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Evidence AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents. [G.R. No. 140079. March 31, 2005] Facts: Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutors office of Pasay City recommended that petitioner Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan under the following facts: x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at the NAIA from Saipan. While waiting for her turn at the arrival immigration counter, her passport was examined by Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga. Noting that Ms. Weng, a Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport, Ms. Pajarillaga suspected that the formers passport was fake. Ms. Weng was taken out of the queue and brought to Respondent who was the duty intelligence officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak in Chinese, asked respondent by sign language that she wanted to meet a friend who was waiting at the NAIA arrival area. Respondent approved the request and accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival area. Thereafter, Respondent, with Ms. Weng and her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration area. While inside the office of Respondent, Ms. Weng asked that her passport be returned. Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of Respondent. The money was grabbed by Respondent. Shortly, her passport was returned ans [sic] she was allowed to leave. When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against Respondent. On July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued the decision finding Augusto R. Samalio guilty of the charges and was ordered dismissed from service. In the 1st Indorsement dated August 30, 1996, former Justice Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of dismissal from service of Augusto R. Samalio. Soon after, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 1997. Guingonas decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission which issued Resolution No. 974501 dated November 26, 1997 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the decisions of Acting Commissioner Liwag and Secretary

Guingona. Similarly, the attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in Civil Service Resolution No. 981925. In the meantime, on June 13, 1994, during the pendency of the instant administrative case, Augusto R. Samalio was convicted (in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679) of the crime of Robbery, as defined in Articles 293 and 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of Arresto Mayor to Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Prision Correccional and to indemnify complainant Weng Sai Qin the amount of US $500.00 and to pay the costs. Samalio did not appeal the conviction and instead applied for and was granted probation by the Sandiganbayan for two (2) years in an Order dated December 12, 1994. In support of his contention that he was deprived of due process in the CSC case, petitioner alleges that no witness or evidence was presented against him, that the CA erred in the interpretation of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that there was no hearing conducted on his case. Issue: WON the testimony in a certain case can be admitted as evidence in another similar case. Held: Yes. The decision was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against petitioner before the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, as well as Resolution No. 093-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the same office recommending the prosecution of petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery and violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 and the fact of petitioners conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to support the decision of the CSC. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on former testimony, in deciding petitioners administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and

valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication of cases before it. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6, 1993, or even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000 Second Division

MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese National born in Amoy, China on January 1, 1923. On 1932, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in sec. 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in sec. 3 of the law. On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former place of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, sec. 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of sec. 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of sec. 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.The state also annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. The petitioner contends that no marriage had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because Petitioner and his wife had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This according to the State, belies him of the claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married. The petitioner also failed to

disclose in his petition that he formerly resided in J.M. Basa St., Iloilo and Alimodian, Iloilo. On 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and denied the petitioners claim for naturalization.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the formal offer of evidence is necessary for the petition for naturalization. 2. Whether the evidence not formally offered should not be admissible.

RULING: 1. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that These Rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, Sec. 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is practicable and convenient. That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents. 2. Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner

failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent. GR. No. 153660, June 10, 2003 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the claims of the other complainant-employees were dismissed. Labor Arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the remaining complainants (petitioners herein). In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants. Thereafter, the NLRC also sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. However, Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals, although the CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship, but nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, et al. should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. Hence, this petition according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be crossexamined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Rules of Court should be strictly applied in giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of the affiants to undergo the test of crossexamination? RULING: NO. In the case of Rabago v. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for crossexamination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only." Moreover, in Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC, it held that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. Hence, to reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. In the case at bar, the submission by respondent, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

PEOPLE VS. GALLENO

FACTS: Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment finding him guilty of Statutroy Rape of Evelyn Garganera (5 years old), daughter of Rosita who had to leave for Manila to find work. The victim and her brother Eleazar were left under the custody of their uncle Emetario and aunt Penicola. Galleno (19 years old) who was courting Emetraio's eldest child Gina, came one afternoon to the house of Emetario while the latter was at work. The only persons left in the house were Evelyn and Eleazar. Galleno took advantage of this situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. Galleno tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. They arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. The following day, Dr. Orosco reported, upon examining Evelyn, that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument inserted into the vigina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and such is considered a blunt intrument. The spouses reported the crime and Galleno was apprehended in a house and was brought to the police station. Denial is presented as the defenses. Galleno testified that when he arrived at the Obligar residence , he was approached by Evelyn, who knew him. He cajoled her by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the house and got some bark or leaves of madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the testimonies of the 3 doctors be given weight and credence. (OPINION RULE) 2. Whether or not the testimony of Galleno is credible. RULING: 1.Yes. In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the

victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various

possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important

consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Verily, it is entirely probable that climax on the part of accused-

appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse bleeding of her vagina.

2. NO. The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his credibility. He failed to explain how his ring finger accidentally came in contact with the genitalia of Evelyn, while it was established by the prosecution that at that time Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate to the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch when she was in shorts. Evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness'

testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nor-existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law.

However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience. DEATH penalty affirmed.

PEOPLE vs.

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants. FACTS: On or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 oclock in the evening at Pamplona Coconut Plantation, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG murdered ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos. The prosecution presented three witnesses, one of which was Magno Gomez. Magno testified that the spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang attacking Alicia. However, during the preliminary examination, Magno declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that Santiago was hacked because Santiago attempted to save his wife.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of the murders

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF MAGNO IS CREDIBLE RULING: Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness account. The trial court believed that Magnos accusations against appellants are true, basing on the fact that Magno was able to testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack wound on Santiagos head and the stab wound on his abdomen. But the court failed to consider that at the preliminary examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked the same questions asked in court, but could not even recall where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No explanation was given how Magno was able to supply during the trial the precise location of Santiagos wounds 19 months after the incident.

Similarly, several portions of Magnos testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebiass house, called out to Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magnos actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from. Magnos claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances

PEOPLE vs.

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants. FACTS: On or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 oclock in the evening at Pamplona Coconut Plantation, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG murdered ALICIA CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos. The prosecution presented three witnesses, one of which was Magno Gomez. Magno testified that the spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang attacking Alicia. However, during the preliminary examination, Magno declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that Santiago was hacked because Santiago attempted to save his wife.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of the murders

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TESTIMONY OF MAGNO IS CREDIBLE RULING: Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost always incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court. Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations, with respect to a persons participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness account. The trial court believed that Magnos accusations against appellants are true, basing on the fact that Magno was able to testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack wound on Santiagos head and the stab wound on his abdomen. But the court failed to consider that at the preliminary examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked the same questions asked in court, but could not even recall where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No explanation was given how Magno was able to supply during the trial the precise location of Santiagos wounds 19 months after the incident. Similarly, several portions of Magnos testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebiass house, called out to Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magnos actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from. Magnos claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances

CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 142856-57. August 25, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO NEGOSA alias JOVIN, appellant.

Crime: Rape Nature of Action: Automatic Review from RTC

FACTS

On June 28, 1997, Gretchen Castao, 10 years old at that time, was raped by Roberto Negosa, common law husband of her mother, Cenilda Castao. Negosa warned

Gretchen not to tell her mother what he had done to her. Gretchen kept the harrowing experience to herself because she was afraid that her mother would side with the appellant if she found out what happened. Every now and then the appellant abused her sexually but she did not tell her mother about it.

On September 2, 1998, Gretchen decided to record her ordeal at the hands of the appellant in the pages of a notebook. She tore off the pages and hid them. She inserted her diary in a notebook and placed it with her things. On September 9, 1998, her auntie accidentally discovered Gretchens diary and confronted the young girl about said incidents, which the latter admitted to be true. Her auntie took her to a doctor to be examined; the doctors certificate of treatment/confinement dated September 14, 1998 had the impression: Sexual abuse child molestation and sexual intercourse.

Two Informations for Statutory Rape was filed with the RTC.

Negosa denied raping Gretchen; he interposed an alibi of being elsewhere with a friend and not seeing Gretchen on June 28, 1997. Cenilda testified for Negosa; the friends testimony was inconsistent with Negosas alibi. On March 2, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 918 and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death, and found him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 919

Negosa contends that the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim despite the long delay in reporting the incident of rape especially when there is no showing that the delay was due to threats on her life or due to the moral ascendancy of the accused over the complainant. He claims that said testimony does not have any probative weight and that it is inconsistent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the testimony of the victim should be given credence.

RULING

Yes.

It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade V, barely eleven years old when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an adult. Being subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological experience on the part of the young victim. In People v. Aquino, this Court held that the range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect information from rape victims. This Court has repeatedly ruled that "the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience -some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility." Some may choose to keep to themselves the harrowing and debilitating experience rather than suffer the embarrassment, humiliation and ostracization from relatives after divulging the terrible secret. In this case, the evidence on record shows that the victim was the secretive and silent type, who chose not to confide in her relatives. The appellants assertion that he never threatened nor intimidated the victim and, as such, is not criminally liable for statutory rape, is unbelievable. First. Gretchen testified that she was afraid to resist or to shout because on prior occasions, the appellant intimidated her by stepping on her feet. Second. In her diary, Gretchen wrote that the appellant warned her not to tell her mother that he had raped her. This Court ruled that it is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life.

Furthermore, the fact that Gretchen started making entries in her diary only on September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred (June 28, 1997), does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries. Third. Even assuming that the appellant did not threaten nor intimidate the victim, this, and the fact that the latter agreed to live with her mother and her abuser, are purely inconsequential matters. This does not affect the veracity of the victims testimony. The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony that on September 4, 1998, the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of the victims loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant on June 28, 1997. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the

corroborative evidence in the case.[39] In this case, the trial court believed Gretchens testimony that the appellant inserted his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of her loose shorts, but disbelieved that part of her testimony that a small part of his penis was able to penetrate her vagina.[40] There is no evidence that Gretchen intended to pervert the truth as to the extent of the sexual abuse done to her on September 4, 1998. Neither can it be claimed that she prevaricated when she testified that the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. The appellant is guilty only of simple statutory rape for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. 918 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Roberto Negosa alias Jovin is found guilty of statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The appellant is directed to pay the victim Gretchen Castao the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. 142856-57. August 25, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO NEGOSA alias JOVIN, appellant.

Crime: Rape Nature of Action: Automatic Review from RTC

FACTS

On June 28, 1997, Gretchen Castao, 10 years old at that time, was raped by Roberto Negosa, common law husband of her mother, Cenilda Castao. Negosa warned

Gretchen not to tell her mother what he had done to her. Gretchen kept the harrowing experience to herself because she was afraid that her mother would side with the appellant if she found out what happened. Every now and then the appellant abused her sexually but she did not tell her mother about it.

On September 2, 1998, Gretchen decided to record her ordeal at the hands of the appellant in the pages of a notebook. She tore off the pages and hid them. She inserted her diary in a notebook and placed it with her things. On September 9, 1998, her auntie accidentally discovered Gretchens diary and confronted the young girl about said incidents, which the latter admitted to be true. Her auntie took her to a doctor to be examined; the doctors certificate of treatment/confinement dated September 14, 1998 had the impression: Sexual abuse child molestation and sexual intercourse.

Two Informations for Statutory Rape was filed with the RTC.

Negosa denied raping Gretchen; he interposed an alibi of being elsewhere with a friend and not seeing Gretchen on June 28, 1997. Cenilda testified for Negosa; the friends testimony was inconsistent with Negosas alibi. On March 2, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 918 and

imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death, and found him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 919

Negosa contends that the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim despite the long delay in reporting the incident of rape especially when there is no showing that the delay was due to threats on her life or due to the moral ascendancy of the accused over the complainant. He claims that said testimony does not have any probative weight and that it is inconsistent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the testimony of the victim should be given credence.

RULING

Yes.

It bears stressing that Gretchen was only in Grade V, barely eleven years old when the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. At such a tender age, still inexperienced in the vagaries of life, she could not be expected to act and react like an adult. Being subjected to a vicious sexual assault was an emotional and psychological experience on the part of the young victim. In People v. Aquino, this Court held that the range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect information from rape victims. This Court has repeatedly ruled that "the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience -some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility." Some may choose to keep to themselves the harrowing and debilitating experience rather than suffer the embarrassment, humiliation and ostracization from relatives after divulging the terrible secret. In this case, the evidence on record shows that the victim was the secretive and silent type, who chose not to confide in her relatives. The appellants assertion that he never threatened nor intimidated the victim and, as such, is not criminally liable for statutory rape, is unbelievable. First. Gretchen testified that she was afraid to resist or to shout because on prior occasions, the appellant intimidated her by stepping on her feet.

Second. In her diary, Gretchen wrote that the appellant warned her not to tell her mother that he had raped her. This Court ruled that it is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life. Furthermore, the fact that Gretchen started making entries in her diary only on September 2, 1998, more than a year after the first rape incident occurred (June 28, 1997), does not lessen the probative weight of the said entries. Third. Even assuming that the appellant did not threaten nor intimidate the victim, this, and the fact that the latter agreed to live with her mother and her abuser, are purely inconsequential matters. This does not affect the veracity of the victims testimony. The trial court disbelieved Gretchens testimony that on September 4, 1998, the appellant managed to insert a small portion of his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of the victims loose short pants and convicted the appellant only of acts of lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair Gretchens credibility and the probative weight of her testimony that she was raped by the appellant on June 28, 1997. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert the truth. The principle FALSUS IN UNO FALSUS IN OMNIBUS is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the

corroborative evidence in the case.[39] In this case, the trial court believed Gretchens testimony that the appellant inserted his penis through the side of his short pants and the side of her loose shorts, but disbelieved that part of her testimony that a small part of his penis was able to penetrate her vagina.[40] There is no evidence that Gretchen intended to pervert the truth as to the extent of the sexual abuse done to her on September 4, 1998. Neither can it be claimed that she prevaricated when she testified that the appellant raped her on June 28, 1997. The appellant is guilty only of simple statutory rape for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. 918 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Roberto Negosa alias Jovin is found guilty of statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The appellant is directed to pay the victim Gretchen Castao the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. 152954

March 10, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO y VILLANUEVA

Facts: Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged and convicted with rape with homicide of Virginia Bakia, 9 year old, before the RTC. The trial court convicted appellant based on the following circumstances: 1. Prior to the commission of the crime the victim and her sister were seen in the company of the appellant. 2. Appellant invited the victim to watch a "beta-show" in Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe. Appellant also offered bread and ice candy to Virginia and Norma Bakia (sisters). 3. Norma Bakia saw the victim and the appellant proceed to a sugarcane field in Campo 9, Hacienda San Antonio, the place where the corpse of the victim was found. 4. Maria Lariosa, saw the appellant together with the victim at noon time of July 22, 1995 pass by the back of their house en route to Camp 9, Hacienda San Antonio. 5. Maria Lariosa saw the appellant emerge from the sugarcane field alone and without the victim, with fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms. 6. When the appellant went to the residence of the victim in the morning of July 23, 1995, witness Norma Bakia observed that the right portion of his face and neck have scratch marks on it. 7. The body of the victim was found in the same sugarcane field at Camp 9, the same place where the appellant and the victim were seen by the witnesses go inside. 8. The multiple scratches suffered by the appellant on the right side of his face and ears were all caused by human fingernails. 9. The appellant was the last person seen in the company of the victim before the commission of the crime and was positively identified as such by the witnesses; and

10. The victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions, abrasions and hematoma on different parts of her body and was strangled resulting to her death which indicated that there was a struggle and the victim vigorously put up a fight against her attacker. Hence, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

Issues: Whether or not circumstantial evidence is well established in this case.

Held:

Yes. The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an

accused through circumstantial evidence require the presence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. These, the prosecution were able to establish.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.

People of the Philippines vs Noel Darilay GR 139751-52 January 26, 2004

Facts: On April 19, 1997 at about 9:00 am in Camariner Sur., Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish) from a store about half a kilometre away from their residences. They used a foot path to get to the store. After buying the dried fish they walked back home. Momentarily they saw Noel Daliray emerge from a catmon tree. He struck Ailyn twice with a piece of wood on her back and boxed her on the left side of her face. She felt excruciating pain on her back and face, and all over her body. She fell unconscious. The appellant then struck Marilyn twice on the back with a piece of wood. He then carried Ailyn to a grassy area and left her there. When Ailyn regained her bearings, she looked for Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be found. Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened to her and Marilyn. Their neighbour Allan Candelaria then rushed to the farm where Pascual worked and informed him of what happened to his daughters. He hurried home and looked for Marilyn to no avail. Earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the victims uncle reported the incident to the police station. The three police officers rushed to the sscene. With the help of the tanods, they searched for Marilyn in the place where the appellant attacked the girls. About 15 meters away, they found a yellow and white colored dress, white panties and a slipper bearing the name of Marilyn. The dress was torn. While the policemen were conducting their investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied by PO3 Antonio Pacardo. The appellant finally told them where Marilyn was and volunteered to accompany them to the place. They proceeded to the place and found Marilyns body in a grassy area near bushes and trees along the Palinao River. She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely naked. There was blood on her nose, her mouth and her vagina. Her hair was dishevelled. The policemen arrested the appellant and had him detained in jail. After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of rape with homicide in Criminal case No. 97-201 and attempted murder in Criminal Case No. RTC 97-202. Hence they appealed. Issue: WON direct evidence is indispensible to prove the guilt of the accused.

Held: No. Direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime charged. It may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The court agrees with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the said crime charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In People vs Delim it was held Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur: x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. The court is thus convinced that, based on the evidence on record and as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the rape. Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex crime

G.R. No. 3544

March 27, 1907

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. EDWIN CASE, respondentappellant.

FACTS: This appeal from the Court of Land Registration involves a right of way claimed by the appellant, Edwin Case, through a passage along the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas, in the city of Manila. The right of way is bounded on the north by the Escolta and on the east by the Estero de Sibacon. Edwin Case owns the two adjoining properties to the south and west. The properties in the south is lying in the rear of Carmen Ayala de Roxas premises, and being the dominant tenement, for the benefit of which the easement is claimed. It also adjoins the rear of Cases properties to the west, which faces the Escolta, but it was formerly owned by another person and was occupied as a hotel, to which the only ingress appears to have been at that time through this passageway. Edwin Case claims that the right of way exists by prescription that is founded not on any written instrument but on immemorial use alone. Case makes the additional point that since the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure, an immemorial prescription does not call for the same proof as under the Spanish procedure. He claim that the third Partida in title 31, law 15, after stating the various definite periods applicable to continuous servitudes, says that discontinuous servitudes have no fixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men cannot remember its commencement. In many judgments the supreme court of Spain has refused to accept proof of any definite number of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law. In the judgment of the 11th of February, 1895, it was said that the court should consider the testimony and number of witnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives and who also had heard it spoken of in the same way by their elders. Case complied with the first requirement, having produced at least one witness over 60 years of age and two of 59, familiar with the property, by whom the use of the right of way was described as existing in the year 1859, but he failed to comply with the second requirement, that is, the declarations of persons older from the memory of the witnesses, contending that such testimony is inadmissible as hearsay under the present of Code of Civil procedure. With the second requirement, that of the declarations of persons older from the memory of the witnesses, the appellant has not complied, urging the inadmissibility of such testimony as hearsay under the present Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: WON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE SUCH TESTIMONY WAS IS INADMISSIBLE PROCEDURE. AS HEARSAY UNDER THE PRESENT CODE OF CIVIL

HELD: The Supreme Court held that there is no vested right in a mere rule of evidence. (Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500.) But the point would be whether this requirement of the Spanish law is not substantive rather than evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. If substantive, then the appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely a matter of procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced by the corresponding provisions of our new code. We find therein no equivalent provision, other than subsection 11 of section 334, establishing as a disputable presumption "that a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership." The use of the passage proved in this case cannot be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it is quite consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its nature. It seems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of the right of way was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should have been offered. We are of the opinion that in order to establish a right or prescription something more is required than the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should be the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide. On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof and the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter the case remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005] HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

Facts: Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. After the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent Miguela Dailo. Aggrieved, Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition. ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY Ruling: Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of

conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the

benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation. In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, PETITIONER, VERSUS LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, Respondents. 2005 May 16 G.R. No. 144773

FACTS: The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.

Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Said

deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344.

In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the Register of Deeds of LapuLapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the abovementioned Aying siblings.

In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded,

petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.

On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The case eventually reached this Supreme Court, a Decision was promulgated in favor of herein petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land in question.

Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220 persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was dismissed twice without prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.

In the Answer to the Amended Complaint, petitioner then raised the affirmative defenses of failure to state cause of action and prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10 months and 27 days to file the action to recover subject property, when an action to recover property based on an implied trust should be instituted within 4 years from discovery of the fraud.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling

that

respondents evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with deed of absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and concluded that said document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to petitioner the property in question.

In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that an action for recovery of possession of registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription. The CA further ruled that even if the action is deemed to be based on implied trust, prescription did not begin to run since there is no evidence that positive acts of repudiation were made known to the heirs who did not participate in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, striking down the RTCs ruling that the respondents complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription, the CA held instead that herein respondents action had not prescribed but upheld the validity of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, except as to the shares of the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta, who did not participate in the execution of said document.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient proof for the principle of laches to apply.

HELD:

In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive period

cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.

The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinogs (heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they already learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale; and Laurencio Ayings (heir of Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sale of the land in dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial law. Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any other evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the execution of the subject document.

In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale, it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish such fact.

The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiffs claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.

In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC, which set up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying, as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying the subject land to petitioner. Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive period should be reckoned.

Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993. Thus, with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by prescription when said amended complaint was filed as they only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.

Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within the period accorded them by law.

Fe J. Bautista and Milagros J. Corpus v. Hon. Malcolm G. Sarmiento and the People of the Philippines G.R. No. L-45137 September 23, 1985

Facts:

An information charging Bautista, Corpus, and one TeresitaVergere with of Judge Sarmiento. The third accused was granted presented during the trial, the petitioners,

Estafa was filed before the sala

a separate trial. To prove its case, the prosecution

private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its sole witness. Thereafter,

believing that the prosecution failed to prove they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt, moved for the dismissal of the case by way of demurrer to evidence. The trial court established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the presented on record. The trial

held that the prosecution

information against said accused on the evidence

court likewise denied the motion to dismiss as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration for the same decision, and further ordered the reception of evidence of the accused on a separate trial date. Hence, the accused filed a petition by way of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the denial of the motion to dismiss based on prima facie evidence is valid or not. Ruling: The denial of the motion to dismiss based on a prima facie evidence in favor of the prosecution is valid. As held by the Supreme Court: A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the general presumption of

innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.

In the present case, there is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to

an acquittal. But when the trial court

denies

petitioners' motion to dismiss by established a

way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had

prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case againstthem. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as petitioners would seem to believe.

Verily, when a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposedthe prosecution. It is

the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution.

Then the burden shifts back. A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result,

plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

As such, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss required them to present their evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to

prove their innocence, or at least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.Therefore; as a result, the trial of the criminal case shall be continued immediately until its final disposition

RIVERA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115625. January 23, 1998

Petitioner: ESMUNDO B. RIVERA

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBEL and MERLINA MIRAMBEL

FACTS:

On July 19, 1990, petitioner filed complaints for ejectment against private respondents Amy Robles Peregrino Mirambel, and Merlina Mirambel, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela.

On August 8, 1990, movant Jose Bayani A. Salcedo filed an urgent motion for intervention on the ground that he has a legal interest in the subject for he applied for title of the public land under Miscellaneous Sales Application, which was consequently denied.

On August 8, 1990, private respondents filed their answers, respectively.

The evidence on record presented by the plaintiff does not also show that his parents and himself have prior possession of the land in question. The evidence presented by the defendants, however, show that they have been the caretaker of the said public land located at Malinta, Valenzuela and adjacent to private lot of plaintiff since the year 1969 which was applied for by their principal, Jose Bayani Salcedo under Miscellaneous Sales Application. It is very evident that the defendants are not squatters on the private land of the plaintiff.

After submission of their position papers, the (Metropolitan Trial Court) rendered joint judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondents. In fine, by evidence plaintiff has preponderably established his cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner proved his cause of action?

HELD:

NO. Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.

This Court is not persuaded. The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of Appeals that the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determine with certainty whether the private respondents houses were inside the petitioners titled property.

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. Therefore, as neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

G.R. No. 151827. April 29, 2005 JOSEFINA BENARES, petitioner, vs. JAIME PANCHO, RODOLFO PANCHO, JR., JOSELITO MEDALLA, PAQUITO MAGALLANES, ALICIA MAGALLANES, EVELYN MAGALLANES, VIOLETA VILLACAMPA, MARITESS PANCHO, ROGELIO PANCHO AND ARNOLFO PANCHO, respondents.

FACTS: The herein respondents were workers of Hacienda Maasin II which is sugar cane plantation located in Murcia, Negros Occidental with an area of 12-24 has. planted, owned and managed by Josefina Benares. Complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of DOLE regarding their wages and other benefits. Because of such, the complainants were illegally dismissed from their work without termination pay and other benefits mandated by law. As the case was a money claim, the parties were ordered by the Labor Arbiter to file their respective position papers. During the hearing, the petitioner failed to appear and the case was now set for decision. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to discuss the cause of their termination. NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents holding that they attained the position of regular seasonal employees of Hda. Maasin II having worked therein from 1964-1985. It found that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the termination of respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence, respondents were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRCs ruling.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: That she was able to present sufficient proof to rebut the claim of illegal dismissal should be considered in light of the NLRCs admission that there are gray areas in the case which require clarification. Petitioner avers that the NLRC should have at least remanded the case to the Labor arbiter to thresh out these gray areas. She further claims that the NLRC was overly zealous in awarding COLA and ERA despite the fact that respondents did not even pray for these awards in their complaint. She also questions the NLRCs general statement to the effect that the payroll she submitted is not convincing asserting that she submitted 235 sets of payroll, not just one, and that the NLRC did not even bother to explain why it found the payroll unconvincing. That the respondents are not regular employees but only employees under the pakyaw system, hence, their dismissal was for just cause.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS: That the quantum of evidence required in a quasi-judicial proceedings is only substantial evidence. Thus, the findings of the NLRC and CA that they are regular employees are correct based on the evidence they had presented during the quasi-judicial proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC and CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in deciding in favor of the respondents based on the substantial evidence presented during the quasi-judicial proceedings. RULING: NO. The probative value of petitioners evidence, however, has been passed upon by the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents complaint because their position paper is completely devoid of any discussion about their alleged dismissal, much less of the probative facts thereof,the ground for the dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that respondents are regular employees. The NLRC was more unequivocal when it pronounced that respondents have acquired the status of regular seasonal employees having worked for more than one year, whether continuous or broken in petitioners hacienda. That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to the labor arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and instead decided the case on the basis of the evidence then available to it is a judgment call this Court shall not interfere with in the absence of any showing that the NLRC abused its discretion in so doing. The Court of Appeals, in fact, found no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for certiorari and affirmed with modification the findings of the NLRC. It is well to note at this point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The issue, therefore, of whether respondents were regular employees of petitioner has been adequately dealt with. The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals have similarly held that respondents were regular employees of

petitioner. Since it is a settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality, we shall no longer disturb this finding. Petitioner next underscores the NLRC decisions mention of the payroll she presented despite the fact that she allegedly presented 235 sets of payroll, not just one payroll. This circumstance does not in itself evince any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as it could well have been just an innocuous typographical error. Verily, the NLRCs decision, affirmed as it was by the Court of Appeals, appears to have been arrived at after due consideration of the evidence presented by both parties.

We also find no reason to disturb the finding that respondents were illegally terminated. When there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a just or authorized cause. In this case, as found both by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals respectively dated June 29, 2001 and November 28, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

MERCEDES

G.

DUDUACO,

complainant,

vs.

JUDGE

LILY

LYDIA

A.

LAQUINDANUM, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: [A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005]

FACTS: On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged[1] respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum[2] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of KabacanCarmen, North Cotabato with grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law. Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent brought her vehicle to the Toyota Service Center in Davao City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and replacement of parts that were damaged due to a vehicular mishap. Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up, respondent went to ToyotaDavao on June 23, 2001 at around 11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson M. Garao, a service advisor, who told her that the vehicle would be released upon payment of deductible franchise. Respondent allegedly refused to pay insisting that the same will be paid by the insurance company. She then asked to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but the latter was in a meeting. At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza, Toyota-Davaos Administration and Marketing Head. Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain to

respondent that the payment of the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company but the latter got angry and raised her voice while demanding to see the manager. She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,[3] Service Department Manager, who alleged that respondent heatedly disagreed with him and shouted that she was a judge

and insisted on seeing the manager.

Upon being told that complainant was in a

meeting, respondent furiously replied that she should be given preferential treatment over said meeting.[4] At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, she paid the amount stated therein under protest. Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogation but she again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew better than to sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill in the blanks but respondent curtly informed him that she will not sign just the same. Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car. On July 4, 2001, she filed a case for Replevin, Damages and Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Replevin.[5] In her Comment,[6] respondent denied that she threw her weight around and abused her judicial authority. She claimed that upon being informed by Garao about the

deductible franchise, she instructed the latter to communicate with her insurer. After the lapse of two (2) hours, Garao told her that he could not contact the insurers office because it was closed on Saturdays. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was reached, she suggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before she would pay. She eventually paid[7] the deductible franchise under protest. She averred that she requested for the execution of a demand letter[8] to serve as proof of her claim for refund. Thereafter, Garao brought out the vehicle and gave the key to her driver, who inspected the car to make sure that everything is in order. She then directed Salvador Caducoy to transfer her belongings from another vehicle.[9] When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao ran after them and told her that she needed to sign a release form.[10] She was given a blank Release of Claim with Subrogation[11] form which she refused to sign. When Saragoza advised her that the vehicle will not be released, she retorted that she will only sign if the form has been properly filled up. The parties were at an impasse when Yez angrily said di fill upan!, then took back the form and went to his office but did not return.[12] It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the Toyota-Davao premises. She wrote a letter[13] to complainant detailing her ordeal. The letter was received by a lady employee who gave her another demand letter[14] stating that in addition to the payment of deductible franchise, she is also required to sign a release form which she refused because some portions were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her car. On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza (Linaza) from FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize.[15]

In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended[16] the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. He observed that respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violate the law. No fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Had respondent grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have gone to her office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize. The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with modification that complainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this baseless harassment suit. The OCA opined that complainants insistence on pursuing her

unsubstantiated charges despite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent but also of the Investigating Justice and this Court.

HELD: We agree with the recommendations of the OCA. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints.[17] Administrative proceedings against judges are by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus be more substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18] To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption.[19] On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[20]Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that the demand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form, did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She was only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would be deemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund. We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.[21] During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the event transpired on June 23, 2001,[22] which means that she has no personal and direct

knowledge of the incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegations therein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief.[23] Significantly, she also went to respondents office and apologized. Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrieved with zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident that complainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an alleged erring member of the bench. Verily, the delay militates against the veracity of their allegations. Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after Toyota-Davao lost possession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suit she filed against them. More specifically, the instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002 or about eight (8) months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July 4, 2001. As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, the timing couldnt be worse.[24] The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. In complainants letter dated January 21, 2002,[25] she informed this Court about a similar complaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council for the purpose of objecting to (respondents) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabato or elsewhere. Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justice to the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degrading respondents reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be countenanced. In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[26] this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her by suspending him from the practice of law for six (6) months. In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,[27] we affirmed the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses imposed against petitioner for filing an unfounded suit in bad faith. The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is commensurate under the circumstances. This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring members of the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any member of the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.[28]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco is FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and unfounded suit.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960 filed by the members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part. The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The reason is simple, a law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact. The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and

groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

Manolo P. Fule, Petitioner, vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, Respondent. G.R. No. L-79094; 22 June 1988; 162 SCRA 446 En Banc Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

The RTC of Lucena City branch LIV convicted petitioner Manolo P. Fule

for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the bouncing checks law, on the basis of an unsigned stipulation of facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during pre-trial conference in the RTC. The facts stipulated upon read: a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case; b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before January 21, 1981; c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2, 541.05; d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera; e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of collection; f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed; g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this case.

At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. Hence, the conviction ordered by the trial court. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Issue:

Whether the conviction, based solely on a Stipulation of Facts which was

not signed by either the petitioner or his counsel, was proper.

Ruling:

Improper.

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118) By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. The omission of the signature of the accused and His counsel, as mandatorily required by -the rules, renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of facts does not cure the defect because rule 118 requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering the lack of the required signatures, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.

SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC., vs. CA, G.R. No. 117728 June 26, 1996 FACTS: Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin and sum of money with damages against the Tolosa spouses and one John Doe. It alleged that on January 15, 1981, the Tolosa spouses purchased from Amante Motor Works one Isuzu passenger-type jeepney with Motor No. C240-317331 and Serial No. CMCI-81063-C for the sum of P48,432.00 to be paid in 24 monthly installments; that the spouses executed a promissory note and drew a deed of chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Amante Motor Works; that on the same day, Amante Motor Works assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to Filinvest Finance; that Filinvest Finance also assigned its rights and interest in said promissory note and chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit; that Servicewide later acquired the rights and interests of Filinvest Credit over said note and mortgage; and that the Tolosa spouses failed to pay the installments due despite several demands. It demanded from the spouses and John Doe, the return of the vehicle or the payment of the balance of P34,224.78 and damages. The trial court issued an order for the seizure of the vehicle subject of the complaint. The Tolosa spouses filed their Answer on March 22,1982. They claimed that they purchased one jeepney unit from Binan Motors, not Amante Motor Works; that in January 1981, they ordered another unit through its President and General Manager, Eduardo Garcia; that Garcia informed the spouses that the additional unit shall be "house financed" by Binan Motors; that Eduardo Tolosa noticed that the vendor indicated in the deed of sale was not Binan Motors but Amante Motor Works; that Garcia explained to Tolosa that he (Garcia) was to make full payment on the jeepney to Amante Motor Works and that he (Tolosa) was to pay Garcia the monthly installments; that Tolosa never received any notice from Binan Motors about the jeepney unit he ordered; that on December 17, 1981, Tolosa received a receipt from Filinvest Finance about payment he allegedly made on a jeepney unit he purchased from Amante Motor Works; that Garcia informed him he was in possession of the jeepney and said that he made the initial payment on the vehicle and that he himself would pay its monthly amortization; that Garcia prepared and executed a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" where it appeared that Tolosa sold and transferred to Garcia the said jeepney. Servicewide amended its complaint by adding Eduardo Garcia as the defendant in place of John Doe. It alleged that the Tolosa spouses, without Servicewide's knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney. The trial court admitted the amended complaint and ordered the issuance of summons on Garcia as additional defendant. The Tolosa spouses filed an "Amended Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants Binan Motors and Eduardo Garcia. The trial court ordered service of summons on the third-party defendants. The sheriff seized the

subject vehicle from the possession of one Lourdes Bartina. Bartina filed a "Third-Party Claim" and "Urgent Motion for Release" alleging ownership of the jeepney. She claimed that she purchased the vehicle from Binan Motors and regularly made payments to Commercial Credit Corporation. On February 21, 1983, the trial court released the vehicle to Bartina on an indemnity bond of P34,000.00. The court found that the documents supporting Bartina's ownership of the jeepney were in due form and executed prior to the documents of the Tolosa spouses. On March 2, 1983, Binan Motors and Eduardo Garcia filed their "Answer to Third-Party Complaint" claiming that the third-party plaintiffs (Tolosa spouses) had no cause of action against them as it was Amante Motor Works that invoiced the vehicle; that the Tolosa spouses purchased a jeepney unit from them but their check for downpayment bounced; that they initiated a complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law against Eduardo Tolosa for which an information was filed on December 2, 1982; that if the Tolosa spouses were prejudiced it was because of their unreasonable neglect to make good their initial payment on the vehicle. A reply was filed by the Tolosa spouses. Despite the court's order, the subject jeepney was not released to Bartina who filed her "Complaint in Intervention." Third-party defendants Garcia and Binan Motors filed their "Answer to Complaint in Intervention." They claimed that they acquired the subject vehicle from the Tolosas "in consideration of the value of one Celeste jeepney in the amount of P56,000.00" but that the Tolosas failed to pay the downpayment on the vehicle; that they came to court with clean hands and that they are actually the victims of the Tolosas. Servicewide manifested that it was adopting its complaint in the principal case as its comment or answer to the complaint-in-intervention. At the pretrial conference, the trial court noted that summons and copy of the amended complaint had not been served on Eduardo Garcia as additional defendant. It deferred the pretrial until such service shall have been effected. The trial court ordered Servicewide to turn over possession of the subject jeepney to Bartina upon filing of the increased bond of P55,000.0. Pretrial was rescheduled but was postponed several times until October 7, 1985. On October 7, 1985, all parties, through their respective counsels, appeared except the Tolosas and their counsel. The trial court declared the Tolosas in default with respect to the principal complaint and scheduled the reception of evidence for Servicewide. The Tolosas were likewise declared nonsuited with respect to their thirdparty complaint against Binan Motors and Garcia. With regard to the complaint-inintervention, the trial court scheduled a pretrial conference. At the hearing for the reception of Servicewide's evidence, the Tolosas again failed to appear. Servicewide presented its legal accounts analyst,Nannette Navea, who testified on the outstanding obligation of the Tolosas and Garcia. It presented documents consisting of the

promissory note, deed of chattel mortgage, the deed of assignment of the Tolosas'

credit by Filinvest Finance, and the notice and demand letter to the Tolosas. It then submitted the case for decision. Pretrial for the complaint-in-intervention was postponed several times until March 1, 1988. The Tolosas were notified but again failed to appear on said date. For the second time, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to present evidence as against the complaint and dismissed with prejudice their third-party complaint against Garcia and Binan Motors. The court also declared them in default with respect to the complaint-in-intervention of Bartina and scheduled the reception of Bartina's evidence accordingly. At the hearing for reception of evidence on Bartina's complaint-in-intervention, the Tolosas again did not appear. Intervenor Bartina testified that said vehicle was sold to her by Binan Motors owned by Eduardo Garcia and that the vehicle was in her possession when it was seized by the sheriff and given to Servicewide. She offered documents proving her ownership of the subject vehicle. On May 23, 1988, Bartina and the defendants-in-intervention Eduardo Garcia and Binan Motors moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention. They alleged that they had "arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims." The court granted the motion on May 24, 1988. On August 3, 1988, the trial court.ruled in favor of Servicewide granting it the right to either foreclose the mortgage on the subject vehicle or to demand from defendants, jointly and severally, payment of P34,224.78 and damages. Defendant Eduardo Garcia moved for reconsideration on the ground that he was not one of the defendants in the principal case. He claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was never served summons on the amended complaint naming him as an additional defendant. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. It amended the dispositive portion of the decision to include Eduardo Garcia as one of the defendants liable to Servicewide. Eduardo Garcia appealed to the CA. On October 27, 1994, the CA found that no summons on the amended complaint had been served on Garcia; however, since Garcia filed several pleadings as a thirdparty defendant in the trial court, he was deemed to have submitted himself to its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it found no sufficient evidence to hold Garcia solidarily liable with the Tolosa spouses on the principal complaint and relieved Garcia from liability. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. May the compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors be taken as

an admission of Garcia's liability?


2. Was there sufficient evidence on record to hold Garcia, together with the Tolosa

spouses, solidarily liable to Servicewide?

RULING: 1. No, the compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission of liability on the part of the parties vis-avis a third person. The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. The policy of the law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third parties are not in any way affected. 2. No, there was no sufficient evidence on record to hold Garcia, together with the Tolosa spouses, solidarily liable to Servicewide. For one, the motor vehicle

described in the "Answer to Third-Party Complaint" has different motor and serial numbers from the vehicle subject of the complaint. The subject vehicle is a galvanized silver jeepney with Motor No. C240-317331 and Serial No. CMCI81063-C while the vehicle in said pleading is a red stainless jeepney with Motor No. C-221-443144 and Serial No. CMCI-81795-C. What Garcia and Binan Motors admittedly sold to the Tolosas was not the subject vehicle. In the "Answer to the Complaint in Intervention," Garcia and Binan Motors admitted that they acquired from the Tolosas the "vehicle subject of the complaint in consideration of one Celeste jeepney valued at P56,000.00." The vehicle subject of the complaint was the one found in the possession of Bartira. Under the two pleadings, however, what Garcia and Binan Motors sold to the Tolosa spouses was a different vehicle from the one they acquired from said spouses and which they allegedly sold to Bartina. A double sale of the same jeepney could not arise because there appears to be two different jeepneys in the pleadings. Even in the "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" where the Tolosa spouses allegedly sold to Garcia the jeepney subject of the complaint, the vehicle described therein had different motor and chassis numbers. The deed reveals that what the Tolosas sold to Garcia was a red jeepney with Motor No. C240328332 and Chassis No. CMCI-82062-C.The documentary evidence of Bartina merely shows that the jeepney subject of the complaint was indeed sold to her by Binan Motors represented by Juliet Garcia, Eduardo Garcia's daughter. There is nothing to show that Eduardo Garcia sold to Bartina the vehicle that he previously sold to the Tolosas. The SC affirmed the CAs decision that it found no sufficient evidence to hold Garcia solidarily liable with the Tolosa spouses on the principal complaint and relieved Garcia from liability.

G.R. No. L-19012

October 30, 1967

VICTORIA JULIO vs. EMILIANO DALANDAN and MARIA DALANDAN

FACTS: Victoria Julios complaint is founded on the salaysay" or statement of one Clemente Dalandan, the deceased father of herein defendants, whereby he (Clemente) acknowledged in writing that a four-hectare piece of riceland in Las Pias, belonging to Victoriana Dalandan (mother of plaintiff Victoria) was posted as security for an obligation which Clemente assumed but failed to fulfill and as a result Victoriana's land was foreclosed. In a document executed by Clemente, Annex "A" of the complaint, he promised to replace the land of Victoriana; to wit: dahil sa hindi ako nakatupad sa aking pananagutanay naembargo ang nasabi niyang lupa dahil dito ako ay nanagot sa kanya (Victoria Julio)at ipinangako ko sa kanya naaking papalitan ng bukid din na may mahigit na apat (4) na hektarya...Na hindi maaring pilitin ang aking mga anak (EMILIANO AT MARIA DALANDAN), na hingin ang ani ng bukid na nabangit sa itaas ng salaysay na ito Deceased Victoriana Julio, in turn states in the document: Na, ako VICTORIANA JULIO, na binabanggit sa itaas nito sa salaysay ni CLEMENTE DALANDAN, ay nagpapatunay na tutoong lahat ang kanyang salaysay na iyon at tinatanggap ko ang kanyang mga sinasabi. By virtue of such document, Plaintiff went on to aver that the land set forth in the document by Clemente Dalandan referred to six small parcels with a total area of barely two hectares - "the only land owned by Clemente Dalandan at the time of the execution of the document." Plaintiff thus requested defendants to deliver the same to her but defendants refused. Having brought the case to the lower court, the latter ruled that plaintiff's suit had prescribed as the10-year period from the date of the execution of the document had elapsed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES: 1) WON the recognition of trust (contained in the document or salaysay) was proved by the plaintiff using evidence aliunde and thus in violation of the express terms of Article 1443 of the Civil Code, which states that no express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.

2) WON the attempt on the part of plaintiff to explain the content of the document by saying that the land set forth in the document by Clemente Dalandan referred to six small parcels with a total area of barely two hectares - "the only land owned by Clemente Dalandan at the time of the execution of the document" violates the Parole Evidence Rule. HELD: The SC Ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Issue 1: No. The argument of defendants overlooks the fact that no oral evidence is necessary. The express trust imposed upon defendants by their predecessor appears in the document itself. For, while it is true that said deed did not in definitive words institute defendants as trustees, a duty is therein imposed upon them when the proper time comes to turn over both the fruits and the possession of the property to Victoria Julio. Not that this view is without statutory support. Article 1444 of the Civil Code states that: "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." Issue 2: No. Plaintiff points out in her complaint that while said deed does not specifically define its boundaries "the parties to the said document actually refer" to the land which was "the only land owned by Clemente Dalandan at the time of the execution" thereof, and which is set forth in small parcels under said paragraph. This allegation in the complaint does not add any new term or stipulation to the writing. Rather, it explains an obscurity occasioned by lack of precision in a clumsily prepared document. Thus it is, that authorities are not wanting in support of the view that "in so far as the identity of land involved" in a trust is concerned, "it has also been held that the writings, in being considered for the purpose of satisfying the statute of frauds, are to be considered in their setting, and that parol evidence is admissible to make clear the terms of a trust the existence of which is established by a writing.

G.R. No. L-26053

February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS, ISABELO OBAOB ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIO SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants. FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila owns of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont & Singalong streets in Malate, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 & 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second--class materials, again without plaintiff'sknowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. The presence of defendants having previously been discovered, some of the defendants were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. The rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the said property. Came the need for this school's expansion became pressing. Plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant was made and demand for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Suit to recover possession was filed and the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering defendants to vacate the premises and pay the rentals. Defendants appealed. The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962--1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial

judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E. ISSUE: Whether Exhibit E is admissible as evidence? RULING: Exhibit E, as evidence, is admissible as evidence. The trial judge was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment applead from. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. Appealed judgment is affirmed.

FLORENTINO GALLEGO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS GR No. L-18247, 31 August 1963 Decision, En Banc

PONENTE: Justice Regala

FACTS: In the morning of 10 March 1957, Florentino Gallego and his companions were about to hold a meeting of Jehovahs Witnesses in front of the public market of Lambunao, Iloilo when Chief of Police Avelino Larrosa approached and inquired if the former have permit. Since they cannot produce any permit, the attendants of the meeting were enjoined by the Chief of Police Larros from proceeding with the meeting. It appears that Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 requires a permit prior to the holding of meetings in public places. Instead of obeying, Gallego, in a challenging vein addressed his companions, You must continue that, we will see what they (referring to the chief of police and policemen) can do for us. Chief of Police warned Gallego of being arrested if he continues with the meeting. Gallego disregarded the warning and the meeting lasted for thrity (30) minutes. Therreupon, Gallego was arrested and charged with slight disobedience of an agent of a person in authority. Gallego was convicted for continuing with the meeting with due disregard of the Chiefs warning and despite failure to secure the necessary permit, and sentenced accordingly. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and found that the slight disobedience was evident from Gallegos aforequoted reaction to the Chief of Polices warning despite the fact that a municipal ordinance at that time requires a permit for holding religious meeting in public places. Hence, this petition raising the defense, among others, that there was no proof of the ordinance requiring permit to hold a meeting.

ISSUE: Whether CA may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinance requiring a permit to hold religious meetings in public places.

HOLDING: Yes. There is nothing in the law that prohibits a court, like the Court of Appeals, from taking cognizance of a municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to take judicial notice of matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly what the Court of Appeals did in this case in holding that "contrary to appellant's (petitioner's) contention, there was an existing

municipal ordinance at the time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing for a previous permit for the holding of religious meeting in public places." Besides, it is not true, as claimed by petitioner, that the trial court did not take notice of the ordinance in question. For the lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to secure the necessary permit" with obvious reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957. In People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, We held that courts of first instance should take judicial notice of municipal ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this ruling that the trial court took notice of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957 of the Municipality of Lambunao. xxxxxx It should not be lost sight of that this is a prosecution for slight disobedience, not for violation of the ordinance. Although petitioner may have legitimate reason to protest the order of the chief of police, he was not justified in disobeying him and in assuming a bellicose attitude by exhorting his followers to proceed with their meeting, as in fact the latter did. As justice Malcolm once said, "To authorize resistance (also disobedience) to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. (But,) there was no case of excessive violence to enforce defendant's idea of a debatable legal question." (People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169). xxxxxx WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.

FACTS: In 1974, an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement was entered into by plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines (Northwest) and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. (Sharp), through its Japan branch, whereby Northwest authorized Sharp to sell the

former's

airlines

tickets.

Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales it made on behalf of Northwest under the agreement which led the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the unremitted amount, with claim for damages. The Tokyo District Court of Japan issued a writ of summons against Sharp at its office in Yokohama, Japan but the bailiff failed twice to serve the writs. Finally, the Tokyo District Court decided to have the writs of summons served at Sharp's head office in Manila. Sharp accepted the writs but despite such receipt, it failed to appear at the hearings. The District Court proceeded to hear the complaint and rendered judgment ordering Sharp to pay Northwest the sum of 83,158,195 Yen plus damages. Sharp failed to appeal and the judgment became final and executory. Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan, hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the judgment of the Japanese court is null and void and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp. The case for enforcement of judgment was tried on the merits. Sharp filed a Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the demurrer motion, holding that the foreign judgment in the Japanese court sought to be enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Northwest appealed but the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court, holding that the process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction was acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state. Hence, this appeal by Northwest.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes. RULING: "A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,

enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected as its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over it. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service'of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show taat under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. Alternatively, in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumpcion may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business ir, the Philippines. Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or 2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or 3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Where the corporation has no such great agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner, in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the government office or official served shall

transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or at least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or any of its officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippines after the two attempts of service had failed. The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not valid under Philippine law holds no water. Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of JAPAN, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Republic vs CA, 277 SCRA 633, 641 (1997) EVIDENCE

Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleading or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.

Facts: Josefa Gacot claimed a parcel of land, the area of which is not indicated, in Palawan. Gacot claims that she has been in actual possession of the property for more than 30 year and bought the land from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera by virtue of a deed of sale and introduced improvement thereon and paid taxes for the land in her name. It appears that a certain Ceferino Sabenacio is a co-owner of the land who later waived his claim in favor of Gacot and admitted that he was only a boundary owner of the land and it was Gacot who is in actual possession of it. Prior to the hearing, the Land Registration Authority intervened, calling the attention of the court on the decision made by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the property as owned by the Republic. However, it did not bar Gacos from filing her answer, presenting evidence of her actual possession of the said property and tax declaration and payment made in her name. The counsel of the petitioner did not present evidence and submitted the case for resolution.

The court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot thus the Solicitor General elevated the case to the CA and filed a motion for the court to reopen and remand the case back to the trial court to allow the Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos which motion was granted by the court. The hearing was set several times and Gacot was able to submit her memorandum while the Republic was unable to submit any evidence to support the claim of the government in court. For failure of the government to refute and to present their evidence contrary to Gacots claim, the court decided not to disturb its former decision. The Republic assailed the decision of the court invoking 2061 that set the time limit of filing an application for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands declared as public land, a provision thereof provides that the application for judicial proceeding should not extend beyond Dec. 31, 1968. Gacot only filed her claim on June 7, 1971 thus the court did not acquired jurisdiction on her claim as she did not file her answer within the period fixed by RA 2061.

Issue: Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: The Court held that what the Solicitor General claims would have been operative if it were able to present evidence during the rehearing of the case proving the alleged decision of Judge Garlitos declaring the property as public land. However they failed to offer evidence on their claim and the court cannot take judicial notice of such claim in the absence of any proof presented before the court. The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to allow the Republic to present evidence which they failed to do.

It is a settled rule that the court shall not consider evidence that has not been formally offered before it. The court cannot take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases, in the adjudication of the cases pending before them even if the trial judge knows or remember the contents thereof. While the case is on trial, Josefa Gacot passed away and her heirs were impleaded to substitute her as the party to the case. The court held to lax on the technical rules of procedure in the case and to expedite the proceeding take a liberal construction on the laws to meet advance the cause of substantial justice. Because the lot area awarded to Gacot was not specified in the records and based on the certification of the Forest Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, some of the lots in the area are classified as alienable and disposable land, while some portion are timber land that forms part of the Mangrove Swamp Forest Reserve. The court decided to remand back to the trial court the case for proper disposition of the conflicting claims of the parties.

JOSE

TABUENA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents. Facts: The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against petitioner Jose Tabuena,. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines, and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own. The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot. Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance documents which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court decided in contrary to the allegations of the appellant. Issue: whether or not the exhibits are not formally submitted in evidence. Ruling: The Supreme court examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described documents, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. In fact, the trial court categorically declared that the documents were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix. Under Rule 132, section 35 of the Rules of Court: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. Even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has

been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But the court do not find that these requirements have been satisfied in this case. The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly the documents which had not been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court erred when it relied on the evidence submitted and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiffs witnesses testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. The court do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001] JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND

CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents. FACTS: Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine

the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. ISSUES: 1. Whether the presentation of Angaras diary is a violation of the hearsay rule. 2. Whether the Best Evidence Rule was infringed when only the newspaper reproduction of Angaras diary and not the duplicate original was used. HELD: 1. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party 2. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. A.M. No. P-03-1708 February 16, 2005

ATTY. JOSE R. ORTIZ, JR., Clerk of Court VI, Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, vs. LARRY DE GUZMAN, Branch Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 31, Quezon City, Respondent. FACTS: Atty. Ortiz's initial investigation4 revealed that on various dates, respondent demanded and received cash bond deposits in violation of standing regulations of this Court. After issuing either fake receipts or unauthorized provisional receipts, he then overstepped the limits of his authority by ordering jail officers to release the accused in each of the following cases: complainant,

Provisional Parties Case No. Receipt Fake Receipt No. PP vs. Orlando 31-10609 8903326

Date Issuance

of

Amount

Barlaan PP vs. Nympha

8/20/1998

P 5,000.00 26,000.00

Magalona PP vs. Bernadeth A. Ramos PP vs. Rolando

31-42077-82

Prov. Rec.

undated

31-42823

8903327

7/24/1998

15,000.00

Noynay PP vs. Florence Pua PP vs. Dandy

31-14170 31-107377

13490965 written notice &

11/22/2000 3,000.00 undated 5,000.00 4,000.00

L. 31-110282 35279

Dimapiles

According to Atty. Ortiz, the falsifications committed were apparent after comparing the fake receipts with the original receipts duly issued by the property division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court. De Guzman was also caught in an entrapment operation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation. Together with another court employee, he was caught extorting P5,000 from a winning party litigant for the implementation of a certain court decision. Atty. Ortiz was ordered to submit additional evidence, and Larry De Guzman was ordered to make a comment on the allegations against him. But none was heard nor received from De Guzman during the formal investigation. ISSUE: Whether respondent's silence may be considered as an implied admission of guilt. HELD: It is noteworthy that throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities given to respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent's refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of

wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. 15 For his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an admission of guilt. We are therefore inclined to believe that the respondent is guilty of all the charges against him

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants. DOMINGO CADIANG, SANTIAGO YUMUL and FILEMON CENZON, defendants and appellants; [GRN L-7973 27 April 1959]

FACTS: During the trial of this case before the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes, one of the accused, was discharged thereof to testify as a witness for the prosecution. The facts, according to Reyes, are summarized as follows: Sometime in the evening of 16 October 1950, Eulogio SERRANO, Cenon Serrano (alias PIPING), Domingo CADIANG, Saniago YUMUL, Filemon CENZON, and Anastacio REYES gathered in the house of SERRANO at Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga. There, the men conspired to have one Pablo NAVARRO killed for allegedly inducing and prompting people to testify on the maliwalu massacre and to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David for help. The plan was to lure NAVARRO to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. In pursuance of the plan, the group of men (except SERRANO) for several days waited for NAVARRO and tried to induce him to go drinking with them. On the 20th, the group were able to spot NAVARRO at a gambling casino and there had drinks with them. One Simplicio Manguerra also joined the drinking spree. The spree began at about 1pm. After drinking about six bottles of liquor, the group were able to convice NAVARRO to go to San Fernando to have a good time. On board a jeep, they headed on to San Fernando, still with bottles of liquor, drinking as they travelled. Eventually, when NAVARRO was drunk enough, PIPING ordered the jeepney driver to head on to Dolores, Bacolor. There, they went to the house of one BENJAMIN TOLENTINO. There, the group repeated beat NAVARRO (while his hands were tied) thru the orders of PIPING. He was left hands tied, and beat up at the post behind the stockade. MANGUERRA, on the other hand was ordered

killed by PIPING. By 5pm, PIPING headed on to the house of SERRANO to report to him that the victims were already in Dolores. In the afternoon of that same day (October 20) SERRANO went to TOLENTINO and there confronted NAVARRO. Manalo, a civilan guard of the house allegedly heard Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was not the one. SERRANO (accompanied with a different group of men) took NAVARRO to Potrero, Bacolor. And there killed him. His body was buried in a pit. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, NAVARROs body was placed in a sack and throwninto a creek. His body was found on 6 December 1951. The accused denied all allegations and presented different alibis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lone testimony of Anastacio Reyes is sufficient to

prove the conspiracy between the parties.

RULING: In this case, YES.

The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a coconspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.

ORIGINAL CASE:

Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga finding them and their co-defendants, who. did not appeal, guilty of murder for the death of Pablo Navarro and sentencing them to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity and the proportionate share in the costs (Criminal Case No. 1262). In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano aliasPiping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at the sala of the house of the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, that Pablo Navarro had been inducing and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of Bacolor, lure him to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to them his plan, Eulogio Serrano told them to go to sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his house. In pursuance of the plan, the next day (17 October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes -waited for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group waited for him at the same places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon Serrano alias Piping promptly invited him to a drink but Navarro declined' saying that he was going somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited for their quarry at the same, places but failed to make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 20 October, the group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling casino between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for some drinks. Navarro ordered some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank. After drinking the contents ,of six bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoe Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping whether what they had drunk was enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more." Navarro left the gambling casino, went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back accompanied by Simplicio Manguerra bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoe Tong wine. Simplicio Manguerra joined the party and all except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank the four bottles of wine. While the spree was going on, Cenon Serrano alias Piping suggested to Pablo Navarro that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which suggestion Navarro agreed. Cenon Serrano alias Piping sent out

Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cadiang returned with an auto calesa jeep driven by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro, Simplicio Manguerra and Anastacio Reyes boarded the jeep, the first and the last sitting at the front with the driver and the rest inside. From the gambling casino the party repaired to Don Q gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando. But before reaching San Fernando, Cenon Serrano alias Piping remarked that "there is no use having a good time" in San Fernando and suggested that they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which suggestion Navarro approved. On the way to Angeles Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the driver to stop at Tony's Place in San Fernando to buy some more wine. After buying another jar of San Miguel gin, part of which Navarro who was already drunk was made to drink, the party resumed their trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon Serrano alias Piping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano alias Piping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At barrio Dolores, the group passed by the house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to come down and ordered him to call for some temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin Tolentino at the house of Dizon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping beckoned and ordered Tolentino to tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon Cenon Serrano's order Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard who came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at Navarro. The latter asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping why he was being tied and Cenon Serrano alias Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up because you are against us." Navarro was brought to the stockade of the civilian guards where he was questioned and accused Cenon Serrano alias Piping of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator Pablo Angeles David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. As Navarro denied the charge, Cenon Serrano alias Piping hit Navarro with his fist, struck him with the butt of his .45 caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as he was ordered by beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter long. As a result of the beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and ordered him to rise, and as Navarro was rising Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping then told Filemon Cenzon to beat up Navarro and Cenzon with the same piece of bamboo struck Navarro on his back about the waistline as he made an effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano alias Piping returned to where the jeep was parked and ordered Felipe Garcia to tie the hands of Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Simplicio Manguerra asked whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano answered "I will also have you killed, you son of a whore." Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes begging for mercy but the latter disengaged himself from him. Cenon

Serrano alias Piping pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat him up. Santiago Yumul hit Manguerra with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered Domingo Cadiang and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the stockade. At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and was ordered by Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in Dolores where De Guzman dug a pit while Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra twice and shoved Manguerra's body in the pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired to the house of Eulogio Serrano in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two victims were already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio Potrero at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As Eulogio Serrano was not in his house when Cenon Serrano alias Piping arrived, the latter boarded the jeep of the late Maximina Serrano and drove on it to the town of Bacolor together with Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes. Upon reaching the second bridge at barrio San Antonio on the way to Bacolor, Santiago Yumul alighted. The rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano in front of the schoolhouse at barrio San Agustin driving a jeep. Cenon Serrano alias Piping reported to Eulogio Serrano that the two men were already in barrio Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang was left in the barrio of San Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes proceeded to the town of Bacolor. In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian guard, was in his house at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and asked him to help him dig a pit at sitio Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his request and helped Tolentino dig it. After digging the pit he went home and then proceeded to his post in sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio Dolores. Upon reaching his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was outside the stockade together with Atilano Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking with another person inside the stockade who he later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro answered that he was not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to take Pablo Navarro out of the stockade and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from behind. Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro fell down dead. Eulogio Serrano ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit that Benjamin Tolentino

and Emiliano Manalo had dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they walked back to barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, Atilano Gopez ordered Emiliano Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late Pablo Navarro, put them in a sack and threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police of Bacolor, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo, accompanied by Constabulary soldiers, exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro. On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin, Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On 12 February 1952, upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the information to testify as witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819 but has not yet been apprehended. Cenon Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at large but later on arrested and brought to trial with his co-defendants in both criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No. 1262) and for the death of Simplicio Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his codefendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. After a joint trial with criminal case No. 1263 for the death of Simplicio Manguerra, the Court found. * * * Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1262 (for the death of Pablo Navarro) and, appreciating No aggravating or mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Pablo Navarro in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. * * *. Only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon have appealed. The appellants deny having been in the house of Eulogio Serrano at barrio Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, in the evening of 16 October 1950, when Eulogio Serrano told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there. Domingo Cadiang claims that on 16 October 1950 he was at the farm of Paquito Liongson in the barrio of San Antonio helping his in-laws thresh palay that they had promised and agreed to do; and that on 17, 18 and 19 October he was in the yard of his house cutting kapok trees for fuel. Filemon Cenzon. claims that on 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00

o'clock in the evening, he was in the market place of Bacolor; that on 17 October up to the early morning of 18 October, he was at Bagac Bay hauling lumber; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 18 October he was already in Bacolor where he refilled the tank of his truck with petrol and thereafter he together with Juanito Bognot proceeded to Dagupan to deliver lumber for his employer, Manuel Joseph, to the Liberty Lumber; and that he returned to Bacolor at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the next day, 19 October, and brought his truck to the garage of the company and went home. Santiago Yumul, corroborated by Martin Tuason and Martin Yumul, claims that from 16 to 19 October 1950 he was working as laborer for Martin Tuason to remove a railroad track of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company leading to Magalang, Pampanga; and for that reason he could not have been with Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang and Filemon Cenzon in the evening of 16 October at the house of Eulogio Serrano, and from 17 to 19 October in the town of Bacolor waiting for Pablo Navarro to carry out the plan of luring him to barrio Dolores and there kill him. And although they admit to have been in the company of Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes, who they claim brought Pablo Navarro and Simplicio Manguerra to barrio Dolores in the jeep driven by Marcelino Sicat on 20 October 1950, yet they disclaim any knowledge of the plot to kill them, and that if they ever took a hand in maltreating the victims it was out of fear to Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping, the latter ordering them to inflict injury upon the victims at the point of a gun. The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo Navarro cannot overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at the house of Eulogio Serrano in the evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It is difficult to believe that a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with him other persons who know nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as they contend, they also would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way Simplicio Manguerra, who was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from reporting to the authorities or from testifying against them in Court; or they also would have been sent away upon arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way that Marcelino Sicat. the driver of the jeep on which they rode in going to the said barrio, was sent away. The way the appellants were seated in the jeep in going to barrio DoloresAnastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at the front seat with the driver and the three appellants on the two parallel seats inside the

jeep-belies the assertion that they were prevented by Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that a criminal act was to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them at the gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable, because the gasoline station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where the slightest commotion or any sign of distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby traffic officer directing the traffic. The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their codefendants were gathered at the house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and temporary police organizations, who ordered them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores, and to kill him there, because he had been inducing anti prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David, to inform him about and to testify on the Maliwalu massacre; that pursuant to the plan laid out by Eulogio, Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where he used to frequent: that they were actually with Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and then to Angeles for a "good time" after a drinking spree in Bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the victim as he was hogtied and rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after the incident together with Cenon Serrano alias Piping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in league with Eulogio Serrano and Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is, therefore, guilty as co-principal. The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a coconspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,"1 applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,2 where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a

polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.3 The trial court did not err in convicting the appellants. For lack of sufficient number of votes to impose the death penalty, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the proportionate costs against the appellants. Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed

People vs. Bulos FACTS: Both the offended party and the accused are working for spouses Mario and Delia Fariolan, who reside in Barangay Dujali, Panabo, Davao. The offended party was the cook and general househelp while the accused worked as a truck helper for the business of Mario Fariolan; they both stayed in the house of the Fariolans. As testified to by Nancy Cordero, at about 3:00 in the afternoon of December 3, 1992, she was in her room folding laundry when the accused suddenly entered, locked the door from inside, and closed the window. At the time, the Fariolans were out of the house. She attempted to flee but the accused grabbed her and threatened her with a hunting knife. Nancy shouted for help, but the accused told her to stop shouting or he will kill her. She lost consciousness and when she came to, she found him on top of her and having carnal knowledge of her. Soon after, a certain "Bong" or "Bobong", the accused's uncle who allegedly served as a lookout, knocked on the door and warned that the Fariolans might be returning anytime soon. Before he left her, the accused threatened the victim not to report the incident to anyone. After he had gone, Nancy examined herself and discovered that she was bleeding. She did not dare tell anyone but wept alone in pain and anger. At 5 o'clock the next morning, Nancy left the Fariolan residence for her house, also in Barangay Duwali, where she told her mother of what happened. Immediately they reported the incident to the barangay captain. On the same day, the accused also left the house of the Fariolans and was nowhere to be located.He only turned up on December 14, 1992, Upon which he was immediately arrested. ISSUE:

Whether or not the lone testimony of the victim in rape cases are competent to establish guilt of the accused. RULING: It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of the rape victim herself is competent to establish guilt, where the same is found to be credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.This is because from the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can oftentimes be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant's testimony. The Court also considers that ordinarily, no woman would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and testify to the details of her ordeal were it not but a response to the compelling need to seek and obtain justice. There is nothing in this case to indicate that Nancy Cordero, an 18-year old cook and house helper, would have any motive to falsely implicate the accused, in the process admitting to the stain to her modesty and honor, and losing her humble means of employment; the logical conclusion is that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. Furthermore, Nancy's statements are corroborated by the medical certificate, which confirmed the presence of healed vaginal lacerations. When testimony of rape is supported by physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal knowledge. Lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. We also join the observation of the trial Court that Nancy Cordero's conduct after the rape renders credibility to her accusations. We have held that the conduct of the victim immediately following the assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.Here, Nancy lost no time in fleeing the Fariolan residence to seek the help of her mother, and together report the matter to the authorities. A gratuitous disclaimer by accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive identification of the offended party, more so if the alibi is corroborated only by the accused's relatives and friends. Accused-appellant argues that the Fariolan spouses, as the employers of both the offended party and accused-appellant, were not only unbiased witnesses but even shared with the offended party an interest in having the perpetrator brought to ,justice as the rape was also effectively a desecration of their home. This argument is unacceptable, however, in light of the spouses' active involvement in persuading Nancy to accept accused-appellant's offer of marriage. It is certainly revealing of which employee they favor, and where their biases lie.

The Court also takes into consideration the flight of accused-appellant the day after the rape, and his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had been reported to the authorities. As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the offended party is an admission of guilt.

COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. HANTEX TRADING CO., INCG.R. No. 136975. March 31, 2005

Facts: Hantex Trading Co is a company organized under the Philippines. It is engaged in the sale of plastic products, it imports synthetic resin and other chemicals for the manufacture of its products. For this purpose, it is required to file an Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (Consumption Entry) with the Bureau of Customs under Section 1301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Sometime in October 1989, Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that the respondent had imported synthetic resin amounting to P115,599,018.00 but only declared

P45,538,694.57. Thus, Hentex receive a subpoena to present its books of account which it failed to do. The bureau cannot find any original copies of the products Hentex imported since the originals were eaten by termites. Thus, the Bureau relied on the certified copies of the respondents Profit and Loss Statement for 1987and 1988 on file with the SEC, the machine copies of the Consumption Entries, Series of 1987,submitted by the informer, as well as excerpts from the entries certified by Tomas and Danganan. The case was submitted to the CTA which ruled that Hentex have tax deficiency and is ordered to pay, per investigation of the Bureau. The CA ruled that the income and sales tax deficiency assessments issued by the petitioner were unlawful and baseless since the copies of the import entries relied upon in computing the deficiency tax of the respondent were not duly authenticated by the public officer charged with their custody, nor verified under oath by the EIIB and the BIR investigators.

Issue: Whether or not the final assessment of the petitioner against the respondent for deficiency income tax and sales tax for the latters 1987 importation of resins and calcium bicarbonate is based on competent evidence and the law.

Held :Central to the second issue is Section 16 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended which provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the power to make assessments and prescribe additional requirements for tax administration and enforcement. Among such powers are those provided in paragraph (b), which provides that Failure to submit required returns, statements, reports and other documents. When a report required by law as a basis for the assessment of any national internal revenue tax shall not be forthcoming within the time fixed by law or regulation or when there is reason to believe that any such report is false, incomplete or erroneous, the Commissioner shall assess the proper tax on the best evidence obtainable. This provision applies when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue undertakes to perform her administrative duty of assessing the proper tax against a taxpayer, to make a return in case of a taxpayers failure to file one, or to amend a return already filed in the BIR. The best evidence envisaged in Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, includes the corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer who is the subject of the assessment process, the accounting records of other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business, including their gross profit and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper, document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other taxpayers who had personal transactions or from whom the subject taxpayer received any income; and record, data ,document and information secured from government offices or agencies, such as the SEC, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff and Customs Commission. However, the best evidence obtainable under Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, does not include mere photocopies of records/documents. The petitioner, in making a preliminary and final tax deficiency assessment against a taxpayer, cannot anchor the said assessment on mere machine copies of records/documents. Mere photocopies of the Consumption Entries have no probative weight if offered as proof of the contents thereof. The reason for this is that such copies are mere scraps of paper and are of no probative value as basis for any deficiency income or business taxes against a taxpayer

SOURCE: http://www.scribd.com/doc/59295752/Case-Digest-II ESTRADA vs Desierto (356 SCRA 108) FACTS: The events which transpired during the 2000-2001 stepdown of power of the former president Estrada brought a lot of issues which the petitioner Estrada assails in this petition before the Supreme Court. On May 1998, Joseph Estrada was elected as the President while Gloria MacapagalArroyo was elected as the Vice President. On 2000 however, issues and expose of

jueteng pay outs were thrown against the president which prompted the Senate and Congress to conduct investigations against the president which resulted to the Impeachment Proceedings against the president. In the course of the proceedings, there was this move to open an envelope which according to the prosecution was a strong evidence against the president. By voting however it was decided not to open the envelope. That event started the call for President Estrada to step down from office by the adverse protests against him, withdrawal of support by the PNP and AFP and call for peaceful, 2001 the president stepped down from his office. The Vice-president then Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took the oath of office and became the President of the Philippines. Petitioner Estrada alleges that he is the president on leave while Gloria MacapagalArroyo alleges that he is the president. ISSUE: Whether or not based on the events that transpired during that period the petitioner resigned as the president. HELD: YES, the petitioner by reason of his actuations during those period clearly showed that he resigned as the president. Supreme Court held that, resignation is not a high level of legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be covered by relinquishment. The validity of resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to express or implied. As long as resignation is clear it must be given legal effect In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, SC that petitioner resigned as President. During the numerous call of the petitioners resignation, evidences proved that indeed the petitioner resigned as the president. During that crucial periods prior of his resignation, his acts and omissions showed his intent to resign as the president. One of the instances which showed his intent to resign is that when during the crowding of people in EDSA, the president called and uttered to his loyal Executive Secretary Angara Ed seryoso na ito, kumalas n si Angelo(Reyes) and an hour later the president called for an snap election in May where he would not be a candidate an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency. The petitioner also during the negotiation for his peaceful exit uttered the words pagod n pagod na ako, ayaw ko na, masyado

ng masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy at intriga , this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation. In sum, Supreme Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency..

Sy April

vs.

Court 12,

of

Appeals 2000

Case: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.

Facts: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute

nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first

time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Issues: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony? Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time

of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Held: A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void We ab note initio that for lack of marriage license and at the time of celebration. are only

their

marriage

certificate

marriage

license

photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to

petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.

G.R. No. 117384 October 21, 1998 HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA

CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed MADRID,respondents. FACTS: On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages 4 against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Isabela. petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents, for P4,000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property. However, the private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said land. On the other hand, the private respondents denied having executed a deed of sale and that the petitioners are in defiance of their repeated demands to relinquish the land in question. Meanwhile, Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976. During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost. Consequently, they were constrained to offer, as Exhibit "A," a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction. However, in disposing of the case, the trial court ruled that Exhibit "A" was inadmissible in evidence and the complaint was dismissed. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter ruled that Exhibit A was admissible in evidence for failure of the private respondents to object at the time when it was offered. While ruling that Exhibit "A" was admissible, concluded that the sine had no probative value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them in 1959. Hence, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thus this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not substantial evidence may be used to prove the sale of the land in question. HELD:

While we concur with the Court of Appeals' finding that Exhibit "A" does not prove that the sale of the land indeed occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the circumstances present in this case. To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office. It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the nonproduction of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable. Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. As earlier stated, Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit "A," the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners' predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying.

In other words, Atty. Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable. However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner. The records show that the disputed petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners' exclusive claim of ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the land rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other buildings was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them protested. We cannot accept the Madrids' explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the unexplained killings within the area. Not a single shred of evidence was presented to show that these killings were perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their remonstration and fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make matters worse, the record is bereft of any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written demand to the petitioners ordering them to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to the petitioners' possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (30) years is simply contrary to their of ownership. Lastly, Marquez' claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspire any merit. In his testimony, he admitted that he knew the land in question. Curiously, in his Answer to the complaint filed by the petitioners, he stated that he has been aware that the former were in possession of the land since 1959. Where a purchaser was fully aware of another person's possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to be an innocent purchaser for value. Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal course of daily life, both the Madrids and Marquezes talked about the status of the property. This being so, it would be difficult to imagine that the latter were not made aware of the petitioner's possession of the land. Armed with such information, they should have acted with the diligence of a prudent man in determining the circumstances surrounding the property. Otherwise, the law does not give him the benefit afforded to an innocent purchaser for value. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Instead, petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. No costs. SO ORDERED.

De La Rama vs. Ledesma G.R. No. L-28498

Facts: Salvador de la Rama is one of the incorporators of the Inocentes de la Rama Inc. He alleged that the corporation suffered damages during the war and had an approved war damage claim in the sum of PhP 106,000.00. The first payment was paid by the Philippine War Damage Commission while de la Rama was still a stockholder. Before the additional liquidation, de la Rama sold to Rafael Ledesma, his own nephew, his 140 shares with the alleged understanding that the former reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits which the latter promised to deliver. The corporation received a final payment in which it was distributed as dividend computed at PhP 29.59 per share. De la Rama demanded the delivery of his alleged share but Ledesma refused so the former filed a money claim suit. In his answer, Ledesma admits the allegation in the complaint except the understanding regarding the unpaid war damage claim. By way of special defense, Ledema claimed that to allow de la Rama to prove any alleged simultaneous oral agreement would run counter to the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. Issue: Whether or not the alleged verbal agreement of the parties can be proven by parol evidence. Held: No. It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been

intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.

ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO v. JUAN MARIANO G.R. No. L-11346. March 21, 1918

Facts: Espiridonia Canuto and Juan Mariano entered into a contract of sale with a right to repurchase over a parcel of land for P360. Such right of repurchase was to expire on December 4, 1914, one year after. Two days before such expiration, Canuto begged an extension of tiem to repurchase the land as she would only be able to get the money to pay Mariano within the end of the month. Mariano agreed to extend it till December 31, as witnessed by Severino Pascual. The following Sunday, Canuto went to the house of Mariano, who promised to meet her at the house of an Atty. Mercado the next afternoon. However, when Canuto went to the meeting place the next day, Mariano didnt show up. Since then, Mariano has refused to carry out the alleged oral agreement, insisting that the redemption period as set in the deed of sale.

Issue: Was there an oral agreement extending the redemption period, and should parole evidence as to such extension be allowed?

Held: Yes. Mariano had extended the time within which Canuto could repurchase the land on the condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period. He cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that Canuto stood ready to make the payment within the extended period and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of Mariano himself.

The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parole of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing. Such parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It is immaterial how soon after the execution of the written contract the parole agreement

was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable, it may be proved and enforced.

Doctrine: The rule forbidding the admission of parole or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict a written instrument does not apply to an agreement between the parties, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN FRANCISCO

Facts: On March 4, 1945, Juan Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead. The defendant signed and sworn an affidavit, Exhibit C, confessing that he stabbed his wife, his child and himself. Issue: Wether or not defendant should be convicted for the crime of parride. Held: Yes. This case, as developed by the evidence for the prosecution, which has not been destroyed nor enervated by that of the defense, presents a truly strange happening. But the fact of the commission of the crime of parricide appears to us to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. As to the reasons impelling the commission of the act, the case is a strange one and admittedly not common. But while it is not necessary even to prove motive in case the commission of the crime is established as required by law, here we have a case of a crime proven beyond reasonable doubt, not absolutely without a proven motive, but with proof of a motive testified to by the accused himself in his confession, strange though it be. But at times "truth is stranger than fiction," and it so happens here. The law must be applied to the facts. As to Exhibit C, this document was sworn to and subscribed by said accused before the justice of the peace of Mansalay. This official testified that he asked the

prisoner before the latter signed said exhibit whether he understood the contents thereof, and that said latter answered in the affirmative. The witness further declared that appellant signed the exhibit voluntarily and that said appellant said that the said affidavit was his (p. 10, ibid.). There is a total absence of evidence, besides the testimony of appellant himself, to show that his statements contained in said exhibit were extracted form him by the use of violence and intimidation. While we are not unaware of the practice resorted to by some peace officers of extracting admissions or confessions from persons accused of crime by the employment of third-degree methods, in the present case we fail to find from the evidence sufficient proof to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of the peace that Exhibit C was signed by appellant voluntarily and with a full understanding thereof. Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said Exhibit C were corroborated by the testimony of his wife on rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of the admissibility of the wife's testimony. At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of their son. (p. 15, ibid.) By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of course, against being subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral and social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may read the same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant child. It has been aptly said that the law of evidence is the law of common sense. Presuming the husband who so testified against his wife to be endowed with common sense, he must be taken to have expected that the most natural reaction which the said testimony would give rise to on the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same testimony, namely, the imputation that it was his wife who killed their little son. Upon the part of the prosecution, because he not only limited himself to denying that he was the killer, but went further and added what was really a new matter consisting in the imputation of the crime upon his wife. And upon the part of the wife, because of the reasons already set forth above. Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, in all fairness, be held to have intended all its aforesaid natural and necessary consequences. By his said act, the husband himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon

the ground of their marital relations must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at the outset. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63, paragraph 3, of the same code, provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, and the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied; in this case, in view of the above indicated circumstance and there being no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty is reclusion perpetua, which was the penalty correctly applied by the trial court, which penalty, of course, carries with it the accessory penalties provided for in article 41 of the said Code. The accused should also be sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romeo Francisco in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975 AVELINO vs. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN, presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I and CONRADO V. POSADAS, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of La Union and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. AQUINO, J. FACTS: Avelino Ordoo was charged in the municipal court of San Gabriel, La Union with having raped his daughter, Leonora, on October 11, 1970. The verified complaint dated November 7, 1973 was signed by the twenty four year old victim (Criminal Case No. 104). In support of that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoo, the mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement wherein she disclosed that on that same date, October 11th, Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoo threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina (his daughter and wife, respectively) if they reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoo in her sworn statement further revealed that her husband had also raped their other daughter, Rosa, on March 25 and April 7, 1973. He was charged in court with that offense. Catalina Ordoo said that the rape committed by Avelino Ordoo against Leonora was mentioned during the investigation and trial of Avelino Ordoo for the rape committed against Rosa Ordoo. Catalina's statement on this point is as follows: Q Why did you not file the complaint against your husband concerning the incident involving Leonora Ordoo? A We Also narrated the incident during the investigation in the Fiscal's Office and also when I testified in court in the case of my daughter Rosa Ordoo but then my daughter Leonora Ordoo was still in Manila, sir. During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino Ordoo because he was already in jail for having raped Rosa Ordoo. The case against Avelino Ordoo, where Leonora Ordoo was the complainant, was elevated to the Court of First Instance of La Union, San Fernando (Criminal Case No. 356). On May 29, 1974 the Fiscal presented Catalina Ordoo as the second prosecution witness. After she had stated her personal circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency. He invoked the marital disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino Ordoo had not consented expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against him. ORDOO, petitioner,

The trial court overruled the objection. After the denial of Avelino Ordoo's motion for the reconsideration of the adverse ruling, he filed the instant action for certiorari and prohibition. He was allowed to sue in forma pauperis. ISSUE: Whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. In the case of Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said: The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other. Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by him against his wife (the victim's mother). That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where, normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually utters the word Inay (Mother) before she invokes the name of the Lord. Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoo, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early morning of October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word, Avelino desisted. That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship is a proposition too obvious to require much elucidation.

MACASIRAY VS PEOPLE G.R. No. 94736. June 26, 1998 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales are the accused in Criminal Case No. 33(86) of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, presided over by Judge Pedro C. Ladignon. The case is for the murder of Johnny Villanueva, husband of private respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva, on February 9, 1986. It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial confession executed by petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on March 27, 1986, in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated petitioners Melecio Macasiray and Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused. Also presented in evidence, as Exhibit D, was the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation of the case on April 8, 1986 before the fiscals office. This transcript contained statements allegedly given by Benedicto in answer to questions of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his extrajudicial confession. When the extrajudicial confession was offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, petitioners objected to its admissibility on the ground that it was given without the assistance of counsel. The transcript of the preliminary investigation proceeding was similarly objected to on the same ground. In its order dated April 14, 1988, the trial court sustained the objections and declared the two documents to be inadmissible. It appears that when it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, Gonzales was asked about his extrajudicial confession (Exh. B). On cross-examination, he was questioned not only about his extrajudicial confession but also about answers allegedly given by him during the preliminary investigation and recorded in the transcript of the proceeding. As he denied the contents of both documents, the prosecution presented them as rebuttal evidence, allegedly to impeach the credibility of Gonzales. Petitioners once more objected and the trial court again denied admission to the

documents. (Order, dated Oct. 17, 1988) Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial courts orders and succeeded. The Court of Appeals declared the two documents admissible in evidence and ordered the trial court to admit them. Hence, this petition for review of the appellate courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the

documents, either by failing to object to their introduction during the trial or by using them in evidence RULING:

First. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered.[4] In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,[5] specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.[6] It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents when they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by their failure to object when these were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial. That was not the proper time to make the objection. Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. Thus, it has been held that the identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. It may be mentioned in this connection that in one case, objection to the admissibility of a confession on the ground that no meaningful warning of his constitutional rights was given to the accused was raised as soon as the prosecution began introducing the confession, and the trial judge sustained the objection and right away excluded the confession. This Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, upheld the action of the trial court over the dissent of Justice Aquino, who argued that the trial courts ruling was premature, considering that the confession was merely being identified. It was not yet being formally offered in evidence.[10] On the other hand, Justice Barredo, concurring, while agreeing that objection to documentary evidence should be made at the time of formal offer, nonetheless thought that to faithfully carry out the constitutional mandate, objections based on the Miranda right to counsel at the stage of police interrogation should be raised as early as possible and the ruling on such objections made just as soon in order not to create prejudice in the judge, in the event the confession is found inadmissible.[11] But the ruling in that case does not detract from the fact that objections should be made at the stage of formal offer. Objections to the admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court may rule on them then, but, if this is not done, the party should make the objections when the documentary evidence is formally offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other party. Indeed, before it was offered in evidence, the confession in this case cannot even be considered as evidence to which the accused should object.

Second. Nor is it correct to say that the confession was introduced in evidence by Benedicto Gonzales himself when it was his turn to present evidence for the defense. What happened is that despite the fact that in its order of April 14, 1988 the court sustained the objection to the admissibility of the confession and the statements given by Benedicto Gonzales at the preliminary investigation, the defense nonetheless asked him questions regarding his confession in reference to his denial of liability. It was thus not for the purpose of using as evidence the confession and the alleged statements in the preliminary investigation but precisely for the purpose of denying their contents that Gonzales was asked questions. Gonzales denied he ever gave the answers attributed to him in the TSN allegedly taken during the preliminary investigation. The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions regarding his confession inasmuch as the court had already declared both the confession and the transcript of stenographic notes to be inadmissible in evidence, but certainly the defense should not be penalized for exercising an abundance of caution. In fact, the defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits, which is proof of the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is, therefore, no basis for the appellate courts ruling that because the defense adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived any objection to the admission of the same in evidence.

LOPEZ VS VALDEZ G.R. No. L-9113 December 24, 1915 FACTS: This is an action begun by Benito Lopez, the administrator of the estate of Marcela Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for the recovery of possession of the land described in the complaint on the payment by the plaintiff of the sum of P30. Judgment was for plaintiff and the court ordered delivery of possession of the land described in the complaint on the payment by plaintiff of the P30 mentioned in the complaint. The court also ordered the cancellation of the registration of that portion of the land of Gregorio San Agustin which includes the land in litigation in this action. Valdez appealed. CONTENTION OF DEFEDANT: When Lopez relied on certain written contracts entered into between the appellant and Marcela Emradura during her lifetime to prove the cause of action set out in the complaint, the documents themselves were not produced and when counsel for appellee sought to prove by certain witnesses the contents of these documents, without presenting facts justifying secondary evidence with reference

thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection that the evidence was incompetent and improper as the documents themselves were the best evidence. Several of these objections were made, to each of which the court, without a decision on the objections, stated: "The objection of Mr. Reyes will be taken into consideration." The witnesses were thereupon allowed, over the exception of appellant, to answer the questions to which the objections were interposed. A decision on these objections was thus left in abeyance and the trial terminated without a resolution of the questions presented. In spite of that the trial court in its final decision took into consideration the secondary evidence thus introduced and based its decision thereon. RULING: We are of the opinion that this procedure was prejudicial to the rights and interests of the appellant. Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground are entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is made unless they present a question with regard to which the court desires to inform itself before making its ruling. In that event it is perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time to study the question presented by the objection; but a ruling should always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom the ruling is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling. The disadvantageous position in which a party may be put by the reservation of a ruling on an objection to a question is illustrated by the case in hand. If the court had given a prompt ruling on the objections, appellant would have had an opportunity to meet the situation presented. If his objection had been overruled, he could have taken his exception and offered evidence to rebut that adduced by the objectionable questions. If the ruling had been the other way, appellee would have been under the necessity of offering the documents themselves, at which time appellant would have been able to present any defense to them which the facts and circumstances might have required or permitted. There having been no decision during the course of the trial, appellant's counsel had no means of knowing what the ruling of the court would be on the objection and, consequently, he could not know whether or not he would be compelled to meet any evidence at all; for, if the objection were sustained, then appellee had offered no competent evidence to support his case; whereas, if the objection were overruled, then appellant would not have the benefit of a ruling on his objection or of the exception taken thereto. We do not regard the procedure objected to as permissible under the facts and circumstances of this case and we believe that it prejudiced the substantial rights of appellant.

PEOPLE VS SINGH February 9, 1924 G.R. No. L-21074

OSTRAND, J.:

FACTS: Early in the morning of the 19th day of March, 1921, Santa Singh, an East Indian, was found dead on the sidewalk in front of his tienda in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. There were three knife wounds on the body, one of them necessarily mortal. Several articles of womans wear were lying nearby and, at first, it was thought that the deceased had been killed by a woman, but investigations based upon that theory proved fruitless. Sometime in the month of May of the same year, the accused Buda Singh confessed to a friend of his, Ram Singh, that he had killed Santa Singh and related the details of the crime, implicating five other East Indians in its commission. On a subsequent occasion Ram Singh thought that Buda Singh looked at him with malos ojos. Suspecting that Buda Singh regretted having made the confession and contemplated killing him, Ram Singh reported the matter to the authorities and the present action was instituted against Buda Singh and his five alleged companions. On motion of the fiscal the case was dismissed against all of the defendants except Buda Singh. Upon trial, the court below found Buda Singh guilty of homicide. From this sentence the defendant appeals.

CONTENTION OF DEFENDANT: Singh asserted the failure of the trial court to rule out the testimony of Ram Singh in regard to the appellants confession. It appears that after this testimony had been received without objection, counsel for the defendant moved that it be stricken from the record on the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement and counsel asserts that it has never been ruled upon and that this has resulted to the defendants prejudice, inasmuch as he has had no opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession.

RULING: There is no merit in this contention. The evidence was clearly admissible. Act No. 619, upon which the argument of counsel is evidently based, has been repealed by the Administrative Code and evidence of a confession may now be received without direct affirmative evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. (U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308.) The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence in rebuttal, the matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion. No such motion having been presented, this court will not now reopen the case for a new trial. LECHUGAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

143 SCRA 335 (AUGUST 6, 1986)

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against private

respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456.

Petitioner testified that she bought the land now subject of the litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a public DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE which the plaintiff has caused to be registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds; preparatory to the execution of the deed Exhibited A, plaintiff had segregated the bigger portion of the 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by contracting a private land surveyor, to survey the land on December 3, 1950, and established its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance with said plan. Petitioner also states that she caused the declaration of said portion of six hectares subject of Exhibit A in her name beginning 1951 and paid taxes on the same.

Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which petitioner bought from Leoncia is different from the land now subject of this action. Defendants evidence in chief shows that on April 6, 1931, Hugo Loza, predecessor-in- interest of heirs of herein defendants purchased two parcels of lot including that of four hectares from Emeterio Lasangue as evidenced by the deed of sale. Defendants further claim that the lot bought by plaintiff from Leoncia as exhibit A, is situated south of the land now subject of this action and which likewise showed by the testimony of vendor Leoncia.

The complaint was dismissed by the CFI of Iloilo and was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Parol Evidence rule applies.

HELD: NO. As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the Parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The petitoners reliance on the parol evidenced rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favour of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold between petitioner and private respondents. In the case at bar, through testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what was really intended to sell and to be subject of exhibit A was lot no. 5522, but not being able to read and write and fully relying in the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which the petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

TAN vs CA On May 14, 1978 and July 6, 1978, petitioner Antonio Tan obtained two (2) loans each in the principal amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), or in the total principal amount of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) from respondent Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP, for brevity) evidenced by two (2) promissory notes with maturity dates on May 14, 1979 and July 6, 1979, respectively. Petitioner defaulted but after a few partial payments he had the loans restructured by respondent CCP, and petitioner accordingly executed a promissory note (Exhibit A) on August 31, 1979 in the amount of Three Million Four Hundred Eleven Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-One Pesos and Thirty-Two Centavos (P3,411,421.32) payable in five (5) installments. Petitioner Tan failed to pay any installment on the said restructured loan of Three Million Four Hundred Eleven Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-One Pesos and Thirty-Two Centavos (P3,411,421.32), the last installment falling due on December 31, 1980. In a letter dated January 26, 1982, petitioner requested and proposed to respondent CCP a mode of paying the restructured loan, i.e., (a) twenty percent (20%) of the principal amount of the loan upon the respondent giving its conformity to his proposal; and (b) the balance on the principal obligation payable in thirty-six (36) equal monthly installments until fully paid. On October 20, 1983, petitioner again sent a letter to respondent CCP requesting for a moratorium on his loan obligation until the following year allegedly due to a substantial deduction in the volume of his business and on account of the peso devaluation. No favorable response was made to said letters. Instead, respondent CCP, through counsel, wrote a letter dated May 30, 1984 to the petitioner demanding full payment, within ten (10) days from receipt of said letter, of the petitioners restructured loan which as of April 30, 1984 amounted to Six Million Eighty-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five Pesos and Three Centavos (P6,088,735.03)

HELD: First, the letter dated September 28, 1988 alleged to have been sent by the respondent CCP to the petitioner is not part of the formally offered documentary evidence of either party in the trial court. That letter cannot be considered evidence pursuant to Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court which provides that: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered xxx. Besides, the said letter does not contain any categorical agreement on the part of respondent CCP that the payment of the interest and surcharge on the loan is deemed suspended while his appeal for condonation of the interest and surcharge was being processed.

GONZALEZ vs CA FACTS: On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as

administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola. On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that

Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during these period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad. On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad. Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers estate. Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties HELD: irst, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latters death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunaos death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is

different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado. As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.i The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. inadmissible in evidence. We thus hold the affidavit

And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,

notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the trial court: In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

People vs Brioso

FACTS: In four (4) separate Informations (in Crim. Cases Nos. 876-K, 891-K, 892-K and 893-K) filed before Branch XXIV of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, the accused appellants CENON Brioso, SEVERINO Brioso and MONICO Vitamog were charged with Murder for the clubbing to death of the spouses Cresencio Vitamog and Erlinda Vitamog, and with Frustrated Murder for the serious head injuries sustained by the couple's two (2) children, KENNEDY Vitamog and Presley Vitamog, committed at around midnight of 15 March 1983 in the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Ilocos Sur. All three accused entered pleas of Not Guilty to the four charges. After a joint trial, the Trial Court rendered verdicts of guilty and decreed: WHEREFORE, finding the accused Cenon Brioso, Severino Brioso and Monico Vitamog, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged in the four (4) informations filed in these cases, judgment is hereby rendered against them, as follows: (1) In Criminal Case No. 876-K, each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Cresencio Vitamog in the amount of P30,000.00; and to pay one-third of the costs; (2) In Criminal Case No. 893-K, each is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Erlinda Vitamog in the amount of P30,000.00; and to pay one-third of the costs; (3) In Criminal Case No. 891-K, each is hereby sentenced to a prison term ranging from six (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the victim Presley Vitamog in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay one-third of the costs;

(4) In Criminal Case No. 892-K, each is hereby sentenced to a prison term ranging from six (6) YEARS and ONE (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the victim Kennedy Vitamog in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay one-third of the costs. 1

HELD:

There is also physical evidence supporting KENNEDY's declaration that SEVERINO was among the three persons who perpetrated the crime. The hair strands found gripped in Erlinda Vitamog's hand during the autopsy is a strong indication that there was a struggle between her and at least one of her assailants as further shown by a broken chair found at the crime scene. This prompted the investigators to secure hair samples from twelve possible suspects, among them the three accused. A biological comparison of the hair specimens by an NBI Senior Analyst showed that only those taken from accused SEVERINO (Exhibit "M-1") and his brother Antonio Exhibit "M-2") resembled the hair strands found gripped by the victim Erlinda. All the other samples did not. And although Antonio is not an accused, he was a suspect and a specimen of his hair was also received from him. As the NBI Analyst testified in respect of the hair samples from SEVERINO: Q Briefly speaking, what are the characteristics of the samples of hair of Severino Brioso represented in your Biology Report No. B-83-501 that resemble the specimens of hair represented in your Biology Report No. B-83-493? (referring to the hair samples taken from the deceased Erlinda Vitamog (Exh. "M-5") A They almost resemble in all aspects, except for the absence of roots in the hair samples taken from the hand grip of the victim, sir. 16 (Emphasis supplied) The close resemblance in "almost all aspects" of the hair strands from Erlinda's grip and those of SEVERINO indicate, at the very least, that SEVERINO was present at the crime scene contrary to his denials. The fact that the hair specimens of the other two accused CENON and MONICO did not show such resemblance would only indicate that

it was not with either of them that the victim, Erlinda Vitamog, had grappled with, but would not negate their direct participation in the commission of the offense as testified to by KENNEDY. The accused tried to inculpate Cornelio alias "Icco", the brother of the victim Cresencio, as the culprit on the basis of the testimony of one Leonora Gascon that Cresencio had told her to supervise the construction of their house because he had an inkling that his brother Cornelio intended to harm them. This, however, is at best hearsay. And, contrary to Leonora Gascon's testimony, the brother Cornelio attended the wake and the funeral of the deceased couple. That he left the day after the funeral to reside in Caloocan City is not an act synonymous with guilt since he is employed in a lumber farm thereat and was afraid that he might suffer the same fate. The denials made and the alibis advanced by the accused cannot prevail over their positive Identification by eyewitness KENNEDY. As has been consistently held, alibi is the weakest of all defenses specially where it has not been shown that it was not physically impossible for the accused to have been present at the place where the crime was committed at the time it was perpetrated. CENON's flue-curing barn was also close to the place of the incident that his wife heard the victim Erlinda scream; while the houses of SEVERINO and MONICO were just a few hundred meters from the crime scene. The acts of commiseration shown by the accused in that MONICO helped in making the hammock on which was loaded the bodies of the deceased; that he and CENON helped in constructing the tombs for the victims; that SEVERINO had attended the wake four (4) times, do not militate against a finding of guilt. They were a convenient ploy to detract suspicion away from them. In the final analysis, it is settled doctrine that with respect to the issue of credibility of witnesses, we have always accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the Trial Court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless the Court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that if considered, might affect the result of the case. 17 The Trial Court cannot be faulted for any such misapprehension of factual findings in the case at bar. By reason of the positive Identification of the accused by a credible prosecution witness as the perpetrators of the crimes charged, neither can KENNEDY's testimony be discredited by them by invoking lack of sufficient motive on their part to commit the

offenses attributed to them. For, it is basic that motive assumes importance only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, 18 which doubt is inexistent herein. People vs De Garcia

FACTS: The prosecutions case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector OLIVER ENMODIAS. He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE

PANGANIBAN boarded a passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, en route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the jeepney reached km. 4 or 5, accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accuseds bag. To confirm their suspicion, they decided to follow

accused when he gets off the jeepney. The accused alighted at the Baguio City hall and the police officers trailed him. The accused proceeded to Rizal Park and sat by the monument. Half a meter away, the police officers saw the accused retrieve a green travelling bag from the back pocket of his pants. He then transferred five (5) packages wrapped in newspaper from the plastic bag to the green bag. As the newspaper wrapper of one of the packages was partially torn, the police officers saw the content of the package. It appeared to be marijuana. Forthwith, the policemen approached the accused and identified themselves. The

accused appeared to be nervous and did not immediately respond. The policemen then asked the accused if they could inspect his travelling bag. The accused surrendered his bag and the inspection revealed that it contained five (5) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The police officers then arrested the accused and seized his bag. The accused was turned over to the CIS office at the Baguio Water District Compound for further investigation. He was appraised of his custodial rights. At about 5 p.m., the arresting officers left for the crime laboratory at Camp Dangwa, Benguet, for chemical analysis of the items seized from the accused. The next day, the policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest and transferred the accused to the Baguio city jail. Verification by the arresting officers of the records at the Narcotics Command revealed that the accuseds name was in the list of drug dealers. The result of chemical analysis of the five (5) items seized from the accused confirmed that they were dried marijuana fruiting tops, weighing a total of five (5) kilos.i

For his part, the accused admitted being at the locus criminis but denied possessing marijuana or carrying any bag on November 28, 1994. He alleged that on said day, at about 8:00 a.m., he left his residence in Angeles City to visit his brother, NICK GARCIA, whom he had not seen for ten (10) years. He arrived in Baguio City at 12:30 p.m. Before proceeding to his brothers house, he took a stroll at the Rizal Park. At about 2:00 p.m., two (2) men accosted him at the park. They did not identify

themselves as police officers. They held his hands and ordered him to go with them. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly taken to a waiting car and brought to a safehouse. There, he was asked about the source of his supply of illicit drugs. When he denied knowledge of the crime imputed to him, he was brought to a dark room where his hands were tied, his feet bound to a chair, his mouth covered by tape and his eyes blindfolded. They started mauling him. Initially, he claimed he was kicked and

punched on the chest and thighs. When asked further whether he suffered bruises and broken ribs, he answered in the negative. Thereafter, he explained that there were no visible signs of physical abuse on his body as he was only punched, not kicked. Notwithstanding the maltreatment he suffered, the accused claimed he stood firm on his denial that he was dealing with illicit drugs. To corroborate accuseds testimony, the defense presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN, a resident of Baguio City and a neighbor of accuseds brother Nick Garcia. He came to know the accused in 1994 when accused visited his brother Nick, a few months before accused was arrested in November that same year. He recounted that in the

afternoon of November 28, 1994, while he was walking along Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men holding the accuseds hands and forcing him to a car. He was then about 8-10 meters away. He did not see the accused or any of the two men carrying a bag. HELD: Coming now to appellants defense, we find that his simplistic version of what transpired that fateful day utterly failed to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution. His testimony is not worthy of credence. Firstly, appellant insists he did not bring any travelling bag or personal items with him. However, we find it baffling that one would visit a relative in a distant province and fail to bring clothes and other personal belongings for the duration of his stay. Secondly, while appellant repeatedly emphasized that he went to Baguio City to visit his brother whom he had not seen for ten years, his corroborating witness, de Guzman, adamantly insisted that the first time he met appellant was only months before the arrest. Thirdly, we find it altogether disturbing that appellant, without compunction, acknowledged in open court that

he lied when he initially claimed he was kicked by the police officers while under their custody. After testifying that he was kicked and punched on the chest and thighs, appellant unwittingly declared that he suffered no broken ribs or internal injury as a result of the alleged mauling. Realizing the improbability of his claim of maltreatment, he promptly altered his previous testimony. He sought to explain the lack of visible signs of physical abuse on his body by clarifying that he was only punched, not kicked, by the police authorities. Lastly, it runs counter to common experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to alleged physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant, through all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not confided to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities. In sum, appellants defense lacks the ring of truth. Neither did the testimony of appellants corroborating witness aid the defense as it is equally flawed. De Guzman testified that he saw appellant being held by two men and being forced into a car, yet he never revealed what he saw to appellants brother Nick. No explanation was offered for this omission. Although de Guzman thought that the two men harbored ill intentions in abducting appellant, he never reported the incident to the police nor told Nick, appellants brother, about what he witnessed. In fact, it was when Nick told him that appellant was in jail that de Guzman allegedly mentioned to Nick what he saw days earlier. Treated separately, the incongruent details in the defense theory may appear innocuous at first blush. However, the inconsistencies eventually add up, striking at the very core of appellants defense -- the real purpose of his presence at the crime scene. The contradictions become disturbing as they remain unsatisfactorily explained by the defense and unrebutted on record.In sum, we find the testimony of Senior Inspector Enmodias credible to sustain a judgment of conviction. We reiterate the familiar rule that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is enough to convict an accused. For indeed, criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses presented against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness..]It bears stress that it is the quality, not the quantity, of testimony that counts. To be sure, a corroborative testimony is not necessary where the details of the crime have been testified to with sufficient clarity. As there was nothing to indicate in this case that police officer Enmodias was inspired by ill-motive to testify mendaciously against appellant, the trial court had every reason to accord full faith and credit to his testimony.

EVIDENCE: CASE DIGEST

SUBMITTED BY: VALDEZ, LUIGI E. 3-A