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Our empirical review suggests that certain participatory approaches and agents appear to transcend this critique and

have resulted in genuine forms of transformation. Moreover, a series of common threads underpins the transformatory potential of these interventions, and these threads, including the pursuit of participation as citizenship, can provide the basis for a conceptual relocation of participation within a radical politics of development. ThisWe argue that the critical modernist approach within development theory offers the best theoretical home for an understanding of participation that is at once political and radical. mohan 238

Democratic decentralization is a key aspect of the participatory governance agenda, and is associated with the institutionalization of participation through regular elections, council hearings and, more recently, participatory budgeting (see, for example, Blair, 2000).242

authorities is also alleged to create incentives for increased civil society activity. However, despite being lauded by development agencies and theorists across the political spectrum as the key to state reform, popular empowerment and, more recently, poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000), the track record of decentralization in developing countries has come under increasing criticism (see, for instance, Crook and Sverrison, 2001). Key problems observed so far include the failure of decentralization to overcome socio-economic disparities within local authority regions and the likelihood of elite capture; the tendency for the forms of participation introduced by decentralization to be subsumed either within more informal modes of patronage in ways that nullify its transformative potential (Francis and James, 2003), or to be negated by over-riding socio-cultural norms, as with the quota representation for minority groups (Kapoor, 2000; Tripp, 2000).243 Similar findings also emerge from reviews of participatory budgeting in Brazil, with evidence of increased popular participation (for example, over 10 per cent of the electorate in the state of Rio Grande do Sul participate in budgeting); changed investment patterns in favour of progressive social sectors such as housing, education, sanitation and health; excluded slums and populations drawn into the political process; and also increased efficiency in terms of planning and implementation (Santos, 1998; Schneider and Goldfrank, 2002; Souza, 2001). Patronage relations have been challenged (Heller, 2001: 140), with people now able to make claims according to their status as citizens rather than as clients (Abers, 1998; Souza, 2001). Once again, the agency for the success of participatory budgeting can be located within a wider radical political project. The most successful cases of participatory budgeting have been in areas where the Workers Party (PT) has been in power, with higher levels of participation correlated most closely with membership of the PT rather than other factors such as literacy (Schneider and Goldfrank, 2002: 9). Similarly, Heller (2001: 139) argues that the defining feature of both democratic decentralization in India and participatory budgeting in Brazil is that of a political project in which an organised political force and specifically non-Leninist left-of-center political parties that have strong social movement characteristics champions decentralisation. Hence..243-244

To a large extent, we would concur that NGOs face severe limitations in seeking to be genuine agents of transformative development through participatory approaches.Originally piloted by ActionAid in the mid-1990s, REFLECT is currently employed by 350 governmental and non-governmental agencies in sixty countries (ActionAid, 2003). The key idea behind REFLECT is to merge the pedagogical and political philosophy of Paulo Freire (1972) with the techniques of participatory rural appraisal, thus re-engaging the technocratic expression of participation with one of its more theoretical, political and radical antecedents (see Table 1). It is also theoretically informed by gender and development thinking, and seeks to develop womens capacity to take on participatory roles at community level and beyond (Archer and Cottingham, 1997). REFLECT proceeds by engaging participants in dialogical discussions of their socioeconomic problems, and uses visual graphics to structure and depict the discussion (ibid.). Keywords emerge from these discussions, which then form the basis for literacy development. Participants are encouraged to devise means of solving the problems, beginning with action-points to be addressed either by REFLECT groups or higher-level organizations.245 female participants and REFLECT facilitators in particular have become key resource people for the communities (Kanyesigye, 1998: 513). REFLECT is inextricably linked to citizenship formation, in that it focuses on peoples ability to participate in civil society, enabling them to effectively assert their rights and assume their responsibilities (Archer, 1998: 101). It thus emphasizes that participation needs to be practised in the broader spaces of the political community beyond the project level, and recognizes the need to reconnect populist methods of participation with more politicized understandings of social change. One of the key weaknesses of the project-based work traditionally favoured by NGOs is the inability to challenge wider structures of marginalization. As Nyamugasira (1998: 297) observes, NGOs have come to the sad realization that although they have achieved many micro-level successes, the systems and structures that determine power and resource allocations locally, nationally, and globally remain largely intact. Increasingly NGOs and other development actors are seeing that a useful contribution is not to take an atomistic view of local organizations246

However, we would argue that the importance of social movements in relation to participation and development cannot be captured in such terms, particularly in relation to the oppositions between culture/politics, and development/resistance. Rather, the historical and contemporary role of social movements, in using identity-based forms of participatory politics to extend the boundaries of citizenship to marginal groups (Foweraker and Landman, 1997; Scott, 1990), suggests that the cultural and the political are closely entwined (Castells, 1997). Furthermore, we would argue that some movements are better understood as being located within a critical position vis-a`-vis the ongoing project of modernity rather than being postmodern alternatives to development.248 Rural Workers Movement (MST) argues that democratic transition has not led to democratic transformation; that is, it has not led to the emergence of substantive forms of citizenship (Robles, 2001: 147). As a movement, it advocates for and works towards not simply obtaining its share of both land and political power within Brazilian society, but the fundamental transformation

of the structures of power within Brazil (ibid.). Each movement has impacted significantly on their respective terrain of struggle, as with the MSTs attainment of land for more than 400,000 landless workers. The forms of participatory citizenship advocated and (in some cases) practised by the movements noted here resonate beyond the narrower concerns of regional and ethnic identity that limit some movements to a position of narrow defence rather than progress (Castells, 1997). For..249 This notion of social movements being transformative and radical within rather than in opposition to the modern is further supported by research with popular organizations in Andean regions of Latin America (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2001). Land, democracy, citizenship and development all totems of the modern project remain the key concerns of a number of new social movements (Robles, 2001; Veltmeyer, 1997). This suggests that the participatory politics of cultural identity, material redistribution and social justice are not alternatives, but can be part of a single political project, a possibility we return to below.

there is an explicit articulation of a radical project that focuses primarily on issues of power and politics.250 2 ve 3-4 burda: Second, each approach that has achieved transformations has sought to direct participatory approaches towards a close engagement with underlying processes of development, rather than remain constrained within the frame of specific policy processes or interventions. In terms of NGOs, the REFLECT approach addresses itself to the patterns of domination and subordination within developing countries, rather than those between development professionals and project participants. The political parties that have attained the greatest success with participatory governance reforms have directly sought to alter patterns of inequality created by uneven processes of development.6 New social movements form the clearest example of a close and critical engagement with efforts to reshape development and the project of modernity itself. Third, each approach is characterized by an explicit focus on and pursuit of participation as citizenship. Each of the initiatives reviewed here seeks in different ways not only to bring people into the political process, but also to transform and democratize the political process in ways that progressively alter the immanent processes of inclusion and exclusion that operate within particular political communities, and which govern the opportunities for individuals and groups to claim their rights to participation and resources. This approach can be distinguished from earlier approaches to participation, such as the colonial project of community development, which promoted a narrow form of citizenship designed to reduce claims on the centre (see Table 1). Amongst the key exemplars here are the Zapatistas campaign for constitutional change in Mexico and the success of some participatory governance reforms in securing citizenship participation as an alternative form of inclusion to patronclient relations. In such instances, citizenship here is often not being requested from a proscribed menu of rights and obligations, but actively defined and claimed from below. The fourth commonality appears to be that, for participatory approaches to be successful in achieving transformation, a precondition is that the modes of accumulating political and economic power in the given context are (to a significant degree) structurally disentwined from each other. For

example, the success of decentralization in the Indian states of West Bengal and Kerala relied on the capacity of the new political elite to protect state resources and decision-making from the economic (landed) elite. To the extent that we focus on participation as a political project here, then, there is a need to examine the political economy of participation, particularly in contexts where the accumulation of political power and economic wealth are entwined, and where a focus on participation may simply be a means of concealing ongoing patronage. However, new forms of citizenship participation can arguably play a key role in challenging and reforming such dysfunctional forms of rule (Mamdani, 1996). However, our argument that participation can only be considered transformative if these rigorous criteria are met needs to be qualified. We do not imply that there is little point in using participatory methods by agents and in contexts where these criteria are not met.251-252 Here, citizenship constitutes not only a set of legal obligations and entitlements but also the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand and maintain existing rights (Isin and Wood, 1999: 4). This participatory notion of citizenship is particularly attractive to women and other marginalised groups (Lister, 1997: 28), as it offers the prospect that citizenship can be claimed from below through their own efforts in organized struggles (for example, the MSTs notion of substantive citizenship), rather than waiting for it to be conferred from above. Moreover, the grounding of citizenship in actual political communities also helps avoid the risk of imputing a specifically Western conception of citizenship into different contexts (Tilly, 1995).254 The key to this politics of difference is that it requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression (Young, 1990: 47, cited in Harvey, 1993: 105). Development from the Left: Critical Modernism In this section we elaborate on critical modernism as a leftist-inspired framework that seeks to balance a normative vision with a political praxis that is sensitive to different rationalities and modernities. Critical modernism emerged as a response to the failure of either populism, postmodernism or political economy approaches to adequately capture the complex positioning of structure and agency within contemporary development arenas. As an approach, it is primarily distinguishable from the postmodern/ postdevelopment rejection of development in stressing that most countries of the South have never been modern in the sense understood by postmodernists (Peet, 1997; Schuurman, 1993). Rather, critical modernism begins from the premise that rather than reject development tout court we need to rethink it (Peet and Hartwick, 1997). It retains a belief in the central tenets of modernism democracy, emancipation, development and progress but, theoretically rooted in Post-Marxism, feminism and poststructuralism, it begins from a critique of existing material power relations, particularly a critique of capitalism as the social form taken by the modern world, rather than on a critique of modernism as an overgeneralized discursive phenomenon (Peet and Hartwick, 1997: 200). This faith in modernism is also scientific in that it requires evidence for analysis and action, rather than faith. This avoids romanticizing the capacity of the poor and treating all local knowledge as pure and incontrovertible. As Peet and Watts (1996: 38) argue, within critical modernism rationality is contended rather than abandoned.255

We develop the notion of citizenship as a meso-level concept linking popular agency with politics, culture and place.257 The notion of citizenship thus offers a useful political, social and historical form of analysis within which to situate understandings of participation, as located within the formation of a social contract between citizenry and authority in particular political communities. Importantly, and although used across ideological divides, citizenship has a radical political trajectory that can be read most clearly off the claims and programmes of both old and new social movements over the past two centuries (Tilly, 1995). More broadly, then, citizenship is an inherently political perspective on participation, arguably the chief requirement of transformative approaches to participation. Finally, we argued that such a politics of citizenship must be tied to a project that is radical but which does not reject modernity tout court since modernity has never been a coherent and teleological process, but one that is fractured and multiply-realized. 257-258 Empirically, at least four very distinct trends are raising questions about classic nation-state-based models of citizenship. First, in some cases, globalization from above is undermining national and local rights, as in the widely debated case of the tension between investor rights and international trade and financial institutions, on the one hand, and citizen-based national efforts to defend social rights and environmental standards, on the other. This is the mirror image of the emergence of transnational rights and membership and will not be addressed in this review (see Fox 2003). Second, the widespread entry of transnational migrant communities into the public sphere, long-distance nationalism, and the rise of dual national identities are provoking sustained debate about distinctions between national identities and civil-political rights (e.g., Faist 2000, Jacobson 1996, Soysal 1994). Third, the rise of transnational civil society and an associated public sphere is extending claims to membership in cross-border civic and political communities grounded in rights-based worldviews, such as feminism, environmentalism, indigenous rights, and human rights. Fourth, within multilateral institutions, regional integration in Europe and broader international soft law reforms are recognizing individuals standing and proto-rights vis-`a-vis transnational authorities.4 As Baubock (2003) put it, the new challenge for political theory is to go beyond a narrow state-centered approachfox 173 In other words, if the core criteria of rights and membership mean that citizenship is a relational conceptbetween citizens and a state and/or a political communitythen what would transnational citizenship relate to? In the context of liberal democratic states, the relationship is vertical, between the individual and the state, mediated by the rule of law and formal political equality. Some analysts deploy a more horizontal approach, focusing on power relations within society. In the case of transnational citizenship, however, the reference point is not as clear.These conceptual choices between state- versus society-based definitions of citizenship are each path-dependent, ultimately determining what counts as citizenship according to a given set of assumptions. In an actor-based approach, membership in a political community is the key criterion. In a rights-based approach, the establishment of enforceable access to rights marks the threshold that determines citizenship. If, as the actor-based approach might suggest, the process of claiming rights across borders were to generate transnational citizenship, then the citizenries that are empowering themselves should be clearly identifiable. If citizenship is about membership in a polity, in addition to claims about rights, then howis that polity defined?

Baubock (1994) defines a polity as an inclusive community or association of equal members that extends basic rights to everybody subject to its collective decisions (p. viii).175 In summary, the claiming of rights is necessary but not sufficient to build citizenship. Along the lines of the state- versus society-based dimensions of citizenship described above, one could pose a distinction between a rights-based approach and an empowerment-based approach. Empowerment, in the sense of actors capacity to make claims, is distinct from rights, defined as institutionally recognized guarantees and opportunities. They do not necessarily go together. Institutions may nominally recognize rights that actors, because of a lack of capacity to make claims, are not able to exercise in practice. Conversely, actors may be empowered in the sense of having the experience and capacity to demand and exercise rights, while lacking institutionally recognized opportunities to do so. Rights and empowerment can each encourage the other, and indeed they overlap in practice, but they are analytically distinct. In other words, some must act like citizens (claim rights) so that others can actually be citizens (have rights), but acting like a citizen is not the same as being a citizen. If this distinction makes sense, then most of transnational civil society falls far short of transnational citizenship176 In the context of this debate, the term transnational citizenship would apply most clearly to membership in the EUa political community that is clearly cross-border yet certainly not global.9 Yet Baubock (2003), one of the leading proponents of the concept of transnational citizenship, suggests that the EU is better understood instead as supranational, meaning that individual membership requires citizenship in an EU nation-state. Indeed, it is not at all clear whether the EUs transnational political experiment is the leading edge of a growing trend or is the exception that proves the rule in terms of the persistent grip of nationstates on political sovereignty.177 coalitions are networks in action mode. Networks, unlike coalitions, do not necessarily coordinate their actions, nor do they come to agreement on specific joint actions. In addition, neither networks nor coalitions necessarily involve significant horizontal exchange between their respective bases. Indeed, many rely on a handful of interlocutors to manage relationships between broad-based social organizations that have relatively little awareness of the nature and actions of their counterparts. The concept of transnational social movement organizations, in contrast, implies much higher density and much more cohesion than networks or coalitions have. The term transnational movement organizations suggests a collective actor that is present in more than one country. Classic cases include migrant groups that have organized membership in more than one country, or transnational environmental organizations that have organized social bases (not just employees) in multiple countries, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth.11 In short, transnational civil society exchanges can produce networks, which can produce coalitions, which can produce movementsbut not necessarily.179 Some mobilizations that look transnational are really more international.Some mobilizations that are widely presented as transnational are in practice more international.180 have not necessarily generated a transnational political community that shares more than instrumental goals (Fox 2002, Laxer 2003). Some181

The concept of citizen was intended to be inclusive-to insist that all per-sons in a state, and not just some persons (a monarch, aristocrats) had the right to be included in the process of collective decision-making in the political are-na and the right to receive the social benefits the state might distribute. Since that time, the existence of rights that are guaranteed to citizens has comprised the minimal definition of what constitutesa modem "democratic"s tate, which virtually every state now claims to be. Wallerstein citizen 651

The way to define citizenship narrowly in practice, while retaining the prin-ciple in theory, is to create two categories of citizens651.
On 29 October 1789, the National Assembly translated this theoretical concept into a legal decree that defined active citizens as those who paid a minimum of three-days wages in direct taxation. Property became the prerequisite of active citizenship. As Rosanvallon (1985:95) points out, "If reason is sovereign, men cannot invent laws. They must discover them. ... The notion of capacity finds its logic in this framework." To be sure, the concept of citizenship was meant to be liberating, and it did indeed liberate us all from the dead weight of received hierarchies claiming di-vine or natural ordination. But the liberation was only a partial liberation from the disabilities, and the new inclusions made sharper and more apparent the continuing (and new) exclusions. Universal rights turned out in actual practice to be somewhat of a linguistic mirage, an oxymoron. The republic of virtuous equals turned out to require the rejection of the non-virtuous. 652 The French Revolution appealed to nature, which was a universal phenom-enon, belonging to everyone. But it also appealed to virtue, which was only a potential( but not necessarily the actual)c haracteristico f everyone. Fromt hese concepts, it derived the existence of human rights. Since there could be multi-ple capacities and then for some multiple "natures,"t he discourse had an "am-bivalent quality" (Landes 1988:123). Scott sums up "the persistent question of the relationship of specific, marked groups to the embodied universal" quite well: "how could the rights of the poor, of mulattos, blacks, or women be fig-ured as the rights of Man? The general answer is: with difficulty" (1989:2). 656 The revolutions of 1848 constituted the first world revolution of the modern world-system. It is not that it occurred in all parts of the world-system, since it did not. Nor is it that the revolutionaries achieved their objectives, since everywhere the revolutions were defeated politically. It is that the multiple rev-olutions centered around the same issue, the issue of exclusion, exclusion from the benefits of citizenship. It was in 1848 that we first see clearly that there would be two kinds of antisystemic movements, two separate ways of dealing with this exclusion in terms of immediate objectives: more rights within the na-tion (the social revolution); separating one ethno-national group from another dominant one (the national revolution). Whether overcoming the exclusions was a sufficient objective or whether they should be truly against the (modern world-) system as such would of course become a continuing internal debate of these movements. And it was in 1848 that the question of long-term strategy first became clear-ly posed. From 1815 to 1848, the ideological struggle had been considered to be one between liberals and conservatives, between the heirs of the spirit (if not of all the tactics) of the French Revolution and those who fervently sought to restore the order derived from an older way of viewing the world. In this strug-gle, "democrats"a nd "radicals"h ad little place. Anathemat o the conservatives, an embarrassmento the liberals, they played a gadfly role, pressuringt he liberals to be more daring (without much success, be it noted). What the revolu-tions of 1848 did was to open up the possibility that these democrats/radicals would do more than be a gadfly, that they would organize mass action separate and distinct from the liberal center.658 Guizot elaborated the concept of class, a concept he had taken from Saint-Simon. He did this, of course, in order to jus-tify the political role of the bourgeoisie as opposed to the aristocracy.B ut he did this as well, in order to

situate the bourgeoisie (which he felt would in time assimilate the aristocracy)v is-a'-vist he proletariat,a nd to distinguishb etween the two (Botrel and LeBouil 1973:143). If he was seeking droit de cite for the bourgeoisie, and ultimately total political control, he was specifically opposed to the inclusion of the proletariat. The droit de cite was to be reservedt o active, that is, propertied, citizens. 660 If citizenship-that is, active citizenship-was difficult to achieve for work-ers and women, it was even more difficult for persons of color (or other groups defined by some status-group characteristic and treated as somehow inferior). The intellectual justification for this had been building up since the beginning of the capitalist world-economy (Poliakov et al. 1976:52). But it was only in the nineteenth century that the theme of superior and inferior "races" was con-stantly elaborated and considered by Whites to be virtually selfevident670

Citizenship always ex-cluded as much as it included.674