What's the Problem?

An Introduction to Problem
Structuring Methods

JONATHAN ROSENHEAD London school of Economics

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
England

OR's traditional problem-solving techniques offer remarkably

little assistance in deciding what the problem is. New problem
structuring methods (PSMs) provide decision makers with sys-
tematic help in identifying an agreed framework for their prob-
lem. The result is either a well-defined project that can be ad-
dressed using traditional OR methods, or a clarification of the
situation that enables those responsible to agree on a course of
action. In principle, PSMs can provide analysts with greater ac-
cess to strategic problems—those engaging multiple relatively
independent decision makers. PSMs' transparent methods
of representation can capture differing perceptions of
the situation, to help generate a consensus or to facilitate
negotiations.

P roblem structuring methods (PSMs)

are a broad group of problem-han-

a range of problem situations for which

more classical OR techniques have limited

dling approaches whose purpose is to as-
sist in structuring problems rather than
directly with solving them. They are partie-
ipative and interactive in character and in
principle offer operations research access to
Copyright © 1996, Institute for Operations Research
and the Management Sciences
0092-2102/96/2606/0117$01.25
This paper was refereed.
applicability.
Operations researchers have been devel-
oping and using individual problem struc-
turing methods since the mid-1960s. How-
ever, only recently have they recognized
PROFESSIONAL—OR/MS IMPLEMENTATION
PROBLEM DIAGNOSIS

INTERFACES 26: 6 November-December 1996 (pp. 117-131)

ROSENHEAD

them as constituting a coherent field that is —The client organization was structured in
important for the current practice and fu- a tight hierarchy;
ture prospects of OR. —Few of its members were analytically
Limitations to the Orthodox Heritage sophisticated;
Since the late 1960s, analysts have ac- —The organization performed a well-
tively debated claims for the objectivity of defined repetitive task generating reliable
OR/MS models and the limitations im- data; and
posed on OR/MS practice by its —There was general consensus on priori-
concentration on well-defined problems. ties.
Critics (for example, Ackoff [1979a], In the New York fire service, it had consid-
Checkland [1983], and Churchman [1967]) erable impact; in the New York public
noted the assumption behind standard OR health service, it suffered ignominious
techniques that relevant factors, constraints, failure.
and the objective function are both estab- The situations that satisfy the conditions
lished in advance and consensual. Consis- Greenberger, Crenson, and Crissey identi-
tent with this, standard formulations of OR fied are predominantly those in which uni-
methodology (for example, formulate, tary control is exercised over uncontentious
model, test, solve, and implement) take as activities. Within these confines, the stand-
their foundation the possibility of a single ard OR approach with its battery of power-
uncontested representation of the problem ful techniques can be formidably effective.
situation under consideration. Within this Many aspects of our complex and inter-
framework, there is no intellectual impedi- locking social arrangements, in the absence
ment to adopting optimization as the cen- of such analytic inputs, could operate, if at
terpiece of OR's technical repertoire. all, only ineffectually or with unreasonable
Critics have generally recognized that waste of effort. This much is not in dispute.
OR practice has been considerably more di- Many, however, have become concerned
verse than this and in particular is far from that the exclusion of problem domains that
dominated by considerations of optimality. violate some or all of the Greenberger con-
They have argued, however, that the avail- ditions may be bad both for OR and for so-
able tools and the accepted wisdom on ciety at large. It is this concern that moti-
methodology give scant guidance to ana- vates and justifies the development of
lysts confronting less well-behaved situa- problem structuring methods.
tions. Dichotomies
An in-depth analysis by Greenberger, This analysis of the RAND experience
Crenson, and Crissey [1976] of the RAND has already pointed to a dichotomy of
Corporation's experience in its seven-year problem situations. Other commentators
engagement with the problems of urban have made broadly parallel observations:
government in New York City provides tame versus wicked problems [Rittel and
supportive empirical evidence for this hy- Webber 1973], problems versus messes
pothesis. They found that the traditional [Ackoff 1981]. Schon [1987] captures this
OR approach worked well where distinction graphically in his extended met-

INTEREACES 26:6 118

PROBLEM STRUCTURING METHODS
aphor contrasting the "high ground,"
where problems are of great technical inter-
est but of limited social importance, with
the "swamp," where messy, confusing
problems defy technical solution. In each
case, the authors reach the same conclu-
sion—that the methods for problem han-
dling appropriate to pacified conditions do
not transfer to more turbulent and prob-
lematic environments.
Why this should be so emerges readily
from a consideration of the nature of
swamp conditions/messes/wicked prob-
lems. Typically there is a range of actors
who are not in subordinate-superordinate
relationships with each other; they have a
considerable degree of autonomy. The dif-
ferent actors have their own interests and
perspectives that lead them to pursue dif-
ferent objectives and to identify different
factors as relevant. The potential is here for
conflict, often exacerbated by the high lev-
els of uncertainty that actors commonly
have to endure about their own options,
their likely consequences, the objectives
and possible tactics of others, and so forth.
Where no one can give orders, knowing
an optimal solution is of Httle use, espe-
cially if it is the optimal solution to only
one party's version of the problem. Where
participants need to interact and negotiate
to reach agreement, mathematics and com-
puter algorithms that are hard to under-
stand will tend to get in their way. Where
uncertainty reigns, their confidence to
make decisions may not be best advanced
by the unambiguous specificities of a single
OR formulation.
Various ways around this difficulty have
been proposed. Thus optimizing techniques
may be valued less for the solutions they
November-December 1996
find than for their well-developed sensitiv-
ity-analysis routines, which a skilled crafts-
person can use as sophisticated diagnostic
instruments [Beale 1980]. Alternatively,
Cyert [1981] suggests that more and yet
more powerful analytic work will enable
OR to "tame" these as yet ill-structured
problems one by one. Decision analysts aim
to extend the range of traditional analysis
by incorporating subjective estimates of
probabilities and of the values of outcomes
when they cannot obtain objective informa-
tion. Simon [1987] proposes that OR and
artificial intelligence are complementary:
where formulating problems precisely is
impossible, we can develop expert systems
capable of replicating human judgment. In
their various ways, these prescriptions for
OR's relevance problem outside its strict
domain all amount to—more of the same
treatment that generated the debilitating
symptoms in the first place.
The Characteristics of Problem
Structuring Methods
Problem structuring methods provide a
more radical response to the poor fit of the
traditional OR approach for wicked prob-
lems—a response based on the characteris-
tics of swamp conditions rather than on a
preexisting investment in high-tech solu-
tion methods. These conditions suggest that
decision makers are more likely to use a
method and find it helpful if it accommo-
dates multiple alternative perspectives, can
facilitate negotiating a joint agenda, func-
tions through interaction and iteration, and
generates ownership of the problem formu-
lation and its action implications through
transparency of representation. These social
requirements in turn have various technical
implications. Representing problem com-
119
ROSENHEAD
plexity graphically (rather than algebrai-
cally or in tables of numerical results) will
aid participation. The existence of multiple
perspectives invalidates the search for an
optimum; the need is rather for systematic
exploration of the solution space. Lay peo-
ple can generally express their judgments
more meaningfully by choosing between
discrete alternatives rather than across con-
tinuous variables. Estimating numerical
probabilities will need to give way to iden-
tifying relevant possibilities. And alterna-
tive scenarios will substitute for future
forecasts.
The specification I have outlined for a
decision-aiding technology more appropri-
ate to messy, strategic problems eliminates
much of the scope for advanced mathemat-
ics, probability theory, and complex algo-
rithms (as practiced, for example, in deci-
sion analysis and the analytic hierarchy
process). It identifies, rather, an alternative
approach employing representation of rela-
tionships, symbolic manipulation, and lim-
ited quantification within a systematic
framework.
These technical attributes are among the
properties that unite the family of problem-
structuring methods. Other common fea-
tures concern the process of the engage-
ment through which analysis assists
decision making [Eden and Radford 1990].
This process is participative and interactive.
Little or nothing happens in back rooms or
black boxes; those who must take or recom-
mend decisions are participants in or exec-
utants of the analysis. The purpose of the
analysis is to elicit relevant knowledge and
to reflect it back in structured form in an it-
erative process of problem construction.
Typically PSMs operate nonlinearly.
INTERFACES 26:6
switching freely between different modes
or phases of the method in response to the
dynamics of group discussion. Outputs
may be visible (recommendations, plans,
policies) or invisible (changed apprecia-
tions, shared values, better working rela-
tions). Of these, the visible outputs, given
the differing agendas of participants, are
likely to consist of partial rather than com-
prehensive commitments.
Virtually all PSMs are designed for use
by groups (although they have been widely
appropriated as individual aids to problem
clarification). The rationale for this is that if
the problem situation involves multiple in-
terest groups and plural rationalities under
conditions in which no group can impose
The assumption is that
relevant factors, constraints,
and the objective function are
established in advance.
its will, then negotiation of a way forward
must involve representatives of these par-
ties. Such arrangements are common both
within organizations—the corporate board,
interdepartmental task forces—and be-
tween them.
Each member of the PSM family incorpo-
rates as a core element the explicit model-
ing of cause-effect relationships. This gives
PSMs their unambiguous operational re-
search identity. It distinguishes them, for
example, from non-OR modes of group
working, such as organizational develop-
ment. PSMs can also be demarcated from
other OR approaches that purport to tackle
messy, ambitious problems (for example,
the analytic hierarchy process). PSMs are
120
PROBLEM STRUCTURING METHODS
distinctive in their transparency of method,
their restricted mathematization, and their
focus on supporting judgment rather than
representing it. These limits are imprecise
and arguable: approaches developed for
other or broader purposes (for example,
spreadsheet models) can be used in a simi-
lar spirit. Methods that have some degree
of similarity to PSMs, but which are best
regarded as falling outside the category, in-
clude decision analysis, decision conferenc-
ing, PROMETHEE, scenario planning, sys-
tem dynamics, and viable system diagnosis.
Other parts of the PSM perimeter are bor-
dered by the focus group approach, and by
Rapid Rural Appraisal and other participa-
tive methods for third-world development
planning.
Some PSMs Summarized
I will attempt here the perhaps unwise
task of summing up in a few sentences
each the. intention, range of application,
and mode of operation of methods that are
the product of years of experience and of
successive refinement.
Eor more detailed coverage of particular
methods, a first stop might be my introduc-
tory text [Rosenhead 1989], which contains
accounts of six leading PSMs, each written
by its principal developer. Another source
is Flood and Jackson [1991], which offers
summaries and critical discussion of a
range of systems-based methods, not all of
which could be described as PSMs.
I will describe the methods in alphabeti-
cal order:
—Hypergame analysis is an interactive ap-
proach to taking action in conflict situa-
tions. It emphasizes (1) exploring the pat-
tern and nature of interactions between the
actors, and (2) the effect of differences of
November-December 1996
perception among the actors about what
actions are possible, about preferences be-
tween outcomes, and so forth [Bennett and
Cropper 1986].
—Interactive planning (also called idealized
planning) is a method with the ambitious
aim of designing a desirable organizational
future and ways of bringing it about. Ana-
lysts generate a reference scenario to dem-
onstrate the dire consequences of not tak-
ing action. This motivates a participative
process in which participants create an
ideal design for the future of their organi-
zation. Other stages of the method deal
with how to bring this future into existence
[Ackoff 1979b].
—Metagame analysis is an interactive
method of analyzing cooperation and con-
flict among multiple actors. Analysts using
supporting software work with one of the
parties. They elicit from them decision op-
tions for the various actors, from which
they construct possible future scenarios.
Analysts and actors use these as a frame-
work to explore their ability to stabilize the
outcome at a more preferred scenario, by
the use of threats and promises [Howard
1993].
—Robustness analysis is an approach that fo-
cuses on maintaining useful flexibility un-
der uncertainty. In an interactive process,
participants and analysts assess the com-
patibility of alternative initial commitments
with possible futiire configurations of the
system being planned for, and the perform-
ance of each configuration in feasible future
environments. This enables them to com-
pare the flexibility maintained by alterna-
tive initial commitments [Rosenhead 1980].
—Soft systems methodology (SSM) is a
general method for system redesign. Par-
121
ROSENHEAD
ticipants build ideal-type conceptual
models, one for each relevant world
view. They compare them with percep-
tions of the existing system in order to
generate debate about what changes are
culturally feasible and systemically de-
sirable [Checkland 1981; Checkland and
Scholes 1990].
—Strategic assumption surfacing and testing is
a method for tackling ill-structured prob-
lems where differences of opinion about
what strategy to pursue are preventing de-
cision. Participants are divided into groups,
each of which produces a preferred strat-
egy and identifies the key assumptions on
which it is based. The reunited groups de-
bate these strategies and assumptions, mu-
tually adjusting their assumptions on the
way to an agreed solution [Mason and
Mitroff 1981].
—Strategic choice approach (SCA) is a plan-
ning approach centered on managing un-
certainty in strategic situations. Facilitators
assist participants to model the intercon-
nectedness of decision areas. Interactive
comparison of alternative decision schemes
helps them to bring key uncertainties to the
surface. On this basis, the group identifies
priority areas for partial commitment and
designs explorations and contingency plans
[Friend and Hickling 1987].
—Strategic options development and analysis
(SODA) is a general problem identification
method that uses cognitive mapping as a
modeling device for eliciting and recording
individuals' views of a problem situation.
The merged cognitive maps provide the
framework for workshop discussions, and
a facilitator guides the group towards com-
mitment to a portfolio of actions [Eden,
Jones, and Sims 1983].
INTERFACES 26:6
PSM Applications
The extent of practical experience with
these methods varies. Undoubtedly the
methods that have the most extensive track
record, in terms both of numbers of appli-
cations and of their migration away from
their original developers, are SSM, SCA,
and SODA. However, there has been very
little systematic research into the extent of
their penetration. An exception is the sur-
vey by Mingers and Taylor [1992], dealing
exclusively with SSM. Though the sample
was nonrandom, the survey did indicate
large numbers of users, a wide dispersion
of application types, and a considerable de-
gree of user satisfaction.
There are no "typical" applications of
these methods. Nevertheless I will indicate
here some accessible accounts of practical
applications, which can provide guidance
for those attempting to assess the costs and
benefits of getting to know one or other of
the PSMs in more detail.
My edited collection [Rosenhead 1989] in-
cludes chapter-length accounts of case stud-
ies for each of six PSMs to complement the
more theoretical expositions of scope, model-
ing formalism, and procedures. Other in-
structive case studies include the following:
—Best, Parston, and Rosenhead [1986] de-
scribe an application of robustness analysis
to planning health services for Ottawa and
the surrounding region of Ontario. They
used DELPHI and cluster analyses in con-
junction to generate alternative possible fu-
tures. Extensive consultation with health
care deliverers and with the public were
other features of the study.
—Checkland and Scholes [1990] provide
the fullest description so far of SSM in ac-
tion, with detailed case studies of work in
122
PROBLE]VI STRUCTURING METHODS
government agencies, major corporations,
and other bodies. The most extended ac-
count concerns reshaping the internal
organizational structure and processes of a
division of a major transnational corpora-
tion.
—Eden [1985] describes an application of
SODA in the publishing industry to deter-
mine strategic directions for a group of
magazines. The facilitator adapted the
SODA procedures to involve members of
the large management team in ways
reflecting their distinctive potential
contributions.
—Howard [1992] discusses and compares
three applications of metagame analysis: (1)
to improve bidding success for an engi-
neering firm, (2) to help a supplier of raw
materials to increase margins by squeezing
distributors, and (3) to develop strategy for
government negotiations with industry rep-
resentatives over reductions in air pollu-
tion.
—Moulin [1991] helped women dissatisfied
with health service provision to articulate
their demands for better birthing facilities.
He used the strategic choice approach to
enable them to crystallize what they
wanted. Their greater effectiveness
enabled them to influence the services
provided.
Brief accounts like these cannot provide
readers with a sense of how problem struc-
turing methods operate in practice. To re-
duce this difficulty, I will give more ex-
tended accounts of two contrasting case
studies. The first illustrates the potential of
PSMs to work interactively to produce a
well-defined project that can be addressed
using a more traditional OR method. The
second indicates their ability to clarify the
November-December 1996
problem situation, so that participants can
agree on action without "hard" analytic
assistance.
Developing Models to Support a Claim
for Damages
Analysts can employ SODA in a range of
ways as a "front end" for analyses which
are then conducted by more conventional
methods. They can use SODA for the prob-
lem formulation stage, after which, for ex-
ample, they may find the problem amena-
ble to evaluation by multicriteria decision
methods; or the process may focus atten-
tion on a key uncertainty that requires tar-
geted market research.
In a study reported by Williams et al.
[1995], SODA was used in a more complex
way in conjunction with system dynamics.
A team from the University of Strathclyde
carried out the work for the Canadian-
based company Bombardier. Through a
subsidiary. Bombardier had contracted to
develop and supply the shuttle wagons to
take cars and buses through the Channel
Tunnel linking Britain and France by rail.
The client was pursuing a legal claim
against the tunnel's builders, Trans Manche
Link, based on the delay and disruption it
alleged had been caused to its activities by
TML's introduction of revised specifica-
tions and by TML's delays in approving
design documents. Revised specifications
for a particular component may not only
result directly in extra design time; they
can also have extensive ramifications for
other parts of the system. Delayed approv-
als can disrupt the design schedule, result
in the need to work on designs in parallel
rather than in series, and cause design
work to be carried out in ignorance
of the specification of related parts, leading
123
ROSENHEAD
to the need to redesign. The analytic prob-
lem was to develop models capable of
quantifying the resulting delay and disrup-
tion, and capable of carrying conviction in
court.
The importance of feedback cycles in the
problem situation made system dynamics
(SD) a natural modeling language. How-
ever, the problem was very large (some 300
variables were eventually required), knowl-
edge was distributed over the management
team, and individual managers had differ-
ent ideas about how the various factors in-
teracted. The first use of SODA on the pro-
ject was as a knowledge acquisition
process; the academic consultants inter-
viewed each member of the client team,
and recorded his or her perceptions of rele-
vant factors and cause-effect relationships
The consultant is a facilitator.
as a cognitive map. The Strathclyde team
merged these maps into a group map,
showing the network of ideas elicited. The
client team, together with lawyers working
on the claim, debated, corrected, and elabo-
rated the structure of this group map at a
series of workshop sessions, assisted by
members of the Strathclyde team.
This validated SODA model would form
a continuing reference framework for the
remainder of the study—as a reminder of
the broader relevance of particular detailed
analyses, as a means of identifying which
aspects of the resulting SD model would
need revision when new assumptions or
data were introduced, and as a medium for
explaining progress to those outside the
project team. More immediately, it served
INTERFACES 26:6
as the raw material for constructing an in-
fluence diagram as an intermediate stage
toward constructing the SD model. The
consultants generated the influence dia-
gram by identifying and extracting the
feedback loops (98 in all) embedded in the
SODA model. Clustering those loops with
shared components helped them to priori-
tize areas for analytic work—primarily the
design stage and then secondarily the pro-
cess engineering and manufacturing stages
of the project.
As the team moved from influence dia-
gram to SD model, the SODA model re-
mained in play as a knowledge repository
for the study and as a medium of commu-
nication between analysts and clients. It
was of particular value that, whereas an SD
model represents only one view of the
problem at a time, the SODA model could
store and relate inconsistent perspectives.
The views of corporate managers often dif-
fered from those of plant managers, while
verbal reports conflicted with much of the
hard data. As new inputs became available,
they could be used in conjunction with the
SODA model to reevaluate the validity of
the viewpoints that had been incorporated
in the SD model.
The resulting SD model was required to
reproduce historically observed behavior
(for example, the total number of freelance
designers employed and their distribution
over the lifetime of the project) with credi-
ble accuracy. It would then be used to em-
ulate what would have happened if actions
that were the subject of legal action had not
taken place. The difference between pairs
of runs would then form the basis of a
costed claim for delay and disruption.
In the event, the legal action was settled
124
PROBLEM STRUCTURING METHODS
out of court. Bombardier was clear that the
evident power of the modeling approach
used to support the claim for costs was in-
fluential in securing a very satisfactory set-
tlement.
Contesting Health Strategy in a Deprived
Inner City Area
Tower Hamlets is probably the most de-
prived borough in Greater London. It has
absorbed successive waves of immigration,
most recently from Bangladesh; much of
the population, of whatever ethnic origin,
is subject to vicious circles of disadvantage.
As might sadly be expected of this sort of
area, health services inadequate to the need
are part of the problem.
In September 1987,1 received an invita-
tion (through a former student) to work
with three local community health organi-
zations to develop an external critique of
the methodology used by the Tower Ham-
lets Health Authority to determine health-
service provision. I was quick to involve
John Friend, principal developer of the
strategic choice approach, which it seemed
might be appropriate. Friend [1994] de-
scribes the resulting engagement.
One of the three groups was the Tower
Hamlets Community Health Council, a
statutory agency responsible for represent-
ing the views of the local population on the
health care it receives. The second organi-
zation was the Tower Hamlets Health
Campaign, a group with a strong trade un-
ion involvement, which was active in de-
fending the local health service from cuts.
The third organization was the Tower
Hamlets Health Strategy Group. Chaired
by the local vicar, this free-standing organi-
zation aimed to channel local pressure for
improvement in health services.
November-December 1996
On an exploratory visit to meet represen-
tatives of the groups, we found that things
had moved on. They saw an imminent
threat that the district health authority
(DHA) would close the accident and emer-
gency unit at Mile Fnd Hospital. Mile End
was effectively an outstation for the Royal
London, a prestigious teaching hospital not
far away. However, Mile End was viewed
as a key health care resource for the local
community. The general view was that
closing Accident and Emergency (A&E)
would prepare the way for the end of acute
services and the eventual closure of the
hospital. The groups' representatives
agreed that this impending crisis must take
priority as the focus of the planned strate-
gic choice workshop, which should be con-
vened with urgency.
The workshop was held on October 15th,
with 13 representatives of the three local
organizations attending. Matters had al-
ready moved on again. The DHA was now
due to confirm a management proposal to
close the A&E Unit at a meeting scheduled
for the following week.
The strategic choice approach most com-
monly operates entirely in workshop for-
mat, as it did at the October 15th meeting.
The participants, assisted by one or two fa-
cilitators, use the SCA framework to repre-
sent their understanding of their situation.
Along the way they engage in, perhaps
more than once, a shaping activity, in which
they establish key areas for decision; a de-
signing activity, in which the method helps
them to identify feasible combinations of
options for action in these areas; a compar-
ing activity, in which they evaluate these al-
ternatives against a range of criteria they
see as important; and a choosing activity in
125
ROSENHEAD
which the method leads them towards
agreement on commitments in some areas
and exploratory investigations in others.
There are decision aiding tools for each of
these four modes.
During the discussion in the shaping
mode at the October 15th workshop, the
participants identified seven key decision
areas, and the pair-wise connections be-
tween them. One such area was possible al-
ternative arrangements for A&E facilities in
the borough, which in turn linked to the
functions of other local hospitals. The fu-
ture role of Mile End Hospital (the decision
area of most urgent concern) was linked
not only to the provision of A&E cover, but
also to decision areas concerning the future
of "community and priority services," and
to care arrangements for mental illness and
handicap. (These were two alternative uses
for Mile End if it should cease to be an
acute hospital.) Another decision area that
emerged was a proposal, still at an early
stage, to open a medical college in associa-
tion with both Mile End Hospital (if it was
still functioning as an acute hospital) and a
nearby college of the University of London.
Normally at a strategic choice workshop,
participants agree to work with a problem
focus of about three important, urgent, and
interlinked decision areas. In view of the
shortness of time—we had only four hours
for the workshop—and the dominating
threat of A&E closure, we agreed to take
only one decision area as the problem fo-
cus: the future of Mile End Hospital. This
was indeed "planning under pressure"
[Friend and Hickling 1987].
The participants shortened the designing
phase by agreeing to consider just two con-
trasting options for Mile End: maintaining
INTERFACES 26:6
the full range of acute services, and reduc-
ing it to "cold acute" status by the closure
of A&E. The implications of these two op-
tions were spelled out in more detail by
adding in compatible options from other
decision areas.
The group started the process of compar-
ing by listing a range of criteria on which
these options should be evaluated. These
were not only the group's own criteria but
those they thought other parties would
consider important. The group tried to
identify where the balance of advantage
between the two options lay on each of the
key criteria: cost, management control.
Where no one can give orders,
knowing an optimal solution is
of little use.
teaching, staff morale, and prestige. This
process usefully threw up areas of disagree-
ment or uncertainty—in particular the cost
of continuing to duplicate services at two
sites (Royal London and Mile End), the via-
bility of cold acute operation, the costs that
closure would generate elsewhere in the
health system, and the state of the fabric of
Mile End Hospital (and hence the costs of
bringing it up to an acceptable standard).
All of this information was available in
diagrammatic form, on the flip charts on
which we had been recording the problem
structure as it emerged, for the final choos-
ing phase. In view of the prevailing uncer-
tainties, many of the possible actions that
emerged from discussion were exploratory
in nature, including the possibility of early
discussions with the DHA. However, the
most creative discussion focused on what
126
PROBLEM STRUCTURING METHODS

form of public reaction to the closure pro- range of recipients. The workshop ended in
posal the organizations should issue. excellent spirits, with a commitment to fur-
Before the workshop, the organizations ther workshops to address longer-term is-
had been expecting defeat and thinking sues. Two weeks later, at the first of these,
only in terms of standard responses to the the DHA had already conceded the case
threat of A&E closure—a letter to the local against early closure of the accident and
paper, a demonstration with placards out- emergency unit at Mile End Hospital. The
side the hospital. As a result of the morn- DHA sent representatives to each of the
ing's meeting, the group could see at least subsequent workshops.
two added dimensions that gave its cam- Many factors in this account are unique
paign a good chance of fighting off the clo-to the particular case. However, it is typical
sure threat. First, the DHA was seen as of strategic choice engagements in certain
heavily influenced by the views of power- respects: the ability to work with multiple
ful consultants at the Royal London. How- organizations in contested areas, to social-
ever, the discussion had established that anize and purposefully organize knowledge
important subset of these consultants was previously fragmented among participants,
involved in the planned medical college, and to generate decision outputs in the
which depended on Mile End remaining in form of immediate commitments combined
full operation. There was scope, therefore, with explorations to reduce the more cru-
to at least undercut the DHA's enthusiasm cial uncertainties.
for closure. Some Current Developments
The second innovative element in the or- I have presented the different PSMs as
ganizations' response was sparked by the separate and distinctive entities, which nev-
inclusion of management control as a di- ertheless constitute a recognizable family of
mension of evaluation. This had brought methods. The family resemblance is rein-
the North East Thames Regional Health forced by the fact that these individual
Authority (NETRHA) into the picture. (The PSMs can be (and have been) disassembled
structure of the National Health Service in and their component phases used either
1987 gave regional health authorities very separately or hitched up to another of the
considerable powers over the DHAs within methods.
their regions.) Group members recalled that Many PSMs consist of a loosely articu-
the DHA was in NETRHA's bad books for lated set of processes (part social, part tech-
failures of management control in the re- nical), which permits users considerable
cent past. The group could therefore mount freedom to switch mode or recycle. They
an argument that the proposed closure was therefore lend themselves to creative reas-
both a consequence of poor managerial ef- sembly. Users may carry through only
fectiveness by the DHA and a recipe for some stages of a method, or they may com-
continued inadequate managerial practices bine methods: for example, SODA and
in the future. SSM, strategic choice and robustness, hy-
Several members went away directly to pergames and SODA [Bennett and Cropper
compose appropriately targeted letters to a 1990; Gains and Rosenhead 1993]. There is

November-December 1996 127

ROSENHEAD
also some limited evidence of work across
the divide between hard and soft methods
[Bryant 1988]. Experience reported from
Shell International [Gibb 1993; Mapleston
quoted in Holt 1993] suggests a potential
for using particular aspects of a PSM with-
out embracing the method in its entirety;
using a PSM for only a part of the journey
from problem appreciation to firm commit-
ment; and using PSMs not for stand-alone
projects but as elements embedded in
larger projects.
One shared feature of PSMs, which dis-
tinguishes them from OR's more conven-
tional approaches, is the nature of the inter-
action between consultant and client group.
In orthodox OR, the consultant is an ana-
lyst committed to extracting from perhaps
recalcitrant data usable knowledge about
the content of the problem confronting her
clients. When operating with PSMs, the
consultant is a facilitator, attempting to
manage the complexities and uncertainties
of problem content while simultaneously
managing the interpersonal processes and
dynamics of the client group. Facilitation is
a specialized and demanding activity; if
PSMs are to establish themselves in the OR
repertoire, changes will be needed in the
content of OR training [Eden and Radford
1990; Phillips and PhUlips 1993].
Almost all the major PSMs now incorpo-
rate purpose-built software, either as an op-
tional or an indispensable element. Friend
[1993] has expressed concern that introduc-
ing a computer into a workshop situation
will adversely affect group dynamics. Con-
versely, Eden [1989] has suggested that the
computer should be introduced precisely
for its potential to depersonalize messages
that might otherwise generate unproduc-
INTERFACES 26:6
tive responses by nature of the position or
personality of their originators. Another
positive argument for computer involve-
ment is its potential, given the wide avail-
ability of PCs and the difficulty in conven-
ing full group meetings, to enable work to
proceed wherever subsets of the project
group can find time and space to gather.
Evidently these issues place PSMs along-
side group decision support systems
[Finlay and Marples 1991] and computer
supported cooperative work.
Future Prospects for Problem Structuring
Methods
It is reasonable to be sanguine about the
future prospects for PSMs. They offer a
route around the frustrating roadblock that
has held operational research at a distance
from many of society's more demanding
problems. I see this problem of OR/MS's
nonacceptance as the result of a failed at-
tempt at inappropriate technology transfer.
PSMs appear to provide a more appropri-
ate model-based assistance than do conven-
tional OR methods to problem specification
and resolution in nonconsensual, multi-
party predicaments. If so, they have the po-
tential to open up the road to a construc-
tive OR engagement with strategy. These
are early days, and this statement deals
with promise rather than fulfilment. How-
ever, we can reasonably expect further
methodological innovations as this fast de-
veloping field multiplies its experience.
The development of PSMs generated
some imperialist proclamations from either
side of the hard-soft divide. Both are
equally misguided. Problem structuring
methods can no more perform the tasks of
conventional OR than the reverse. What
PSMs provide is an extension of the OR
128
PROBLEM STRUCTURING METHODS
repertoire, rather than a driving out of for-
mer evil spirits.
That said, I am persuaded, with Schon,
that the wicked problems, the problems of
the swamp, are of greater social signifi-
cance than those relatively tame problems
that OR to date has been technically and
methodologically equipped to tackle. The
problems of the high ground are tractable
because they have many givens. It is
through the processes in the swamp that
these givens are established. The scope to
influence social developments is thus far
wider. Using model-based methods we can
achieve a purchase on these situations—but
only if we abandon any notion that their
role is to replace subjectivity, that is, judg-
ment, by analysis. Instead we need meth-
ods that interleave judgment and analysis,
which aim to support judgment, not substi-
tute for it. From many perspectives this lib-
eratory aspect of PSMs (by contrast with
the control paradigm of more orthodox ap-
proaches) is one of its principal attractions.
The elimination of the assumption of a
singular rationality renders PSMs particu-
larly appropriate in the public domain, in
which much of the terrain is contestable.
How successfully PSMs can be employed
actively in public debate is, however, open
to doubt. The small group dynamics
through which PSMs operate can generate
a high level of commitment among those
who have shared the experience. However,
the resulting conclusions do not necessarily
cany conviction to a larger constituency.
Contributions to debate may, therefore, be
more indirect.
One area of unconventional OR practice
that has already made extensive use of
PSMs is community operational research.
November-December 1996
PSMs have proved themselves well
adapted to a nonmanagerialist, nonhier-
archical environment, where resource allo-
cation is not an issue (because there are no
resources) [Thunhurst et al. 1992; Thun-
hurst and Ritchie 1992]. There is also some
evidence of their applicability to problems
of development in third world countries
[Bornstein and Rosenhead 1990; Rosenhead
1993].
Public policy making itself is perhaps the
most significant area of potential applica-
bility for problem structuring methods. In
the 1970s, overenthusiastic advocates made
such inflated claims for a high-tech version
of policy analysis that it was discredited,
and that left the field open to the danger-
ous form of hyper-irrationalism that now
prevails worldwide in governmental circles
[Rosenhead 1992]. Multiple advocacy, a
necessary basis for sound policy analysis, is
a process that could be well served by par-
ticipative, multiple-perspective approaches
of the kind that problem structuring meth-
ods can deploy. Achieving a more struc-
tured debate over policy formation would
be a prize not just for operational research,
but for the society we serve.
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