have complete freedom (p162). This primacy of freedom over logic and arguments came to him in a dialogue with von Weizscker. It embodies one of the most important philosophical conversions in Feyerabends life. Feyerabend tells us the story of this conversion in several places. It occurred in 1965 in Hamburg in von Weizsckers seminar. Feyerabend was at the height of his pluralist phase. He defended at this time his own philosophical synthesis, which tried to specify a general methodology not just for the sciences but also for the arts. So Feyerabend had a philosophy in 1965: philosophical pluralism. He was a rationalist and a pluralist, committed to finding general rules that would cover all cases and non-scientific developments as well. (SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY, p117). According to Feyerabend: My arguments were excellent. But von Weizscker gave a historical account of the rise of quantum theory and this was much richer and more rewarding and I realised that what I was talking about was just a dream (p162). This realisation concerned not so much the arguments themselves, as Feyerabend conserved them but put them to a different use. He no longer tried to impose general rules, but he did not advocate the pure and simple abandon of rules. He used his arguments to expand the repertoire of accepted rules, and to argue for the reseachers complete freedom with respect to all rules: Today the same arguments are offered with a very different purpose in mind, and they lead to a very different resultAll attempts to revive traditions that were pushed aside and eliminated in the course of the expansion of Western culturerun into an impenetrable stone wall of rationalistic phrases and prejudices. I try to show that there are no arguments to support this wall and that some principles implicit in science definitely favour its removal (SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY, p144-145). Thus when Feyerabend concludes in the interview that excellent arguments dont count when you want to deal with something which is as rich as nature, or other human beings (p162), he is slightly overstating his case. Excellent arguments dont count when you want to impose general rules on research or on life. The important thing is the purpose of the arguments (freedom or servitude) and the attitude. Feyerabend declares that he had a rationalist attitude up to his dialogue with von Weizscker, when I suddenly realized how barren such an attitude is in the face of concrete research (SFS, p144). This abandon of the rationalist attitude had effects on Feyerabends thinking and research, but also on his teaching and his life. He began to give more importance to feeling and to the concrete details of life. Indeed, the rationalist de-conversion was just as much an affective experience as an intellectual one: For the first time I felt, I did not merely think about, the poverty of abstract philosophical reasoning (KILLING TIME, p141).
anarchistic ideas. Jung asks if they had their origin in some special negative experience (of frustration or constraint). Feyerabend reiterates his basic experience of freedom and declares that his motivation for dealing with science and philosophy was interest, the active interest of someone who plunges into a new activity and learns by immersion: Interest. Like somebody who starts playing the piano (p161). This emphasis on the positivity of his experience and of his motives comes as a necessary corrective to the widespread conception that Feyerabends work is essentially negative. This is far from being the case, but unfortunately some of his terminology and his general provocative attitude have contributed to this misunderstanding. Feyerabends abandon of rationalism stems from a dissatisfaction with a certain type of rationality whch submits action to universal rules (here many would agree) or even, more liberally, to a set of conditional contextual rules (the nec plus ultra of most relativists and multiculturalists). He defines rationality as: A set of rules which you are supposed to follow, and which says: If so then it will be this and that. (p162) In Deleuzian terms these rules (universal or contextual) are transcendent to the field that they constrain or regulate. What Feyerabend rejects is transcendent rationality and rules as transcendences imposing actions and hindering us in our research and in our life. To go back to Feyerabends conversion experience, von Weizscker did not abandon all argument. He refused to accept Feyerabends abstract arguments and treated them as irrelevant to the historical process of invention and adjustment that characterised the development of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. He argued historically, and not abstractly, allowing the methods to emerge in the immanent field of research. Feyerabend remarks elsewhere (FAREWELL TO REASON, p317) that this attitude was not new, and constituted in effect a return to Mach. Indeed, we are confronted here with a case of the negation of the negation (Feyerabend would have been comfortable with this formulation as he admitted to being a Hegelian, but of a special sort: a pluralist Hegelian, or a Machian Hegelian). According to Feyerabend it is the rationalist who have abandonned (immanent) reason and replaced it with an abstract phantasm that they call Reason. So abandoning the phantasm of transcendence and returning to immanent reason looks like you are abandoning reason and defending irrationalism: some thinkers, having been confused and shaken by the complexities of history, have said farewell to reason and replaced it by a caricaturethey have continued calling this caricature reason (or Reasonto use my own terminology). Reason has been a great success among philosophers who dislike complexity and among politiciansIt is a disaster for the rest, i.e. practically all of us. It is time we bid it farewell (FAREWELL TO REASON, p17). So we must read farewell to Reason as in fact farewell to the farewell to reason, or Hello reason, my old friend.
parataxis!), but because the translator must make certain conceptual, and not just stylistic, choices. For example, Graham Harman is very fortunate to have a writer of the ilk of Olivier Dubouclez as translator, as his translation (L'OBJET QUADRUPLE) of Harman's THE QUADRUPLE OBJECT, is very elegant and in fact stylistically an improvement. It is better written than the original, but often at the price of slightly twisting the sense. The contrary effect can be seen with Feyerabend's books, at least according to him. He regretted that the fluidity and the ambiguity of his style could not be captured in translation, and that his books were reduced to lifeless caricatures of the original.] I would argue that fluidity is achieved by different means in French and in English. Be that as it may, I have always felt that there is a close parallel between Deleuzes ideas and those of Feyerabend, and that certain texts produce an intense resonance when juxtaposed. In particular, Feyerabends LAST INTERVIEW, which is remarkable for its concision, can best be illuminated by a comparison with Deleuzes little text PERICLES ET VERDI. I will not here be giving a summary of this book,itself quite concise and dense with meaning, but I think that by listing a few similarities I will be able to shed some light on both texts, though my focus is on Feyerabends interview. 1) Immanence: This is Deleuzes term for one of his favorite concepts, but I argue that it is omnipresent in Feyerabend from his anarchism without the dogmas to his rationalism without abstract principles. Deleuze contrasts the plane of immanence, which is anarchic in the sense that the principles and rules that constitute and regulate it are not over and above it but integrally part of it, with the plane of organisation, which is subjected to extrinsic principles of ordering. This helps us make sense of the fact that the LAST INTERVIEW begins apparently quite oddly with a question on the difficulty of getting new ideas published in professional philosophy journals. Feyerabend replies that he does not know enough about the administrative structure of the philosophy publishing business" (p160). One can see him immediately relating the problem to one of his principal concerns: the destructive , deforming, or hindering effect of extrinsic principles of organisation on the field that they regulate. He imagines the rejection letter as saying We cannot publish that because of our high standards, once again highlighting the problem of the systems of extrinsic standards that bring us under their judgement. Another seemingly perplexing trait is Feyerabends insistence that he is not a philosopher. One motive for that insistence comes from Feyerabends characterisation of his profession: My profession was: I was a professor of philosophy. This means a civil servant, ein Denkbeamter [my gloss: a thought-bureaucrat] (p165). This can be further clarified by a passage in FAREWELL TO REASON (p315): professors serve masters who pay them and tell them what to do: they are not free minds in search of harmony and happiness for all, they are civil servants (Denkbeamte, to use a marvellous German word, and their mania for order is not the result of a balanced inquiry, or of a closeness to humanity, it is a professional disease. This mania for order as extrinsic to and imposed on the matter it organises is what characterises the arrogance of those who operate in terms of transcendence. This is what nourishes Feyerabends contempt for the arrogance of success, which closes the interview: What does not please me is to see some idiots getting large amounts of money in important positions [while] some smart young people [are] being pushed around, with no jobs, no money, nothing (p168). My argument is that Feyerabend gives great importance to moods and feelings, but that these form no mere irrational jumble. Feyerabend is a philosopher, albeit not an abstract rationalist, and his affects expressed in the interview (and his other works) are fully convergent not with his philosophical position, for he has none, but with his conceptual creation and with his
philosophical process of individuation. Immanence and transcendence are concepts that are used explicitly by Deleuze, and implicitly by Feyerabend, for evaluating not just the form and content of philosophical theories but also concrete ways of living (and acting and feeling and perceiving) in the world.
beyond similarity. It is this alterity and heterogeneity of the real which makes Feyerabend hostile to the idea of its status as a construction, which he gently makes fun of when Jung brings up Maturana and Varela: J: They explain subjectivity in a very reasonable manner. They say that everything is a construction of the subject. F: You are my construction? That means: if I stopped constructing you, you wouldnt be here anymore? (p163). He finds that such views impose too much unity on the heterogeneous material of the universe. I do not need to construct an object, or to be constructed myself in a similar way to the object, in order to know it. In fact, knowledge implies the primacy of dissimilarity, alterity, and multiplicity. This is the ontological counterpart to Feyerabends methodological pluralism, which he presents as a simple fact of the practice of science: Just look at the history of the sciences. Compare what some physicists have said at one time and at another time, in some [personal] letters. You find all sorts of methods. And this is not a philosophical position. This is just a statement of fact (p161). For Feyerabend we are not free to construct reality however we like, some approaches simply fail to be supported by the real. He is not a naive relativist who thinks that all ideas and all points of view are equally good: This is relativism because the type of reality encountered depends on the approach taken. However, it differs from the philosophical doctrine by admitting failure: not every approach succeeds (AGAINST METHOD, Postscript on Relativism). We can see this confrontation with failure and with the illusory nature of some of our constructions in Feyerabends dialogue with von Weizscker. Defending an abstract methodological pluralism, Feyerabend, made to consider the real developments of quantum theoretical research, saw that his systematic account was a phantasm unsupported by the real: I realized that what I was talking about was just a dream (p162). One of the limits to our rational constructions, he came to see, is the richness and heterogeneity of the raw material of the world: Excellent arguments dont count when you want to deal with something which is as rich as nature or other human beings (p162). Deleuze agrees that in our research and in our lives we are dealing with a rich heterogeneous material, and he signposts this with a philosophical word and concept: multiplicity. what we deal with according to Deleuze is always a group of multiplicities, along with various operations of rationalisation and of administration, of participating in the multiplicities or relating to them on the same plane, or of simplifying, unifying, and organising these multiplicities in the name of some transcendence such as Reason or the Subject. Feyerabend does not like such philosophical terms as subjectivity which assume a division that does not exist in reality: I wouldnt say that, because subjectivity is already a philosophical expression which assumes a division between something objective and something subjective. I would never assume that, because these things freely interpenetrate (p161). Given this free interpenetration of elements across abstract divisions, Feyerabend is acutely aware of the ambiguity of our words, our concepts, and our perceptions, and of the richness of the material that we participate in and try to deal with. Encountering von Weizsckers arguments allowed him to see the richness of the material, how there are so many little steps being made (p162). The historical development of quantum theory appeared to him as a rich and heterogeneous assemblage
of multiplicities that could not be organised into the simple narratives proposed by methodology freaks and by rational reconstructors. Weizsckers arguments caused Feyerabend to abandon the rational attitude (really, as we have seen, the transcendent attitude) and to adopt a freer, more open, more complex attitude - the participative attitude (or, in deleuzese, the immanent attitude). We can call this attitude pluralism, provided that we understand this aright as participative pluralism (or immanent pluralism) neither proposing nor making use of standards that do not themselves vary with the progression of the research that they judge. Thus a variety of approaches exist and are necessary because of the nature of reality itself, which imposes strict limits on our constructions. Which constructions work, and which fail, are not a matter of a priori constraints that guarantee the applicability or not of our conceptual schemes, but is an empirical question. This is why Feyerabend towards the end preferred to call his position ontological relativism to emphasise that pluralism was both required by Being and subject to its constraints. Feyerabend is fond of reminding us that not all constructions can succeed, not all forms of life can flourish. But more of them than we think can and do succeed and flourish. In this way, we see that both Feyerabends positive suggestions and his negative criticisms stem from his views on reality, are grounded in his ontology.
questions and answers (which was the guiding principle for the collection in which DIALOGUES was published), Deleuze chose to embody the intensive attitude in a dialogue with Claire Parnet where the identities were inassignable: the first plan for a conversation between two people, in which one asked questions and the other replied, no longer had any value. The divisions had to rest on the growing dimensions of the multiplicity, according to becomings which were unattributable to individuals, since they could not be immersed in it without changing qualitatively (DIALOGUES, x). Feyerabend could have chosen this solution, but he tells us in KILLING TIME that this has been the case in his writing for the previous ten years: Grazia read some of my articles and criticized them quite thorougly the language, the presentation, the ideas I in turn read some of her work and made some suggestions here and there. After ten years of such exchanges our views have become rather similar except that Grazia knows a wealth of details and has the ability, which I lack, to grasp the simple ideas behind a complex and murky message (KILLING TIME, p175). Thus Feyerabend is an adept of the deleuzian post-identitarian dialogue. But he has something else in mind in this Last Interview, not to give us an already accomplished example of dialogue outside abstract categories and identities, but a sample of the transition from abstract to immanent thought. Feyerabend is quite frustrating: He refuses to suggest any administrative solutions, declares that he has had only good experiences and to have enjoyed total freedom, rejects Jungs philosophical jargon (subjectivity, construction), claims to have no philosophical position, calls methodological pluralism in the sciences just a statement of fact, maintains that arguments dont count, affirms his suspicion of anything positive in philosophy, brags that his aim is to upset people, terms rationality an emotional attitude etc. But whenever Jung gives in and asks a merely personal question Feyerabend replies laconically, with nothing much to say. At the end Feyerabend seems to have come full circle, denouncing the situation in the United States, where there are many people who are much better than there so called superiors idiots getting large amounts of money in important positions smart young people pushed around with no jobs, no money, nothing (p168). The whole interview has been a feyerabendian deconstruction of the initial question and of the principles and attitudes present in our institutions responsible for this state of affairs. Feyerabend speaks of his life yes, but he brings out a more than personal import, without letting it become impersonal. He teaches Jung , and through him he educates us, by telling stories that embody his humanitarian attitude, and his rejection of intellectualistic conceit and folly (AGAINST METHOD, Fourth Edition, p280). Perhaps the best statement of intention is in Feyerabends last letter: What I want to do is change your attitude. I want you to sense chaos where at first you noticed an orderly arrangement of well-behaved things and processes. Repeatedly Feyerabend finds that Jungs questions presuppose too much order, and he responds by trying to get him to sense in its place chaos, ambiguity, interpenetration, multiplicity, fluidity, difference, abundance. Jung is on the way to immanence, and just as anything can be distorted in the direction of transcendence (You can twist everything into a rational shape Anything can be bent in a direction, p167), so too anything can be pushed towards immanence. Jungs questions, with their transcendent presuppositions, are necessary to render that demonstration possible, so we can only be glad that he was there.
the titles of his major works: AGAINST METHOD, FAREWELL TO REASON, THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE these are negative titles indeed, confirming and fostering Feyerabends reputation as a crazy anarchistic nihilistic buffoon. However, one has just to read these books to perceive that Feyerabends enterprise is overwhelmingly positive, but in an unexpected fashion. This is the second source of Feyerabend being taken for a purely negative thinker: he has many creative ideas and positive suggestions, but he refuses to tie them together with some general stuff (cf. Last Interview, p163), as he claims systematic thinkers do. Feyerabend was often caricatured as a negative thinker, but he himself contributed to this caricature. As Deleuze says philosophers often present their newness to the world under the disguise of an old mask. Feyerabend is full of positive suggestions, but he often attributes them to others, or presents them contextually, or seems to be joking, or deconstructs them at the end. But even his deconstructions are based on a positive notion of the ambiguity and the fruitful imprecision of ordinary language. He argues that the natural sciences are a branch of the social sciences, or of the humanities, or of the arts. He incorporates the play of multiple hypotheses and multiple points of view in his work. He declares that he holds in horror nailing things down or being nailed down himself. So the positivity, being quite fluid, can easily be missed on a superficial reading. Following a remark by Babette Babich that philosophers mostly dont even read the books they discuss, I would like to indicate how misleading the titles cited are. AGAINST METHOD abounds in positive suggestions and developments to show how knowledge is part of a complex historical process (positive description), how we can usefully participate in such a process (positive recommendations), and what consequences follow for the ideas of knowledge and reality (positive epistemology and ontology). As Feyerabend explains, the title was a joke, aimed in the first instance at his friend Imre Lakatos, and more generally at rationalists of all ilks. FAREWELL TO REASON, as we saw in a previous post, means in fact farewell to the farewell to reason and its purport is positive. As to THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE, this is not even Feyerabends title, which was CONFLICT AND HARMONY but was chosen by the editor, as was the cover depicting nuclear apocalypse. This is a good example of the self-perpetuating, self-validating nature of clichs: Feyerabend already had a reputation as a negative thinker, so this posthumous book was adapted to conform to that image, thus providing it with further confirmation. (NB: I can only assume that this choice was imposed by the publishers, as the editor Eric Oberheim is an impeccable and sensitive Feyerabend scholar). The image of the negative thinker is a mask worn by Feyerabend as part of a set of strategies to avoid the crystallisation of his ideas into a system. Anything new needs a mask to survive, or to render at least a minimum of communication possible, as Deleuze (citing Nietzsche) would often remind us in his discussion of philosophical creativity. (NB: an interesting example of this use of masks, but in reverse, is Graham Harman, whose philosophy in large part amounts to an outdated epistemology masquerading as a new ontology. Here the old wears the mask of the new, as I argue in my review of Harmans THE THIRD TABLE). Feyerabend does not wish to provide us with a systematic objective account, yet his work abounds in positive ideas and propositions. For him, when philosophy becomes a system the ambiguous , personal, fluid nature of ideas is lost: a philosophy is a collection of opinions which are tied together by some general stuff. Its much too rigid for my taste (p163). Feyerabends conclusion is that we can have the concrete, singular ideas and help them have their own immanent coherence by participating in their complex process, or we canhinder that coherence and those processes by imposing an extrinsic structure (the general stuff). So no paralysis or mutism is implied: I do not have a philosophy, I have lots of opinions (p162). It is interesting to note the convergence with Jean-Franois Lyotard on this point. Lyotard claimed that the age of the grand systems (of the systematic account of everything, in Feyerabends terms,
p162) is at an end. All that remains (and here he cites Adorno) is to accompany metaphysics in its fall and to multiply the micrologies. Feyerabend would have agreed, even if he tried to avoid such philosophical terminology. In his terms we could summarize: lets have more opinions without the general stuff, lets tell more stories.
philosophical assumptions, such as the division between something objective and something subjective, imposing boundaries where in fact things freely interpenetrate (p161). Writing a letter to oneself implies hopefully a more democratic enunciative posture, an experimentation with ideas, and a freer more ambiguous style of language. A letter implies an exchange over time and not a static system. We have also seen that Feyerabend is post-identitarian, so the notion of aletter to themselves is more complex than may appear at first glance. The self comports an internal multiplicity and is an open system without fixed boundaries in constant exchange with other such open systems, whether people or otherwise My blog posts are letters to myself, part and parcel of my process of individuation, of my anamnesis (remembering who I am outside the system of identities). So they are letters of invitation to you who read them, inviting you to share a moment of co-individuation, to be continued each in his or her own way.