THEMEN

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Major geopolitical explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa

Introduction
In many societies, violent conflict is one of the major factors negatively affecting development. It diverts resource that could have been otherwise used productively; hence, it appears that there is a general agreement as to its undesirable nature. In order to resolve and, if possible, prevent violent conflict, it is imperative to understand the underlying motives behind it. The Horn of Africa provides a perfect instance of a conflict-ridden area. In general, there is no consensus on the states that are comprised in the region, but for our purpose, we will consider the following six states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan. The scope of the paper will thus be limited to the study of these states making up the Horn of Africa and their interactions between themselves, but also their relations with the rest of the world. These states have shaped not only the geography of the region but also its politics. They have contributed in part for the intractable conflict in the Horn of Africa. What lies behind this instability will be the subject of discussion. This paper is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the external influences that affect the politics of the region. It includes the main explanations for external involvement during the imperialist Cold War, and postCold War periods and also explores the degree to which the strategic location of the region by itself accounted for attracting a wide variety of states, ranging from capitalists to communists, from Christians to Islamic fundamentalists. The second part will deal with internal problems faced within the Horn of Africa that have exacerbated the conflict. Here, recourse will be made to the question of territoriality. The marginalization of minorities in general, and of pastoralists in particular, will be treated. In addition, the relationship between ethnicity and territoriality will also be invoked. In brief, the objective of the paper is to exhaust the major geopolitical explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa in order to devise ways and means for transforming conflict into cooperation. More particularly, the study attempts to present an insight into the main internal and external causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa. As the saying goes, a cause well defined is a problem half-solved; the author will not be over-ambitious by attempting to find both the causes and the solutions of conflict in the region. On the other hand, the title indicates that the major focus of the study will be on the major explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Thus, only some possible solutions for conflict mitigation and resolution will be recommended. The task of finding solutions is an entire area of study by itself and needs further research. Lastly, a politico-geographical approach will be adapted as the methodology for conducting the research. Information will be gathered from secondary sources, mainly from published materials.

1. External influences
The Horn of Africa has always been of strategic importance because of its geographical settings. It has, most often than not, captured the attention of various states which started intervening in the politics of the region. It is this influence external to the Horn which has in part created a favorable condition for conflict to reign in the region. 1.1 Imperialism European presence in the Horn of Africa was greatly felt during the nineteenth century although external influence from Islam had preceded it. This was the time when European powers engaged in what is known as the scramble for Africa. The African continent had been divided between the major European powers, and the Horn of Africa was no exception with this regard. Within the Horn of Africa, the British had established their presence in Sudan, Kenya, and the northern part of Somalia (also known as British Somaliland). The Italians on their part, occupied Eritrea and southern Somalia (referred to as Italian Somalia) while the French had a stronghold in Djibouti (Markakis, 1994: 222). The only exception in the Horn of Africa was the Abyssinian Empire which escaped the fate of its neighbors. On the contrary, the Abyssinian Empire was considered by many writers as having had imperialistic tendencies because of its southward expansion and its incorporation of different peoples (Bereket, 1980: 3). In the process of colonization, boundaries were put in place where such territorial organization rarely existed. There is no question as to the artificial nature of the boundaries which cut across the same people and divided them. A perfect example are the Somali people, who found 627

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themselves divided in British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, French Djibouti, British Kenya, and Ethiopia. Hence the boundaries in the Horn of Africa could be said to be rather reflections of imperial rivalries than a genuine pattern of population settlement along geographical or ethnic lines (Woodward, 1996: 13). The consequences of imperialism were not confined to the above problem only. There also was the issue of proper administration once the European powers settled in. The colonial powers did not impose their rule equally over the whole of their territories; some communities were favored, while others were marginalized. This applied to the Sudan, whose northern part was administered quiet separately from its southern part, where Islamic and Arab influence was minimized, while Christianity and the English language were promoted (Markakis, 1994: 222). This contributed largely to the subsequent north-south dichotomy in Sudan. Somalia was another case in point where the difference between the British and the Italian colonial administrations was reflected in a very strained relation between northern and southern Somalia after its reunification in 1960 (ibid.). While mentioning these issues, it must be pointed out that the natural process of nation building had been completely interrupted. Just like the artificial nature of boundaries imposed on the region, the importation of state structure in the process of state formation was equally superficial (Harbeson, 1995: 133). In Europe however, the creation of nationstates took place after the French Revolution and also after 1945. These were attempts by peoples or their leaders to give a nationality or group a territory that it could control for itself(Vasquez, 1993: 132). All these problems have played a role in influencing the politics of the region. Imperialism has left a scar on the face of the Horn of Africa. To this day, four decades after the withdrawal of the European powers from the region, some of the current conflicts in the area still find their roots embedded in imperialism. 1.2 The cold war Unlike the colonial period, when the consequences of imperialism in the Horn of Africa were the rule (as in most of Africa) rather than the exception, the Cold War period witnessed the involvement of the superpowers on a large scale mostly in the Horn of Africa. This was mainly due to the increasingly strategic position of the region. The Nile, representing the major river system within the Horn, called the attention of neighboring countries, especially that of Egypt (Woodward, 1996: 11). But it was with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1867 that the area started to have commercial significance internationally (Bereket, 1980: 1-2). The Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, The Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden are considered as links to the 628

Middle East. In addition, the vital seaways for petroleum tankers lie not far away from the region. The location of the Horn of Africa vis--vis the Arab-Israeli area of conflict is still another added value. According to Mesfin (1999: 88-89), these are the major factors that call for the involvement of the United States, which attempts to protect and keep its access to the vital raw materials indispensable for the functioning of the Western economy. Keeping these issues in mind, the United States first established in the 1940s a strategic relationship with Ethiopia in which telecommunications surveillance base near Asmara was constructed (Schraeder, 1996: 192). Here again, the Horn of Africa was among the most suitable geographical settings the United States could find with the technology of the time. The United States kept on supporting Ethiopia, while the presence of the Soviet Union in the Horn was beginning to be felt by the early 1960s. The Soviet Union established military relations with Somalia and, for a time, Sudan (Lyons, 1996: 86). Moscow started engaging itself in the politics of the Horn, not only for its strategic geographic location, but also to divert Western attention and resources from Europe where if felt more vulnerable militarily (Lefebvre, 1996: 206). Nevertheless, the Soviets were allowed to develop military facilities at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden (ibid.: 209). But developments within Ethiopia, namely the revolution and the subsequent emergence of a Marxist regime in 1974, dramatically transformed the superpowers relations with the states of the region. Moreover, Somali claims of the Ogaden in Ethiopia to form a Greater Somalia had strained the relations of the two neighbors ever since the 1960s until it broke out as a war in 1977-78. Obviously, the United States could not have continued its relations with such a Marxist military regime in Ethiopia. The increasing hostility towards the West and capitalism by the military regime proved to be unbearable to the United States. Technological innovations had also rendered the telecommunications surveillance base in Ethiopia useless. On top of these, a mounting pressure, coming from Arab neighbors in support of the Somali cause, converged with the US policy to find a solution to the Middle East crisis. The United States sought for maximum support from Arab states to get legitimacy in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict diplomatically; hence, abandoning Ethiopia in favor of Somalia seemed to be the best policy from the perspective of the American national interest at the time. The Soviet Union for its part took advantage of the situation by aligning with Ethiopia. From the Soviet viewpoint, Berbera seemed less strategic as compared to Assab and Massawa for controlling the Red Sea and checking the US presence in the region. The United States had turned its attention to Somalia, Sudan, and also Egypt; thus the superpowers switched their positions within a matter of few years (Woodward, 1996: 3).

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Rather than reducing conflict in the region, the superpowers gave priority to maintaining ties to their clients. The massive flow of military aid from the Soviet Union not only helped Ethiopia in resolving militarily the border dispute with Somalia, but it also contributed to the resort of force instead of negotiation especially regarding the internal problems within Ethiopia. However, there was one attempt by the Soviet Union through the services of Cuba, to solve the Ethio-Somali border dispute, before it erupted, by proposing the formation of a Marxist-Leninist Red Sea Confederation which was supposed to include Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen. This attempt failed when within a few months war broke out and the Soviet Union decided to fully support Ethiopia (Lefebvre, 1996: 209). By the 1980s, the United States was becoming successful in seeking to bankrupt the Soviet Union under what was known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, which aimed at trapping the Soviet Union to spend more in the Horn in order to maintain its credibility. The United States maintained its influence at a fraction of the Soviet cost (ibid.: 210-211). By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union began to disengage itself from the politics of the Horn, especially in Ethiopia, due to its own internal changes. The United States followed suit in Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya (Lyons, 1996: 86). It can be said that the superpower rivalry during the Cold War manifested itself in the Horn of Africa at a larger scale than elsewhere in the continent. While the role of superpowers in influencing the politics of the Horn was unprecedented in the Cold War era, the part played by regional powers needs also adequate attention. These regional powers may either have had their own motives or may have acted as proxies for superpowers (Woodward, 1996: 5). One such regional power came from the Arab world which sought to make the Red Sea an Arab lake in order to minimize Israeli and superpower involvements (Legum and Lee, 1977: 6). Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti have been members of the Arab League and so Islam still plays a big role in extending the conflict of the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, Israel, in collaboration with the United States, had been transferring Falashas from Ethiopia to Israel and, according to Mesfin (1999: 74), this extension of opposing interests from the Middle East into the Horn may be one of the strongest factors for turning the region into the most conflict-ridden part of Africa. Another point regarding the interest of the Arab states in the region, especially that of Egypt, seemed to be the unrestricted use of the Nile waters by supporting secessionists in Eritrea and the Somali claim of the Ogaden in order to weaken the Ethiopian state and divert its resources (Mesfin,1999: 84-85). In general, it seems that the strategic geographical location of the Horn of Africa has so far proven to be a liability

instead of an asset, in light of the superpower and regional power involvement it had entailed. 1.3 The post-cold war period With the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a result, the end of the Cold War, the situation in the Horn of Africa has changed. New issues have arisen and the significance of the region has also been affected. The first development associated with the withdrawal of superpower patronage in the Horn of Africa is the collapse of the Somali Republic (Woodward, 1996: 145). This was followed by the demise of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia, the secession of Eritrea, and the quest for selfdetermination in southern Sudan (ibid.: 191). Military aid to the Horn of Africa during the Cold War increased the resolution of conflicts through military means by the regimes then in power and this backfired on them when all the support from the superpowers was withdrawn; without their patrons, what remained of these regimes was the military which was no more powerful as compared with the insurgents and freedom fighters themselves supported by regional powers. The absence of communism as a threat to US interests diminished the attention given to the Horn of Africa. The Gulf crisis of 1990-91 further shifted US attention to the Middle East (ibid.: 147). But the emergence of an issue, which had hitherto been considered as irrelevant compared to communism, called for the re-engagement of the United States in the politics of the Horn. This issue, referred to as Islamic fundamentalism by western countries, was the emergence of Islam as a political ideology. It is believed that Islamic fundamentalism took advantage of the political vacuum created by the Horn countries preoccupation with profound internal questions. It is also associated with the collapse of communism and the withdrawal of the superpowers from the region. From its base in Sudan, Islamic fundamentalism is perceived by many to be on the way of penetration in southern Ethiopia, Kenya, and to a lesser extent Somalia. What has caused this belief is the conversion of Sudan to an Islamic state (Harbeson, 1995: 143-144). Especially after the bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1999, and most importantly, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the issue of Islamic fundamentalism is being highly associated with terrorism. The United States government ever since, has been trying to mobilize worldwide support on the issue. In the Horn of Africa, since the early 1990s, the US had planned to use the new regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea to counter the further spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The two leaders [of Ethiopia and Eritrea] were also seen as part of the new breed of African democratic leadership. The US saw them as a bulwark of their regional policy against Sudanese Islamic fun629

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damentalism, as two rocks in the sea of instability in the Horn of Africa. (New African, 1998: 24) But, by 1998, both states engaged in a border conflict, an incident which was regarded by the United States as affecting its interest in the region. In general, what can be seen in the Horn of Africa is that the United States is attempting to replace one set of shackles (anticommunism) with yet another (anti-Islamic fundamentalism) (Schraeder, 1996: 202). On the other hand, regional powers have continued their involvement in the politics of the Horn of Africa. Old actors in the region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, seem to be wanting more than the unrestricted use of the Nile and the protection of the Red Sea. As the most populous and richest states in the Middle East, Egypt and Saudi Arabia respectively seek to emerge as regional powers in order to influence not only the politics of the Middle East but also that of the Horn of Africa. For them, the retreat of the superpowers has created a conducive environment for their increased presence in the region. There are also new actors that seek to influence the politics of the region. Iran is one such actor and Libya another, though to a lesser extent. After the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis, Iran has strengthened its ties with the Sudan to the extent that many believe it has exported its Islamic fundamentalism to Sudan (Woodward, 1996: 205-206). Thus, one implication of the end of the Cold War was the increased external influence from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. Yet another development in the post-Cold War period is the process of democratization throughout the Third World, especially in the Horn of Africa. The United States becoming the sole power in the international arena, democratic principles and institutions were being propagated on the assumption that ...because democracies do not fight democracies regional conflicts would be anachronistic once all Third World countries were democracies (Brown and Schraub, 1992: 15). Rothstein (1992: 39) however questioned the necessity for the United States to support the transition to democracy as there exist weak democracies also referred to as travesties of the democratic ideals at worst, and uncertain imitations of the real thing, at best that may generate more conflict than cooperation. Others, like Harbeson (1995: 137-138) point out the fusion of two separate issues in the Horn of Africa pressured by western states for economic and political liberalization. These are the reformation of the state along democratic principles and the consensus of peoples to live within one political community. He further argued that [t]his most fundamental of all political issues the question of the contours and geography of political identity defines the contemporary political crisis of the Horn of Africa (ibid.). 630

Not few are those who believe that such external involvement and pressure needs to be limited by the concerted efforts of the states in the Horn of Africa through the offices of regional organizations. Regional organizations need to be established in order to increase cooperation among states also. But there is the doubt that [c]ommon problems do not inevitably lead to regional cooperation (Lyons, 1996: 94). Further, the interdependence of the Nile riparian states and the Red Sea littoral states creates mutual suspicion and motives to initiate interstate conflicts as well as an open avenue for external intervention in the region (Mesfin, 1999: 93). Regional organizations in the area will thus have to cultivate this interdependence and create conducive environment for cooperation. One such regional organization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), already exists since 1986. But its ability to solve conflicts within the region has so far proved unfruitful as demonstrated in its attempt to solve the Sudanese conflict in 1994 (Lyons, 1996: 95). In addition, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict in 1998 seemed to have been beyond the mandate and capacity of IGAD as the OAU directly engaged itself in the mediation process. It must also be kept in mind that the member states had their national interests at stake, so objectivity in the mediation would have been very difficult to attain. On the whole, there is much to be done regarding the use of regional organizations to counter external influences in the Horn of Africa.

2. Internal problems
It is difficult, especially nowadays, to make a clear distinction between external involvement and internal problems. This is true particularly for the Horn of Africa where most internal problems find their origin in external involvement. Most internal conflicts seem also to have spillover effects and the notion of internationalization of internal conflicts has become popular. But for the purpose of this paper, we will consider as internal all those geopolitical problems found within the Horn of Africa, regardless of whether they have their origins in external involvement or not. 2.1 Territoriality Territoriality is defined as [t]he need by an individual or group to establish and hold an area of land. [I]t is more an organization of space in order to make sense of it (Mayhew, 1997: 414-415). In general, territoriality is believed to have been at the core of interstate conflicts. Vasquez (1993: 124-125) explains that most of the interstate wars that are fought are between neighbors. This shows that territorial contiguity is a major factor in causing interstate conflicts. He further stated that territorial disputes are much more likely to lead to war than other issues and that neighboring states are prone to

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engage in territorial conflicts at some point in the history of their relations. The more borders a state has, the more likely it is to have territorial conflicts. In addition few other issues lead to war unless they have a link with territorial issues. For Vasquez, international politics is centered around territoriality rather than around realpolitik. [T]he very idea of power politics and its practices are derived from an inability to settle territorial questions. Power politics is not the key fact of existence, as the realist paradigm would have us believe, but may simply be an epiphenomenon of territoriality. Realism and the practices of power politics come out of a particular set of struggles and construct a world appropriate to those struggles. Once those struggles end, however, the ideas are less relevant and even counter-productive. The great mistake of realism has been to assume that a struggle for power is a constant verit of history, when in fact it is most characteristic only of (contention on) one kind of issue - territory. (Vasquez, 1993: 147-148) With this concept in mind, the state which has more neighbors within the Horn of Africa is Ethiopia. Mesfin (1999: 70) deduces from this that [a]ll other things remaining equal, all the other countries of the Horn have at least only half of both the advantages and the disadvantages that Ethiopia has. One of these disadvantages then would be the tendency of Ethiopia to encounter territorial conflicts as compared with the other states in the region. Vasquezs theory seems to work, when we note that Ethiopia experienced two interstate wars with its neighbors associated with territorial issues within two decades. The first one was with Somalia in 1977-78. The roots to this territorial conflict are associated to the colonial period when the Somali people found themselves divided into five states, as discussed earlier. The irredentist claims pursued by Somalia after independence led to this conflict (Bereket, 1980: 31). The second interstate conflict took place in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Here again, it was a territorial conflict (at least officially), which finds its roots, inter alia, in the colonial arrangements of the imperial era (Mesfin, 1999: 179). It seems that Ethiopia is equally a victim of imperialism as its colonized neighbors, even if it then succeeded in keeping the colonial powers out of its territory. While Ethiopia and Somalia were engaged in conflict, Djibouti could not have remained ignorant; the same was true for Kenya. Somali irredentist claims affected both countries in addition to Ethiopia. But Djibouti relied heavily on its patron, France, for its military security (Bereket, 1980: 25). Territoriality, compounded with external intervention, is then one of the major factors causing conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

2.2 Marginalization of pastoralists The Horn of Africa is home to the largest concentration of pastoralists in the world. The pastoral populations size in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya rank first, third, fifth, and sixth respectively while the proportion of this pastoralist population in relation to the total populations of the countries ranges from 6 per cent in Kenya to 60 per cent in Somalia. In addition, 52 per cent of the total territory of Ethiopia, 66 percent of that in Sudan, 72 per cent of that in Kenya, and 75 per cent of that in Somalia constitute dry lands suitable for pastoralism (Markakis, 1993: 1). These figures show that pastoralism in the Horn of Africa is a significant issue. The question arises, as to what factors associated with pastoralism cause conflict in the region. In Somalia, pastoralist communities in the past used to possess political power, but due to various reasons political power was taken away from them. In many other countries, this was due to the growth in population size which required more land for agriculture. But in the Somali case, this could not have been so as most of the land is not arable (Doornbos, 1993: 100). Pastoralists were the most affected by imperialism which, as mentioned earlier, imposed artificial boundaries and divided the peoples. In that way, boundaries were laid down where pastoralist communities lived in. But for pastoralists, boundaries were meaningless and this created conflict between them and the authorities (Harbeson, 1995: 131). It was relatively easy for pastoralists to evade external control over them; thus pastoralism was viewed as a nuisance by the authorities and as a potential resource to be tapped (Doornbos, 1993: 118). In the post-colonial era, the dry lands inhabited by the pastoralists were considered as security areas where the state was able to wage war with them (Odhiambo, 1991: 293). This was a time when pastoralists resisted the control of the state, probably even more than during the colonial era (Markakis, 1993: 13). It must be noted that pastoralists in the Horn of Africa had neither the intention of creating a state of their own nor of imposing themselves on states created by others (ibid.: 3). On another plane, recourse must be made again to geographical factors in the region. Desertification is becoming an endemic problem and deforestation further aggravates the situation. Erosion has also played its part in the process. While there are potentially fertile areas along the Nile, the Awash, and the Wabe Shebelle rivers, they remain highly underdeveloped (Harbeson, 1995: 131). The periodically recurrent drought and famine must not be forgotten, for it has contributed to the downfall of Haile Selassie in 1974, Gaafar el-Nimeiri in 1985, and Siad Barre in 1991 (Woodward, 1996: 3). In addition, rainfall is too unpredictable for total dependency. Pastoralists have therefore developed an adaptive mechanism to these climatic conditions by moving within vast territories. This would increase their 631

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probability of finding adequate grazing land and water (Markakis, 1994: 218). But this mobility, coupled with scarcity and the meager natural endowment, creates inevitable conflict between pastoralists and cultivators, as the latter have been witnessed to have increased their land holdings over the years. Conflict among pastoralists must also be pointed out as they enter into a competition for survival mainly due to the above-stated natural conditions (ibid.: 219-220). It is possible to say that pastoralists in the Horn of Africa have not been given all the attention they deserve and that this marginalization, coupled with geographical conditions and external influences during the colonial era, has contributed to the exacerbation of conflict in the region conflict against the state, against cultivators, and most of all, conflict among themselves. Over the last decade, there have been few measures in Ethiopia attempting to empower pastoralists, though with various degrees of success. One such example could be regarding the Afar living along the Awash river. The government handed-over to the Afar regional state, previously irrigated state farms of the Derg regime. Not few are the pastoralists in the Middle and Lower Awash valley, who now have started engaging directly or indirectly in agriculture. Having no farming experience, they use the assistance of highlanders in discovering the benefits of irrigated agriculture. Being the new landowners, they either take a share from what the highlanders have produced, or take the whole lot and pay salaries to the farmers, depending on their agreements. Some of the new generation Afars have even learnt how to farm and require no assistance. These Afar pastoralists have not totally abandoned cattle herding; they are enjoying the fruits of both pastoralism and agriculture. Compared to pastoralists in other areas, these ones, although very few in number, have better been able to withstand drought in the past decade. Assuming that access to resources, marginalization, and poverty are some of the causes of conflict in the area, finding solutions to these problems would definitely reduce the level of conflict. Therefore, such policy measures by governments can be fruitful, especially if persuasion is used instead of force in the implementation process. 2.3 Ethnic conflict Ethnic conflict is a form of social and political struggle in the modern world. [I]t might be argued that ethnic conflict as such does not exist. What does exist is social, political, economic conflict between groups who identify each other in ethnic terms: colour, race, religion, language, national origin (Stavenhagen, 1990: 76). It is considered by Mesfin (1999: 138) as the most barbaric and cruel of all conflicts. Ethnicity is usually related to territoriality hence ethnic conflict will necessarily be associated with territoriality. This occurs when a certain person identifies 632

himself with a community, which unfortunately may not be within the confines of the state (Coakley, 1993: 1-2). There is a contention as to whether such identification of the individual with his ethnic community is a hindrance to the process of nation building (as the need arises to transfer these loyalties from the ethnic group to the larger civil society) or harmonious with the process (as such ties can coexist with the nationstate) (Stavenhagen, 1990: 78). It is often true that internal conflicts are caused by two major factors. These are neglect and discrimination, also referred to as distributional and identity elements. Without distributional deprivation, identity remains a positive factor and not a motivation for conflict; without an identity element, distributional inequities remain unfocused and non mobilizing. (Zartman, 1995: 5) Therefore, it can be said that in order for a group of grieved people to mobilize support, it may be natural for them to organize themselves within ethnic lines. But Stavenhagen (1990: 80) argues that if economic grievances lie at the core of ethnic demands, why have not they been expressed in terms of class rather than along ethnic lines? What can be said is that different situations give rise to different mechanisms to solve them and that an increasing number of insurgents mobilized along ethnic lines have been observed of incorporating class elements in their demands. In general, among the major factors causing ethnic conflict as pointed out by Markakis (1994: 218-235) are: meager natural endowments and scarcity; the emergence of modern states; uneven development among regions and groups; cultural oppression; regional, ethnic, or clan movements; class conflict and ideology. Once having identified their grievances, the priority of ethnic groups usually consist of either one of the demands for: equality of citizenship, cultural rights, institutional political recognition, or secession. These issues have increasing territorial implications when one moves from the first to the last (Coakley, 1993: 6-7). Having raised such conceptual issues, the realities on the ground need to be assessed. The imperialist era had witnessed the division of various ethnic groups like the Somali, the Afar, the Beja, and the Boran as a result of the artificial colonial boundaries imposed by the colonizers (Markakis, 1994: 220-221). The Abyssinian expansionism also contributed to this factor (Bereket, 1980: 2). Furthermore, uneven development in the region was caused by the central role played by the state especially in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, in moving the economy. The state was the prime mover of the economy and access to the state was synonymous with access to resources (Markakis, 1994: 224-225). Uneven development in the Sudan, caused by the British rule, contributed to the current con-

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flict between the north and the south, in which the latter is opting for self-determination (Woodward, 1996: 60). In addition, regional movements are factors behind the prevalence of ethnic conflict in the region. The Eritrean liberation struggle was an example of a regional movement, which affected but also was affected by Sudanese politics (Harbeson, 1995: 129). This internationalization of internal conflicts was one increasingly prominent issue in the Horn of Africa. There was also the issue of ethnic minorities. Kenya is a perfect example where a single ethnic group did not amount to more than 20 per cent of its population, which meant that all ethnic groups were minorities. Kenyans in general have strong feelings of ethnic identity and, coupled with the minority element, it constitutes a political system in which ethnic competition or deprivation were salient features (Mawhood and Wallis, 1993: 173-174). On the whole, all these issues contribute to the exacerbation of ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa. It has been observed that ethnic conflicts are associated with the notion of territoriality. In order to resolve these ethnic conflicts there is a need to de-territorialize ethnic issues a concept employed by Vasquez (1993: 150-151) to mean the separation of an issue from its territorial base. He further explains, [t]o de-territorialize an issue is to see that the needs and values giving rise to the issue can be satisfied without it being necessary to have exclusive control over a given piece of territory. In the contemporary period, nationalist aspirations (in terms of identity issues) and ideological preferences are treated as zero-sum and territorialized. Nationalism preaches that each people is a nation and to protect its cultural identity and autonomy it must have its own territory with its own state. It is not clear, however, that identity is zero-sum or that its only protection is to divide the world into national territorial units. What is clear is that such efforts increase the probability of war and attempts to de-territorialize identity issues would make them easier to resolve. (ibid.) This new approach to resolve ethnic questions involves the active participation of educational institutions, the media, and the government in bringing a change of thinking with regards to ethnic issues. Conventionally, ethnic conflicts are linked with territoriality; with this approach to solve the conflicts however, one needs to disassociate ethnic issues with a territory and the resources found within. Only then there can be a realistic solution to the problem. This new approach to resolving ethnic questions has not been tested so far. It therefore remains to be seen to what extent ethnic conflicts will be resolved or minimized.

Conclusion
For most of its existence, the politics of the Horn of Africa has been influenced by many factors. To what extents each of these have put the stability and development of the region in distress has been discussed. No factor has been as influential as the geographical location of the region vis--vis the major petroleum producing states, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as important routes for transporting petroleum. The regions proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict area needs also to be pointed out. This strategic location has called for the involvement of various states. During the Imperial, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods, external intervention in the region had been and remains to be quite important in contributing towards conflict. Current conflicts in the Horn of Africa still find their roots in the Imperial period. The Cold War period further called for superpower intervention over the internal affairs of the member states. The superpowers were more interested in retaining their clients instead of finding a lasting solution to the problems of the region especially since they were part of the problem. The post-Cold War era also witnessed still some intervention by the United States which replaced one set of shackles (anticommunism) by yet another (anti-Islamic fundamentalism) (Schraeder, 1996: 202). In addition, external intervention has always included regional powers mainly from Arab neighbors who primarily want to maximize their utilization of natural resources. Most of these interventions have proved to be harmful to the region and are related in one way or another to the major causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa. The need for using the offices of regional organizations in order to minimize external influence and to cooperate over the sharing of natural resources has become quite clear. Member states in the Horn of Africa have to recommit themselves for solving regional problems locally by keeping undesirable external intervention at bay. With regards to the internal problems of the region, territoriality is one factor that exacerbates conflict. Among the theoretical justifications for backing this proposition, one is the principle that territorial contiguity is a source of interstate conflict. The more borders a state has, the more likely it is to engage in interstate conflicts. Similarly, it has been established that few other issues lead to war unless they have a link with territorial issues. This proved to be the case during the Ethio-Somali conflict of 1977-78 and the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998. The marginalization of pastoralists is also considered as further fueling the internal conflict. The pastoralist population is nowhere as concentrated as it is in the Horn of Africa. This community had its political power taken away from it by the State, over time. The State wanted to reduce its movements and exploit it, cultivators were 633

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pressured to take over its land, and the regions meager natural endowment created a competition for survival, in which pastoralists among themselves entered into conflict. The governments of the member states should pay enough attention to the needs and demands of pastoralists. Instead of abandoning them, it would be for the best interest of all concerned to empower them by providing them access to resources. The more access to resources they have, the less will they engage in conflict. In implementing their policies, governments need to persuade them, especially the new generation, through sensitization and education rather than through the use or threat of force. To finish with, there is an important relationship between ethnic conflict and territoriality in the Horn of Africa. For an ethnic conflict to emerge, usually grievances of the concerned group come from distributional inequities as well as ethnic elements. In addition, the major factors causing ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa are, inter alia, the scarcity of resources, the uneven development among various regions and groups, and cultural oppression. In general, territoriality has been seen as the core of ethnic conflict. In order to minimize or resolve ethnic conflict, there is a necessity to de-territorialize ethnic issues. By separating an issue in our case ethnic conflict from its territorial base, it is believed that ethnic conflicts would be minimized, if not resolved.

Legum, Colin and Bill Lee, 1977: Conflict in the Horn of Africa. London: Rex Collings Ltd. Lyons, Terrence, 1996: The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea. Africa in the New International Order Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, (edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild) Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Markakis, John, 1993: Introduction. Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa, (edited by John Markakis) London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Markakis, John, 1993: Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa. Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, (edited by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis) Athens: Ohio University Press Mawhood, Philip and Malcolm Wallis; 1993: Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Africa: Kenya and Tanzania. The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, (edited by John Coakley) London: Frank Cass Mayhew, Susan, 1997: A Dictionary of Geography. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 1999: The Horn of Africa Conflict and Poverty. Addis Ababa: Commercial Printing Press New African, 1998: No. 365 (July-August). London: IC Publication Odhiambo, Atieno, 1991: The Economics of Conflict among Marginalized Peoples of Eastern Africa. Conflict Resolution in Africa, (edited by Francis M. Deng and William Zartman) Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Rothstein, Robert L., 1991: Weak Democracy and the Prospect for Peace and Prosperity in the Third World. Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges of a New Era, (edited by Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub) Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press Schraeder, Peter J.; 1996: Removing the Shackles? US Foreign Policy Toward Africa After the End of the Cold War. Africa in the New International Order Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, (edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild) Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, 1990: The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights. Tokyo: United Nations University Vasquez, John A., 1991: The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Woodward, Peter, 1996: The Horn of Africa: State politics and international relations. London: I.B. Taurus Publishers Zartman, I. William, 1995: Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts. Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, (edited by I. William Zartman) Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution

References:
Bereket Habte Selassie, 1980: Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa. London: Monthly Review Press Brown, Sheryl J. and Kimber M. Schraub, 1992: Fundamental Sources of Third World Conflict. Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era, (edited by Sheryl J. Brown and Kimber M. Schraub) Washington D.C.: United States Institutes of Peace Press Coakley, John, 1992: Introduction: The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict. The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, (edited by John Coakley) London: Frank Cass Doornbos, Martin, 1993: Pasture and Polis: The Roots of Political Marginalization of Somalia Pastoralism. Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa, (edited by John Markakis) London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Harbeson, John W., 1995: Post-Cold War Politics in the Horn of Africa: The Quest for Political Identity Intensified. Africa in World Politics Post-Cold War Challenges, (edited by John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild) Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A., 1996: Moscows Cold War and Post-Cold War Policies in Africa. Africa in the New International Order Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, (edited by Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild) Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Alexander Attilio Vadala, Addis Abbeba University, Ethiopia. Kontakt:alexatti@psir.aau.edu.et

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