)

New World Order: Kauffman

Emergence of Order
in

and Lonergan on the an Evolutionary Universe

Grant Miller Francisco
Department of Theology Boston College

Stuart Kauffman argues that Darwinian natural selection cannot account for the spontane-

ous order of self-organized systems. This paper

that life
is

lo(>Ls in detail at

two of Kauffman

s claims: (I

an emergent property of autocatalytic sets of chemicals; and (2) that the ontogenetic development of living organisms is an emergent property of complex networks of genes. The
author suggests that there are parallels between Kauffman's ideas about
"

emergent properties"

and Bernard Lonergan 's notion of "emergent probability." He then briefly explores the different ways in which their work on the emergence of order in the universe raises religious cpiestions.

What might
While
little

and a theoretical biologist have

at first

Roman Cathohc theologian in common?

glance there would seem to be

of substantive interest connecting the

that had been dominant within Roman Catholic circles. Yet Lonergan had already become aware of the untenability of this paradigm

paradigm for theological studies

work of Bernard Lonergan and Stuart

Kauffman,
affinities
I

several decades before Vatican

II.

He located

want

to argue that there are strong

their projects.

the root of the difficulty in the inability of

between

Exploring
in

neoscholastic theology to deal with the meth-

these affinities will

mean looking
From
the

some

ods of both the natural sciences and the

cal historical sciences,

criti-

detail at their understanding of the sources of

and he made

his life's

order in the universe.

the origin of
life to

problem of

the moiphogenesis of de-

veloping organisms, Kauffman finds this order emerging in ways that challenge the gradu-

work the search for a theological methodology that could integrate these methods. While Method in Theology (1972) remains
Lt)nergan's mature articulation of such a
theological methodology,
it

alism of Darwinian natural selection.

Lonergan's work on the worldview of modern empirical science, which he terms "emer-

is in

large

mea-

sure dependent on the foundation laid in his

earlier

work. Insight:
{

A Study of Human
to

gent probability," converges in surprising

Understanding

1957).

ways with Kauffman's work. To understand this convergence, one must first examine these
thinkers in the context of their respective enterprises.

Lonergan intended Insight

for a study of the

be "an ex'

ploration of methods generally in preparation

method of theology."

Bernard Lonergan
suit

904- 1 984) was a Je-

philosopher and theologian whose pro-

Lonergan "s fundamental strategy in this earnot just lier work is to understand method theological method, but all determinate meth-

fessional career
in

was spent teaching theology

Since the

ods, whether theological, historical, or scientific

Roman

Catholic universities.

as rooted in a set of invariant structures

Second Vatican Council, there has been a widespread collapse of the neoscholastic

operative within the

human

subject. Thus, as

part of his overall

argument

in Insight,

The Boston Theological Institute

179

Lonergan includes on the one hand an analysis of the operations which the scientist performs as a
scientist

What

is

the
that

new paradigm

or research

progrannne

in

other words, an ac-

count of scientific knowing

and on
for this
I

leitmotif that

Kauffman proposes? The runs through his work is the

the other

notion of spontaneous order in nature

"oris

hand

an explicit articulation of the

worldview worldview
to

der for free" as he puts

it

repeatedly.^

He

implied by this same account of scientific

convinced

that

Darwinian natural selection

in

knowing. Lonergan 's tenn

is

and of

itself

cannot account for the order ob-

"emergent probability." As

hope

show,

served in the universe.

lowing:

He proposes
organisms

the fol-

aspects of Lonergan's notion of emergent

probability

in particular his

understanding

[M]uch of

the order in

may

of "schemes of recurrence," development, and

finality

work of Kauffman.
Stuart
tigious
is

provide

a point of contact with the

not be the result of selection at all, but of the spontaneous order of self-

organized systems.''
is

Kauffman

a recipient of the pres(

He

argues that
is

much

of the order within

Mac Arthur Fellowship

Fe

1987-92), and
in

the universe

not the accidental

outcome of

one of the founding members

1984 of

chance processes, but emerges spontaneously,

naturally, in

the Santa

Institute, a scientific research

ways

that are only

beginning to

center devoted to the interdisciplinary study

be understood. According to Kauffman, Dar-

of the dynamics of complex phenomena. Here

I

winian natural selection

is

not wrong, but

it

is

will focus

on

his

work

as he presents

it

in

insufficient for understanding these sources

his book.

At

Home

in the

Universe:

The

of spontaneous self-organization. Yet a revision of the Darwinian worldview needs a con-

Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (1995), a somewhat popularized

version of his earlier book. The Origins of

ceptual
lection

framework

that

can embrace both sein

and self-organization,

which

bio-

Order (1993). Kauffman

logical evolution can be understood as both a

is

a theoretical, rather than an

"deeply historical process" and yet "lawlike

at

experimental, biologist.

A tremendously cremost of
his time

the

same

time."*'

So Kauffman sees

his

ative thinker, he spends

project as a search for such a conceptual

speculating on large-scale questions about

framework.
tify

He proceeds by

trying to iden-

such things as the origins of life, the structure

of living organisms, and the behavior of complex systems from cells to global economies.

"generic emergent properties" in which

the

erties not

As with many of

the scientists

engaged

in

whole of a complex system exhibits proppossessed by any of its parts.^ Kauffman proposes to explore these "geFirst,

study of the problems of complex dynamical

systems, he exploits the power of the computer and the mathematical models and explorations that
it

neric emergent properties" using three differ-

ent examples.

he takes up "the origin

of

life

as a collective emergent property of

makes
be "in

possible; his "experisilico'' rather

ments" tend
vitro.

to

than

///

complex systems of chemicals." Secondly, he investigates "the development of the fertilized

He

is

primarily concerned, then, with

asking questions, pursuing promising lines of

inquiry,
talizing

erty of
ling

egg into the adult as an emergent propcomplex networks of genes controlactivities." Finally,

and hazarding provocative and tananswers

to the questions that

one another's

he ex-

he

raises.

The work of experimental verification he leaves for others. As such, he fills one important role within the ecology of scientific
research.

plores the emergent properties of "the behavior of coevolving species in ecosystems that

generates small and large avalanches of extinction

and

speciation."**

The

origin of

life,

He

is

engaged

in

what philosophers
of a parascientific re-

the ontogeny of the organism, and the coevolution of linked populations: each exhibits

of science would

call the ailiculation

digm- or the fonnulation of a

search programme.^

emergent properties

that

Kauffman believes

180

The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange 2000

^

may
tion.

point us toward laws of self-organiza-

Autocatalytic sets as

schemes

of
as-

recurrence As I alluded
ability is that

life. He argues that life emerged complex and whole, and has remained so ever since. The linchpin for his argument is the idea that life emerges as a consequence of

origin of

to above,

one of the key

the catalytic closure characteristic of autocatalytic sets.

pects in Lonergan's notion of emergent prob-

The

basic idea of an autocataall,

of a "scheme of recurrence."
this has to

lytic set is fairly

easy to grasp. First of

What relevance

Kauffman's

"autocatalytic" simply

means self-catalyzing.

project will perhaps

become

clear in turning

Molecules are created through chemical reactions. These chemical

reactions are capable of being catalyzed, or sped up, by

want to

shift attention to the similar-

ity

between Kauffman^s notion of collectively autocatalytic sets and what

calls

other molecules.

If the set

Lonergan

schemes of recurrence.
up:
his

molecules formed through such catalyzed chemical reactions are

of
themselves capable of catalyzing the very set of reac-

to the first issue that

Kauffman takes
life

tions that

formed them, then the collection

set.

understanding of the origin of

tive

as a collec-

of such self-catalyzing molecular chemical

reactions can be temied an autocatalytic

emergent property of complex systems of

chemicals.

The
calls

central idea here

is

what
"^

Kauffman

writes:

Kauffman

an "autocatalytic

set."

He
that

introduces the idea of an autocatalytic set as a

At its heart, a living organism is a system of chemicals that has the

capacity to catalyze its own reproduction. Catalysts such as enzymes speed

way
life

of answering(he question of how

it

is

emerges from
to

non-life.

But

first

he pre-

sents a thumbnail sketch'" of the history of at-

up chemical reactions that might otherwise occur, but only extremely

slowly.

tempts

explain the emergence of

life:

What

call a collectively

Alexander

Oparin's

discovery

that

coascervates could provide high concentrations

is one in which the molecules speed up the very reactions by which they themselves are fomicd:

autocatalytic system

of simple organic molecules; Stanley Miller's

A makes
again."

B;

B makes

C;

C makes A

demonstration that

many

of the fundamental

building blocks of proteins could be synthesized abiogenically; Crick and Watson's dis-

Cells, for instance, are autocatalytic sets, be-

covery of the double-helix structure of

DNA,

cause
except for "food molecules," every molecular species of which a cell is constructed is created by catalysis of
reactions, and the catalysis
cell.'^
is itself

and the subsequent discovery of the complex

machinery of protein enzymes which mediates

the

work of DNA;
in

finally, the idea that life

could have begun

much

the

same way

that

carried out by catalysts created by the

nude

RNA functions, without DNA or its meThe gen-

diating structure of protein enzymes.

eral picture painted

The

cell,

however,

is

an enormously complex
It

by these

efforts is in ac-

network of chemical reactions among roughly

100,000 different kinds of molecules.
thus

cord with the assumptions of Darwinian gradualism:

a slow accumulation of chance occur-

seems unlikely
spontaneously.

that

such a vast network of

rences that eventually results in living organisms. In other words, life emerged simple and became complex. Kauffman has a radically different vision from these previous attempts to explain the

autocatalytic chemical reactions could

emerge

What Kauffman

labors to

demonstrate
lytic set

is

the possibility that an autocata-

could emerge spontaneously given

sufficiently high

numbers of chemicals

in suf-

The Boston Theological Institute

181

ficiently high concentrations.

His argument

depends on precisely establishing the conditions for the

emergence of such autocatalytic

fulfilled.

.A will recur. Such a circular arrangement may involve any number of temis, the possibility of alternative routes, and in general any degree of
.

molecular systems, and then asking whether

such conditions can indeed be
Furthermore, Kauffman has to show that

complexity.'^

As Kenneth Melchin
The

suggests.

such systems (which so far lack

ducing
entities are

DNA)

are

basic insight at the center of

capable of reproduction, and that such reprocapable of Darwinian evolution through natural selection.

Lonergan's notion of the recurrence scheme is that of retlexivity.'^

These argu-

Kauffman's description of autocatalytic

sets

ments take up the bulk of chapters two tlirough

four. In the end,

and Lonergan's notion of schemes of recurrence are clearly congruent with one another.

Kauffman

thinks he has

made

a good case for the plausibility of such a theoretical

But while

this reflexivity
is

provides a point

model of the

origins of

life.

As I menscientific

of comparison, there

also a point of differ-

tioned above, the further

work of

ence. Kauffman's autocatalytic set stands as

a particular instance of Lonergan's
eral notion.

experimentation and verification remains to

more gen-

be done. Autocatalytic sets

may

or

may

not
ori-

Lonergan suggests several ex-

be the final solution to the mystery of the

amples of schemes of recurrence:

In illustration of

gin of living systems from nonliving collections of chemicals, but they are certainly an

schemes of recurrence

the reader

may

think of the planetary

intriguing possibility.

The point

want

to

make does
I

not have to do with the likelihood

is right.

of whether or not Kauffman

Instead,

want

to shift attention to the similarity be-

system, of the circulation of water over the surface of the earth, of the nitrogen cycle familiar to biologists, of the routines of animal life, of the repetitive economic rhythms of production and exchange.'^

tween Kauffman's notion of collectively au-

what Lonergan calls schemes of recurrence.

tocatalytic sets and

scheme of recurrence

is

thus a highly gen-

eralized or generic notion, capable of the widest application.

The

heart of this comparison

is

the notion

of reflexivity. Autocatalytic sets are reflexive because they are able to catalyze the very

This difference between particular instance and generalized notion

is

rooted in the

reactions that produce the catalysts in the

place:

first

difference

between

Kauffman's

and

"A makes

B;

B makes C; C makes

Lonergan's respective projects.

In order to

again." But this reflexivity underlies

Lonergan's notion of a scheme of recurrence
as well.

deepen

my
I

Lonergan,

comparison of Kauffman and would like to try and sketch the

Lonergan's notion of a scheme of

is

broader context for both autocatalytic sets and

recurrence
are
( 1 )

that of a series of events

which

schemes of recurrence. The two notions are

answers to two different kinds of questions.

conditioned, and for which (2) the con-

ditions link up to form a closed circuit.

Lonergan

writes:
the

way
scheme of recurrence

Kauffman is asking the question: what is the in which life emerged from non-life? He
to this question.

The notion of

introduces autocatalytic sets as a plausible

arose when it was noted that the diverging series of positive conditions for an event might coil around in a circle. In that case, a scries of events A, B, C,... would be so related that the fulfillment of the conditions lor each would be the occurrence of the others. Schematically, then, the scheme might be represented by the series of conditionals: If A occurs, B will occur: if B occurs, C will occur: if C occurs.

answer
(even
tific

In short, he

is

seek-

ing determinate
if

knowledge about

the world

he presupposes a division of scien-

labor by leaving the process of verifica-

tion to others).

Lonergan, on the other hand,

different question.

is

asking a

He wants

to understand

both the scientist's knowing, as well as the

structure of the scientifically

known.

182

The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange 2000

y


Lonergan's question thus has two sides to
{ 1 )

it:

expressed as physical laws. This

his

is

the sort

do when he or she knows something scientifically? and (2) what

what does
a scientist
is is

of heuristic structure employed by Galileo in

law of falling bodies (d =

in his

I/2 Gt-) or

by

the general structure of the world, not as

it

Maxwell
hand,
terms:

laws of electromagnetism. The

investigators,

scientific investigation, but as

ristically

known through any detemiinate results of it is known heuthrough the structures of scientific

work of statistical

on the other

may

be understood in the following

knowing? What does this mean? Lonergan's analysis of scientific knowing focuses on the cognitional
activities

of the scientific knower.

that scientific inquiry
is

What he disknow," the

provide a account of nonsystematic processes by searching for the probabilities with which events occur, while
[Sjtatisticai invesligalions

scientific

covers

is

rooted in what
to

abstracting from the

random

differences

from those

probabilities.'^

he calls "the unrestricted desire

human
are

capacity to wonder, to ask questions

about anything and everything. But questions

Lonergan has in mind here 19th-century developments in thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of gases,

one thing; answers are another.

Modern

and 20th-century detheory.

empirical science has developed powerful meth-

velopments

in

quantum

These two

ods

Lonergan

calls

them heuristic

stnictures

types of investigation and their resultant intelligibilities are

for guiding this process of asking

and answer-

complementary:
tell

ing questions. Heuristic structures are

ways of

[C]lassical laws
if

what would happen

the unknown to the known. Just as in algebra, one names the unknown "x" in order to name its properties, to combine those

moving from

conditions were fulfilled; statistical laws tell how often conditions are
fulfilled.'^

properties in equations, and finally to solve the

Lonergan's notion of a scheme of recurrence

enters in here as a
y

way

of linking classical
statistical intelli-

and

gibility into a unified

Lonergan^s analysis of scientific knowing focuses on the cognitional activities of the

scientific

whole. The key points

are as follows:
( 1

knower. What he discovers

is

events occur;

is

(2) these events

that scientific inquiry

rooted in what he

have probabilities of
occurring;
(3)

calls ^Hhe unrestricted desire to know,*^ the

some events

human

capacity to wonder.
mod-

are

systematically

linked to others by
classical laws;

equations for a specific values of "x", so

(4) in certain cases events

with their re-

ern empirical science has developed heuristic

structures for

spective probabilities can be linked in cycles,

naming the unknown. Lonergan focuses on two of these

which he terms
statistical heuristic structures.

or schemes of recurrence, by virtue of their

struc-

systematic, classical connections;

(5) these
.selves

tures in particular,

classical
clas-

schemes of recurrence themand schemes of recurrence

and

Both

have probabilities of occurring;

sical

and

statistical investigations

seek to un-

(6) both events

derstand the "immanent intelligibility" of the

universe, but they do so in different ways.
Classical investigations seek insight into sys-

have conditions; and

(7)

some schemes of recurrence function

statistical intel-

as the conditions for other schemes.

tematic processes tlirough "the correlation of

This linkage of classical and

ligibility

measurements by means of mathematical functions." "' These insights are generally

through the notion of schemes of re-

currence results in the powerful explanatory

The Boston Theological Institute

183


structure

which Lonergan temis "emergent

difficulty here lies in the fact that the

probabiUty":

complex whole may

that are not readily

exhibit properties

explained by

h results from the combination of the conditioned series of schemes with their respective probabilities of emergence and survival. While by itself it is extremely
jejune,
it

possesses rather remarkable

understanding the parts. The complex whole, in a completely nonmystical sense, can often exhibit collective properties, 'emergent" features that are lawful in their own right.-"

potentialities

of explanation.'"
is

Darwinian natural selection

is

a reduction-

For Lonergan, the universe

tally characterized

fundamenthe

istic

attempt to account for biological order.

it is,

by emergent probability.

In

Kauffman's estimation,

therefore, ulto be

The universe unfolds through

interlinking of physical,

myriad

tiinately insufficient

and needs

comple-

chemical, biological and

psychic schemes of recurrence. Furthermore,

Jiist as

emergent probability

is

no

less operative in hu-

man

history than

it

is

in

the natural world, hi es-

sence,

much

Kauffman*s notion of an autocatalytic set invites comparison with Lonergan^s notion of a scheme of recurrence, so Kauffman^s use of emergence invites comparison with emergent probability.
emeris

of the

lat-

ter half
sists

of Insight conat-

of Lonergan 's

teinpts to explore the significance of

gent probability for

the huiuan good.
clearly a

human

history, including

Emergent probability
for

mented by an account of the whole in biological systems. For Kauffman, the order of self-organized systems is an emergent order.
Life "emerges" as a property of catalytic closure in chemical sets.
point out below,
Similarly, as
I

key idea

Lonergan. What

want

to suggest here is that just as

Kauffman's no-

shall

tion of an autocatalytic set invites compari-

ontogenyor more precisely,

and morphogenesis
is at

son with Lonergan 's notion of a scheme of

recurrence, so Kauffman's use of emergence
invites
ity.

cell differentiation

emerges as a property of genomic networks.

This idea of emergent properties
the very
heart of Kauffman's notions of "order for free"

comparison with emergent probabilI

As

pointed out above, Kauffman belife,

lieves that the origin of

the ontogeny of

and laws of self-organization.

the organism, and the coevolution of linked

Lonergan shares with Kauffman

this fun-

populations

all

exhibit einergent propeilies.

damental intuition about the inadequacy of reductionism and the importance of emergence.
In his introduction to Insight, he says that part

Reductionism, holism, and emergent probability

A recurring theme
to the relationship

in

Kauffman's book

of the relevance of his treatment of mathematical physics in the

is

the notion of emergence, a

theme

that refers

opening chapters
to relativity

is

to high-

between the

parts

and the
is

light "the significance of the transition

from
In

whole.

One

of his central intuitions

is

the old

that

mechanism

and from the

reductionism
world:

not ultimately an adequate

old determinism to statistical laws."-'

strategy for understanding the biological

Lonergan's view, scientific developments

themselves have made a
strict

mechanism
all

or

determinism untenable.
reductionist

Still,

not

branches

The

program has been

left

of .scientific investigation or all scientists have

a

spectacularly successful, and will continue to be so. But it has often

made

this realization explicit,

so part of the

vacuum:

How

do we use

the informa-

function of his idea of metaphysics as "the

integral heuristic structure of proportionate

tion gleaned about the parts to build

up

a theory of the

whole? The deep

being"

--

is

to enable a systematic

exposure

184

The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000

of the limitations of mechanist and determinist

Emergence
to provide

is

a central notion in Insight as

assumptions and to effect their reversal.

probability, then,
is

well; but unlike Kauffnian.

Lonergan
it

is

able

Emergent

way

of talk-

an explanatt)ry account of emeris

ing about the worldview presupposed by scientific investigation, but a

gence, by means of which

possible to

way

that avoids

work out

its

implications for understanding

mechanist or determinist assumptions.

the universe.

One of

the implications of

Emergent probability gives Lonergan a way of talking about emergence that is precise yet highly generalized.
istic

emergence, for both Kauffman and

Lonergan,
is

that the universe

it

is

a develop-

As

is

character-

ing universe, and so

is

to

Kauffman's exI

of Lonergan's
its

way

of proceeding, emer-

ploration of the developing organism that

will turn next.

gence takes

fundamental meaning from

cognitional theory. Here Lonergan talks about

the integration of elements of an

image

Ontogeny and development

The second
ties is the issue

through an insight:

topic

Kauffman takes up

in

his investigation of generic

is

emergent proper-

The prototype of emergence

the

of ontogeny, "the development

insight that arises with respect to an

appropriate image: without the insight, the image is a coincidental manifold; by the insight the elements of the image

of the fertilized egg into the adult as an emergent property of complex networks of genes
controlling one another's activities." Ontogeny, or development, has
differentiation

become

intelligibly united

and

related;

moreover, accumulations of insights unify and relate ever greater and more diversified ranges of images, and what remains merely coincidental from a lower viewpoint becomes systematic from the accumulation of insights in a higher view point.-'

two

aspects:

cell
cell

and morphogenesis. In the

differentiation that takes place in a

human

person, for instance, the descendants of a

single zygote cell develop into
cell types,

256

different

each of which

is

specialized for a

While Lonergan here uses

an insight or
set

the

example of

certain type of function within the body.

of insights that systematize the

Somewhere on

the order of

10''*

cells are

otherwise merely coincidental image or ranges

of images, such a notion of emergence can be

generalized to include any
sively higher integrations.

formed through a series of 50 cell divisions. Morphogenesis refers to the organization and
coordination of this vast
functioning tissues and organs.

number of succes-

An autocatalytic set
inte-

number of cells into The obvious

can be understood as just such a higher

gration of a lower chemical manifold.

question

is.

how

did such a magnificently

While

complex and ordered process emerge?

led to

each and every chemical reaction

its

is

related to
intelligi-

predecessors by classical laws, the

The discovery of the gene, and later, DNA, what Kauffman calls the central dogma
Cells differ because different genes are
active in the different cell types of the

bility

of the whole recurring set goes beyond

for emergence,

of developmental biology:

the intelligibility of each event in the set.

Such a meaning
and

worked
Emerheavy
But

organism.-^
this leads to further questions:

out within the context of a basic set of terms

relations, is lacking in Kauffnian.
is

gence

clearly a notion that bears a

philosophical burden in Kauffman's work,

but besides his frequent remark that his un-

What is the mechanism that allows some genes to be active while others are suppressed? And how, as the zygote
cell

derstanding of emergence

is

"nonmystical,"

unfolds into the body, do the various types know which proteins to

he

is

somewhat

at a loss to

explain what he

express?'^

means, other than by providing examples

such as his idea that
life is

The next important

in the

step,

according

to

an emergent prop-

Kauffman, was the work of Jacob and

Monod

erty of autocatalytic sets, or that

ontogeny

is

mid-1960s, and their idea of genetic

an emergent property of genomic networks.

circuits, especially the idea that "action via

The Boston Theological Institute

185

second

sites

meant

utter

freedom from the

cir-*'

perturbations; otherwise these cell types

molecular point of view to create genetic

cuits of arbitrary logic

would lack the

absolute:

requisite homeostasis.

On

and complexity."
to the
is

the other hand, this homeostasis cannot be

Such a view
view

is

amenable

Darwinian

that natural selection

the sole source

of order. In this view, the pattern of ontogeny

that leads to a
sult

human body

is

simply the

re-

of the chance accumulation and selection

If the zygote differentiates through branching pathways to intermediate cell types that themselves branch to the final cell types of the newborn or the

adult, then occasionally a perturbation

of arbitrary genetic circuits.

will

have

to

push a

cell into a

new
new

Kauffman, as might be expected, is not satisfied with this explanation. He does not
think
it

basin of attraction (lowing to a new attractor that is, into a new develop-

is

sufficient to account for the actual

If

mental pathway flowing

type.-"

to a

cell

order observed within the processes of on-

togeny:
Since each of our cells houses some 10(),()()() or more genes, the state space of the human genomic regulatory system is at least 2"'"""" or lO^*''^"". As

Kauffman

is

right about

genomic networks

functioning as basins of attraction for cell

types, then the process of ontogeny represents

another example of "order for free."

we have
lessly

A further question arises about the source

of these perturbations
there a
in the first place.
Is

number is meaningenormous compared with

noted, this

anything

we know

about, hi terms of

way

this vast state space,

what

is

a cell type?

operates to

which the organism as a whole condition which basins of attracin

The

central

dogma of developmental

tion a cell might be

biology merely states that different cell types are different patterns of activity of the same genomic system. That is not much help when the human genome affords at least 10^"""" combinations of

pushed toward?^" Kauffman does not address this question, but

Lonergan's understanding of development
suggests that this might be a fruitful line of

gene In

activity.-'

inquiry to pursue. As has been shown, Lonergan introduces emergent probability as

a

place of this central

dogma,

way of

integrating classical and statistical

Kauffman proposes

that cell types are ba-

methods, but emergent probability also admits of further ex-

pansions to include

Is there

a way in which the organism as a

to condition

both genetic method

whole operates

attraction a cell

which basins of might be pushed toward?

this question^

(which allows Lonergan to deal with development

and change) and dialectical

Kauffman does not address

but Lonergan^s understanding of development suggests that this might be a fruitful

line

method

(which allows him

to deal with the dis-

of inquiry

to

pursue.
'^

tortions of
history).

human

Genetic
this

method deals with

sins of attraction within the

work. The vast

state

genomic netspace of the genomic

in a

development, which Lonergan defines

way:
...a flexible,

network was not explored

purely ran-

dom

linked sequence of

fashion; rather,

it

is

pulled by a rela-

tively small

number of

attractc^rs.-**

Such

dynamic and increasingly ditferentiatcd higher integrations thai meet the tension
of successively transfomied underlying

basins of attraction should be able to resist

186

The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000

manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.^'

Lonergan's account of emergent probability

is

based on the heuristic structures of empiri-

cal science (in other words,

on the concrete on the

Development consists of a
manifolds, but
ing,
if

series of higher

perfomiance of

scientists), rather than

integrations of lower, otherwise coincidental

detemiinate contents of particular scientific

investigations, his account does not stiuid or
fall

development
is static

is

to be

ongo-

such integrations must be dynamic.

with the eventual verification or

falsifi-

higher integration

when

the lower

cation of Kauffman's theories.

manifold

is

dominated with complete success,

so that the same systematic patterns keep re-

Order for free and

In closing,
I

finality

curring without modification or change."

want

to consider briefly the

Lonergan's example here

is

of the inert gases

matter of how, for both Kauffman and

locking manifolds of subatomic events within

Lonergan, reflection on an evolutionary

world-order characterized by emergence opens out onto religious questions. Written
as
it

permanent routines. One could also think of

it

in

terms of Kauffman's absolute homeosta-

sis

within cell types that would preclude fur-

is

as a popularization of a
it

body of scien-

ther differentiation.

But according to
is

tific

Lonergan, when the higher integration

of the underlying manifold until a
gration emerges.

dy-

would be easy to overlook Kauffman's more poetic flights in At Home

work,
in the

namic, there results an ongoing modification

Universe. But while such reflections

new

inte-

may

not offer
still

much

in the

way of "hard

sci-

Lonergan

refers to the deit

ence,"

they express on the one hand a deep

veloping organism as an operator, because

dissatisfaction with

what he takes

to be the

"so integrates the underlying manifold as to

call forth...
its

implications of Darwinian natural selection,

own

replacement by a more

and on the other hand a deep-seated religious

longing for meaning.

specific and effective integrator."^'

erator,
it

As an op-

Kauffman

sees nihil-

seems

likely that

an organism might

ism

at the heart

of Darwinian evolution:

play

at least a

limited role in determining

which developmental pathway a cell might follow. The developing organism is thus the ongoing linked series of increasingly differentiated integrations.
I

Science has left us as unaccountably improbable accidents against the cold, immense backdrop of space and time.^''

Not

that

Kauffman

is

about to embrace
Traditional reli-

institutionalized religion.
that

hope

have shown

Lonergan's ex-

gious belief he considers a non-option: "Paradise has been lost, not to sin, but to science."
^^

planatory account of emergence, along with

its

implications for development, meshes

For Kauffman, the

rise

of science means
Yet he holds
wrest from

nicely with Kauffman's explorations into the

the

demise of religious

belief.

ontogeny of the organism. As was the case

with the comparison between autocatalytic
sets

out hope that although paradise has been lost

to science, perhaps science

can

still

and schemes of recurrence, there

is

here,

the world a sense of the sacred:

If

as well, an interesting convergence

between

we

are, in

ways we do not

yet see,

the ideas of these

thinkers.

two seemingly disparate

natural expressions of matter and

As

mentioned above, however,

far left the

Kauffman has so

work of
It

experientirely

mental verification to others.

theories are wrong.

is

possible, perhaps even likely, that

Kauffman's

energy coupled together in nonequilibrium systems, if life in its abundance were bound to arise, not as an incalculably improbable accident, but as an expected rulfillment of the
natural order, then
in the universe.
^^

The point

want

to

em-

we

truly are at

home

phasize here

is

that the validity

of Lonergan's
the cor-

understanding of emergence and emergent

probability in no

way depends upon

The phrases "at home in the universe" and "we the expected" rather than "we the improbable" echo throughout the book, and lend

rectness of Kauffman's ideas.

Because

The Boston Theological Institute

187

Kauffman's search for "order for free" not a

little

Lakatos, Imre. "Falsification and the Meth-

of

its

urgency.

odology

of

Scientific
In Criticism

Lonergan finished writing Insight in 1953, the same year Watson and Crick's paper on the double helix structure of DNA was published. In light of this, the applicability of

Programmes."

Research and the Growth

of Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 91-1 96. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970.

Lonergan 's ideas on genetic method is nothing short of astonishing. Lonergan, I have
suggested, would find

Lonergan, Bernard. Insight:

much
is

in

Kauffman's
final pjirallel

A Study of Human Understanding. Vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. by

Frederick E.

work to embrace. There

that
I

one

Crowe and Robert M. Doran.

wish

to draw,

namely, that for Lonergan

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992

[1957].

no

less than for

Kauffman, the order of the

ways. For what
its

universe opens out onto religious questions,

albeit in significantly different
J.

A Second Collection. Ed. William F. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell. Philadel.

Kauffman terms "order

for free" finds

phia: Westminster Press, 1974.

counterpart in Lonergan's notion of finality,

an "upwardly but indeterminately directed

Melchin, Kenneth R.

History, Ethics

and

dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being." ^^ But while Kauffman limits his
search for the sacred to the universe accessible to the empirical sciences

Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society and History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan.

Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,

1987.

(what Lonergan
for the unre-

would

refer to as the universe of proportion-

ate being),

Lonergan allows

stricted desire to

know

to raise the question

is, is

Endnotes:
1.

of transcendent being: that

there

some-

Lonergan,

thing that explains the explainability of the

A Second Collection,

p.

268.

universe of our experience?

And

to raise that

2.

See Kuhn.

question
for

is

already to be engaged in a search

3.

See Lakatos.
at the level

Roughly speaking,
that

God.

Lonergan might say

primarily

Kauffman operates

of formulating insights,

while leaving the task of judgment to others.

While

this

remark

invites a

comparison of

Lonergan's account of scientific rationality

with that of other figures in the philosophy of
science,
will prescind

Works

from

this task in or-

cited:

der to deal at greater length with other issues.

Byrne, Patrick H.

"God and

the Statistical

4.

Kauffman, At

Home

in the

Universe, pp.

Universe."

Zygoii 16, no. 4

(December
Self-

71-95 passim.
5. Ibid., p. 25.

1981): 345-63^

Kauffman,

Stuart.

The Origins of Order:

in

6. Ibid., p. 14. 7. Ibid., p. 24.

8. Ibid., p. 19.

Organization and Selection

Evohition.

New York: Oxford University At Home in the Universe:

plexity.

Press, 1993.

The Search

for Laws of Self-Organization and

1995.

Com-

9. Ibid., ch. 3.

Oxford: Oxford University Press,

10. Ibid., ch. 2.

11. Ibid., p. 49.

Kuhn, Thomas.

The Structure of

Scientific

12. Ibid., p. 50.

See figure

3.1 (p.

49) and

Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University

figure 3.7 (p. 65) for schematic representations of autocatalytic sets.

of Chicago Press, 1970.

188

The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000

13.

Lonergan,
Melchin,

///.v/g/zr, p.

141.

L.

Wang, Science News

159, no. 7 (17 Feb.

14. 15.
16.

p. 105.

2001): 100-101.
28. For an introduction to attractors and
attractor basins, see

Lonergan,
Byrne,
p.

loc. cit.

349.

Chaos: Making a
1

New

17. Ibid., p. 357.

Science, by James Gleick

cit., p.

(New York: Penand 233-36.

10.
1

18.

Lonergan, op.

131.

guin Books, 1987), pp.

29.

19ff.

Kauffman, op.

cit., p.

19. Ibid., p. 145.

20.

Kauffman, op.

30. This question

cit.,

pp. vii-viii.
15.

Patrick

was suggested to me by Byrne during a "God and the World

at the Je-

21. Lonergan, op.

cit., p.

of the Sciences" seminar meeting

suit Institute at

22. Ibid., pp. 415-21.

Boston College on 25 March

479.

23. Ibid., p. 506. 24.

1999.
cit., p.

Kauffman, op.

95.

31. Lonergan, op.

cit., p.

25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., p. 97.

27. Ibid., p. 106.

32. Ibid., p. 477. 33. Ibid., p. 490.

The

recently completed

34.

Kauffman, op.

cit., p. vii.

sequence of the human genome puts the number of genes closer to 30,000, but Kauffman's
point remains valid.

35. Ibid., p. 4. 36. Ibid., p. 20. 37. Lonergan, op.

cit., p.

See "The Newly Se-

quenced Genome Bares All," by J. Netting and

477.

Grant Miller Francisco is currently in his fourth year of doctoral studies in the Department of Theology at Boston College. His area of specialization is systematic theology, with an

emphasis in theology and science. Originally from Portland, Oregon, he received his bachelor's degree in religion from Reed College, and an M.A. in theology from the Earlham School of Religion. He now lives in Newton and attends St. Paul's Episcopal Church
there.

This paper was presented on 27 April 2000 at Boston University for the Science and Religion Colloquium, an annual event sponsored jointly by the New England Center for Faith and Science Exchange and the Boston Theological Institute.

The Boston Theological Institute

189