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Strategic Survey
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Lebanon, Syria and the PLO

Version of record first published: 22 Jan 2009.

To cite this article: (1976): Lebanon, Syria and the PLO, Strategic Survey, 77:1, 81-88 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597237608460392

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THE MIDDLE EAST

Events in the Middle East during 1976 were dominated by Arab politics. At both the beginning and the end of the year the Arab states mounted diplomatic offensives directed towards Israel, but in the months in between they were sharply divided, notably by events in the Lebanon. The Palestinians started the year on the crest of a political wave, but finished it in great disarray, disciplined by Syrian force. Israel watched these Arab quarrels attentively and built up her own military strength. By the turn of the year, however, she was under renewed political pressure both from the Arabs, who had closed ranks under the strong influence of Saudi Arabia, and internally. In January 1976 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) won a major diplomatic victory when it was invited to attend a UN Security Council debate on the Middle East.* Israel announced that she would boycott the meeting, and the session began after the United States failed to block PLO participation. A draft resolution was put forward at the debate by Arab representatives aimed inter alia at recognizing the PLO as the legal Palestinian representative and at the establishing of a Palestinian state. Although this was vetoed by the United States, the UN discussions were a measure of the political isolation of Israel and the high-water mark, as it turned out, of the PLO. Arab Dissent It was Syria, in her search for political momentum for change in the Middle East, that was effectively the sponsor of the PLO at this point, and the direction and evolution of Syrian policies became central to the year's events in the region. She sought closer cooperation with Jordan, suggesting the concept of a federated state to incorporate Syria, Jordan and a Palestinian authority on the West Bank, thus giving notice of her intention to ensure that the emergence of a Palestinian state would be along lines that suited her own national interests. Jordan welcomed further military and economic co-operation but was clearly cautious about any step that might blur her own identity; her relations with Syria did, however, improve markedly. At the same time, relations between Syria and Egypt grew steadily worse, prompted by Syrian denunciation of the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreement. Syria was, of course, much preoccupied by events in the Lebanon and, fearful that they would get out of control, moved from mediation in Lebanon to eventual large-scale military intervention (see pp. 86-8). This was despite numerous Arab attempts, notably by Saudi Arabia, to work out a policy for the Lebanon that would reconcile the conflicting views of the participants and their supporters, but essentially to reach accommodation with Syria, for whom the issue was a vital one. Meetings between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were held in Riyadh in June and July (one in May was cancelled because of Syria's last-minute refusal to attend, occasioned by her dispute with Egypt), and an Arab emergency summit was called there by King Khaled in October, when events in the Lebanon had reached a critical point. This meeting at last produced a degree of harmony, above all between Syria and Egypt. It was clear that Saudi Arabia, long the financial centre of gravity of the Arab world, had now become a powerful political centre as well, uniquely able to apply pressure in pursuit of her aim of strengthening Arab stability (see pp. 89-92). If disputes between Syria and Egypt followed an up-and-down course so did those between other Arab states, often showing even greater volatility. In July, Egypt had threatened to cut diplomatic relations with Libya, and by September the situation grew
* See Strategic Survey 1975, p. 78.

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worse - with Libya accused of planting bombs in Cairo - but by the end of the year there was an attempt at reconciliation. President Numeiry of Sudan called for the isolation of Libya, claiming that Colonel Gaddafi had planned the abortive coup against him in July, while Tunisia was concerned over Libyan support for Tunisian dissidents. Jordan had long been at loggerheads with Libya but, together with Tunisia, moved in the late summer towards the restoration of more friendly ties. Iraq, however, stood out against this general trend towards Arab cohesion, maintaining strained relations with Saudi Arabia and Syria throughout, and withdrawing her ambassador from Syria in November. At the root of much of this Arab dissension was, of course, the problem of the Palestinians, who themselves were riven by factional differences. During the year the PLO had looked wherever it could for support, essentially against Syria, but did not find enough to avert military defeat in the Lebanon. The Riyadh emergency summit did finally set some limits to Syrian actions, but many Arabs would not have been disturbed to see the PLO'S stature sharply reduced. At the end of the year, when calls were being made for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, the Palestinians faced a crisis of leadership and of policy on the age-old issues of recognition of Israel and the nature of a Palestinian state. Israel's Position While Arabs fought among themselves, Israel used the year to bolster her military strength and to keep a wary eye on events in Lebanon, particularly in the sensitive area south of the Litani river. She did, however, face during the year continuous unrest on the West Bank. Strikes, protests and demonstrations, sometimes set off by new (and often unauthorized) Jewish developments on Arab land, led to the use of Israeli troops to control riots and to a number of deaths. The publicity given to this military action drew renewed attention to the Israeli occupation and, in particular, to settlement and land policy on the West Bank and the Golan Heights, which attracted widespread criticism, not least from the United States. The Israeli military position was improved steadily by arms deliveries from the United States, no doubt facilitated by the climate of presidential election politics. Israel received approximately $2*2 billion in military aid from the United States, and before the election President Ford promised the transfer of several items of advanced equipment, new precision weapons, target-acquisition equipment and concussion bombs. (In February 1977 the Carter Administration announced that it was reviewing this arrangement, and in March the decision was taken to cancel the transfer of the concussion bombs - fuel air explosives. The first of 25 F-15 Eagle fighters on order were delivered in December, and at the end of the year Israel and the United States were discussing the sale or coproduction of the F-16 fighter, as well as the purchase of tank components. During the year attention was also drawn towards Israel's growing domestic arms industry by the unveiling on Air Force Day in July of a squadron of Kfir C-2 fighters, built not only for her own use but also with an eye on possible export later (see p. 21). The flow of equipment to the Israeli Defence Forces undoubtedly put Israel in a stronger position militarily than in October 1973, despite chronic manpower problems. But it was at the cost of considerable financial strain: the Israeli pound was devalued in June for the tenth time within a year. And military expenditure on such a scale meant dependence on heavy assistance from the United States, which in 1976 accounted for over 35 percent of the Israeli defence budget. Whatever immediate comfort the worsting of the PLO in Lebanon had given to Israel, she would inevitably have been concerned over the growth of Syrian influence in that country. Given the obvious problem that in a new war the Lebanon could present a fourth military front, Israel had a particular interest in the area south of the Litani. Both Syria and Israel were at pains to exercise restraint here during the year, and Syrian forces were

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kept north of the river, while Israel gave no overt provocation. She made it clear, however, that Palestinian armed strength was just as unwelcome as that of Syria, who clearly understood this. Syrian preoccupation with the Lebanon also led to the renewal of the mandate for the UN contingent on the Golan Heights in May and November, and no attempt was made to use the threat of non-renewal to apply pressure to Israel, as had happened previously. Regional Diplomacy The Sinai Interim Agreement of September 1975 was carried a stage further in 1976. The first substantial forward movement by Egyptian troops was made in January and completed on 23 February, when the area west of the Giddi and Mitla Passes was handed over to them by UN personnel. The electronic early-warning stations to monitor the two sides, manned by 200 Americans, had begun operation some two days beforehand. There were later protests by Israel to the UN that Egypt had moved forward more battalions than the agreement permitted, and they were moved out in August and September. In retrospect, the Sinai agreement achieved its limited objectives of disengaging the two armies, restoring territory to Egypt, and breaking the twenty-two-year ban on the passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal. One year after its signing, both countries had reason to be satisfied with it. This may have been the reason for a number of Israeli consultations or initiatives that were made in the autumn, directed to promoting negotiations. But Israel's decision in December to table a resolution in the UN General Assembly for the first time came in response to mounting Arab peace moves. Israel formally requested the early reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference with the original participants, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, but made no mention of the PLO. This move closely followed statements by President Sadat and Yassir Arafat, chairman of the PLO. Sadat was said to have offered a nonbelligerency pact with Israel before a withdrawal from all occupied territories; Yassir Arafat spoke of his willingness to establish an Arab Palestinian State in land evacuated by Israel under any agreement. Neither of these positions was new but, taken together, they did perhaps show some promise. Of course, what was still needed was the Palestinians' acceptance of peaceful coexistence with Israel, but their altered and reduced circumstances made it possible that at least the moderates among them could sooner or later be pressed into this by the Arab governments. Arab moves were directed towards getting the PLO to a reconvened Geneva conference - if they wanted to go - and in late December Syria and Egypt reversed their previous position that there should be a single Arab delegation and announced that the PLO should go to Geneva in its own right. However, the purpose of the Israeli draft General Assembly resolution (which was soon withdrawn) had been to ensure that the PLO would be excluded from any talks, and Israel remained adamant that she would not sit with the PLO anywhere, insisting that Jordan only should speak for the Palestinians. Despite deadlock on this familiar point, much else was happening politically. In December Syria and Egypt agreed to form a 'united political leadership', following a similar agreement earlier in the month between Syria and Jordan; in each case the purpose was to ensure a united Arab front in the search for a peace settlement. Military co-ordination was also discussed, and Saudi Arabia led talks of Arab leaders in the Gulf to co-ordinate financial support for Egyptian military modernization. At the December meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) the Saudi Oil Minister, Sheikh Yamani, stood out against the decision of eleven of the participants for a ten per cent oil price rise and announced that Saudi Arabia, together with the United Arab Emirates, would increase prices by only five per cent while increasing production. Yamani later said that the decision had been motivated by political considerations, and Saudi Arabia expected Western action to help to obtain a Middle East settlement

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Israel, conscious that much of this Arab activity was pointed towards a new Administration in Washington, was herself preparing for American initiatives when they came. But political opinion within the governing coalition and the country at large was far from united on a number of issues, and skirmishing within the Knesset was rife. This was brought to a head on 21 December, when Prime Minister Rabin resigned after breaking up the ruling coalition by dismissing the three National Religious Party (NRP) ministers. This followed a motion of no confidence - which the government survived but on which the NRP abstained - over an alleged breach of the Sabbath caused by the government's public welcome of the arrival of the first three F-15 fighters. The country was thus left with a caretaker government to hold office until elections in mid-May and with the continuing prospect of political dissension. Israeli law gives a caretaker government full authority to conduct negotiations in response to any outside initiatives for peace, but it was doubtful whether the Prime Minister would have a sufficient political base to make any major territorial concessions. It seemed clear that Rabin had chosen the occasion to resign in a bid to strengthen unity within the somewhat discontented Labour Party (though his authority was challenged, he did win re-election as leader in February 1977), and that he, like others, would use the election campaign to obtain a mandate for a settlement. In any event, the holding of elections some months earlier than expected could make negotiations slightly easier, for the government had promised that significant withdrawals from the West Bank would have to be approved by the electorate. At the year end the way was thus being cleared on both sides of the dispute for a new American initiative. While American policy had understandably been muted for a period, it had pursued its even-handed course during the year, and considerable care had been taken to continue good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular. Substantial supplies of arms were made to the latter (see p. 91), despite the evident possibility that such supplies could find their way into use against Israel in any new fighting, in return for Saudi Arabia's political and economic support of a moderate Arab position. The Middle East seemed likely to figure fairly high on President Carter's priorities. The events of the year, distressing through their impact in the Lebanon, had clarified at least some of the problems. The Soviet Union had found it hard to capitalize on them, torn between the desirability of supporting the PLO and the greater need to stay on good terms with Syria. Israel's immediate security was no longer an issue, and the scene was thus being set for an attempt to find further solutions. Something would have to be done to defuse the situation on Israel's north-eastern front with Syria, and the Lebanon would have to be prevented from becoming another ingredient in the Arab-Israel dispute. Perhaps further steps in the Sinai might also be necessary, but the central problem to be grappled with, and for which the time was perhaps more ripe than before, was that of the Palestinians. While progress was made in 1976, there remained appalling difficulties ahead - not least for Israel, because a settlement could only be built upon Israeli concessions. The question of establishing a Palestinian state figured largely in preliminary discussions with Arab leaders during the February 1977 Middle East visit of the new US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. One possibility, suggested by President Sadat, was a confederated state linked with Jordan. But long and difficult negotiations seemed inevitable before so many deep-rooted differences of opinion could be reconciled. However, not to get negotiations under way was to risk yet another war in the not-too-distant future.

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LEBANON, SYRIA AND THE PLO

The causes of the 1975-6 conflict in the Lebanon can be traced to a number of divergent sources of friction in that country and the region as a whole. Lebanon had for some time been prone to crises culminating in political violence of varying degrees, particularly

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because the bulk of the Muslim minority continued to resent the pre-eminence and builtin privileges accorded to the Christian Maronites.* The attempt by the Druze leader Kemal Jumblatt to wrest the leadership of the indigenous Muslim community from the more traditional and conservative politicians and to marshal radical groups, including the Palestine guerrilla movement, to challenge Christian political supremacy served as a catalyst for the ferocious civil war which in 1976 left the Lebanon ravaged, the guerrillas defeated and the Syrian army in occupation under the auspices of the Arab league. The Palestinians The presence of non-indigenous Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon aggravated all the susceptibilities which had lain dormant since the civil war in 1958. Their activities contributed to the radicalization of the political climate, especially among the Muslim population, and the guerrilla forces were perceived by many as an alternative military organization to the Christian-led Lebanese army. This led the Muslims to press for greater political concessions from the Maronites, under threat of disrupting the normal processes of political life, so that in the 1970s the guerrillas were able to gain a powerful position in Lebanese politics. The revolutionary guerrilla organizations in particular, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under the Marxist-inclined George Habash, sought to exploit the Lebanese domestic struggle to further their own interest. The goal of dominating Muslim politics was not precluded by the growing disagreement in the ranks of the guerrillas over policies for the creation of a Palestinian state. The fundamental schism in the guerrilla movement was between, on the one hand, the official PLO led by Yasir Arafat and the Syrian-backed Sa'iqa led by Zuhair Mohsen, and, on the other, the 'Rejection Front', made up of the PFLP, the PFLP General Command under Ahmed Jibril and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front (ALF). The relationship between the guerrillas and the Lebanese State had never been cordial, and from the outset both sides realized they were on a collision course. An early series of clashes had been terminated by the Cairo agreement of 1969, which allowed the guerrillas extra-territorial rights over their camps and unhampered access to the southern border with Israel, but the agreement did little to assuage Christian resentment against these concessions. When the clashes were resumed in 1973, Arab political pressure forced the Lebanese army to suspend its operations against the guerrillas, and the result was more concessions. The Palestinians were granted the right to defend their camps against outside attacks (presumably those of Israeli forces), and this meant that they could deploy heavy weapons like mortars, heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft missiles within the camps. In securing these rights, Syria's intervention had been crucial: she put pressure on the Lebanese economy by closing her border with Lebanon to commercial traffic, while allowing continued movement of men and equipment in support of the guerrillas. She resorted to the same tactics in April 1975, when renewed clashes signalled the outbreak of a civil war which lasted until October 1976 and claimed over 50,000 lives.
Domestic Considerations

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The onset of civil war led to a realignment of Muslim politics when Kemal Jumblatt, the acknowledged leader of the leftist movement assumed the leadership of the Muslim community. As a leader of a minority Muslim sect (the Druzes) he could not aspire to more than a ministerial position under the old confessional system of the Lebanese constitution,! and he now sought to extend his political base by appealing to the guerrilla
* See 'Lebanon', Strategic Survey 1975, pp. 82-6 (including map, p. 85). The confessional system allocated political power according to the size of the religious communities when the constitution was promulgated (see Strategic Survey 1975, p. 82).

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organizations. The Lebanese left quickly rallied to the guerrillas' cause, so as to gain the protection it needed against attacks by Muslim conservatives and Christians alike, and a diverse but formidable conglomeration of radical groups and social militants joined forces with the guerrillas in an organization known as the Arab Front Supporting the Palestine National Struggle. Jumblatt became its Secretary-General. The unwillingness, or inability, of the Muslim leadership to defy the guerrillas and join the Christians in a common defence of the country's territorial integrity during 1975 enabled the Christian Maronite parties to present themselves as the defenders of Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. One of these, the Kata'ib, was prepared to allow some changes to be made to the constitution in order to redress the political balance in favour of the Muslims, though it repeatedly condemned any proposal for partition. But other Maronite groups, like Camille Chamoun's National Liberals, the Zgharta Liberation Army of former President Suleiman Franjieh and the fanatical Guards of the Cedars, were not so restrained about the possibility of partition; faced with radical changes in the political system, they made plain their preference for a federal or confederal state in which the Maronites would enjoy autonomy. They also voted not to allow the Palestinian guerrillas to remain in the country, and several calls were made for resettlement of refugees from the Lebanon in other Arab states. Implementation of this plan would have left behind but a fraction of the estimated 300,000 Palestinians in the Lebanon. The implied threat of partition was particularly serious for the Arab states, since it could encourage other minorities occupying a definable geographical area to demand the right to secede, which might portend the disintegration of the present state structure in the Middle East; moreover, such a collapse would accord legitimacy to a Jewish state in the region. Syrian Objectives It was Syria that became the champion of the guerrillas' right to operate in Lebanon and intervened to defend them against attacks by the Lebanese army and the Christian militias. But there were also other considerations as well which prompted her interest in the country. After the signing of the Sinai Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt in September 1975, Syria and the PLO drew together to discuss the setting up of a joint military and political command. This move was intended both to protect Syria's flank against a possible Israeli military action and to form partjof a concerted effort to strengthen Arab defences after the 'neutralization' of Egypt by the Sinai agreement. Syria had also become alarmed about the influence of the radical Palestinian groupings in the 'Rejection Front' supported by the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, with which she had a long-standing feud. Moreover, since she was basically just as interested in a peaceful settlement of the ArabIsraeli dispute as Egypt, she could not look with favour on the rise in Beirut of a radical regime dominated by the 'Rejection Front'. A radical Lebanon would make war with Israel imminent and might also drive the Maronites to opt for formal partition. President Assad therefore faced the complex and sensitive political task of containing 'rejectionist' control of the PLO and reassuring the Maronites that there would be no major change in the status quo. By so doing, he would reduce the risk of war with Israel and be in a position to allow the PLO to attend a resumed Geneva conference on the Middle East. The official PLO leadership, which had no wish to see the 'rejectionists' triumph, began by co-operating with Syria, but subsequently came under increasing pressures to change this stand. The Collapse of the Army Syrian assurance to the Maronites came in the form of the Damascus Pact of February, which followed the introduction of 1,500 Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army regulars during the previous month. The .pact, which reaffirmed the confessional system

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in the Lebanon but promised equal parliamentary representation to Christians and Muslims, did not please all the parties. The Maronites were comforted by the maintenance of confessionalism and the promise of the Presidency. They also welcomed Syrian guarantees that the provisions of the 1969 Cairo agreement, governing the presence of the guerrillas in Lebanon, would be strictly observed (Syria was to police the cease-fire and have a direct say in how and where the guerrillas were to deploy their forces). The guerrillas and their leftist allies, however, could not accept such a settlement. With more than two thirds of the country under their control, they embarked on a campaign to undermine the unity of the Lebanese armed forces as a first step. The result was a rebellion in March led by a young Muslim officer, Lt Ahmad al-Khatib, who called on his coreligionists to join what he called the Lebanese Arab Army. Within a few days, several barracks declared their allegiance to al-Khatib. Some of the 55 per cent of Muslim troops arrested their officers (64 per cent of the officer corps was Christian) and installed Muslim replacements. The rebellion had a crucial impact on national politics. President Franjieh, supported by the army, moved to bring charges of desertion and sedition against the mutineers, while other members of the government pressed for an amnesty to maintain the unity of the military establishment. Syrian mediation failed to break the impasse, and on 11 March Brigadier Aziz al-Ahdab, Commander of the Beirut garrison, announced a take-over of the government, calling on the President to resign and promising the formation of a new administration. But the gesture proved to be an empty threat and served only to intensify the war, as other officers declared themselves for Franjieh. It became obvious that the Lebanese army had lost all semblance of unity, and by the end of March it was reduced to a multiplicity of factions which were to continue the civil war with the aid of the heavy armaments at their disposal. Ahdab's move coincided with the Palestinian and leftist offensive against the Maronites. The most spectacular action of this campaign was the bombardment of the presidential palace on 25 March, which forced Franjieh to seek refuge in the Maronite enclave of Jounieh, ten miles north of Beirut. Syria stepped up her intervention with the dispatch of 1,000 troops, ostensibly to prevent the forcible removal of the President. In fact, the constitution was amended to allow a new presidential election to be held in May, instead of September as outlined in the Damascus Pact. When the Syrian-backed candidate, Elias Sarkis, was elected, Syria mounted a massive security operation, but the crisis was not thereby resolved. At the end of May, Syria sent an armoured column of 60 tanks and 2,000 troops (quickly reinforced by 3-4,000 men) into Lebanon to check Palestinian operations against the Maronites. The move was frustrated not so much by armed resistance (although this was fierce in certain places, like Sidon) as by Arab and international pressure. President Sadat condemned the intervention and proposed a joint Arab force under the auspices of the Arab league. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, representatives of Syria and Egypt met at Riyadh in June and agreed to send a peacekeeping force to the Lebanon. But in the absence of an effective cease-fire, the peace force found it impossible to carry out its task and remained passive. The arrival in Beirut of the 1,000-strong Syrian and Libyan Arab Force (followed by a Sudanese contingent) in late June coincided with concerted attacks by the Maronite forces against the refugee camps of Jisr al-Pasha and Tal al-Za'tar on the south-eastern outskirts. These were the only remaining Palestinian strongholds in the Christian enclave which ran along the coast from East Beirut northward as far as Jounieh and then turned eastward into the Maronite hinterland. The fall of Tal al-Za'tar in mid-July marked the turning point of the civil war. PLO representatives, who had been discussing with Syria a possible formula to end hostilities, began to yield to Syrian and Saudi pressure. In September, three weeks before he was to assume office, President-elect Sarkis was invited to join the talks in Chtoura in eastern

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Lebanon. Although agreement was reached on the terms of a new cease-fire, Lebanese. Muslim factions, with the support of the Palestinian 'rejectionists', were not prepared to accept its provisions, and the talks ended inconclusively. Syria saw no alternative but to mount yet another disciplinary campaign. A force of some 15,000 went on the offensive in the mountain region and headed for the three areas under Palestinian control, Tripoli in the north, Sidon and Tyre in the south, and west Beirut. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, meanwhile, stepped up their efforts at mediation between Egypt and Syria, and as a result a summit meeting was held in October at Riyadh. Three weeks later a conference meeting of Arab heads of state was held in Cairo to endorse the agreement worked out at Riyadh. Apart from marking the reconciliation of Syria and Egypt, the Riyadh agreement provided for an effective cease-fire to be policed by an Arab peace-keeping force, this time of 30,000, and the Syrian forces in Lebanon were endowed with Arab League authority. It also ensured the strict adherence of the Palestinians to the provisions of the 1969 Cairo Agreement and established a round-table conference, to be arranged by President Sarkis, to bring together all the Lebanese factions and representatives of Arab states to work out a settlement. President Sarkis was to control an Arab fund for the reconstruction of the Lebanese economy. Uncertainties By the end of the year, Syria, by a masterful combination of diplomacy and force, had essentially obtained Arab recognition of her primacy in the politics of the fertile crescent. Her alliance with Jordan, her newly-acquired influence with the PLO and her powerful position in the Lebanon all gave her a crucial role to play in the conduct of Middle East diplomacy during 1977, and her co-ordination, and possible union, with Egypt presented Israel and the United States with a formidable challenge. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Arab leaders, in harmony once again, set their sights on the resumption of the Geneva conference and a comprehensive settlement of their conflict with Israel. Within Lebanon, however, the situation remained delicate, particularly following Jumblatt's assassination on 16 March 1977. The country was virtually partitioned, and the Maronites remained intransigent over their status and the presence of the Palestinian guerrillas. The Muslim community was resentful of the Syrian role (for example, the effort to have all the factions turn over their weapons to the Arab peace-keeping force encountered difficulties) and was still unwilling to co-operate with the Maronites. President Sarkis postponed the proposed talks on the future of the country's political system until essential services were provided and government institutions were functioning again. The crucial question of Palestinian representation remained open too. In December President Sadat, in an effort to meet Israeli objections about the status of the PLO, seemed to revive the proposal for a federal state of Jordan and Palestine made by King Hussein in 1972. But, in view of Arab League recognition of the PLO as the 'only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people', this was likely to meet strong resistance from Arafat. Finally, the situation in southern Lebanon remained explosive. In December Christian militias, with the support of Israel, were fighting guerrilla forces who were increasingly concentrated in that region; at the same time, the Syrian-dominated Arab peace-keeping force seemed reluctant to move into south Lebanon because of Israeli objections. However, at the end of January 1977, Israel reported that Syrian units had extended their positions south to the towns of Nabatiyeh, Aichiyeh and Marjayoun - all nine miles from the frontier with Israel. Christian Maronite militiamen warned that Syrian forces would not be allowed south of the Litani River,, and the United States warned that the movement of the Arab peace-keeping force closer to the border could provoke an Israeli attack. These forces were apparently withdrawn in mid-February, but, even so, Syria's position was not without risks as the new year got under way.