Plato's Description of Division Author(s): A. C. Lloyd Reviewed work(s): Source: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 2, No.

1/2 (Jan. - Apr., 1952), pp. 105-112 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/636866 . Accessed: 12/03/2013 07:25
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PLATO'S DESCRIPTION

OF DIVISION

THERE are many passages in Plato which look as if they alluded to well-worn

practices, discussions,or lessons in the Academy. As is natural with allusions, they are often marked by a puzzling brevity or oddity of expression.One need not assume that they are always conscious allusions; for every writer has moments of obscurity which are due not so much to his conclusions as to his reaching them along lines that have long been familiar to him.To appreciate his whole meaning the reader has then to infer as best he can the writer's train of thought. I wish to suggest that the language in which Dialectic is described in the later Dialogues presupposesa particularand probablyfamiliarmethod of illustrating it. This was a geometrical illustration of the rules of Division by means of a divided line. By failing to notice it readershave not been led into any important misunderstanding of the Academy's rules. But I hope it will appear that the recognition of it makes Plato's manner of describing Division intelligible to an extent that is otherwise difficult. It is only a tentative suggestion, and would perhaps not have been worth making but for the possibility that some points of interest might at the same time emerge for those who were unconvinced by it. So much only is the direct intention of this article. But if the suggestion is correct, it has also in my view an indirect importance. For Plato was fascinated by the mathematical puzzles of infinite divisibility. And by the time he wrote he the Parmenides considered (I believe) that Zeno's paradoxes indicated a solution of his own paradoxes about the One and the Many. I do not want to defend this suggestion here: but its upshot may be put very roughly and dogmatically in the following equations. The Many = the Indeterminate = i.e. the infinite, indefinite, number of parts of a whole. The 'Ones' or species = thefinite or determinate number of parts into which a whole or genus must be divisible if it is to be an actual whole. For in mathematics magnitudes are infinitely divisible : but such magnitudes are only abstractions; and in reality there are always indivisible parts. And just as mathematical objects are images of the real, so the infinite Many are only appearances (due to inadequate division) of the One. Both horns of Zeno's dilemma are grasped:2 one accounts for the intelligible, the other for the sensible. Being is shot through with Notbeing (or Otherness or Matter): but the first forms a plurality, the second an infinity.3 Dialectic meant always the discovery of the One in the Many, and in the later Dialogues this consisted of Collection and Division. In my opinion, then, the illustrationof Dialectic by the division of a line into parts would be a natural result of Plato's great imaginative feat-his theory that there was (as we should say now) identity of logical structure between Zeno's continuous magnitude and the world itself as an object of experience and knowledge. And the choice of illustration would help to confirm the
I This is not to be contradicted by Aristotle's statement (Met. A 992a22; cf. M Io84b I-2) that Plato believed in indivisible lines. For there is more than one sort of mathematics according to Plato. Parm. 164 c-165 d, where magnitudes are infinitely

divisible, applies to 'popular' as opposed to 'philosophical' mathematics (v. Phil. 56 d-e;

Rep. vii. 525 d-526 a). I hope to offer an

explanation of this on another occasion. 2 Cf. Parm. 142 c 7-145 a 2.

3 Soph. 255 e, 256 e-257 a.

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Io6

A. C. LLOYD

interpretation of his metaphysics. It was probably used in the Academy for refuting Zeno. But let me repeat that to show this is only an indirect or secondary purpose here. For the recognition of the illustration does not depend on accepting the metaphysical interpretation. It depends only on an examination of Plato's expressions. And to this I now proceed. After the Phaedrus the chief passages in which the theory of Dialectic is expounded are two. The most generalized account is in Philebus I6d ff. It can be divided for convenience as follows:
SEIY OV'V 77jU,S TOVTrV OVJTOW LaKEKOO'T(JL?EvVL (I) dEl iLav 16Eav "/Tp, 7rapT3s

3 TVa (J/CO 77 Kalo dLpLO(LV, E(7, ElUl, IE7V, El8E fLET((lav (3o, Et 7TO ,TpELS~ ,,oV EV JWV EKELV;OV (4) EXXPrEp TO KaCT av apXa E ff v EKa,Tov7ITCL, oToa,,

(3)

Tov

-0ls dooUKOWEEV KTE pv Lv da w.8KELoLT T o'p peod xalp',A KL (6) p oi6 OUS' O V ov, orw7o 0eol, EEKT ToV TWV r apdOUv 7 VPVTW T0uc r

d,

aV KV Iy7TELPOV

KaOo

E770V

K(

TOOLOUEL 8EPOV

TOv

Txwrtf', 2TTOVo ~E JLE7cE EV VKOET'YEL a .... 3EOV70S, E/O8;a, o E aa ~L7TEL3Pa VoS We are to imagine, as it might be drawn or composed of pebbles on the ground, a line AB of unknown length. This is TrodrrELpov,though not because it is infinitely divisible but because it is not known of how many divisions it is capable. (i) We place provisionally' between A and B a point C, thereby 'finding' in AB a line CB (the tdav 18&av).(2) CB is divided at D, giving us CD and DB (3) CD and DB are similarly divided at E and F respectively. v'vo). (iEr& lar E D B A C F 0o"o00

tv,

iTrws

av

KLaL 7roAAa

KacL flpacV'-rEpov

LO 7r ctOt

TO)

(4) The divisions of CE, ED, DF, FB are continued as far as necessary, i.e until it is seen how many indivisible lines there are in CB (Tr Ka7' apxacs EV, the generic Idea). (This is not of course derivable from the diagram; in Dialectic it involves Collection. We shall suppose the process already comas pleted.) This is equivalent to refraining from considering CB (Tr3 rAiOo0o) before the exact number t''av infinitely divisible (T7rvT70o dL7TElpOV 7Tda TpoEpEvw) is of its components is known.' 7rrAios a word which Plato uses when he means or it to be undetermined whether a magnitude is a7TrrEpov 7TE7TEpacJLuEvov (cf. i8 b 2). The number of lines, viz. CD, (DB,) CE, ED, DF, will be seen to be between (tEtra7ef)AC, which is the remaining still divisible part (o70v0 drrapov) The objection to of the original line, and the last indivisible line, FB (To70 vods). has this is that To70 VdS6 a different denotation both from that of KaT' Ev in and from r E"V (6), which, we shall see shortly, cannot be the lowest dpx3. species.
OetIEvovs refers not merely to the diagram but to the fact that in Dialectic all Ideas start as hypotheses. For, incidentally, Plato never said there is an Idea corresponding to every general name, although this is now attributed to him by writer after writer. Rep. 596 a says Eld2OauEv -IOEaatU, 507 b

OE'?1Evo 1rtOEvrE.Cf. Phaedr. 237 d i (dfoAoylta opov) for connexion with Socratic method. 2 For the use of 'number' where we should say 'number of parts' see Theaet. 204 d. But it has also an esoteric meaning, as is mentioned below.

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PLATO'S DESCRIPTION

OF DIVISION

1o7

One may reply (a) that if Plato visualized a diagram the difficulty would not occur, since the 'one' in question could be pointed to; and (b) that (6) is a new sentence in which the thought makes it quite natural to return to the original 'one'. (There is, however, an alternative, which strains the expression a little, but which would avoid the difficulty: the intermediate lines could be conceived metaphorically as 'standing between' CB as a unit and the indefinite divisibility of AB; for Plato is thinking as much of the understanding of the genus [CB] as of the lowest species [FB].) (5) The lines CD, CE, ED, DF are then ignored--or, what comes to the same thing, we attend only to CB, DB, FB.

CF becomes again indefinitely divisible and we lose CD, CE, ED, DF. Two things are to be noticed in this. First, we are now left, as can be seen from the diagram below, with the lowest differentia, the superordinate species and the genus; and this gives us a definition of the lowest species according to the Academy's rules. Secondly, this definition, which amounts to ignoring the left-hand side of a division, amounts also to 'dismissing it into the d~rLpov'; for the left-hand side contains those things which the contents of the right-hand side (the defining characteristics) are not or are otherthan;' and the former, the 'others', are, in respect of their otherness, dirLpa.2 (6) Plato goes on to say that people erroneously reach the limit of division too quickly, i.e. do not put enough points between C and B, or too slowly, i.e. put too many. In the first case they might, for example, omit DB by dividing CB only at F. (Thinking of Dialectic only as definition of the and of as individuals, editors have often taken the Ev inat-rurovbe the to only (6) 7rEmLpa lowest species.3 But (a) tleaa would naturally mean between the Ev and the 11eepa, while if the former is the lowest species there are no such &lea; (b)more conclusively-it is not 'eristic' but correct 'dialectic' to apply the notion of dJ-IEpla after the lowest species has been reached. -r "v is therefore the genus, Aristotle's CB.) Such division would be equivalent to 'bad' definition-in example, to defining Man as Two-footed Animal instead of Two-footed
rd yap ToAAa EK rO AAv iv&dov. gEar-a" the error of this view cf. 18 c 3 For apa 7-d i. EL,3WV rrEptEKaUTov Tr&V To -r oAVEarEU O&,7rEpovEwA7OE It is the same reason which has led to susT 8 pdv io and wvEEPOV vat picion of the text-both KaCrroAAcd OV..K. Ka ; v av T Epo I Soph. 255 2 Ib. 256 e: f.
AEK'rEIOV ... Ka. l 7r ovv ap' iTjv, oaTrTp EdarLra OK EUrtLV' EKEtEvayap JAAa, Ka-ra TroUaOT-ra o0K 5E"v v aptOV v ~iv a )rd E'ntv, dTrE'pav-ra Xv OVKOV oO'K ETIr-v aG. Parm. 158 c": T'AAa v aEl UKO7rOvrTES
al-rV

fpa6"rEpov. sistent with

many species is similar to supposing too

few: a wrongly supposed species (a pdEpos instead of an ELOSg, Pol. 263) is no species at all and therefore a'rrEtpov-avvaywyhas (C.Q. xxxiii (1939), on this sentence

The latter was thought inconBut to suppose too EVOVS. werrrpa

oVTwS

KaO'

aa7 -v

77

EV OUrE 0;vE 7T ovre &JAov ildptLad oAAa ovrE Ear a little unsatisfactory; especially so since r&AAa o40Lg0Ta 70E) Evds, 8L[ aTToV Err ITErXEL. his notes (Plato's Examination of Pleasure, Philop. in Ar. Phys., ed. Vitelli, 8o. 29 [Lee, 23-24) on our (4) and (5) do make the E7 PL r .eno of Elea, fr. 3]: E' T- v ELv, ot point. % [sc. 6 Z'vwv], Kal a5LalpE7Ov, oz3E oAAd

ov v 70T EL8OvSg aav3'nS dEtE O dav"to a-rELpov EUgaL 7T7r49EL; I59 d: 0 o' Op,/IEV AAa Ev ydp v -v E"Kaorov 'rL & capa roAAd"a E avr&Tv Idpcov 70o OJAov, .El woA.Ad v-v-iv U

Er-pav

simply not taken place. Failure to emphasize this point makes Prof. Hackforth's note
23-24)

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108

A. C. LLOYD

Footed Animal as Plato required.' This is at once seen if the scheme is represented thus: (AB) AC CD GCB (Animal) DB (Footed)

ED DF CE FB (Two-footed) This is the more familiar representation, and no doubt it is the one that Plato generally had in mind when he was making applications of SLaipEUL-. But when he is more concerned with theory-and with the structure of reality as revealed by Division, rather than our piecemeal discovery of it-his language is that of the Parmenides; and since the language there is appropriate to the division of lines it is natural to expect it to be so here. Moreover it was from this geometrical point of view that mutual implications were first seen among the concepts of irrationality, indefinability, and infinite divisibility.z And the last forms the limiting case of the second possible error, the error of completing the division too slowly. It is what is only prevented from happening, according to Plato, by the fact that if we collected merely particulars even these would have a share in Ideas.3 So Plato refers to the danger on this sidedescribing his opponents as represented by Protagoras' sensationalism-by into fragments (6pLTrTELV).4 The Eleatics represented the 'crumbling' reality extreme case of the alternative error, for they allowed only a single 'One' to be discovered. The via media, advocated by Plato, is that reality is, rather, 'chopped up' (KEKEptaILatILEVOV, KaTaKEKEptaTLaliE So that he exactly ov).5 describes the attempt to treat changing particulars as reality by saying, 7-j7 t o ov, o aCv OpV`7rTEae 377 oLCtL vCyKr77 KEptaaTL1dtLEVOV 7trav TL r8tavo[' (Parm. 165 b 4-6). There is one point which presents some difficulty if we do not recognize the suggested illustration. I hope, however, that a discussion may be helpful also to those who do not accept my 'divided line'. In (5) Tr E'vEKcaaTov 7WV ,rdv must refer to all the unities, i.e. Ideas, which have emerged by Collection and Division. For to take them as individuals6 is surely inadmissible when Ev is just
its having Being that Not-being is 'chopped 6422b5-9. i EKEL ydp 2 ov0 Edr' /rELpov LalpEait, KatL up'. The metaphor is, of course, explained TOb Aoyov (Procl. in I Eucl., ed. Friedlein, by its being used for the division of a genus ' Ar. Met. Z 1o38ag9-25; De part. an.
. . XAAq7Aa . (cf. 257 c 7). It is in respect of

repudiate the 'reality' of the materialists, AEyo~lE'vv ,r7r' ov / aLrcIv aAq'OEULV aiKpL StaLOpaovr-E EV KWarT rori AOyots. pAvov i 17 ye s Ib. 258 d: [LELSFrS oi, Kal--Va ovra 0 EafrtyV LAAa 7 EIdog~ dCL7TEiELgaLEv, V n7V TvyXavEtL vo tlr dV70boy

into species (Meno 79 a so; c 2; Pol. 266 a 2). p. 6o. 15). 6 As does Stenzel, Studien z. Entw. d. plat. 3 For this lesson in the Parmenides cf. Dialektik2 (Leipzig-Berlin 1931) 104, at least 158 b 2-d 8; 164 c 7-d 8; 165 a 5-c 3. 4 Cf. Soph. 246 b 9-c I: the Idealists in Allan's interpretation ([Stenzel] Plato's

-a E'KEIVWVtia-ra KaL Tr'v

method of Dialectic, tr. and ed. D. J. Allan, Oxford 1940, 146). Mr. Allan, who has very

kindly read my manuscript, suggests that Stenzel 'could say that 'v, which has just been used in the dialectician's sense, (4), is
then used as a man in the state of

,-a-rrs would use it, (5), i.e. "those alleged unities" '. IorTEr)i7VEqLEOa" But how many readers would grasp this Kati yap oaadv (atv dVrroaElavrEg Oa'rEpov L a ovT "7r from Plato's text ? 7rpd~ ETrV7 7r ra Ka7taKEKEpta7rtpLf/E 'Trv

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PLATO'S DESCRIPTION

OF DIVISION

o109

had E'v and when iw-cv oE iaV( EKaT-rov what is being distinguished from drTELpov, denoted species in the previous sentence. Now we are told to dismiss them into the drTeLpov.But why? All we should be left with is a genus and the arithmetical number (say 4 or 6 or 8) of its species. And if it is important to know how many species there are, this can surely only be because we cannot do this without knowing what they are. In what circumstances ought we then to forget this latter knowledge? The purpose of Division here may be one or more of the following possibilities: (a) to define or understand a genus; (b) to define a lowest species; (c) to show how a genus (or any divisible Idea) is both a Many and a One; (d) as part of an argument (e.g. to refute the thesis, 'Government is necessary, Athenian democracy is government, therefore Athenian democracy is necessary'). But as for (a) we do not define or understand a genus by saying that it has m species, where m is a mere number. In (b) to omit the superordinate species from the definition of a lowest species is un-Platonic, as we have seen; and secondly, it is not obvious-except on my (first) interpretation of (4)-that we shall have been left with even a lowest species. (c) at least must be admitted here, because Plato explicitly says so (16 a-c). He is, for the purpose of this dialogue, fitting his Dialectic into the Pythagorean formula in which i- v is the first product of rrpas and cd7rpov, and in which reality is generated by the on imposition of Number or durov the ad'tpov. So once the species have been -'enumerated the genus has been shown to be a Many, and we can return to its unity. And it is to be added that the dismissal of the Many into the d'ITtpov will we were told in (4) show how the One and Many together are also diErrepa-as -not simply in respect of the lowest species, but all of them.' This Pythagorean framework would explain the emphasis on the mere number of species, for 'the' number has then an esoteric meaning (cf. especially 17 c i I-e 6).z (d) is an aspect to which Hackforth has drawn attention. It too might explain the 'dismissal'. For in our example it is sufficient to know that democracy is a species of government; and if one asks, 'Why the emphasis on the numberof species?' it could be replied that until the whole division is completed it is impossible to know that any single division was a 'real' one and therefore to be admitted in a genuine, instead of an eristic, argument.3 (d) is not so important, I think, as (c). Nevertheless all four purposes are present to Plato's mind. For it is notable that when he goes on to illustrate the method there is no hint of the 'dismissal'.4 With the possible exception of the continuation (18 b 6 ff.) of the first one, it seems essential in the illustrations to know not only how many the species are, but what they are. The improbability of both (c) and (d) as explanations could be supported by Politicus 285 a-b, where knowledge of all the species was necessary to an understanding both of ' Cf. L. 2 Cf. ii Robin, Platon: (1924), 7, J. Stenzel,Zahl u. Gestalt complktes, 'DasEinzelneb. Platon 'une foiseuvres est arrive' I3-18; A. Preiswerk, (1942), 184 n. 20: qu'on a l'espace dernikre . . 'impossibilite de und Aristoteles', suppl.-Bd.xxxii, Philologus, "specifier" davantage nous met en presence, Heft I (1939), 55-56. co et de l'individu, avec la multiplicit6 de ses 3 Cf. ot vi3vrv &v pcorwv o01 of (6)
caracteres singuliers, et du nombre infini d'individus auxquels s'6tend la notion de I'espkce derniere, avec tout ce qu'elle implique et qui constitue la chaine des interm diaires.' But his translation 'c'est alors que d6sormais on doit abandonner l'infini et lui dire adieu', is inexplicable. with the vioS of 15 d-e, who 'at one moment kneads any argument into one ball, then unrolls it again and chops it into pieces'. Compare also Phaedr.237 d. 4 Nor elsewhere. (Pol. 286 e 6, despite Campbell's note, has nothing to do with the present point.)

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A. C. LLOYD IIo the lowest species and of the genus. Still more could it be supported by the next page (286 c-287 a). For there, in an apology for the length of preliminary and were also required to be tested against discussions,?uaKpoAoyla /paXvAoyla the rules of Division 'Tt/LV 7TO KaT EL77rTTv ELvat (rrp3)rov /6OOoovav'Tr7V 8vvaoTOV But this criterion was, in fact, the correctnessof the definition of the S&atpErv). lowest species, viz. the 'royal art'. Indeed when a concrete application of the rules was made (287 b ff.), a number of species were'dismissed',namely those on the left-hand side of the division. And these were just the ones which would have been dismissedin our suggested interpretationof the Philebus passage, but not on the normal interpretation. The trouble is, in fact, that (a) and (b) as explanations are incompatible with (c) and (d). However, this need not rule out the normal interpretation.For one may concentrateon (c) and possibly (d), and say that both Socrates'examples and the Politicus illustratea use of Division This furtheruse would be beyond that for which it is introduced in the Philebus. its more common one in the sciences, and one which had already been alluded to by Socrates in 16 c 1-3. An alternative, which I should prefer, is to claim that Plato is trying to combine (a), (b), (c), and (d). For he has a habit of combining two levels of thought--of teaching an immediately relevant lesson in method at the same time as an indirect lesson in metaphysics.And it is a habit which is at once idiosyncraticand rathervulnerable to strict logic. To conclude, ' then, the 'dismissal into the drrELpovis readily intelligible for any of the purposes of Division that may be intended, if the 'divided line' is agreed to illustrate it: but it does not contain sufficient difficulty to make it positive evidence for the illustration. The secondpassagewhich describesthe method of Dialectic is in Sophist d: 253
isv nTaVt3v alls atis
igEK

fo

ntanc

o qer Ee-qtg

EtVcvL;

... t

OVKOVV

YE

roio 7rTeVTi)

Svva-r'S Spaiv (i)

oLntsV

,dav 1&'av &di 7woAAC^v, EOVJO& EcKaCTTOVKEL/LEVOV XWPLS, w7nVa L'KAVA VEc-sucet, KhcL ia AaosjAtwv s ntserepas o &self d'oe ojuic tao
&

eWOEv

(2) tKatClav a' ITEPLEXOiLEmVL,

rroAAa' Xp's nTcav-ri WptEcLEvas.

4 t cAthwv E'v noAAC'v vvllusrMvyiqv, Kat

Especially since Stenzel's work' it has been widely agreed that the passage refersto the method of Division. To suppose it merely describesfour different kinds of relationbetween Ideas, two of Communionand two of non-Communion is not at all satisfactory; for instance E'v vvvwit1t-iq[ is takenz to mean 'remaining on its own' or 'self-sufficient', V does not seem to do justice to which the Greek. It is much easier to follow if we think of the same illustrationof the divided line-though, once again, only as influencing the expression: it is not necessary to it, and if Plato had thought it necessary he would have made it explicit. But this second passage is closer, of course, chronologically, to the Parmenides. 1a I(sa (our CB) is drawn or stretched across the whole of the shorter lines but ;3 they (7Tv- qStva-TErapL'vqv) arecontained it (6wCOEOv by ITEPLEXOXLEVa), are
Studien, 62-71 [tr. Allan, 96-1o6]. e.g. recently by B. Liebrucks, Platons Entw. z. Dialektik (Frankfurt-a.-M. 1949) 148. The collection of parts is mentioned before the Division. Mr. Allan therefore suggests that, if a line is intended, a discontinuous one would be more comprehensible:

B
to see

'For here some at"'aB7qL is required

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PLATO'S DESCRIPTION

OF DIVISION

III

still units (Xwpi S&twptrlt'vas). 7EPLEXELV is the technical term for the relation of of a magnitude to its parts,' and is contrasted in Parmenides150 a with St' jAov ELvaL,which is coextensiveness.2 wlOOEvalludes to the paradox of the TETaaEV7V whole-part relation disclosed by Zeno (v. Parm. 145 b-e, and 149 d 8 ff., specially 150 e 5-151 a) and well known in the Academy (v. Ar. Top. vi. xiii; In (2) it is possible that tlav denotes the generic Idea cf. Phys. A 2IoaI6-I7).3 as it did in (I), and El the lowest species. But it is preferable to take them the other way about. The emphasis of the first half will then be upon Collection, the emphasis of the second (marked by av') upon Division, and the two will form respective explanations of ?TE-r ' E E LoS~ ETEPOVy47rarOaecL ETEpov /lprE 7a-,r3v t vqpEvl) av carodv. Ev Ev vlV v is a variation from 63d tudis1S'a IEPtEXoIEV7)and as represents the passive of uvAAaJPWv it was used at 250 b 9.... But the terms he is employing belong so much to the logic of geometry that the Stranger finds it necessary to explain that all this is the same thing as what the others will already have understood by 'Dialectic' !4 There is one other passage to be discussed; for unlike the previous two it does, I believe, provide some positive evidence for our suggested illustration. The Politicus has a puzzling remark in repeating the rule that dichotomy is to be preferred but, failing that, division into three or more parts:
Karact

yap The usual view of the second sentence is stated by 'pour la division dans le nombre le plus proche, [cf.] Philebe 16 d: ,Eral Dies:. (18dav) &)o, E lav ' EtrTo ELUL, toute m6thode.' But the Philebus passage did not say that we should try the lower number first. For the tEra t1av &8o had nothing to do with alternatives. True, Plato regards dichotomy as preferable. But this appears to be for no better reason than the attractiveness of rO'iErov.6 And once the division of mankind by races into two parts, like Greeks and Barbarians, is seen to be merely nominal (Pol. 262 d-e), it is unlikely to be an economical method to proceed by trying three. At the same time 'the nearest number' must denote the next number, sc. in the number-series. (It cannot, for example, mean 'nearest to reality', nor, of course, 'the nearest number' in the English sense of nearest the right one.) I suggest that the expression contains a reference to the position of divisions in the
that pl'a 13'a stretches through from beginCf. Parm. 145 b 8. ning to end.' 2 This is not to reject C. Ritter's contenEl E UKOWTELV,ts

TO EL& EV5yyvarTa rct

tLE17To -ovV

a-raTS OLOV

/LctALUaEIVEW pOVdoEa (287 c).

aEPELOV

SaLpyLEOca,

E'EL&%

'cXa cSvva-ro-LEVv.o

6AAov TpELt&g 7rtva Principe JptOLdv.

d'6conomie, ame de

passage,Hipp.ma.300-2, which looksto me like a set pieceof the Academy's Idealtheory.

4 70o70
8"

E'artV,

rE KOLV(oVELV E'KaUrTa

against it. Plato's final interest, even in the Parm. passages, is not (pace Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 179 ff.) in infinite divisibility, but in a whole, i.e. genus, which is, and yet is
more than, its parts. Cf. Theaet. 201 e-205 e

tion (Neue Untersuchungen iiber Platon KaTa O~/7 Lj, q ~taKplVELV yEVOg SvvaeraL, Ka (19io) E7la-raaOaL. 57 ff.) that Sta-E'aa0at refers to the /dyta-ra ydEvr, like Otherness which is ta 7rrwovrwvv s Bud6 edition, ad loc. 6 Pol. 262 b 6-7; 265 a 4. The reason is and EprEdLXEaOaL the species to tLEAv0v7av, of ordinary genera-though not that which a nominalist logic would give, 250 b 8 is

viz. the exhaustiveness of a class-concept and its contradictory (although this doubtless influenced him in practice, especially in the Sophist), for a negative class is likely to be
JvEpov

with Ar. Met. Z I04Ib9-33 and the neglected

and Ross ad loc. (Platonists' denial of Ideas of negations).

(cf. Pol. 262 d) ; cf. Ar. Met. A 990bi3

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line. Thus if DB had been divided at F and G instead of F alone, it would not have been divided at the nearest point to ED (the last line). E D F B E D G F B

In other words FB (the last definiendum) should be pushed nearer to ED. The result is the same as if Plato had said 'the lowest number'; but the lack of justification for the principle would have been glaring had he been thinking simply of what we call numbers. Pythagorean mathematics would not distinguish, in the absolute way in which ours would, lengths from numberswhich had extension. And I suspect that Plato was thinking too of what would have been at least an exact analogy (and for him perhaps more than an analogy) of this process of Division, namely the generation of numbers by the 'drawing in' of - A'yytyta dlrdpov.I
70o A. C. LLOYD

St. Andrews
' Ar. Phys. A 213b22; Met. N Io9IaI7;
fr. 201 (Rose).

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