionhoweverto construing passagein this way is that the and Hippolytusstates explicitlythat Chrysippus's Zeno's analogyillustrated the universalrule of fate (To xaO' Ei'agE'VnV ELVaL 7acvTa) and he representsthe Stoicsas linkingthis ideawithavayxil or necessity.But in no other major context where 'fate' is identifiedwith 'necessity'and said to 'rule all things' (Aul. Gell: NA, Bk 7, II, 1-5), or to be that 'accordingto which the whole universeis administered' (Alex: DeF, 22; Calcidius:ad Timaeum,ep. 160), or is referredto as 'a principleof universalnature'(P1: DeSR, 1050), do the writershave in mindthe unhappyhumanfate which preoccupiedthe late Stoics who scornedthe theoreticalbias of their predecessors. On the contrary,the context in each case makesplain (withthe possibleexceptionof the passagefromAulus Gellius)thatthe whole chain of causes and thereforethe thesis of universaldeterminism itself is under
discussion. Indeed the first Stoics considered the word d,uLaQQELv root (its

or being E'LQw'stringbeads')particularly to appropriate conveytheirnotion of a Great Chain of Causes and introducedthis usage of it. I shall take it then36 that determinismis underdiscussionin the Hippolytuspassage. I want now to considerhow plausibleit wouldbe to regardthe Analogy as the Stoics' response to a 'libertarian' opponentwho, knowingof their reputationas determinists,challengestheir assertionthat our actions are free and 'in our power' because they are caused by our own choices and desires. For surely,the libertarian urges,if it is determinedthatour desires will cause us to performcertainactions,then not even we ourselvescould
1s See Cicero De Finibus, III and Diogenes Laertius, VII, 86-108.

3*Sorabji assumes a similar interpretation(DD, 262).

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prevent them doing so. In what sense, then, can we really be said to act

freely or be responsiblefor our acts?

Consent as Exempt from Causal Determination

Supposethat the Analogy representsthe Stoics' capitulationto the libertarian:even though we cannot choose, or act, otherwisethan we do, we may at least choose whetheror not to consentto whatwe have to do. If we consentthen in a certainsense we do what we do of our own accordsince consent, at least, is exempt from priordetermination.(Such a solutionto of the free willproblemwouldof coursebe reminiscent thatproposedin the and Tractatus Notebooks,73, 76-78, 81-82, by Wittgenstein.) But on this readingthe passageis internallyinconsistent.For how could an analogy, whose point is to show that consent is exempt from prior ruleof fate'?Moreoverif be determination, used to illustrate'the universal were proposingthis kindof solutionto the despite the inconsistency Stoics the free will problem, then they would have had to explain how consent which occurs outside the causal order, and so presumablyhas no causal withinthat efficacy,couldchangeactions,or even statesof mindoccurring order. (For the wise dog in the Analogy who complies with his master ceases to be dragged, and instead 'follows'.) But there is no apparent Finally, even if Hippolytus'spassage did awareness of this difficulty.37 a representthe Stoicsas countenancing breakin the GreatCausalChainto preserve freedom, it would conflict sharply with the testimony of the central commentators,accordingto whom (as we have seen) the Stoics were adamantthat:
Everythingthat comes about in any way whateverin the whole universeand in any of its parts will necessarilyhave come about conformablywith that nature and its reason in due and unimpededsequence, for neither is there anythingto obstructthe organizationfrom without nor is any of its parts susceptible of being moved or of assumingany state save in conformitywith universalnature. (P1:DeSR, 1050d)

Overdetermination: Davidson; Frankfurt's Willing Addict But the idea that an individual's own power is united with 'necessity' when he does of his own accord what will otherwise be compelled suggests another possible reading of the passage. The Stoic Analogy might be taken as an attempt to throw back the libertarian challenge by asserting, in the
37

Compare Wittgenstein'sattempt to deal with this problem, Notebooks, p. 78.

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mannerof Davidson, that even when we cannot act otherwisethan we do we may still sometimes act freely, and of our own free will. For supposethat our desireto act in a certainway is suchthat we would still have performedthe action, even if it had not also been independently determined.Would it not then be plausibleto claim, as does Davidsonin his contemporary versionof this argument,that, thoughwe could not have done otherwise(since it was in any case fated that we act in that way), we still also acted of our own free will? Our desiresstill form partof a causal chain which resultsin our action. But the significancefor free will of this case is thatour desires(andthe causalchainthatincludesthem) are now set over and against an inexorablenecessity or fate which would also have producedthe act. But Davidson'sexample'0 the Dog Tied to WaggonAnalogydifferin and subtle ways. There are, for instance, two kinds of case of which the counterfactual'even if x hadn'twished to do y, he would still have been caused to do it by external forces' might be asserted. In both cases, the agent'sdesireandexternalforcesare independently sufficientto producea given effect. But only in the formerare both the desireand externalforces actuallyefficacious.In the latter, externalforcesonly come into operation whenthe desireis absent.WhilstDavidsonprobably in mindthe former has case (and perhapsonly where this symmetryis present do we have true overdetermination38),is the lattercase whichthe StoicAnalogysuggests. it For thoughthe dog mustfollowthe waggon,if he runsalongsideit, thenthe rope slackensand no longerdragshim. Howeverthe contrastbetweenthe two types of case might perhaps be undermined by questioning the coherence of the whole notion of symmetrical overdetermination.39 A second, and possibly more serious, point is that Davidson is not concernedwith cases wherean individual's reasonfor choosingto perform some action is merely his belief that there exist independentforces which would otherwisecompelhim to do it. It is moreoverdoubtfulwhethersuch an individualwould be actingof his own free will by Davidson'scriteria. But the Stoic Analogy suggeststhis kindof case. It mightbe of coursethat
38It is difficult, however, to thinkof examples here (assumingthat the externalforces are physical) which are neither dubious nor contrived. To see this, one only has to imagine a man tryingto raise his armintentionally,whilst his armis also being raisedmechanically. 39 It might be said that a burglaralarmringsno more loudly when set off by simultaneous entry in two partsof a house than it does when set off by any single entry. If the alarmbell ringing is considered as the only effect then this may be true. But many hold that if a causal path is traced beyond the superficialringingof the bell other effects will be found which differentiate the two situations.

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the dog keeps up with the waggonjust becausehe enjoys running,though perhapshe has cultivatedthis enjoyment because he sees the wisdomof co-operationwith necessity.But it seems morelikelythat, in these circumstances, where he feels the rope pullinghim the moment he slackenshis pace, thathe doesn'twantto runat all andsimplywantsto avoidthe painof beingdragged:he has submittedto, or 'accepted',necessity.Thislastcase, unlike the others, would not howeversupportthe counterfactual 'even if externalforceshadnot been sufficientto causex to do y he wouldstill have of done y becausehe wantedto' whichjustifiesthe ascription freedomon Davidson'saccount.But perhapsthere is still a kind of freedomin voluntary submissionto necessity. The real difficulty, however, with attemptingto elucidate the Stoic position, on the above interpretation,by reference to Davidson is that Davidson, unlike the Stoics, as presentlyrepresented,wouldnot assertof every free action that is performedthat, if the agent had not desired to to performit, he wouldstillhavebeen constrained do so by an independent necessity. Thus it becomes apparentjust how deeply alien, despite its seemingly contemporaryreverberations,is the view now being attributedto the Stoics. For the Stoic notion of an 'independent necessity', as here conunderstood,cannot be identifiedwith anythingthat mightordinarily be presentwith may, or may not, strainaction, since ordinaryconstraints have to be construedas actions. It would accordingly regardto particular some kind of 'force' which stands 'over and against'events and actions, preventing themfromdeviatingfrom,or coercingtheminto, the fatedpath. Now it cannot be denied (see section 1) that, despite the philosophical fate, or necessity,as difficulties40 obscuritiesimplicitin characterizing and an independententity, the early Stoics did sometimesrepresentfate as a god(dess) ruling over the universe (Alex: DeF, 22 '...they call Destiny herself... a goddess'). On the other handthatStoicfate was a transcendent deity would have to be assessed againstthe extreme form of pantheism it associatedwithStoicthought.Moreover,even whenfate is personified is a coerciveagency.I and typicallyas a householderor administrator not as
this idea one would have to distinguishbetween an individual'sjust fulfilling, and his being constrained to fulfil, his fated destiny. But this may well be impossible:was Oedipusconstrainedby fate to kill his fatherand marryhis motheror did these actions occur just 'in the natural course of events'? And does it make sense to speculate, as does Auden ('Macbeth and Oedipus' in Shakespeare's Tragedies, ed. Lerner) as to what would have happened if Oedipus had just 'sat and waited in Corinth' vowing never to strike anyone?
40 To make sense of

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shall return to this point later, but conclude here by showing that the interpretationis in any case incompatiblewith the key Stoic doctrine regardingaction, as representedby the chief ancient commentators(see section 2). It hasjust been suggestedthatthe Stoicsmayhaveintroduced overdeterminationin order to be able to say that, even though there always exist externalforcessufficientto produceour actions,we neverthelessact freely wheneverwe wantto do whatin fact we have to do. But, for the Stoics, the idea thatexternalforcesalone couldbe sufficientfor an action'soccurrence contradicts their principlethat only if we had deliberatelychosen to act in the way we did would we have acted at all. The originalaccountof overdetermination might,however,be amended is so thatthe focusof overdetermination not now the actionitselfbut rather our desire to performit, so that even if whatwe do is overdetermined this would no longerentail that we would have done it, if we hadn'twantedto do it. Frankfurt's twofoldclassification desires41 usefulin articulating of is this type of overdetermination.Briefly, for Frankfurt, we may be spontaneouslyor unreflectively motivatedby 'firstorder'desires. However,on reflection, we may either endorse, or reject, these desires and form so-called'secondorder'desireswith which(as Frankfurt puts it) we 'identify' ourselves,for they involveour consideredappraisal our 'firstorder' of desires. first Supposenowthatwe onlywantto be motivatedby a particular order desirebut thatto achievethiswe haveto suppressanotherfirstorderdesire which neverthelesscontinues to motivate our actions (because of forces which determineits efficacy independentlyof our second order wishes). We will then experiencethis irrepressible desire as an inexorablecompulsion to whichwe mustsubmit.Thusourfirstorderdesiresmaybe a causeof actionswhichare eitherin accordance with, or in oppositionto, our second order wishes. A more subtle version of the overdetermination action of now arises wheneverthe first order desire that producesaction is simultaneouslydeterminedboth by our secondorderdesire(for we wantthusto be motivated)and by forces independentof our second order desires. Frankfurt gives an illuminating exampleof how a kind of freedommay plausiblybe ascribedto an individual whose actionsare neverthelessoverdeterminedin just this manner. Consideringthe case of an addict who
41 H. Frankfurt,'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journalof Philosophy 68, 1971, 5-20.

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actuallywants (has a second orderdesire)to yield to his cravingfor drugs, will he arguesthat it may be illegitimateto say that this individual's is free since, such is the strengthof his addiction,he has no choice but to take the drugs.But he maystill be describedas actingof his own free willsince he is quite willingto be motivatedto take drugsand wantshis desireto take the drugs to be effective. Thus he might seem to illustratethat union of an individual's'own power' with 'necessity'to which Hippolytus'spassage alludes. Leavingaside howeverdoubts(similarto those raisedin the comparison with Davidson) as to how complete the parallel really is, even using the willingaddictas a modelfor understanding Analogywillnot Frankfurt's render it consistent with the Stoics' general position on freedom. The their in reason,though,is worthconsidering some detailsinceit illuminates accountis general position further.A crucialconsequenceof Frankfurt's that first order desires, and the actions that springfrom them, are in our power only if the causalchainfromwhichthey resultincludesratherthan bypasses our second order desires. But not only are there no explicit secondorderdesiresin the Stoictheory,buttheir equivalentsto Frankfurt's sinceas we sawin section2, impulseandassent is introduction unnecessary which, for the Stoics, were the immediatecausesof action, and so are the first order only plausible candidatesfor identificationwith Frankfurt's desires, were necessarilyin our power, just as were the actionsto which they gave rise. that violatesmorethanjust the Stoicprinciple no action In fact Frankfurt can be sufficientlydeterminedby externalforces. Accordingto Frankfurt, we identify ourselves only with our second order desires and those first order desires that we endorse at the second level. Consequently,desires which, though not thus endorsed, continue to motivate us 'externally', view then desireitself can representa sourceof compel us. On Frankfurt's unfreedom.But the Stoics maintained,quite contrarily,not only that all free, butthatit is preciselythe specialcausalroleof the actionis necessarily actionthat guaranagent'sdesire (his 'impulse'and 'assent')in producing passage,then, on the modelof Hippolytus's tees thatfreedom.To interpret willingaddictwould distortthe Stoic accountof freedomeven Frankfurt's more than the previousinterpretation.
4. Agent-Causalism and Autonomy: A Reappraisal of the Stoic Theory of Freedom It should be clear by now that not only is it difficult to produce a satisfactory 296

interpretation the Dog Tied to WaggonAnalogy assumingthat it conof cerns determinism,but also that any such interpretation will almost certainlyconflictwiththe centraldoctrinesof earlyStoicism.I willconsiderthe broaderimplications these inconsistenciesin the next section, but first of wantto take up againthe natureof the Stoics'generalpositionon freedom, which, though shown (in section 2) not to be that of traditionalsoft determinism,still lackspositive characterization. As we have just seen, the Stoic identificationof freedom with the distinctivecausalstructure actionis quite alien even to those recentsoft of deterministaccounts,such as Frankfurt's Davidson's,whichdispense and with the alternativepossibilitiesrequirement.May it not be that the first Stoicswere, perhapssurprisingly view amongmodern given the prevailing moreakinto certaincontemporary commentators, suchas agent-causalists, RichardTayloror even Chisholm?42 Certainlyit wouldseem thatonly if we construethe earlyStoicsas agentcausalistsare we able to makecoherenttheiridea that impulse,assentand action are necessarilyin our power. For it is just becauseagent-causalists, such as Taylorand Chisholm,rejectthe attempts(by soft determinists and others) to break down agency into a sequence of events, such as desiring and acting,each linkedas antecedentto consequentin the ordinaryeventcausalmanner,thatthey are able to representthe bond betweenagentand action as so intimatethat 'externalforces'cannotconceivablyeither compete withor usurpthe role of the agentin producing action.On this reading of the Stoicsmoreover,assentandimpulseare themselvesthe specialcausal powers of agency, and thus it becomes clear why they should diverge so sharplyfrom Frankfurtian orderdesires, over which,by contrast,the first agent may said to have (or not to have) power. But is thereevidencein the earlyStoictextsof a typeof causationdistinct from ordinaryevent-causationand particularlyassociated with action? And could a systemas rigorously deterministic the Stoics'accommodate as two typesof causationthatdifferas radically agent-causation eventas and causation? And since, according to such writers as Alexander and Nemesius, the Stoics comparedhumanaction with the behaviourof animals and even of inanimateobjects, would even the latter on such an interpretation have to be regardedas agent-causes? In replyto the firstquestionwe mightpoint againto the Stoic distinction
42

R. Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 108-119;R. Chisholm, 'Freedomand Action', in Freedomand Determinism,ed. Lerner(New York, 1966), pp. 14-44.

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between principal and proximate causes which, particularly with regard to action, cannot be captured simply by treating principal causes (as most commentators have treated assent and impulse) as those antecedents of an action which contribute most to its occurrence: principal causes were not, unlike proximate causes, antecedent conditions of action at all (Clement: Stromateis, VIII, 8). Moreover, not only was the principal cause associated with the agent in a way that proximate causes were not, but, unlike proximate causes, it produced action (as we have already noted) in some sense autonomously. 'It is called', writes Clement, 'acUOTEXEsbecause self-sufficiently through itself alone and independently of anything else (atvT6Q;X 6i'acd'Toi) it is capable of producing the outcome' (Stromat., VIII, 9). But such an idea, whilst definitive of agent-causalism, simply cannot be captured within a traditional soft determinist framework. Again, whilst contemporary agent-causalists have generally been antideterminist and are sometimes accused of positing a substantive, extraempirical self, it is by no means clear that there is any intrinsic illogicality in both being determinist and maintaining that the agent-causal relation is conceptually irreducible, provided a distinction is also acknowledged between two mutually exclusive levels of description. (For a modern example, see the dual standpoint theory of J. Bishop.43) Finally, as to the Stoics' comparison of human action with other types of behaviour, whilst writers like Alexander and Nemesius may well have been exaggerating the similarity in order to ridicule the Stoics, it would nevertheless be quite consistent with Stoic pantheism for non-humans to be agent-causes. But surely to say that the agent-causalist must, if he is also a determinist, recognize a dual perspective is just another way of saying that he must allow that there is some sense in which the individual who acts has the power not to act in that way? For what otherwise would be the significance of claiming that it is the agent himself who causes his action? Yet the early Stoics apparently did not associate the power to do otherwise with the exercise of agency (see Chrysippus's reply to the Lazy Argument). Admittedly, the question of whether an individual could have done otherwise when he acted is not intrinsic to agent-causalism as it is, for instance, to traditional soft determinist ascriptions of freedom. For whilst the external circumstances in which someone acts are crucial for these latter ascriptions, it is enough for the agent-causalist that the individual simply acts, since, according to him, the source of freedom is the distinctive causal structure of action itself.
43

J. Bishop, 'Agent-Causalism',Mind 92, 1983.

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On the other hand, the agent-causalist, unless he also happensto be a of purely logical fatalist, assumesa background ordinarycausal relations is between events. And since agent-causalism evidentlynot compatible(as e.g. Davidson'sbrandof soft determinismmay appearto be) with situations in which external forces have equal causal claims with the agent himself, the opportunityfor agency can only exist where there are no sufficientcauses to pre-emptits exercise. to Now the opportunity an individual act canstill be presenteven in a for situationwhere he lacks in any effective sense the power to do otherwise. He may, for instance, deliberatelychoose to produce a state of affairs himselfratherthanleave alienforcesto causeit, as otherwisetheywill. But even in this situationthe individualexercises a minimalchoice between differentcoursesof action. Even this linkhoweverbetweenthe exerciseof agencyandthe powerto do otherwiseis absentfromthe earlyStoicaccount of freedom. This objection, however, reveals something new and interesting:the difficultwith construingthe early Stoics as agent-causalists not in the lies fact that their determinism excludesalternativepossibilitiesbut merelyin the way it (apparently)does. A purely logical fatalism, for instance, excludesalternative possibilities withoutin anywayundermining integrity the of the agent-causalrelation. But so far, in discussingStoic freedom, we havefollowedmoderncommentators treatingthese ancientphilosophers in as straightforward causal deterministsof a relatively modern type, for whom the thesis that there exist sufficient antecedent conditions for everythingthat occursmightbe expectedto have been essential. So it may be temptingto suppose that their exclusionof alternativepossibilitiesof action rested upon this thesis in a manner inconsistent with agentcausalism. But we know(see section 1) thatStoicdeterminism involvedteleological and pantheisticelements which, thoughconflictingwith, are difficultfully to disentanglefrom the more recognizablymodern elements: the Great CausalChainwas still seen on the one handas the productof animateand inanimateagents, inexorablycarryingout the decrees of fate, and on the other as the interrelatedactivity of the parts of an organic unity, not requiring externalregulation.It wouldhardlybe surprising the Stoicshad if not yet worked out the consequences for human freedom of a purely mechanisticdeterminismwhich had not itself been isolated from more ancient fatalistic ideas, and thus continued to base their affirmationof freedom and responsibilityupon a conception of agency as logically
primitive. 299

Suppose now that one believed (as many passages testify that the Stoics believed) that the universe was a harmonious whole, rationally administered, in which each individual had his appointed role to play in some overall design. Would it be so implausible, against this background of beliefs, both to deny that human action could ever be the mere passive effect of antecedent circumstances (since it must be actively initiated by an agent), and yet to assert that, when an individual acts, he only ever does so in strict, though spontaneous, accordance with fate's decrees, so that there is no chance that he will deviate from his fated path? Moreover, even the idea that fate in some sense imposes certain ends or purposes on the agent, obliging him to act to fulfil them (cf. Calcidius: 'the movements of our minds are mere instruments for carrying out determined decisions since it is necessary that they be performed through us by the agency of fate' SVF II, 94), is offset by the Stoic conviction that the individual, being a part of the Great Whole, was himself partly author of those very ends and purposes. It will already be apparent that the agent-causalism here being attributed to the early Stoics can bring no comfort to those still seeking parallels between these ancient philosophers and today's thinkers. Indeed no contemporary philosopher, so far as I know, has ever supposed that a notion of agent-autonomy, so baldly shorn of its implications of alternative possibilities of action, as the early Stoic fatalist presented it, and without the benefit of a dual standpoint theory which could soften the apparent inconsistency with an accompanying causal determinism, could support attributions of moral responsibility in anything like the way our more fullblooded conception of freedom does. One can only wonder, then, at the overwhelming conviction with which the early Stoics did in fact affirm men's responsibility for their actions. Almost paradoxically, in view of their fatalistic determinism, the extraordinary expansion of their notion of responsibility, which results from the apparent absence of any ordinary system of excuses, constitutes one of the major gulfs between early Stoic and contemporary thought. For whilst agent-causalists, like e.g. Chisholm, provide general criteria for distinguishing between actions as the bearers of freedom and things that just happen to, or in spite of, the agent, they do not regard this latter category as crudely co-extensive with involuntary movement; it includes what an individual does unwillingly, in ignorance, when overcome by desire, and so on. The early Stoics, on the other hand, at least on the evidence of the texts that have survived, adhered to an altogether starker, less subtle view: if what we do is intentional under any description, if, that is, it is not just a matter of involuntary movement, then we act freely and must bear 300

responsibilityfor our deeds. This is the import of that harsh passage in which Aulus Gellius quotes Chrysippus verbatimthus:
'the carrying out of action (is) regulated by each individual's own will and the characteristicsof his mind... therefore it is said by the Pythagoreans: You will learn that men suffer ills which they themselves Bring on themselves, for harm comes to each of them through themselves, and they go astray through their own impulse and are harmed by their own purpose and determination.' Therefore (Chrysippus) says that the wicked, slothful, sinful and reckless men ought not to be endured... who, when they are caught fast in guilt and sin, take refuge in the inevitable natureof fate, as if in the asylumof some shrine, declaring that their outrageousactions must be charged, not to theirown heedlessness, but to fate. (NA, Bk, 7, II)

But once this ruthlessstance concerningthe attributionof responsibility and blameis comparedwith eitherthat of an agent-causalist Chisholm like or thatof Frankfurt (who wouldwishat least to exemptthe unwilling addict fromresponsibility, despitethe parthis desiresplayin producing action) his the extent of divergenceeven in moral outlook between the ancient and modernaccountsof freedomand action is apparent. The early Stoics were perhapsin certainrespectsthe heirsof the Greek tragedianswhose conception of fate they commendedand whose moral outlook their own so often, and so strikingly, evokes. Oedipus, for instance,(in Sophocles'OedipusRex) is held guiltyof killinghis fatherand marrying mothereven thoughhe was fated to committhese deeds. Nor his is he even exoneratedof guilt by not having intended to carryout these actions which he was fated to perform.For Oedipusdid not intentionally kill his fatherand marryhis motheryet he says:
I have done things deservingworse punishmentthan hanging (line 1380)

and again:
To this guilt I bore witness against myself Now I am found to be a sinner and a son of sinners (line 1158)

Unfortunately, however, there is no space here to develop further this comparison between early Stoic moral attitudes and those expressed in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Stoic Pantheism and the Willing Subject If the comparison with Frankfurt shed light upon some of the mysteries surrounding the Stoic account of freedom as we left it at the end of section 301

2, there still remainsthe problemof how to deal with the passagefrom Hippolytus.There seems little to choose betweeneitherof the interpretations consideredin section 3 since each is inconsistentwith some central the featureof earlyStoicthought.The firstrepresented Stoicsasplacingthe freedomwhich willingself outsidethe determinedorderso as to guarantee extendsto Stoicclaimthat'necessity' is incompatible withthe fundamental apartfromtheir 'everything'.Both versionsof the second interpretation, of questionable characterizations Stoic fate, relied upon a distinction, withinthe determinedorder, betweendoingsomethingof our own accord to andbeingcompelledto do it, whichit provedimpossible draw,giventhe Stoic account of action and freedom, as we have it from such writersas and Cicero,AulusGellius,Plutarch Alexander.On the otherhandthe type of agent-causalism have finallyattributedto the Stoics representsthe we accordwithfate, as co-author individualas actingin a kindof harmonious of its ends - a picture of co-operationthat contrastssharplywith that conveyed by the Analogy. this Yet despite the difficultyin interpreting passageI still believethatit posedfor recordsan attemptby the Stoicsto come to gripswiththe problem freedom by their thesis of determinismand should not be dismissedas, unexcitingly,just a restatementof that thesis. Indeed I do not see how it of could be thus dismissed.For this would be to overlookthe significance of the allusion(virtuallyuniquein early Stoic discussions freedom)to the individualwho does not want to do whathe is fated to do, andwhosewill, being thus in some way at odds with universalnecessity,has to be coerced by necessity. It is impossible, of course, to say just what this allusion might have a signifiedor exactlywhatinferencesconcerning shiftin the Stoics'conceptual framework mightbe drawnfromit. But it is plausibleto speculatethat here, probablyfor the first time in Stoic thought,there beginsto emerge that metaphysical conceptionof a 'willingsubject'which'standsover and Yet against'the whole determinedworld.44 such a conceptualinnovation and libertarian earlyWitt(familiarto anyoneconversantwith traditional of gensteiniandiscussions free will) wouldhave seemedalien, even revolutionary, to the early Stoics. It might even have been resistanceto such a pictureof the relationbetweenthe self and the worldthatpreventedthem from fully articulatingthe free will/determinism conflict, and thus from grapplingwith it except by a confused, thoughsuggestive,analogy. Let us finallyconsiderthe kind of reasons(alreadyhintedat in the last
44

See Wittgenstein, Notebooks, p. 80 and p. 82.

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section) thatthere mighthave been for Stoicresistance makinga concepto tualdistinction externalworld. opposingthe willingsubjectto a determined Firstlythe self or subjectis, according the new picture,'splitoff' from to the world;but the Stoic self or soul was explicitlyconceivedof as a partof, not distinctfrom, the materialuniverse.As Alexanderwrote:'Thesoulsof living beings are partsof the soul of the whole world'. Again, the determinedworldis typicallyconstruedon the new pictureas constitutedof blind, mechanicalforces. But the Stoic universeis a divine and rationalorderin whichas Plutarch wrote:'Nothing... eitherrestsor is moved otherwise than accordingto the reason of Zeus' (SVF, II, 937c). And the many referencesto the Stoic universeas a 'household'run by a beneficentmaster(Alex: SVF, II, 945; P1:SVF, II, 645) suggesta kind of harmonybetween the individualand the universe similar to that which Hegel supposedactuallyto haveexistedbetweenthe citizenandthe ancient Greek city-state. Finally,the new picture,in settingthe humansubjectbrutally apartfrom the world, accordsto him a certainpre-eminence.This pre-eminencehas taken different forms. Traditionallibertarians,for instance, claim that human beings have a power (denied to all other creaturesor things) to influenceevents. Forthe earlyWittgenstein,however,the humansubjectis privilegedin thathe alone canconsentto his own powerlessness. surely But such human pre-eminence,whether of the former or the latter kind, is contraryto the spiritof Stoic pantheismwhichconstruedeverythingin the universeas partof a divineorder, andheld this divineorderto be a god. As Themistiuswrote:
...the Stoics hold that God pervadesevery substance, and in some partof the world is mind, in another soul or nature, or cohesion. (SVF, I, 158)

Yet care must be taken not to overstate the case. For whilst the early Stoics did stress the continuity between, for instance, animal and human

behaviour(and even, if Origenis to be believed, classedmen and animals togetherwithfire, metalsandwaterspringsas 'self-movers') continuity this was, as moderncommentatorsremindus, 'offset by a sharpbreak'.45 For man, being a rational creature, was considered, unlike other creatures (who had no logos) to be, as Long puts it, a 'particular logikos':
Not all of God has planned the individual'slife in isolation (whether temporal or spatial) from him since there is a portionof God whichis not externalbut inherentin every human being, namely his own logos. (PIS, 179)
45 S. G. Pembroke, 'Oikeiosis' in PIS, p. 121.

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Even so, one maywell wonderwhetherthe earlyStoicsever felt, withquite the same intensity,that cravingto whichWittgensteinalludesin the Tractatusand with whichthe firstStoic commentators were alreadyfamiliar,to 'procure',in Wittgenstein's words,a 'pre-eminent place'for humanbeings in the hierarchyof living creaturesand inanimatethings. Perhapsin one sense at least a Stoic like Chrysippusregarded (to quote Wittgenstein again):
Humans and animals quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together. (The Notebooks, 82)46

28 Maida Avenue London W.2.

46 I

would like to thankProfessorA. Long for commentson an earlierdraftof this paper, Dr. R. W. Sharplesfor his generous help on some points of scholarship,Dr. MaryCook for her painstaking translations of the more obscure Greek passages, Dr. A. R. Jonckheere and Will Cartwrightfor their acute discussion of a number of issues. Of course none of these people is responsible for any mistakes that remain.

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