Chapter 1- Introduction Tort is a branch of the civil law (as opposed to criminal law) based on a claim that the

e defendant has caused injury or loss to the claimant by breaking a relevant obligation imposed by the general law What conduct is tortious. You will understand o what counts as injury or loss o and what obligations the law imposes tort law is one of the methods by which people who have suffered injuries are compensated In studying each tort you should ask yourself: o what interests are being protected o and against what sorts of interference For example, the tort of defamation protects the distinct interest of reputation

What interests are protected by the law of tort? the physical integrity of the person, property interests, reputation and economic interests a persons right to privacy- There are arguments

Tort is said to be actionable per se when material damage has been caused no material damage but one of the claimants rights has been interfered with e.g. deliberately to touch another even though no damage is caused to defame someone in writing even though no damage is caused

Tortious liability may be strict (e.g. consumer protection legislation): liability does not depend on proof of fault on the defendants part based on negligence by defendant based on intentional conduct by defendant based on the ultimate motive or purpose of the defendant (rare in English law)

Forms of torts o o o Some tortious conduct is at the same time illegal in some other sense (e.g. criminal) Some action is tortious but is not criminal or illegal in any sense other than being tortious Some conduct is illegal but is not tortious even if it causes loss or damage

Tort and contracts o Tort- breach of an obligation imposed by the general law (if I knock you down by carelessly driving my car, I am liable to compensate you because the law imposes a duty to drive carefully and not because I have promised you that I will do so) o Contracts- breach of an obligation voluntarily undertaken by the person in breach (if I fail to deliver the car that you have bought from me, I am liable to compensate you because I have failed to carry out my promise) o There is also liability for mistreatment (tort by voluntary assumption of responsibility) that has s has blurred the traditional distinction between tort and contract Chapter 2- Negligence Negligence of course means carelessness According to Lord Wright 1934:

In strict legal analysis, negligence means more than heedless or careless conduct, whether in omission or commission: it properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach and damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty was owing. (Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co v McMullan [1934] AC 1 at 25) Thus, the claimant in a negligence action must establish three propositions 1) That the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care. The claimant will in some circumstances be the only person to whom the duty was owed (a surgeon and patient for example): in others the claimant will be a member of a very large and possibly ill-defined class of persons to whom the duty was owed (a car driver and other road users). (Duty) 2) That the defendant broke the duty of care. This means that the defendants conduct fell below the standards that the law demands. (Breach) 3) That as a result of the breach the claimant suffered damage of a kind that the law deems worthy of compensation. (Damage) Read SG page 12 Chapter 3- Negligence duty to care and breach of duty 1) Duty of care: two purposes o providing a general principle-overall framework for the huge variety of situations in which liability may arise o providing limitations-setting the boundaries within which one person could be liable to another for the consequences of careless behavior duty of care general principle The neighbour principle
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 1) HoL recognised a new relationship as giving rise to a duty of care, between manufacturers and the ultimate consumers of manufactured products This is sometimes called the narrow rule in Donoghue v Stevenson: it still survives but has in practice been superseded by a new kind of liability established in the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 2) Lord Atkin-A duty was owed to persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected He described such people as my neighbours: so his definition of the duty is called the neighbour principle.

A revised test two-stage test

Anns v Merton London BC [1978] AC 728 at 75. 1) Prima facie duty of carewhether there was a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that in the reasonable contemplation of the defendant carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the claimant 2) The second question was whether there were any considerations which ought to negative or reduce or limit the scope of the duty of care or the class of persons to whom it was owed. Anns case was itself overruled in 1991

The current test: foresight, proximity and fairness

Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 The claimant has to show three things if there is to be a duty of care 1) It was reasonably foreseeable that a person in the claimants position would be injured. 2) There was sufficient proximity between the parties. 3) It is fair, just and reasonable to impose liability.

Assumption of responsibility Whether there had been a voluntary assumption of responsibility by the defendant for the claimant. used in cases of o liability for omissions o for mis-statements for economic loss

These tests are of most use when the law is uncertain. These are concepts that judges use when deciding whether or not a duty of care ought to be recognised in new situations. Once a duty situation is recognised, the test in a sense drops out of the picture. So, in an examination context, there is no need to go through the Caparo test unless either the situation is a novel one, where there are no clear precedents, or you are trying to argue that the law ought to be changed (as was done by the House of Lords in respect to the liability of lawyers; see Duties of lawyers in SG). If the question you are answering is about a motorist knocking down a pedestrian, the duty of care is established by many previous cases and there is no need to go through the tests for establishing a duty afresh.

The duty- 2 separate functions o o The notional duty or duty in law: Is there a duty at the abstract level: e.g. does a motorist owe a duty of care to other road users? Or do barristers owe a duty of care to their clients? Duty in fact (matter of breach of duty or as a matter of remoteness of damage): Is the particular claimant within the scope of the duty of care: e.g. was this particular road user owed a duty by this particular motorist?

1) Duty at the abstract level: how far the defendant owes a duty to stop or prevent another person (X) injuring the claimant. e.g. o Should a school (or a parent) owe a duty of care to passing motorists to see that a child does not run out of the school and cause an accident? o Should a host at a party owe a duty of care to prevent a guest driving home drunk and injuring a pedestrian? o Should a car owner owe a duty of care to keep it locked up to prevent a thief stealing it and knocking down a pedestrian?

In deciding whether a duty of care arises, it is relevant to ask, what is the relationship between o X and D? Does D have some responsibility over X? o C and D? Does it involve some obligation on Ds part to protect C against harm?
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1104; Carmarthenshire County Council v Lewis [1955] AC 549; Topp v London Country Bus (South West) Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 976; AttorneyGeneral of British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12: [2004] 1 WLR 1273.

Instances where C and X are the same person Jebson v Ministry of Defence [2000] 1 WLR 2055 Duties of lawyers Lawyers of course owe a duty of care to their clients, but until recently it was thought that no duty was owed by barristers (and later solicitors also) in respect of work closely connected with the presentation of their case in court.
Moy v Pettman Smith (a firm) [2005] UKHL 7: [2005] 1 WLR 581

Duty of care to unborn children- resolved by statute Act Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1976 1990 Recognises A child being born with disabilities damage to stored sperm or eggs as the result of damage to the mother (or sometimes the father) occurring during pregnancy or sometimes before conception Example physical injuries to a pregnant woman in, say, a car crash, or the side effects of drugs The damage caused the disability from which the baby suffers when it is born. Liability NonThey do not allow an action where the negligence caused the baby to be born, but did not liability cause the disabilities. Example A doctor may, for example, negligently carry out a sterilization procedure on either a man or a woman, or may fail to recommend an abortion: any child born as the result of this negligence has no claim. Ethical issues o the child is healthy and is being raised in a loving family (McFarlane v Tayside Health Board) o the child is disabled (Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital) o the child is healthy but the mother did not want children because of her own disability (Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust). Novel situations o Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence [1996] QB 732 (liability of injuries to soldiers on active service; Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318: [2003] 1 WLR 1607 (liability of rugby referee to injured player). 2) Scope of the duty of care Question of whether the particular claimant was within the scope of that duty.
o o o o o Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92; Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co (1928) 248 NY 339; Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778: Urbanski v Patel (1978) 84 DLR (3rd) 650; Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All ER 161.

2) Breach of duty The next question is whether there has been a breach of the duty of care. Has the defendant actually been negligent? You are not expected to decide in an examination answer whether or not the defendant was in fact negligent, but to identify in a question the respects in which the claimant could argue that the defendant has been negligent and also explain how the question will be approached within the structure of legal rules.

The basic rule The basic rule is that the defendant must conform to the standard of care expected of a reasonable person. o Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. (Blythe v Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 11 Exch 781) Ordinary person in ordinary circumstances Glasgow Corporation v Muir [1943] AC 448

It is an objective test The abstract reasonable person is put into the shoes of the defendant, who is expected to have the same general knowledge and understanding of risks as the reasonable person. The actual defendant may be stupider or more ignorant, or may be cleverer or more knowledgeable, but is still judged by this abstract impersonal standard. The judge has to decide what, in the circumstances of the particular case, the reasonable man would have had in contemplation. What to one judge may seem far-fetched may seem to another both natural and probable.

Defendant with special skills or qualifications E.g. professionals In such cases the defendant is to be compared to a reasonable person with the relevant skill or qualification Defining the group to which the defendant belonged Phillips v Whiteley [1938] 1 All ER 566-. Did the defendant, who had pierced the claimants ears, have to show the care of a reasonable surgeon or of a reasonable jeweller? In Shakoor v Situ [2000] 4 All ER 181 There is an interesting analysis of how to treat a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine working in England. Was he to be compared to a reasonable orthodox doctor, a reasonable traditional doctor practising in China or a reasonable traditional doctor practising in England? Many cases involve car drivers. The only standard of care is that of a reasonable driver, whether the actual driver is highly experienced, newly qualified or even just a learner. It is irrelevant that the learner driver defendant was doing as well as she could, given her lack of experience, if a reasonable driver would have done better: Nettleship v Weston[1971] 2 QB 691. Medical negligence The defendant is to be compared with a reasonable person of the same specialism and status: a general practitioner is not judged by the same standards as a consultant cardiologist and so on o Issues-There is often no single right way of proceeding The courts do not insist that one approach must be right and the other wrong: they require that the defendant has acted in a way that would be supported by a body of respectable medical opinion Bolam test (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957]1 WLR 582) This test allows the medical profession to some extent to determine appropriate standards for itself, but the courts reserve the right to strike down a medical practice as unreasonable (Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232)

Bolam test issues The doctor failed to give the patient sufficient warning of the risks of the proposed treatment. Australian courts have taken a view more generous to the patient and ask what a reasonable patient would expect to be told. See Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871 and Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. Other scenarios Children Children may be liable in negligence and are judged by what might be expected of a reasonable child of the defendants age, and the courts appear to be indulgent towards high spirits and horseplay: Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 All ER 920 and Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814: [2004] 3 All ER 315

Defendant unable to perform competently A defendant may be liable even if he was doing his incompetent best. But if his behaviour was the result not of inexperience or incompetence, but of illness or other external forces, then he may be found not liable. See Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263. (But the result would have been different if the driver had known of the medical condition.) Eliminating harm must be proportional to the danger A defendant is not required to eliminate all risk of harm even when it is foreseeable: to do so might be out of all proportion to the danger. The defendant must do something only if a reasonable person would have thought it right to do so. Guidelines a. How likely was it that injury would occur? b. How serious was the injury likely to be if it did occur? c. How difficult and/or expensive would it be to eliminate the risk? d. How important or urgent was the action of the defendant? See: Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 (explained by Lord Reid in Wagon Mound (No. 2)) [1967] 1 AC 617 at 642; Latimer v AEC [1952] 2 QB 701; Paris v Stepney BC [1951] AC 367; Watt v Hertfordshire CC [1954] 2 All ER 368. Other cases- defendant acting under pressure or with limited time for full consideration. For examples, see: Roe v Minister of Health [1954] QB 66; Luxmoore May v Messenger, May- Baverstock [1990] 1 All ER 1067; and Moy v Pettman Smith [2005] UKHL 7: [2005] 1 WLR 581 Are decisions on breach questions of fact or law? The decision on the particular facts of a case does not constitute a binding precedent. The issue will have to be decided in the light of the particular facts each time it occurs. See Qualcast v Haynes [1959] AC 743. Proving breach of duty All the claimant can do is show that such a thing does not normally happen unless there has been negligence res ipsa loquitur (the facts speak for themselves) You must ask yourself: a. when it is legitimate to use the maxim b. what the effect of invoking it is. See Scott v London & St. Katharines Dock (1865) 3 H. & C. 596; Henderson v Henry E. Jenkins [1970] AC 282; Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] RTR 298 You should be warned that this doctrine applies only exceptionally. You should not make use of it in answering questions unless there is a clear suggestion that there is no explanation for what has happened and the only inference is that the defendant must have been negligent. General examination advice All claimants in a negligence action must establish that there has been a breach of a duty of care. This does not mean that all examination questions require an extended discussion of these topics. If a problem involves a driver of a car hitting someone while proceeding at 80 mph down a one-way street in the wrong direction, then these issues can be disposed of in two sentences. A problem question may involve only issues discussed in this chapter, but is likely also to involve topics from other chapters. An essay question of a general kind on the duty of care will almost certainly require information and ideas from Chapter 5 as well as this chapter

Chapter 4: Negligence: causation and remoteness of damage Damage Causation The breach has resulted in injury or damage (factual and logical question) Remoteness The injury or damage is sufficiently closely connected to the breach (legal question)

1) Causation Link the breach of duty (Tort) to the damage and not merely the defendant to the damage e.g. Incident - A baby has brain damage: it has recently been vaccinated. Tort - Negligence that a doctor in breach of the duty of care failed to carry out proper tests to discover whether the baby had an allergy to the vaccine Causation - The vaccine caused the damage- (scientifically prove) The breach of duty caused the damage. E.g. If the proper tests carefully administered would have revealed the allergy and the baby would be saved The basic rule (but for test) If the damage would not have occurred but for the defendants breach of duty, then the breach of duty is a cause of the damage o o Burden of proof is with the claimant. It is sufficient to show that on a balance of probabilities the breach was the cause of the damage. If it is more probable than not that the breach of duty caused the damage, then the claimant recovers in full for the damage. If not nothing.

Difficult instances in linking the tort to the damage i. There may be doubt about what the natural course of events would have been if the defendant had behaved properly. o For example, the defendant doctor failed to diagnose the claimant as having an illness in need of treatment. Was it so serious that the defendant would have died even if the proper diagnosis or treatment had been given? See: Barnett v Kensington and Chelsea Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428. o The claimant fell overboard into icy water. The defendants rescue effort was inadequate. Would the claimant have perished in the cold water before even a competent rescuer could have saved her? See: The Ogopogo [1971] 2 Lloyds 410.

ii. There may be doubt about how the defendant would subsequently have behaved if he had done what he should have done in performance of the duty. o Bolitho v City and Hackney Heath Authority [1998] AC 232. You will see that the doctor in breach of her duty failed to attend a patient, but she successfully argued that the action she would in fact have taken if she had attended would not have been negligent (because it was in accordance with a respectable body of professional opinion) and would not have saved the patient. The child would therefore still have been dead even if she had performed her duty by attending. Therefore her culpable failure to attend was not a cause of the death. iii. There may be doubt about how the claimant would subsequently have behaved if the defendant had done what should have been done. o The defendant doctor may have failed to warn the patient about the risks of treatment: would the patient have decided to have the treatment anyway? If so, the failure to warn cannot be a cause of the damage if one of the risks occurs. The defendant employers may have failed to provide safety equipment for their employees: would the deceased employee have used it if it had been provided?

If not, then the failure to provide it was not the cause of the injuries. See: McWilliams v Sir William Arrol [1962] 1 All ER 623. o This issue has recently been considered by the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 [2005] 1 AC 134 where a majority of the House of Lords took a view very favourable to the claimant. You must address the policy reasons for this view. The surgeon had advised the claimant to undergo surgery but in breach of duty had failed to advise her of the risk. The claimant did not show that she would probably never have had the operation, but she did show that she would have taken her time and consulted friends and therefore would not have had the actual operation on the particular day that she did have it. The House of Lords held that she had therefore established that the breach of duty was a cause of her injury. Notice however that the sort of injury was something that happened on very rare occasions for no very obvious reason. The result would surely have been different if the injury had been due to some previously unknown peculiarity of the claimant, so that it might well have happened to her even if the operation had been postponed and performed on a different day.

iv. There may be doubt about how other people would have behaved if the defendant had done what should have been done. Springv Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 996. The damage is properly to be regarded as the loss of a chance, and that it is not necessary to prove on a balance of probabilities that the other people would have behaved in a particular way. Damages for loss of a chance Breach of contract actionso Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 o If the claimant has proved that the tort caused physical injuries leading to permanent unemployment, then the amount of money paid in compensation will be based on the chances of future employment, and not on proof that on a balance of probabilities he would have had a particular career o Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 996/Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602 (In both cases the loss was economic and not physical). The claimant would not have to prove that the negligent reference supplied to prospective employers caused him not to be appointed to a post, but that he would be compensated for the loss of a chance of future employment Causation: special problems: Instances when the but for test would lead to outcomes that would be absurd or arguably unjust Two separate causes of the same damage two unconnected events (one or both a tort), each of which would in the absence of the other have caused a particular item of damage Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC 467 and Jobling v Associated Diaries Ltd [1982] AC 794 both cases were concerned with continuing liability for the consequences of the original injury and not with liability for the additional consequences of the second injury Uncertainty of the facts lack of proof because something else happened at the same time which obscures the position, or because medical science has not reached the point where it can be certain of the causation of the damage Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 AC 1074

2) Remoteness: the basic rule A breach of duty may considerably change the course of subsequent events, but the defendant will not be liable for everything that can be traced back to the original wrongdoing. The remoteness issue limits the extent of the defendants liability. Early rule o 1921-Re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560: if there was something which broke the chain of causation, then the defendant was not liable. o 1964- The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] 1 AC 388: Defendant is liable for damage only if it was the foreseeable consequence of the breach of duty. A test of foreseeability was (a) simpler and (b) more just, because it was unfair to hold a careless defendant liable for more than could have been foreseen when and if he thought about the consequences before committing the act of negligence. The basic test (Present test) Qualifications of the basic test a. How much is foreseeable? b. The egg-shell skull cases c. Financial weaknesses where (i) the defendant is in breach of to take the victim as he finds duty to the claimant him, i.e. to compensate the claimant for his actual loss (ii) it was foreseeable that the claimant would suffer some e.g. If the defendant injures a physical injury claimant who happens, be a leading soccer star whose career (iii) the particular claimant has a is ruined, then the defendant has, particular susceptibility or to compensate the claimant for abnormality and as a result his actual loss. What has to be suffers more serious injury or foreseen is physical injuries that injury of a different type from that were result in loss of employment. which was foreseen, then the defendant is liable for that further injury. Robinson v Post Office [1974] 2 All ER 737

Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837, Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 1082 These cases show that it is not necessary to foresee either (i) the severity of the damage or (ii) the precise manner in which it occurred. It is sufficient if the injury is of the type that could be foreseen, even it came about in an unexpected way or was much more severe than expected. See also Doughty v Turner Metal Manufacturing Company [1964] 1 QB

New and intervening cause (nova causa interveniens or as novus actus interveniens) Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office [1970]: the original tortfeasor could be liable for intervening human conduct, whether that was criminal, negligent or innocent, but only if it was something very likely to happen: a mere foreseeable possibility was not enough. Intervening criminal conduct Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625; Perl v Camden London Borough Council [1984] QB 342; Smith v Littlewoods Ltd [1987] AC 241 Al-Kandari v Brown [1988] QB 665

The claim failed

even though the intervening criminal conduct is surprising, is not too remote, if it is closely related to the risk posed by the defendants conduct

Intervening negligent conduct The subsequent carelessness of some third party has caused new injuries Knightley v Johns [1982] 1 WLR 399 3 outcomes 1-The 3rd partys negligence fails the but for test, then the D is liable for all the subsequent injuries. Robinson v Post Office 2- Gross negligence by the 3rd party is unconnected with the initial injury, (e.g. amputating the wrong leg) D would not be liable for the aggravation of the injuries. Robinson v Post Office 3- Where the 3rd partys negligence falls between 1 and 2, it is likely that it would not break the chain of causation, but that both the D and the 3rd party would be jointly liable for the consequences Intervening conduct by the claimant i. Did the defendant owe a duty to protect the claimant against the claimants own stupidity? ii. Did the claimants own conduct break the chain of causation? It is certainly likely that, where the defendant had a duty to protect the claimant against an identified risk (e.g. that the claimant would commit suicide), then the risk, if it materialises, cannot be a new and intervening cause. (See the Reeves case) iii. Are any of the defences of voluntary assumption of risk, contributory negligence or illegality available so as to defeat the claim or reduce the damages available?
McKew v Holland Hannen & Cubitts [1969] 3 All ER 162; Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets [1969] 3 All ER 1006 Kirkham v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [1990] 2 QB 283 Reeves v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 the claimants subsequent actions are careless

the claimants subsequent actions are deliberate

Chapter 5: Negligence: special problems Liability for pure economic loss and for negligent mis-statements Mis-statements that caused financial or economic loss to the claimant Historical overview Derry v Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337 The House of Lords had held that to establish liability in that tort the claimant had to prove that the defendants either knew that what they were saying was false or were reckless as to whether what they were saying was true or false. There could be no liability where the defendant had not lied or been reckless, but had merely spoken carelessly. Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 A claimant who suffers loss by relying on inaccurate statements could and can bring a claim in the tort of deceit a. the defendants were held to owe a duty to take care in the advice or information that they gave b. that duty extended to purely economic losses. Economic loss Consequential economic loss
A claimant suffers personal injuries: damages are recoverable for the economic consequences of the personal injuries, such as lost wages or salary if the claimant is unable to work because of the injuries. The claimants property is damaged. The claimant can recover for the economic consequences, which might be: the reduction in the value of the property or the cost of repairing it and might include the loss of profit from the use of the property.

Pure Economic loss (Financial, pecuniary)

where there is no physical injury to any person or to any property Where there is physical injury to a person other than the claimant or to the property of some person other than the claimant.

The recovery of pure economic loss: policy considerations General common law rule - A defendant was not liable for purely economic loss. The Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) LR 3 App Cas 279 Candler v Crane, Christmas [1951] 2KB 164 Read SG for poly considerations pg 48

Economic loss cases (i): negligent mis-statements Liability for economic loss flowing from careless advice or information When does the duty arise? There has to be between the speaker and hearer before a duty of care arises It is unusual, although not impossible, for the duty to arise between friends in a relatively social context. See Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988] 3 All ER 718 Liability is sometimes said to result from an assumption of responsibility on the part of the defendant Lord Goff in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Caparo Industries v Dickman Even where there is an employment relationship or other contractual or similar relationship between the parties, a defendant may be found to have voluntarily assumed responsibility to advise the claimant on specific matters Lennon v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2004] EWCA Civ 130: [2004] 2 All ER 266. When is there liability? The defendant has the opportunity to explain the limits of his knowledge and the amount of research he has undertaken and is to be judged according to what he promised to do. It also has to be shown that the negligent advice or information was a cause of the claimants loss. To whom is there liability? (i) The loss may be suffered by someone other than those to whom the advice or information was addressed. Smith v Eric S. Bush (a firm) [1990] 1 AC 831 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co [1991] 2 QB 113, Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd [1991] Ch 295, Law Society v KPMG Peat Marwick

(ii) The advice may be relied on by one person but the loss suffered by someone else:

Ministry of Housing v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223, Spring v Guardian Assurance Ltd [1995] 2 AC 296.

In the latter case the writer of a reference about a former employee seeking a job was held to owe a duty of care to the employee and not merely to the prospective employer who relied Points to consider on it. Notice that the defendant was obliged (i) the number of potential claimants in the two (through the rules of the regulatory system for situations and financial institutions) to provide a reference. (ii) the social significance of each of the two situations. Can liability be excluded? If the contract has an exclusion clause it is dealt with the Unfair Contracts Act 1977 Hedley Byrne v Heller, Smith v Eric S. Bush

Economic loss cases (ii): performance of a service Extended Hedley Byrne principle: the defendant can be liable where there has been a voluntary assumption of responsibility by the defendant towards the claimant either generally or for the purposes of a specific transaction Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145-reliance is not a necessary ingredient of liability

Williams v Natural Life Health Foods [1998] 1 WLR 430 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 Gorham v British Telecommunications plc [2000] 4 All ER 867 Economic loss cases (iii): damage to anothers property