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Dilag vs IAC Facts: Herminio Arellano died in a vehicular accident involving a truck owned by sps.

. Pablo and Socorro Dilag. Marciano Arellano (Private Respondent), filed an action for quasi-delict (Civil Case 8714). Plaintiff won and the decision became final. A writ of execution was issued on Feb. 16, 1979. Sps. Dilag filed a petition for relief from judgment praying that the decision in CC#8714 be set aside (CC#12832). A compromise agreement between the parties in CC#8714 was presented but was disapproved by the court for failure of the Dilag spouses to sign it, although it was alleged by the plaintiff that the Dilag spouses made a partial payment of P9,000 to plaintiff Marciano Arellano. CC#12832 was dismissed. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued on Feb. 16, 1979, a Notice of Levy on Execution was annotated on TCT 30137 on Feb. 21, 1979, covering a parcel of land in Iloilo (Lot#288 registered in the name of sps. Pablo and Socorro Dilag). An adverse claim was inscribed in TCT 30137 filed by Suzette, Benito, Sussie and Susan all surnamed Dilag (Petitioners) to protect their rights and interests as vendees evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their parents Pablo and Socorro Dilag evidenced on Nov. 21, 1973. The adverse claim further stated that the owners duplicate certificate was in the possession of DBP to which the property had earlier been mortgaged. Another inscription was included in the TCT which was a Contract of Lease executed on Feb. 9, 1979 by the sps. Pablo and Socorro Dilag in favor of David and Erlinda Diancin who took possession of the property (lot 288) described in TCT as lessees. After compliance with the legal requirements of notice and publication, Lot 288 under TCT 30137 and lot 1927 (unregistered but declared in the name of the Dilag Spouses) were sold at public auction on Aug. 26, 1981 to Marciano Arellano. On Aug. 27, 1981, the corresponding Certificate of Sale at public auction was inscribed on TCT 30137 subject to the right of redemption as provided for by law. Another inscription appears, a Deed of Absolute Sale date Aug. 26, 1981 executed by Pablo Dilag, in favor of their children. TCT 30137 was cancelled and a new one TCT 104986 was issued in the name of Benito, Susette, Sussi and Susan on Aug. 14, 1981. Aug. 30, 1982, after the Dilag spouses failed to exercise their right of redemption, a Definite Deed of Sale over lot 288 was executed in favor of Marciano Arellano. A writ of possession was issued. Sheriffs Return of Service attested to the fact that delivery of possession of the subject lot was made to Marciano Arellano, who executed a Delivery Receipt acknowledging receipt of the material possession of Lot 288. Marciano Arellano sold Lot 288 to Marcelino Florete Jr. and Leon Coo. David Dancin, the actual lessee of the property in question, executed a deed giving up his claim or interest as a lesee over the leased property in favor of Marciano Arellano in consideration of P38,000 as payment for his fish fry placed in the fishpond. July 7, 1983, Sussie Dilag in behalf of her sisters and brother, executed a Notarial Recission of the Lease Contract dated July 7, 1974 entered into by Diancin and Dilag Sps. Private Respondents filed CC#15085 for the annulment of decision in CC#8714 and all proceedings thereafter with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order alleging that the levy on TCT 30137 was illegal since it was made on property no longer owned by judgment debtors and that the Dilag children are not parties in CC#8714. The court approved the restraining order. Also the preliminary prohibitory injunction was granted. Marciano Arellano filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or injunction with preliminary mandatory injuction and damages to invalidate the Orders issued by the trial court in CC#15085 with the IAC. The appellate court sided with the respondent that there was a simulated sale between the Sps. Dilag and their children. The court ruled that the deed of sale was simulated since it was executed in fraud of creditors. The Dilag children filed a petition for certiorari Whether or not petitioners are owners of Lot 288 at the time of the levy on execution in CC#8714? Whether or not the decision and the consequent writ of execution in CC#8714 are operative against petitioners who admittedly were not parties to said civil case? No Yes

Issue: 1. 2. Held: 1. 2.

Ratio: Sps. Dilag were still the registered owners of Lot 288 at the time of the levy on execution in CC#8714. It is not refuted that the title in the name of respondents was issued on Aug. 14, 1981, several days ahead of the deed of sale, dated Aug 26, 1981 on which the new title in the name of the petitioners was based, and inscribed on Aug. 27, 1981. Clearly the Deed of Absolute Sale was a simulated and fictitious transaction to defraud Arellano who obtained a money judgment against the parents of petitioners. The Sps. Dilag continued exercising acts of ownership over Lot 288 by leasing the same to David Diancin. When the deed of sale in favor of Arellano was executed, by failure of the Sps. Dilag to redeem the property, the actual possessor was David Diancin. There was no factual and legal basis for the restraining order of the lower court ordering Arellano and/or his agents to desist from entering Lot 288. Thus Rule 39 Sec. 13 does not apply in this case.

Campillo vs. C.A. G.R. No. L-56483

May 29, 1984

FACTS: Tomas de Vera and his wife Felisa Serafico sold two (2) parcels of land to Simplicio Santos. Said sale was however never presented for registration in the office of the Registry of Deeds of Manila nor noted in the title covering the property. Petitioner Sostenes Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against Tomas de Vera in a Civil Case No. 49060 in the CFI. That judgment became final and executory, and petitioner obtained an order for the issuance of a writ of execution. The City Sheriff levied on three (3) parcels of land, including the two (2) parcels of land which the latter previously sold to Simplicio Santos. Claiming to be the owner of the two parcels of land by reason of the previous sale to him by Tomas de Vera, Simplicio Santos filed an action to annul the levy, notice of sale, sale at public auction and final deed of sale of Lots 1 and 2 in favor of petitioner. After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment sustaining the validity of the levy and sale at public auction primarily because at the time of the levy and sale, the disputed properties were still registered in the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera. On appeal at the instance of the herein private respondent, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court ISSUES: Whether Petitioner who subsequently purchased them at an execution sale and obtained a certificate of title is the valid owner? HELD: Yes. A sale of real estate, whether made as a result of a private transaction or of a foreclosure or execution sale, becomes legally effective against third persons only from the date of its registration. Consequently, and considering that the properties subject matter hereof were actually attached and levied upon at a time when said properties stood in the official records of the Registry of Deeds as still owned by and registered in the name of the judgment debtor, Tomas de Vera, the attachment, levy and subsequent sale of said properties are proper and legal. The net result is that the execution sale made in favor of the herein petitioner transferred to him all the rights, interest and participation of the judgment debtor in the aforestated properties as actually appearing in the certificate of title, unaffected by any transfer or encumbrance not so recorded therein. While it may be true that purchasers at execution sales should bear in mind that the rule of caveat emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him to place the purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property and he is merely charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the registered land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

G.R. No. L-48689 August 31, 1987 CIRIACO PACHECO, ESTRELLA RAZO-REY and BENVENUTO ABITRIA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL HERNANDEZ and ANASTACIO RANESES, respondents. FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari Emiliano Pacheco owned unregistered land. o A portion of the land was sold to Rafael Pacheco. o It was mortgaged by Rafael to PNB, sold at public auction upon foreclosure of mortgage, and then later repurchased by Rafael. o Rafael sold land to Ciriaco, who sold a portion thereof to his co-petitioner Estrella Razo-Rey. In a civil case Hernandez vs. Pacheco, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. o To enforce the decision, certain properties, including the subject land, were levied upon and sold at a public auction. Private respondent Hernandez was the purchaser. Hernandez filed a complaint against petitioners, alleging that the lands the latter were occupying and which they refused to vacate were part of the property which he acquired in the judgment sale. CFI ruled for the petitioner. They said that petitioner acquired title over subject land by acquisitive prescription, except to Abitria who had bought his lot from Emiliano Pacheco, but the CA reversed CFI decision upon appeal. CA held that the petitioners claim of acquisitive prescription was untenable because their possession of the property in dispute was interrupted when the Philippine National Bank acquired it at the foreclosure sale and held it for one year before it was repurchased by Rafael Pacheco. o The ten-year period for prescription had not been completed. o It also held that, not having registered his opposition to the attachment and execution sale of the lots he was claiming as his own, petitioner Abitria was now barred from asserting ownership over the said properties.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners acquired the property by acquisitive prescription: RULING: 10 years of such possession, acquisitive prescriptive title was vested in Rafael Pacheco. Consequently, when he mortgaged the land to the PNB, he did so not as a mere possessor but as an owner by virtue of prescription under Article 1134 of the Civil Code. The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires no higher or better right than what the execution debtor has in the property levied upon. If the judgment debtor had no interest in the property, the execution purchaser acquires no interest therein. The judgment sale in favor of private respondent Hernandez did not and could not cover the lands claimed by the petitioners as these lots no longer belonged to the judgment debtor when they were levied upon and sold. That sale covered only the lands stin under the ownership of the judgment debtor and did not affect the ownership of the property titled in the name of the herein petitioners. None of them was a party to the civil case brought by the private respondent against Emiliano Pacheco. Finally, as to the effect of Abitria's failure to oppose the sale of this land in 1963 to enforce the judgment against Emiliano Pacheco, it suffices to point out that under Rule 39, Section 17, of the Rules of Court, the claimant who does not file a thirdparty claim to the property being levied upon is not prevented "from vindicating his claims to the property by any other action." Hence, Abitria is not precluded now from asserting in the present petition his claim of ownership over the disputed property.

G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED CONTROL & ELECTRIC CORPORATION (ACEC), and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. Facts: ACEC filed an action to recover a sum of money from Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgment ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC. The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at ACEC's instance on December 18, 1987. Attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August 19, 1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment Debtor," alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a debtor of BBGMI and praying that certain officials of the NPC be required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to BBGMI.- GRANTED. The Manager of NPC, Vinoya, appeared in response to subpoena and duly testified that NPC needed to reimburse BBGMI certain amount. RTC direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October 8,1987 out of the remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant," and ordered his deputy sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and attach the said credit due Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc." In justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" in addition to "real property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that the NPC official, had later admitted that "this amount of P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant BBGMI. Sheriff garnished such of the funds of the NPC on deposit at the PNB, Escolta, Manila, as were "sufficient to cover the sum" required to be paid by respondent Judge's Decision of October 8, 1987. ISSUE: WON respondent Judge was guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering NPC (as BBGMIs debtor) to pay ACEC HELD: YES. It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination of a judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39 of the rule: SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an execution against the property of a judgment debtor has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the judge, that a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order, require such person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer or member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a commissioner appointed by him, at a time a place within the province in which the order is served, to answer concerning the same. The service of an order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all money and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of service; and the judgment may also require notice of such proceedings to be given to any party to the action in such manner as he may deem proper. It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be questioned regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment debtor to pay the claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was demandable. The applicable provision is not, as was respondent Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39, which merely states the procedure that the sheriff should follow in the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor, including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The relevant provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule 39. Section 42 reads as follows: SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction of judgement.- The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, or money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands of either himself or other person, or of a corporation or other legal entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to any prior rights over such property, .... Section 45, on the other hand, states the following: SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person claims the property. - If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment creditor to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt until an action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated by the judge granting the same, or by the court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as may be just. After summary examination of a person or entity alleged to be a debtor of the judgment debtor or holding property

belonging to the latter, in accordance with Section 39, Rule 39, supra execution may issue against such person or entity only upon an incontrovertible showing that the person or entity in fact holds property belonging to the judgment debtor or is indeed a debtor of said judgment debtor, i.e., that such holding of property, or the indebtedness, is not denied. In the event of such a denial, it is NOT, within the judge's power to order delivery of property allegedly belonging to the judgment debtor or the payment of the alleged debt. The indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI was denied not only by the representative of NPC, but also by its lawyers. Of course, the respondent Judge's Order makes a general reference to later admissions supposedly made by Vinoya, the NPC representative. The categorical admission of liability on the part of the NPC, cannot operate to invest the respondent Court with jurisdiction to order NPC to pay its alleged indebtedness to BBGMI. The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have made in the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring a separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI, and consequent payment to it ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds to the amount of its judgment.

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents. Facts: On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest and defendant Sharp entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages. Several attempts to serve summons to Sharp in Japan had failed so it was effected through diplomatic channels at its principal office in Manila. Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages. On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Judgment became final and executory. On May 20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the RTC. RTC - The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that this is an action in personam CA - sustained the trial court. It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was void. Issue: WON Japanese court judgment is valid and binding to Sharp? Held: YES A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. It was incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation. In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001 ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents. Facts: Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad for the enforcement of the money of the judgment of the High Court of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur against private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation. Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project. The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent which is also designated therein as the "2nd Defendant. " Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated a complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. Private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the Person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the court's jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondent's counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court's jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court. The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court. Ruling: A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity. In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Vinayak Prabhakar Pradhan, presented as petitioner's sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced. Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.

The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case. In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, denying the enforcement of the Judgment of the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation to pay petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad the amounts adjudged in the said foreign Judgment, subject of the said case. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Buena, JJ. , concur.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. Facts: Respondent Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married in 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this Petition for Review under Rule 45. Issue: Whether the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to respondents civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Held: No. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." This quotation bolsters SCs contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. SC rejects the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws. Hence, SC believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if

any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

Roehr v Rodriguez FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied by the trial court in its order dated May 28, 1997. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997 The parental custody for the children was granted to the father petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent. an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge ISSUES: 1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and 2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court. On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly. Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. HELD: the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. 1. It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period,

2.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy. We find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

Bayot vs. C.A. G.R. No. 155635 FACTS:

November 7, 2008

Vicente and Rebecca were married in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements. Rebecca filed a petition, this time before the RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by Vicente. Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. The CA issued the desired TRO. The CA, by a Decision effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case ISSUES: Whether the judgment of divorce is valid? HELD: Yes. A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union. The presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen, acquired A Canadian citizenship. o He married respondent Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Because of work Gerbert left for Canada after the wedding. He returned to the Philippine in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn. However he was shocked to discover that she was having an affair with another man. o Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. o The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. o Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable; the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation. o She requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. RTC denied Gerberts petition. RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. From the RTC ruling, Gerbert filed the petition. ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree issued by Canadian court is binding in the Philippines? RULING: The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for

the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

G.R. No. 129788 December 3, 2002 OROPEZA MARKETING CORPORATION, ROGACIANO OROPEZA and IMELDA S. OROPEZA, petitioners, vs. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondent. Facts: Allied Bank extended a loan ofP780,000 to petitioners Oropeza Marketing Corporation (OMC) and the spouses Rogaciano and Imelda Oropeza. To secure this obligation, petitioners executed a Promissory Note and a REM over their properties. Petitioners failed to pay thus, Allied Bank filed a collection suit with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC Branch 15 (1st case.) While the writ of attachment was pending, Allied Bank discovered that the Oropeza spouses had executed an Absolute Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor of Solid Gold Commercial Corporation, covering the real properties mortgaged to respondent. Allied Bank filed a complaint for the annulment of said Deed of Sale RTC Branch 9 (2nd Case.) RTC Branch 9, declared the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage VALID RTC Br. 15 -dismissed respondent's complaint on the ground of litis pendentia CA (1st case) - reversed the order of dismissal issued by RTC Branch 15 CA (2nd case) upheld RTC branch 9s decision Issue: WON CA, in rendering the judgment Declaring the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage valid, constitutes res judicata insofar as the collection suit is concerned? Held: YES, BUT only as to the CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT. The principle of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) "bar by prior judgment" as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and (b) "conclusiveness of judgment" which is contained in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the 1st case where the judgment was rendered and the 2nd case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The judgment in the 1st case constitutes an absolute bar to the 2nd action. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The existence here of the first three requisites is not disputed. In both of the cases, it is clearly established that both parties are the same parties in the collection suit and declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale. With respect to identity of subject matter, the conclusiveness of judgment shall be only with regard to the questions directly and actually put in issue and decided in the first case. The test to determine the identity of causes of action is to consider whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. In the 1st case, Allied Bank will have to present evidence showing the existence of the loan and petitioners' failure to comply with their bounden duty to pay such loan. However, in 2nd case, respondent's evidence must establish that: (a) petitioners secured a loan from it; (b) said loan was secured by a promissory note and a mortgage over properties owned by the Oropezas; (c) petitioners failed to pay their debt; and (d) petitioners sold the mortgaged properties with intent to defraud respondent bank. Accordingly, we find that the evidence to sustain the respective causes of action in the two cases is not exactly the same. Hence, there is no identity between the causes of action in the 1st and 2nd case. There being substantial identity of parties but no identity of causes of action, the applicable aspect of res judicata in the instant case is "conclusiveness of judgment." Res judicata is founded on the principle that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. Hence, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court - - so long as it remains unreversed - - is conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. It having been determined with finality that the debt of the Oropezas has been settled, respondent's cause of action in the collection suit must be deemed extinguished.

G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006 ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., petitioner, vs. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., respondent. Facts: Petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus Aircraft ". Petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft. Respondent failed to pay costs for the maintenance of its aircrafts. Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18 against respondent. The court issued a Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon respondent. Despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim. The Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent. On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process. RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss. MR was denied. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the case Issue: WON the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines Held: YES, hence Singapore High Courts judgment is valid The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons is void and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City,or elsewhere in the Philippines." This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court 19966 of Singapore, which provides. (2) Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to be served on a defendant in any country with respect to which there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for service in that country of process of the High Court, the originating process may be served a) through the government of that country, where that government is willing to effect service; b) through a Singapore Consular authority in that country, except where service through such an authority is contrary to the law of the country; or c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process issued by that country. In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against respondent is valid.

G.R. No. 167330 September 18, 2009 PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. Facts: For resolution are a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration, respectively, filed by petitioner Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue [CIR] sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18. The deficiency [documentary stamp tax (DST)] assessment was imposed on petitioners health care agreement with the members of its health care program pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter. As respondent did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments. The CTA rendered a decision: PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to PAY the deficiency VAT until fully paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency. Respondent appealed the CTA decision to the [Court of Appeals (CA)] insofar as it cancelled the DST assessment. He claimed that petitioners health care agreement was a contract of insurance subject to DST under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. The CA rendered its decision. It held that petitioners health care agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST: GRANTED. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, petitioner filed this case. The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CAs decision. We held that petitioners health care agreement during the pertinent period was in the nature of non-life insurance which is a contract of indemnity. We also ruled that petitioners contention that it is a health maintenance organization (HMO) and not an insurance company is irrelevant because contracts between companies like petitioner and the beneficiaries under their plans are treated as insurance contracts. Moreover, DST is not a tax on the business transacted but an excise on the privilege, opportunity or facility offered at exchanges for the transaction of the business. Unable to accept our verdict, petitioner filed the present motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Oral arguments were held in Baguio City. The parties submitted their memoranda. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner reveals for the first time that it availed of a tax amnesty under RA 9480 (also known as the "Tax Amnesty Act of 2007") by fully paying the amount of P5,127,149.08 representing 5% of its net worth as of the year ending December 31, 2005. Ruling: Petitioner raises another interesting issue in its motion for reconsideration: whether this Court is bound by the ruling of the CA in CIR v. Philippine National Bank that a health care agreement of Philamcare Health Systems is not an insurance contract for purposes of the DST. In support of its argument, petitioner cites minute resolution of this Court dismissing the appeal in Philippine National Bank (G.R. No. 148680). Petitioner argues that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680 by minute resolution was a judgment on the merits; hence, the Court should apply the CA ruling there that a health care agreement is not an insurance contract. It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases? With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years. Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or

principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice. Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioners liability for DST on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor. Nonetheless, in view of the reasons already discussed, this does not detract in any way from the fact that petitioners health care agreements are not subject to DST. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 1996 and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to desist from collecting the said tax. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005 PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents. Background of the Case: The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations. The Philippine trial court required the petitioners to pay a filing fee of P472,000,000.00 (Million) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. Facts: In 1991, a complaint was filed with the US District Court, District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of $1,964,005,859.90 (Billion Dollars). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the RTC, for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. o They argued that the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. o It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410.00 as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of US$2.25 Billion. Respondent Judge Ranada dismissed the complaint without prejudice. o He opined that the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. o On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid. Petitioners MR was denied. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners contentions: Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay P472,000,000.00 in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have paid the correct filing fees. Held: Yes. There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their

successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself. More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds. As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. As to the filing fees: SC holds that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. SC finds that the instant case is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property." Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.

POLICARPIO vs. ACTIVE BANK FACTS: Sps. Ricaza are registered owners of a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang. October 6, 1996 they mortgaged the property to Active Bank. They failed to settle obligation. Property foreclosed. Sps. Ricaza failed to redeem the property during the period. The bank consolidated its ownership over the property. Active Bank filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession with RTC in Muntinlupa. Petitioner Policarpio opposed it and submitted a Deed of Sale of the subject property in her favor, executed by one of the Sps. Ricaza, sometime 1998. TC set opposition for hearing but neither Policarpio nor the counsel appeared. January 2002 TC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession because it appears that the Deed of Sale is void since only the husband Ricaza signed it and it was not shown that he was allowed by the wife to sell the conjugal property. January 18, 2002 resolution was served to Policarpio along with the Notice to Vacate. February 2002, the sheriff with Banks employees entered the property and removed Policarpios personal belongings. The Bank was only able to occupy a portion of the property due to the timely intervention of the Muntinlupa Police and Ayala Alabang Security personnel. Policarpio filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA seeking to nullify the TCs resolution, Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate property. Policarpio argued that TC could not issue the Writ of Possession in favor of the Bank since she was a 3rd party in possession of the property. The Bank countered that the Deed of sale in petitioners favor was void since it was executed without the wifes consent and the sale has not been registered. CA denied the petition. It ruled that the validity of the sale was questionable sine only the husband signed the deed, and that the deed has not been registered. Also, she never pursued or prosecuted her claim against the Writ of Possession. Laches may have worked against her by then. ISSUE/S: Whether or not he petitioner is a 3rd party in possession of the property contemplated in R39, S33 such as to preclude the TC from issuing the Writ of Possession in favor of the Bank? HELD: NO. RATIO: A purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of property. Whenever the purchaser prays for a Writ of Possession, TC has to issue it as a matter of course. The obligation ceases to be ministerial once a 3rd party in possession of the property claiming an adverse right over it as that of a debtor/mortgagor. Where such 3rd party exists, TC should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession. In the case at bar, TC conducted the required hearing but neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared. Thus, the TC is not at fault for evaluating the only documentary evidence submitted by Policarpio, which are the Deed of Sale and Certified true copy of the TCT. The case should be dismissed since only one of the Sps. Ricaza signed the Deed of Sale. Even if both spouses signed the

deed, it was not registered, so, a fatal defect exists.

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