If I were an offshore worker today, I would have three main concerns regarding my helicopter transport.

Firstly, I would have to question the safety of helicopters in general and of the EC225 in particular. Secondly, I would be thinking about sea states in the very unlikely event of being involved in a controlled ditching, like the two last year. And finally, my ongoing concerns over the use of the DACON Scoop as a primary method of rescue havent been answered at all. Lets have a look at the first issue helicopter (and EC225) safety and lets take it as a given that we dont want to see any helicopter in the sea. As a helicopter pilot who was, until last October, flying the EC225, Im obviously slightly biased! I have been flying helicopters for over thirty years, twenty three of which have been on the North Sea. I have flown both the AS332L and the EC225 variants of the Super Puma family as well as the MBB Bo 105, when I was based offshore on the Ninian North platform. So lets have a look at safety in general. The statistics show that you are more likely to be killed on the roads or offshore than in a helicopter. The numbers of fatalities in offshore helicopter accidents is considerably lower than the number of those sadly killed in offshore incidents. Add in the number of injuries sustained while offshore and Im sure you will agree that the short helicopter flight you take every two weeks is actually much safer. However, it is a perception problem when you are sitting in the back of a helicopter, you have absolutely no control. Driving your car or doing your job on the installation, you do have control, or at least more control and thats really the issue isnt it? What you are probably not aware of is the safety regime the helicopters operators have in place. It isnt just the excellent standard of engineering that each company has built up over the years and the aircraft engineers working on your helicopters are the best in the business. The other ground personnel are just as important the refuellers, the handlers, the safety teams, the metrological officers, even the air traffic controllers. They are all trained to the highest levels and they really do have safety as their number one priority. Then there is the training regime of the pilots themselves. Pilots, both rotary and fixed wing, are in the most tested profession there is. Apart from the obvious annual or six-monthly medical checks we have to have, we are checked every six months in the operation of our aircraft. Typically, we will spend three days doing our Operator Proficiency Check (OPC), when we will have one day in the classroom covering the helicopter systems, followed by two days in the simulator usually four two-hour sessions. In the simulator, we will be tested on our aircraft handling, emergencies, instrument flying and crew cooperation. Add in training days covering dangerous goods, first aid, fire fighting, CRM (crew resource management), HUET (helicopter underwater escape trainer), life raft drills, ESC (emergency and safety equipment check), security! And we have to be in date on every one of these aspects failure of any will mean being grounded until we have achieved the required standard. So although you will have no control when you are flying offshore, you are in extremely capable hands. Just one further thought for you just remember that your pilots want to go home after each days work and they take their own safety very seriously! So, back to the issue of the EC225. I know it has its problems at the moment, but I am sure that Eurocopter will solve the issue in the near future, and that it will be back in the air soon. The very fact that the type has been flying since November 2000 (first UK aircraft in July 2004 with Bristow) with no history of any problems with the shaft in the main gearbox, shows that the design is actually very sound. The basis for the Super Puma family was the Sud Aviation SA330, which first flew in April 1965 and was introduced into service with both the French Army and the Royal Air Force, where it is still in service - the original design was so good! I, for one, will have no qualms flying the EC225 again, once the current problem has been solved its that good a machine. One further thing to note is that the EC225 has the most sophisticated autopilot fitted on any helicopter, which has increased general flight safety to a new, much higher level. It is very much a pilots machine and I dont know any EC225 pilot who would disagree.

The industry was extremely fortunate that the two incidents last year occurred when the sea states were very benign. Had the sea state in either incident been higher, then the results could, indeed, perhaps would, have been somewhat different. Both the EC225 and the S92 are fitted with floatation equipment, which have been demonstrated to sea state 6 (SS6). What does that actually mean? During the testing of the airframe/floatation combination, a scale model is tested in a wave tank with mechanically generated waves, to simulate actual ditching conditions and the stability of the helicopter is observed. Unfortunately, this testing is flawed. The Safety Regulation Group (SRG) of the UK CAA (Civil Aviation Authority) published a paper in December 2005 entitled Summary Report on Helicopter Ditching and Crashworthiness Research, (CAA Paper 2005/06). In this report, the SRG used a number of other reports from 1984 to 2003, which had been commissioned by the CAA. The main conclusions of the 2005 report were that: the testing done so far was inadequate as the waves tanks produced regular rather than irregular waves; float scoops fitted to emergency floats would enhance stability at minimal costs; additional high-level flotation devices to prevent total inversion should be fitted; the upper practical capsize limit for helicopters lies in the region of SS5 or SS6, but there is a significant risk of ditching in seas greater than SS6 in some areas of the operation (e.g. the northern North Sea); sea conditions should be defined in terms of a significant wave height, zero crossing wave period and wave spectrum shape; sea state steepness should be more rigorously defined. During the testing of the scale model in the wave tank, only regular waves of an equivalent height of 4m is used. The figures are then extrapolated to give the 6m demonstrated capability of the floatation system. Unfortunately, Mother Nature doesnt do regular waves very often in the North Sea we mainly get irregular waves, which are waves that break. It is these breaking waves that cause helicopters to capsize. And as pilots, we only have access to very limited wave data offshore installations regularly only give a significant wave height. Some are much better, giving maximum wave heights as well. However, some will give nothing until asked for directly usually when the sea states may curtail flying! It is then up to the pilots to decide if the sea conditions are acceptable, bearing in mind the demonstrated floatation capability. To my mind, no commercial offshore flights should be carried out if the actual sea conditions exceed the capabilities of the aircraft floatation equipment. So as the only real information available is the significant wave height, and 6m basically relates to SS6, then flight operations should cease at 6m waves heights. And that is being optimistic as the demonstrated limits of both the EC225 and the S92 floatation systems are actually little more than educated guesswork. What we really need is for the CAA to re-commission the work that has already been done, but with the most up to date information now available. Lets look at the worst case, where the helicopter has ditched in very poor conditions and the crew and passengers have been unable to launch the life rafts. On the plus side, the aircraft is very close to a platform and the standby vessel is heading towards the survivors bobbing around in the cold North Sea. The height of the waves means that the fast rescue craft (FRC) can be launched, so the chances of picking up all the survivors within the two hours laid down in the regulations is looking good. But what if the waves preclude the use of the FRCs? Under these conditions, the vessel master would have to use the DACON Scoop. Im sure most offshore workers are now aware of the scoop and have seen video of it in operation. Lets face it; the scoop is a recovery device, not a rescue device. The idea of an injured survivor, suffering from hypothermia, with little or no feeling in his/her hands trying to avoid being caught in the mesh of the scoop horrifies me. I know some people will say that the chances of this scenario happening are highly improbable, 10 or so. But thats not the point is it? Virtually all accidents occur when all the holes in the Swiss cheese line up. By operating when only the scoop is available, we have already lined up one of those holes. So when assessing the weather data, pilots should not accept the scoop as the only method of

rescue/recovery. The primary method of rescue will always be a dedicated search and rescue (SAR) helicopter, but as there is only one based offshore on the Miller platform and the onshore based helicopters would potentially take far too long to reach most incidents, the next best method is the standby vessel and its FRCs. In conclusion, the problems with the EC225 will be solved in due course, thus permitting an excellent machine to get back to work. Of the six findings of the CAA 2005 report listed above, five of them have not been acted upon: testing hasnt been done using irregular waves; float scoops havent been added; high-level floats havent been fitted; sea conditions are still not being defined as the report advised; wave steepness hasnt been addressed at all. The DACON scoop should not be considered when flight planning is carried out. Everyone involved in offshore oil and gas operations has the responsibility to make all aspects of the industry as safe as possible ALARP does have some standing, but I believe it should only have a limited part in aviation. Advances in technology, training and awareness have pushed us towards that goal, but we must not take our collective feet of the pedal and relax. We must use all the latest data now available to better our understanding of waves, their steepness and how these affect a ditched helicopter. It is time for the workforce to insist that the findings and recommendations made by the CAA in the 2005 report are introduced, without delay.