GAMILLA v MARIO FACTS: Atty Marino, Jr.

as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35 Milllion. The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989, the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of 16 officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including Atty Marino, Jr. The Sec of Labor prescribed the retroactivity of the collective bargaining agreement to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment to settle backwages. The important fact in this case is that Atty, Marino, as president, negotiated with UST as union attorney, even though he was an interested party since he was one of the officers who were dismissed (conflict of interests) ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. Atty Marino failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union atty and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attys fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such clain to the members of the UST Faculty Union. 2. As one of the 16 union officers and directors seeking compensation from the UST for their illegal dismissal, Atty. Marino was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an atty from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an atty to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. 3. Atty Marino. Both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of the union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him at the expense of the other faculty members. He also ought to have disclosed his interest (which he only did only years after the consummation of his share.. tsk bad.) SHIRLEY TOLEDO and ROSIE DAJAC vs. JUDGE KALLOS Facts: Prior to his appointment as a judge, Judge Kallos was complainants counsel of record in a Civil Case involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514

square meters of "lot 2082 Albay Cadastre." On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executor. In 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, a Civil Case for the issuance of an order constituting in his favor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorneys fees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when "one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share. Later, the complainants filed a complaint praying for three things. First, they pray for an order directing the respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share attorneys fees. Second, the recovery of the property involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. Lastly, the removal of the respondent from his position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. Issues: 1.WON respondent has the right to demand his attorneys fees. Held: Yes. Respondent judge was, indeed, complainants counsel in a Civil Case and he should therefore be compensated for his services. The act of demanding payment for his attorneys fees is not a ground for administrative liability.Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.As what constitute fair and reasonable fees in this case is not yet certain. The respondents claim for attorneys fees was still being litigated in a Civil Case.Thus, said reasonable fees is not yet certain. As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for his services. And his filing of a claim for attorneys fees in a Civil Case was an appropriate legal remedy. Considering the pendency of such claim, the suspension of the determination of the instant administrative complaint until the rendition of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondents attorneys fees is just proper. In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The hearing on the matter being conducted by the trial court should be allowed to run its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute. Here,the duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. 2. WON respondent Judge be removed from his position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge Held:No. There was no evidence presented to prove respondents alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. Here, the respondent was not yet a judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him. As such, and to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as a judge. SC: the instant administrative complaint was DISMISSED for being premature and for lack of merit. DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99634. JUNE 10, 2002 Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutors office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed. Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioners feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively. Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. PNB v ATTY CEDO Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving govt. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he had intervened with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB. During Cedos stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner. Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ongs case. He also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.

Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02. Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. GLORITO MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO GONZALES Sps. Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in law, Glorito MAturan as their atty- in-fact, thru a SPA. Said SPA authorized MAturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying the lot, located in GEnSan as well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of PD 772 again in connection with the lot. Respondent, prepared and notarized said SPA. Subsequently, Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters occupying the lot. While the said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former. Respondent declared that he was of the belief that the filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyerclient relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his childrens sustenance. HELD: Respondent here was guilty of representing conflicting interests thus, he was suspended for two years. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of atty and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. As lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of clients secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of motion for writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.

ERLINDA ABRAGAN ET.AL. VS. ATTY MAXIMO RODRIGUEZ A.C. NO. 4346. APRIL 3, 2002 Facts: Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in a case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants. Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer client relationship. On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without the petitioners consent. That as a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the complainants.

The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basis for Imeldas decision to use his services. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. 77 ARTEZUELA v MADERAZO

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.

Held: Yes. In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. NAKPIL v VALDES Facts: Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted. What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil. Issue: W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely: o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil; o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm. Held: The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.

Facts: Echavia had a vehicular accident in Mandaue City. Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar owned by a Japanese national but in the name of his brother-in-law Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. Artezuela engaged the services of Atty. Maderazo in filing a damage suit against Echavia. Artezuela paid Maderazo the amount of P10,000 as attorneys fees and P2,000 as filing fee. Artezuela filed a suit for disbarment against Maderazo. She alleged that Maderazo grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer. According to Artezuela, atty. did not do anything to keep the case moving and atty. withdrew his services without obtaining Artezuelas consent. Artezuela also alleged that Atty. Maderazo engaged in activities inimical to her interests. She says that while acting as her counsel, Atty. Maderazo prepared Echavias answer. Atty. Maderazo claims that the document of Echavia was not prepared by him. According to him, the answer by Echavia was only printed in his office. Issue: W/N Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Held: Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Suspension of 6 months. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be the counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of another party who is claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of the original client. Because of the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and the client, sound public policy dictates that the lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to

refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report and recommendation. 2 As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows: On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc. On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b"). On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf. 3 The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and

client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. 9 Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well. ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. DEE v CA Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey Dee, to Ceasars Palace. Petitioners father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey having heard of a link between the mafia and Ceasars Palace and his possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000. Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits. Atty Mutuc talked with the president of Ceasars palace and advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated from liability. Ramon Sy acknowledged the obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared. Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorneys fees. Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner Dee for the collection of attorneys fees. Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between hin and Atty Mutuc. Dee insists that the visits made to Atty Mutuc was merely informal and that Atty Mutuc had not been specifically contacted to handle the problem. The P50,000 given to Atty Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorneys fees but merely pocket money. Issue: W/n there was a lawyer-client relationship Held: YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorneys fees for professional services rendered. To establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in

pursuance of a request from the latter. receive a reasonable compensation.

Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to

Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when Dee alleged that Mutuc was acting as agent of Ceasars Palace. Mutucs representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the casinos claim but were actually geared toward proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney: (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; (i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. Revelation of secrets. In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity. The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

CANON 14 A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. The relation of attorney and client may be created not only by the voluntary agreement between them but also by the appointment of an attorney as counsel de oficio for a poor or indigent litigant, and the attorney so appointed has as high a duty to the indigent as to his paying client. *RULE 14.01 Rule 1138, S. 20(h). Duty of attorneys: x x x never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. Rule 138, s.20 (i). In the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion to the guilt of the accused to present every evidence that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. Rule 14.01 however is not applicable in civil cases because of obvious reasons. It is the lawyers duty To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear o him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. (Rule 138, section 20 , RRC) when the lawyer signs a complaint or answer, his signature is deemed a certification by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support xxx (Rule 7, Section 5, ROC). For violating this rule, the lawyer may be subjected to disciplinary action. *RULE 14.02 I. COUNSEL DE OFFICIO A counsel de officio is the counsel appointed by the court to represent and defend the accused in case he cannot afford to employ one himself

Rule 138, s. 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants: A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown. Rule 116, s.7 Appointment of counsel de oficio. WHO: WHO CAN BE APPOINTED COUNSEL DE OFFICIO?

1. members of the bar in good standing; 2. any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, in localities without lawyers WHAT CONSIDERED: 1. 2. 3. II. gravity of offense difficulty of questions that may arise experience and ability of appointee AMICUS CURIAE

Rule 138, s. 36 Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it. Definition: bystander; friend of the court whose function is to remind the court or tribunal of some matter which otherwise might escape its notice and in regard to which it might be wrong. One who gives information upon some question of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken, or upon a matter of which the court may take judicial cognizance. *RUL 14.03 The rule involves indigent clients who come to a lawyer for legal services. Under Rule 138, Section 31 of the Rules of Court, a judge may assign a lawyer to render a professional service free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation, it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney. The lawyer assigned must render the required legal service unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient of cause shown.