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Dreyfus, Georges B.J., Recognizing Reality: Dharmakrtis Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. [SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies.] Albany: State University of New York Press 1997, pp. xxi, 622. ISBN 0-7914-3097-9, 0-7914-3098-7. The book under review is a splendid harvest from the eld of the studies of Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition at the end of the twentieth century. The author, Prof. Georges B.J. Dreyfus, is well known for his varied education and career. He studied Buddhist philosophy with Tibetan teachers for fteen years in Tibetan monasteries in India, where he completed the Ge-shay (dge shes) degree. He then started learning Western philosophy and Sanskrit literature in the USA. In 1991, he brought together his broad knowledge and deep philosophical insight successfully in his Ph.D. thesis (Ontology, Philosophy of Language and Epistemology in Buddhist Tradition, University of Virginia), on which this book is based. His long and extensive academic training in both Tibetan and Western cultural circles allowed him a critical analysis of his materials. The book deals with the three streams of the Buddhist logicoepistemological tradition: Indian tradition (Dharmakrti and his prede cessors and successors) and two Tibetan lineages, viz. the Sa skya lineage and bKa gdams-dGe lugs lineage.1 That is to say, the historical development of thought over one thousand ve hundred years from the fourth to the twentieth century comes into the scope of the authors investigation. Moreover, the author takes account of Indian non-Buddhist philosophy as well as Western philosophy, including modern philosophy, for he thinks that such a comparison helps readers with a correct understanding of Indian and Tibetan terminology. His enthusiasm for a deeper exploration of the tradition pushed him to this challenge and opened the door to a systematic exposition of the development of Dharmakrtis philosophy within a considerably wide scope. The present book is indeed the most convincing demonstration of the methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must be examined not in isolation from but in connec1 See the lists of thinkers and authors belonging to each lineage handled in the book

(pp. xvixix). Indo-Iranian Journal 46: 349368, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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tion with its historical and cultural circumstances. Not only scholars who have been confronted with Tibetan interpretations of Indian thought but those who are interested in any philosophical inquiry have given Dreyfus a warm welcome for this publication. The present reviewer, who has been receiving great benet from his studies, should also like to express her sincere gratitude to him. The focus of this book centers upon Tibetan articulations of Dharmakrtis system, especially the interpretation of universals in the classical period of Tibetan Buddhism between the end of the fourteenth and the end of the fteenth centuries. In various stages of his discussion, the author analyzes the problem of universals in its various aspects. The entire work is divided into two books entitled Ontology and Philosophy of Language (Book I) and Epistemology (Book II). Book I has three parts (Ontology, the Problem of Universals and Philosophy of Language), consisting of fteen chapters. Later twelve chapters from 16 to 27 belong to Book II, which is compiled under the subjects Valid Cognition and Perception. For each topic, the author opens his discussion with an introductory chapter to explain terminology, basic ideas and historical backgrounds, which is followed by the chapter for examining Dharmakrtis original thought. Then, the author proceeds to the chapters where its Tibetan interpretations are investigated. In particular, theoretical discrepancies between Sa skya thinkers and dGe lugs thinkers are closely examined. This simple but solid procedure gives the entire discussion an enormous clarity. Readers can survey the structure of the book by looking at the table of contents (pp. vix), in which all subtitles are included. The author gives careful explanation by using a standard Western philosophical vocabulary to the most important terms and ideas of Dharmakrtis tradition such as valid cognition (pram na, tshad ma), momentariness (ksanikatva, a. . . skad cig ma nyid), elimination of others (any poha, gzhan sel), universal a (s m nya, spyi), and perception (pratyaksa, mngon sum). The rich matea a . rials in Sanskrit, Tibetan and modern literature, which the author has consulted, are referred to in the notes to each chapter (pp. 463561). The book also includes glossaries (Tibetan-Sanskrit-English, SanskritTibetan-English, pp. 563580), bibliography (pp. 581601), author index (pp. 603609), and subject index (pp. 611622). Tibetan names are phoneticized in accordance with the essay phonetic system developed by Jeffrey Hopkins. Covering a tremendously extensive eld, this book undertakes an ambitious enterprise to deal with the interactions between history and philosophy, between India and Tibet, between Buddhism and non-Buddhism,

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between India and West, between tradition and modern thinking, or, between traditions. In order to establish a critical comparison, however, it is required to provide a detailed picture of the philosophical positions of each tradition and each thinker. The author seems to have successfully performed this difcult task by centering his discussion upon the question of universals. Ontology is, in his words, closely linked to the question of whether universals exist, and linguistically, they can be thought of as designated by general terms (p. 49). From this viewpoint, the author tries to analyze Dharmakrtis ontological position in Chapter 1 by contrasting it with that of his contemporary adversaries, especially the Ny ya school, as well as with the ontology of modern a philosophers such as W.V. Quine. The author proposes as the framework of his discussion to differentiate Dharmakrtis antirealist position from the realism of his Hindu opponents on the basis of his rejection of real universals (p. 54). Dharmakrti opposes the concept of specically char acterized (svalaksana, rang mtshan) to that of universal (s m nya, spyi) a a . . or generally characterized (s m nyalaksana, spyi mtshan). Dreyfus a a . . special interest attaches to the Tibetan interpretations of the ontological status of universals. It is undoubtedly an important contribution of this book to have revealed the detail of dGe lugs realism, which he designates moderate realism in contrast with the extreme realism of the Ny ya a school (pp. 106, 173, 179). Tsong kha pa, mKhas grub and rGyal tshab, namely, consider that coarse objects, continua, and universals have some reality, but they do not accept the independent existence of these objects from svalaksana or rang mtshan (p. 106 infra). Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge . . belongs to this realist lineage, whereas most Sa skya scholars conform to Dharmakrtis antirealistic view. This picture is now accepted to a certain degree, if not completely,2 and stimulates readers of different interests to further discussion. Specialists of relevant elds are expected to review critically Dreyfus evaluation of respective theories of Indian and Western philosophy. Regarding his treatment of Sanskrit literature, there seems to remain some unsatisfactory points. Misspelling of terms should have been avoided.3 For some Tibetan words, a more adequate Sanskrit equivalent
2 L. van der Kuijp has questioned in his review of the present book (Journal of Asian Studies 1997; 56(4): 10831086) Dreyfus way to subsume the variety of thinkers under one doctrinal lineage. 3 Corrections are given in parentheses: anavayin (avayavin) pp. 56, 83, paramarthasatya (param rthasatya) p. 84, gattva (gotva) p. 137, parin ma (parinama) p. 137, a a . bedh bedha (bhed bheda) p. 140, abh vadhi (abh vadh) p. 233, pratiedha (pratisedha) a a a a s . p. 247, adhyavasaya (adhyavas ya) pp. 288, 355, viaya (visaya) p. 299, arth pati a s a . (arth patti) p. 370, kanikatv num na (ksanikatv num na) p. 477, hetus magri a s a a a a a . . (hetus magr) p. 480. In Glossary: samvrti (samvrti) p. 563, purua (purusa) pp. 563, 577, a . s . . .

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could be proposed.4 In the notes in which the texts from Vasubandhus Abhidharmakoabh s ya, Dharmakrtis Ny yabindu (NB), Dharmottaras s a. a Ny yabindutk (NBT), and Kamalalas Tattvasamgrahapajik are a a s a . . . cited, it would be more helpful if the Sanskrit originals were referred to.5 Since the author clearly states that his aim is not only to clarify the Tibetan interpretations of Indian Buddhist epistemology but also to investigate Dharmakrtis philosophy in its Indian context,6 it is important for readers too to examine the authors interpretation of Dharmakrtis tenets. The present reviewer should like to conne herself to reconsidering the authors identication of svalaksana with the real on the basis of . . their being individual. The author ascribes to Dharmakrti the idea that svalaksanas are real insofar as they are individuals in the sense of being . . spatially, temporally and essentially determinate. He terms these three qualications of an individual identity conditions and takes them as criteria of reality for Dharmakrti. In the section entitled Dharmakrtis Ontology and Its Relation to the Problem of Universals (p. 67) in Chapter 2 (Dharmakrtis Ontology), the author outlines the char acteristics of specically characterized phenomena (svalaksana) in . . accordance with Dharmakrtis own words: a) being causally efcient
pr sa ga (prasa ga) pp. 567, 578, arth pati (arth patti) pp. 567, 575, asadrsa (asadrsa) a n n a a .. . p. 570, anavayin (avayavin) pp. 571, 575, adhyavasaya (adhyavas ya) p. 575, asadrsa a .. (asadrsa), t d tmya-sahbandha (t d tmyasambandha) p. 576, nirvikalpakapratyaksa a a a a . . . (nirvikalpakapratyaks a), parin ma (parinama) p. 577, vastubalapravr ttanumana a . . . (vastubalapravr tt num na), viddhi (vidhi) p. 578, sabdasy viayah (abdasy visayah) a a s . s a . . a . p. 579. Cf. also the corrections of Western, Tibetan and Japanese personal names made by van der Kuijp (op. cit., p. 1086). 4 adhyavasaya (adhyavas ya) is not adequate for nges shes or nges pa. For nges a shes, nicayaj na is to be given (pp. 288, 355, 564, 575). vastubalapravr ttanumana s a . (vastubalapravr tt num na) corresponds to dngos po stobs shugs kyi rjes dpag rather than a . a dnogs po stobs skugs (shugs) kyi rigs pa (p. 578). btags yod is a translation of prajaptisat, not vijaptisat (p. 578). 5 Notes 27, 30 (p. 478), 37, 38 (p. 479) to Chapter 2, notes 6 (p. 484), 23 (p. 486), 42, 44 (p. 488) to Chapter 4, notes 22, 29, 31, 35 (p. 518), 37 (p. 519) to Chapter 13, note 19 (p. 527) to Chapter 16, and notes 9 (p. 538) and 31 (p. 540) to Chapter 20. As van der Kuijp (op. cit.) as well as Seiji Kimura in his review of the present book (Journal of Buddhism, ed. by Department of Buddhism, Komazawa Junior College, 1977, pp. 155 160) have indicated, Dreyfus missed referring to some important modern studies. 6 My understanding of Dharmakrtis ideas is not independent of that of traditional Tibetan scholars, as it is based mostly on a philosophical reading of the Tibetan versions of his texts and their Tibetan commentaries. Nevertheless, my view of Dharmakrti is not reducible to the Tibetan interpretations either. Although this work focuses the Tibetan reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology, it also investigates the Indian side of the story. By consulting some of the Sanskrit texts and the views of modern scholars on the topic, I have tried to present a philosophically meaningful interpretation of Dharmakrti that is more than the sum total of the scholarly contributions on which I have relied (p. 12).

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(arthakriy samartha) and real according to Pram nav rttika (PV) III 37 a a. a (p. 67); b) causes and effects and the objects to which all persons apply themselves practically according to PV I 171c1728 (p. 67); c) being apprehended through their own entity (svar pa) according to PV III u 9 54cd (p. 68); d) objects of perception (pratyaksa) according to NB I . 121510 (p. 68). At the end of this section, however, he replaces them by slightly different descriptions (p. 69): (1) having the power to produce effects (arthakriy sakti, don byed nus pa); (2) being specic, that is, india vidual (asadrsa, mi dra ba); (3) not (directly) denotable by language . (abdasy vis aya, sgrai yul ma yin); and (4) apprehensible without relis a . ance on other factors (nimitta, rgyu mtshan) such as language and conceptuality. Although the author does not suggest any textual source for these four characteristics of svalaksana, they are evidently reducible to PV III . . 12.11
7 PV III 3: arthakriy samartham yat tad atra param rthasat | anyat samvrtisat proktam a a . . . .

te svas m nyalaks ane || That which is capable of producing an effect is designated a a . . here as ultimately existent. The other is designated as conventionally existent. They are [respectively] the particular and the universal. 8 PV I 171c172: sa ev rthas tasya vy vrttayo pare || tat k ryam k ranam coktam a a . a . a . . . tat svalaksanam isyate | tatty g ptiphal h sarv h purusanam pravrttayah || (I prefer the a a a. a. . . . . . . . . reading tat k ryam to tatk ryam in accordance with the edition of PVSVT, 330, 4). This a a . . . [particular (viesa)] alone is real thing, and the other [i.e., universals] is the exclusions s . [from others] with regard to this [particular]. This [particular] is called effect and cause. This is regarded as svalaksana. All activities of human beings are carried out to abandon . . or obtain this [particular]. Its Tibetan translation runs: de nyid don || de ni gzhan las log pa yin || de ni rgyu dang bras bur bshad || de ni rang gi mtshan nyid dod || de ni blang dor bras can pas || skyes bu thams cad jug pa yin || Dreyfus translations from both Sanskrit and Tibetan texts strangely include the term generally characterized, which has no correspondence in the originals. He renders the Tibetan text of 171d172ab as follows: These [real things] are differentiated from other [things]. They are described as causes and effects. They are accepted as specically characterized and generally characterized phenomena (p. 67). His rendering of the Sanskrit in note 35 (p. 479) is more puzzling: These others are the exclusions of this. They are described as causes and effects. They are accepted as specically characterized and generally characterized phenomena. 9 PV III 54cd: tasya svaparar p bhy m gater meyadvayam matam || This [particular u a a. . (svalaksana)] is apprehended in either its own form or another form (i.e., in the form of . . universal), so that the object of cognition is considered to be twofold [i.e., svalaksana and . . s m nyalaksana]. a a . . 10 NB I 1215: tasya visayah svalaksanam || yasy rthasya samnidh n sam nia a a . . . . . . dh n bhy m j napratibh sabhedas tat svalaksanam || tad eva param rthasat || a a a. a a a . . arthakriy s marthyalaks anatv d vastunah || The [perception] has the particular as its aa . . a . object. The thing which appears to a cognition differently according to whether it is placed near or far is the particular. This alone is ultimately existent, since the real entity is characterized as being capable of producing an effect. 11 PV III 12: m nam dvividham visayadvaividhy c chaktya aktitah | arthakriy y m a . a s a a. . . . keadir n rtho narth dhimoksatah || sadrsasadrsatv c ca visay visayatvatah | s a a . . a . . . a . .

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The author then moves to the new section Uncommonness and Identity Conditions in order to explain the rst two of the four, but his chief concern is the second characteristic, i.e., the individuality of svalaksana . . (pp. 6972). Moreover, he shifts his focus from svalaksana to the real, . . since, for the author, the individuality of svalaksana connotes its reality. . . Having expressly stated, An entity can be considered to be real if, and only if, it has its own distinctive essence (p. 69), the author introduces the three identity conditions that Dharmakrti implies (p. 70): 1. Real things are spatially determinate (deaniyata, yul nges pa or yul s ma dres pa); that is, they occupy a denite spatial location. 2. Real objects are temporally determinate (k laniyata, dus nges pa or a dus ma dres pa). They come into and go out of existence at denite moments. 3. Real things are determinate with respect to their entity ( k raniyata, a a ngo bo nges pa or ngo bo ma dres pa), which is determined in causal terms. Go ram pas sDe bdun rab gsal is the authors main ground for Dharmakrtis implication of these conditions (n. 41, p. 480). Besides, the author suggests both Indian and Tibetan sources for the terminology: deaniyata, k laniyata and ak raniyata are found in Moksakaraguptas s a a . Tarkabh sa (TBh). Tibetan scholars often use a similar expression, yul a. dus rang bzhin ma dres pa, as rGyal tshab does (n. 42, p. 480), in which ma dres pa appears instead of niyata (nges pa) and rang bzhin instead of ak ra (ngo bo or rnam pa). PV I 4012 is cited as well in relation with these a conditions (p. 69). Having elucidated the three identity conditions in his own words, Dreyfus conclusively remarks (p. 71):
Accepting these criteria of reality commits Dharmakrti to a radical rejection of realism regarding universals, for these criteria imply that real entities must be spatially and temposabdasy nyanimitt n m bh ve dhsadasattvatah || There are two kinds of cognition, since a a a. a . the object is [divided into] two kinds according to whether it is capable or incapable of producing an effect. Hairs [appearing in a diseased eye-cognition] and the like are not the object [of cognition], since they are fallaciously trusted as a [real] object. [The object is divided into two kinds further] according to whether it is similar or dissimilar [to others], whether it is the object of words or not, or whether its knowledge arises when there exist other causes and does not arise [unless there exist other causes, or its knowledge exists independently from other causes]. 12 PV I 40: sarve bh v h svabh vena svasvabh vavyavasthiteh | svabh vaparabh a a. a a a a . v bhy m yasm d vy vrttibh ginah || Since all things by nature consist in their respective a a. a a . a . essential nature, they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]. Dreyfus translation runs (p. 69): Because all things essentially abide in their own essence, they partake in the differentiation between [themselves and the other] similar and dissimilar things.

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rally localized and, therefore, constantly changing. Static entities, including universals, exist in the same state in different places and times. Thus, Dharmakrtis criteria clearly imply the philosophical position of antirealism and the commitment to an event ontology.

This idea of the criteria of reality provides a theoretical basis for the authors explanation of dGe lugs realism in Chapter 5, Ge-luk Thinkers on Specic Ontology, where the author closely investigates the discrepancy between Dharmakrti and dGe lugs realists. In the section entitled Realist Explanation of the Nature of the Specically Characterized (p. 116), the author reveals that such dGe lugs thinkers as dGe dun grub, mKhas grub and rGyal tshab, who do not exclude universals from the domain of real things, refuse to dene rang mtshan (svalaksana) as that which is deter. . minate in space, time and essence. Therefore, according to the author, they refuse to identify the real with the individual. The author contrasts this dGe lugs position with that of Dharmakrti:
Contrary to Dharmakrti, Ge-luk thinkers do not dene the specically characterized in relation to the three sets of identity conditions, denite spatio-temporal location, and individual essence (p. 116); For Dharmakrti specically characterized phenomena are real inasmuch as they are individuals (p. 117); Strict determination in space, time, and entity entails that only individuals are real. Accepting these identity conditions would exclude the real and recurrent properties required for a moderate solution to the problem of universals. So, for the Ge-luk tradition, real things are not strictly determinate in space, time, and entity (p. 117); For Dharmakrti, the real is that which is determinate in space, time, and entity. There is no need to add any qualication to that statement. Dharmakrti does not give any other characterization of specically characterized phenomena. This is to say that these three sets of identity conditions play an extreme important role in Dharmakrtis thought (p. 118); For Dharmakrti, the three sets of identity conditions dene the real because real things and constructs are distinguished from each other on the basis of being or not being individuals (p. 118).

In this way, Dreyfus develops his discussion, emphasizing the importance of the identity conditions as the essential conditions of reality in Dharmakrtis system. Yet one might doubt whether such identity conditions are really assigned to dene reality in Dharmakrtis ontology. First of all, as the author himself admits (p. 69), Dharmakrti neither states explicitly what these conditions are, nor denes the real as that which fullls these conditions. Second, the textual sources to which the author reverts possibly support the idea that svalaksana is a determinate existence in space, time . . and essential nature, but they do not imply that these conditions are related to the denition of the real. The dGe lugs pas in turn do not accept these conditions as dening characteristics of svalaksana (rang mtshan), . . but they do not thereby enter into discussion of the real either. Third, Dharmakrti never asserts that things being individual determines their

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reality. Although it is true that, for Dharmakrti, svalaksanas count among . . real things, they are dened as real because of their having causal efcacy (arthakriy sakti), not because of their being individual. a As a matter of course, the author takes notice of the signicance of causal efcacy in Dharmakrtis system. The rst half of Chapter 2 (Dharmakrtis Ontology) is devoted to analyzing the notion of causal efcacy as well as the theory of momentariness (ksanikatva). In Chapter 4, . . Purview of the Real (p. 83 infra.), he further investigates what the real is for Dharmakrti, collecting different accounts of the real from various sources. Throughout the present book, the authors emphasis lies on the variety of Dharmakrtis thought concerning the real. The interrelationship of the different positions is, however, left unsolved. It is not completely clear how the author relates the idea of the identity conditions as criteria of reality to the theory of causal efcacy or that of momentariness. One suggestion that the author gives to solve the complexity of Dharmakrtis ontology is to assume that Dharmakrti adopts different views to dene the real from a strategic viewpoint and assigns them to different levels of philosophical investigation. In this perspective, it follows that the identity conditions or being individual would be just one dening characteristics of the real among many others, and that svalaksana would not be . . real from a certain viewpoint, as will be seen in the later part of this review. The authors treatment of Dharmakrtis ontology as a whole, thus, must be said to leave problems. In the following will be reexamined 1) the textual sources that the author adduces in support of the idea of identity conditions and 2) the authors problematic treatment of Dharmakrtis thought about the real. Thereby, the reviewer will attempt to specify problems that confront Dreyfus as well as all interpreters of Dharmakrtis philosophy. Textual sources Having presented in accordance with PV III 2a13 the denition of svalaksana (rang mtshan) as a thing that exists not sharing with others . . space, time and essential nature (yul dus rang bzhin ma dres par gnas pai dngos po),14 Go ram pa indicates that Dharmakrti implies these dening
13 Cited above in n. 11. 14 sDe bdun rab gsal 18a2: dra dang mi dra nyid phyir dang || (PV III 2a) zhes pas

rang spyi gnyis kyi thun mong ma yin pai don ldog ston pas de gnyis kyi mtshan nyid rim bzhin | yul dus rang bzhin ma dres par gnas pai dngos po dang | yul dus rang bzhin thun mong par snang bai sgro btags so || By the statement because of being similar and dissimilar, [Dharmakrti] teaches the specic meaning-exclusion (i.e., meaning itself) of the particular and universal respectively. Accordingly, the denitions of these two are

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characteristics of svalaksana in his PV. Namely, he cites PV I 153ab,15 . . 68ab,16 139cd,17 and 136b18 for yul ma dres pa, PV I 87ab,19 139ab,20 68ab, 139cd, and 136b for rang bzhin ma dres pa, and PV I 92c,21

respectively [given as follows]: The thing that does not share place, time and essential nature [with other things is the denition of the particular]. The superimposed [thing] that appears sharing place, time and essential nature [with other things is the denition of the universal]. 15 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b3f.: gzhan la gnas par gyur pa ni || rang gi gnas las mi g-yo zhing || cited from PV I 153: anyatra vartam nasya tato nyasth najanmani | svasm d a a a acalatah sth n d vrttir ity atiyuktimat || [If you assert] the [universal] that is occuring a a . . in one [particular] occurs, without moving from its own place, in [another particular] which arises in a different place from this [particular], [you have] too good argument. Cf. PVSV 78, 1f.: sarvatra sarvad sarv k rasthit tmeti cet. [The opponent] says that a a a a [the universal] has the nature of abiding everywhere, every time and in every form. 16 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b6: tha dad dngos rnams la brten nas || don gcig tu ni snang bai blo || cited from PV I 68: parar pam svar pena yay samvryate dhiy | u . u . a a . . ek rthapratibh siny bh v n asritya bhedinah || The cognition that has an appearance a a a a a . of one and the same object conceals another form by its own form, [despite] depending on individual things. 17 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b6: de bras can min las ldog pa || gnyis ka la yang yod pa yin || cited from PV I 139: yad rupam sabaleyasya b huleyasya n sti tat | atatk ryapar vr ttir . a a a a . dvayor api ca vidyate || The nature of a spotted [cow] is not present in a black [cow], but exclusion from that which does not produce the [one and the same] effect [of cows] is common to both. As regards atatk rya, cf. PV I 137138 cited below in n. 24. a 18 sDe bdun rab gsal 22a1: ldog pa kun la yod pai phyir || cited from PV I 136: abhedavyavah r s ca bhede syur anibandhan h || sarvatra bh v d vy vrtter naite dosah a a a. a a a . . . prasa ginah || Supposing that [the universal is] distinct from [the particular], it follows n . that the verbal expressions [to be applied] to the same [object] as well would be groundless. These faults do not result [from our theory of exclusion], since exclusion is present in all [homogeneous things]. 19 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b4: dam pai don gyi don rnams ni || rang gi dre dang tha dad med || cited from PV I 87: samsrjyante na bhidyante svato rth h p ram rthik h || r pam a. a a a. u . . ekam anekam ca tesu buddher upaplavah || The ultimate existents neither intermingle . . . with nor separate from [other things] by themselves. A single nature [in many things] or many natures [in sole thing] are illusions of [conceptual] cognition with regard to these [ultimate existents]. 20 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b4f.: khra bo yi ni ngo bo gang || de ni ser skya la yod min || cited from PV I 139 (see n. 17 above). 21 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b5: de tshe rang gi mtshan nyid med || cited from PV I 92: sabd h samketitam pr hur vyavah r ya sa smrtah | tad svalaksanam n sti samketas a. a aa a a . . . . . . . tena tatra na || Words express [the meaning] that is conventionally postulated. This [meaning] is formed for the purpose of verbal communication. At the time [of communication], the particular [based on which the meaning was formed] does not exist. Hence, verbal convention is not [applied to] this [particular]. Cf. PVSV 45, 28: tasya deak lavyaktibhed n skandan t. Because this [particular] does not pervade different s a a a a places, times and individuals.

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III 486d487a,22 I 98ab,23 and 136b for dus ma dres pa, among which Dreyfus mentions PV I 153, III 486 infra., and I 13813924 (p. 70 and n. 45, p. 480). All of the verses from PV I are involved in refuting the real existence of universals or generally characterized phenomena (s m nya, a a s m nyalaks ana) as the object of words. Dharmakrti thereby contrasts a a . . with universals the unique and uncommon characteristics of svalaksana. . . However, he does not suggest that such characteristics are the criteria for reality. Nor does Go ram pa appeal to these verses to conrm the criteria of reality. For Go ram pa, they support Dharmakrtis acceptance of the deni tion of svalaksana (rang mtshan) as a thing that exists not sharing with . . others space, time and essential nature, but they do not serve to establish the reality of an individual existent. In the same manner, Moksakaragupta, in the relevant passage, . solely explains what svalaksana is: Svalaksana, which is the object of . . . .
22 sDe bdun rab gsal 21b5: phan tshun dre ba med pa yi || yig cha rim ldan ji ltar na || cited from PV III 486487: avasthit v akram y m sakrd abh san n matau | varnah a a a. . a a . . sy d akramo drghah kramav n akram m katham || upakury d asamslisyan varnabh gah a a a. a a . . . . . parasparam | akramena grah d antakramavad dhs ca no bhavet || Cf. PV III 485 a . . 487ab in Tosaki 1985: 167ff.: avasthit v akram y m sakrd bh san n matau | varnah sy d a a a. . a a a . . a akramo drghah kramav n akram m katham || upakury d asamslisyan varnabh gah a a. a . a . . . . parasparam | antyam p rvasthit v urdhvam vardham no dhvanir bhavet || akramena a a . u . . . grah d ante kramavad dhs ca no bhavet | Supposing that [a cognition] lasts [more than a one moment], a letter would not be gradual and [a long vowel] would not be long, because it appears at once in the nongradual (i.e., simultaneous) cognition. How can the part[s] of a [long] letter that [occurs] gradually cause a nongradual [cognition], not uniting with each other? If the previous [part] lasts to the end, the sound would augment later. The cognition in turn would not be gradual, since it cognizes [the long vowel] nongradually (i.e., simultaneously) at the end. 23 sDe bdun rab gsal 22a1: gsal ba rnams ni tha dad kyang || bya ba de dang de byed pai || cited from PV I 9899ab: j n dyarthakriy m t m t m drs. v bhede pi a a a . a . a . ..t a kurvatah | arth ms tadanyavilesavisayair dhvanibhih saha || samyojya pratyabhij nam a. s . . a . . . . kury d apy anyadarane | Although [things] are different [from each other], they have a s the function to produce an effect such as causing [one and the same] cognition. Having observed each function, one associates things with the words, the object of which is the elimination from other [things] than those [which have the same effect]. Then, one may recognize [something as identical with that which one saw before], despite seeing something different. 24 As for PV I 139, see n. 17 above. PV I 137138: ekak ryesu bhedes u a . . tatk ryaparicodane | gaurav saktivaiphaly d bhed khy y h sam srutih || krt vrddhair a a a a a a. a . a . . atatk ryavy vr ttivinibandhan | na bh ve sarvabh v n m svabh vavyavasthiteh || The a a . a a a a a. a . sages have given the same word to different things that have one and the same effect for the purpose of indicating this [one and the same] effect on the basis of the exclusion from those which do not have this [one and the same] effect, because it is redundant, impossible and useless to denote [each of] different things [respectively by a specic word]. [A word is] not [given to indicate real] thing[s], for all things are established in their own nature.

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perception, is the specic nature of real entity (vastusvar pa) that is u determined in space, time and form (deak l k raniyata).25 The phrase s aa a deak l k raniyata refers to the mode of a real existent, but not to the s aa a condition of reality. Such Tibetan scholars as Go ram pa consider this description of svalaksana as its denition,26 whereas the dGe lugs pas like rGyal tshab, . . mKhas grub and dGe dun grub assert different denitions of svalaksana . . (rang mtshan).27 In this respect too, their controversy remains as to what svalaksana is, not what the real is. . . None of these texts, after all, provides support for the authors view that things are dened as real if they fulll the three identity conditions. The author, nevertheless, applies these accounts to the real, by insisting that svalaksana is real insofar as it is individual. Indeed, the author seems . . to be rmly convinced of the identication of svalaksana with the real, . . which is recognizable in his substitution of one concept by another and abrupt shifting of the subject of discussion from one to another. Besides his aforementioned shifting in p. 69, the author opens Chapter 4, The Purview of the Real , (p. 83), having announced that he would turn to the consideration of the purview of specically characterized phenomenon (the famous svalaksana, rang mtshan) (p. 82). . . The same substitution is seen in his interpretation of PV I 40. The verse teaches that things have their own essential nature, according to which they are distinguished from their homogeneous and heterogeneous things.28

25 TBh 21, 8ff. (tr. Kajiyama 1966: 56): tasya visayah svalaksanam | tasya catur. . . .

vidhasya pratyaksasya svalaksanam visayo boddhavyah | svalaksanam ity as dh ran am a a . . . . . . . . . . vastusvar pam deak l k raniyatam | The [perception] has the particular as its object. u . s aa a The fourfold perception is to be known to have the particular as its object. What is the particular is the intrinsic nature of real entity that is unique and determined in space, time and form; Cf. NBT 70,7f. cited in Kajiyama, loc. cit., n. 129 ad NB I 12 (tasya visayah . . . svalaksanam): tasya caturvidhasya pratyaksasya visayah bodhavyah svalaksanam |. . . . . . . . . 26 The sDe bdun la jug pai sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel ascribed to Tsong kha pa, for instance, gives the same denition (3b6, cf. Yoshimizu 2000: 24) to svalaksana. This, . . however, seems one of those which are handed down by tradition rather than Tsong kha pas own idea, for this treatise is a collection of terminology and supposed to have been compiled for educational purposes. 27 Dreyfus discusses their respective denitions of svalaksana (pp. 116117). Cf. e.g., . . Yid kyi mun sel 21b2f.: rang lugs la | rang mtshan gyi mtshan nyid rtog pas btags pa min par rang ngos nas thun mong ma yin pai rang bzhin du gnas pai dngos poo || In our own system [of the Sautr ntika], the denition of the particular is the thing which consists, a not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature uncommon [with other things]. Cf. also Yoshimizu (forthcoming). 28 See PV I 40 cited above in n. 12.

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First, the author construes this verse to express the condition of reality, for he explains (p. 69):
This passage (viz., PV I 40) is said by the commentarial tradition to explain the nature of things (dngos poi gnas lugs).29 Hence, it must be considered a particularly meaningful statement. An entity can be considered real if, and only if, it has its own distinctive essence. Moreover, such an essence must correspond to clear identity conditions. Tested in this way, individuals pass, but universals and abstract entities do not.

The last sentence implies that universals etc. do not satisfy the condition of reality, since they lack individuality. From this explanation, one can naturally infer that the author reads in the verse a denition of the real, by taking the subject things (bh va, dngos po) to refer to real things. a One page later, however, he gives the denition of svalaksana in . . accordance with the same verse (p. 70):
If we put together the bits and pieces that Dharmakrti and his commentators provide, however, we can dene specically characterized as that which essentially abides in its own essence.

Here the subject of the verse is replaced by svalaksana. In the authors . . mind, a real entity is to be dened as that which essentially abides in its own essence, insofar as svalaksana is dened as such. It is inter. . esting to compare this reading with that of dGe lugs interpreters such as mKhas grub and rGyal tshab, who have also taken the subject of the verse as svalaksana.30 Most presumably depending on this verse, they . . have formulated their own denition of rang mtshan (svalaksana) as that . . which abides, not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side (i.e., intrinsically), in its essential nature.31 The inserted phrase not being conceptually imposed, but from its own side indicates that svalaksana . . is a real thing, since it is a dening characteristic of ultimate reality for
29 As Dreyfus indicates (p. 118), among main Tibetan commentators on PV I, it is rGyal

tshab to have explicitly stated that PV I 40 sets forth the nature of things (dngos poi gnas lugs) in his Thar lam gsal byed (45b1). Cf. Analytical table of contents of Thar lam gsal byed ad PV I 40185 in Yoshimizu 1999: 470f. 30 Cf. Yid kyi mun sel 41b6f.: . . . ces rang mtshan rnams rigs mthun mi mthun gyi chos . . . rGyal tshab seems to concur with mKhas grub in this interpretation, for he elucidates the subject of the verse by applying the same denition of rang mtshan as mKhas grub (cf. n. 27 above). In his Thar lam gsal byed (45b3f.), namely, he comments on the verse as follows: dngos kun chos can | . . . rtog pas btags pa tsam min par rang bzhin gyis gzhan dang ma dres par rang gi ngo bo la gnas pai phyir | All things are the subject . . . they consist, not being merely conceptually imposed, but by nature [i.e., intrinsically], in its essential nature without intermingling with others. 31 See ns. 27 and 30 above. The reviewer has discussed this issue in Yoshimizu (forthcoming).

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both mKhas grub and rGyal tshab.32 That is to say, they have required a different condition of reality from the individuality in the sense of abiding in own essential nature to indicate that svalaksana is real. For Dreyfus, . . contrastively, being svalaksana or abiding in own essential nature, is a . . primary condition of reality. These all are, however, later interpretations of PV I 40. It is very unlikely that Dharmakrti, in this verse, intends to dene svalaksana or the . . real, although one may properly identify the subject of the verse as real or individual things. The verse seeks to clarify what makes things different, since it asserts that things are to be differentiated into species, etc., not by virtue of universals, but on the ground of their different features, with which they are essentially endowed. Dharmakrti thereby precludes the objection that real universals are the ground of differentiation as well as the object of words, but he does not intend to say that universals are unreal since they are not individuals.33 To sum up, one can hardly agree with the authors understanding that PV I 40 suggests by the expression essentially abiding in own essence the identity conditions or being individual as criteria of reality.

The authors problematic treatment of Dharmakrtis thought about the real Having thus elucidated the core of Dharmakrtis ontology on the ground of the idea of identity conditions, the author proceeds to Chapter 4, The Purview of the Real , where he analyzes Dharmakrtis various commitments to the concept of reality. His particular stress is laid on the variety of thoughts contained in Dharmakrtis works with regard to the question of what the real is. His new inquiry is, in short, whether the real is to be reduced to a minimum existent such as a partless atom (param nu) or a momentary phase of a continuum. Such a minimum unit a.
32 Cf. e.g., Yid kyi mun sel 44a6f.: don dam bden pai mtshan nyid | rtog pas btags pa

tsam ma yin par rang ngos nas grub pai chos | The denition of ultimate reality is the thing which is not merely conceptually imposed, but established from its own side [i.e., intrinsically]. The same denition is found in many other treatises of dGe lugs pa, as cited in Yoshimizu 1998: 64, n. 11. 33 In the context of apoha theory, Dharmakrti disproves the existence of real universals by various arguments. He thinks that it is unnecessary at all to postulate universals to explain the formulation of concepts or the function of words. PV I 40 is often quoted out of context by later interpreters. It is, however, indispensable to reexamine this verse in broad context of both logic and semantic, considering its relation to previous and succeeding verses with the help of the autocommentary.

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is not the object of perception, as the author indicates, citing PV III 19534 that perception can merely apprehend the aggregate of atoms. Supposing that a single atom is real, it follows that such an extended object as the aggregate of atoms would not be real. That is to say, the object of perception, viz., svalaksana, would not be real. In order to avoid this undesirable . . consequence for Dharmakrti, the author assumes that Dharmakrti accepts both a single atom and extended objects as real, and yet manages not to contradict himself (p. 83):
Rather than proposing a unied system, Dharmakrti offers a variety of conicting views which he sees pragmatically compatible.

According to the author, Dharmakrti, on one hand, maintains that spatially extended objects, which are to be cognized by perception, exist in reality, but on the other hand, he conforms to the Sautr ntika view that only single a a atoms are real. The authors solution is, following S kya mchog ldan, to understand that Dharmakrti handles the problem of the real, adopting contradictory ontologies, through a strategy of ascending scales of analysis from a pragmatic standpoint (pp. 83, 86, 98). At a commonsense level, namely, Dharmakrti is supposed to accept the reality of extended objects, whereas, at a deeper level, he rejects it within the framework of Sautr ntika ontology.35 a
34 PV III 195: arth ntar bhisam bandh j j yante ye navo pare | ukt s te sacit s te a a a a a a . . hi nimittam j najanmanah || By virtue of [atoms] connecting with other [atoms], there a . . arise other atoms [than the previous ones], which are called aggregated. They are indeed the cause of the origination of cognition. Cited by Dreyfus together with III 196197 in p. 86 (notes 1718 in p. 485). 35 Dreyfus says (p. 98f.): Our analysis reveals a surprising diversity among Dharmakrtis Sa-gya commentators . . . Who is right? This diversity, I would argue, is less due to mistaken interpretations than to a multiplicity of views within Dharmakrtis own work. Hence, in a certain way all three interpretations are partly right, although they are a wrong to claim to represent Dharmakrtis exclusive view. This seems to be S kya Chok dens approach in some parts of his work. Such a view is quite helpful here. Contrary to other Sa-gya scholars and most modern commentators, he refuses to describe Dharmakrti as opting exclusively for one or the other of the views we described here. Instead, he shows that Dharmakrtis analysis of external objects is articulated around three levels of analysis: (1) At a commonsense level, objects such as jars and so on are said to exist. (2) At a deeper level, however, these preanalytical ideas cannot stand. When examined in relation to sense spheres ( yatana, ske mched), objects of commonsense disappear and the color of the re a is distinguished from the re. This is the level of analysis corresponding to what I describe as the alternate interpretation. In the Buddhist tradition, this level is reected in the Abhidharma, where commonsense objects are reduced to phenomenologically available entities. The ontological analysis, however, cannot stop there, for even entities such as color are not real. Therefore (3) at the deepest level, only their innitesimal components are real. This third level corresponds to what I have described as the standard interpretation. The author

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It should, however, be noted that this account by Dreyfus is again not based on Dharmakrtis own words, as he admits (p. 85):
And although Dharmakrti never provides a detailed statement of his ontology, we could expect him to follow this Sautr ntika view. Several traditional and modern scholars have a explained Dharmakrti in this way, emphasizing that in his system reality is reducible to partless atoms interacting with moments of consciousness.

From this classication of levels, moreover, it follows that Dign ga and a Dharmakrti postulated svalaksana as real at a commonsense level, where . . no philosophical investigation is required, since the object of perception, that is svalaksana, is an extended object. If that were so, svalaksana would . . . . not be identical with the real at a deeper level, where only a single atom is qualied to be real. Finally, the identity conditions or being individual, which the author has proposed in the preceding chapters, would be discredited as fundamental criteria of reality. Although the author has not discussed in detail the reality of temporally extended objects, it must result in the same absurdities. In this way, the authors discussion on the real is leading away from his initial approach. As the author emphasizes, it is true that one can encounter in Dharmakrtis works several answers to the question of what the real is. This accounts for the rich diversity of interpretations among his commentators, and may also account for the authors varied explanations of the real. The authors problematic commitments to Dharmakrtis philosophy, however, seem mainly due to his reading of Dharmakrtis texts based on later Tibetan commentaries and modern interpretations. He, in fact, often attributes to Dharmakrti different views, following later interpretations, without identifying them in Dharmakrtis words. It is not entirely mean ingless but is unconvincing to argue, in dependence on later interpretations, that Dharmakrti adopts different views at different levels from a pragmatic point of view. They might not really be Dharmakrtis own views. The authors identication of svalaksana and the real, too, can be . . supposed to derive from the dichotomous classication of different concepts, which has been widely accepted by Tibetan thinkers. The rst group of equivalents which refer to the real are: svalaksana/ rang mtshan, . . anitya/ mi rtag pa, bh va or vastu/ dngos po, vyakti/ gsal ba, dravya/ a rdzas, param rtha/ don dam pa, arthakriy samartha/ don byed nus pa, a a ma dres pa. The second group of equivalents which refer to the unreal are: s m nya/ spyi, s m nyalaksana/ spyi mtshan, nitya/ rtag pa, abh va/ a a a a a . . dngos med, vy vrtti/ ldog pa, samvrti/ kun rdzob, anarthakriy samartha/ a . a . .
adds to these three the fourth level, on which the existence of external objects is refuted in conformity with Yog c ra doctrine (p. 83). a a

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don byed mi nus pa, dres pa.36 This kind of classication as well as equivalency is certainly of great help for the systematical apprehension of Dharmakrtis philosophy. One must, however, be conscious of the fact that it is not Dharmakrti but later commentators to have collected and classied these concepts. If one gets familiar with such an equivalency, one might be less concerned with the question of how and why Dharmakrti equals or opposes one concept to another. For what theoretical reason has Dharmakrti ascertained that only indi vidual things or svalaksanas are real? From his own words, one can safely . . conclude that only svalaksanas, not universals, are real because they alone . . have causal efcacy (arthakriy sakti), for Dharmakrti explicitly denes a an ultimately existent (param rthasat) or a real entity (vastu) as that which a has causal efcacy.37 Demonstrating the special signicance of causal efcacy, the author calls this, too, the denition of reality just one page before introducing the idea of identity conditions (p. 68):
Following up on his idea that the denition of reality is the capacity to perform a functions. Dharmakrti asserts that only individual objects are real. They alone can perform functions. Since these objects possess their own individual essences, they are called specically characterized objects. Phenomena that do not possess their own characteristics cannot perform any function. Hence they do not appear to perception, which is an accurate reection of reality.

Yet, as for the relation of this denition with the identity conditions, his explanation becomes intricate (p. 70):
36 Dreyfus introduces (p. 77) Sa pans presentation of these equivalents in Rigs gter rang .

grel 19a2f. and 19a5ff. (176-2): rang gi mtshan nyid dang | gsal ba dang | dngos po dang | rdzas dang | log pa dang | don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun ma dres pa rgyu dang bras bu grub pa | skyes bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya bai jug yul yin pas dngos poi don du don gcig pa yin te . . . | spyi dang gzhan sel dang | ldog pa dang | rnam gcod dang | dres pa dang | brel pa dang | kun rdzob ces bya ba sogs pa ni | don la mi gnas pa | dngos por ma grub pa | dbang poi yul ma yin pa blos sgro btags pa | brtags pai chos dngos po la don byed mi nus pa | gzhan sel gyis brel pa dang | brel med dang | dgag pa dang bsgrub pa la sogs pai sgo nas | jug gi don byed mi nus par don mtshungs pa yin te | Sa pans source for these equivalents is PV I 171172 (see . n. 8 above). Sa pan sets forth them in order to investigate the nature of real things (dngos . poi gnas lugs, 19a1). Almost the same equivalency appears in many treatises of dGe lugs pa (cf. Yoshimizu 1998: 63, n. 9). 37 See e.g., PV I 166abc: sa p ram rthiko bh vo ya ev rthakriy ksamah. Only the a a a a a . . thing which is capable of producing an effect is ultimately existent; PVSV ad I 166: idam eva hi vastvavastuyor laksanam yad arthakriy yogyat yogyat ca. For the capability a a a . . . and the incapability to produce an effect are indeed the [respective] characteristics of real entity and unreal entity; PVSV 87, 4 ad PV I 171cd: yad arthakriy k ri tad eva vastv ity a a uktam | sa ca viesa eva | Nothing but that which produces an effect is said [in PV I 166] s . to be real, and it is none other than the particular; PV III 3 (see n. 7 above); NB I 1215 (see n. 10 above).

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For Dharmakrti, the impossibility of attributing a denite spatial location to reness shows that it is not something that makes a real difference. Therefore, in accordance with the criterion of reality that something is real if, and only if, it can perform some function, such a universal is unreal from a spatial point of view.

Here, it is ambiguous whether a universal is unreal on account of its lacking spatial location or capacity of performing a function. The last sentence is, in particular, confusing, if compared with the aforementioned statement of his own in p. 69: An entity can be considered real if, and only if, it has its own distinctive essence. After all, it is unclear how the author denes the relation between two essential characteristics of the real, viz., being individual and being causally efcacious. There is still one sentence which draws ones attention. Directly commenting on PV III 3 (cited in n. 7), the author subsumes that which has causal efcacy under svalaksanas (p. 67): . .
Any phenomenon that is causally efcient is real and included among specically characterized phenomena.

If the author thereby interprets the verse to state that causally efcacious phenomena are identiable with svalaksanas or individual things because . . they are real, the reviewer would not agree with this interpretation. It is true that, as the author asserts (p. 67), Dharmakrti equates svalaksanas with . . real and causally efcacious phenomena, but what Dharmakrti intends to say in PV III 3 is, in the same way as NB I 1215 (cited I n. 10), that the ultimate reality of svalaksanas is established on their being causally . . efcacious. Although the authors position on this issue is unclear, it is worth attempting to clarify the links among concepts and theories and reveal what is the most essential to Dharmakrtis philosophy, instead of distributing them into different levels of philosophical achievement. In the reviewers view, the possession of causal efcacy is the most fundamental criterion of reality in Dharmakrtis ontology, according to which the real is to be distinguished from the unreal and svalaksana is . . identied as real. For Dharmakrti, Dign gas epistemological qualication a of svalaksana as the object of perception (pratyaksa) can already entail . . . that a svalaksana has the capacity to cause a perception of its own image. . . By virtue of this capacity, svalaksana makes a difference, appearing as . . an individual entity, which occupies a certain location in space and time, and marks its unique features. Hence, it may be proper to say that the three identity conditions explain the individuality of svalaksana, but its reality is . . primarily established on causal efcacy. In the same way, the individuality of things is understood to be grounded in causal efcacy, since, according to Dharmakrti, the essential nature of an individual is nothing other than causal efcacy of its own, which is created by a particular capacity of its

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causes.38 One should also note that Dharmakrti demonstrates the theory of impermanence (anityatva) or momentariness (ksanikatva) on the basis . . of the denition of the real as being causally efcacious. The establishment of this theory is no doubt the most important task for Dharmakrti, to which his logical system is largely devoted. Thus, the possession of causal efcacy offers the most fundamental basis to Dharmakrtis entire philosophical system. If one takes account of the question as to whether the real is reducible to a momentary phase, as Dreyfus has done, one may answer that the real is to be reduced to such a minimum phase in conformity with the theory of momentariness that whatever is real is exclusively momentary. Things are considered to have different causal efcacy at each moment, for Dharmakrti ascribes a specic causal efcacy to each phase of the collection of causes (k ranas magr).39 Therefore, it is not contradictory a . a that svalaksana exists in ultimate reality as having causal efcacy, even if it . . is to be identied as the aggregate of atoms, since nothing but the aggregate of atoms has the capacity to cause a cognition.40 Nor does it incur any contradiction that svalaksana counts among momentary existents, for this . . does not mean that svalaksana is imperceptible. Solely its momentariness . . is beyond the range of perception. Thus considered, there is no need at all to conceive that Dharmakrti adopts contradictory ontologies or sets forth different levels of the real. Although this analysis of Dharmakrtis ontological system by the reviewer certainly requires further investigation, the reviewer would hereby like to propose to reexamine Dharmakrtis own words in their respective context apart from later interpretations. The fact that there exist controversies among interpretations attests to the necessity of revisiting original texts. Not only the identication of svalaksana with the real but . .
38 Cf. e.g., PVSV 21, 11f.: k ryotp dana akteh k ranasvabh vatve py . . . If the a a s a . a .

capacity to produce an effect is the essential nature of cause, . . .; PVSV 87, 17f.: bhedam tr vies e pi svahetupratyayaniyamitasvabh vatv t kecid eva k rak h syuh n nye a a s . a a a a. . a tatsvabh vatv t . . .Even if [causes] are not distinct with regard to mere difference, certain a a [things] alone may produce a [certain] effect, because [their] essential nature is determined by their primary and secondary causes. Other [things] do not [produce the same effect] since they do not have the [capacity to produce this effect] as their essential nature. Cf. also Steinkellner 1971: 183188. 39 Cf. e.g., the discussion of momentariness in HB 8 , 22f. (tr. Steinkellner 1967: 44): tasm d yo ntyo vasth viesah sa ev nkur dijananasvabh vah . p rvabh vinas tv a a s . . a a a . u a avasth viesah k ranasya k rananti . . . Therefore, the special condition (i.e., phase) of a s . . a . a . the last [moment of the collection of causes] alone has the nature to produce a sprout etc., whereas the special conditions [thereof], which are present at previous [moments], are causes of the cause [of sprout, etc.]. 40 Cf. PV III 195 cited above in n. 34.

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the dichotomy of the real and the unreal or individuals and universals are to be the subjects of reconsideration, once problems are revealed. The scholars who are engaged in the study of Dharmakrtis tradition should further Prof. Dreyfus efforts toward a deeper exploration of Dharmakrtis philosophy. This is only the way to appreciate and reward his great contribution.

ABBREVIATIONS
sDe bdun la jug pai sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pai dpal. The Collected Works of Tsong kha pa 27 (bKra shis lhun po edition). New Delhi, 1977. sDe bdun rab gsal Go ram pa bSod names seng ge. Tshad ma rigs pai gter gyi dka gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun rab gsal, The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 12. The Toyo Bunko, 1969. HB Dharmakrtis Hetubinduh I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Ernst . Steinkellner, ed. Wien, 1967. Kajiyama Y ichi Kajiyama. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of u the Tarkabh sa of Moksakaragupta. Kyoto, 1966. a. . NB Dharmakrti. Ny yabindu, Pandita Durveka Miras Dharmottarapradpa [Being a a s .. sub-commentary on Dharmottaras Ny yabindutk , a commentary on Dharmakrtis a . a Ny yabindu], Malvania D, ed. Patna, 1955 (second edition 1971). a NBT . Dharmottara. Ny yabindutk . see NB. a . a PV I The Pram nav rttikam of Dharmakrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, Text a. a and Critical Notes. Gnoli R, ed. Rome, 1960. PV III Dharmakrti. Pram nav rttika-k rik (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Y sh Miyasaka, ed. Indo a. a a a u o Koten Kenky (Acta Indologica) II. Naritasan Shinshoji, 1971/71, pp. 1206. u PVSV Id., Pram nav rttikasvavrtti, see PV I. a. a . PVSVT . Karnakagomin. Pram nav rttikasvavrttitk , Karnakagomins Commentary on the a. a . . . a . Pram nav rttikavrtti of Dharmakrti. Kyoto, 1982 (reprint). a. a . Rigs gter rang grel Sa skya Pandita Kun dga rgyal mtshan. Tshad ma rigs pai gter gyi rang grel, The .. Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 5. The Toyo Bunko, 1968. Steinkellner Ernst Steinkellner. Dharmakrtis Hetubinduh II, bersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien, . 1967.

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Steinkellner Id., Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakrti. Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sdasiens 15, pp. 179211. TBh Moksakaragupta. Tarkabh sa, Tarkabh sa and V dasth na of Moksakaragupta and a. a. a a . . Jit rip da, by Iyengar R, ed. Mysore, 1952. a a Thar lam gsal byed rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. Tshad ma rnam grel gyi tshig leur byas pai rnam bshad thar lam phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa, gSung bum, Cha (lHa sa Zhol edition). Tosaki Hiromasa Tosaki. Bukky ninshikiron no kenky Hossh cho Pram nav rttika no o u o a. a genry ron (Study of Buddhist epistemology The pratyaksa theory of Dharmakrtis o . Pram nav rttika), J (part I), Ge (part II). Tokyo, 1979, 1985. a. a o Yid kyi mun sel mKhas grub dGe legs dpal gzang po. Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel, gSung bum, Tha (lHa sa Zhol edition). Yoshimizu Chizuko Yoshimizu, Geluku ha ni yoru Ky ry bu gakusetsu rikai I nitai setsu (The dGe o o lugs pas Interpretation of the Sautr ntika System I The Theory of the Two Kinds of a Reality). Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 1998; 21: 5176. Yoshimizu Id., Drsya and vikalpya or snang ba and btags pa Associated in a Conceptual Cognition. . Proceedings of the 3rd International Dharmakrti Conference, Hiroshima 1997. Wien, 1999, pp. 459474. Yoshimizu Id., Geluku ha ni yoru Ky ry bu gakusetsu rikai II fuhen jitsuzai ron (The dGe lugs o o pas Interpretation of the Sautr ntika System II The Theory of Real Universals). Bukky a o bunka kenky ronsh (Studies of Buddhist Culture) 2000; 4: 332. u u Yoshimizu Id., Dening and Redening svalaksana: Dharmakrtis Concept and its Tibetan Modi . . cation. Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawas Felicitation Volume. Delhi (forthcoming) (in print).

Tsukuba Japan

CHIZUKO YOSHIMIZU