THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee Vs FRED L DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants May 19, 1903 G.R. No.

1051 FACTS OF THE CASE The defendants were charged of scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands because of an editorial it published in the issue of Manila Freedom. The defendants were convicted for said offense basing upon Section 8 of Act. No. 292 of the Commission. Defendants then appealed for reversal of judgment made by the lower courts. ISSUE (ADMINISTRATION) Is the editorial published by the defendants directed towards the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands? RULING/HELD No, the editorial was not directed towards the government itself but towards the aggregate of individuals who were administering the government at that time. We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration." In this case, the editorial published by defendants where directed towards the personnel of the Commission whom they described as "notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character". This as being ruled out by the Supreme Court was an attack not to the government system but to the aggregate of individuals by whom the government is being administered. NOTES The final judgment of the convictions of the defendants was reversed by the Supreme Court acquitting the defendants with costs against the officials.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 145951 August 12, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIV.), and JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., JULIAN ALZAGA, ATTY. MANUEL SATUITO, ELIZABETH LIANG and JESUS GARCIA, respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25741. The Information alleged that respondents misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount of P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).1 On November 12, 1999, respondent Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest."2 He argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by respondents Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on January 6, 2000.3 Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on May 12, 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained respondents' contention that the AFPRSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 25741. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the instant special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: I RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2000 INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED JUNE 1, 2000, SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED JULY 10, 2000 AND SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 12, 2000.4 Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which dismissed Criminal Case No. 25741 was a final order which finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Section 1 of said Rule 45 explicitly provides: Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Moreover, Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7975, states: Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. xxx xxx xxx.

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules may be availed of only where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.6 Certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.7 The foregoing rule, however, may be relaxed where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. In such cases, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient.8 If the strict application of the Rules will tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.9 We now come to the substantive issue of whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are public or private. The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity on its findings that the Government does not provide counterpart contribution to

the System; that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive any salary from the Government and are not covered by the salary standardization law; that their remittances and contributions were made to the Social Security System and not to the Government Service Insurance System; and that the contribution to the System of the sum of P200,000,000.00 under Presidential Decree 361 can not be deemed as equity of the government in the System but rather, a donation or "seed money" which was never increased thereafter.10 Generally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on us. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.11 The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997.12 Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFPRSBS for their retirement, pension and separation benefits. For this purpose, the law provides that the contribution by military officers and enlisted personnel to the System shall be compulsory, thus: Officers and enlisted personnel in the active service shall contribute to the System an amount equivalent to four per cent (4%) of their monthly base and longevity pay, which contribution shall be deducted from their pay from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and paid to the System: Provided, however, That any officer or enlisted person who is due for compulsory retirement or is optionally retirable and actually elects to retire within one year from the approval of this Act, shall no longer be required to contribute to the System: Provided, further, That any officer or enlisted person who is separated through no fault of his own and is not eligible for either retirement or separation benefits shall upon his separation, be refunded in one lump sum all his actual contributions to the System plus interest at the rate of four per cent (4%).13 Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense.14

In connection with the Sandiganbayan's finding that the funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations, Section 2 of P.D. 361 states: SECTION 2. The System shall be funded as follows: (a) Appropriations and contributions; (b) Donations, gift, legacies, bequest and others to the System; (c) All earnings of the System which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever. Indeed, the clear import of the above-quoted provision is that, while it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 2000 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 25741 is ordered REINSTATED, and the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resume proceedings thereon with dispatch. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Summary: ACCFA vs. CUGCO (GR L-21484, 29 November 1969) The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs.Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), etc.[GR L-21484, 29 November 1969]; also The Agricultural Credit Administration(ACA) vs. ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA), etc. [GR L-23605]En Banc, Makalintal (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion Facts: On 4 September 1961 a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which was to be effective for a period of 1 year from 1 July 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and nonimplementation of said agreement. Finally, on25 October 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on 26 November 1962. On 30 October 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the CBA in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated 25 March1963 ordered the ACCFA (1) to cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self organization; (2) to comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on 4 September 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance; and (3) to bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated 25 April 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought the appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (GR L-21484). During dependency of the ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844),which among other things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration(ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On 17March 1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers Association filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case 1327-MC) praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order dated 30 March 1964 directed the Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the ACA to allow the posting of said order "for the information of all employees and workers thereof," and to answer the petition. Incompliance therewith, the ACA, while admitting most of the allegations in the petition, denied that the Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers, respectively, in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not the proper party to be

notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees and supervisors could not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation of the Unions dated 7 May 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the Agrarian Counsel in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council, it was agreed "that the union in this case represent the majority of the employees in their respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised would be submitted for the resolution of the trial Court. Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to the petition to be without merit, the trial Court in its order dated 21 May 1964 certified the ACCFA Workers' Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors, respectively, of ACA. Said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its resolution dated 24 August 1964. On 2 October 1964 the ACA filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to stay the CIR order (GR L-23605). In a resolution dated 6 October 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for 'lack of adequate allegations," but the dismissal was later reconsidered when the ACA complied with the formal requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, the Court ordered the CIR to stay the execution of its order of 21 May 1964. Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions. Held: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, nonproprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Hereof course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the

establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of the Court's ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the lower Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the Unions is concerned.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte [GR 74930, 13 February 1989]En Banc, Cortez (J): 13 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be"furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa whowere able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legalimplications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to theDeputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that aconfidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that itwould not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service andInsurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter,saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of publicinterest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, RolandoBartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid,Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a

special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnishValmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to theUNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) tofurnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. I ssue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSISrecords on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansamembers belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties. Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and theadministrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its fundsassume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (theRevised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to paythe contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, asemployer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guaranteesto pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources withutmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was thenecessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by theSystems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizingthe benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowerswere Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for theGSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its taskswith the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, thepublic nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the allegedborrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still,Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. Itis argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality asregards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely onconsiderations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declarewhat the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180 )

Immunity from Suits Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by the petitioner Bermudez seeking for the clarification of Sec. 5, Art. 18 of the proposed 1986 Constitution, as quoted: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Petitioner sought the aid of the Court to determine as to whom between the incumbent Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel and elected Pres. Marcos and VP Tolentino the said provision refers to. Issue: Whether the Court should entertain the petition for declaratory relief? Held: It is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.(Note: ROC provides that the jurisdiction for petitions for declaratory relief is with the RTC ) More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure. It being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of election

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez

Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . . . ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous. HELD: No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and VicePresident under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM) v. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, Facts: This is a petition for mandamus praying for the respondent judge to continue the proceedings in a civil case which was initiated under the regime of the so called Republic of the Philippines establishd uring the Japanese military occupation in the country. The respondent judge refused to takec ognizance of the proceedings on the ground that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur when the American forces took over the occupation of the island from the Japanese government, hadthe effect of invalidating and nullifying all the judicial proceedings and judgments of the court under the Philippine executive Committee and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. Respondent further claim that lower courts have no more jurisdiction to take cognizance and continue the case in courts under a defunct government in the absence of enabling law granting authority of such courts. Respondent contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government. The principal issues to be resolved now for the court are the following: 1. Whether judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the first government were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation oroccupation by the United States , 2. Whether the proclamation by Gen. MacArthur declaring that all laws, regulations andprocesses of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void and without legaleffect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control, has invalidated alljudgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said court 3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings were not been invalidated, will the present courtsunder Japanese occupation continue those proceedings pending in court The court in resolving the issue one by one shed light to the given questions. In the first issue, the court said that under international and political law, it is a legal truism that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. Another question now then needs an answer that is whether or not the government under the Japanese occupation was a de facto government. And if they were, then all those judicial proceedings remain good and valid even if there is a change of government. Several kinds of de facto government were elucidated by the court to find out what is applicable to the present case at bar. A Government de facto in a proper legal sense government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter

Government de facto established and maintained by military forces this is by way of invasion and occupation of a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated a government of paramount force. A Government de facto established as an independent government by inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state The powers and duties of de facto government of the second kind are regulated in Section III of the Hague conventions of 1907, which provides the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to re-establish and insure as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possess all the powers of a de facto government and he can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but is enjoined to respect municipal laws in force in the country, those laws which enforce public order, and regulate social and commercial life in the country. Laws of political in nature and affecting political relations such as the right of assembly, right to bear arms, right to travel freely are considered as suspended and in abeyance during military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended it is not unusual for the invader to take the whole administration into his hands. Local courts are authorized to continue administering justice, and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts. The municipal laws of a conquered territory or the laws which regulate private rights continue in force during military occupation except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror, he nevertheless has all the powers of a de facto government and can at his pleasure either the existing laws or make new ones. The Philippines during the Japanese occupation falls under the second kind of de facto government a civil government established by military forces of occupation. According to Halleck who wrote a book on international law, the government established over an enemys territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over theconquered and is subject to all restrictions which the code imposes. The governments by the Philippine Executive commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese military occupation being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those government which are not political complexion were good and valid and by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium)in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by American and Filipino forces. According to that principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not wipe out the effects done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. In the book of Isagani Cruz, the right of postliminy says Vatel is that in which persons or things taken by the enemy are restored to the former state on coming actually into the power of the nation to which they belong. In the present concept jus postliminium now also imports the reinstatement of the authority of the displaced government once control of the enemy is lost over the territory affected. In short non-political acts performed during the occupation (civil rights) remain

valid even after the occupation but acts of political automatically lose their validity upon the end of the occupation. In Nachuras book, postliminium is explained as the revival or reversion to the old laws and sovereignty of territory in the belligerent occupation once control of the belligerent occupant is lost over the territory affected. Side discussion:On the phrase processes of any other government which is the second issue of the case, still the well-known principles of international law is upheld that is all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of political complexion, of the de facto government during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereignLegal maxim, excepting that of a political nature, Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty. There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place and when changed it continues in such condition until the next change and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change. (Joseph H. Beale, author cases on conflict of laws and treatise on conflict of laws.Respondent judge is ordered therefore to take cognizance of and continue to the final judgment of the proceedings. Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). The court resolved three issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the

Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become

courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

G.R. No. L-5270, U.S. v. Bull

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION January 15, 1910 G.R. No. 5270 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant. Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee. ELLIOT, J.: The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The information alleges: That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the

vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation. By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following: The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns. Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked. 1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and

established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes. (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen. 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.) 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality. The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.) secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Bakers ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.) The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convenient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U.S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520-525.) Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United

States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquility of the country. (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ships company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass. 188.) The order and tranquility of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities. In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a quarrel on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to guard against a repetition of similar proceedings. (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this quarrel was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.) 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows: I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law. This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or arbitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquility of the country, it is

competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquility, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place. (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.) The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquility of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires unto hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquility of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case. It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not. It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas 416), the word willfully carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act. So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon 538), it was said: The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant knowingly did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondents counsel that the words willfully and knowingly conveyed the same meaning. To willfully do an act implies that it was

done by design done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was knowingly done. To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill. 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case. The evidence shows not only that the defendants acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals. It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally. In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. 556.) The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals. The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed. The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with failure to provide sufficient and adequate means. The words used are medios suficientes and medios adecuados. In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word suitable is translatable by the words adecuado, suficiente, and conveniente, according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide suitable means for the protection of the animals. 2. The appellants arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L.R.A., N.S. 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established. The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States. (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U.S., 194 U.S. 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U.S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S. 138; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370, 385.) The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.S. 138; Rassmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S. 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States. When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.) In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S. 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined. President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. that part of the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character was transferred from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as

should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character. This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act

of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands. The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form of government which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the Presidents instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided. In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read By authority of the United States instead of By the authority of the President. In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States. This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States. Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the

Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges. In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly government. Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws. The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U.S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same. (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.) In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.) 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid. 3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be

determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence: That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation. That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a

serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case. The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto. The petitioners contend that their vote were not taken into consideration in requiring that in amending the constitution, the law requires 3/4 of the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question of constitutionality of the said resolution. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction and whether or not the journals can be investigated against the conclusiveness of the enrolled bills. HELD: Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to confusion in the administration of the law. Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due enactment thereof.

Planas vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L- 35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L35979] Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as

amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on 1 June 1971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public

questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73. Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue. Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention. Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify. Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L- 35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L- 35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L- 35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and

decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs. Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections Facts On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a nationalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martiallaw, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous PresidentialDecree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting andcanvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that thepeople's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire tohave such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interimlegislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National Referendum-Plebiscite.Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition withPreliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031. They contend thatunder the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise theconstituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was institutedby Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power topropose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees. Issue: W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than

three months a after the approval of suchamendment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of twothirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shallinitially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace andorder in the country.When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they wereaware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when hecould convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of theinterim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves.In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution wassubmitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold theconvening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, becausesome of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemedautomatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in thatreferendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment toa Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged inthe amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for theinterim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for thenation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approvalof the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approveor disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of

legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. COMELEC

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual

vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. MacapagalArroyo, et. al.
G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Ponente:

OVERVIEW: This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following bases:

The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down President; Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety integrity of the State

and the the and

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend. February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I. February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on

the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military. The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas. Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand. ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic; 2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none of it; 3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble. HELD: 1. The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case. 2. Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot

undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove. 3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters

consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission

Political Law Separation of Powers In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. (j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. (l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Case Brief Summary

Summary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). The Steel Seizure Case

Facts
The Korean war effort increased the demand for steel. Disputes arose between steel industry management and labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike by the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry and keep the mills operating.

Issue

Does the President of the United States have executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nations steel mills?

Holding and Rule (Black)

No. The President does not have implicit or explicit executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nations steel mills.

The court held that there was no explicit statute or act of Congress which authorized the President to act in such a manner. The only two statutes which authorized the acquisition of personal and real property were not met here. Not only were such acts unauthorized, Congress specifically refused to grant such authorization. The court held that in order for the President to have this authority, it must be found somewhere explicitly in the Constitution, or implicitly in some historical context or foundation. The President cannot order policy; he can only suggest it. Congress can approve any proposal for regulation, policy, settlement of disputes, wages, and working conditions. None of this is delegated to the President. Under a textual approach to interpreting the Constitution the Presidents powers are curbed in this extension.

Dissent (Vinson, Reed, and Minton)

Many presidents have taken such action before, most notably Lincoln (Civil War, naval blockade, Emancipation Proclamation), Hayes and Cleveland (authorization of the use of the military to settle strikes) without state or legislative authority.

Concurrence (Frankfurter)
FDRs actions during the Great Depression resulted in extensions of executive authority, but his authority was not violative of the Constitution. Three laws had already been enacted by Congress when FDR enacted his policy, and six others were only enacted after Congress declared war, thereby falling under the war powers.

Concurrence (Jackson)
In determining whether the executive has authority, there are three general circumstances: 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, the Presidents authority is at its greatest. 2. When the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority. When this is the case, the test depends on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the authority of the President is at its lowest. Justice Jackson stated that this case falls into category three. If the Presidents argument were accepted the executive branch could exert its authority over any business or industry.

Notes
The most important part of this case is the three part test set forth in Justice Jacksons concurrence. This case is also cited as Youngstown v. Sawyer and as Youngstown Sheet Tube v. Sawyer. See Missouri v. Holland for a case brief of a constitutional law opinion in which the Supreme Court held that Congress has the power under Article II to give effect to a treaty authorized by the President pursuant to the Executives treaty power, even if such legislation would otherwise be an unconstitutional interference with states rights.

Bowsher v. Synar
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States held that Congress assignment of certain functions under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to the Comptroller General of the United States violated the doctrine of separation of powers because by its assignment of such functions, Congress was reserving the removal power of an officer charged with execution of the laws. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws except by impeachment. Facts. Respondents, Congressman Synar and the National Treasury Employees Union, challenged the constitutionality of Congress assignment of certain functions to the Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act). Respondents claimed that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The Act consisted of a threetiered procedure to control spending. The Comptroller General is nominated by the President and removable only by impeachment or by joint resolution of Congress. A three-judge district court held that the Act was unconstitutional because it imposed executive functions on the Comptroller General and that those functions could not be exercised by an officer removable by Congress. Issue. Whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Held. Yes. Judgment of the district court affirmed. Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws because those functions assigned to the Comptroller General entail interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate which is the very essence of execution of the law. The Constitution forbids Congress to execute laws. Dissent. The practical result of the removal provision reveals that the Comptroller General is unlikely to be removed by Congress because removing the Comptroller General requires a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than that required to impeach and convict. Therefore, there is no real danger of aggrandizement of congressional power. Discussion. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids Congress from directly and indirectly giving the legislative branch executive authority.

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

On September 6, 2011 00 Question Hour EO 464 In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make

investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the

separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Read the full text of the case here. BELOW is a reproduction of EO 464: E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order: Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President. SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. **The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.** *** On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.***

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 100481 January 22, 1997 PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONFERENCE OF INTERISLAND SHIPOWNERS AND OPERATORS, UNITED PETROLEUM TANKER OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LIGHTERAGE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PILOTAGE INTEGRATED SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and MANILA PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, respondents. G.R. No. 103716-17 January 22, 1997 HON. PETE NICOMEDES PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents G.R. No. 107720 January 22, 1997 HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, and SIMEON T. SILVA, JR., in his capacity as the South Harbor Manager, Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court Manila, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and the MANILA PILOT'S ASSOCIATION, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines. The service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific point, usually about two (2) miles off shore, to an assigned area at the pier and vice versa. When a vessel arrives, a harbor pilot takes over the ship from its captain to maneuver it to a berth in the port, and when it departs, the harbor pilot also maneuvers it up to a specific point off shore. The setup is required by the fact that each port has peculiar topography with which a harbor pilot is presumed to be more familiar than a ship captain. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government agency which regulates pilotage. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857, it has the power "to supervise, control, regulate . . . such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the Authority" 1 and to "control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port District." 2 It also has the power "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." 3 These cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of Executive Order No. 1088, which fixes the rates of pilotage service, and the equally determined efforts of the PPA and its officials, the herein petitioners, to block enforcement of the executive order, even as they promulgated their own orders which in the beginning fixed lower rates of pilotage and later left the matter to self determination by parties to a pilotage contract. I. THE FACTS G.R. No. 103716 On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA. However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation: that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations. 4

The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986. This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 4386, fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088. Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez, and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Soils, Jr. It sought a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in accordance with E.O. No. 1088. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-38913, was raffled to Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the UHPAP, its officers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting pilotage fees pursuant to E.O. No. 1088. On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc., Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. and Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, filed a joint answer in intervention. On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. The administrative order provided:
Sec. 3. Terms/Conditions on Pilotage Service. The shipping line or vessel's agent/representative and the harbor pilot/firm chosen by the former shall agree between themselves, among others, on what pilotage service shall be performed, the use of tugs and their rates, taking into consideration the circumstances stated in Section 12 of PPA AO No. 03-85, and such other conditions designed to ensure the safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas/grounds.

The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and that consequently E.O. No. 1088 had ceased to be effective. The UHPAP opposed the motion. Together with the Manila Pilots' Association (MPA), it filed on May 25, 1988 a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC-Manila, questioning the validity of A.O. No. 02-88. This petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 8844726 (United Harbor Pilots' Association and Manila Pilots' Association v.

Hon. Rainerio Reyes, as Acting Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and Maximo Dumlao, Jr., as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), et al.) and raffled to Branch 2 of RTCManila. The factual antecedents of this case are discussed in G.R. No. 100481 below. Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a decision 5 holding that A.O. No. 0288 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under obligation to comply with E.O. No. 1088 because the order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal. The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. The petition was filed in this Court which later referred the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. On the other hand the intervenors appealed to the Court of Appeals where this case was docketed as CA G.R. No. 21590. The two cases were then consolidated. In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division 6 of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. Hence, this petition by the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA. The intervenor shipping lines did not appeal. G.R. No. 100481 Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari filed before RTC-Manila, Branch 2 (Civil Case No. 88-44726), the UHPAP and the MPA sought the annulment of A.O. No. 02-88. which in pertinent parts provided:
Sec. 1. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared that the provision of pilotage in ports/harbors/areas defined as compulsory in Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, entitled, "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports" shall be open to all licensed harbor pilots/pilotage firms/associations appointed/accredited by this authority to perform pilotage service. Sec. 2. Persons Authorized to Render Pilotage. The following individuals, persons or groups shall be appointed/accredited by this Authority to provide pilotage service: a. Harbor Pilots of the present Pilotage Associations of the different pilotage districts in the Philippines. Their probationary training as required under Section 31 of PPA AO No. 03-85 shall be undertaken by any member of said Association.

b. Members/employees of any partnership/corporation or association, including Filipino shipmasters/ captains of vessel (domestic/foreign) of Philippine Registry and individuals who meet the minimum qualifications and comply with the requirements prescribed in Sec. 29 of PPA AO No. 0385, aforestated, and who are appointed by said firm or association and accredited as harbor pilots by this authority. New Harbor Pilots who wish to be appointed/accredited by PPA under the open pilotage system either as an individual pilot or as a member of any Harbor Pilot partnership/association shall be required to undergo a practical examination, in addition to the written examination given by the Philippine Coast Guard, prior to their appointment/accreditation by this Authority.

The UHPAP and MPA, as petitioners below, contended (1) that A.O. No. 0288 was issued without the benefit of a public hearing; (2) that E.O. No. 1088 had not been repealed by any other Executive Order or Presidential Decree and, therefore, should be given effect; and (3) that A.O. No. 02-88 contravened P.D. No. 857. On August 21, 1989, the Philippine Interisland Shipping Association, Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators of the Philippines, Lighterage Association of the Philippines, and Pilotage Integrated Services Corp., were allowed to intervene. On September 8, 1989, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court, enjoining the PPA from implementing A.O. No. 02-88 and, on October 26, 1989, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners therein. The dispositive portion of the court's decision 7 reads: WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted.
1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in approving Resolution No. 860 and in enacting Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88, the subject of which is "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service"; 2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void; 3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent; and 4. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

Respondents and the intervenors below filed a joint petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 19570), assailing the decision of the

trial court. But their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the issue raised was purely legal. The parties separately filed petitions for review before this Court. The first one, by the PPA and its officers, was docketed as G.R. No. 100109 (Hon. Pete Nicomedes Prado, Philippine Ports Authority and Commodore Rogelio Dayan v. United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines and Manila Pilots' Association), while the second one, by the intervenors, was docketed as G.R. No. 100481 (Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines, Conference of Interisland Ship Owners and Operators, United Petroleum Tanker Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals. United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines and Manila Pilots' Association.) The petition filed by the government in G.R. No. 100109 was dismissed for failure of petitioners to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error. 8 On the other hand, the petition of the intervenors in G.R. No. 100481 was given due course. G.R. No. 107720 Following the denial of its petition in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA issued on July 31, 1992, Administrative Order No. 05-92. placing harbor pilots under the control of the PPA with respect to the scheduling and assignment of service of vessels. The PPA cited as justification "pilotage delays . . . under the set-up where private respondents (UHPAP & MPA) assign the pilots. Intentionally or otherwise, several vessels do not receive the pilotage service promptly, causing them operational disruptions and additional expenses/costs." 9 Private respondents UHPAP and MPA viewed the matter differently. On October 28, 1992, they asked the RTC-Manila, Branch 2 which heard and decided Civil Case No. 88-44726 to cite PPA officials in contempt of court. On the same day, the trial court issued an order restraining the herein petitioners from implementing Administrative Order No. 05-92. However, the PPA proceeded to implement its order, prompting the UHPAP and MPA to move again to cite petitioners in contempt, even as they questioned the validity of A.O. No. 05-92. Accordingly the trial court issued another order on November 4, 1992, reiterating its previous order of October 28, 1992 to petitioners to refrain from implementing A.O. No. 05-92 pending resolution of the petitions. Making a special appearance, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the court and moved for the dismissal of the petitions for contempt. Allegedly to prevent the disruption of pilotage services, petitioners created a special

team of reserve pilots to take over the pilotage service in the event members of UHPAP/MPA refused to render pilotage services. For the third time respondents moved to cite petitioners in contempt of court. Again petitioners questioned the court's jurisdiction and manifested that they were adopting their previous motion to dismiss petitions for contempt filed against them. On November 17, 1992, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and set the contempt petitions for hearing on November 19, 1992. Hence, this petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 107720 (Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority, Commodore Rogelio A. Dayan, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority and Simeon T. Silva, Jr., in his capacity as the South Harbor Manager, Philippine Ports Authority v. Hon. Napoleon Flojo, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, RTC, Manila, UHPAP and MPA). Pending resolution of this case, the Court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo as of October 31, 1992.
II. THE ISSUES AND THEIR DISPOSITION

The issues raised are:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CHALLENGED DECISION OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 41, WHICH RULED THAT: (A) CIVIL CASE NO. 87-38913 HAS NOT BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-88; AND (B) HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO COMPLY WITH E.O. NO. 1088; II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING CA G.R. SP. NO. 19570 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION? III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE NAPOLEON FLOJO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS FOR CONTEMPT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 05-92?

These issues will be discussed in seriatim.

A. Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and Petitioners are Bound to Obey it (G.R. Nos. 103 716-17) Executive Order No. 1088 reads: EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 1088 PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE OR PUBLIC PHILIPPINE PORTS. WHEREAS, the United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines has clamored for the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, whether public or private; WHEREAS, the plea of the Association has been echoed by a great number of Members of Parliament and other persons and groups; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby direct and order: Sec. 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels;
For Foreign Vessels Rate in US $ or its Peso Equivalent Less than 500GT $ 30.00 500GT to 2,500GT 43.33 2,500GT to 5,000GT 71.33 5,000GT to 10,000GT 133.67 10,000GT to 15,000GT 181.67 15,000GT to 20,000GT 247.00 20,000GT to 30,000GT 300.00 30,000GT to 40,000GT 416.67 40,000GT to 60,000GT 483.33 60,000GT to 80,000GT 550.00 80,000GT to 100,000GT 616.67 100,000GT to 120,000GT 666.67 120,000GT to 130,000GT 716.67 130,000GT to 140,000GT 766.67 Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess tonnage. Rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting other related special services is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in government and private wharves or piers,

For Coastwise Vessels: Regular 100 and under 500 gross tons P41.70 500 and under 600 gross tons 55.60 600 and under 1,000 gross tons 69.60 1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons 139.20 3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons 300.00 5,000 and over gross tons Sec. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange rate. Sec. 3. All orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and other issuances inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of February, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-six. ( S g d . ) F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S P r e s i d e

n t o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s By the President: (Sgd.) JUAN C. TUVERA Presidential Executive Assistant

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its power under its charter to fix pilotage rates. The contention has no merit. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. 10 Indeed, the great battle over the validity of the exercise of this power by administrative agencies was fought in the 1920s on the issue of undue delegation precisely because the power delegated was legislative. The growing complexity of modern society, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations and the increased difficulty of administering the laws made the creation of administrative agencies and the delegation to them of legislative power necessary. 11 There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in

the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by E.O. No. 1088. It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character. Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. No. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees . . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District." It is worthy to note that E.O. No. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports." The case presented is similar to the fixing of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act (R.A. No. 6727) whereby minimum wages are determined by Congress and provided by law, subject to revision by Wage Boards should later conditions warrant their revision. It cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-fixing powers, by virtue of the former's plenary power of legislation. When Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that

The power of the PPA to fix pilotage rates and its authority to regulate pilotage still remain notwithstanding the fact that a schedule for pilotage fees has already been prescribed by the questioned executive order. PPA is at liberty to fix new rates of pilotage subject only to the limitation that such new rates should not go below the rates fixed under E.O. 1088. The rationale behind the limitation is no different from what has been previously stated. Being a mere administrative agency, PPA cannot validly issue orders or regulations that would have the effect of rendering nugatory the provisions of the legislative issuance such as those of the executive order in question.(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner refused to implement E.O. No. 1088 on the ground that it was issued without notice to the PPA and that it was nothing but a "political gimmick" resorted to by then President Marcos. This perception obviously stemmed from the fact that E.O. No. 1088 was issued shortly before the presidential elections in 1986. But lack of notice to the PPA is not proof that the necessary factual basis for the order was wanting. To the contrary, the presumption is that the President had before him pertinent data on which he based the rates prescribed in his order. Nor is the fact that the order might have been issued to curry favor with the voters a reason for the PPA to refuse to enforce the order in question. It is not unusual for lawmakers to have in mind partisan political consideration in sponsoring legislation. Yet that is not a ground for invalidating a statute. Moreover, an inquiry into legislative motivation is not proper since the only relevant question is whether in issuing it the President violated constitutional and statutory restrictions on his power. The PPA did not have any objection to the order based on constitutional ground. In fact the nearest to a challenge on constitutional grounds was that mounted not by the PPA but by the intervenors below which claimed that the rates fixed in E.O. No. 1088 were exorbitant and unreasonable. However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overruled the objections and the intervenors apparently accepted the ruling because they did not appeal further to this Court. There is therefore, no legal basis for PPA's intransigence, after failing to get the new administration of President Aquino to revoke the order by issuing its own order in the form of A.O. No. 02-88. It is noteworthy that if President Marcos had legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution 12 so did President Aquino under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution 13 who could, had she thought E.O. No. 1088 to be a mere "political gimmick," have just as easily revoked her predecessor's order. It is tempting to ask if the administrative agency would have shown the same act of defiance of the President's order had there been no change of administration. What this Court said in La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas, 14 mutatis mutandis may be applied to the cases at bar:

Was it within the powers of the then Collector Ang-angco to refuse to collect the duties that must be paid? That is the crucial point of inquiry. We hold that it was not. Precisely, he had to give the above legal provisions, quite explicit in character, force and effect. His obligation was to collect the revenue for the government in accordance with existing legal provisions, executive agreements and executive orders certainly not excluded. He would not be living up to his official designation if he were permitted to act otherwise. He was not named Collector of Customs for nothing. . . . . Certainly, if the President himself were called upon to execute the laws faithfully, a Collector of Customs, himself a subordinate executive official, cannot be considered as exempt in any wise from such an obligation of fealty. Similarly, if the President cannot suspend the operation of any law, it would be presumptuous in the extreme for one in the position of then Collector Ang-angco to consider himself as possessed of such a prerogative. . . .

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally, the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088 or alter it as it did in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86. Much less could the PPA abrogate the rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties as it did through A. O. No. 02-88, 3. Theretofore the policy was one of governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By leaving the matter to the determination of the parties, the PPA jettisoned this policy and changed it to laissez-faire, something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with lawmaking authority, could do. B. Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the Appeal of Intervenors from the Decision of the Trial Court Invalidating Administrative Order No. 02-88 of the PPA (G.R. No. 100481) The Court of Appeals dismissed the joint appeal of the government and the intervenors from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 88-44726 on the ground that the issues raised were purely legal questions. 15 The appellate court stated:
After a painstaking review of the records We resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. From the facts, it is clear that the main issue proffered by the appellant is whether or not the respondent Philippine Ports Authority could validly issue rules and regulations adopting the "open pilotage policy" pursuant to its charter (P.D. 857).

xxx xxx xxx It must be noted that while the court a quo had clearly recognized the intricate legal issue involved, it nevertheless decided it on the merits which apparently resolved only the procedural aspect that justified it in declaring the questioned order as null and void. While We recognize the basic requirements of due process, the same cannot take precedence in the case at bar in lieu of the fact that the resolution of the present case is purely a legal question. Moreover, it appears that appellants in the court below had filed a manifestation and motion waiving their presentation of evidence. Instead, they opted to submit a comprehensive memorandum of the case on the ground that the pivotal issue raised in the petition below is purely legal in character. (p. 231, Records) At this juncture, We are at a loss why appellants had elevated the present action before Us where at the outset they already noted that the issue is purely legal. If in the case of Murillo v. Consul (UDK-9748, Resolution en banc, March 1, 1990) the Supreme Court laid down the rule that "if an appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, and in the latter Court, the appellant raised naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (page 5, Resolution in Murillo)," then with more reason where as in the case at bar public-appellants thru the Office of the Solicitor General in their memorandum manifested that the controversy has reference to the pure legal question of the validity of the questioned administrative order. Consequently, We have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition on the strength of these pronouncements.

As already stated, from this decision, both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court. In G.R. No. 100109, the government's petition was dismissed for lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. The dismissal of the government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481 for the review of the same decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those stated in the government's petition. It is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the merits of a controversy. 16 Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct.
17

It is significant to note that the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA, petitioners in G.R. No. 100109, have conceded the finality of the dismissal of their appeal. 18 Thus, the administrative policy, the validity of which herein petitioners seek to justify by their appeal, has already been abandoned by the very administrative

agency which adopted it, with the result that the question of validity of A.O. No. 02-88 is now moot and academic. C. Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and Decide the Contempt Charges against Petitioners (G.R. No. 107720) As already noted, following the dismissal of the government's appeal in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA abandoned A.O. No. 02-88 which provided for "Open Pilotage System." But it subsequently promulgated Administrative Order No. 05-92, under which the PPA assumed the power of scheduling and assigning pilots to service vessels, allegedly regardless of whether the pilots assigned are or are not members of the UHPAP and the MPA which theretofore had been the exclusive agencies rendering pilotage service in Philippine ports. The UHPAP and the MPA saw the adoption of this system as a return to the "Open Pilotage System" and, therefore, a violation of the trial court's decision invalidating the "Open Pilotage System." They considered this to be a contempt of the trial court. Petitioners moved to dismiss the motions for contempt against them. They contend that even if the motions were filed as incidents of Civil Case No. 88-44726, the RTC-Manila, Branch 2 did not have jurisdiction to hear them because the main case was no longer before the court and the fact was that the contempt citation was not an incident of the case, not even of its execution, but a new matter raising a new cause of action which must be litigated in a separate action, even as petitioners denied they had committed any contumacious act by the issuance of A.O. No. 05-92. Private respondents maintained that their petitions were mere incidents of Civil Case No. 88-44726 and that the trial court has jurisdiction because in fact this Court had not yet remanded the case to the court a quo for execution of its decision. Private respondents complain that petitioners are trying to circumvent the final and executory decision of the court in Civil Case No. 88-44726, through the issuance of A.O. No. 05-92. As already noted, however, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44726 enjoined petitioners from implementing the socalled "Open Pilotage System" embodied in A.O. No. 02-88. If, as alleged, A.O. No. 05-92 is in substance a reenactment of A.O. No. 02-88, then there is basis for private respondents' invocation of the trial court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Still it is argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 887426, upon the perfection of their appeal from its decision. That is indeed true. "The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this

last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after perfection of the appeal." 19 The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the trial court. 20 Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts. The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in G.R. No. 100109, petitioners rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction as embodied in its decision would be properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents' complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful processes of a court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the court. We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose. III. JUDGMENT WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Regalado, J., took no part.

People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng
Political Law Equal Protection Probation Law

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that ony in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 Facts : Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the

exercise of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court. Issue : Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid? Ruling : Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise

of the police power of the State. Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates

against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

De La Llana vs Alba
On October 30, 2011 00 Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the

matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Hirabayashi vs US - A case digest

Hirabayashi vs US 320 U.S. 81 (1943) Facts: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued EO 9066 which was later endorsed by the Congress thru HR. 1911 authorizing the Secretary of War to adapt measures in protecting the state against espionage and espionage. General Dewitt then issued Public Proclamation No. 1 and 2 defining the military zones. Public Proclamation No. 3 was released thereafter imposing curfew hours on all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, and all alien Italians including all persons of Japanese ancestry, and that they all be confined within their respective residences between 8pm6am. Hirabayashi failed twice to adhere to the curfew and was therefore sentenced to one month and one day imprisonment. Issues: WON EO 9066 is constitutional and that if it violates the Fifth Amendment as to descriminating citizens as to their race or ancestry. WON the congress unjustly delegated its powers to another in promulgating laws. Held: The US supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of EO 9066 pointing out the necessity to adapt such measures in time of war to prevent the country from espionage and sabotage. In addition, the Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the

Congress delegating its legislative function to another. The Proclamation No. 3, EO 9066 and HR 1911 should not be taken individually but is rather each as an affirmation of the other and that they are all in conformity. G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al. FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizesthe President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for theReorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.Petitioners contend that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegateslegislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regionsor at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is notexpressed in the title of the law.aw libraryThey also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the Presidentis only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainlynot to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion. HELD: No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination the existing regionsfollowing the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the patternset in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of thePresident as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only theadministration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires shouldhave regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in theConstitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are notterritorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power toadjust municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the linesseparating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local governmentunits by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.

3/25/12 3:39 AMSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 210Page 28 of 31http://175.41.139.102/sfsreader/session/00000136463470a850134143000a0083001f00 e5/p/AAAC5914/?username=Guest In reply to your enclosed letter of August 7, 1986,please be informed that the President had nothing to dowith the order of 612 612SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno seniority. The list and order of seniority was submittedby a screening committee and passed on to the SupremeCourt for review. Very truly yours,(SGD.) JOKER P. ARROYOExecutive SecretaryWhen Secretary Arroyo states that the President hadnothing to do with the order or sequence of seniority, itmeans that she just followed the recommendations of herown Screening Committee, which recommendations hadalready been reviewed by the Supreme Court. She did notselect any recommendees from another list. She did notmake a new listing or ranking of her own. She neverdeviated from the recommendations because everybodyrecommended was appointed. The change from No. 11 to No.26 could not have been a deliberate act of the President asshe had nothing to do with the order of seniority of theJustices she was appointing. The change could only havebeen an inadvertence because it was violative not only of the law but also of the recommendations of her Screening Committee.There are other matters raised in the letter and reply of Justices Campos and Javellana which have been answeredby Justice Puno in his Comment. I find no need to commenton them at this time.I regret if my answer to the query of Justice Campos ledhim to be lulled into inaction. Justice Campos called me upover the telephone inquiring about the petition of JusticePuno before I was aware that there was such a petition. I tryto read all petitions filed with the Court en banc but I do soonly after they are placed in the agenda and are in the nextorder of business of a particular session. My staff never

3/25/12 3:39 AMSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 210Page 29 of 31http://175.41.139.102/sfsreader/session/00000136463470a850134143000a0083001f00 e5/p/AAAC5914/?username=Guest places a copy of any petition on my desk until it is entered inthe agenda. It is unfortunate that Justices Campos,Camilon, dela Fuente, Javellana, Purisima, de Pano, andBellosillo were not furnished copies of the letter-petition of Justice Puno but this is for then Chief Justice Marcelo B.Fernan and Clerk of Court Atty. Daniel T. Martinez toexplain.Justices Campos and Javellana state that Justice Punois 50 years old and to put him in No. 5 will destroy thechances of 613 VOL. 210, JUNE 29, 1992613 Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno those displaced by him who are older than he to aspire forpromotion.The fears of the good Justices are unfounded. Except forthe Presiding Justice, a greater number of junior Justiceshave been appointed in the past ten years to the SupremeCourt from the Court of Appeals, than the most seniorJustices of that Court. In other words, there has been moreby passing of senior members than adherence to theseniority listing. In fact, the latest nominations of theJudicial and Bar Council for position to which JusticeBellosillo was appointed, included Justice Campos and excluded Justices Kapunan and Puno. I understand that inthe past few vacancies in this court, Justice Campos hasbeen nominated more often than Justice Puno.Our resolution dated November 29, 1990 correcting theseniority ranking of Justice Puno was a unanimous decisionof this Court except for Mr. Justice Feliciano who was onleave. All the matters treated by Justice Padilla werediscussed and fully deliberated upon. Since our resolution isbased on both the facts and the law, I see no reason why weshould modify or set it aside.I, therefore, vote to reiterate the Courts resolution datedNovember 29, 1990.CRUZ, J., Dissenting: