ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

JIADS
MULTISERVICE PROCEDURES
FOR A JOINT INTEGRATED
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

FM 3-01.15
MCRP 3-25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.31

JUNE 2001
AIR LAND SEA
APPLICATION
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authorized to DOD and DOD contractors only to
protect information and technical data on current
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application. This determination was made on
22 Jan 99. Other requests will be referred to
HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATDO-A, Ft Monroe, VA
23651-5000; HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C42, Quantico, VA
22134-5021; NWDC, ATTN: Code N5, Newport,
RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ, Langley
AFB VA 23665-2722.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any

method that will prevent disclosure of contents
or reconstruction of the document.

MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

 FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective
commands and other commands as appropriate.

JOHN N. ABRAMS J. E. RHODES

General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC
Commander Commanding General
Training and Doctrine Command Marine Corps Combat
Development Command

R. G. SPRIGG LANCE L. SMITH

Rear Admiral, USN Major General, USAF
Commander Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

This publication is available on the

General Dennis J. Reimer Training
and Doctrine Digital Library at
www.adtdl.army.mil
 PREFACE
1. Scope

This publication supports Joint Integrated Air Defense System (JIADS) planning,
coordination, and employment for the component/functional commanders, joint force
commander (JFC)/joint task force (JTF) staff planners, and those unit commanders
participating in and providing assets to theater operations. Additionally, it provides
the warfighter and planner single-source reference for specific service air defense
capabilities and limitations. Specific JIADS architectures to define command and
control (C2) procedures and plans regarding the threat, systems, sensors, and processes
should be detailed in documents derived from the respective theater operation plan
(OPLAN)/operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN) and concept of operations
(CONOPS).

2. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for C2 specific planning,

coordination, and employment of a JIADS. It will facilitate decisions by highlighting
issues to be considered by the JFC and the area air defense commander (AADC) when
preparing for theater air defense operations as it relates to theater force protection.
Although JIADS as doctrine is currently under development, concepts and discussions
in this publication will provide procedures that equip the warfighter with those tools
necessary to support the JFC in building an effective JIADS.

3. Applicability

The procedures described in this publication apply to all elements of a joint

force. This publication uses approved joint and service doctrine and terminology as
its foundation. The publication identifies methodologies to use existing command
and control (C2) systems to facilitate air-ground operations.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will

review this publication, validate the information, and, where appropriate, reference
and incorporate it in service and command manuals, regulations, and curricula as
follows:

Army. The Army will incorporate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
in this publication in US Army training and doctrinal publications as directed by the
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is
in accordance with DA Form 12-99-R.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate the TTP in this publication
in US Marine Corps training and doctrinal publications as directed by the
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).
Distribution is in accordance with Marine Corps Publication Distribution System
(MCPDS).

Marine Corps: PCN 14400010400 i

 Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and
doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development
Command (NWDC). Distribution is in accordance with Military Standard requisi-
tioning and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP) Desk Guide and Navy Standing Operating
Procedure (NAVSOP) Publication 409.

Air Force. Air Force units will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures
in accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance
with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 37-161.

5. User Information

a. TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center (HQ

AFDC), and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication
with the joint participation of the approving service commands. ALSA will review
and update this publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and service doctrine, C2 organizations,

facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in service protocol,
appropriately reflected in joint and service publications, will likewise be
incorporated in revisions of this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your

comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

ii
 Army
Commander
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATDO-A
Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000
DSN 680-3454 COMM (757) 727-3454
E-mail Address: doctrine@monroe.army.mil

Marine Corps
Commanding General
US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C42
3300 Russell Road Suite 318A
Quantico, VA 22134-5021
DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234

Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command
Doctrine Development Division (Code N5)
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207
DSN 948-4201 COMM (401) 841-4201

Air Force
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
ATTN: DJ
216 Sweeney Boulevard, Suite 109
Langley AFB, VA 23665-2722
DSN 574-8091 COMM (757) 764-8091
E-mail Address: afdc.dj@langley.af.mil

ALSA
ALSA Center
ATTN: Director
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB, VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902
E-mail Address: alsa.director@langley.af.mil

iii
 FM 3-01.15
MCRP 3-25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.31

FM 3-01.15 US Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

MCRP 3-25E Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

NTTP 3-01.8 Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.31 Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

8 June 2001

JIADS
Multiservice Procedures for a
Joint Integrated Air Defense System

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW
Background ................................................................................................ I-1
The Threat ................................................................................................. I-1
Principles of a JIADS ............................................................................... I-2
Conclusion ................................................................................................. I-2

CHAPTER II JIADS C2 INTEGRATION

C2 Relationships ...................................................................................... II-1
JIADS Planning ........................................................................................ II-4
Communications Architecture ............................................................... II-9
ROE Considerations .............................................................................. II-10
Joint Combat Identification (CID) Considerations ........................... II-12
JIADS C2 Employment ......................................................................... II-14
Conclusion .............................................................................................. II-16

CHAPTER III ARMY AIR DEFENSE

Background .............................................................................................. III-1
Mission ..................................................................................................... III-1

iv
 Organization ............................................................................................ III-1
C2 .............................................................................................................. III-2
Weapon Systems ..................................................................................... III-7
Planning ................................................................................................... III-8
Operations ............................................................................................. III-10
Summary ................................................................................................ III-14

CHAPTER IV NAVY AIR DEFENSE

Background .............................................................................................. IV-1
Mission ..................................................................................................... IV-1
Organization ............................................................................................ IV-1
C2 .............................................................................................................. IV-2
Weapon Systems ..................................................................................... IV-5
Planning ................................................................................................... IV-6
Operations ............................................................................................. IV-10
Summary ................................................................................................ IV-10

CHAPTER V AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE

Background ............................................................................................... V-1
Mission ...................................................................................................... V-1
Organization ............................................................................................. V-2
C2 ............................................................................................................... V-3
Weapons Systems .................................................................................... V-4
Planning .................................................................................................... V-4
Operations ................................................................................................ V-6
Summary ................................................................................................... V-6

CHAPTER VI MARINE CORPS AIR DEFENSE

Background .............................................................................................. VI-1
Mission ..................................................................................................... VI-1
Organization ............................................................................................ VI-1
C2 .............................................................................................................. VI-5
Weapon Systems ..................................................................................... VI-7
Planning ................................................................................................... VI-8
Operations ............................................................................................... VI-9
Summary ................................................................................................ VI-10

APPENDIX A MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................ A-1

APPENDIX B JOINT INTERFACE CONTROL OFFICER (JICO) ............................... B-1

REFERENCES ....................................................................................... References-1

GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................... Glossary-1

INDEX ............................................................................................................ Index-1

FIGURES II-1 Notional Multi-TADIL Architecture ......................................... II-10

II-2 Link Architecture ........................................................................ II-11

v
 III-1 AMDPCS Configuration for AAMDC ......................................... III-4
III-2 Army Air and Missile Defense Data Architecture ................... III-5
IV-1 Naval C2 ........................................................................................ IV-2
IV-2 Naval Communications Avenues ................................................ IV-6
V-1 JAOC Organization ....................................................................... V-2
V-2 TACS Organization ....................................................................... V-3
VI-1 MAGTF Communications ............................................................ VI-6
B-1 Notional JICO Organizational Relationships ........................... B-2
B-2 Notional JICO Cell Organization ............................................... B-9

TABLES III-1 AMDPCS Systems and Functions for the AAMDC TOC ......... III-3
III-2 Key Army Interfaces and their Characteristics ....................... III-6
III-3 Weapon Systems Characteristics ............................................... III-8
III-4 ADA Support Relationships ...................................................... III-12
IV-1 Hull Specific Data (TADIL, Sensor, Launch System) .............. IV-5
IV-2 Navy Surface Platforms ............................................................... IV-7
IV-3 Navy Aviation Air Defense Weapons Systems.......................... IV-8
V-1 CRC Equipment ............................................................................. V-4
V-2 Airborne and Ground Operations Capabilities Matrix............. V-5
VI-1 MAGTF Integrated Air Defense Weapons, Sensors, and C2 .. VI-7
B-1 Notional JICO Cell Manning to Support Combat Operations B-6

vi
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Multiservice Procedures for a

Joint Integrated Air Defense System

Overview

The Joint Integrated Air Defense System (JIADS) is not a formal system in itself
but the sum of component air defense systems operating in a theater or specific area
of operations. It is applicable to all levels of conflict to which a joint task force may
be employed—from a local single component operation, to a large, theater-wide,
multinational effort.

This publication serves as a reference and primer for all practitioners in the air
defense community. Specifically, it addresses the integration of service command
and control (C2) systems while providing overviews of individual service C2,
planning, and operating procedures. Joint interface control procedures are also
addressed.

Chapter I provides a brief introduction to a JIADS along with general principles.

Chapter II is the key portion of this publication as it addresses C2 relationships,
architecture, connectivity, and employment of a JIADS. Chapters III through VI
provide an overview of service specific air defense C2, weapons systems, and
planning and employment considerations. Appendix A provides considerations for
JIADS in a multinational environment. Finally, Appendix B describes the duties
and responsibilities of the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO) as described in
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff Manual 3115-01 (1 October 2000).

One of the key aspects to a successful and effective integrated air and missile
defense system is an efficiently functioning C2 element. This begins with an
understanding, familiarity, and appreciation for component C2 capabilities and
operating procedures that come together for the joint fight. This publication aids in
this endeavor.

vii
 PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this

publication:
Joint

ll Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET), Eglin AFB, FL 32542

Joint Staff, J38 DSOD, Washington D.C., 20310
US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5101
US European Command, Vaihingen, GE APO AE 09128

Army

32nd AAMDC, Ft. Bliss, TX 79916

US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Ft. Bliss, TX 79916-70450
US Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, GA
US Army Signal Center and Ft. Gordon, Ft. Gordon, GA 30905
US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Arlington, VA 22215

Marine Corps

4th Marine Division, 4th LAR Bn, Camp Pendleton, CA 92055

MAWTS-1, MCAS Yuma, AZ 85369-9200
CG MCCDC, Quantico, VA 22134-5020

Navy

Aegis Training and Readiness Center, Dahlgren, VA 22448

COMSURFWARDEVGRU, Norfolk, VA 23521-2896
COMCRUDESGRU 8, Norfolk, VA
NWDC, Division Norfolk, Norfolk, VA 23511-2723
TACTRAGRULANT, Virginia Beach, VA 23461
USS Anzio (CG68), Norfolk, VA
USS Cape St. George (CG71), Norfolk, VA
VAW-121, NAS Norfolk, VA

Air Force

552 ACW, Tinker AFB, OK 73145-9160

612th COS, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4224
HQ Air Force Doctrine Command, DET 1, Langley AFB, VA 23665
HQ 1st AF, Tyndall AFB, FL 32403

viii
 Chapter I

OVERVIEW

1. Background

The joint integrated air defense system (JIADS) is comprised of sensors,

weapons, command and control (C2) systems, and personnel. In combination, they
provide air defense against missiles and aircraft for a theater, area of responsibility
(AOR), joint operations area (JOA), or area of operations (AO). Integrating the
systems of all services in a JIADS ensures the optimal employment of each service’s
sensors and weapons, maximizes the level of defense provided to friendly forces, and
enables offensive operations against the enemy.

A number of factors drive the requirement for a robust JIADS capability. These
include new threats with the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and the necessity for the services to operate and fight in more compressed
battlespace with reduced warning and reaction times. On today’s battlefield, the
joint force commander (JFC) must take full advantage of all the longer range and
more capable sensors, weapons, and C2 systems that are now available.

In Operation DESERT STORM, the lack of joint connectivity and common

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) forced the segregation of the battlespace
into service specific, exclusive-use zones. The Navy performed surveillance and air
defense over the Persian Gulf, while the Air Force and Army were assigned
exclusive operational zones on and above friendly and enemy territory. As a result,
individual service air defense systems were not optimized and could not function to
their full capability.

2. The Threat

The theater air threat is comprised of 2 elements: aircraft (manned and

unmanned) and theater missiles (TMs), including theater ballistic missiles (TBMs),
cruise missiles (CMs), and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Even individual aircraft
and TMs are a threat. However when employed in a synchronized manner, they
must be countered early in the conflict—doing so is critical if they are carrying
WMD. In addition to conventional applications of theater air and missile systems,
the threat of preemptive strikes on population centers may be used to terrorize and
destabilize regional governments.

Theater air and missile threats vary regionally and in their technological
sophistication. Technology transfers and weapons proliferation complicate our
ability to assess all potential threats with certainty. The number of countries with a
TM capability is likely to increase. Improved technology and an increase in the
number of deployed TM systems pose increased risks to United States (US) forces.
Many countries also maintain modern combat aircraft and continually upgrade
them. The proliferation of CMs, TBMs, ASMs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
complicates the tasks of providing force protection and attaining air superiority.

I-1
3. Principles of a JIADS

a. Centralized Planning. Maintains unity of effort, optimizes the contributions

of all forces.

b. Decentralized Execution. Permits timely, decisive action by tactical

commanders without compromising the ability of operational commanders to stop
undesirable actions.

c. Planned Responses. Exploit prior testing and development of optimal net

setup, service doctrines, force operations, and course of action (COA) to support
prompt, decisive tactical action.

d. Minimized Communications. Support timely data and information exchange

and maintain net effectiveness and operational tempo by avoiding unnecessary
communication.

e. Layered Defense. Engages attacking aircraft and missiles throughout their

flight, providing multiple engagement opportunities beginning at maximum range.

f. 360-Degree Coverage. Guards against unpredictable targets, pop-up targets,

and multithreat, multiaxis attacks.

g. Early Detection, Classification, and Identification. Support prompt warning

of attacks; timely cueing; and enables prompt, informed decision support for
engaging time-critical targets.

4. Conclusion

A commander in chief (CINC) or JFC normally has limited forces available to

provide the required level of air and missile defense. This requires employing every
air defense asset to the full extent of its capability. The means of accomplishing this
is through the development of a JIADS. This system must allow for the integrated
use of the battlespace by all assets and services.

I-2
 Chapter II

JIADS C2 INTEGRATION

1. C2 Relationships

a. JFC. The JFC organizes the joint force to achieve objectives. Even though
JFCs can organize their forces as needed, they normally assign a joint force air
component commander (JFACC), an area air defense commander (AADC), and an
airspace control authority (ACA). Since the AADC and ACA coordinate, integrate,
and regulate the use of the joint airspace, Joint Publication (Pub) 3-01, Joint Doctrine
for Countering Air and Missile Threats, recommends the following: “The
responsibilities of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally
assigned to 1 individual, but they may be assigned to 2 or more individuals when the
situation dictates.” Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign the
JFACC, AADC, or ACA as 1 individual, then close coordination between all 3
positions is essential. The functions of the JFACC, AADC, and ACA must be
integrated in order to optimize joint air operations, joint air defense operations, and
joint airspace control. Additionally, the service component air defense functions
(Army Air and Missile Defense Command [AAMDC], Navy air defense commander
[ADC], and the Marine sector antiair warfare coordinator [SAAWC]) must
coordinate their activities to take full advantage of those additional assets that may
also support total theater air defense. The JFC’s staff is the focal point for
communicating component commander needs to the JFC and achieving the
commander’s objectives and intent with the warfighter. A team effort is imperative
to avoid service and system parochialism and build a seamless, well-integrated
JIADS.

b. JFACC. The JFACC is responsible for joint air operations throughout the
JOA. The JFACC controls air operations through a comprehensive joint air and
space operations plan and a responsive and integrated control system. Normally,
the JFC will assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the
preponderance of air assets and the ability to command, task, and control joint air
operations. The JFC establishes the authority, command relationships, and
responsibilities of the JFACC. These typically include exercising operational
control (OPCON) over assigned and attached forces, tactical control (TACON) over
forces made available for tasking, or receiving direct support (DS) from other
military capabilities/forces. The JFACC’s responsibilities include but are not
limited to planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations
based on the JFC’s objectives and guidance including the air apportionment
recommendation. Specific JFACC responsibilities normally include—

(1) Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force
objectives as assigned by the JFC or higher authority.

(2) Recommending, after consulting with all component commanders, the

apportionment of the joint air effort to the JFC (by percentage or by priority) that
should be devoted to the various air operations and geographic areas for a given
period of time.

II-1
 (3) Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of
capabilities/forces made available based on the JFC’s guidance and objectives.

(4) Controlling the execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC,
including making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking of available joint
capabilities/forces.

(5) Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other component

commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the JFC.

(6) Evaluating the results of joint air operations and forwarding combat
assessments to the JFC to support the overall combat assessment effort.

(7) Performing the duties of the ACA, when assigned that responsibility by
the JFC.

(8) Performing the duties of the AADC, when assigned that responsibility by
the JFC.

c. AADC. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint

task force (JTF), the JFC will normally assign overall responsibility for air defense
to a single commander commonly referred to as the AADC. The AADC normally
develops the Area Air Defense Plan (ADP) based on the JFC’s operational concept
and allocation decisions and establishes air and missile identification (ID)
procedures and criteria. Normally this will be the component commander with the
preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and
communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations.
Other components will provide representatives, as appropriate, to the AADC
headquarters.

d. ACA. Additionally, the JFC will designate an ACA to assume overall

responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system. The ACA develops
broad policies and procedures for airspace control and coordinates as required
among units within the AOR/JOA subject to the authority and approval of the JFC.
Because of the integrated relationship between airspace control measures and air
defense, 1 individual normally should perform AADC and ACA duties. Regardless of
who fulfills these functions and responsibilities, the functions of the 3 must be
integrated in order to unite joint air operations. The ACA coordinates, integrates,
and regulates the use of the joint airspace. Because the JIADS integrates activities
and communications among all air-ground systems, it is important to define
additional ACA functions affecting the structure and execution of the JIADS.
Specific ACA responsibilities normally include—

(1) Coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control area.

(2) Developing broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the
coordination required among units within the AO, AOR, or JOA.

(3) Establishing an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of

the JFC, providing for integration of the airspace control system with that of the
host nation, and coordinating and deconflicting user requirements.

II-2
 (4) Developing the airspace control plan (ACP) and, with JFC approval,
promulgating it throughout the AO, AOR, or JOA.

(5) Providing the flexibility needed within the airspace control system to
meet contingency situations.

e. Other Component Commanders. Each component commander advises the

JFC on the employment of forces. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each
component commander within a joint force will normally do the following:

(1) Provide airspace control in areas designated by the ACA in accordance

with (IAW) directives and procedures in the ACP and be prepared to provide
airspace control in other components’ areas designated by the ACA when combat or
other factors degrade the airspace control system.

(2) Forward requests for airspace control measures to the ACA IAW the
ACP.

(3) Develop detailed airspace control instructions, plans, and procedures

IAW guidance in the ACP. These detailed instructions, plans, and procedures need
to be coordinated by the ACA to ensure consistency with JFC approved airspace
control guidance and approved IAW directives and procedures in the ACP.

(4) Provide necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions
in assigned AOs and identify these facilities and personnel to the ACA for inclusion
in the ACP.

f. Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). Although an enabling function, the

JICO function within the C2 spectrum must be understood. The JICO concept was
developed to overcome joint and multinational interoperability deficiencies related
to management of the joint force tactical digital information link (TADIL) networks.
A goal of a JIADS is to provide a common tactical picture (CTP). A JICO cell is
responsible for planning, coordinating, establishing, and maintaining the multi-
TADIL network that is the primary source of data to the CTP. This includes not
only connectivity and interoperability but also correctness and completeness of
distributed information. The JICO, in coordination with other network managers,
will designate appropriately equipped interface units (IUs) to provide such
interfaces and will monitor the quality of data and connectivity with those IUs. In
complex operations, the AADC may designate regional/sector area defense
commanders (RADC/SADC). In that case, regional/sector interface control officer
(RICO/SICO) cells may be established for each RADC/SADC. The RICO/SICO will
report to the RADC/SADC to develop and maintain their regional portion of the
CTP. RICOs and SICOs will coordinate with and answer to the JICO for planning
and execution functions that cross regional boundaries or impact the theater-wide
joint data network (JDN). The JICO may recommend resolution of architectural and
data coordination issues between RICO/SICO cells. See Appendix B for detailed
information.

g. Liaison Officers (LNO)/Augmentees.

(1) LNOs. Effective liaison between forces is essential for coordinated JIADS
operations and is a key factor in the success of joint operations. LNOs serve as their
II-3
parent commanders’ eyes and ears as well as their representative on matters of
service capabilities and limitations. LNOs need to have clearly defined parameters
to take action and make decisions on operational matters. Functional component
commanders, who may also be service component commanders, will use parent
service liaison elements. Additional information for prospective LNOs is available
in Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center’s Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Joint Task Force Liaison Operations.

(2) Augmentees. The AADC may determine a need to augment the staff.
When requesting augmentees, the AADC must specify exact qualifications and
experience levels of personnel desired. When assigned as a member to the AADC,
those members are directly responsible to the AADC.

2. JIADS Planning

a. General. During the planning process, the AADC may designate an air
defense planner. This individual gathers representatives from the various service
component commanders/multinational planning staffs providing assets, C2
capability, and expertise. This group of subject matter experts (SMEs) determines
the best structure for a JIADS based upon JFC guidance, the threat, and available
resources. Some assets may be available in theater; however, in many cases
augmentation by forces external to the theater is required.

(1) Planning for siting platforms should consider accessibility, force

protection, effects of terrain (especially on low-level contacts), and spacing of assets
to optimize the coverage. Assets providing early warning, such as radar platforms,
should be located first. Air-based platforms, such as E-3 Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) and E-2 HAWKEYE, can help fill gaps, particularly in
low-level coverage between surface-based platforms.

(2) Weapons system placement is closely tied to the defended asset list
(DAL), and should be layered to maximize defense in-depth. Range and versatility
will drive much of the placement of theater air defense units. Short-range air
defense (SHORAD) weapons may be deployed in the immediate vicinity of defended
assets. Fighter aircraft can also add vertical layering over defended assets by flying
above missile engagement zones (MEZs) or by flying under centralized control
within joint engagement zones (JEZs) in collaboration with surface-based air defense
units.

(3) The theater or AOR may be divided into air defense regions and air
defense sectors, as appropriate. Each region and sector will have respective RADCs
and SADCs. Typically the SADC is subordinate to the RADC who, in turn, is
subordinate to the AADC. In the normal course of daily operations, RADCs, or their
delegated agents, will work directly with the sector air defense officer (SADO) to
accomplish the air defense mission.

(4) Planning considerations include the following:

(a) Protection of high-value airborne assets.

(b) Tanker support for airborne platforms.

II-4
 (c) Force protection.

(d) Mix of airborne and alert fighter aircraft.

(e) Types and locations of weapons engagement zones (WEZs).

(f) Weapons control status (WCS) of friendly surface-to-air missiles

(SAMs).

(g) Air defense warnings (ADWs) for those specified areas and
authorities. Planning tools such as the joint defensive planner application within
the Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS)/Contingency Theater
Automated Planning System (CTAPS) and Global Command and Control System
(GCCS) may be available to air defenders in both planning and plans development.
A variety of planning systems are in development or being fielded such as the
Patriot planner and the Army Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS).

b. Theater Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

The JFC establishes guidance and objectives in the theater OPLAN or CONOPS and
provides guidance for the employment of command, control, communication,
computers and intelligence (C4I) and counterair. The AADC uses the OPLAN/
CONOPS as a framework for planning. The AADC develops the AAMDP based on
the JFC’s operational concept and allocation decisions and establishes air and
missile ID procedures. The AADC and staff normally develop additional products
during the planning process. These include the area air defense plan (AADP),
inputs into operational tasking data links (OPTASKLINK) that is the guidance for
establishing the link architecture, and the tactical operational data (TACOPDAT).
Other products requiring coordination are the special instructions (SPINS) and
airspace control order (ACO).

c. Intelligence. Intelligence includes at a minimum the enemy order of battle

(EOB), the friendly order of battle (FOB), intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(IPB), and the DAL. The primary intelligence organization providing support to the
joint force is the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The JIC integrates the intelligence
support capabilities of all services and combat units within a central activity. The
AADC’s intelligence planners will use the GCCS resident intelligence support
systems to perform IPB in support of air and missile defense planning. These
systems will host, maintain, and provide a gateway to various intelligence-related
databases (that is, the EOB). In conjunction with the component commanders, the
Operations Directorate of a joint staff (J-3) shall compile and distribute the FOB.

(1) IPB is a continuous process that reveals the threat’s air and missile
attack capabilities and vulnerabilities and systematically predicts threat COA. IPB
provides the planner with an estimate of the enemy air and missile concept of
operations.

(2) The JTF staff, with component input, proposes key political and military
assets to be defended. Depending on the situation the JFC reviews, modifies, and/or
approves this list. Once approved, this list is the DAL. The DAL is subject to
change as an operations progress. The DAL is the critical component in the AADC’s
positioning of the active air defense forces.

II-5
 (3) The AADC uses the DAL, EOB, and IPB in planning the arrangement of
forces, surveillance and ADWs, and in establishing WCS, aircraft, and missile ID
procedures. The AADC also provides rules of engagement (ROE) inputs and
develops plans for disseminating theater air and missile early warning (EW)/
indications and warning (I&W).

d. Coordination. The establishment and maintenance of an effective JIADS

requires continuous coordination between all elements of the joint force.
Coordination requires a seamless communications network that allows planners,
operators, and maintainers to maximize system capabilities while minimizing
system limitations.

e. Theater Air Defense Integration. Service component commanders must

coordinate with the AADC and the J-3 to ensure that their components are
integrated into the AAMDP. Component commanders plan and execute operations
as directed by the JFC and conduct active defense IAW weapon control procedures
and measures established by the AADC. Component commanders are responsible
for coordinating and prioritizing their operations and needs with the JFC and with
other component commanders.

(1) Tactical Warning. Tactical warning is the act of disseminating warning

information of a threatening or hostile act to personnel within the area of risk. This
warning is based upon an evaluation of information from all available sources.
Though the AADC has overall responsibility for providing tactical warning, all
commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. All personnel
shall respond to tactical warning information IAW their assigned responsibilities.

(2) Service Systems Integration. The goal of the AADC, in constructing the
JIADS, is to optimize allocated assets with respect to surveillance, engagement, and
multi-TADIL capability. To maximize integration, the AADC must be completely
aware of service specific systems. This can be achieved through consulting with
SMEs, LNOs, or requiring those units to report their capabilities and limitations via
voice or electronic message before deployment.

(a) The data required for planning the multi-TADIL architecture is found
in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 6120.01, Joint Multi-
Tactical Digital Information Link Operating Procedures (JMTOP), and includes—

• Specific TADIL capability (TADIL-A, J).

• Track processing capacity (352 tracks).

• Auto-correlation capability (Yes/No). (Correlation parameters, for

example; 12 nautical mile (NM) ellipse, +/- 30 degrees of heading, +/- 50 knots speed,
matching identification friend or foe [IFF]).

• Procedural/doctrine ID capability.

• ID capability (recognition of SUSPECT, neutral, assumed friend tracks).

• Communications capability (number and type of satellite communication

[SATCOM]/ultra high frequency [UHF]/high frequency [HF]).
II-6
 • Auto-alert messages capability.

• Force order capability.

(b) Examples of surveillance data required for planning surveillance

would include—

• Operating frequencies of air defense sensors (frequency management,

electromagnetic capability assessment program).

• Height-finding capability.

• Range limits.

• Auto-detect and initiate tracks.

• Azimuth coverage.

• IFF interrogation capability.

f. Air Breathing Threat (ABT). When creating an ABT defense design, each fire
unit’s primary target line (PTL) must orient toward the most likely avenue of
approach that suspected ABT would use to attack the defended asset. The following
list is a general defense design process that planners can use to determine an ABT
defense:

(1) Determine the assets to be protected (static or mobile).

(2) Determine the most likely enemy avenues of approach.

(3) Determine locations that fire units can deploy to in order to protect the
assets.

(4) Try to maintain convergent PTL to increase coverage of the asset and to
protect adjacent fire units.

(5) Monitor the OPORD for changes in the plan and make adjustments to the
air defense coverage as applicable.

g. TBM Threat. Countering the TBM threat requires simultaneous and

sequential execution of a wide spectrum of tasks and activities, some occurring
before the use of force. Some of these are operational preparation, training, and
planning. General planning considerations include but are not limited to the
following:

(1) Designing a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure consisting of interoperable systems
providing complete coverage against an array of TBM threats.

(2) Fusing geographically separated offensive and defensive operations into

a focused effort.
II-7
 (3) Understanding of the JFC’s ROE to include multinational ROE.

(4) Developing accurate and timely ID procedures to enhance engagement,

conserve friendly resources, and reduce the risk to friendly forces.

(5) Determining the right mix of sensors at the right time and location.

(6) Detecting of launch platforms (enhanced EW).

(7) Transmitting of timely warning to alert commanders theater-wide.

Theater missile defense (TMD) is inherently a joint mission. Therefore, joint force
components and supporting combatant commanders must be integrated toward the
common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy’s TM capability. The
ability to integrate forces/systems and to plan TMD operations before arriving in
undeveloped theaters is imperative.

h. AAMDP. The AADC, with the support and coordination of the component
commanders, develops; integrates; and distributes a joint AAMDP. The AAMDP
integrates the active air and missile defense capabilities of the joint force’s
components providing a responsive air defense system that achieves operational and
tactical objectives. Because air defense and airspace control and management are
inherently related areas, the AAMDP, ACP, and air operations plan should be
developed in concert to avoid conflicts. The AAMDP addresses but is not limited
to—

(1) Air defense C2.

(2) JFC’s air defense priorities.

(3) Sensor employment.

(4) ID procedures.

(5) Engagement procedures.

(6) Airspace control measures.

(7) Weapons control procedures.

(8) Weapons system employment.

(9) Tactical interface (for example, TADIL) design.

(10) Dissemination of EW.

(11) DAL.

(12) Joint theater missile defense (JTMD) integration.

(13) Maintenance scheduling.

(14) Designation of RADCs/SADCs.

II-8
 i. Weapon and Sensor System Allocation. JIADS includes weapon and sensor
systems/platforms made up from the service components. Based on JFC guidance
and other considerations, such as an OPLAN and existing agreements, each service
component provides assets to the JFACC when established to fulfill common air
defense support requirements within the JOA. However, even when common air
defense support is provided for by a lead service or a JIADS, service unique air
defense requirements remain the responsibility of the individual service
components. The combatant and subordinate JFCs should consider the common
support requirements needed to allow service components the ability to execute
their service specific requirements.

j. The JFACC further allocates air assets between strike, support, and
counterair missions based on JFC priorities. Missile batteries, radar, electronic
surveillance systems, and naval combatants are also provided by components based
on JFC priorities, location, and mission requirements. Forces not assigned directly
to the JFACC/AADC can also contribute additional sensors and weapons units to the
JIADS. The inherent and simultaneous multimission capabilities of many platforms
may drive this supporting arrangement vice direct AADC TACON of these
platforms. The AADC should coordinate with both planners and unit commanders to
ensure the correct number and mix of capabilities is available to achieve an
uninterrupted JIADS.

3. Communications Architecture

Communications systems must provide reliable near real-time information to

dispersed JIADS elements. The systems must be redundant so that continuous
communications are available in case the primary system is disabled. Radar, IFF,
computers, automatic data links (ADLs), and voice links provide real-time data. The
following are considered when establishing the JIADS communications architecture:

a. OPTASK LINK. The JICO, working for the JFACC/AADC, develops the
OPTASK LINK based on the theater TADIL plan to support the AADC’s surveillance
and C2 plans. The OPTASK LINK is the formal and executable portion of the JIADS
TADIL plan (Figure II-1). The OPTASKLINK addresses but is not limited to the
following information:

(1) All TADIL operating parameters.

(2) Track block assignments.

(3) Coordinated frequency allocation. (Note: Must be coordinated with the

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate of a Joint
Staff [J-6] before release.)

(4) Designation of RICOs and SICOs. (Note: In determining whether to

designate RICOs and SICOs, the JICO should consider geographic limitations and
whether RADCs or SADCs are employed. This requires close coordination with
AADC before inclusion in the OPTASKLINK message.)

(5) Individual TADIL managers/alternates.

(6) Track management conventions.

II-9
 Figure II–1. Notional Multi-TADIL Architecture

(7) ID policy for automated systems.

(8) Data forwarding rules.

b. Data Link (see Figure II-2).

c. Voice Communications. Voice communications are critical to situational

awareness of the battlespace. A voice communications architecture supporting
interface management is crucial to ensuring the appropriate commander has valid
information to make timely engagement decisions. Planning and continuous
coordination must be given to a voice communications architecture that not only
supports the joint force but each element of the JIADS. The capabilities and
limitations of each IU within the JTF force structure must be considered before
force deployment. Considerations for equipment supplements must be given to each
IU to ensure force deployment capabilities parallel the connectivity needs of theater
operations.

4. ROE Considerations

ROE is a critical part of the JIADS planning and employment process. The
AADC should continuously evaluate its impact on accomplishing the JIADS mission
and ensure the AADP is consistent with current ROE. The AADC should ensure that
the joint air operations center (JAOC) and other personnel supporting the air
defense mission are familiar with current ROE. The AADC may recommend changes
to current ROE, as necessary to support the JIADS mission.

II-10
 Brigade
TOC
F-15C
MARFOR CGS DISE JTIDS F-15C
COC Fighter
S AWACS* Data Link

JSTARS F-18*
AOC C
Forward E-2*

A EP-3
B AEGIS*
Senior
Scout A CRC*
Link - 16
B

B
JVMC SHORAD F
SAAWF GW ABMOC SHORAD
Tower Avenger/
TAOC* Relay Stinger
PATRIOT B
A A ICC
a EPLRS
JICO Cell P
RTU
RTU
G PFU PFU a=A TDL-1
G maneuver A=T ADIL-A
LAV-AD vehicles B=T ADIL-B
LAAD PFU
AAMDC C/*=T ADIL-C
F=F AAD DL
ADA BDEs G=GBDL
JTAGS P=P ADIL
B S=SCDL

Figure II-2. Link Architecture

a. ID Criteria. ID criteria are developed to support current ROE as well as

standing rules of engagement (SROE) in light of weapon systems capabilities. The
AADC is responsible for developing JIADS ID criteria and submitting the same for
JFC approval. ID criteria shall be published in the AAMDP with specific
instructions in the air tasking order (ATO) and SPINS.

b. ID Considerations. In developing ID criteria consistent with, and in support

of SROE and current ROE, the AADC may consider the following:

(1) IFF Modes (I-IV per the ATO).

(2) TADIL-J precise participant location and identification (PPLI).

(3) Procedural measures (for example, minimum risk routes).

(4) A radar contact correlated with a voice (position) report from an air or
ground control agency.

(5) Off-board/on-board combat identification systems (CIDS).

(6) Visual ID.

(7) Formation assessment (premerge guilt by association).

II-11
 (8) Weight factors/doctrine statements.

(9) Point of origin.

(10) Track maneuvers (for example, noncompliance with airspace control

measures).

(11) Self-defense criteria.

5. Joint Combat Identification (CID) Considerations

CID is the process of identifying entities in a combatant’s AOR with sufficiently

high confidence to make real-time decisions, including the use of weapon systems.
This section describes the primary CIDS employed by US military forces. It
emphasizes the importance of early ID of unknown air contacts and highlights the
methods of track management used within the Department of Defense. It also
discusses joint command relationships and the role of each level during mission
execution.

a. CIDS. CIDS are capable of locating and identifying airborne, land, and
surface targets. CIDS are technology-based ID systems that exploit the physical or
electronic characteristics of a target; for example, noncooperative target recognition
(NCTR), signals intelligence, and electronic support measures. During planning and
execution phases for air defense, all participants must consider the capabilities and
limitations of the available CIDS platforms such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-3
AWACS (Block 30/35), C-130 Senior Scout, E-2C Hawkeye, EP-3 Aries II, and Aegis
(depending on ship configuration). All are voice product net (VPN) capable and all
have some TADIL-A or TADIL-J capability. Rivet Joint and Senior Scout are tactical
information broadcast service (TIBS) producers. Not all participants will see the
same ID-related information or to the same detail. This is dependent primarily on
system implementation; Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)
versus TADIL-A/B message standards and operator display capabilities. CIDS input
(either on-board or off-board) or visual ID will always be part of the enemy ID
process.

b. Formation Assessment (FA). FA is a procedural ID methodology that is

accomplished by either a C2 node or a “shooter.” FA is also an ID process that can
be used to identify all members in a group of targets as either friendly or hostile.
This group ID is based on the ID (IAW the ID criteria) of at least 1 member of the
group. Factors such as similarity to known threat tactical formations and relative
spatial relationships (distance, speed, and altitude) must contribute to the FA ID of
these groups. Once the group has been identified, if the group is observed to split,
all contacts in each of the resulting groups maintains the ID. This ID methodology
requires that 1 or more radar systems (that is, fighter or C2) continuously monitor
the group or groups during the split. The group is considered “continuously
tracked” if not lost/faded for more than 1 sweep/cycle. FA is most accurate when
performed before the first merge in a clean environment where the battlespace is
well defined. After the initial merge, the FA must be executed with caution.
Accurate sensor data and reliable link architecture are essential. The following are
examples of FA criteria used in the CID process:

II-12
 (1) Defensive Counterair (DCA) Fighters. A “group” is a set of contacts
bounded by 3 NMs. Observing the group for a few seconds can improve confidence
that the group is aircraft flying together. If a group includes a contact with a
properly established ID, the ID can be applied to the other members of that group.
DCA fighters cannot use FA in a postmerge environment where friendly and enemy
fighters have been mixed.

(2) E3 AWACS/Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC)/Control and

Reporting Center (CRC)/ E-2C. Any group of contacts within 3 NMs (regardless of
altitude) of each other will be treated as a single group. IDs of tracks splitting from
that group could be considered to be part of the same association as long as no
sensor ambiguity exists.

(3) Patriot. FA is not applicable to Patriot.

(4) Navy Air Defense Units. Procedures is to bind the group in question by 3
NMs combined with an altitude separation of not greater than 5000 feet.

c. Combat ID Coordinator (CIDC). The RADC may designate a CIDC to

coordinate, monitor, and deconflict CIDS ID functions. The RADC and CIDC
prioritize tasks, assign responsibilities, and develop specific procedures to identify
hostile contacts within the JIADS and alert appropriate units. Relevant
considerations include ROE, the ID criteria matrix, and operational and
communications capabilities of individual CIDS platforms, C2 nodes, and shooters.
The CIDC should be collocated with the RADC to enhance battle management
decision making. Should the RADC elect to delegate ID authority to the SADC, the
SADC should also employ a sector CIDC to support the decision-making processes
within that sector. The sector CIDC should also be collocated with the SADC. The
CIDC should update a VPN log which includes all hostile air tracks, times, and
amplifying information passed over the net to help account for all IDs in that sector.
The CIDC will also monitor the track supervision network (TSN) and the data link
coordination network (DCN) to resolve track ID conflicts.

d. Track Deconfliction. The assumption that each C2 participant sees the same
tracks with the same identity in the same place is not valid and leads to
misunderstanding and mistakes. Platform sensor differences aggravate preexisting
problems of miscorrelation and dual tracking. This can cause the following:

(1) C2 surveillance tracks not updating/tracking aircraft.

(2) C2 surveillance tracks that appeared to be tracking aircraft but were not.

(3) C2 surveillance tracks that “jumped” many miles from one aircraft to
another.

(4) IFF modes and codes swapped among tracks.

(5) Effects of terrain on track continuity.

e. Track Jumps. Each system must be cognizant of the possible “jumping” of

tracks when 2 or more tracks are within a nominal distance (system dependent) and

II-13
how that “jump” can effect the ID of that track. This phenomenon can occur within a
system and can occur when cross-told to other systems and presents 1 of the most
dangerous forms of miscorrelation.

f. Dual Tracks. Dualing, is the occurrence of multiple tracks on one target.

This occurs frequently within the JIADS. Dual tracks may result in miscorrelations,
uncommon air pictures, ID errors, and cluttered air pictures and data links. Dual
tracking indicates a situation where there are more tracks than actual aircraft.
Multiple links and operating systems within a JIADS can increase dual tracks
which, in turn, negates the benefits of a clear tactical picture. Lack of data link
connectivity and failure of surveillance systems to correlate contacts with PPLI
tracks are other causes of dual tracking.

g. Lack of Data Link Connectivity. Details of the data link connectivity

problems (systems not holding exactly the same tracks) are contained in Joint
Combat Identification Evaluation Team (JCIET) evaluation reports (see JCIET
website at http://www.eglin.af.mil/jciet/).

h. Correlation Problems. These problems include varying size of correlation

windows, auto correlation system differences or lack thereof, radar measured
altitude differences between systems, IFF conflicts by systems, sensor registration/
gridlock problems, and lack of familiarization of other service system capabilities
and operations. Ultimately these problems can result in tracks being displayed in
different locations at different nodes. Minimizing these problems requires the use of
a dedicated secure voice TSN to deconflict track ambiguities.

6. JIADS C2 Employment

a. Air Space Control Procedures. The JFC will define airspace control areas and
the specific airspace within those areas for which air defense must be planned and
provided. The AADC typically allocates missions to each RADC to perform DCA
functions. The number of regions/sectors and RADCs/SADCs may vary depending
upon geographical, political, and operational factors such as friendly forces, the
threat, OPLANS, and sensor coverage capabilities/limitations. For example, the
AADC may assign an AEGIS cruiser, SAAWC, or CRC to perform RADC duties in a
specific geographic region. Air defense regions may be further subdivided into
sectors, with a SADC coordinating within a sector. SADCs are responsible for
managing assets within their sector and coordinating handoffs between sectors.
SADCs will exercise control over friendly aircraft and SAMs and coordinate all
engagement operations. All air defense systems within a given sector should have
connectivity to the SADC via data link and voice communications. A SADC’s sector
may contain part or all of a JEZ.

b. Air Defense Engagement Zones.

(1) JEZ. A JEZ is airspace of specified dimensions where multiple air

defense weapons systems are simultaneously operated and employed. The JEZ
construct consists of layered defense in-depth with overlapping fires. Multiple
weapons systems may operate in a single sector. Each system has a primary
operating area with first engagement priority and a secondary engagement
envelope. Tactical situations will arise where a JEZ will be appropriately mixed

II-14
with fighter engagement zones (FEZs) and MEZs within a sector. Situations may also
arise where a JEZ is not possible and a FEZ or MEZ must be established. Similar to
the construct of the JEZ, these WEZs will have preplanned engagement procedures
published in the AAMDP and ACP. Among these procedures are minimum risk
routes (MRRs) or return to force (RTF) profile. MRRs are temporary corridors of
defined dimensions recommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft which
present the minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the theater
airspace. MRRs normally extend from the corps’ rear boundary to the fire support
coordination line. Low-level transit routes are employed in a similar fashion in
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. RTF profile constitutes
specific maneuvers/tracks friendly aircraft will fly returning to the friendly
operating areas. The purpose of the profile is to reduce the possibility of fratricide.
Instructions (altitudes, course, speed, ingress points, safety corridors, and approach
sectors) are defined SPINS. It is imperative that the local air defense commander
monitors these procedures and ensures compliance.

(2) WEZ. A WEZ is airspace of specified dimensions where the

responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon system.
Examples of WEZs are FEZs and MEZs.

(3) High-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ). A HIMEZ is airspace

of specified dimensions where the responsibility for engagement normally rests with
high-altitude air defense SAMs.

(4) Low-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ). A LOMEZ is airspace

of specified dimensions where the responsibility for engagement normally rests with
low to medium-altitude air defense SAMs.

(5) SHORAD Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). A SHORADEZ is airspace of

defined dimensions where the responsibility for engagement normally rests with the
SHORAD weapons. It may be established within a LOMEZ or HIMEZ.

c. WCS (Hold, Tight, Free). The authority to direct WCS changes within the
JIADS resides with the AADC. This authority may be delegated to the RADC or
SADC for specific regions or sectors. Individual weapon systems within the JIADS
are not strictly bound to operate in the same WCS and may operate in varying WCS
simultaneously when directed. WCSs are defined as follows:

(1) Weapons Hold. A weapon control order imposing a status whereby

weapon systems may only be fired in self-defense or in response to a formal order.

(2) Weapons Tight. A weapon control order imposing a status whereby

weapon systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile.

(3) Weapons Free. A weapon control order imposing a status whereby

weapon systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly.

d. ADW Conditions. ADW conditions are degrees of air raid probability

according to the below listed codes. The term air division/sector referred to herein
may include forces and units afloat or deployed to forward areas as applicable.
ADWs are defined as follows:

II-15
 (1) ADW White. An attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable. ADW
White may be called either before or after ADW Yellow or ADW Red.

(2) ADW Yellow. An attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is probable. This

means that hostile aircraft or missiles are en route towards a respective division/
sector or unknown aircraft or missiles suspected to be hostile are en route towards
or within a respective division/sector.

(3) ADW Red. An attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is imminent or is in

progress. This means that hostile aircraft or missiles are within an air defense
division/sector or are in the immediate vicinity of an air defense division/sector with
high probability of entering the division/sector.

7. Conclusion

The JIADS is not a formal system in itself but the sum of the component air
defense systems. For each of these systems to operate as an integrated whole it is
imperative that everyone working within the system understands each component’s
capabilities, limitations, and where they can be best utilized within the JIADS. All
participants must understand the system and its coordination requirements.
Chapters III-VI provide an overview of each service air defense systems, their
capabilities, and limitations. Therefore planning between AADC and component
commanders’ planning staffs is normally required.

II-16
 Chapter III

ARMY AIR DEFENSE

1. Background

Synchronizing and integrating Army capabilities in air and missile defense

operations is a complex process. It involves coordinating C2 organizations and
capabilities with specific data links, communications and intelligence capabilities,
weapon systems capabilities, and data architecture. For the joint planner,
understanding the planning considerations in support of the JIADS is very
important.

2. Mission

The air and missile defense mission is to protect the force and selected
geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance. This ensures
the Army forces (ARFOR) retain the ability to perform their mission of closing with
the enemy and destroying it using maneuver, firepower, and shock. Integration of
the air and missile defense mission into the JIADS is accomplished by the Army’s air
defense artillery (ADA) units.

3. Organization

Within a theater or AO, all elements of the Army air defense structure are not
required to be in place for Army elements to interface in a joint operation. When in
place, Army air defense forces are organized as follows:

a. AAMDC. The Army’s AAMDC is a general officer level command that

exercises C2 over echelon above corps (EAC) ADA brigades. The AAMDC
coordinates EAC and corps ADA active defense operations within a theater. The
AAMDC performs coordination functions with other services and multinational air
defense elements and plans the Army air and missile defense portion of TAMD. The
Army will have 2 AAMDCs: 1 active Army component and Army National Guard
(ANG) mix and 1 all ANG.

b. ADA Brigades. Army ADA brigades exercise C2 over their assigned and
attached ADA battalions. The normal ADA brigade has 2 to 5 battalions and may be
composed of a mix of TAMD and SHORAD weapon systems. EAC brigades provide
support to the ARFOR as a whole, while corps ADA brigades are organic forces and
primarily defend the corps’ forces and priorities.

c. ADA Battalions. The battalion is the basic operational ADA unit. Only
armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) and certain enhanced brigades have a smaller
organic unit, a battery. Patriot units have 5 firing batteries and SHORAD units have
4 per battalion. Theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) firing batteries are
normally deployed as part of a THAAD-Patriot task force.

d. Patriot Battalions. Patriot battalions are assigned to EAC and corps brigades
to defend against aircraft and lower tier missile threats. The division SHORAD

III-1
battalions have Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Avenger,
Linebacker, and Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) air defense systems
supported by the forward area air defense (FAAD) command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) system using the Sentinel radar. Active force
SHORAD battalions are organic to Army maneuver divisions.

4. C2

Army C2 encompasses multiple echelons in the planning and operations of Army

air and missile defense systems. C2 is enabled through the use of a tactical
operations center (TOC). TOCs exists in some form at every command level—the
AAMDC, EAC and corps ADA brigades, and battalions.

TOCs provide a common, integrated, digitized C4I capability that automates and
integrates the performance of engagement operations (EO) and force operations
(FO) functions for air and missile defense (battery through AAMDC) as well as joint
force elements.

Contained within the TOC is an integrated system of hardware and software

known as the Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS). The
AMDCPS contains the computers, communications, and ancillary equipment
required to plan and execute air and missile defense operations. The AMDPS
systems are tailored to the echelon (for example, the AAMDC AMDPCS will have
different C4I systems than a battalion AMDPCS). The AMDPCS system that
comprises AAMDC TOC is shown in Table III-1. The AMDPCS TOC configuration is
shown in Figure III-1.

a. Functions. At each echelon, AMDPCSs are organized to perform the

following functions:

(1) Monitor the execution of operations.

(2) Synchronize combat activities to sustain tempo and adjust the plan to the
situation.

(3) Maintain the current operation’s situation.

(4) Sustain the tempo of operations by ensuring a continuity of combat

consumables.

(5) Provide a focal point for the receipt and development of intelligence.

(6) Plan future operations.

(7) Monitor combat operations of supported, adjacent, and higher echelon

organizations.

(8) Provide situational information to higher headquarters.

(9) Conduct air defense engagement operations. At the Patriot battery level
and at the Patriot information coordination center (ICC), the AMDPCS can fire
missiles if the system is properly initialized.
III-2
 Table III-1. AMDPCS Systems and Functions for the AAMDC TOC
Systems Function
Air Defense Systems Integrator See Table III-2
(ADSI)*
Air and Missile Defense Workstation Provides real-time air picture as a planning tool for radar coverage
(AMDWS)* and system firing fans.
Central Communications Display (CCD) Allows the battle captain the ability to view other component
displays.
Automated Deep Operations Displays units, airspace control means used to plan deep targets
Coordination System (ADOCS)* through the corps’ deep operation coordination cell. Provides
situational awareness to targeting officer.
Maneuver Control System (MCS) Provides comprehensive friendly force information and inbound
missile warning.
Joint Warning (JWARN) Receives, displays, and transmits nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) messages.
Global Command and Control System Multiservice C3I data.
(GCCS)
Army Field Artillery Tactical Data Assists in fire support management, passes launch points and
System (AFATDS) accesses friendly artillery database.
Interim Pager Alert Warning System Provides missile warning/force warning via pagers.
(IPAWS)
All Source Analysis System Displays EOB, assists in analysis, receives, prints and plots
(ASAS)* intelligence reports and imagery.
Global Combat Support System (GCSS) Provides control of personnel, logistics, material, and financial
information.
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support Provides automated/connectivity to facilitate collection and
System (JDISS) coordination of intelligence information.
Generic Area Limitation Environment Terrain analysis using resident database; can do location
(GALE)* suitability modeling for threat systems.
Worldwide Origin Threat System Receives and correlates joint tactical ground station (JTAGS),
(WOTS) ALERT and tactical detection and reporting (TACDR)
reports/alerts.
Airborne Broadcast Intelligence System Provides real time multi-spectral imagery, flight following and
(ABIS) threat displays.
Contingency Theater Automated Used to download ATO/ACO and provide input to blue air
Planning System (CTAPS) planning.
Joint Services Work Station (JSWS)* Provides Moving Target Indicator (MTI)/synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) data and initiates remote sensor relay (RSR).
Commanders Tactical Terminal-3 (CTT- Radio UHF receiver for TIBS and TADIL-B.
3)
PSC-7 SATCOM radio Receives line of sight UHF secure data and voice
communications.
Joint Tactical Information Distribution Receives TADIL-J picture.
System (JTIDS)
*Linked via LAN to CCD

III-3
 • ADSI DISPLAY x2
GCCS • AMDWS x1
CTAPS • GCCS x1
WARLORD ATTACK OPS VAN
G-2 ADSI REMOTE
G-3 W/S • AFATADS x1
GALE
PLANS
G-2 PLANS AMDWS LAPTOP W/S • ASAS (WARLORD) x1
LAPTOP
• GALE x1
COMMS G-3 WARLORD
LAN HUB LAPTOP ACTIVE • MSTS x1
/MAINT GALE MSTS
CTT3 RADIO DEFENSE • CGSWS x1
AFATADS• ADOCS x3
PASSIVE ATTACK
DEFENSE OPS

BATTLE CPT
COMM TECH ADSI W/S ADOCS
JWARN WOTS CGSWS
GCCS G-1
PASSIVE DEFENSE VAN G-4 G-2 ANALYSIS/ OPS
ULLS-4 LAPTOPS
• ASAS (WARLORD) x1 MCS / P

• GCCS x1 G-4
AN/PSC-7 SATCOM AMDWS
• MCS/P x1 RADIO
• GALE x1
• WOTS x1 IST phone

• AMDWS x1 G-1 BRIEFING DNVT Phone

AMDWS TENT SECTEL
• JWARN x1 G-1/G-4 STAFF VAN
Printer
• AN/PSC-7 SATCOM RADIO x1

Figure III-1. AMDPCS Configuration for AAMDC

b. FAAD C3I. FAAD C3I provides SHORAD weapons and C2 centers with
digital automated target information from Sentinel and joint sensors with battle
command information. Along with the AMDWS, it provides automated EO and FO
capabilities in the SHORAD battalion. FAAD C2 EO capabilities include real-time
early warning and cueing information to SHORAD weapon systems, friendly aircraft
ID, and air battle management. AMDWS FO capabilities include automated mission
and staff planning (for example, development and distribution of logistical and
administrative orders and directives) and interoperability with other Army
battlefield control system (ABCS) components.

c. C2 Architecture. The C2 of Army air and missile defense units is

implemented through use of 1 C2 architecture as shown in Figure III-2. Key Army
interfaces within this architecture are shown in Table III-2. This table summarizes
the mission, functions, and characteristics of each interface.

d. JTAGS. JTAGS is a transportable information processing system that

receives and processes in-theater, direct downlinked data from Defense Support
Program (DSP) satellites. JTAGS disseminates warning, alerting, and cueing
information on TBMs and other tactical events of interest throughout the theater
using existing communications networks. Its in-theater location provides the
earliest warning, and it can be readily tailored for and linked to theater-unique
terrestrial C3I systems.

III-4
 Data Link Architecture
ALTERNATIVE
TADIL-A
TADIL-B
PADIL
SERIAL-J Other Services/Coalition Forces

Note 6
Note 6

UHF/HF
MSE/ Joint Land Attack
TRITAC Missile Defense
Cruise
Netted Sensor System
Elevated
Fiber
Tactical Optic
(JLENS) TADIL-J
Joint Tactical Air
Satellite Cable
Ground Station
Note 1
Note 1 Army Air & Missile
Defense Command

ADA BRIGADE

PATRIOT
BATTALION Note2

UHF PADIL
Note
PATRIOT BATTERY 3

THAAD BATTERY

MANEUVER DIVISION
A2C2

SHORAD
BATTALION ABMOC

SINCGARS
Notes:
1. Requires special interface and coordination.
2. When Battery command post present. SHORAD SENSORS
3. Only one SHORAD C2 element transmits track data.
4. 1st CAV, 3rd INF, 4th INF only.
5. Army Class 2M terminal is IJMS and TADIL-J capable. SINCGARS
6. Service/coalition force dependent. FDL EPLRS
SHORAD WEAPONS Note 4

Figure III-2. Army Air and Missile Defense Data Architecture

III-5
 Table III-2. Key Army Interfaces and their Characteristics
Air Defense System
Integrator (ADSI) Army SHORAD with
Interface (AAMDC and ADA Army Patriot Information FAAD C3I
Characteristics Brigades) Coordination Center (ICC) (Sentinel Radar)
1. Missions Threat detection and Threat detection Threat detection
warning Tracking Tracking
SAM control Identification Dissemination
Air defense management SAM control Warning
Tracking Air defense management Cueing
Identification Air battle management
2. Technical functions PPLI PPLI PPLI
(Includes mission Air surveillance Air surveillance Air surveillance
categories for weapons Weapons coordination and Weapons coordination and Weapons coordination
coordination and management management and management
management and control) Information management Information management Information management
(R = receive only) Mission management Point surveillance Mission management
Point surveillance Point surveillance
3. Types of tracks Air Air Air
maintained and reported Points Points EW
to interface (R = receive EW EW
only)
4. Interface data link TADIL-B TADIL-A TADIL-J
capability/limitations TADIL-J TADIL-B FDL
SERIAL-J TADIL-J TADIL- B
TADIL-A ATDL1 IJMS
ATDL1 PADIL
FDL IJMS
IJMS
5. Track position data For unit location – 1024 data For unit locations: +/- 1023.5 460 km
base limits miles from own SCC and data miles from own SCC. The
1024 data miles of date time other track positional data +/-
reference checkpoint. 511.75 data miles from own
SCC.
7. Maximum display 1024 data miles 1024 km x 768 km 400 km x 400 km
area
8. Data registration Done automatically with Done automatically with Manual input to
respect to the DLRP. respect to the DLRP. coordinate converting
parameters.
9. Track number Assigned sequentially from Assigned sequentially from Assigned sequentially
assigned block. assigned block. from assigned block.
10. Track Identification Automatic “PENDING” all Automatic (passive/active) Automatic with manual
others manually Manually (passive/active) override adjustable
parameters.
11. Track quality Air Air Air
maximum value Surface N/A Surface 15 Surface 15
Land Land Land
12. Correlation Automatic if within 5 data Automatic (correlation block Automatic within
miles when in auto track size is variable as a function of limitation of sensors.
Mode. No correlation done aircraft position). Capable of 125m3
over joint interface. correlation.
13. Handover None, voice or digital None, voice or digital None, voice or digital

III-6
5. Weapon Systems

a. Stinger.

Stinger provides short-range air defense for maneuver units, rear echelon
forces, special operations forces, and combat service support units (Table III-3).
Stinger is mounted on a variety of platforms and is located throughout the theater of
operations. The Stinger missile is designed to counter high-speed, low-level, ground
attack aircraft, CMs, helicopters, observation UAVs, and transport aerial platforms.

Stinger consists of a tube-launched missile, IFF unit, trainers, and ancillary

equipment. The software-controlled guidance functions are reprogrammable via a
memory module and provide the capability to meet the changing UAV and CM
threats (Table III-3). The Stinger is now used by 2 low-altitude air defense platforms
(Avenger and Linebacker) and 3 helicopters (Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche).

b. Avenger. The Avenger weapon system is a lightweight, day and night,

limited adverse weather fire unit (Table III-3). The fire unit consists of 2 turret-
mounted Stinger missile pods, a .50-caliber machine gun, a forward-looking infrared
(FLIR) system, a laser rangefinder, and an IFF system. The fully rotating turret is
mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The sensor
components and armament system are gyro-stabilized for shoot-on-the-move
capability and can slew-to-cue in response to EW information. The gunner operates
the system from inside the turret or from a remote control unit (RCU) away from the
HMMWV. On-board communications equipment provides for radio and intercom
operations.

c. Linebacker/BSFV.

(1) The Bradley Linebacker is mounted on a M2A2 M6 Bradley vehicle and

has a crew of 4 personnel with an integrated, externally mounted Stinger launcher,
which is mounted in place or the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
missiles. The Bradley Linebacker can fire while stationary or on-the-move while
maintaining pace with the armored forces. The crew remains under armor
protection during engagements and missile reloading. An integrated position,
navigation, and north-seeker capability allow for on-the-move cueing. The FAAD C3I
provides targeting information to assist in target acquisition. The Bradley
Linebacker is being fielded to the Armored and Mechanized Infantry divisions and
to the ACRs.

(2) The BSFV also consists of a M2A2 Bradley vehicle but has a crew of 5 and
has no externally mounted missiles. The BSFV has a dedicated Stinger team that
must dismount the vehicle and deploy before engaging aerial targets. The BSFV is
fielded to both armored and mechanized infantry divisions and to the ACRs (Table
III-3).

d. Patriot. Patriot is a long-range, mobile, theater and corps air and missile
defense system that protects critical assets and maneuver forces from TMs, UAVs,
helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. Patriot is the centerpiece of the Army’s TAMD
force. The Patriot system, with the Patriot advanced capability-3 (PAC-3) and
guidance enhanced missile (GEM), is currently the only fielded Army TAMD system.

III-7
 e. THAAD. The THAAD system protects the force and selected geopolitical
assets against TBMs as the upper-tier of a 2-tier defense system (Table III-3).
THAAD provides a near seamless defense against threats directed against critical
military and civilian assets. THAAD engages at high altitudes and at long ranges to
minimize collateral damage caused by nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
warheads and debris. THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 will provide a 2-tier defense for
high value assets located under their protective envelopes. Together the 2 systems
are known as the Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF). Additional
information on Army systems can be found at http://147.71.210.21/. This site includes
additional Army ADA links.

6. Planning

The commander, AAMDC, and other representatives in the service component

headquarters are responsible for active air and missile defense planning. The
AAMDC assists in integrating air defense and TAMD priorities into the force’s
defended assets prioritization process. Active, passive, and other combined arms air
defense measures are covered in the air defense estimate. The AAMDC also ensures
coordination between air defense elements at higher and lower echelons, as well as

Table III-3. Weapon Systems Characteristics

Weapons HIMAD HIMAD SHORAD SHORAD
Characteristics THAAD Patriot Avenger/Linebacker Manpads
Targets TBM TBM Airplanes Airplanes
CM Helicopters Helicopters
TASM CM CM
UAV UAV

Sensor range/ 1000 km 37 NM Sentinel radar 40 km Visual detection

planning range (Dependent on (dependent on location of
location of radar to radar to Avenger).
Avenger). On-board
detection is visual or
FLIR
ID capability NONE IFF/SIF IFF IFF
weighted Visual Visual
system
Number of fire units 2 5 Heavy Division: Light division—8 teams
per battalion 36 (Avenger) ACR—12 teams
24 (Linebacker)
ACR
6 (Linebacker)
Number of missiles 10 4 GEM or 4 Avenger (8) 2 ready to fire
loaded per launcher PAC-2 or 16 Linebacker (4) with 4 reloads with each team
and platform PAC-3 6 on-board reloads

Coverage angle of Track and Track and 360 degrees 360 degrees
supporting radar search search sectors up to 30,000 feet up to 30,000 feet
sectors are are classified.
classified.
Engagement range N/A 37 NM 4 km 4 km
(planning)

III-8
at adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal integration of air
defense coverage throughout the battlefield. In force-projection operations, this will
include integration with joint or multinational counterair and TMD participants. If
the senior air defense person in theater, the AAMDC becomes the theater Army air
and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) with an expanded theater scope.

a. Operational Planning.

(1) The focus of air and missile defense planning at the operational level is
on protection of forces and assets IAW command priorities. The AAMDC allocates
ADA units to EAC and corps ADA brigades based upon the priorities and the
concept of operations for land operations. While planning for air and missile defense
of the AO, the ARFOR also considers the contributions of the other components to
protection of the force from air and missile attack.

(2) In the air and missile defense plan, the AAMDC and the EAC ADA
brigades may be tasked to protect theater assets such as airbases, logistics facilities,
seaports, and geopolitical assets, as well as maneuver forces in assembly areas.
Corps commanders may also be tasked to protect theater assets located in the corps
area using corps ADA forces.

b. Operational Planning Process.

(1) Air defense planning at the operational level is an iterative process. Once
the AADC develops the air defense concept for the theater, the ARFOR, through the
battlefield control detachment (BCD), provides an air defense estimate to the
AADC. Once the AADC develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates air
assets for various missions, the AAMDC determines whether EAC or corps have
sufficient air and missile defense coverage or if the ARFOR should allocate
additional theater Army air and missile defense assets for protection. The AAMDC
recommends which assets Army ADA units can protect and integrates ADA units
into the AADC/DCA planning process.

(2) The ARFOR allocates resources and assigns tasks to the corps which then
can suballocate corps assets and assign air and missile defense missions to divisions.
In each corps and division main command post (CP), within the G-3 (operations)
plans section, the air and missile defense coordinator (AMDCOORD), with input
from the G-2 (intelligence), the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) cell, and
fire support element (FSE), incorporates the air defense mission requirements into
the maneuver plan.

(3) Within the AAMDC the TAAMDCOORD, in conjunction with the G-3,
develops and recommends air and missile defense priorities to the commander for
approval. Part of the TAAMDCOORD’s responsibilities involve coordinating input
from TMD planning into the offensive counterair (OCA) and interdiction targeting
process. The TAAMDCOORD works with the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)
to incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support annexes of the maneuver
plan. Coordination between TAAMDCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the Army
TAMD portions of the JIADS are complementary with theater OCA plans. The
integration and synchronization of OCA and TAMD attack operations by the

III-9
TAAMDCOORD and FSCOORD prevent mutual interference and maximizes unity
and economy of effort.

c. Active Air Defense Planning.

(1) Integration and prioritization permit Army ADA units the flexibility to
support the commander’s concept of the operation. The AADC integrates low-,
medium-, and high-altitude air defense systems with airborne counterair resources
to optimize DCA defenses.

(2) Most Army TAMD active defense tasks are assigned to ADA units. Army
ADA units will be positioned tactically by the appropriate ground force commander.
Because of their limited numbers, ADA resources are allocated based on specific air
and missile defense priorities.

(3) Passive measures are an essential part of air and missile defense
planning at all levels. All units plan passive actions as an integral part of their
assigned missions and tasks. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the enemy
air threat. Conducting passive operations is an implied task critical to the survival
of every unit.

(4) At all levels, the AMDCOORD and unit operations staff officer (S3)
evaluates and recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver
commander’s plans and standing operating procedures (SOP). They recommend
measures that may deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air and surveillance
assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at night,
developing an EW system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing
emission control procedures.

7. Operations

Army ADA forces are either organic to the echelon they are defending or task
organized for the mission. All ADA units remain under the OPCON of their
component commander or assigned headquarters but conduct operations IAW the
JFC, AADC, and ACA approved and promulgated priorities, plans, and ROE. The
AADC/RADC executes air defense operations through subordinate C2 nodes, such as
the CRC or AWACS. The ADA fire coordination officer (ADAFCO) at the CRC
monitors engagement activity to ensure compliance with existing guidance. If this
data link to the CRC is inoperable, units revert to established ROE. The ADA unit
commander is the senior TAMD advisor to the force commander at each echelon.

a. C2 Relationships. The ARFOR commander, AAMDC commander, and corps/

division commanders establish C2 relationships for ADA units. ADA forces assigned
to corps and lower maneuver elements are under the OPCON of the echelon
commander. At EAC, ADA forces are under the ARFOR or AAMDC.

b. Special Command Relationships. Placing the ADA unit under OPCON,

TACON, or attachment to another unit can form special command relationships.
These control measures create special operational, training, administrative, and
logistical relationships among the ADA unit, its parent organization, and the
receiving unit.

III-10
 (1) OPCON. The commander receiving the ADA unit is responsible for task
organization of subordinate forces, training, administration, logistics support,
assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and employment of forces.

(2) TACON. TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and control of
movements, fires, or maneuvers necessary for mission accomplishment. The parent
ADA unit commander retains training, administrative, and logistical
responsibilities.

(3) Attachment. Attachment is the temporary placement of a unit within

another organization. Subject to the limitations imposed by the attachment order,
the commander of the organization receiving the ADA element will exercise the
same degree of C2 over attached units as over organic units. This includes
administrative and logistical support. The parent ADA unit commander retains the
responsibility for administrative functions.

c. Control Chain. Regardless of whom they defend, all battalions, whether in

the EAC or corps ADA brigade, are data linked to the established AADC/RADC/
SADC control networks. Patriot units are all data linked to the CRC, and TBM fires
are decentralized to the fire unit level. They conduct all JIADS operations IAW the
JFC/AADC/ACA established plans, procedures, and ROE. SHORAD battalions also
operate IAW the joint processes but without electronic engagement control and
monitoring. Divisional SHORAD battalions are data linked into the JIADS through
the battalion air battle management center (ABMOC). However they do use the
ACO and the AADC promulgated WCS to guide the conduct of their engagements.

d. Support Relationships. Support relationships define specific arrangements

and responsibilities between supporting and supported units (Table III-4).

(1) There are 4 ADA support relationships:

(a) DS. A DS ADA unit provides dedicated air defense for a specific
element of the force that has no organic air defense. The supporting ADA unit
coordinates its movement and positioning with the supported unit.

(b) General support (GS). An ADA unit in GS provides support for the
force as a whole. It is not committed to any specific element of the supported force.
It does not support a specific unit within the larger unit’s AO.

(c) Reinforcing (R). A R ADA unit augments the coverage of another ADA
unit and strengthens the air defense of the force being defended. A R ADA unit is
positioned to protect 1 or more of the reinforced unit’s priorities as specified by the
supported ADA unit commander.

(d) General Support-Reinforcing (GS-R). An ADA unit with a GS-R

mission provides support for the force as a whole and secondarily augments the
support provided by another ADA unit. ADA units with a GS-R mission have a
primary responsibility to provide support to the force as a whole within a specific
area but must coordinate with the supported ADA unit to reinforce the coverage of
assets in the AO.

III-11
 Table III-4. ADA Support Relationships
General General Support
Issue Direct Support Support Reinforcing Reinforcing
Who establishes The supported The ADA The supported ADA commander who
priorities? commander. commander who commander. established the support
established the relationship.
support
relationship.
Who positions* The ADA The ADA The ADA The ADA commander
ADA fire units? commander with the commander in commander with in coordination with
approval of the coordination approval of reinforced ADA
supported with local reinforced ADA commander.
commander. ground commander.
commander.
Who The supported The ADA The reinforced ADA The ADA commander
coordinates for commander. commander who commander. who established the
terrain used by established the support relationship.
ADA fire units? support
relationship.
With whom The supported unit. As required As required and the As required and the
should liaison reinforced ADA reinforced ADA unit.
be established? unit.
With whom The supported unit. As required As required and the As required and the
should reinforced ADA reinforced ADA unit.
communications unit.
be established?
*The term “positions” specifies the selection of the exact placement of individual fire units within the AO. The
parent ADA commander retains responsibility for administration and logistics.

(2) Selecting a Support Relationship. To determine the most appropriate

support relationship for accomplishing the ADA mission, the following questions
need to be answered:

(a) Who establishes air defense priorities?

(b) Who coordinates terrain on which ADA units will position fire units?

(c) Who positions ADA fire units?

(d) With whom should the liaison be established?

(e) With whom should communications be established?

e. ADA Coordination. ADA forces at every level coordinate with each higher
echelon and adjacent ADA element in order to provide appropriate C3I to
subordinate units. Coordination is essential in disseminating the information
necessary to operate a JIADS. The ATO, ACO, theater air defense and airspace
management plans and real-time alerts, air defense warnings, WCS, and control
data are examples of where this coordination must take place. Coordination also

III-12
synchronizes the commander’s priorities at each level and resolves conflicts of
intent. In most theaters, the majority of air defense coordination of interest to ADA
occurs among the AADC, JFAAC, and the joint force land component commander
(JFLCC). Close coordination with the AADC ensures proper integration of Army
capabilities into joint air and missile defense efforts. Each component provides a
liaison representative to the AADC. The representatives function as the necessary
interface among the service component headquarters. For the ARFOR or JFLCC,
this coordination is accomplished by the BCD, which collocates part of its staff with
the AADC or JFACC. If the AADC is from the Air Force or Navy, the
TAAMDCOORD plans and conducts operations from the air operations center
(AOC). If the AADC is from the Marine Corps, the tactical air command center
(TACC) conducts the joint air defense activities.

f. Detect-to-Engage (DTE) Sequence. The DTE sequence is divided into

detection, acquisition, ID, engagement, and destruction. The DTE sequence may be
different for SHORAD and HIMAD weapon system engagements. During the
operation, DTE must have the flexibility to respond to changes in mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, (METT-T).

(1) Detection. ADA systems must discern the presence of TMs and aircraft
that are or may become a threat. Early detection demands continuous surveillance of
the battlespace. Detection of TBMs by HIMAD systems is dependent on reliable
launch locations. TAMD weapon systems will detect the threat while in the active
radar surveillance mode or when cued in the passive mode by external systems. In
the case of SHORAD weapon systems, the threat is normally detected visually or is
cued by surveillance radar or passed from a TAMD unit.

(2) Acquisition. ADA systems must obtain data defining the position of the
enemy TM or aircraft. The data must be sufficiently accurate to provide targeting
information to the weapon platforms. Early detection of TMs is critical to
classification and engagement by TAMD systems. Enemy air elements are acquired
to determine the threat to defended assets.

(3) Classification and ID. ADA systems must classify potential threats as an
air or missile threat and if a potential target is friendly or hostile in order to
support target prioritization. For TMD, ADA units use classification in lieu of ID.
This enables ADA units to classify targets as ASM, CM, or TBM to engage those
threatening defended assets consistent with theater ROE. Threats classified as
aircraft are addressed separately and are identified IAW specifically defined theater
identification procedures interrogated by IFF, selective identification feature (SIF)
and visual systems for ID. Friendly aircraft must conform to airspace control
measures and supplemental procedures established by the AADC and the ACA to
prevent fratricide.

(4) Engagement and Destruction. Air defense elements having detected,

acquired, and identified the target tracks must prioritize them for engagement and
destruction. TAMD systems receive engagement authority before engagement of
aircraft. For HIMAD systems manned aircraft engagements are normally centrally
controlled. Centralized engagement authority is received from the AADC through
the RADC or CRC, although self-defense is never denied.

III-13
Note: TAMD systems automatically engage TMs threatening defended assets. TM
engagements are normally decentralized to the fire unit level and are engaged
automatically by the weapon system. SHORAD units conduct decentralized
engagement IAW established ROE and AADC weapon control measures. Established
ROEs specify circumstances permitting and limiting aircraft engagement.

8. Summary

The Patriot, THAAD, Avenger, Linebacker/BSFV, Stinger MANPADS, and

associated C2 provide primary defenses against TMs and aircraft. These systems can
link into a joint network using a variety of tactical data links and voice
communications. The radar systems provide quality track information on friendly,
hostile, and neutral tracks. The combination of weapon and sensor systems,
integrated with the force, support the air and missile defense mission. The various
ADA units, providing support to the ARFOR at all echelons, continuously coordinate
their internal and JIADS-based operations with each other and their joint
counterparts. This facilitates the most efficient use of resources in a joint
environment to provide an integrated JIADS.

III-14
 Chapter IV

NAVY AIR DEFENSE

1. Background

The United States Navy relies on an organizational structure, roles, and fighting
precepts in the execution of joint or standalone operations. As a key contributor of
interoperable resources to the JIADS, Navy forces provide aircraft carrier-based
tactical/C2 aircraft, surface combatants, and land-based aircraft that are capable of
integrating with other services’ air defense systems to defend those assets
prescribed by the JTF Commander or AADC.

2. Mission

The Navy conducts warfare in 3 distinct areas: on the surface (to include
overland), subsurface, and in the air. The goal is battlespace dominance in all 3
dimensions. Because of the Navy’s unique role in a 3-dimensional battlespace, the
Navy has developed fundamental Naval warfare tasks to counter the enemy’s
capabilities and ultimately gain an asymmetrical tactical advantage over enemy
forces. This includes providing an air defense umbrella for those assets delineated
in the DAL while simultaneously conducting offensive operations.

3. Organization

The unique nature of maritime operations shapes the organization of Navy

assets and affects how these forces fit into the overall military structure. Vast
distances, wide dispersion of forces with associated C2 challenges, and the
complexities of conducting warfare in a three-dimensional battlespace characterize
maritime operations.

a. Chain of Command. The operational chain of command flows from the

unified or specified commander, through the fleet commander in chief, to the
numbered fleet commanders. Below the numbered fleet level, commands are
organized by operational tasks (task force, task group, and task unit) to conduct the
naval warfare tasks mentioned above. These commands are the basic operating
units of naval warfare.

b. Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). Under the composite warfare

commander (CWC) concept, the OTC, who is the senior naval commander, has
overall C2 of the assigned forces. He is responsible for accomplishing the mission,
allocating assigned forces, and providing for safety of the force.

c. Subordinate Warfare Commanders. Figure IV-1 depicts the CWC command

structure. Under the CWC, there are 5 subordinate warfare commanders that are
assigned responsibility for directing actions in each of the naval warfare tasks. They
are:

(1) ADC–analogous to AADC for battle group only operations.

(2) Undersea warfare commander (USWC).

IV-1
 OTC/CWC
Overall C2

AREC
Aircraft Management

STWC ADC* C2WC SUWC USWC

(Tactical Control) (Tactical Control) (Tactical Control) (Tactical Control) (Tactical Control)

SCC (if assigned)

Figure IV-1. Naval C2

(3) Surface warfare commander (SUWC).

(4) Strike warfare commander (STWC).

(5) Command and control warfare commander (C2WC).

Under some organizational schemes, the SUWC and USWC are combined under
a single commander referred to as the sea combat commander (SCC). Additional
information on the organization and doctrinal employment schemes of navy forces
may be found in naval warfare publication (NWP) 3-56 (CWC manual).
In cases where the Navy will be the first air defense C2 asset to arrive on scene, the
ADC may assume the role of the AADC. In a mature joint environment the ADC
would normally assume the role of either a RADC or SADC for an over water sector.

4. C2

Navy CWC doctrine is predicated on the concept that individual warfare

commanders are trained and equipped to recognize and effectively counter rapidly
developing threats, especially in a multithreat environment with respect to their
assigned warfare task. A wide range of options is available to the CWC in
delegating command authority to the subordinate warfare commanders. These
options range from full delegation of authority to no delegation at all, depending on
the threat and tactical situation. Regardless of the authority delegated, the CWC
always retains the option to control by negation. Control by negation is a C2
philosophy in which a subordinate commander has the freedom of action to direct
and execute those operations necessary to accomplish assigned and implied missions
unless the superior commander overrides specific actions and operations.

a. Command Considerations. It is important to note that individual combatants

typically operate and conduct simultaneous, multimission tasking depending on the
tactical situation. It is not uncommon for a combatant to simultaneously be under
the OPCON of one commander and the TACON of another commander while
simultaneously receiving engagement direction from a third commander. For
instance, an AEGIS cruiser, while assigned duties as ADC, may also be actively
engaged in strike operations involving Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM)
employment while simultaneously conducting under sea warfare operations.
Because of the C2 complexities created as a result of this multimission capability,

IV-2
planners must be acutely aware of Navy asset command relationships when
developing task assignments.

b. Navy Air Defense Precepts. Navy air defense is focused on the protection of
those assets delineated in the DAL by either the CWC, JFC or AADC, to include the
carrier battle group (CVBG) and assigned joint/multinational forces, against hostile
air platforms and weapons (that is, TBMs, CMs, and aircraft). These functions are
controlled by the battle group ADC. The overall responsibilities of the ADC
include—

(1) Planning the protection of assigned forces against the air threat.

(2) Executing TACON of assigned assets.

(3) Maintaining air defense battle watch.

(4) Collecting and disseminate tactical information and intelligence

pertinent to air defense operations.

(5) Coordinating air defense plans and actions with the AADC, RADC,
SADC, CWC, and other warfare commanders and coordinators.

(6) Assisting in coordinating and promulgating ROE, air coordination areas,

special zones, and RTF procedures.

(7) Assisting in establishing, publishing, and implementing airspace

coordination measures.

c. ADC Control Process.

(1) Under the CWC construct, and when a specific mission has been
assigned, the CWC normally promulgates general duties, functional assignments,
and command guidance using a general operation message. Subordinate warfare
commanders, in turn, use operational tasks (OPTASKs) and supplements to the
OPTASK to deal with specific instructions for their warfare areas. The ADC uses
the Navy-wide OPTASK air defense plan to assign duties and responsibilities in the
area and an OPTASK supplement to expound upon those instructions to address the
specific theatre or region of operation requirements.

(2) The Navy-wide air defense plan is the primary reference for guidance in
conducting task force (TF)/task group (TG) air defense. Joint and multinational
operations are conducted IAW the appropriate theater guidance. The Navy-wide air
defense plan describes the following:

(a) The maritime air defense role.

(b) Missions for TG and independently deployed ships and aircraft.

(c) Procedures for operating multiple CVBGs in a joint or multinational

operation within the AADC organization.

IV-3
 (d) FEZ/MEZ/JEZ guidance.

(e) Specific air control procedures.

(f) Weapons employment procedures.

(g) Air surveillance schemes.

(h) Targeting priorities

(i) ID criteria.

Specific battle group air defense plan supplementary messages or annexes are
promulgated to provide more detailed guidance on such items as battle group ID
policy; TBM operations; cooperative engagement capability (CEC) operations; and
TADIL employment procedures. To ensure Navy air defense assets are able to
easily transition from unitary service operations to joint operations, these messages
routinely incorporate joint TTP.

d. Practical Integration. Each major air warfare asset is equipped with a tactical
data system (TDS) that consolidates the input of all shipboard sensors (radar, IFF,
sonar, electronic signal intercept, and so forth) and displays this information to
decision makers for action. Each TDS is capable of TADIL-A and TADIL-J exchange
within the naval force and with all service TADIL-A and TADIL-J capable platforms
and sites. Each shipboard TDS installation combines the functions of the CRC/
TAOC as well as fire direction/ADA interfaces with Patriot battalion ICC control.
Moreover, TADIL-C and TADIL-J interface with TDS-equipped ships and aircraft
completes the integration of all airborne and surface weapons within the naval
component.

e. Joint Employment.

(1) In a joint environment, the ADC may be assigned by the JFC/AADC the
role of RADC or SADC, coordinating with Navy or joint assets to provide a CTP to
the AADC. In the pursuit of a CTP, the ADC optimizes asset employment to
maintain track integrity, correctly identify friendly aircraft operating in the air
defense region, and positively identify all aircraft operating in the defended area
before they enter the vital area. The ADC also has authority to assign capable assets
to perform duties as an air control unit (ACU). In this role, ACUs will assist friendly
aircraft in the air defense area, providing vectors and updated information to en
route and mission-complete aircraft. AEGIS cruisers, destroyers, and airborne early
warning (AEW) aircraft are typically assigned duties as an ACU. Smaller ships such
as guided missile frigates (FFGs) also possess a limited capability to serve as an
ACU.

(2) The Navy is shifting to TADIL-J as its primary data link. However,
several naval platforms will never be upgraded to TADIL-J. Platforms like the FFG
and navy destroyer (DD) will continue to rely on TADIL-A. It is important to
consider whether the platform is a model 4 or 5, since there are significant
differences which will impact the quality of the overall TADIL architecture (Table
IV-1). A naval TF may or may not be equipped with Dual Net Multi-Frequency Link

IV-4
 Table IV-1. Hull Specific Data (TADIL, Sensor, Launch System)
Hull Number TADIL Sensor Launch System
CG 47-51 TADIL-A/C SPY 1A MK 26 GMLS (80)
CG 52-58 TADIL-A/C/J (M4) SPY 1A VLS* (120)
CG 59,63,64 TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1B VLS (120)
CG 60,61,62 TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1BV VLS (120)
DDG 51-78 TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1D VLS (90)
CG 65,67,68,70-73 TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1BV VLS (120)
DDG 79 and above TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1D VLS (90)
CG 66,69 TADIL-A/C/J (M5) SPY 1BV VLS (120)
*Vertical Launch System
For hull specific information contact AEGIS Training and Readiness Center (ATRC) home page
(http://www.atrc.navy.mil/) or the specific battle group capabilities and limitations document available on the
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) SIPRNET home page
(http://www.phdnswc.navy.smil.mil/). Note: UHF only with extended line of sight (LOS) to about 40 miles,
with airborne JTIDS unit (JU), operations capable of operations to 300NM plus. The Navy has 2
implementations of TADIL-J, Model 4 using M Series Message (Link 11 translation) and Model 5 using J
series Message. It is important to remember that there are taxonomy issues that exist during translation
between model 4 and model 5 systems. The goal for battle group compositions is to allocate like systems,
model 4 or model 5 to the same battle group.

(DNMFL). DNMFL equipment is limited in distribution and is typically only

installed on deploying units. DNMFL allows for a participating unit to participate
in 2 separate TADIL-As simultaneously and also share the information between the
2 networks. Multifrequency allows for greater connectivity. DNMFL is ideal for
data forwarding and a useful tool to determine the best frequency to be used for a
primary link. The system allows units that may be restricted to receive only, or out
of the link all together, to operate in their own link architecture and have their
information forwarded into the primary link. A specific Navy link is the HAWK link.
This helicopter to ship data link is used for over the horizon targeting of surface
vessels, surface surveillance, and separating friendly from enemy of low and slow
flyers.

(3) Naval platforms communicate primarily via UHF secure SATCOM. HF

and UHF are still used but less frequently. The aircraft carriers (CVs), AEGIS
guided missile cruisers (CGs) and guided missile destroyers (DDGs) have very
robust communications capabilities that include extremely high frequency (EHF).
The FFG and DD have very limited capabilities with no EHF capability. The CV,
general purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA), and general purpose amphibious
assault ship (with internal dock) (LHD) are the only platforms with super high
frequency (SHF). In the future, plans call for all naval surface platforms to receive
Global Broadcast Systems (GBSs) and all to be equipped with UNCLASSIFIED but
SENSITIVE Internet Protocol Router Networks (NIPRNETs) and SECRET Internet
Protocol Router Networks (SIPRNETs) capability. Global Command and Control
System (GCCS) can be found on the CV, LHA, and LHD. The CVN, LCC, or LHD
have a tremendous amount of bandwidth available and is capable of monitoring
numerous radio circuits as well as pulling large volumes of intelligence and
cryptographic data including detailed imagery files (Figure IV-2).

5. Weapon Systems

The overall goal of naval air defense is to achieve defense in-depth, allowing for
mutual tracking and multiple weapon engagement opportunities for the protection

IV-5
 EHF Commercial
SHF GBS Wideband
24 LDR Channels SIPRNET UAV Video Primary Imagery
UHF 248LDR Channels SIPRNET UAV Video Primary Imagery
Telemedicine
Primary JDISS AFRTS/CNN/Trng Video
8 Primary JDISS AFRTS/ ATOs
CNN/Trng Video Telemedicine
STU III
“Quad DAMA” 8 Secondary GCCS
“Quad DAMA” 8 Secondary GCCS ATOs STU III
VTC/VTT
16-20 8 RCV Only TESS 3 MDUs
16-20 8 RCVATO
Only MDUs QOLVTC/VTT
Phones
Netw orks
Netwonly)
orks (MDUs, VoiceTESS 3
VIXS/VTC Imagery (BDA/MSI/DMA)
Imagery (BDA/MSI/DMA) QOL Phones
(25kHz (MDUs, ATO Voice VIXS/VTC
JWICS DS TPFDD JWICS
(25kHz only) Dissemination, DS TPFDD JWICS
Secure Voice/Data Dissemination,
OTCIXS, JWICS
*Includes JDISS, JSIPS SIPRNET
Secure Voice/Data OTCIXS, *Includes JDISS, JSIPS SIPRNET
NIPRNET
Netted Comms TADIXS, CTAPS,GCCS METOC
Netted Comms TADIXS, CTAPS,GCCS METOC NIPRNET
DSCS
TACINTEL DSCS
TACINTEL
Secure Voice/ Surge/Restoral
IXS Secure Surge/Restoral
IXS
TACINTEL Data)Voice/
TACINTEL Data) High Capacity
TDDS
TDDS Broadcast
CUDIXS/
CUDIXS/
NAVMACS
NAVMACS
ANDVT

Su
ANDVT TV-Direct

r
M

viv
ob To Sailors

ab
ilit
y/

il
Fl

ity
ex
ib MDR Life

LD
ili MDR
LD y
t Quality of CNN/MSNBC

R
CNN/MSNBC
AFRTS/SPORTS
INMARSAT (B) R HDR AFRTS/SPORTS
2 Stereo
2 Stereo
Radio Chnls
SALTS/FAX Logis tics RadioRadio
Chnls
SALTS/FAX 1 Mono
Official/QOL Phones Chnl1 DataRadio
1 Mono Chnl
Official/QOL
VTC Phones LDR Chnl1 Data Chnl
VTC

MDR EHF MDR

Time-Critical Protected Capacity SIPRNET
Time-Critical SIPRNET
NIPRNET
Tactical Information NIPRNET
Tactical Information JWICS
to the Warfighter JWICS
DSVT
to the Warfighter DSVT
MMT
MMT
MDUs
MDUs

Figure IV-2. Naval Communications Avenues

of mission essential units (MEUs) and defended assets through unit stationing. Naval
air defense capabilities are for defense of the battle group, as well as protection of
assets in the littorals. Navy surface platform capabilities are at Table IV-2. Navy
aviation platform capabilities are at Table IV-3. See http://www.phdnswc.navy.smil.mil/
for detailed Navy air defense systems capabilities and limitations.

6. Planning

Primary air defense planning afloat will be done on the flagship, CV/CVN,
amphibious command ship (LCC), or LHA/LHD, or on an AADC-equipped AEGIS
cruiser; all of which have significant planning capabilities. They all have very robust
intelligence and cryptographic collection capabilities to aid in planning. The CV/CVN is
equipped with CTAPS and a host of other tools for collaborative planning. The large
deck amphibious ships have similar capabilities. These platforms provide LNOs to the
JFACC/AADC and can host LNOs from other services. LNOs have significantly
increased the level of understanding and interaction between services and should be
encouraged for all joint operations.

The CV/CVN, LCC, or AADC-equipped AEGIS cruiser have the capability to

perform functions as JFACC, AADC, ACA, and JICO if first on the scene and in a small-
scale operation. As the preponderance of forces transition ashore, it becomes more
difficult for the CV to maintain these functions and they should be shifted to a more
robust command organization such as an AOC. The CV and CGs can, however, continue
to provide considerable support as RADC or SADC and perhaps as an afloat interface
control officer (ICO).

a. Naval Air Asset Allocation. Naval air asset allocation in a joint operation is
balanced between JFC requirements and battle group commander requirements.

IV-6
 Table IV-2. Navy Surface Platforms
Air Search
Ship Primary Radar Weapon Data Link Communica Aviation
Type Role Systems Systems ID Capabilities Capabilities tion Capabilities
Capabilities
Aircraft Fixed-wing AN/SPS 48E NSSMS Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF Fighters (F-14/
Carrier Aircraft (3D) CIWS ACDS BLK 0/1 TADIL-C EHF F-18)
(CV), Operations AN/SPS 49 (CV Auto ID) TADIL-J UHF (4) SH60 F
aircraft (2D) SES ADSI UHF Plane Guard
carrier, CEC ** SATCOM Dipping Sonar
nuclear SHF SAR
(CVN)
Guided Battle Group Primary TLAM Mast Mounted TADIL-A HF ACU,
Missile Air Defense SPY 1B SM2 BLK Phased Array IFF TADIL-C EHF DCA/CAP
Cruiser (3D) 2/3 (Backup IFF TADIL-J UHF Controller
(CG) * Secondary VL Mounted on SPS DNMFL UHF (2) SH60 B
AN/SPS 49 (ASROC) 49) HAWK Link SATCOM OTH Targeting
(2D) HARPOON CEC ** SAR
(2) 5in54
CIWS
SLQ 32 V3
Guided Air Defense SPY 1D TLAM Mast Mounted TADIL-A HF ACU,
Missile (3D) SM2 Phased Array IFF TADIL-C EHF DCA/CAP/
Destroyer BLK2/3 (Backup IFF TADIL-J UHF Controller
(DDG)* VL ASROC Mounted on SPS DNMFL UHF Flight deck will
HARPOON 67) HAWK Link SATCOM support landing
5in54 and refueling,
CIWS no helicopter
SLQ-32 V2 hangar
Guided Surveillance AN/SPS 49 SM1 BLK Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF ACU,
Missile (2D) 6B Mounted on SPS HAWK Link UHF DCA/CAP
Frigate CAS Search HARPOON 49 UHF Controller
(FFG) 3inch 76mm SATCOM (2) SH60 B
Gun OTH Targeting
SLQ-32 V3 SAR
Spruance Antisub Surf AN/SPS 40 TLAM Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF
Destroyer (2D) SLQ-32 V3 HAWK Link UHF
(DD) UHF
SATCOM
Amphibio Sea/Air SPS-52 CIWS Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF ACU
us Landing SPS-40B NTDS TADIL-J UHF Harriers
Helicopter Force TADIL-C UHF Helicopters
Assault Assault SATCOM
Ship EHF
(LHA) SHF
Amphibio Sea/Air SPS-48C NSSMS Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF ACU
us Landing SPS-52 CIWS NTDS TADIL-J UHF Harriers
Helicopter Force SPS-49 CEC # TADIL-C UHF Helicopters
Dock Assault SATCOM
Ship EHF
(LHD) SHF

Amphibio C2 Rotating IFF TADIL-A HF ACU

us NTDS TADIL-J UHF AADC Module
Command TADIL-C UHF (LCC 20 only)
Ship SATCOM
(LCC) EHF
SHF
* AEGIS platforms have comprehensive data recording capability. Amount of saved data and reuse of recording media should be
considered during operation planning. Recorded data can be reviewed on board most AEGIS ships or at selected shore installations.
** CEC is only currently fielded and operational on CG 66, CG 68, CG 69, CG 71, CVN 71, and LHD 1.

IV-7
 Table IV-3. Navy Aviation Air Defense Weapons Systems
Platform Primary Role Air Weapon ID Data Link Communicatio Combat
Type Search Systems Capabilities Capabilities n Capabilities Range
Radar
Systems
E-2C Air Surveillance APS-145 Detection IFF (M1-4) TADIL-A HF 4 hours on
Block II and Aircraft Range: Over limited ES TADIL-C UHF/VHF station
Control 300 NM. capability (2-way) UHF
Over 2000 CID capable TADIL-J SATCOM
tracks Have Quick
F-14 A/D Air Intercept, AWG-9 AIM-54 IFF TADIL-C UHF 1400 NM
Strike (A/B) AIM-7 TCS (2-way) Have Quick In-flight
APG-1(D) AIM-9 IRST (D (A/B/D refuelable
AIM-120 only) model)
(D) TADIL-J
20mm (D model
PGM only)
(series)
F/A- Air Intercept, APG-65 AIM-120 NCTR TADIL-C VHF 575 NM
18C/D Strike AIM-7 (Electronic (2-way) UHF In-flight
AIM-9 ID) Have Quick refuelable
AGM-84 IFF (Some
20mm BLKs)
EA-6B SEAD/Jam APS-130 AGM-84 EW ID TADIL-C HF 600 NM
EW intercept Communicat (1 way) UHF/VHF In-flight
ions Have Quick refuelable
intercept
S-3B Anti-Surface APS-137 AGM-65 IFF (M1-4) TADIL-A HF 1800 NM
EW Surveillance AGM-84 EW-ID TADIL-C UHF In-flight
Counter target MK-80 (1 way) refuelable
series

EP-3 EW/ APS-116 N/A IFF (M1-4) TADIL-A HF 2000 NM

Communications EW-ID UHF
Comm-ID VHF
UHF
SATCOM
P-3C ASW APS- AGM-65 IFF TADIL-A HF 2070 NM
ASUW 115/137 AGM-84 EW-ID UHF
EW Surveillance Torpedoes VHF
Mines UHF
Maverick UHF

Frequently the carrier air wing (CVW) commander, in the role as the STWC, liaisons
with the supported JTF staff to determine the level of support desired. An
agreement is reached between the warfare commanders, and aircraft assets are
assigned to warfare missions. This CVW planning is accomplished on a 72-hour
timeline that coincides with the ATO production cycle. Allocation for fleet defense
is dependent on the threat and surface assets available.

b. Planning Considerations for CVN Air Wing Limitations in an Air Defense

Role.

(1) Limitations on CVW air asset availability are driven by many factors. A
typical CVW is comprised of the following: 1 fighter squadron (VF) of 10-12 F-14
aircraft; 3 strike fighter squadrons (VFA) comprised of 12 F/A-18 aircraft per
squadron; 1 tactical electronic warfare squadron (VAQ) of 4 EA-6B aircraft; 1 sea
control squadron (VS) of 8 S-3 aircraft; 1 carrier airborne early warning squadron
(VAW) of 4 E-2C aircraft; and 1 helicopter ASW squadron (HS) of 6 SH/HH-60
helicopters. Aircraft operations are usually conducted in a cyclic manner, with
launches and recoveries typically on a 1+15 (75 minutes) or 1+30 (90 minutes)

IV-8
schedule. A typical 1+30 cycle consists of 15-20 sorties exclusive of those aircraft
whose endurance allows them to fly double cycles. Shorter cycles limit the number
of aircraft that can be launched and recovered. Longer cycles allow for larger
launches but increase requirements for airborne tanking. Flight deck crew positions
are singularly manned and sustained flight operations affect flight deck crew
performance because of fatigue.

(2) An important planning consideration for naval aircraft because of CV/

CVN flight deck operations is the efficient use of limited airborne refueling assets.
While the E-2C does not require (nor is it capable of receiving) in-flight refueling to
remain on station for an extended time, fighter aircraft remaining airborne for more
than a single cycle do require in-flight refueling. This can be accomplished either
organically, through the use of limited air wing assets such as the S-3B, or
externally, utilizing JFC tanker assets (KC-10/KC-130/KC-135).

c. Planning Considerations for Surface Ship Stationing. The AEGIS platforms

may be used in a coastal defense role, area defense protection of the MEU, or to
defend a harbor from sea and air attack. They may also be shifted closer to the
beach to provide cueing and tracking of TBM launches. Naval platforms do not
currently have the capability to engage a TBM but will gain that capability in the
future. Another ship or DCA station must be assigned to provide air defense of the
unit with the nontactical data collection (NTDC) patch activated.

(1) Air Defense Picket Station. During “blue water” (outside the littoral)
operations, a unit will be stationed over the horizon (typically 40-60 miles) down the
expected threat line of bearing.

(2) Surface Air Defense Station. As the battle group transitions toward the
littoral, a unit will be stationed along the expected threat axis within 20 miles of the
MEU (CVN, LHA/LHD) to conduct engagements against a low, fast target.

(3) Shotgun. This unit is tasked with guarding another unit. Typically, the
shotgun unit will remain close to the unit it is guarding (within 2-3 miles).

(4) Spotlight. An AEGIS unit with its NTDC patch active for TBM
operations.

d. Planning Considerations for TBM Detection/Surveillance. AEGIS combat

direction system (CDS) program has the capability to run a computer patch that
allows the AEGIS weapons system (AWS) to conduct TBM search and track
operations. A trade-off is that the AWS cannot adequately provide other air defense
support. Therefore, any AEGIS asset conducting tracking operations requires a
dedicated air defense escort (shotgun) unit to provide basic air defense.

e. REDCROWN/GREENCROWN. The final ID authority for the CVBG.

REDCROWN/GREENCROWN will continually maneuver to maintain good
connectivity with the CV, positive IFF interrogation of returning aircraft, and
delouse returning strike missions. GREENCROWN provides the same duties for
amphibious ready groups (ARGs).

IV-9
7. Operations

The Naval battle group operates everywhere from open-ocean or “blue-water”

operations to shallow water littoral operations. In the open-ocean the Navy’s
primary mission is protection of its battle group assets, while operating under the
traditional CWC organization. When tasked to move into the littorals, the Navy
battle group takes on additional roles, which may include the protection of
operations ashore, defended assets, or ground force insertion. Whether in open-
ocean or littoral operations, the Navy will organize its assets assigning warfare
mission tasking responsibility in order to best cover the undersea, surface, and air
threat. In the defense against air and surface threats, the basic premise is the ability
to detect, track, and engage air threats, including air-to-air missiles and anti-ship
CMs. In an air defense role, the Navy will typically operate with a JEZ versus the
traditional MEZ/FEZ in order to maximize its capability.

The DTE process may occur in numerous ways. A long-range engagement

against an ASM or manned aircraft may begin with an AEW detection from a joint
asset such as an E-3 or an organic battle group E-2 asset. Track information would
be passed to interceptor aircraft either under AEW control or control of a surface
platform such as a CG or DDG. Aircraft intercept allows intercept at maximum
range. Should fighter assets not be available, the next weapons system of choice
would be a long-range standard missile intercept from a CG or DDG platform. As
the target closes, this option could permit several engagement opportunities. If the
range continues to decrease, medium range missile systems on the FFG platforms
and surface platform gun systems could be brought into use. Final options would
include self-defense weapons such as the Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) or
Phalanx, Rolling Airframe (RAM) or NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System (NSSMS).

8. Summary

The Navy brings a very robust capability to the joint fight. It is important to
remember that while protection of the MEU (CVN /LCC/LHD/LHA) is important, it
is not the Navy’s only role. Most naval air assets are allocated to the JFACC and
very few are retained for direct support of the battle group at sea. All Navy ships are
multimission capable and can/do provide self-protection, protection of the MEU, and
perform a host of other warfare functions. An AEGIS cruiser is capable of standing
by for strike operations, while providing air and surface protection for the MEU.
Navy ships and aircraft can track and provide TADIL information overland tracks,
while also maintaining the over water picture. Capabilities vary from battle group to
battle group. All naval battle groups come into a theater prepared to conduct blue
water operations, littoral operations, and operate within a joint architecture.

IV-10
 Chapter V

AIR FORCE AIR DEFENSE

1. Background

The Air Force airspace C2 system is a reflection of the air and space power
tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Force Theater Air
Control System (TACS) provides the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)
the means to achieve this cornerstone C2 principle. While sometimes configured
differently in the various theaters of operations, the basic C2 and airspace
management functions performed by the TACS are the same. Basic air defense
operations are accomplished through the AOC construct. For this reason the AOC
will be the focal point of air and space power disbursement and air defense
operations providing an overview of the planning considerations in support of a
JIADS.

2. Mission

The Air Force mission requires airspace control and is conducted throughout
the entire range of the JOA. Providing fighter, tanker, and C2 capabilities to a
JIADS involves—

a. Integration of counterair.

b. Counterspace.

c. Counterland.

d. Countersea.

e. Strategic attack.

f. C2.

g. Airlift.

h. Air refueling.

i. Special operations.

j. Intelligence.

k. Surveillance.

l. Reconnaissance.

m. Combat search and rescue.

n. Theater air control system.

V-1
3. Organization

Normally an AOC is led by an AOC director and has 4 divisions with 10 core
teams with numerous specialty and support teams as depicted in Figure V-1. The
AOC team concept represents a wide range of systems and capabilities. These
teams are organized and integrated within the AOC to support the COMAFFOR
and, when designated, the JFACC serves as the basis for a JAOC. The AOC director
is charged with the effectiveness of joint air and space operations and focuses on
planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing air power
operations in the AOR/JOA based on JFACC guidance and Director of Mobility
Forces (DIRMOBFOR) coordination. It is the director’s responsibility to ensure the
AOC functions necessary to complete the air and space planning and execution
process are executed in a timely and efficient manner using core teams from the 4
divisions (strategy, combat plans, combat operations, and air mobility) form the basic
infrastructure of the AOC and drive the planning and execution process. The
combat plans division and the combat operations division provide the most inputs to
JIADS. The 4 divisions follow:
a. Strategy Division. This division develops, refines, disseminates, and assesses
the progress of the JFACC’s air and space strategy, concentrating on long-range
planning of air and space operations for theater activities. Representatives from a
range of functional areas, such as operations, intelligence, communications, logistics,
and space are full-time members of the division.

b. Combat Plans Division. The combat plans division is responsible for the
near-term air and space operations planning function of the AOC. This division
develops detailed plans for the application of air and space resources based on
JFACC approved guidance received from the strategy division. These plans include
the near-term guidance, allocation, and tasking instructions for assigned and
attached forces.

c. Combat Operations Division. The combat operations division is responsible

for executing the current ATO. Combat operations analyzes, prioritizes, and, if
necessary, makes recommendations to the JFACC (or designated representative) to
redirect assets.
d. Air Mobility Division. The air mobility division will plan, coordinate, task,
and execute the air mobility mission.

AOC Director DIRMOBFOR

Strategy Combat Plans

Strategy Plans Operational Master Air ATO/ACO

Assessment Attack Plan Production
Combat Operations Air Mobility

Offensive Operations Defensive Operations Air Mobility Airlift Control Team

Control Team
Aerial Refueling Air Mobility Element

Figure V-1. JAOC Organization

V-2
4. C2
The COMAFFOR exercises command authority as defined by the JFC.
COMAFFOR normally is assigned responsibilities as the JFACC, ACA, and AADC.
The JFACC staff (if JFACC is COMAFFOR) or Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff will
normally function within the Air Force component TACS (Figure V-2). If another
component has JFACC responsibility, the COMAFFOR would retain service
component responsibilities, which would also be accomplished through the TACS.
The TACS is designed to perform centralized planning and control and to facilitate
decentralized execution. The elements that form the TACS (Figure V-2) are the
AOC; CRC; AWACS; joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS);
airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC); air support operations
center (ASOC); tactical air control party (TACP); and FAC(A). They are supported
by enabling intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms such as
Rivet Joint, U-2, and UAV as well as an infrastructure of component and coalition
agencies/liaisons, and communications and computers. No two AOCs are exactly
alike. They vary by personnel/positions and mission structure; however there are
some essential features that are required in all AOCs and will be covered below.
a. CRC. The CRC is a theater C2 asset that can operate independently or in
conjunction with AWACS, JSTARS , and ABCCC functionally and/or geographically
in support of the JFC/JFACC requirement for tactical level battle management. It is
capable of effective integration vertically with operational level C2 systems and
horizontally with other tactical C2 elements (Table V-1). The CRC may be tasked
with decentralized execution of the air defense and airspace control functions.
Within its AOR, the CRC may be employed alone or in combination with other
elements of the TACS C2 architecture. The CRC may also direct region or sector air
defense and provide aircraft control and monitoring for defensive missions including
high value asset protection. The CRC is capable of conducting force marshalling/
recovery, airspace control, weapons control of DCA assets, and surveillance. When
directed by the JAOC, the CRC establishes liaison with service components such as
Army Patriot and multinational forces to exchange airspace management and air
defense data from C2 systems established in the TADIL interface. Through the use
of TADIL-A/B/C/J and ATDL-1/Link-1, the CRC is capable of receiving data link
information from the various C2 elements established in the TADIL network. All
authorities are based upon the ROE and execution authorities released by the
JFACC.
b. AWACS. AWACS is a theater C2 asset that can operate independently or in
conjunction with CRC, JSTARS , and ABCCC functionally and/or geographically in
support of the JFC/JFACC requirement for tactical level battle management. It is
capable of effective integration vertically with operational level C2 systems and
horizontally with other tactical C2 elements. The AWACS may be tasked with

AOC

ASOC JSTARS CRC ABCC AWACS

(Theater Asset)

TACP FAC(A)

Figure V-2. TACS Organization

V-3
 Table V-1. CRC Equipment*
Major
Equipment Description Numbers Function
TYQ-23 C2 operator 4 OMs Theater air defense, data links management,
Operations consoles surveillance, CID, and air battle execution
Modules (OMs)
AN/TPS-75 Mobile radar 2 TPS-75 sails/vans Local or remote mode radar application
Radar equipment

AN/TSC-147 JTIDS module 1 JTIDS connectivity

AN/TSC-100A SHF SATCOM 1 van TADIL - A/B/C/J/JTIDS
AN/TRC-170 Long haul 1 Data/voice nets/links
communications
AN/TER-170 Line-of-sight 1 Remote sighting of radios
microwave
AN/TTC-42 Automatic 1 Telephone switch
telephone central
AN/TSQ-146 Multiplexer 1 Communications switching node
terminal
*See AFTTP 3-1 Vol 26 for further details.

decentralized execution of the air defense and airspace control functions within its
AOR or may share these responsibilities with the CRC. The AWACS may also direct
region or sector air defense and provide aircraft control and monitoring for
defensive missions including high value asset protection, but these air defense tasks
will normally be assigned to a CRC if one is available. AWACS is also capable of
conducting force marshalling/recovery, airspace control, weapons control of DCA
assets, and surveillance. All authorities are based upon the ROE and execution
authorities released by the JFACC.

5. Weapons Systems
The Air Force defense structure relies on the use of multiple airborne and
ground-based platforms to carry out the mission (Table V-2). Sound planning and
the integrated use of these systems provide a layered defense against the oncoming
threat.

6. Planning

The AOC is the air and space operations planning and execution focal point for
the COMAFFOR. When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC and has OPCON
or TACON of additional forces, the AOC becomes the JAOC and is manned
accordingly. AOC personnel are responsible for planning, executing, and assessing
air and space operations and directing changes as the situation dictates.

a. Primary AOC Functions.

(1) Develop air operations strategy and planning documents that integrate
air, space, and information operations to meet JFACC objectives and guidance.

(2) Task and execute day-to-day air operations; provide rapid reaction and
positive control; coordinate and deconflict weapons employment, thus integrating
the total air effort.

V-4
 Table V-2. Airborne and Ground Operations Capabilities Matrix
Aircraft AAI
Platform COMM/SECURE Data Link Armament RADAR Capable References
F-15C* UHF/Yes N/A AIM-120/7/9 A/A Yes AFTTP 3-1
S Vol 4
H F-15E** UHF/Yes TADIL-J AIM-120/7/9 A/A Yes AFTTP 3-1
O Vol 17
O F-16C UHF/VHF/Yes N/A AIM-120/9 A/A No AFTTP 3-1
T Vol 5
E F-16CJ UHF/VHF/Yes N/A AIM-120/9 A/A No AFTTP 3-1
R HARM Vol 5
S F-16ADF UHF/VHF/HF/Yes N/A AIM-120/7/9 A/A No AFTTP 3-1
Vol 5
AOC UHF/VHF/HF/Yes TADIL-A, B N/A N/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
Vol 26
E-3*** UHF/VHF/HF/Yes TADIL-A, J N/A A/A Yes AFTTP 3-1
C Vol 15
2 ABCCC UHF/VHF/HF/Yes TADIL-J N/A N/A N/A AFSOC M 11-1
Vol 5
JSTARS UHF/VHF/HF/Yes SCDL N/A A/G N/A AFTTP(I) 3-2.2
TADIL-J
CRC UHF/VHF/HF/Yes TADIL-A, B, J N/A G/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
Vol 26
Rivet Joint UHF/VHF/HF/Yes TADIL-A, J N/A N/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
S Vol 21
U Senior Scout UHF/VHF/HF/Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A
P
P Compass Call UHF/VHF/HF/Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
O Vol 16
R KC-135 UHF/VHF/HF/Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
T Vol 22
KC-10 UHF/VHF/HF/Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A AFTTP 3-1
Vol 22
*One squadron currently JTIDS capable.
**May be used for air defense.
***Block 20/25 IJMS only; Block 30/35 full-up JTIDS.

(3) Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence

and weather information to support air operations planning, execution, and
assessment.

(4) Issue ACO and coordinate airspace control activities for the ACA when
the JFACC is designated the ACA.

(5) Provide overall direction of air defense, including TMD, for the AADC
when the JFACC is designated the AADC.

(6) Plan, task, and execute theater intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance missions.

(7) Conduct operational level assessment to determine mission and overall

air operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater counterair
effort.

(8) Produce and disseminate an ATO and its changes.

(9) Provide for the integration and support of all air mobility missions.

V-5
 b. Air and Space Planning and Execution Process. Fundamental to the AOC is
the integrated team concept. This concept places various experts in integrated
teams to accomplish strategy development, operational level assessment, detailed
planning, ATO production, and execution functions.

7. Operations

Depending upon the command structure, the COMAFFOR staff or the JFACC,
when designated, directs the planning and execution of all capabilities/forces made
available for a given ATO. Affected component commanders will be notified by the
JFACC/COMAFFOR of redirected sorties previously allocated in the ATO for
support of component operations. Aircraft or other capabilities/forces not
apportioned for tasking, but included in the ATO for coordination purposes, will be
redirected only with the approval of the respective component commander or
designated senior AOC liaison officer. The combat operations division of the AOC is
responsible for the execution of the ATO through the wing operations centers,
CRCs, and AEW platforms. Components execute the ATO as tasked and recommend
changes to the AOC as appropriate, given emerging JFACC/COMAFFOR and
component requirements.

The AOC must be responsive to required changes during the execution of the
ATO. In-flight reports and initial battle damage assessment (BDA) may cause a
redirecting of air capabilities/forces before launch or a redirection once airborne.
The AOC is the central agency for revising the tasking or air capabilities/forces. It is
also charged with coordinating and deconflicting those changes with the appropriate
control agencies or components.

Because of battlefield dynamics, the AOC may be required to make changes to

the planned air operations during execution. When these changes are required, the
AOC will notify the component commander’s LNOs as appropriate. The AOC is
responsible for retargeting missions apportioned and allocated to support the force
as a whole and responding to moving targets or changing priorities. Ground or
airborne C2 platform mission commanders may be delegated the authority from
combat operations in the AOC to redirect defensive counterair sorties/missions
made available to higher priority targets as necessary. It is essential, however, that
the AOC’s combat operations section be notified of all redirected missions.

8. Summary

The functions and responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA, and AADC must be
integrated in order to unite joint air operations with joint airspace control and joint
air defense operations in support of the JFC’s operations. These functions include
developing, coordinating, and publishing airspace control procedures, operating the
airspace control system, and integrating the joint force air defense effort. The
COMAFFOR’s AOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated facility and staffed
to fulfill all of the COMAFFOR’s responsibilities. The two organizations or
functions common to all AOCs are combat plans (future joint air operations) and
combat operations (execution of the daily ATO).

V-6
 The Air Force contributes to the air defense process by gaining control of the air
and space environment while conducting other missions and support activities
throughout the AO, AOR, or JOA. This is primarily done through planning and
execution through the AOC-CRC-control reporting element (CRE)-warfighter
construct. To achieve JFC assigned air operations objectives, the Air Force plans,
coordinates, and controls air missions utilizing a variety of command, control,
communications, and computer systems that enable the control of assets.

V-7
 Chapter VI

MARINE CORPS AIR DEFENSE

1. Background

Antiair warfare (AAW) is a US Navy/US Marine Corps term used to indicate

actions required to destroy or reduce, to an acceptable level, the enemy air and
missile threat. AAW integrates all offensive and defensive actions against enemy
aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and theater missiles into a singular, indivisible set
of operations. AAW, along with assault support, offensive air support, air
reconnaissance, EW, and control of aircraft and missiles, is one of the 6 functions of
Marine aviation. This chapter focuses on how the Marine Corps conducts air
defense. Air defense consists of active and passive measures to protect our forces
against attack from enemy aircraft and missiles.

2. Mission

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) air defense assets are employed based
on the intelligence estimate of the threat, air defense priorities, AAW and air
defense principles, and air defense employment principles and guidelines. The
aircraft, surface-to-air weapons, and C2 agencies that make up the MAGTF’s
integrated air defense system and their supporting intelligence, EW, and
communications support are employed based on the enemy air threat to the
MAGTF’s vital areas.

3. Organization

The Marine Corps employs its forces as a MAGTF. The 3 basic MAGTFs for
deployment are the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary
brigade, and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). The composition and size of the
MAGTF may vary, but the organizational structure will always be a single command
element, a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a
combat service support element (CSSE).

The MAGTF commander normally delegates the authority for air operations,
including AAW, to the ACE commander. The ACE commander exercises authority
through the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS).

The MACCS provides the ACE commander with the means for effective
command, coordination, and control of all MAGTF air operations including AAW
and the effective functioning of the MAGTF’s integrated air defense system. For
AAW operations, as with all MAGTF operations, the MACCS task-organizes its
resources based on METT-T. Although all MAGTF elements provide the personnel
and control agencies that comprise the MACCS, the MAGTF ACE provides the
majority of functions for AAW operations. MACCS agencies and activities involved
in MAGTF AAW operations include the following:

VI-1
 a. Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).

(1) The TACC is the senior MACCS agency and the focal point for C2 of
MAGTF aviation. It is the ACE commander’s operational command post. The TACC
should not be confused with a similar Navy element known as the tactical air control
center and also abbreviated as TACC. The TACC is an extension of the ACE
commander. The airspace control functions that it performs are analogous to the
Navy’s tactical air control center-but with greater command influence.

(2) The TACC consists of 3 mutually supporting, cross-functional operational

organizations supported by a centralized intelligence organization. The TACC does
not provide facilities for all ACE staff functions. It provides a facility from which the
ACE commander and staff plan and execute MAGTF aviation and aviation support
operations. The TACC includes the following operational organizations:

(a) Future Plans. Conducts aviation and aviation support planning for the
next MEF mission change.

(b) Future Operations. Develops future ATOs and prepares operation

orders or fragmentary orders for the next ACE mission change.

(c) Current Operations. Executes the daily ATO and assesses its
effectiveness.

(d) Air Combat Intelligence (ACI). ACI is the focus of all aviation
intelligence activities supporting the ACE. It produces and disseminates aviation-
specific all-source intelligence, to include assessments of adversary capabilities and
vulnerabilities, target analysis, BDA, and the current status and priority of assigned
targets to assist in execution day changes.

b. Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC).

(a) The commander, landing force (CLF) can establish a TADC during
amphibious operations. Its purpose is to coordinate between the MACCS agencies
ashore and the commander, amphibious task force’s (CATF’s) Navy tactical air
control center afloat. Once the CLF is ashore and ready to assume control of air
operations and airspace management functions, the CATF transfers control of all air
operations within the amphibious objective area (AOA) to the CLF. The CLF’s
Marine TADC then becomes the TACC ashore, and the Navy’s tactical air control
center reverts to a Navy TADC. The Marine TADC normally mirrors the TACC in
organization, facilities, and capabilities.

Note: The essential difference between the TACC and TADC is the amount of
responsible airspace and the scope of assigned tasks. A Marine TADC is typically
assigned specific tasks pertaining to air operations in the landward sector of the AOA.
In the case of AAW operations, a TADC may be delegated the authority to coordinate
landward sector air defense operations, offensive antiair warfare (OAAW) operations,
or both.

c. SAAWC.

VI-2
 (1) The SAAWC is the MAGTF commander’s air defense battle manager. The
ACE commander determines the extent of the SAAWC’s authority. The SAAWC
coordinates and manages all active air defense weapons (aircraft and surface-to-air
weapons) within an assigned sector. In amphibious operations, the Marine SAAWC
may also be known as the landing force SAAWC.

(2) The SAAWC does not exercise real-time control of air operations.
Responsibilities focus on the coordination and planning of air defense and some
OAAW operations. Within these guidelines, the SAAWC and staff typically provide
the interface between TAOC controllers and the ACE commander’s battlestaff.

(3) The Marine SAAWC’s operations facility normally collocates or

integrates with the TAOC in order to provide the SAAWC and battlestaff a greater
capability to coordinate with the TAOC. Representatives from various units of the
Marine air control group and the ACE battlestaff also man the Marine SAAWC
operations facility. SAAWC functions in AAW operations typically include—

(a) Managing air defense resources, including aircraft and surface-to-air

weapons within an assigned sector.

(b) Managing airborne tankers.

(c) Recommending air defense control measures to the TAOC, ACA, and
RADC/SADC as appropriate.

(d) Recommending the employment of AAW resources to support future

operations.

(e) Recommending ADW and weapons release conditions to the TACC.

(f) Recommending air defense priorities to the MAGTF commander via

the ACE commander.

(g) Launching alert aircraft or diverting airborne aircraft to attack time

critical targets, when authorized.

(h) Functioning as RADC/SADC for theater air defense operations, when

directed.

d. TAOC.

(1) The TAOC is subordinate to the TACC and is the primary AAW agency
within its assigned sector. When necessary, the TAOC, along with the SAAWC and
staff, may perform alternate TACC functions (current operations only) for limited
periods of time.

(2) The TAOC provides positive control, management, and surveillance for
its assigned airspace. Personnel at the TAOC detect, identify, and control the
intercept of hostile aircraft and missiles by aircraft and surface-to-air weapons.
They also provide en route air traffic control and navigational assistance for friendly
aircraft.

VI-3
 (3) The TAOC has 3 types of organic surveillance radars:

(a) The AN/TPS-59 radar provides long-range air surveillance for the
TAOC. It is capable of operating in 3 modes.

• TBM Mode. In this mode, the radar is capable of detecting and tracking
the launch of TBMs at ranges to 400 NMs and at altitudes over 500,000 feet without
external cueing. In the TBM mode, the AN/TPS-59 also provides data concerning
launch and impact circular probability ellipses, projected missile trajectory, and
missile time to impact.

• Air-Breathing Target Mode. In the air breathing target mode, the AN/
TPS-59 is capable of tracking traditional air breathing targets at distances out to 300
NMs up to 100,000 feet.

• Combined Mode. The combined mode offers tracking of both air

breathing and ballistic missile targets; air breathing targets at distances to 230 NMs
and altitudes to 100,000 feet; ballistic missile targets at distances to 350 NMs and
altitudes to 100,000 feet.

(b) The AN/TPS-63 radar provides mid-range (up to 160 NMs) two-
dimensional radar coverage. The AN/TPS-63 radar is usually used as an EW or gap-
filler radar.

(c) The AN/MPQ-62 continuous wave acquisition radar (CWAR) provides

close-in, low-altitude, two-dimensional radar coverage. The CWAR is typically used
in conjunction with ground-based data link (GBDL) to provide early cueing to low-
altitude air defense (LAAD) systems.

(4) The TAOC shares the air picture built by its organic radars with data
link-equipped aircraft, missile units, MACCS, and joint air defense agencies and
facilities. For units not capable of receiving information via data link, the TAOC can
provide voice reports (manual cross tell) for EW and situational awareness.

(5) The TAOC is responsible for detection, ID, and control of intercepts for
air defense operations within its assigned sector. In this role, the TAOC provides
close, broadcast, tactical, or data link control to DCA missions and assigns targets to
surface-to-air weapons units.

e. Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment (MATCD).

(1) The MATCD is the principal MACCS organization responsible for

terminal air traffic control. The MATCD uses its organic radars to provide airspace
control, management, and surveillance within its designated air defense sector.

(2) The MATCD contributes to the MAGTF’s integrated air defense system
by exchanging air traffic information with air command and control units by digital
data link and voice reports (manual cross tell). The MATCD is also normally
responsible for the activation of a designated base defense zone and providing EW
and cueing to surface-to-air weapons units within the base defense zone.

VI-4
 f. LAAD Battalion.

(1) LAAD battalions consist of a headquarters and service battery and 2

LAAD firing batteries. Firing batteries use the Stinger missile to provide close-in,
low-altitude air defense of forward combat areas, installations, and vital areas. It
also provides surface-to-air weapons support for units engaged in special operations
and independent operations. The LAAD battalion typically establishes a combat
operations center collocated with the SAAWC’s operations facility. Each firing
battery has 3 platoons with each firing platoon consisting of 3 firing sections. Each
firing section includes 5 firing teams. Each battalion has 30 man-portable air
defense systems—the shoulder fired version of the Stinger missile—and 60 Avenger
vehicles. The battalion, batteries, platoons, and sections are task organized with a
mix of these weapon systems.

The AN/UPS-3 tactical defense alert radar is organic to the LAAD battalion.
It has a short-range (10 NMs), low-altitude (under 10,000 feet), EW, alerting, and
cueing capability. The AN/UPS-3 is employed at the section level.

(2) LAAD units are normally assigned either in GS of the MAGTF or in DS of

a specific unit. Depending on its size, a LAAD unit can provide both GS and DS
close-in air defense by task organizing its assets. When operating in a GS role,
LAAD units typically receive tasking from the MAGTF commander via the ACE
commander and are positioned to provide close-in, point defense of MAGTF vital
areas and designated maneuver elements. When operating in DS, LAAD units
provide defense of those resources designated by the supported unit commander.

g. Marine Wing Communications Squadron (MWCS). The MWCS provides

communications support and coordination for the ACE and the MACCS. It provides
the interagency communications required to establish and maintain an integrated
MACCS, thus linking elements of the MAGTF’s integrated air defense system
together.

h. Air Coordinators/Air Controllers. Ground-based and airborne coordinators

and controllers (includes forward air controllers, forward air controllers [airborne],
tactical air coordinators [airborne], strike control and reconnaissance missions, etc.)
can contribute significantly to the overall AAW effort by controlling OAAW strikes,
defensive counterair missions, conducting visual surveillance, and providing
intelligence input.

4. C2

After the air defense plan and ACP/ACO are promulgated and the MAGTF ATO
and SPINS are issued, C2 coordinates and integrates the execution and employment
of air defense assets. This ties individual missions and engagements into a cohesive
air defense by providing ground-controlled interception, target assignment,
surveillance, and coordination for CAPs and surface-to-air weapons. MACCS
agencies, positive and procedural control measures, and communications provide
the elements necessary for C2 of air defense assets and operations. Nonorganic
assets, including AEW and special information systems aircraft, can enhance or
augment C2 of MAGTF air defense assets.

VI-5
 a. Command. The ACE commander executes command of air defense resources
in the MAGTF. The ACE commander exercises centralized command and
decentralized control authority of MAGTF air defense assets as the tactical air
commander from the TACC. The ACE typically delegates the authority for
management of air defense assets in the MAGTF air defense sector(s) to the SAAWC
for execution of air defense operations.

b. Control. The ACE commander delegates the authority for real-time control
of air defense assets to the TAOC. The TACC supervises and the TAOC executes
control of the MAGTF’s integrated air defense system. Control of air defense
operations can be decentralized or centralized. The maximum degree of
decentralized control is achieved through the establishment of effective procedural
control measures, including WEZs and ROE/RTF procedures. When operating
under a decentralized control mode, weapons platforms conduct engagements based
on the established weapons control status and ROE. In a centralized control mode,
weapons platforms evaluate targets based on the established WCS and ROE, then
request permission to engage the target from the TAOC. Engagements are
conducted only upon direction of the TAOC unless the target meets the criteria for
self-defense.

c. Communications. Communications provide the means to execute C2 of air

defense operations. Communications paths between the TACC, aircraft units,
forward operations bases (FOBs), the TAOC, and air defense platforms and units are
critical to the successful execution of air defense operations. Figure VI-1 illustrates
the complexity of the voice and data paths required to successfully employ the
MAGTF’s integrated air defense system.

Voice/data/TADIL B
CAP Aircraft JTF and components
TACC
Voice/data/
TADIL B
Voice/data Voice/data/
TADIL

Voice/data/TADIL B
TAOC MATCD
SAAWF
Voice/data
Voice/TADILS (GBDL)
Voice/data
(GBDL)

PATRIOT/AEGIS BDZ

LAAD Battalion

Voice/data

NOTE: MACCS will be

LAAD Battery TADIL-J capable

Figure VI-1. MAGTF Communications

VI-6
5. Weapons Systems

The weapons, sensors, and C2 agencies listed in Table VI-1 represent the key
elements of the MAGTF’s integrated air defense system. Additional information can
be obtain through the MAWTS 1 website http://www.tediv.usmc.mil/mawts1/.

Table VI-1. MAGTF Integrated Air Defense Weapons, Sensors, and C2

Air-Air/
Platform Employment Surface-to-Air Data Radar COMM/SEC
Link
F/A-18C/D AAW- OAAW/air AIM-120 TADIL-C APG-73 1 AN/ARC-
Hornet defense AIM-7 AN/AAS-38 210, UHF,
FAC (A) AIM-9 FLIR VHF
TAC (A) 20 mm gun Navigation SINCGARS
SEAD (w/HARM) FLIR Havequick
OAS-CAS/DAS KY-67
Interdiction
W Night Attack
E Escort
A AV-8B OAAW AIM-9 N/A APG-63 2 AN/ARC-
P Harrier II+ SEAD (w/A-G ordinance) 20 mm gun FLIR 182, UHF,
O OAS Navigation VHF
N CAS FLIR KY-58
S DAS
Interdiction
Night Attack
Assault support escort
STINGER LAAD FIM-92D Stinger GBDL *See note. MANPAD-
(MANPAD/ Missile SINCGARS
Avenger/ Avenger- 2
LAV (AD) SINCGARS
LAV (AD)- HF
and
SINCGARS
Platform Mission Type/Data Link Band Range Altitude

AN/TPS- Long-range surveillance 3D L 400 NM 500k

59(V)3 (ABT/TBM) point-to-point
S GCI data link
E (PPDL) to air
N defense
S communications
O platform (ADCP)
R AN/TPS-63 Medium-range (gap-filler) 2D L 160 NM 60k
S surveillance (ABT) remote radar
GCI (VHF)
AN/MPQ-62 Close-in, low altitude EW 2D J 30 NM 30k
(CWAR) and cueing GBDL
(ABT, CM)
AN/UPS-3 Short-range, low altitude 2D L 10 NM 10k
tactical EW and cueing GBDL
defense
alert radar
(TDAR)
AN/TPS-73 ATC surveillance radar 2D E 60 NM pri 60k
TADIL B 120 NM sec

VI-7
 Table VI-1. MAGTF Integrated Air Defense Weapons, Sensors, and C2 (continued)

Agency Mission C2 System Data Link Comm/Sec Reference

TACC Senior agency of MACCS Multi-source A, B, HF, UHF, MCWP 3-25.4

ACE commander CP correlation NATO VHF,
C C system (MSCS) Link-1, SATCOM
O O CTAPS CTT HAVEQUICK,
M N YES
M & T TAOC Control intercept of hostile AN/TYQ-23 A, B, C, J, HF, UHF, MCWP 3-25.7
A R aircraft and missiles ATDL-1, VHF,
N O surveillance and NATO HAVEQUICK,
D L identification of a/c within Link-1, YES
assigned sector CTT
TATC
ADCP Provide EW cueing of AN/TSQ-124 J, PPDL, HF, UHF,
TBMs from AN/TPS-59 GBDL VHF, YES
(V)3 radar via
TADIL -J
MATCD ATC BDZ AN/TSQ-131 B HF, UHF, MCWP 3-25.8
control and VHF, YES
communication
subsystem
(CCS)
*Note: Stinger units with the remote terminal unit can utilize all Marine sensors and specific sister service
sensors.

6. Planning

The MAGTF conducts planning to orient itself on future objectives. Planning

forces MAGTF personnel to look forward in time, focus on the enemy, anticipate
actions and reactions, and assess risk. Proper planning can help to seize the
initiative, assist in time-sensitive decision making, simplify complex situations, and
generate tempo. Within the MAGTF, AAW planning supports deep operations to
shape the battlespace and achieve battlespace dominance. It supports close
operations to engage in decisive combat and supports rear operations to provide
force sustainment. The effective conduct of AAW operations requires integrated
planning at all levels and with each element of the MAGTF. The MAGTF
commander relies on the expertise and advice of the aviation combat, ground
combat, and combat service support element commanders and their staffs to help
determine the MAGTF’s AAW concept of operation. Therefore ACE, GCE, and
CSSE commanders, their staffs, and their subordinate elements must understand
the MAGTF commander’s guidance and intent concerning AAW operations. To
achieve unity of effort, AAW planning responsibilities within the MAGTF must be
clearly outlined by the MAGTF commander. However, commanders at all levels are
responsible for the planning and execution of appropriate passive air defense
measures.

The ACE conducts AAW operations in support of the MAGTF. The ACE
commander directs the staff and subordinate commanders and their staffs to plan
AAW to support the MAGTF’s deep, close, and rear operations. AAW planning is
based on the MAGTF’s mission, commander’s intent, designation of the main effort,
air defense priorities, and other guidance. The MAGTF commander may designate

VI-8
the ACE as the main effort to conduct AAW operations, especially during the initial
stages of a conflict. This could include both offensive AAW and air defense or other
shaping efforts of which AAW efforts could play a large role. The ACE G-3/S3
(future operations) conducts long-term planning for AAW operations that will
normally occur beyond 48 hours and the building of the next ATO. The TACC future
operations organization conducts near-term (24 to 48 hours) planning, builds the
ATOs, and AAW near term planning. The SAAWC provides air defense expertise to
the ACE commander and battlestaff during AAW planning. The TACC current
operations organization executes AAW operations.

During AAW planning, the SAAWC and TAOC staffs will normally augment the
ACE with several air defense specialists to assist in preparing the MAGTF
operations order. Critical decisions, including air defense apportionment and
planning to achieve air superiority, must be addressed and answered during this
phase. The preliminary site selections for air defense agencies (TAOC, LAAD, etc.)
are also finalized.

7. Operations

Air defense includes all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking

enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth’s atmosphere or to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of an enemy attack. Air defense includes both active and passive
actions. Passive air defense is the responsibility of all commanders and includes
such methods as EW, cover, concealment, deception, dispersion, etc. MAGTF active
air defense is coordinated at the TACC/SAAWC level and conducted at the TAOC
level.

a. The MAGTF may be designated 1 or more sectors in which it will conduct and
coordinate air defense efforts. Typically, a SAAWC is designated in each sector to
coordinate the execution efforts of air defense agencies and units within the sector.
The SAAWC supervises the TAOC in its execution of active air defense operations,
plans future activities for air defense units within the sector, and makes
recommendations to the ACE commander regarding the employment of air defense
resources within the sector. The SAAWC also coordinates with the MATCD for the
activation of base defense zones (BDZs) around FOBs. As the MAGTF commander’s
air defense battle manager, the SAAWC may be the MAGTF’s agent for performing
RADC or SADC functions when operating as part of a joint force. The SAAWC
coordinates air defense actions within its sector with higher and adjacent air
defense agencies and activities including the AADC, RADC, and SADC as applicable.

b. As enemy air threats are detected, the SAAWC requests the TACC to
upgrade the ADW condition for particular areas. Commensurate with this, the
SAAWC may also ask for upgrades to the WCS to engage the threat at the maximum
possible range.

c. The TAOC uses information gained from its air surveillance radars, data link
equipped aircraft, and air control agencies to build a comprehensive air picture. This
information is shared with other appropriately equipped data link agencies to build
an air situation picture that portrays air activity throughout the JTF’s AO. To
enhance this picture, the TAOC takes advantage of all available air surveillance
sensors including aircraft equipped with TADIL-C, electronic warfare support

VI-9
aircraft, and MATCD sensor information. The TAOC typically deploys an EW and
control site to a location where terrain masking or line-of-sight limitations inhibit
the detection afforded by radars located at the main site. The information gained
through various, dispersed battlefield air surveillance sensors and electronic
intelligence assets can provide a detailed air picture that significantly enhances
identification of friendly aircraft and EW of enemy air attack.

d. The TAOC executes active air defense tasks through the control of air
defense weapons. It uses assigned air defense aircraft and surface-to-air weapons
within its area to destroy enemy air and missile threats, determining which
resource to use based on available air defense assets and the location and type of
threat. The TAOC reports the results of engagements to the TACC, maintains status
on weapon expenditures and remaining time on station for combat air patrol (CAP)
aircraft, and tracks the amount of fuel available from tanker aircraft. It is
responsible for the control of air defense aircraft and surface-to-air weapons systems
and for the safe routing of itinerant air traffic through its assigned sector.

e. The SAAWC uses aircraft scheduled on the ATO for air defense missions and
assigns these aircraft to the TAOC based on air defense activity within the sector.
The SAAWC also manages the CAP’s use of aerial refueling assets. Air defense
missions appear on the ATO as either preplanned, scheduled, or on-call. Preplanned
and on-call mission aircraft are often called strip alert aircraft. If the need for
additional air defense aircraft arises, the TAOC requests additional assets from the
SAAWC, or if none are available, requests from the TACC that a strip alert air
defense mission be launched or that available airborne assets can be refueled and
returned to station. The ACE commander may delegate authority to the SAAWC to
launch strip alert aircraft.

f. If aircraft are not available for immediate air defense missions, the TACC’s
current operations organization may elect to divert aircraft from another type of
mission (direct air support, deep air support) to fill the void or request additional
aircraft from the ACE or the JAOC.

8. Summary

The MACCS is the principal conduit through which the MAGTF integrates with
the JIADS. The senior agency of the MACCS, the TACC, is responsible for planning
and coordinating MAGTF air defense operations with the AADC. The SAAWC
assists in the near-term coordination and management of MAGTF-organic and joint
force air defense resources allotted to the MAGTF by coordinating with the AADC,
RADC, or SADC, as appropriate. The TAOC is the MAGTF’s principal air defense
agency responsible for the real-time execution of air defense operations. The TAOC,
through the SAAWC, coordinates its activities with adjacent sector and regional air
defense control agencies.

VI-10
 Appendix A

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Planning

a. The multinational force (MNF) commander may designate an AADC to

ensure an integrated defense effort by the MNF. Because of the interrelationship
between airspace control, air defense, and other air operations, the ACA, AADC,
and air component commander duties are normally performed by the same person.

b. Multinational operations planning considerations include—

(1) Host Nation (HN) Training Levels and Air Defense Order of Battle (OB).
When required to operate as part of a MNF, understanding types and numbers of
participating nation’s air defense systems and capabilities is important. Operations
may or may not include integration with host nation air defense systems, ATC, and
C2 architecture.

(2) Interoperability. Integrating US and foreign nation weapon systems must

always be considered in order to optimize defense design. Several countries own and
operate US designed weapons systems such as Patriot and Hawk air defense
systems. However, just as US systems must upgrade, so do most foreign government
systems. Based on foreign military sales case agreements, US forces going into a
multinational theater may find incompatibilities with like systems. Therefore,
planning and conducting interoperability training with foreign governments
becomes even more critical.

(3) Disclosure of Critical Air Defense Information. When operating as part of

a MNF, US forces rely on classified sophisticated intelligence and operations
databases. Although sharing this information is critical to successful conduct of the
mission, much of this information is not usually releasable to foreign governments.
For air defense, this critical information includes accessibility to the different data
links. The US forces commander must carefully consider national disclosure policy
(NDP) guidance, along with the intent and concept of the operation when
determining whether to request release of additional source information to specific
countries. In some instances during the execution of combat operations, the
commander may have to make a determination to release previously nondisclosed
information if, in the assessment, release of the information serves to protect the
interests or safety of US forces.

(4) CID. Normally, Mode IV will be the primary IFF system used. However,
when conducting multilateral operations, HN will usually only be equipped with up
to Mode III. Therefore, the US forces commander must establish a combat
identification SOP that is mutually agreeable with the host nation (refer to CID in
Chapter II).

(5) ROE. US forces operating in a multinational environment must follow the

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of
Engagement for US Forces. The JFC will normally be asked to submit additional
supplemental ROE for approval by the joint staff. In many cases, commanders of
A-1
deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in
the ROE development process. Complete consensus may not be achievable;
therefore, the force commander must reconcile differences as much as possible early
on in the planning process.

c. Air Defense Considerations.

(1) Ground ROE. Ground ROE when operating in a foreign country can differ
significantly if the HN is willing to or insists on providing some type of ground
security or force protection. When this is the case, a typical arrangement is for the
HN to provide overall base or facility security and for US forces to provide local or
perimeter security for each of their units. In any case, language barriers can prove
to be a hindrance. SOPs must be established to closely coordinate security and
force protection measures.

(2) Air ROE. Usually, US forces will provide air defense protection for their
own defended assets using a separate DAL. This is the preferred method of
providing air defense as it reduces conflicts because of predisposed differences in
ROE. In cases where US forces and HN forces are providing mutual protection to a
defended asset, it must be clear who is controlling engagements. Where differences
in ROE for either ABT or TBM exists, it is important to establish detailed
procedural control measures for friendly airspace users to reduce the possibility of
fratricide. One technique is to prepare an SOP of mutually agreed-upon ROE for
each weapon system in theater. TBM ROE should be less difficult as classification of
this threat is much easier. In any case, the US forces must not be denied the right to
self-defense.

(3) Passive Defense/EW. Most nations have an EW system to alert military

and civilian populations of impending attacks. It is important for the MNF
commander to determine what I&W are available and to use them as necessary to
maximize force protection. Commanders should not rely solely on host nation
systems but should deploy with their own EW capability to augment that of the
MNF. One technique is to establish voice and data TBM early warning systems and
publish them in the operations order. Establish voice early warning nets and radios
at each C2 node. Data link rehearsals can be done by coordinating through the US
Space Command to generate exercise TBM tracks.

(4) Liaison. Depending on level of operations security, conducting early

liaison with the host nation to establish an air defense C2 structure is critical to a
successful multinational JIADS. An SOP should be established to provide for
liaisons at critical C2 nodes within the JOA. Liaison duties will include
deconfliction of ROE and procedural control measures at critical levels in the chain
of command.

(5) Language Barriers. Depending on the country, language can impose

significant hardships on commanders who must communicate their military plans.
This is especially important when operating under OPCON or TACON of foreign
military leadership. SOPs for communicating must be worked out before the
execution phase of any operation to ensure continuity and clarity. Every effort must
be made to deploy with adequate linguists who understand military terminology to
ensure clear communications. In cases where the language barrier is less
significant, exchanging liaison officers and positioning them at critical C2 nodes may
be adequate.
A-2
 Appendix B

JOINT INTERFACE CONTROL OFFICER (JICO)

Note: This information taken verbatim from Appendix C to Enclosure A, of

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3115.01, Joint Data
Network (JDN) Operations, dated 1 October 2000. Only the figures and table
numbering was changed to reflect being in Appendix B of this publication. It
gives an over view of the JICO role in a JTF. Any references to “this manual”
refer to CJCSM 3115.01.

MULTI-TADIL NETWORK MANAGEMENT

1. General. Network interface control and tactical data management are the
cornerstones of effective multi-TADIL operations. The JICO is the coordinator of
the multi-TADIL network. ICOs exist at different levels within the components in
support of specific TADIL operations. When the scope of operations shift from
single service TADIL operations to joint multi-TADIL operations, units with a
doctrinal mission of ICO functionality shall be able to seamlessly transition to JICO.
Specific ICO responsibilities are addressed in CJCSM 6120.01, JMTOP.

2. Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO). The JICO is the senior multi-TADIL ICO
in support of JTF operations. The JICO is responsible for effecting planning and
management of the joint multi-TADIL network within a theater of operations.
When a JTF is formed, there will be only one JICO per JTF.

a. To support JTF operations, the multi-TADIL AO may be subdivided into

regions and sectors. In cases where regions and sectors are employed, regional
ICOs (RICO) and sector ICOs (SICO) will be assigned and are governed by the same
techniques and procedures for the JICO that are contained in this manual. The
exception to this may be in the composition (personnel and equipment) of a RICO or
SICO cell. These cells are to be organized according to mission requirements and
platform configuration.

b. Figure B-1 depicts a notional JTF JICO command and coordination structure.
The diagram shows the relationships between the JICO and his principle supported
commander (JFACC), as well as the JICO’s control and coordinating responsibilities
with subordinate and adjacent elements (RICO and JCCC). The diagram also
depicts coordinating relationships between RICOs and component commanders, who
may be under tactical control (TACON).

c. To support and facilitate peacetime and contingency planning, coordination,

and execution, JICOs are required at various echelons of command within the joint
forces — the CINC headquarters (HQ), Service component HQ, and the operational
forces.

3. JICO Responsibilities. The JICO, acting under authority of the JFC-designated

component/functional commander, is the multi-TADIL network coordinator. As
such, the JICO plans the MTA; supports IERs with the other supported
commanders; manages the information derived from data exchanged across the
MTA; drafts the Operational Tasking (OPTASK) Link message; coordinates the
B-1
 JFC

J-6 JCCC JFACC JFLCC JFMCC

JDN Ops
Officer AADC

JICO

RICO RICO

SICO
RICO SICO SICO
RICO

Control
Coordination

Figure B-1. Notional JICO Organizational Relationships

initiation of and monitors the multi-TADIL network; affects network corrective

action, when required; and coordinates the termination of networks at the
conclusion of operations. If regional multi-TADIL networks are required, the JICO
has the additional responsibility of planning regional architectures with support
from RICOs.

4. JICO Planning Requirements. Multi-TADIL network planning is best

accomplished during deliberate planning. However, there will be times when the
JICO is required to accomplish crisis planning and dynamic replanning in support of
the multi-TADIL network operations. Throughout the planning process, the JICO
should always be cognizant of, and tailor the plan to, IERs, environmental factors,
threat, scenario, and supporting friendly forces. The following is a list of
overarching multi-TADIL Network planning requirements. The JICO shall refer to
Appendix B of Enclosure B of this manual for detailed planning tasks.

a. Design a multi-TADIL architecture based on IERs.

b. Provide requirements for multi-TADIL related voice communications to

communication planners.

c. Determine JICO cell organization, structure, equipment, operational facility

(OPFAC), etc.
B-2
 d. Identify multi-TADIL interoperability requirements.

e. Plan for the placement and integration of strategic data link nodes. For
details on strategic noding, refer to Enclosure D of this manual.

f. Develop OPTASK Link messages. Specific OPTASK Link message

instructions are contained in CJCSM 6120.01 (JMTOP) and MIL-STD 6040, US
Message Text Format (USMTF).

g. Plan for and coordinate the integration and interoperability of intelligence

support systems at national through tactical levels.

5. JICO Execution Requirements. The following requirements are a list of the

overarching Multi-TADIL Network execution requirements. The JICO shall refer to
Appendix B of Enclosure C in this manual for detailed planning requirements.

a. Establish and manage multi-TADIL network.

b. Direct interface and architecture reconfiguration.

c. Direct the JICO organization and structure.

d. Establish multi-TADIL voice-related communications.

e. Direct sensor and data registration.

f. Conduct joint track data coordination and management.

g. Coordinate connectivity to the intelligence support systems of the CINC,

CJTF, joint commands, components of the joint commands, etc.

6. JICO Manning Requirements. To meet warfighting requirements for CINCs and

their components, trained JICO and multi-TADIL operators are required.

a. CINC JICOs. To meet deliberate planning and coordination requirements for

exercises and contingencies within their particular AO, each of the following CINCs
should establish a JICO billet: USJFCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM,
USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USSPACECOM (NORAD). The CINC JICO should
be a senior Officer (0-4 to 0-5) with multi-TADIL planning and operational
experience, and formally trained in JICO operations. The CINC JICO should reside
within the J-3 and support operations within the Joint Operations Center (JOC).
The CINC JICO is responsible for coordinating with component JICOs to ensure
that multi-TADIL network operations fully support JTF operations during
contingencies or training exercises.

b. Component JICOs. In order to support CINC multi-TADIL planning,

coordination, and execution requirements for exercise and contingencies, each
component should establish a JICO billet at appropriate headquarters elements and
operational units. Component JICOs should be officers (0-3 to 0-5) with a multi-
TADIL planning and operational experience, and formally trained in JICO
operations. Component JICOs should reside within the S/G/N-3 and be able to

B-3
support operations within command and battle management centers. Component
JICOs are responsible for coordinating within their chain of command all elements
required for seamless integration of their TADIL platforms into joint multi-TADIL
network operations. The following paragraphs reflect component JICO
requirements:

(1) US Air Force. Two JICOs at each of the 12 numbered Air Forces (NAF)
(24).

(2) US Navy. One JICO at each of the fleet CINC staffs (4), one at each
numbered fleet staffs (5), one each at group staffs (14), one on each AADC module
Cruiser (12), one at each NCTSI detachment (4), and an appropriate number of
trained JICOs in subordinate units to meet anticipated operational requirements.

(3) US Marine Corps. Three JICOs at each active tactical air command
center (TACC) (9) and two at the reserve TACC (2). Three JICOs at each active
tactical air operations centers (TAOC) (9) and two at each reserve TAOC (4).

(4) US Army. One staff JICO in each operational area or JTF (2) and two
staff JICOs in each contingency area (4). Three JICOs in each AAMDC (6) and two
in each ADA brigade (14) (includes AC, NC, and UAADASCH training brigades).

c. Total JICO Manning. The following is a summation of joint forces JICO

requirements for CINC staffs and their component manning:

CINC staffs 6
Components 113
Total: 119

7. JICO Training. JICO training will supplement, but not replace, Service-specific
operational and multi-TADIL training and competence. Joint training will build on
that foundation to provide essential skills to plan and execute the joint multi-TADIL
network. The JICO was established to plan and manage the joint force multi-TADIL
network. Increased emphasis on joint integration and information exchange
requirements has placed greater demands on interface planning, execution
(operations), and management. These increased demands require that the JICO be
formally school trained in joint multi-TADIL operations. An understanding by the
JICO of how disparate TADILs affect the multi-TADIL network is paramount. The
JICO must have a firm understanding of the JDN and how it interrelates with the
JCTN, GDN, IN, JPN, and COP.

a. Service ICO Training. Each Service is responsible for training their

personnel in Service-specific ICO procedures, multi-TADIL operations, and
supporting communications. Service ICO training is an important building block
and is a prerequisite for JICO training.

b. Formal JICO Training. US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as executive

authority is responsible for joint multi-TADIL training. US Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM) Joint Multi-TADIL School (JMTS) serves as the JICO and multi-TADIL
training center. FORSCOM, coordinating with Service training activities, will
maintain the multi-TADIL training curriculum, which includes JICO. The training

B-4
includes both classroom and practical application of JICO core competencies. The
training provides advanced-level technical academics and a realistic operational
environment using multi-TADIL analysis, display, and communications systems
JICOs can expect to encounter in JICO, RICO, SICO cells throughout various
theaters of operation.

c. JICO Course Prerequisites. Prerequisites for attendance to the JICO course

are:

(1) Graduate of the JMTS JTIDS Operators Course.

(2) Graduate of the JMTS Multi-TADIL Advanced Joint Interoperability

Course (MAJIC).

(3) Graduate of the JMTS JTIDS Network Design Course (waiver may be
granted).

(4) Be a Service multi-TADIL subject matter expert (SME).

d. Waivers. Waivers to any of the course prerequisites will be addressed by the

JMTS staff on a case-by-case basis.

8. JICO Cell. The JICO cell is a task-organized team of multi-TADIL-experienced

personnel that support the JICO. The JICO cell shall be staffed, trained, and
equipped to support continuous operations. The cell should be comprised of
personnel from participating components to optimize multi-Service knowledge and
experience. The JICO cell shall contain the necessary systems and communications
for establishing and managing the multi-TADIL network.

a. The following C2 nodes are candidate locations for the JICO cell as well as a
RICO or SICO cell: JOC, Air Operations Center (AOC), Command Ships (LCC and
AGF class), Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) Tactical Flag Command Center
(TFCC), AEGIS AADC module Cruiser, Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), Command
Center, Marine Tactical Air Command Center (MTACC), and Army Air and Missile
Defense Center (AAMDC).

b. C2 execution nodes include the Control Reporting Center (CRC), TAOC, and
ADTOC.

9. JICO Cell Personnel. The JICO cell consists of a JICO cell OIC, Watch Officer,
and operators necessary to support continuous multi-TADIL planning, operations,
and management. Members of the JICO cell will continuously monitor the multi-
TADIL network, ensure nodal connectivity, and resolve interoperability and track
management issues. A JTF-level JICO cell designed to support 24-hour-a-day
operations is shown in Table B-1. This table represents a level of effort expected for
managing multi-TADIL operations in a major theater of operations. Cell
composition can be task organized or tailored to meet the scope of operations at any
level (RICO, SICO, shipboard, etc.).

a. To support crisis or contingency operations, JICO-trained personnel will

need to be mobilized from within each component, as required, and deployed to

B-5
support the JICO/RICO/SICO cell(s). The metrics required for mobilizing and
deploying JICO cell personnel must be established during the deliberate planning
process by each CINC and their components. To facilitate this process, each
component should establish a means of tracking formally trained JICO and multi-
TADIL personnel, which may include assigning subspecialty codes or secondary
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to graduates of the JMTS, JICO, and MAJIC
courses.

b. The following represents the recommended military occupational specialties

from each Service to provide optimum manning of a JICO, RICO, SICO cell
(although recommended, other occupational specialties may fill these positions at
the discretion of the component):

(1) US Air Force Enlisted:

(a) 1C5X1 Aerospace Control and Warning Systems Operator.

(b) 1A4X1 Senior Surveillance Technician.

(c) 2E153 Communications Technician.

(2) US Air Force Officer: 13B Air Battle Manager.

(3) US Marine Corps Enlisted:

(a) 7236 Tactical Air Defense Controller.

(b) 5979 Tactical Data Systems Maintenance Chief.

(c) 5974 Tactical Data Systems Administrator.

(4) US Marine Corps Officer:

(a) 7202 Marine Air Command and Control Officer.

(b) 7210 Air Defense Control Officer.

(c) 5902 Electronics (Aviation) Maintenance Officer.

Table B-1. Notional JICO Cell Manning to Support Combat Operations

Joint Interface Control Cell Number Rank
JTF JICO Cell OIC 1 O- 3 to O-5
JICO Cell Watch Officer 3 E-7 to O-3
Multi-TADIL Coordinator 3 E-5 to O-3
Joint Track Data Coordinator (JTDC) 3 E-5 to O-3
Intel Liaison Officer (LNO) 1 E-7 to O-3
JCCC Liaison Officer (LNO) 1 E-7 to O-3
Communications Technicians 3 E-5 to O-3
Total 15

B-6
 (d) 5970 Tactical Data Systems Maintenance Officer.

(5) US Navy Enlisted:

(a) Operations Specialists (OS) with applicable Naval Enlisted

Classification Code (NEC).

(b) Information Systems Technician (IT) with applicable NEC.

(c) Electronics Technician (ET) with applicable NEC.

(6) US Navy Officer:

(a) 6120 Operations Limited Duty Officer.

(b) 7120 Operations Warrant Officer.

(c) Unrestricted Line Officer Surface with applicable Additional

Qualification Designator (AQD).

(d) Unrestricted Line Officer Aviation E-2 Mission Commander qualified

or with applicable AQD.

(7) US Army Enlisted: 4J C4I Enhanced Operator/Repairer-maintainer.

(8) US Army Officer:

(a) 140A0 Command and Control Systems Technician.

(b) Commissioned Officer (O-3 – O-5).

10. JICO Crew Positions. The following is a description of JICO cell positions and
duties:

a. JICO Cell Watch Officer. The JICO cell watch officer is directly responsible
to the JICO for cell operations and active management of multi-TADIL operations.
The JICO cell watch officer directs and supervises the on-watch team and
coordinates with the JICO and other JDN component coordinators to ensure
information completeness in support of CTP and JFC requirements. The JICO cell
watch officer will monitor overall quality of the multi-TADIL network and direct
actions to rectify problems as they occur. The JICO cell watch officer will conduct
dynamic planning to adjust the multi-TADIL architecture and interfaces to meet
changing requirements and operations. In a theater divided into multiple regions,
the JICO cell watch officer will act as the coordinator between RICO cells for overall
theater multi-TADIL network management. The JICO Watch Officer shall be
formally trained in JICO operations.

b. Joint Track Data Coordinator (JTDC). The JTDC is responsible to the JICO
watch officer for all track management issues. The JTDC is responsible for the
clarity, accuracy, currency, and quality of tactical pictures. The JTDC, via the Track

B-7
Supervision Net (TSN) and Voice Product Net (VPN), facilitates the resolution of
dual-track designations and identification conflicts that are the result of system
interoperability problems or operator action. JTDC functionality is an integral
component in the combat ID process. The JTDC will assist the theater ID Authority
in timely and accurate assessment of tracks of interest. When multiple track data
management regions or sectors are established, the JTDC coordinates, and is the
ultimate resolution authority with, RICO cells to resolve cross-region track
management and ID issues. The JTDC is net control station (NECOS) for TSN.

c. Multi-TADIL Coordinator (MTC). The MTC will support the JICO cell watch
officer by monitoring and resolving connectivity and interoperability issues. The
multi-TADIL coordinator will monitor IU performance and compliance with
OPTASK link parameters. He will ensure effective data flow to support the CTP
and act as NECOS for the data link coordination net (DCN). In multiple regions, the
multi-TADIL coordinator will coordinate with the RICO cells to resolve cross-region
network architecture issues. The multi-TADIL coordinator, with JICO approval and
concurrence, may delegate TADIL management responsibilities to individuals
located at a C2 node (i.e., ship, CRC, TAOC) that can best facilitate the management
of a particular data link. Those individuals include the Link 11/11B/16 manager.
Specifics on TADIL managers can be found in the CJCSM 6120.01, JMTOP.

d. Intelligence Liaison Officer (LNO). The Intel LNO will coordinate with
intelligence organizations such as the special information systems officer, Joint
Intelligence Center (JIC), and Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Information Management
Element (IME) to ensure appropriate intelligence data are distributed to and by the
JDN through intelligence systems interfaces.

e. Communications Technician. The JICO cell communications technician will

coordinate all communications and cryptographic matters. The JICO cell
communications technician will coordinate with the appropriate activity or unit to
resolve support equipment and circuit issues and advise the JICO cell watch officer
regarding all communications matters. The JICO cell communications technician
will assist the JICO to ensure that correct data and voice connections are provided
to the JICO cell.

f. JCCC LNO. The JCCC LNO interfaces with the JCCC or other
communications activities and units on all pertinent matters concerning the multi-
TADIL network and JDN interfaces as they apply to local and theater
communications.

11. Communications. The JDN requires specific communications networks to

operate in a real-time and/or near-real-time environment. The JFC’s J2, J3, J6, and
the JICO must take these into account when planning and deploying the JDN into
an AOR. Care must be taken to ensure mutual compatibility between the JDN
required communications networks and the overall command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
requirements of the JFC. Specific multi-TADIL communications circuits required by
the JICO cell are discussed in detail in CJCSM 6120.01, JMTOP.

12. JICO Cell Equipment. In order to properly fulfill the mission, a JICO or JICO
cell (to include RICO and SICO cells) must have available equipment, or a suite of

B-8
equipment, that allows it to plan, evaluate, implement, monitor, reconfigure, and
communicate across the multi-TADIL network and JDN in support of joint force
requirements.

13. JICO Support Teams. In order to better support and facilitate JICO operations
around the world, a requirement exists for a rapidly mobilized and deployable
capability consisting of personnel and equipment that when in place become force
multipliers for the JICO.

a. Joint Interface Control Cell – Deployable (JICC-D). The JICC-D consists of

multi-TADIL and communications equipment and personnel capable of providing
rapidly deployable, task-organized JICO augmentation and equipment support for a
limited duration for contingency operations to areas employing a multi-TADIL
network. Specific details of the JICC-D can be found in Enclosure E of this manual.

b. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) Engineering

Response Team (JERT). The JERT is a US Joint Forces Command-sponsored
activity consisting of Link 16 operational experts and network design engineers
from various Service organizations such as FORSCOM joint training division,
Service network design facilities (NDF), and civilian/contractor support to DOD.
When activated, the JERT will work in direct support of the JICO during
contingency operations providing Link 16 expertise not otherwise resident in
theater. Specific details of the JERT can be found in Enclosure F.

JICO Cell

Joint Interface Control Officer

JICO Cell
Watch Officer

JCCC Intelligence
Liaison Officer Liaison Officer

Communications Joint Track Data Multi-TADIL

Technician Coordinator Coordinator

Link 11A/B Link 16

Manager Manager

Figure B-2. Notional JICO Cell Organization

B-9
 References

Joint

ASCIET, ASCIET 99 Evaluation Plan, Jan 1999.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagement for US forces, 15 Jan 2000.
Joint Combat ID Master Plan, Aug 1995.
Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 1995.
Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
12 Apr 2001.
Joint Pub 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 Oct 1999.
Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, 22 Feb 1996.
Joint Pub 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 22 Jul 1995.
Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 Nov 1994.
JTAMDO, JTAMDO Battle Management Concept, Mar 1998.
JTAMDO, JICO Operational Concept, 11 Feb 1999.
Multi-TADIL Advanced Joint Interoperability Course, Operations, Plans, and
Management (Module 5), 31 Mar 2000.

Army

FM 44-18, Air Defense Artillery Employment Stinger, 17 May 1985.

FM 44-43, Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle Platoon & Squad Operations, 3 Oct 1995.
FM 44-44, Avenger Platoon & Squad, Oct 1995.
FM 44-85, Patriot Battalion & Battery Operations, 21 Feb 1997.
FM 44-94, Army Air & Missile Defense Operations, 31 Mar 2000.
FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, 15 Jun 1995.
FM 100-12, Army Theater Missile Defense, 31 Mar 2000.
FM 100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, 7 Oct 1987.

Marine

MCWP 3-25.3, Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook, Dec 1997.
MCWP 3-25.4, Tactical Air Command Center Handbook, Sep 1998.
MCWP 3-25.6, Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator Handbook, Aug 1997.
MCWP 3-25.7, Tactical Air Operations Center Handbook, Sep 1996.
MCWP 3-25.8, Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment Handbook, Aug 1997.
MCWP 3-25.9, Marine Air Command and Control System Communications
Handbook, (Final Draft Pending).
MCWP 3-25.10, Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion Handbook, Jun 1998.
MCWP 3-25.10A, Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner Handbook, Nov 2000.
MCWP 5-11.1, MAGTF Aviation Planning, Jun 1995.

Navy

NWP 3-56, Composite Warfare Commander’s Manual (Revision A), 1 Apr 2001.

Air Force

ACCI 13, AOC Vol. 3 Air Operations Center, Feb 95.

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Sep 97.
AFPD 13-1, Theater Air Control System, 11 May 95.

References-1
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 4, Tactical Employment F-15A/B/C/D (Secret), Oct 1997.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 5, Tactical Employment F-16 (Secret), Feb 1997.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 15, Tactical Employment AWACS (Secret), Oct 1996.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 16, Tactical Employment EC-130H (Secret), Jan 1997.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 17, Tactical Employment F-15E (Secret), Mar 1996.
AFTTP 3-1Vol 21, Tactical Employment RC-135 (Secret), Sep 1997.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 22, Tactical Employment KC-10/KC-135 (Secret), Apr 1997.
AFTTP 3-1 Vol 26, Tactical Employment Theater Air Control (Secret), Jul 1997.

Multiservice

Introduction to TADIL-J and Quick Reference Guide, Jun 2000.

FM 90-41/MCRP 5-1.A/NWP 5-02/AFTTP(I) 3-2.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations, 26 Aug 1998.
FM 100-103-2/MCWP 3-25.2/NWP 3-56.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, TAGS, Multiservice
Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System, 29 Jul 1998.

References-2
 Glossary

A/A air to air

a/c aircraft
A/G air to ground
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AADC area air defense commander
AADP area air defense plan
AAI air-to-air integration
AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Command
AAMDP area air and missile defense plan
AAW antiair warfare
ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center
ABCS Army battlefield control system
ABIS Airborne Broadcast Intelligence System (Army)
ABMOC air battle management center
ABT air-breathing threat; air-breathing target (USMC)
AC airspace controller
ACA airspace control authority
ACDS advanced combat direction system
ACE aviation combat element (USMC); airborne command
element (USAF)
ACI air combat intelligence (USMC)
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACR armored cavalry regiment
ACU air control unit
ADA air defense artillery
ADAFCO air defense artillery fire coordination officer (Army)
ADC air defense commander (USN)
ADCCN air defense command and control net
ADCP air defense communications platform
ADL automated data link
ADOCS automated deep operations coordination system (USA)
ADQ additional qualification designator
ADSI air defense system integrator (USA)
ADTOC Air Defense Tactical Operations Center
ADU(S) air defense unit (secondary)
ADW air defense warning
AEGIS shipboard integrated AAW combat weapons system
AEW airborne early warning
AFATDS Army field artillery tactical data system
AFDC Air Force Doctrine Center
AFFOR Air Force forces
AFI Air Force Instruction
AFRTS Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Component
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures

Glossary-1
AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (interservice)
AGF Navy command ship
ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center
AMDCOORD air and missile defense coordinator (USA)
AMDPCS air and missile defense planning and control system (USA)
AMDTF air and missile defense task force (USA)
AMDWS air and missile defense workstation (USA)
ANDVT advanced narrow band digital voice terminal
ANG Army National Guard
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AOC air operations center (USAF)
AOR area of responsibility
AREC air resource element coordinator
ARFOR Army forces
ARG amphibious ready group
AQD additional qualification designator
ASAS All Source Analysis System (USA)
ASIT adaptable surface interface terminal
ASM air-to-surface missile
ASOC air support operations center
ASROC antisubmarine rocket
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
ATC air traffic control
ATDL1 Army tactical data link 1
ATO air tasking order
ATRC AEGIS Training and Readiness Center
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWS AEGIS weapons system

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

BDA battle damage assessment
BDE brigade
BDZ base defense zone
BLK block
BMDO ballistic missile defense office
BSFV Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle

C2 command and control

C2P command and control processor
C2WC command and control warfare commander (USN)
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
CAOC combat air operations center

Glossary-2
CAP combat air patrol
CAS close air support; combined antenna system
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CAV cavalry (USA)
CCB configuration control board
CCD central communication display (USA)
CCS control and communication subsystem
CDS combat direction system
CEC cooperative engagement capability
CG guided missile cruiser
CGS common ground station
CGSWS JSTARS Common Ground Work Station
chnls channels
CID combat identification
CIDC combat identification coordinator
CIDS combat identification systems
CINC commander in chief
CIWS Close-in Weapon System (USN)
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF Commander Joint Task Force
CLF commander, landing force
CM cruise missile
CNN Cable News Network
COA course of action
COC combat operations center
COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces
comms communications
CONOPS concept of operations
CONPLAN operation plan in concept format
COP common operational picture
CP command post
CRC control and reporting center
CRP control and reporting post
CSSE combat service support element (MAGTF)
CTAPS contingency theater automated planning system
CTP common tactical picture
CTT commanders tactical terminal
CUDIXS common user digital information exchange system
CV aircraft carrier
CVBG carrier battle group
CVN aircraft carrier, nuclear
CVW carrier air wing
CWAR continuous wave acquisition radar
CWC composite warfare commander

DAADC deputy area air defense commander

DAL defended asset list
DAS direct air support

Glossary-3
DCA defensive counter air
DCN data link coordination network
DD navy destroyer
DDG guided missile destroyer
DII defense information infrastructure
DII COE defense information infrastructure common operating
environment
DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DISE Deployable Intelligence Support Element
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
DLRP data link reference point
DMA Defense Mapping Agency
DNC data network coordinator
DNMFL Dual Net Multi Frequency Link
DNVT digital nonsecure voice terminal
DS direct support; database specification
DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
DSP Defense Support Program
DSVT digital secure voice telephone
DTE detect-to-engage

E-2 military pay grade (enlisted)

E-5 military pay grade (enlisted)
E-7 military pay grade (enlisted)
EA electronic attack
EAC echelons above corps
EHF extremely high frequency
EMCAP electromagnetic compatibility analysis program
EMT expert missile tracker
EO engagement operations
EOB enemy order of battle
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
ES electronic surveillance
ET electronics technician
EW electronic warfare; early warning
EWS early warning station

FA formation assessment
FAAD forward area air defense
FAC (A) forward air controller (airborne)
FAX facisimile
FCR fire control radar
FDL forward area air defense data link
FEZ fighter engagement zone
FFG guided missile frigate

Glossary-4
FJUA forwarding JTIDS unit, TADIL J – TADIL A
FJUAB forwarding JTIDS unit, TADIL J – TADIL A/B
FJUB forwarding JTIDS unit, TADIL J – TADIL B
FLIR forward-looking infrared
FM field manual
FO force operations
FOB forward operations base; friendly order of battle
FPU forwarding participating unit
FRU forwarding reporting unit
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element

G/A ground to air

G-1 Army or Marine Corps component manpower or personnel staff
officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or
higher staff)
G-2 Army or Marine Corps component intelligence staff
officer (Army division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or
higher staff)
G-3 Army or Marine Corps component operations staff officer (Army
division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff))
G-4 Army or Marine Corps component logistics staff officer (Army
division or higher staff, Marine Corps brigade or higher staff))
GALE Generic Area Limitation Environment (USA)
GBDL ground-based data link
GBS Global Broadcast Service
GCCS Global Command and Control System
GCE ground combat element (MAGTF)
GCI ground control intercept
GCSS Global Combat Support System
GDN Ground Digital Network
GEM guidance enhanced missile
GMLS guided missile launching system
GRU grid reference unit
GS general support
GS-R general support reinforcing

HARM high-speed anti-radiation missile

HDR high data rate
HF high frequency
HIMAD high-to-medium altitude air defense
HIMEZ high-altitude missile engagement zone
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HQ headquarters
HS helicopter ASW squadron (USN)

Glossary-5
I

I&W indications and warning

IAD integrated air defense
IAW in accordance with
IAW in accordance with
IBS Integrated Broadcast Service
ICC information coordination center
ICO interface control officer
ID identification
IER Information Exchange Requirement
IFF identification, friend or foe
IJMS interim JTIDS message standard
IN Intel Network
inf infantry (USA)
INMARSAT a mobile satellite communications system (company name)
INS inertial navigation system
intel intelligence
IPAWS Interim Pager Alert Warning System (USA)
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IRST infrared search and tracking
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IST interswitch trunk
IT information systems technician
IU interface unit
IXS information exchange system

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff

J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staff
J-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
Directorate of a joint staff
JAC joint analysis center
JAOC joint air operations center
JBC joint command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance battle center
JCCC joint communications control center
JCIET Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team
JCTN joint composite tracking network
JDISS Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JDN joint data network
JERT Joint Link Engineering Response Team
JEZ joint engagement zone
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JIADS joint integrated air defense system
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
JICC-D joint interface control cell-deployable

Glossary-6
JICO joint interface control officer
JICU joint interface control unit
JLENS Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System
JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMTOP joint multi-TADIL operating procedures
JMTS joint multi-TADIL school
JNL JTIDS network library
JOA joint operations area
JOC Joint Operations Center
JPN joint planning network
JSIPS Joint Services Imagery Processing System
JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar system
JSWS Joint Services Work Station
JTAGS joint tactical ground station
JTAMD joint theater air and missile defense
JTAMDO Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
JTDC joint track data coordinator
JTF joint task force
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JTMD joint theater missile defense
JTOC joint tactical operations center
JU JTIDS unit
JVMFGW Joint Variable Message Format Gateway
JWARN joint warning
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

km kilometers
kHz kilohertz

LAAD low-altitude air defense

LAN local area network
LAV (AD) light armored vehicle (air defense)
LCC amphibious command ship
LDR low data rate
LHA general purpose amphibious assault ship
LHD general purpose amphibious assault ship (with internal dock)
LNO liaison officer
LOMEZ low-altitude missile engagement zone
LOS line of sight

m meter
MACCS Marine Air Command and Control System
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MAJIC Multi-TADIL Advanced Joint Interoperability Course

Glossary-7
maint maintenance
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense System
MARFOR Marine Corps forces
MATCD Marine air traffic control detachment
MAWTS 1 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One
MCAS Marine Corps Air Station
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCE modular control equipment
MCPDS Marine Corps Publication Distribution System
MCRP Marine Corps Reference Publication
MCS maneuvers control system
MCS/P Maneuver Control System/Phoenix (USA)
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MDR medium data rate
MDU mission data update
MEF Marine expeditionary force
METOC meteorological and oceanographic
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available
MEU Marine expeditionary unit; mission essential units (USN)
MEZ missile engagement zone
MIL-STD Military Standard
MILSTRIP military standard requisitioning and issue procedure
mm millimeter
MMT master message terminal
MNF Multinational Force
MOS military occupation specialty
MRR minimum risk route
MSCS multi-source correlation system (USMC)
MSE multiple subscriber equipment
MSI multi-spectral imagery
MSNBC Microsoft National Broadcasting Corporation
MSTS Multiple Source Tactical System (USA)
MTA Multi-TADIL Architecture
MTACC Marine Tactical Air Command Center
MTC multi-TADIL coordinator
MTI moving target indicator
MWCS Marine wing communications squadron

N/A not applicable

NAF numbered air forces
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVMACS Naval modular automated communication system
NAVSOP Navy standing operating procedures
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NC Navigation Controller (JTIDS)
NCS net control station
NCTR non-cooperative target recognition

Glossary-8
NCTSI Naval Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability
NDF network design facility
NDP national disclosure policy
NDSM Network Design and System Management
NEC naval enlisted classification
NECOS net control station
NILE NATO Improved Link Eleven
NIPRNET Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network
NM nautical mile
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSSMS NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System
NSWC PHD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division
NTDC nontactical data collection
NTDS naval tactical data system
NTR network time reference
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command
NWP naval warfare publication

O-3 military pay garde (officer)

O-4 military pay grade (officer)
O-5 military pay grade (officer)
OAAW offensive antiair warfare
OAS offensive air support
OB order of battle
OCA offensive counterair
OIC officer in charge
OM operations module
OPCON operational control
OPFAC operational facility
OPLAN operation plan
OPR office of primary responsibility
ops operations
OPSEC operational security
OPTASK link operational tasking data link
OPTASK operational task
OS operations specialists
OTC officer in tactical command
OTCIXS officer in tactical command information exchange system
OTH over the horizon

PAC-2 Patriot Advanced Capability-2

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3
PADIL Patriot digital information link
PFU Patriot firing unit
PGM precision-guided munition
PPDL point-to-point data link

Glossary-9
PPLI precise position location information
PR position references
pri primary
PTL primary target line
PU participating unit
pub publication

QOL quality of life

R reinforcing
RADC regional air defense commander
RAM rolling airframe (USN)
RCU remote control unit
RCV receive
RICO regional interface control officer
ROE rules of engagement
RSR remote sensor relay
RTF return to force
RTU remote terminal unit
RU reporting unit

S3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine

Corps battalion or regiment)
S/G/N-3 tactical level operations directorate
SAAWC sector antiair warfare coordinator (USMC)
SAAWF sector antiair warfare facility
SADC sector air defense commander
SADO sector air defense officer
SALTS Streamlined Automated Logistics Transfer System
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SATCOM satellite communication
SCC system coordinate center (USA); sea combat commander (USN)
SCDL surveillance and control data link
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SECTEL secure telephone
SES ship-based electronic system
SHF super high frequency
SHORAD short-range air defense
SHORADEZ short-range air defense engagement zone
SIAP single integrated air picture
SICO sector interface control officer
SIF selective identification feature
SINCGARS Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

Glossary-10
SLAM stand-off land attack missile
SM surface missile
SME subject matter expert
SOC sector operations center
SOP standard operating procedure
SPINS special instructions
SROE standing rules of engagement
SSS system subsystem specification
STU-III secure telephone unit III
STWC strike warfare commander (USN)
SUWC surface warfare commander (USN)

TAAMDCOORD Theater Army air and missile defense coordinator

TAC (A) tactical air coordinator (airborne)
TACC tactical air command center (USMC); tactical air control
center (USN)
TACDR tactical detection and reporting (USA)
TACINTEL tactical intelligence
TACON tactical control
TACOPDAT tactical operational data (USMTF)
TACS tactical air control system; Theater Air Control System
TADC tactical air direction center
TADIL tactical digital information link
TADIXS tactical data information exchange system
TAMD theater air and missile defense
TAAMDCOORD Theater Army Air and Missile Defense Coordinator
TAOC tactical air operations center
TASM tactical air to surface missile
TATC tactical air traffic control
TBM theater ballistic missile
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System
TCS target control system; television camera system
TDAR tactical defense alert radar
TDDS TRAP Data Dissemination System
TDS tactical data systems
tech technician
TESS tactical environmental support system
TF task force (USN)
TFCC Tactical Flag Command Center
TG task group (USN)
THAAD theater high-altitude area defense
TIBS tactical information broadcast service
TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile
TM theater missile
TMD theater missile defense
TOC tactical operations center
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRITAC tri-service tactical communications

Glossary-11
TSN track supervision network
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TV television

UAADASCH US Army Air Defense School

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF ultra high frequency
ULLS unit level logistics system
US United States
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USFORSCOM United States Forces Command
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USMTF United States message text format
USN United States Navy
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM United States Space Command
USWC undersea warfare commander (USN)

VAQ tactical EW squadron (USN)

VAW carrier airborne early warning squadron (USN)
VF fighter squadron (USN)
VFA strike fighter squadron (USN)
VHF very high frequency
VLS vertical launch system
VMF variable message format
VPN voice product net
VS sea control squadron (USN)
VTC video teleconferencing
VTT video target trainer

W/S work station

WAN wide-area network
WCS weapons control status
WEZ weapon engagement zone
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WOTS Worldwide Origin Threat System
WPN weapon(s)

2-D two dimensional

3-D three dimensional
4J army enlisted military occupation skill (MOS)

Glossary-12
 Index
A Aegis viii, II-11, II-12, II-14, IV-2, IV-4,
A2C2 III-9, References-1, Glossary-1
AADC i, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6,
II-8, II-9, II-10, II-11, II-14, II-15, II-16,
III-9, III-10, III-11, III-13, III-14, IV-1,
IV-2, IV-3, IV-4, IV-6, V-3, V-5, V-6,
VI-9, VI-10, A-1, B-4, B-5, Glossary-1,
Glossary-3
AAMDC vi, viii, II-1, II-11, III-1, III-2,
III-3, III-4, III-6, III-8, III-9, III-10, B-4,
B-5, Glossary-1
AAMDP II-5, II-6, II-8, II-11, II-15,
Glossary-1
AAW II-1, VI-1, VI-2, VI-3, VI-5, VI-8,
VI-9, References-1, Glossary-1,
Glossary-9, Glossary-10
ABCCC V-3, V-5, Glossary-1
ABIS III-3, Glossary-1
ABMOC III-11, Glossary-1
ABT II-7, A-2, Glossary-1
ACA II-1, II-2, II-3, III-10, III-11, III-13,
IV-6, V-3, V-5, V-6, VI-3, A-1,
Glossary-1
ACE VI-1, VI-2, VI-3, VI-5, VI-6, VI-8,
VI-9, VI-10, Glossary-1
ACI VI-2, Glossary-1
ACP II-3, II-8, II-15, VI-5, Glossary-1
Acquisition III-7, III-13, VI-4, Glossary-3
ACR III-1, Glossary-1
ADA battalions III-1
ADA brigades III-1, III-2, III-9
ADAFCO III-10, Glossary-1
ADC i, II-1, II-15, III-9, IV-1, IV-2, IV-3,
IV-4, Glossary-1, Glossary-3,
Glossary-10
ADL II-9, Glossary-1
ADOCS III-3, III-4, Glossary-1
ADSI III-3, III-4, III-6, Glossary-1
ADW II-15, II-16, III-12, VI-3, VI-9,
Glossary-1
ADW conditions II-15
ADW red II-16
ADW white II-16
ADW yellow II-16
IV-5, IV-6, IV-9, IV-10, B-5, Glossary-1,
Glossary-2
AFATDS III-3, III-4, Glossary-1
Air and missile defense planning and
control system (see AMDPCS)
Air and Missile Defense Task Force (see
AMDTF)
Air and Missile Defense Workstation
(see AMDWS)
Air and Space Planning and Execution
Process V-2, V-6
Air battle management center (see
ABMOC)
Air Breathing Threat (see ABT)
Air Combat Intelligence (see ACI)
Air Coordinators/Air Controllers VI-5
air defense artillery battalions (see ADA
battalions)
air defense artillery brigades (see ADA
brigades)
Air defense artillery fire coordination
officer (see ADAFCO)
Air defense commander (see ADC)
Air Defense Picket Station IV-9
Air Defense Systems Integrator (see
ADSI)
Air defense warning conditions (see
ADW conditons)
Air defense warning red (see ADW red)
Air defense warning white(see ADW
white)
Air defense warning yellow (see ADW
yellow)
Air defense warning (see ADW)
Air Force TACS V-I
Air Force Theater Air Control System
(see Air Force TACS)
Air Mobility Division V-2
Air operations center (see AOC)
Air operations center director (see AOC
director)
Air Space Control Procedures II-14
Air tasking order (see ATO)
Airborne battlefield command and
control center (see ABCCC)
Index-1
Airborne Broadcast Intelligence System
(see ABIS)
Airborne Warning and Control System
(see AWACS)
Air-Breathing Target Mode VI-4
Aircraft carrier (see CV)
Aircraft carrier, nuclear (see CVN)
Airspace control authority (see ACA)
Airspace control plan (see ACP)
All Service Combat Identification
Evaluation Team (see ASCIET)
All Source Analysis System (see ASAS)
AMDPCS vi, III-2, III-3, III-4, Glossary-2
AMDTF III-8, Glossary-2
AMDWS II-5, III-3, III-4, III-4,
Glossary-2
amphibious command ship (see LCC)
AN/MPQ-62 VI-4
AN/TER-170 V-4
AN/TPS-63 VI-4
AN/TPS-75 Radar V-4
AN/TRC-170 V-4
AN/TSC-100A V-4
AN/TSC-147 V-4
AN/TSQ-146 V-4
AN/TTC-42 V-4
AN/UPS-3 VI-5
ANG III-1, Glossary-2
Antiair warfare (see AAW)
AO vii, I-1, II-2, II-3, III-1, III-9, III-11,
V-7, VI-9, B-1, B-3, Glossary-2
AOC II-10, II-11, II-13, III-13, IV-6, V-1,
V-2, V-3, V-4, V-5, V-6, B-5,
References-1, Glossary-2, Glossary-6,
Glossary-11
AOC director V-2
AOR I-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-12, V-2, V-3,
V-4, V-7, B-8, Glossary-2
Area Air and Missile Defense Plan (see
AAMDP)
Area air defense commander (see AADC)
Area of operations (see AO)
Area of responsibility (see AOR)
ARFOR viii, III-1, III-9-III-10, III-13,
III-14, B-4, Glossary-2
Armored cavalry regiments (see ACR)
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
(see AAMDC)
Army airspace command and control (see
A2C2)
Index-2
Army Field Artillery Tactical Data
System (see AFATDS)
Army forces (see ARFOR)
Army National Guard (see ANG)
Army tactical data link 1 (see ATDL-1)
ASAS III-3, III-4, Glossary-2
ASCIET viii, II-14, References-1,
Glossary-2
ATDL-1 II-11, III-6, V-3, Glossary-2
ATO II-11, III-12, IV-8, V-2, V-5, V-6,
VI-2, VI-5, VI-9, VI-10, Glossary-2
Automated Deep Operations
Coordination System (see ADOCS)
Automatic data links (see ADL)
Avenger III-2, III-7, III-14, VI-5,
References-1
Aviation combat element (see ACE)
AWACS II-4, II-11, II-12, II-13, III-10,
V-3, V-4, Glossary-2
B
Base defense zone (see BDZ)
Battlefield control detachment (see
BCD)
BCD III-9, III-13, Glossary-2
BDZ VI-4, VI-9, Glossary-2
Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (see
BSFV)
BSFV III-2, III-7, III-14, References-1,
Glossary-2
C
C-130 Senior Scout II-12
C2 architecture III-4, V-3, A-1
C2WC IV-2, Glossary-2
Carrier airborne early warning squadron
(see VAW)
Carrier battle group (see CVBG)
CATF VI-2, Glossary-3
CCD III-3, Glossary-3
CEC IV-4, Glossary-3
Central Communications Display (see
CCD)
CG viii, IV-5, IV-10, Glossary-3
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (see CJCSI)
CIDC II-13, Glossary-3
CIDS II-11, II-12, II-13, Glossary-3
CJCSI II-6, A-1, References-1,
Glossary-3
Classification and ID I-2, III-13
Classification and identification (see
Classification and ID)
CLF VI-2, Glossary-3
Combat Identification Coordinator (see
CIDC)
Combat identification systems (see
CIDS)
Combat Operations Division V-2, V-6
Combat Plans Division V-2
Combat service support element (see
CSSE)
Combined Mode VI-4
command and control architecture (see
C2 architecture)
Command and control warfare
commander (see C2WC)
Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer Systems Directorate of a
joint staff (see J-6)
Commander, amphibious task force (see
CATF)
Commander, landing force (see CLF)
Commanders Tactical Terminal-3 (see
CTT-3)
Common operational picture (see COP)
Common tactical picture (see CTP)
Communications architecture iv, II-9,
II-10
Compass Call V-5
Component commanders II-1, II-2, II-3,
II-4, II-5, II-6, II-8, II-16, V-6, B-1
Composite warfare commander (see
CWC)
Concept of operations (see CONOPS)
CONOPS i, II-5, III-9, Glossary-3
Contingency Theater Automated
Planning System (see CTAPS)
Control and Reporting Center (see CRC)
Cooperative engagement capability (see
CEC)
COP B-4, Glossary-3
Core Teams V-2
CRC vi, II-13, II-14, III-10, III-11, III-13,
IV-4, V-3, V-4, V-5, B-5, B-8, Glossary-3
CSSE VI-1, VI-8, Glossary-3
CTAPS II-5, III-3, IV-6, Glossary-3
CTP II-3, IV-4, B-7, B-8, Glossary-3
CTT-3 III-3, III-4, Glossary-3
CV IV-5, IV-6, IV-9, B-5, Glossary-3
CVBG IV-3, IV-9, B-5, Glossary-3
CVN IV-5, IV-6, IV-8, IV-9, IV-10,
Glossary-3
CWC IV-1, IV-2, IV-3, IV-10,
References-1, Glossary-3
D
DAL II-4, II-5, II-6, II-8, IV-1, IV-3, A-2,
Glossary-3
DCA II-13, II-14, III-9, III-10, IV-9, V-3,
V-4, VI-4, Glossary-4
DD IV-4, IV-5, Glossary-4
DDG IV-5, IV-10, Glossary-4
Defended asset list (see DAL)
Defensive counter air (see DCA)
Detect-to-engage (see DTE)
Detect-to-engage sequence (see DTE
sequence)
Direct support II-1, IV-10, B-9,
Glossary-4
Disclosure of critical air defense
information A-1
Division main command post (see
Division main CP)
Division main CP III-9
DNMFL IV-4, IV-5, Glossary-4
DTE III-13, IV-10, Glossary-4
DTE sequence III-13
Dual Net Multi Frequency Link (see
DNMFL)
E
E-2 HAWKEYE II-4
E-2C II-12-II-13, IV-8-IV-9
E-2C Hawkeye II-12
E-3 II-4, II-12-II-13, IV-10, V-5
E-3 Airborne Warning and Control
System (see E-3 AWACS)
E-3 Airborne Warning and Control
System (Block 30/35) (see E-3 AWACS
(Block 30/35)
E-3 AWACS II-4, II-12, II-13
E-3 AWACS (Block 30/35) II-12
EA-6B IV-8
EHF IV-5, Glossary-4
Engagement and destruction III-13
Index-3
Engagement operations (see EO)
EO II-14, III-2, III-4, Glossary-4
EP-3 II-12
EP-3 Aries II II-12
Extremely high frequency (see EHF)
F Guided missile frigate (see FFG)
F-15C II-11, V-5
F-15E V-5
F-16ADF V-5
F-16C V-5
F-16CJ V-5
FA II-11, II-12, II-13, Glossary-4
FAAD II-10, II-11, III-2, III-4, III-7,
Glossary-4
FAAD command III-2
FEZ II-15, IV-4, IV-10, Glossary-4
FFG IV-4, IV-5, IV-10, Glossary-4
Fighter engagement zone (see FEZ)
Fire support coordinator (see
FSCOORD)
Fire support element (see FSE)
FO I-2, III-2, III-4, xxxGlossary-5
Force operations (see FO)
Formation Assessment (see FA)
Forward area air defense (see FAAD)
Forward area air defense command (see
FAAD command)
FSCOORD III-9, III-10, Glossary-5
FSE III-9, Glossary-5
G
GALE III-3, Glossary-5
GBS IV-5, Glossary-5
GCCS II-5, II-10, III-3, IV-5, Glossary-5
GCE VI-1, VI-8, Glossary-5
GCSS III-3, III-4, Glossary-5
General purpose amphibious assault
ship (see LHA)
General purpose amphibious assault
ship (with internal dock) (see LHD)
General support III-11, Glossary-5
General support-reinforcing (see GS-R)
Generic Area Limitation Environment
(see GALE)
Global broadcast system (see GBS)
Global Combat Support System (see
GCSS)
Index-4
Global Command and Control System
(see GCCS)
Ground combat element (see GCE)
GS-R III-11, Glossary-5
Guided missile cruiser (see CG)
Guided missile destroyer (see DDG)
H
High-altitude missile engagement zone
(see HIMEZ)
HIMEZ II-15, Glossary-5
I
I&W II-6, A-2, Glossary-6
ID Considerations II-11
ID Criteria II-11, II-12, II-13, IV-4
Identification Considerations (see ID
Considerations)
Identification Criteria (see ID Criteria)
identification, friend or foe Modes (see
IFF Modes)
IFF Modes II-11, II-13
Indications and warning (see I&W)
Intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (see IPB)
Interim Pager Alert Warning System
(see IPAWS)
IPAWS III-3, Glossary-6
IPB II-5, II-6, II-7, Glossary-6
J
J-3 II-5, II-6, B-3, B-8, Glossary-6
J-6 II-9, B-8, Glossary-6
JAOC vi, II-10, V-2, V-3, V-4, VI-10,
Glossary-6
JCTN B-4, Glossary-6
JDISS III-3, Glossary-6
JDN II-3, B-1, B-4, B-7, B-8, B-9,
Glossary-6
JEZ II-14, II-15, IV-4, IV-10, Glossary-6
JFACC II-1, II-9, III-13, IV-6, IV-10, V-2,
V-3, V-4, V-5, V-6, B-1, Glossary-6
JFC i, I-1, I-2, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5,
II-6, II-8, II-9, II-11, II-14, III-10, III-11,
IV-3, IV-4, IV-6, IV-9, V-3, V-5, V-6, V-7,
A-1, B-7, B-8, Glossary-6
JFLCC III-13, Glossary-6
JIC II-5, B-8, Glossary-6
JICO v, vi, vii, II-3, II-9, IV-6, B-1, B-2,
B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9,
References-1, Glossary-7
JMTOP II-6, B-1, B-3, B-8, Glossary-6
JOA I-1, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-9, V-1, V-2, V-7,
A-2, Glossary-7
Joint air operations center (see JAOC)
Joint composite tracking network (see
JCTN)
Joint data network (see JDN)
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support
System (see JDISS)
Joint engagement zone (see JEZ)
Joint force air component commander
(see JFACC)
Joint force commander (see JFC)
Joint force land component commander
(see JFLCC)
Joint Intelligence Center (see JIC)
Joint Interface Control Officer (see
JICO)
Joint multi-TADIL operating
procedures (see JMTOP)
Joint operations area (see JOA)
Joint planning network (see JPN)
Joint Pub 3-01 II-1, References-1
Joint Publication 3-01 (see Joint Pub
3-01)
Joint Services Work Station (see JSWS)
joint surveillance, target attack radar
system (see JSTARS)
joint tactical ground station (see JTAGS)
Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (see JTIDS)
Joint Warning (see JWARN)
JPN B-4, Glossary-7
JSTARS II-11, V-3, V-5, Glossary-3,
Glossary-7
JSWS III-3, Glossary-7
JTAGS II-11, III-4, Glossary-7
JTIDS II-11, II-12, III-3, B-5, B-9,
Glossary-4, Glossary-5, Glossary-6,
Glossary-7, Glossary-8
JWARN III-3, III-4, Glossary-7
K MEZ II-15, IV-4, IV-10, Glossary-5,
KC-10 IV-9, V-5
KC-135 IV-9, V-5
L
LAAD II-11, III-7, VI-4, VI-5, VI-9,
References-1, Glossary-7
LAAD battalion VI-4, VI-5
LCC IV-5, IV-6, IV-10, B-5, Glossary-7
LHA II-10, IV-5, IV-6, IV-9, IV-10,
Glossary-7
LHD IV-5, IV-6, IV-9, IV-10,Glossary-7
Liaison officer (see LNO)
Linebacker, III-2, III-7, III-14
LNO II-3, A-2, B8, Glossary-7
LOMEZ II-15, Glossary-7
Low-altitude air defense (see LAAD)
Low-altitude air defense battalion (see
LAAD battalion)
Low-altitude missile engagement zone
(see LOMEZ)
M
MAGTF vi, VI-1, VI-2, VI-3, VI-4, VI-5,
VI-6, VI-7, VI-8, VI-9, VI-10,
References-1, Glossary-7
MANPADS III-2, III-14, Glossary-7
Man-Portable Air Defense System (see
MANPADS)
Marine Air Traffic Control Detachment
(see MATCD)
Marine air-ground task force (see
MAGTF)
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics
Squadron One (see MAWTS 1)
Marine expeditionary force (see MEF)
Marine expeditionary unit (see MEU)
Marine SAAWC II-1, VI-3
Marine sector anti-air warfare
coordinator (see Marine SAAWC)
Marine Wing Communications Squadron
(see MWCS)
MATCD VI-4, VI-9, References-1,
Glossary-7
MAWTS 1 VI-7, Glossary-7
MEF VI-1, VI-2, Glossary-8
MEU IV-6, IV-9, IV-10, VI-1, Glossary-8
Glossary-7, Glossary-8
Missile engagement zone (see MEZ)
Index-5
MNF A-1, A-2, Glossary-8
MNF commander A-1, A-2
Multinational force (see MNF)
Multinational force commander (see
MNF commander)
Multi-tactical digital information
link (see Multi-TADIL)
Multi-TADIL v, II-3, II-6, II-10, B-1, B-2,
B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9,
References-1, Glossary-6, Glossary-7,
Glossary-8
Multi-tactical digital information
link network (see Multi-TADIL
network)
Multi-TADIL network II-3, B-1, B-2, B-3,
B-4, B-5, B-7, B-8, B-9
MWCS VI-5, Glossary-8
N REDCROWN/GREENCROWN IV-9
National disclosure policy (see NDP)
Naval Air Asset Allocation IV-6
Navy ADC II-1
Navy air defense commander (see Navy
ADC)
Navy Air Defense Precepts IV-3
Navy destroyer (see DD)
NDP A-1, Glossary-8
NIPRNET IV-5, Glossary-9
O Glossary-10, Glossary-11
Officer in tactical command (see OTC)
OM V-4, Glossary-9
OPCON II-1, III-10, III-11, IV-2, V-4, A-2,
Glossary-9
Operation DESERT STORM I-1
Operation plan (see OPLAN)
Operational control (see OPCON)
Operational tasking data links (see
OPTASKLINK)
Operations Directorate of a joint staff
(see J-3)
Operations Module (see OM)
OPLAN i, II-5, II-9, Glossary-9
OPTASKLINK II-5, II-9, B1, B3, B8,
Glossary-9
OTC IV-1, Glossary-9
Index-6
P
Passive defense A-2
Patriot II-5, II-10, II-11, II-13, III-1, III-2,
III-5, III-7, III-8, III-11, III-14, IV-4, V-3,
A-1, References-1, Glossary-9
Patriot PAC-3 III-8
Primary target line (see PTL)
PSC-7 SATCOM radio III-3, III-4
PSC-7 satellite communication radio (see
PSC-7 SATCOM radio)
PTL II-7, Glossary-9
R
R III-11, Glossary-10
RADC/SADC II-3, III-11, IV-3, VI-3
RC-135 Rivet Joint II-12
Regional/sector area defense
commander (see RADC/SADC)
Regional/sector interface control officer
(see RICO/SICO)
Reinforcing (see R)
Return to force (see RTF)
RICO/SICO II-3, B-5, B-6
Rivet Joint II-12, V-3, V-5
ROE iv, II-6, II-8, II-10, II-11, II-13,
III-10, III-11, III-13, III-14, IV-3, V-3,
V-4, VI-6, A-1, A-2, References-1,
RTF II-15, IV-3, VI-6, Glossary-10
Rules of engagement (see ROE)
S
S-3B IV-9
SAAWC II-1, II-14, VI-2, VI-3, VI-5, VI-6,
VI-9, VI-10, References-1, Glossary-10
SADO II-4, Glossary-10
SCC IV-2, Glossary-10
Sea Combat Commander (see SCC)
SECRET Internet Protocol Router
Network (see SIPRNET)
Sector air defense officer (see SADO)
Sector anti-air warfare coordinator (see
SAAWC)
Senior Scout II-11, II-12, V-5
Sentinel Radar III-2
SHF IV-5, Glossary-10
SHORAD II-4, II-11, II-15, III-1, III-2,
III-4, III-5, III-7, III-11, III-13, III-14,
Glossary-10
Short-range air defense (see SHORAD)
SIPRNET IV-5, Glossary-10
SROE II-11, A-1, References-1,
Glossary-11
Standing rules of engagement (see
SROE)
STINGER III-2, III-7, III-14, VI-5,
References-1, Glossary-2
Strategy Division, V-2
Strike fighter squadron (see VFA)
Strike warfare commander (see STWC)
STWC IV-2, IV-8, Glossary-11
Subordinate Warfare Commanders IV-1,
IV-2, IV-3
Super high frequency (see SHF)
Surface warfare commander (see SUWC)
SUWC IV-2, Glossary-11
T Task group (see TG)
TAAMDCOORD III-9, III-10, III-13,
Glossary-11
TACC III-13, VI-1, VI-2, VI-3, VI-6, VI-9,
VI-10, B-4, B-5, References-1,
Glossary-8, Glossary-11
TACON II-1, II-9, III-10, III-11, IV-2,
IV-3, V-4, A-2, B-1, Glossary-11
TACOPDAT II-5, Glossary-11
TACS vi, V-1, V-3, References-1,
Glossary-11
Tactical Air Command Center (see
TACC)
Tactical Air Direction Center (see
TADC)
Tactical air operations center (see
TAOC)
Tactical control (see TACON)
Tactical data system (see TDS)
Tactical defense alert radar (see TDAR)
Tactical digital information link (see
TADIL)
tactical digital information link-A (see
TADIL-A)
Tactical digital information link-A/B/C/J
(see TADIL-A/B/C/J)
Tactical digital information link-J (see
TADIL-J)
Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron
(see VAQ)
Tactical operational data (see
TACOPDAT)
Tactical operations center (see TOC)
Tactical warning II-6
TADC VI-2, Glossary-11
TADIL vi, II-3, II-6, II-8, II-9, II-10, III-5,
III-6, IV-4, IV-5, IV-10, V-3, B1, B4, B8,
Glossary-4, Glossary-5, Glossary-11
TADIL-A II-6, II-10, II-11, II-12, III-5,
III-6, IV-4, V-3
TADIL-A/B/C/J V-3
TADIL-J II-10, II-11, II-12, III-5, III-6,
IV-4, References-2
TAOC II-11, II-13, IV-4, VI-3, VI-4, VI-6,
VI-9, VI-10, B-4, B-5, B-8, References-1,
Glossary-11
Task force (see TF)
Task group air defense (see TG air
defense)
TBM II-7, III-11, III-13, IV-4, IV-9, VI-4,
A-2, Glossary-11
TBM Mode VI-4
TBMCS II-5, Glossary-11
TDAR VI-5, Glossary-11
TDS IV-4, Glossary-1, Glossary-9,
Glossary-11
TF i, vii, II-2, II-4, III-1, III-8, IV-1, IV-3,
IV-4, VI-1, VI-2, References-2,
Glossary-2, Glossary-3, Glossary-7,
Glossary-11 IV-3-IV-4, xxxGlossary-11
TG IV-1, IV-3, Glossary-11
TG air defense IV-3
THAAD III-1, III-5, III-8, III-14,
Glossary-11
Theater Air Control System (see TACS)
Theater Army Air and Missile Defense
Coordinator (see TAAMDCOORD)
Theater ballistic missile (see TBM)
Theater Ballistic Missile Mode (see TBM
Mode
Theater Battle Management Core
Systems (see TBMCS)
Index-7
Theater high altitude area defense (see
THAAD)
Theater operation plan i, II-5
TLAM IV-2, Glossary-11
TOC vi, III-2, III-3, Glossary-1,
Glossary-7, Glossary-11
Tomahawk land-attack missile (see
TLAM)
U Weapon and Sensor System Allocation
UHF II-6, III-5, IV-5, Glossary-12
ultra high frequency (see UHF)
Unclassified but Sensitive Internet
Protocol Router Network (see
NIPRNET)
Undersea warfare commander (see
USWC)
USWC IV-1, IV-2, Glossary-12
V WOTS)
VAQ IV-8, Glossary-12
Index-8
VAW IV-8, Glossary-12
VFA IV-8, Glossary-12
Voice communications II-10, II-14, III-14,
B-2
W
WCS II-5, II-6, II-15, III-11, III-12, VI-6,
VI-9, Glossary-12
II-9
Weapons control status (see WCS)
Weapons engagement zone (see WEZ)
Weapons free II-15
Weapons hold II-15
Weapons of mass destruction (see WMD)
Weapons tight II-15
WEZ II-15, Glossary-12
WMD I-1, Glossary-12
Worldwide Origin Threat System (see
WOTS III-3, III-4, Glossary-12
 FM 3-1.15
MCRP 3.25E
NTTP 3-01.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.31
8 June 2001

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
Official: General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0119103

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance with
the initial distribution number (IDN) 115850 requirements for FM 3-01.15

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force:

LANCE L. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Air Force Distribution: F

PIN: 079137-000