Human Development 2008;51:6679 DOI: 10.

1159/000112532 Reprint of Human Development 1979;22:122

From Social Interaction to Higher Psychological Processes

A Clarification and Application of Vygotskys Theory1
James V. Wertsch
Department of Linguistics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Key Words Adult-child interaction Language game Regulative speech Self-regulation Vygotsky

Abstract Vygotskys notions of speech, language and thought have recently begun to receive more attention in the west, but some of his basic distinctions are not well understood. The first part of this paper deals with some of the confusions that have arisen due to inaccurate translation and misunderstanding of Vygotskys general theoretical framework. The focus of this analysis is on Vygotskys distinction between language and speech. The second part of the paper deals with the emergence of selfregulative capacities in ontogenesis a central theme in the work of Vygotsky and his followers. It is argued that their ideas about selfregulation can be properly understood only if we conduct a genetic analysis that goes back to the origins of self-regulation. These origins are to be found in adult-child interaction where

adults provide the other-regulation necessary for a child to carry out a task. We argue that it is by coming to function in communicative settings involving other-regulation that the child can develop self-regulative capacities. These self-regulative capacities are seen as emerging as the result of the childs taking over the communicative and regulative responsibilities formerly carried out by the adult.

One of Vygotskys most interesting ideas in his study of the ontogenesis of higher mental functions is what he called the zone of proximal development. He defined it as: . . . the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). He proposed this idea in his attempt to elucidate the relationship between learning and mental development. Rather than restricting his account of mental development to assessing

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Working Conference on the Social Foundations of Language and Thought held at the Center for Psychosocial Studies, Chicago, Ill., September 810, 1978. The author is indebted to Michael Cole, Maya Hickmann, Benjamin Lee, Addison Stone, Stephen Toulmin and Bernard Weissbourd for comments and criticisms of the ideas included in this paper, and to Nancy Budwig, Gillian Dowley, Joan McLane and Phyllis Schneider for their assistance in collecting and analyzing data for the mother-child interaction study. The author wishes to thank the Spencer Foundation for support in the preparation of this paper.

2008 S. Karger AG, Basel 0018716X/08/05110066$24.50/0 Fax 41 61 306 12 34 E-Mail karger@karger.ch www.karger.com Accessible online at: www.karger.com/hde

James V. Wertsch Department of Linguistics Northwestern University Evanston, IL 60201 (USA)

whether or not an individual has a certain ability or concept in its finished form, he was interested in the past history as well as the future potential of mental phenomena. With regard to the latter issue, he argued that . . . what children can do with the assistance of others might be in some sense even more indicative of their mental development than what they can do alone (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 85). The idea of the zone of proximal development reflects two aspects of the theoretical framework that guided all of Vygotskys research. First, it reflects his emphasis on genetic explanation. In accordance with the Marxian tradition which guided his work, Vygotsky argued that any complete explanation of a psychological function must be based on an account of its origins and development. Second, it reflects his concern for the role that social interaction plays in the development of all higher mental functions. He argued that higher mental functions appear first on the interpsychological (i.e., social) plane and only later on the intrapsychological (i.e., individual) plane. Any higher mental function was external because it was social at some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function. It was first a social relation between two people. The means for influencing oneself originally were means of influencing others or others means of influencing an individual (Vygotsky, in preparation, p. 21). While Vygotskys work has had a powerful influence on Soviet psychology and is becoming more appreciated in the west, researchers have paid very little attention to his ideas about the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning. This is an important oversight since this transition is one of the main cornerstones of his approach. Any attempt to understand specific issues in his theoretical framework is bound to be misguided if this issue is overlooked. In this paper we will deal with how social interaction at the level of interpsychological functioning can lead to independent problem solving at the intrapsychological level. Our analysis will first attempt to clarify some of Vygotskys ideas about speech and its role in this transition. Then we will analyze examples of adult-child discourse

which illustrate various levels of social interaction in the zone of proximal development and how they lead to independent problem solving on the plane of intrapsychological functioning.

Vygotskys Ideas about Speech a Clarification

In trying to understand Vygotskys notion of the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning, we must understand the crucial role he attributed to speech in this process. Without a clear idea of his position on this issue, many other points in his theoretical framework will not be seen from the proper perspective. It is well known that Vygotsky proposed his interpretation of egocentric speech in response to Piagets. Unlike Piaget, he did not think that egocentric speech is a temporary phenomenon that gradually disappears as the childs socialization progresses. Rather, he argued that it reflects a new functional capacity for speech self-regulation and that it gradually becomes internalized (goes underground) as inner speech. There are two specific problems with the existing research on egocentric speech that need to be pointed out and discussed if we are to understand Vygotskys position. These problems have not arisen because of overt disagreement with his notion of egocentric speech. Rather, they hare arisen because of poor translations from Russian into English or because of the failure to appreciate how all the aspects of his theoretical framework fit into an integrated system. The first problem is concerned with Vygotskys distinction between speech and language. It is important to note that when writing about egocentric and inner speech, he was specifically interested in speech rather than language. This needs to be emphasized since there is room for misunderstanding due to inaccurate translations. For example, there is a definite distinction between language (yazyk) and speech (rech) in Russian, but the last word in the title of Vygotskys monograph (Myshlenie i Rech) has been translated as language. Rather than Thought

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and Language, a more accurate translation would have been Thought and Speech.2 Perhaps because of this inaccurate translation there has been a tendency to understand Vygotsky as being primarily concerned with language systems rather than with how language systems are utilized in human social interaction. It is true that he was interested in how historically developed conceptual systems are reflected in language, as his analysis of the relationship between word meanings and concepts shows. However, when dealing with the function of speech in self-regulation, Vygotsky was mainly concerned with emphasizing the social activity of speech or speaking rather than the structure of the language system. Once we understand that Vygotskys emphasis was on speech, rather than on language, we need to go even a step further and point out that what he had in mind was a broad interpretation of speech something which characterizes Soviet linguistics and psychology. When Vygotsky and his followers deal with speech they are typically concerned with a wider range of issues than those covered under that term in the west. While they believe that speech activity (rechevaya deyatelnost) can be identified and characterized, they do not think it is profitable to separate verbal output and study it in isolation. Rather, they insist that speech can be understood only if it is viewed as being part of ongoing human activity. For example, in reviewing the history of Soviet ideas about speech, Leontev points out that:
. . . it would be totally incorrect to reduce communication to the transfer of a coded message from one individual to another. We would be likely to renounce such a simple approach if we subscribe to a notion of communication which corresponds more closely with our contemporary level of knowledge about the nature and concrete facts of the speech process. Such an idea is the activityoriented conception of speech. This conception treats speech as a particular kind of activity (deyatelnost), namely, as speech activity (rechavaya deyatelnost). This treatment was first proposed in Soviet (and worldwide)

science by Lev Semenovich Vygotsky (Leontev, 1969, p. 25).

Thus, Vygotskys statements about egocentric speech should be understood as comments about communicative social interaction rather than statements about language systems or narrowly defined verbal phenomena. In trying to explicate Vygotskys notion of speech more fully, we would like to draw an analogy with Wittgensteins notion of a languagegame. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein argued that in order to understand an expression we must understand how it fits into the flow of human activity. With regard to his notion of a languagegame he wrote, . . . the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 11). In supporting this argument, he analyzed many languagegames and instances of how understanding an expression depends on understanding the flow of activity in which the interlocutors are engaged. Included in his argument are cases where a single segment of the linguistic code can have quite different meanings depending on what languagegame is involved.
21. Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colors and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place. Such a report might run: Five slabs. Now what is the difference between the report or statement Five slabs and the order Five slabs!? Well, it is the part which uttering these words play in the language-game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the tones being the same for an order and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face the difference being only in the application (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 10).

When Vygotsky dealt with the various functions of speech, his ideas were very similar to those developed by Wittgenstein in connection with language-games. This is not to say that

There is also a problem with using thought as a translation of myshlenie. A more accurate translation would be thinking. There is a separate word mysl which is correctly translated as thought. By making both of these corrections we see that Vygotsky was primarily interested in the dynamic aspects of human activity rather than static representational systems.

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Vygotsky was influenced by Wittgensteins writings. However, the two perspectives mesh in an interesting way that will allow us to apply some of Wittgensteins notions to problems raised in Vygotskys theoretical framework. The argument that what Vygotsky had in mind when dealing with speech is very similar to Wittgensteins notion of a language-game has important implications for understanding the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning. The second weakness we will cite in the research on egocentric speech is that investigators almost always fail to take the origins of this phenomenon into account in their analyses. Most researchers who have studied egocentric speech (e.g., Kohlberg et al., 1968) have restricted their attention to the childs utterances once the child has begun to function as an independent, selfregulating agent. While this is an important part of the picture, it fails to take advantage of a genetic explanation something which was very important in Vygotskys view. Specifically, it fails to take into account the fact that egocentric speech has its origins in earlier forms of social speech. Studying the interpsychological origins of egocentric speech is crucial for more important reasons than that it extends the span of developmental phenomena included in an analysis. It is important because our understanding of the very nature of egocentric speech must be based on the types of communication in which the child participated before the emergence of this speech function. If we are to make sense of the self-regulative capacities of egocentric speech we must be aware of the earlier communicative situations involving what we will call other-regulation by adults. It is only by analyzing the communicative origins and subsequent development of egocentric speech that we will be in a position to appreciate the crucial role it plays in the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning. No one would argue that the speech used in social interaction is unrelated to the speech used by the child for self-regulative purposes. However, by failing to take earlier forms of social interaction into account in their analysis of egocentric speech, investigators have often failed to appreciate many aspects of its form and function. That is, they have arrived at an

incomplete (if not distorted) account of Vygotskys ideas about egocentric speech because they have abstracted the phenomenon out of the framework of genetic explanation in which it was developed. We can summarize our attempt to clarify Vygotskys ideas on egocentric speech as follows: (a) the notion of speech is similar to Wittgensteins idea of a language-game, it includes many aspects of communication rather than being restricted to language systems; and (b) any complete analysis of egocentric speech must be based on a genetic analysis, beginning with its social interaction origins.

An Application

Let us now turn to an analysis of the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning in problem-solving situations. This account is based on an empirical study of adult-child interaction. Before going into the details of this study and the interpretation of the results, two caveats are in order. First, our analysis focuses on one aspect of the development of problem-solving skills and does not deal with those that would typically be highlighted in other (e.g., Piagetian) approaches. Specifically, we are concerned with the metacognitive and strategic skills outlined recently in western research by investigators such as Brown (in press, 1978) and Flavell (in press, 1978). While we obviously believe that the mechanisms analyzed in this paper play a major role in cognitive development, we would not want to rule out the importance of others in a complete explanation. Second, the analysis examines the interaction between middle-class children who are enrolled in a Montessori preschool program and their mothers. Much of what we will have to say about the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning may be specific to subjects of this educational and social class background. Further studies are needed to investigate adult-child interaction and the development of problemsolving skills in other sociocultural groups. The language-game we will be dealing with is part of a puzzle-making task situation that mothers

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and their 2, 3, or 4-year-old children were to do together. The puzzle depicted a truck carrying a load of six boxes (squares). Approximately half of the pieces in the puzzle made up the non-cargo section. They were pieces depicting the truck body, wheels, headlights, and windows and could be inserted correctly simply by fitting items from the pieces pile into the puzzle frame. There was only one piece that could fit into only one place in the frame. The other part of the puzzle consisted of two rows of three squares each. These squares were the cargo which the truck was carrying. There was only one correct pattern for the cargo pieces. It was depicted in a model puzzle which was placed before the child next to the copy on which she/he was working. The childs task was to make the copy look exactly like the model. The task was further complicated by the fact that there were extra pieces in the pieces pile which did not need to be used in the copy. Each mother with her child was first shown the model and the intact copy. Then we took the copy apart, set all the pieces aside, and told them we wanted them to make the copy look exactly like the model. The mothers were instructed simply to help their children whenever they thought it was necessary. These sessions were videotaped, and the videotapes were transcribed and coded for various behaviors such as pointing, gazing and handling pieces. Once the child had agreed that she/he needed help from the mother (there was sometimes a discussion about this), the communicative situation became one in which the mothers utterances were used to regulate the childs performance in the task. Thus we have a case of adult-child interaction in which an adult is providing other-regulation in the zone of proximal development. We will see that a variety of forms of other-regulation may be involved and that the child may show signs of being able to participate in the interaction at various different levels. It is important to note that we are not concerned here with how children acquire the linguistic forms used in directives or in how they learn to understand directives in general. Investigators such as Shatz (1974) have demonstrated that these abilities are acquired at a very young age. In

her investigations, Shatz has been primarily concerned with how children come to understand directives used within the framework of an activity which the listener understands. Her research has demonstrated that when children participate in a familiar stream of activity they can interpret directives appropriately. As compared with this research, our concern is with how children learn to participate in a communicative situation involving a new type of activity. While children may be able to understand the commands, suggestions, hints, etc. of an adult in a communicative context involving a familiar task, they may not interpret the same directives in the way intended by the speaker when these utterances are embedded in the flow of activity found in a novel task. Thus, the question is not when children show the first signs of understanding directives in general (namely those used in connection with a well-established routine). Rather, it is a question of how children develop the ability to participate more fully in interaction concerned with a new task. In our examination of the transition from other-regulation to self-regulation, we will identify and characterize four successive levels. These levels are not to be thought of as comprising an exhaustive list of precisely defined stages. They are merely four out of many possible points in the transition from other-regulation to self-regulation, and our only reason for introducing them is to illustrate that this transition does not take place at a single, identifiable moment. In particular, these levels should not be taken as characterizing the overall status of cognitive or communicative capacities of an individual child. A child might carry out one task independently (i.e., at the fourth level) while having great difficulty in carrying out another task even with a great deal of strategic assistance from an adult. We would claim, however, that a young child can come to function at a higher level in connection with a particular task only by having passed through the lower one(s). Obviously, this claim does not always apply to older children and adults who can understand explanations (i.e., can think about a task as opposed to think in it by participating in an other-regulation language-game).

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Levels of Interaction in the Transition from Other-Regulation to Self-Regulation The first level in the transition is characterized by the fact that the childs understanding of the task situation is so limited that communication is very difficult. At this level it is often questionable as to whether we should even speak of otherregulation. The adult may try to provide strategic assistance, but the childs understanding of the stream of activity is so limited that she/he may not interpret utterances in an appropriate way. One could say that the mismatch between the adults and the childs definition of the task situation is so great that they are participating in different language-games. It is perhaps more accurate to say that the adult is participating in what she/he perceives to be one coherent language-game while the child interprets the adults speech as a series of utterances which do not fit together into a single, integrated activity. We will illustrate the social interaction at this level with two segments of the discourse between a 2-year-old boy and his mother while they were working on the truck puzzle. The first segment occurred while the child was inserting the pieces of the truck body (the noncargo pieces) into the puzzle frame. Among the noncargo items is a window piece. This segment of the discourse begins immediately after the child has finished inserting and adjusting a piece depicting a wheel. (1) C: (picks up window piece) What goes with it? (2) M: I think (points to other window piece in pieces pile) . . . (3) M: What do you think . . . (4) M: I think thats a window. (5) M: It doesnt look like a window, no. (child looks away from puzzle task materials and looks at windows in the classroom) (6) M: But its a window to this truck. (mother points to location in copy where window piece is to be inserted) (7) C: (drops window piece in his hand back into the pieces pile)

In this case we see that the mother was unsuccessful in regulating the childs task performance. The child failed to interpret the speech in terms of the adults definition of situation to such a degree that the mothers mention of a window in utterances (4) and (5) led him to shift his attention to a window that had nothing whatever to do with the puzzle. Apparently, he had not realized that the model puzzle before him depicted a truck and that the truck had windows.3 Hence, the only way he could interpret his mothers utterances was concerned with windows in the room. The second segment of discourse we will examine in connection with the first level comes from the same mother-child dyad. This time, the child had finished most of the noncargo portion of the truck puzzle, and his mother was attempting to get him to insert some of the cargo pieces. (8) M: What do you suppose goes up here? (points to cargo area of copy) (9) M: Could we put some of these (points to remaining items in pieces pile) up here? (points to cargo area of copy) (10) C: Okay. (picks up cargo piece and places it incorrectly in cargo area) (11) M: Thats right. (12) C: One. (picks up second cargo piece after utterance) (13) M: Two. (14) C: Two, three, four (places second piece in cargo area of copy) . . . three (picks up one of the two cargo pieces from the copy) . . . hey (laughs) Woo. (drops cargo piece in his lap) Here we have an instance where the mother was trying to use a common form of other-regulation, namely counting aloud for the child. This form of assistance occurred fairly often in our study. Apparently, it is a way to focus the childs attention on the number of pieces placed in the copy and to keep track of how many pieces had been inserted so that comparisons could be made with the model. For example, some mothers used a routine like the following: Now we have one, two, three here (points to a copy). Lets count to see how many we have over here (points to model). One,

3 Further evidence for this comes from the fact that he constantly referred to wheels as circles or cookies. Indeed, he seemed to prefer the activity of eating these cookies to that of using them appropriately in the overall perceptual and strategic framework of the task.

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two, three, four, five, six. So we need some more pieces in our truck (points to copy). In the case of the 2-year-old in the example above, however, the child did not perceive the relationship between the speech and the task situation. When his mother counted in connection with his activity, he apparently interpreted her speech as a routine whose sole purpose was counting (perhaps for practice). That is, once again we have a case where the childs understanding of the task situation was so limited that he could not see how the adults utterance fit into what the adult perceived to be a coherent stream of meaningful activity. In both of these cases, the issue is not how the child is taking over strategic responsibility for aspects of the tasks which were formerly carried out through other-regulation. Rather, the issue is how the child begins to learn to participate in a communicative context involving other-regulation. In both instances the mother was trying to provide strategic assistance in a form that we often saw used with other children. What distinguished this 2-year-old from some of the other children, however, was that he did not interpret the adults communicative moves in the manner intended. It is important to note that the child did interpret something in the adults speech. After all, he did look at a window when his mother uttered window, and he did continue his mothers counting. However, he did not understand his mothers utterances in terms of the language-game in which she was participating. At this point one could question whether it is possible for the mother of a 2-year-old to provide any sort of other-regulation in this task situation. If children at this age are so incapable of participating in appropriate language-games, can an adult really be expected to provide the strategic assistance necessary to get them through the task? The answer is that adults can provide the necessary assistance, but they must rely on a specific type of communicative strategy. Rather than trying to regulate the childs activity by relying on the definition of situation that may exist for adult speakers, the adult must use speech and gestures which are tied to the definition of situation that exists for the child. In the first segment of discourse this would have been possible had the

mother refrained from referring to the window piece by uttering window and used verbal and nonverbal pointing. Instead of relying on the child to understand that the puzzle depicted a truck which had windows, the mother could have used speech which was interpretable on the basis of the childs definition of situation. The use of deictics such as this and that in English what Silverstein (1976) calls referential, presupposing indexes in connection with the use of nonverbal pointing requires less of the child in the way of a definition of the situation than does the use of a referential expression such as the window which relies on an appreciation of the overall task (or at least of the overall perceptual array). That is, the adults use of deictics (especially nonverbal pointing) in this communicative situation allows the child to function on the basis of a definition of situation which consists of this thing and that thing rather than windows, wheels and headlights. Rommetveit (1976) has made an analogous argument (though not in connection with pointing) about how adult-child communication concerned with a single set of physical objects can vary as a function of the way the communicative situation is defined. His research indicates that childrens performances on Piagetian seriation tasks may fluctuate depending on what definition of situation the adult experimenter assumes in the communicative context. For example, he has found that 7-year-old children who are seemingly unable to carry out directives appropriately when these directives are concerned with a seriation task can perform much better if the experimenter refers to the same physical objects with different referential expressions which presuppose a different definition of situation. As mentioned earlier, at the first level of the transition from other- to self-regulation the issue is not really one of how the child takes over the strategic responsibility which had formerly been vested in the adult. Rather, the issue is how the child begins to develop a definition of the task situation that will allow him/her to participate in the communicative context. We will trace the path of this development in our analysis of the second and third levels. Even though the child of

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the first level is not taking on the regulative capacities necessary for carrying out the task, this level is an important part of a complete description of the transition from other- to selfregulation because of the childs understanding (or lack of understanding) of the communicative context. An understanding of the communicative context provides the necessary foundation for any transfer of strategic responsibility from adult to child. The second level in the transition from otherto self-regulation is more difficult to define and analyze than the others. On the one hand, the interaction at the second level is not as restricted by the childs limited understanding of the task situation as is the case for the first level. At the second level the child at least seems to realize that the adults utterances are connected with the task in some coherent way, so the communication in doing the task has a chance of getting off the ground. However, unlike interaction at the third level in our scheme, at the second level the full extent of the connection between speech and activity is not always evident to the child, and consequently, she/he cannot make the inferences necessary to interpret an utterance in the otherregulation language-game. Part of what we will have to say about the problems of adult-child interaction at this and next level will involve Ervin-Tripps (1976, 1977) classification of directives. As a result of analyzing a large corpus of speech from adult speakers of American English, Ervin-Tripp has arrived at the following six classes of directives: (a) Need or desire statements, e.g., I need a match. (b) Imperatives, e.g., Gimme a match. or You gimme a match. (c) Imbedded imperatives, e.g., Could you gimme a match? (d) Permission directives, e.g., May I have a match? (e) Question directives, e.g., Gotta match? (f) Hints, e.g., The matches are all gone. Her research has shown that there are systematic differences in the use of the various types of directives attributable to specific social characteristics of speakers and addressees such as

familiarity, rank, territorial location, likelihood of compliance, etc. One of the criteria that distinguishes these various classes is the degree to which they are obvious or explicit as directives. As the examples given above show, need or desire statements, imperatives, imbedded imperatives and permission directives all involve an explicit mention of an action and/or the object upon which an action is to be performed. In contrast, the last two classes, question directives and hints, do not involve an explicit mention of the desired actions, and in those cases where the desired action is mentioned, the interpretation of the directive depends on a shared definition of situation. Question directives and hints require inferences on the part of the listener in order to be interpreted as directives since they are ambiguous as to their function. Because of this, Ervin-Tripp has argued that these two types are more likely to lead to misfires, such as a question being interpreted as a request for information while it was really intended as a directive, or, inversely, being taken as a directive when none was intended. Ervin-Tripps account of directives, in conjunction with an analysis of the interlocutors definition of situation, provide the framework for understanding how other-regulation takes place (or fails to take place) at the second level of interaction. Let us turn to an example from the interaction at this second level. The segment of discourse we will analyze is from a mother with her 2-year-old daughter. This segment occurred just after the child had completed most of the noncargo section of the puzzle. (15) C: Oh. (glances at model, then looks at pieces pile) Oh, now wheres this one go? (picks up black cargo square, looks at copy, then at pieces pile) (16) M: Where does it go on this other one? (child puts black cargo square back down in pieces pile, looks at pieces pile) (17) M: Look at the other truck and then you can tell. (child looks at model, then glances at pieces pile, then looks at model, then glances at pieces pile) (18) C: Well . . . (looks at copy, then at model) (19) C: I look at it.

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(20) C: Urn, this other puzzle has a black one over there. (child points to black cargo square in model) (21) M: Um-hm. (22) C: A black one . . . (looks at pieces pile) (23) M: So where do you want to put the black one on this puzzle? (child picks up black cargo square from pieces pile, looks at copy) (24) C: Well, where do you put it there? Over there? (inserts black cargo square correctly in copy) (25) M: That looks good. The first point to note about this segment of discourse is that, unlike the interaction at the first level, the child interpreted all the utterances in terms of the problem-solving situation. There are no instances where she interprets something that her mother said in terms of a definition of situation that was completely unrelated to the task situation as the adult perceived it. However, there are several indications that the child still had a somewhat limited definition of situation. The first indication can be found in the childs response to the mothers utterance (16). The child did not seem to realize that the mothers question directive was in response to her utterance (15) and that she could get an answer to (15) by responding to it. That is, she did not see the connection between the model and the copy in the general framework of the task, and when her mother asked where it (the black cargo square) was located in the model, the childs only response was to drop the black cargo square that was in her hand. In this case, the mothers utterance did not elicit the intended response in the child (a gaze at the model to see where the black one was located) so she followed it up with (17) which dealt directly with this response. Note also that (17) is an imperative in which both the action (look) and the object upon which the action is to be performed (the other truck) are explicitly mentioned. Thus, the mother has assisted the child both by directing her to carry out a step of the procedure to be followed in responding to (16) and by being explicit in how to do this. A further indication that the child had a limited definition of the situation can be found in

utterances (18) through (24). After the mother had translated her question directive into an explicit imperative and thereby induced her daughter to look at the model, the child was still at a loss as to what looking at the model had to do with the task they were carrying out. Utterances (18) through (20) indicate that she realized that she did not understand the full implications of her mothers utterances. It is as if she were saying to her mother, Im looking where you told me to look, but I still dont see what it has to do with our overall goal or definition of situation. In utterance (23) the mother is back to using a question directive which requires more of the child in the way of a definition of situation than the imperative found in (17). After having led the child through the steps that illustrate the connection between the model and copy puzzles, the mother is more successful in having the child interpret such an utterance i.e., (23) at this point. Utterances (24) and (25) suggest that the child is not completely certain how to interpret utterance (23), but ultimately her performance indicates that she has been led to a more adequate definition of situation than existed when the mother uttered (16). This segment of interaction illustrates only a few of the problems that can arise at the second level in the transition from other-regulation to selfregulation. In general, this level is characterized by the fact that the child is beginning to participate successfully in the language-game, but his/her understanding of the task situation is still far from being in complete agreement with the adults. Thus, communication problems arise because she/he does not see all the implications of an utterance in the other-regulation language-game. While the child is still not functioning as an independent problem solver, she/he is beginning to develop a definition of the situation that will provide the underpinnings for independent activity. At this point, his/her evolving definition of situation is primarily useful for functioning at the interpsychological plane, but it is a necessary step in the zone of proximal development if the child is eventually to carry out the task at the intrapsychological plane. The third level in the transition from otherto self-regulation is characterized by the fact that

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the child can function adequately in the otherregulation language-game. She/he can make all the inferences needed to interpret an adults directives even when the directives are quite nonexplicit in Ervin-Tripps sense and when they require a great deal of the child in the way of a definition of situation. While the process is still carried out at the interpsychological plane, the fact that the child can make all these inferences indicates that self-regulation is beginning to account for much of his/her performance. Of course, interaction at all of our levels in the transition involve some degree of self-regulation, but at the third level it becomes particularly evident that the child has taken on a significant share of the strategic responsibility for the task. The adult no longer has to specify all the steps which must be followed in order to interpret a directive since the child can carry these out on the basis of a fairly complete definition of situation. Indeed, in some cases it seems that the child is functioning independently and that the adult is simply providing reassurances that what she/he is doing is correct. The segment of discourse we will examine in connection with the third level in the transition from other- to self-regulation is from a mother with her 4-year-old daughter. The child had finished inserting most of the noncargo pieces as well as one of the cargo squares (the purple one). In this segment she is concerned with a second cargo square (black). (26) C: (picks up black cargo square) Wheres the black one go? (looks at black cargo square in her hand and then at model) (27) M: Wheres the black one go on Moms (child looks at copy and inserts black cargo square correctly) (28) C: Down there. (29) M: Um-hmm. In this segment of interaction the first two utterances are almost identical with those found at the beginning of the interaction i.e., (15) and (16) we analyzed at the second level. However, it is obvious that self-regulation plays a much larger role in the present case. In the interaction at both levels the child starts out by asking where a piece which she has picked up goes in the copy,

and in both cases the mother replies with a question directive concerned with where it goes in the model. This is as far as the similarities go, however, since the speech functions in quite different ways in the two cases. The reader will recall that in the interaction analyzed at the second level, the child did not look at the model after the adults question directive. The mother had to help the child interpret her utterance by using an explicit directive which instructed the child to look at the model. In the segment of discourse from the third level, the interaction proceeds much differently. First, the child has shifted her gaze to the model even before her mother said anything. It appears that the child looked at the model in response to her own utterance (26). This sequence of the childs utterance and gaze suggests that she has taken over a great deal of the strategic responsibility for carrying out the task. Unlike the case in the interaction at the second level, the adult did not have to use an explicit imperative in order to get the child to look at the model. Indeed, the sequence (26) shows evidence that this child is beginning to operate at the fourth level in our transitional scheme the level of self-regulation at the intrapsychological plane. However, in some of the episodes after the one examined here the child still needed considerable strategic assistance from the adult. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the mothers utterances were not superfluous accompaniment to what would have been successful performance of the task without her assistance. Rather, it seems that the child was operating at the upper end of the third level and thus could participate very well in the otherregulation language-game, but that she still needed some adult assistance. The analysis of utterances (27) and (28) also is instructive. First of all, we see that no nonverbal pointing was involved. This indicates that the child was fully capable of interpreting utterance (27) on the basis of the mothers definition of situation. She did not need to have the adult translate referential expressions such as the black one and Moms into that one (with nonverbal pointing) or this one (with nonverbal pointing). Second, note that unlike the case in the segment from the second level, the child here was able to

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make all the inferences necessary to insert the piece correctly in the copy. Thus, when a child is functioning at the third level in the transition from other- to selfregulation, his/her definition of situation coincides with the adults to the degree necessary for him/her to participate fully in the languagegame. As we saw in our analysis of the segment of interaction, this means that the child has already taken over much of the strategic responsibility for carrying out the task. The transition from other-regulation to self-regulation is well under way, but the task is still being carried out at the interpsychological plane. The fourth and final level in our scheme is the level at which the child has taken over complete responsibility for the problem-solving effort. The process shifts from the interpsychological to the intrapsychological plane at this point, and the transition from other-regulation to self-regulation is completed. In many cases egocentric speech will appear during, and shortly after the shift to the intrapsychological plane. This speech, with its self-regulative function, will be similar in many respects to the speech used earlier by the adult in carrying out other-regulation. The speech we will use to illustrate this fourth level in our scheme comes from the interaction between a mother and her 4-year-old son while he was inserting a series of cargo squares. (30) C: (looks at pieces pile, picks up blue cargo square, looks at model, then at copy, then at model) Its kind of squooshy (looks at copy), but (looks at model) . . . (31) C: I need a little one (looks at copy) like this one (inserts blue cargo square correctly in copy) (32) C: (looks at pieces) The next (looks at model) . . . next is (looks at pieces) . . . will be yellow (picks up yellow cargo square, looks at copy) (33) M: Okay. (34) C: (inserts yellow cargo square correctly in copy) Have to move all the pieces. (35) C: (looks at pieces) Next is the black. (picks up black cargo square and looks at copy). (36) C: (looks at model) The black ones up here (looks at copy) . . .

(37) C: Next (inserts black cargo square correctly in copy) a white. (38) C: Wheres a white? (looks at pieces, picks up white cargo square, looks at copy, inserts white cargo square correctly in copy) In the middle of the puzzle? (39) C: (looks at pieces) Okay. (40) C: (looks at model) Next we need . . . (looks at copy) . . . um . . . (looks at pieces) purp . . . (looks at pieces, then at model) purple. (looks at pieces, picks up purple cargo square, looks at copy, inserts purple cargo square correctly in copy) (41) C: (looks away from task) There. A striking fact about these egocentric speech utterances is that while none of them were elicited (in any strict sense) by an adults speech, most of them have the same form as utterances found in adult-child interaction at the previous levels (especially the third level). Some of the childs utterances e.g., (35), (38), (39), (40) and (41) are very similar to those which adults use, and others e.g., (31) and (36) are very similar to utterances which children make in response. If one looks carefully at such self-regulative utterances which typically occur at the fourth level in the transition (if overt regulative speech occurs at all), it becomes apparent that what the child has mastered as a result of functioning in otherregulation communicative contexts at the various levels is all the procedures in a language-game. That is, she/he has not simply mastered the ability to carry out one side of the communicative interaction by responding to the directives of others. She/he has taken over the rules and responsibilities of both participants in the language-game. These responsibilities were formerly divided between the adult and child, but they have now been taken over completely by the child. The definitions of situation and the patterns of activity which formerly allowed the child to participate in the problemsolving effort on the interpsychological plane now allow him/her to carry out the task on the intrapsychological plane. Before concluding our account of the fourth level, we should point out that the further we go beyond the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning in connection

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with a particular problem-solving task, the less direct will be the connection between the external social interaction involved in other-regulation and the psychological processes involved in selfregulation. Vygotsky (1962) pointed this out and argued that as egocentric speech goes underground it will become abbreviated and eventually lose its structural similarity with social speech. Thus, the specific parallelisms we are drawing between speech on the interpsychological and intrapsychological planes exist only during the time when we can witness egocentric speech and will not be evident once the individual has functioned for a long period on the intrapsychological plane. However, the social interaction origins of this individual functioning will still be a necessary part of any adequate account. This is a fundamental aspect of Vygotskys notion of a genetic explanation. In analyzing the final level in the transition from other- to self-regulation we have returned once again to the two cardinal points we brought up in our clarification of Vygotskys notion of egocentric speech: (a) the notion of speech includes many aspects of communication rather than being restricted to language systems, and (b) any complete analysis of egocentric speech must be based on a genetic analysis, beginning with its social interaction origins.

Conclusion

In this paper we have outlined four levels in the transition from other-regulation to self-regulation. These levels do not provide a full account of this transition, but they do define several points in the developmental path through which the child must pass in order to attain independent problem-solving abilities with regard to a particular task. We can summarize these levels as follows: First Level: The child may fail to interpret adults utterances in terms of the task situation. For example, because of his/her limited definition of situation she/he may respond to an adults utterance in a way that has nothing to do with the task as the adult perceives it. Second Level: The child will be able to respond to specific questions and commands

of the adult in connection with the task, but his/her interpretation of adults utterances will be limited because she/he does not understand the full implications of these utterances in light of the task demands. That is, she/he is aware that the adults utterances are concerned with the task, but she/he has not attained a level of mastery of the task and the associated communicative situation that allows him/her to make all the inferences necessary to participate fully in the other-regulation language-game. Third Level: The child will be able to follow quite nonexplicit directives (e.g., hints) in such a way that it will be obvious that she/he is operating in a sophisticated manner in the language-game. At this level we can clearly see that the child has taken over some of the responsibility for regulating his/her own activity. The transition from other-regulation to selfregulation has begun while the process is still being carried out on the interpsychological plane of functioning. Fourth Level: The problemsolving activity shifts from the interpsychological to the intrapsychological plane and the transition from other-regulation to self-regulation is completed. The child carries out the task without any strategic assistance from the adult. The first three levels in this framework are all in the zone of proximal development. When we consider that one could also identify other points while the problem-solving process is being carried out at the interpsychological plane, it becomes evident that the zone of proximal development involves more than one form of assistance from adults. The issue is not simply one of whether or not the adult is providing strategic assistance it is also an issue of what type of other-regulation is being used. While this paper has been devoted to identifying various levels in the transition from otherto self-regulation, it implicitly raises another issue as well. This issue is: What are the mechanisms which make the transition from one level to another possible? By now, the reader may have guessed that our answer to this will be connected with the mechanisms used to carry on communication. We will not go into the problem in great detail here, but we would like to suggest that the progression from one level to the next in the zone

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of proximal development is largely the result of the childs effort to establish and maintain coherence between his/her own action and the adults speech. When an adult directs another adult to carry out an action, this coherence already exists for the listener. She/he can understand what behavior is being requested because she/he understands the speech with its presupposed definition of situation. For the child in the zone of proximal development, however, the coherence between speech and action must be created rather than assumed. One of the major ways that it is created for the child is by carrying out the behaviors specified by the adult and then building a coherent account of the relationships among speech, definition of situation and behavior. This means that it is not the case that the child first carries out the task because she/he shares the adults definition of situation. It is precisely the reverse: she/he comes to share the adults definition of situation because she/he carries out the task (through other-regulation). In analyzing directives, this means that coherence is created by the childs adjusting his/her definition of situation so that it is consistent with his/her behavior. At first glance this seems to be illogical since it means that the child somehow responds to a directive before she/he develops a definition of situation which would allow him/her to interpret it. However, in our studies adults spontaneously follow a communication strategy in which they use directives that children do not understand and then guide the children through the behaviors necessary to carry out these directives. Communication would proceed more smoothly in one sense if adults did not do this (i.e., if they only used directives which the child could readily interpret), but other-regulation by means of uninterpretable directives seems to be an important way of luring the child further and further into the communication by building up his/her definition of situation. It is as if adults were tutoring the children on how to interpret communicative moves. They do not limit themselves to using directives that the child can respond to flawlessly, and they do not give up when the child either responds inappropriately or does not respond at all. Rather, they use directives

which require a definition of situation somewhat beyond the childs level and then coach the child on how to respond. For example, a mother might use a nonexplicit directive like, What do we need next?, and point to the correct piece in the model when the child fails to respond. Thus, she uses a directive and then provides information about how to respond. We would argue that sequences such as this benefit the child in ways other than simply allowing him/her to respond appropriately in this isolated instance. Adults directives to children which do not elicit the intended behaviors and must be followed by explicit directives which do elicit the appropriate behaviors are probably an important learning tool for the child going through the zone of proximal development. The importance of such sequences lies in the fact that carrying out the appropriate behaviors (even under someone elses guidance) in connection with a directive is a way that the child can make sense out of the directive and its associated definition of situation. In these cases the child does not perform the requested behaviors because she/he understands the directive with its associated definition of situation. Rather, the child comes to understand the directive with its associated definition of situation because she/he has performed the behavior. That is, the child comes to understand the task situation as a result of behaving (under someone elses guidance) as if she/he understood it and of trying to create a coherent account of the relationship between speech and action. The definition of situation which is presupposed in adult-adult interaction, is created in adult-child interaction while carrying out the other-regulation language-game. Obviously, what we have provided here is only a rough sketch of a mechanism responsible for the childs progress through the zone of proximal development. There is much that remains to be done in this area, especially with regard to the relationship between this mechanism and the various levels in the transition from other- to self-regulation. Whatever the outcome of this research one is left with the profound impression that Vygotskys theoretical framework provides a powerful foundation for understanding how higher psychological processes emerge out of social interaction.

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References
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