CASE 28: MOUNTBATTEN AND INDIA Overview Usually we use the Mountbatten case as the last case in the

course. It summarizes many aspects of strategy formulation, strategy formation, organization, and implementation. It is an exciting case that plays on a world scale. Students and executives tend to identify with the players and the historic events depicted. The case involves a negotiation strategy in which Mountbatten is the facilitator as well as one of the key players. Mountbatten is given plenipotentiary powers by the prime minister of England to negotiate the release of India from the British Empire. The case is a summary of the strategic events and interactions, which ultimately lead to that goal. Through the movie Gandhi, students have a vague sense of the events surrounding these decisions. But the movie did not bring out Mountbattens role or any of the crucial interactions involved. An excellent documentary by PBS, the Public Broadcasting System, did go into these events somewhat more. However, since this was a very long series, few participants will really know the history. Session Structure The overall structure of the session involves first understanding some of the political and power interplays that preceded Mountbattens departure for India. Second, one can look at the strategy itself and analyze how one can design a win-win strategy for Mountbatten and England in this complex environment. Next, one can look at the various steps in the management of this negotiation process. It is helpful to break the process down into three stages: (1) the actions Mountbatten undertakes soon after coming to India, (2) his actions in dealing with the four principal negotiators, (3) his management of the overall process and the understanding one can draw from his methodologies for other situations. Then, it is helpful to evaluate the process and its outcomes from the viewpoint of all the major parties. Usually, students and executives praise Mountbatten elaborately. About 25 minutes before the class is over, one can hand out Mountbatten and India (Part II) contained in this note. We allow about 5 minutes to read this very quickly. Then we ask What do you think of Mountbatten and his negotiation process, now? The Part II note sets forth the horrors that occurred as India fell apart after its partition. Usually, there are some comments, which mildly change the evaluation of the management process derived above. Then, as a final shocker, we hand out Mountbatten and India (Part III), also contained in this teaching note. The students are then put in an active mode and asked, OK. What do you do now if you are Mountbatten? Having critiqued his actions and found them brilliant, or somewhat wanting, the students are asked to take action themselves. Now, one can move on to a direct strategy involving action of major forces in a complex and unknown situation. This note will cover the handling of all three parts of the case. PART I

This session opens by asking, What should Mountbatten have done before he left England? Why did he do the things he did? This brings out some very interesting political points. Chief among these are the following: A. Why does Mountbatten accept? It is clear he is risking both his life and his reputation. However, his values and his sense of noblesse oblige require that he take on the challenge. There is no greater challenge for his career than this. If successful, it will be an even greater capstone than his World War II successes. B. Why does Attley select Mountbatten? Students usually respond, Because of his knowledge, because of his sympathy with the movements in Southeast Asia, because he is very able and could handle this difficult process, etc. All of this is true. But, Attley is also setting up a win-win situation for the Labour Party. If Mountbatten is successful, Attley wins. If Mountbatten fails, Mountbatten (not the Labour Party) fails. Attley can say, If Mountbatten couldnt do it, no one could have. This is a common methodology used by political figures. They select a person of high rank from the opposing party to represent the country on its most complex negotiations, thus insuring the partys own security. C. Why does Mountbatten make these particular demands? Many of them are simply symbolic. He wants to establish a relatively higher profile so that he can increase his bargaining leverage with both Attley and the Indians. The establishment of a precise date for the break is a very powerful symbol that England will, in fact, act this time. Discussions have been going on for a long time, and there is much distrust on the part of the colonial leaders. To have any hope of success, Mountbatten had to signal a clear break with the past. Several of his moves were designed with this in mind. D. Why does he ask for plenipotentiary powers? Students will usually respond, To have the authority he needs to negotiate. One can then ask, Does the government give up anything in this process? Does it actually gain by this delegation? Students tend to be perplexed at first. Then they slowly realize that the government can keep enough controls over Mountbatten to protect its own interests. Both Mountbatten and the government gain by the plenipotentiary powers. Mountbatten gains flexibility in negotiations. He gains apparent power in the negotiations. Yet, he still must refer back to London for final approval. This double approval process is useful in most negotiations to add leverage to the powers of the negotiating party. E. What strategic controls does the government need? What strategic controls does it have? The most important controls it has are goal controls. By making sure that Mountbatten understands and identifies with the goals it wishes to achieve, the government has its strongest control over the process. If Mountbatten does not share these goals sincerely, he will unconsciously undermine the governments position and perhaps destroy its very purposes in the negotiation. Whenever one has a representative negotiating at a long distance, the goal identity of that person should be carefully assured. Selection of the person to represent England is the second strategic control the

government has. By selecting a person of stature, skill, understanding, and values appropriate to its goals, the government has the greatest possible insurance that its own purposes will be well served. Approval control is another important level of strategic control. Although Mountbatten has plenipotentiary powers, he cannot actually commit England. The government has the ultimate control by approving any treaty that he may come up with. Organizational control is another powerful strategic control. The government controls the appointments Mountbatten may make to his team. It also has the right to remove Mountbatten from his post. These two powers also insure that Mountbatten cannot make commitments that the government would not wish to honor. Open communications are an important strategic control. The government must make sure that it has a way of understanding what Mountbatten is doing in time to use its other controls. This portion of the control system is not specified in the case write-up. However, the Prime Minister would insist on periodic communications and, if wise, have independent channels of communications to check on what Mountbattens team might be saying. Coalition power is another form of control. By having the capacity to offer or withhold Commonwealth status, presumably a large bargaining chip, the government can control to a large extent whether a coalition takes place and the terms of that coalition. Commitment controls are another major strategic control. Mountbatten cannot call on military resources, fiscal resources, or other implied resources of the government, without its own vote or approval. Again, these implicit constraints bound the realm in which Mountbatten can really negotiate or cause the British government to move in directions it may not desire. One should note that these tie in very well with the concepts of grand strategy developed early in the course. Corporate level or grand strategies tend to involve setting major goals, setting controls on operations, establishing communications systems, motivations systems, overall organization structures, key appointments, etc.

Strategic Analysis and Strategy Formulation Before Mountbatten leaves for India, what kinds of strategic analysis should he have undertaken? How does one determine strategy in this kind of situation? This is a good point at which to introduce some ideas about world-scale strategic analysis. In this type of situation, one first looks at the major forces and movements in the world with a view to aligning strategy in congruence with these forces and movements. If a nation (or large corporation) does not align itself with such forces, it will either surely lose, or have to use such inordinate amounts of resources to resist these forces that it will become exhausted. It is interesting to ask the students, What were the most important forces at play in the world at that time? Clearly, the following are among the most important: anticolonialism, the revival of religious movements, nationalism, socialism, restructuring of the less developed world, emergence of the Third World as a political force, Britains decline as a military and industrial power, the emergence of the East-West conflict, the Cold War confrontation between the United States and Russia, the emergence of China (a

next-door neighbor) as a communist state, the attempt by Russia to subvert the governments of neighboring nations and convert them to Stalinist communism. Britain must recognize these great forces and position itself in a way that it can win in the long run. The forces are too powerful for Britain alone to resist. Next, one analyzes the major interests representing some of these forces in this particular negotiation. In this case, the most powerful interests involved are: (1) those of the Congress Party, (2) those of the Maharajas, (3) those of the major religious movements (Hindu, Moslem, and Sikh), (4) those of the extreme left political activists looking to destabilize India, and (5) those of the professional civil service and army in India. Each of these interests represents a power base that Mountbatten must deal with. He must analyze the nature of that power base and how important it is to his most important goals. He must assess the possibility of coalitions and counter-coalitions among these interests. The next factor he must analyze is the actors who will lead these interests. Key among them are of course Nehru, Gandhi, Patel, and Jinnah. Not only must he analyze the interests they represent, but also their own peculiar relationship to these power bases. Such a multi-level analysis of forces, interests, and actors is essential in any world-scale negotiation. Finally, Mountbatten must analyze any potential constraints to reaching his goals. These may be provided by the powers described above, or they may come from other forces within his own establishment. He must find a workable coalition among forces, interests, and actors both within his own power base and those of opposing parties. This requires an assessment of his own options and those of the opponents. By keeping his opponents separated in the early stages of the negotiation, he can increase the leverage of his own coalitions and help prevent coalitions from forming among his opponents. As a portion of the strategic analysis, Mountbatten must determine what goals provide a feasible focal point around which the needed joint coalition can form. The key elements in this appear to be: (1) establishing a British Commonwealth of multi-racial nations with India in it, (2) maintaining the influence of Britain in world affairs, (3) avoiding bloodshed if possible, (4) moving as rapidly as possible to avoid undue risk and expenditure of resources, (5) making sure that the world feels that the Indians are responsible for whatever outcome occurs, and (6) obtaining a broad-based Indian agreement which gives legitimacy to whatever outcome does occur. In such a complex situation, Mountbatten must know that the ultimate outcome is unknowable. Consequently, he has to establish a flexible posture relative to each individual goal to ensure that Britain wins regardless of how forces may combine to produce extraordinary later outcomes.

Managing the Early Process At this point, the professor can begin to build whatever process management model he or she prefers. However, certain aspects of Mountbattens management of the early stages of his process seem clear. These are briefly outlined below: A. Understanding what goals are feasible. This is one of the purposes of Mountbattens early inquiries with his own staff and the power centers in India and Britain. B. Understanding the system constraints. Again, Mountbatten uses multiple information points to help him understand the constraints of timing, key personalities, and powerful interests. C. Building personal credibility. Mountbattens early actions in India in meeting with Indian leaders, being more visible, making a speech at the coronation, etc. build his personal credibility and help him bypass the power base of others. D. Changing the flux of the decision process. Mountbatten has to send signals that something has changed radically, and that he is the focal point of that change. This causes diffuse powers to focus on him and increases his leverage. E. The use of symbols. Mere words will not make this point. Consequently, Mountbatten changes a number of symbols, painting the austere offices of his palace, riding through the park, inviting Indians to his table, having Indian aides de camp, etc. F. Building his information base. Through Ismay, Abell, the provincial governors, his own intelligence services, the police, etc. Mountbatten quickly builds his information base by using multiple channels of information. G. Building a power base. Crucial to any movement in the negotiations is the perceived power base of Mountbatten. He improves this first by obtaining plenipotentiary powers, and forming tacit coalitions with Nehru, Gandhi, and Patel. He extends his power base by bypassing those of the key players and obtaining identity with the Indian people. All of these elements help him gain flexibility and bargaining leverage. H. Forming coalitions. By forming coalitions both in Britain and in India, Mountbatten helps to define the zone within which decisions can be made and to predispose various parties to these decisions. I. Controlling the sequence of events. By controlling the sequence in which he sees the key players, reveals his intentions to the Indians and English, allows interactions among key players, and deals with critical issues, Mountbatten can control the process and possibly its outcome.

J. Splitting opponents. By keeping his opponents separated, Mountbatten avoids counter-coalitions or the building of their information base to a level that is higher than his own. He tries to use whatever small differences exist to leverage his own positions. K. Isolating key issues. Mountbatten quickly isolates those issues which are under his control and those which are not. He then concentrates on those which he can possibly controli.e., the issues of timing, partitioning, and joining the Commonwealth. L. Moving through zones of indifference. By finding those areas where there are common interests or his opponents are not overly concerned, Mountbatten can build a more powerful apparent coalition than may really exist. He holds off on those issues which are most likely to split his coalition, until after the coalition is heavily committed. M. Setting few targets. Mountbatten does not lay out a complete program or try to deal with all of the issues faced by the major parties. Instead, he focuses on the few strategic goals described above. This keeps Mountbatten and his opponents from diffusing their efforts and helps to achieve a higher result in the end. N. Maintains multiple channels of information. To avoid becoming isolatedand to have more information than anyone else in the negotiationsMountbatten purposely keeps multiple channels of information open to his governors, staff, police, intelligence units, etc. Nehru himself becomes a crucial element in providing Mountbatten with information which is useful in managing the process. His private conversations with key players ensure that he increases his information base without necessarily sharing it with all players. O. Choosing a few crucial action points. Mountbatten is a master at using bluff, threat, cajolery, etc. to achieve a series of partial movements forward. He does not waste effort on things he knows he cannot deal with or control. P. Obtaining incremental agreement. Through the steps above, Mountbatten first obtains agreement in principle from most of the key players. He then tests the limits of these principles by raising specific issues as they come up. He does not try to get detailed agreement until the very last moment. In fact, he withholds the details of the plan until the famous scene in which he slaps the plan down on the table in front of the group. Q. Controlling timing. Crucial to the entire process is controlling the timing at which the various key elements must be decided or when key players come together. After understanding the nature of the partial coalition he can create between Nehru, Gandhi, and Patel, he moves to try to bring Jinnah into this as far as he can. In doing this, he realizes the ultimate constraint of Jinnahs position. He uses the partial agreements already made to force detailed agreement. He does this by controlling deadlines and the possibility of public embarrassment of key players. R. Maintaining flexibility. Since he cannot know either the sequence of events in detail or the outcomes which may be possible, Mountbatten maintains his own personal

flexibility and the flexibility of his positions as long as possible. Even at the last moment, he is willing to rewrite a thoroughly drafted proposal in order to accommodate what he perceives as a disastrous level of opposition from Nehru. He does not dwell on defeats, but works on those elements over which he can maintain some control. S. Focusing on programs. When Mountbatten cannot get full agreement on the goals of releasing India from the Empire, he shifts over and concentrates on the program itself. He can get the key players to agree on release of India, although they would violently disagree on the specific goals (i.e., a separatist Moslem state, etc.). T. Forming strategy dynamically. Although the broad outlines of Mountbattens strategy are clear at the beginning of his trip to India, the ultimate nature of the strategy cannot be worked out in advance. It must be created interactively as events and powerful forces interplay with each other. Note that the ultimate strategy which is adopted was not one which Mountbatten would have accepted at the beginning of the processes analyzed above. U. Being lucky. One should also note all of the results achieved were not acts of intellect. Mountbatten was clearly lucky on a number of occasions when events turned in his direction. He could easily have been killed at a number of different points in the process.

Evaluating Mountbattens Actions

At this stage it is interesting to ask whether Mountbatten was a good manager. Generally, everyone thinks he did a superb job. One can then ask, Why is he a good manager? What makes Mountbatten a good manager? Typically, the answers come back in terms of Mountbattens personal stylei.e., he is said to be: A. Confident.

B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J.

Charming and charismatic. Persuasive. Flexible, not hung up by mistakes. Courageous, optimistic, dramatic. Patient, a workhorse, a leader. He is an organizer, he chooses people well, uses them well, and relates to individuals. He is decisive, accepts reality, and deals with what he can affect. He understands politics and deals with the politics of the situation. He gives credit to others rather than seeking it for himself (i.e., the Gandhi plan).

At this point one can raise a series of other questions. For example, one can ask, Was there clear planning at all stages? Was everyone well served by the solution? What about the Sikhs? Did Mountbatten really understand the situation? Was his Balkanization plan realistic? Did he deal with the politics more than the real facts of the situation? Was he overwhelmed by the personal information received on his visits? Did he use his power to go directly to the people? Should he have done something about

Jinnah? Eliminate him? Destroy Jinnahs credibility? Bypass his power base? Why had he not selected a date for freedom in advance? Did he do the kind of detailed planning that would have helped with the transition? Did he really involve the new leaders in such planning so that they would know what they were getting into? One should not overdo these criticisms. However, raising a few of them leads well into the next section.

PART II At this stage, one can hand out copies of the Mountbatten and India Part II case contained in this note. This should not be handed out in advance. Otherwise, the students will second-guess the entire process. It undercuts the drama of the presentation. The professor should allow about 5 minutes to read this short case. Usually the students are a bit stunned and confused. They may be a little defensive because of their effusive praise of Mountbatten. Consequently, the professor should ease them into the next discussion by saying, The book, Freedom at Midnight, continues with 150 pages of such atrocities. What should Mountbatten have done? How could the process have helped prevent some of this? Was the process itself at fault? Usually the students add a few items to their earlier critique. Some better transitional planning could have taken place. Some more involvement of the leaders in detailed planning would have helped. Reorganizing the armies to help in the transition might have facilitated matters. Perhaps the process of dividing his opponents also kept Mountbatten from creating the unity they needed to make the result succeed. And so forth. However, usually the students then conclude that there was very littlegiven the strong antagonisms held by the different interest groupsthat Mountbatten could have done. This kind of result seems to have occurred in numerous other areas when local nationalist groups took over upon the withdrawal of colonial power. The antagonisms were so great that atrocities continue even today.

PART III Leaving about 10-15 minutes for discussion, the professor should now hand out the Mountbatten and India Part III case. This little one-page case poses the student with still another dilemma. What should (can) Mountbatten do now? Why does Mountbatten say, OK, Ill do it. What are the critical factors he must deal with and how can he handle them? By promising the support of Britain and the Commonwealth when needed, Mountbatten had no choice but to accept this particular task, no matter how difficult it may seem. The more relevant question is,

Strategically what should he do? Can he really have any effect? The following steps summarizevery brieflywhat is needed and what happened. Mountbatten must: A. Create a power baseMountbatten first asks the three Congress Party leaders Patel, Nehru, and Gandhi to create an Emergency Council. Jinnah is not available for this purpose. B. Avoid betrayal of leadersMountbatten immediately warns the leaders that their supporters will never forgive them if he (Mountbatten) is found to have been put back in power after Independence. Consequently, all of the parties agree that none of them will talk about what happens in this meeting until the last of them is alive. By a quirk in history, Mountbatten is that person. To keep the formalities of power in place, he recommends that the Council ask him to be its advisor. He then says, As your advisor I suggest to the Council.... And he very strongly acts to keep the Council making the formal decisions while he merely is an advisor. C. Build an information baseSince the situation is in great confusion, Mountbatten immediately establishes a command center into which all information can flow. This helps him and the leaders understand the situation in the best manner possible. D. Avoid British exposureIn order to avoid subverting the carefully laid position that the Indians must be responsible for whatever happens, Mountbatten does not want to commit any British forces. He can commit British aircraft without substantial exposure, as long as they do not engage in significant military actions. Otherwise, British troops must be used as little as possible. E. Identify resourcesMountbatten begins to look for whatever forces are available. A few of the military units are still moderately intact. Some local police forces still have some control. Most of the bureaucracy, however, is beginning to collapse. Fortunately, some of the Maharajas have their own local fighting forces or armies. Can the new government strike a deal with the Maharajas to stabilize the situation without risking their takeover of the country? F. Concentrate at key pointsEven with the limited forces at hand, Mountbatten must concentrate these forces in a few crucial places. What are they? Students usually conclude: Delhi, Calcutta, the border area, and the trains. Mountbatten tries to concentrate his forces in these positions and uses his aircraft to provide the appearance of protection above the trains moving people north and south toward or from Pakistan. He tries to provide an armed force on the trains, where the worst atrocities have often occurred. G. Build an organizationAs quickly as possible, the Emergency Council tries to reform police forces in each of the critical areas. However, this occurs relatively randomly.

H. Use the leaders powerGandhi volunteers to go to Calcutta to try to calm that crucial city. He gets a leading Moslem to agree to live in the same house with him. Gandhi says that he will make his life forfeit if the Hindus kill Moslems. He asks that the Moslem leader agree to give up his great wealth if Moslems kill Hindus. The two men stand togetherdespite great skepticismand slowly calm the Calcutta area. Gandhi begins one of his great fasts to attract attention to the need for people to stop their slaughter. Slowly, Calcutta calms down as people move out of Calcutta into Bangladesh and from Bangladesh into India. Once Gandhi feels that Calcutta is secure, he moves to Delhi to try to work the same miracle. Again, he undertakes a fast, saying it will be a fast unto death unless the country stops its madness. A few days into his fast, he is assassinated in his garden after saying his prayers. The people around Gandhi immediately call Mountbatten and begin to say, It was the Moslems who killed Gandhi. Final Conclusions Mountbatten rushes to the garden where Gandhi has been assassinated. He immediately calls out, Stop, you fools! Dont you know it was a Hindu? At that moment Mountbatten does not know that in fact an extremist Hindu sect gunned down Gandhi. However, this is a gamble, which once again pays off for Mountbatten. While the police and security forces look for the assassins, Mountbatten and the Indian leaders use Gandhis death to mesmerize the nation and tranquilize it. Throughout the country there is mourning for the funeral. Throughout the country Gandhis death and funeral preparations are covered in detail by radio and cinema. In the meantime, the trains carrying people north across the Pakistan border and bringing them south into India and those moving people into and out of Bangladesh continue the giant exodus. The great leaders from all nations come to India to honor Gandhi. The relative calm that the funeral creates assists greatly in the massive movement of millions of people from their homes to new abodes. Despite many more horrible incidents, Gandhis death pushes the transition steadily toward its conclusion. Telling this part of the story makes a dramatic ending to the case and puts the students in an action mode, rather than merely critiquing the actions of another person. We strongly urge that the professor collect all copies of Parts II and III of the case so that they do not get into the fraternity file system. The drama of these two additions makes the case lively and relevant year after year.

MOUNTBATTEN AND INDIA Part II It would be unique, a cataclysm without precedent, unforeseen in magnitude, unordered in pattern, unreasoned in savagery. For six terrible weeks, like the mysterious ravages of a medieval plague, a mania for murder would sweep across the face of northern India. There would be no sanctuary from its scourge, no corner free from the contagion of its terrible virus Everywhere the many and the strong assaulted the weak and the few Communities that had lived side by side for generations fell upon one another in an orgy of hate. It was not a war; it was not a civil war; it was not a guerrilla campaign. It was a convulsion, the sudden shattering collapse of a society. One act provoked another, one horror fed another, each slaughter begot its successor, each rumor its imitator, each atrocity its counterpart, until, like the slow-motion images of a building disintegrating under the impact of an explosion, the walls of society crumbled in upon each other.

The Punjab, August-September 1947 The disaster was easily explained. [The partition] line had left five million Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistans half of the Punjab, over five million Moslems in Indias half. Prodded by the demagoguery of Jinnah and the leaders of the Moslem League, the Punjabs exploited Moslems had convinced themselves that somehow, in Pakistan, the Land of the Pure, Hindu moneylenders, shopkeepers and amindars (aggressive Sikh landlords) would disappear. Yet, there they were in the aftermath of independence, still ready to collect their rents, still occupying their shops and farms. Inevitably, a simple thought swept the Moslem masses: if Pakistan is ours, so too are shops, farms, houses and factories of the Hindus and Sikhs. Across the border, the militant Sikhs prepared to drive the Moslems from their midst so that they could gather onto their abandoned lands their brothers whom [the partitions] scalpel had left in Pakistan. And so, in a bewildering frenzy, Hindus, Sikhs, and Moslems turned on one another. India was ever a land of extravagant dimensions, and the horror of the Punjabs killings, the abundance of human anguish and suffering that they would produce would not fail that ancient tradition. Europes people had slaughtered one another with V-bombs, howitzers, and the calculated horrors of the gas chambers; the people of the Punjab set out to destroy themselves with bamboo staves, field-hockey sticks, ice picks, knives, clubs, swords, hammers, bricks and clawing fingers. Theirs was a spontaneous, irrational, unpredictable slaughter. Appalled at the emotions that they had inadvertently unleashed, their desperate leaders tried to call them back to reason. It was a hopeless cry. There was no reason in that brief and cruel season when India went mad The gutters of Lahore ran [literally] red with blood. The beautiful Paris of the Orient was a vista of desolation and destruction. Whole streets of Hindu homes were ablaze while Moslem police and troops stood by watching. At night, the sounds of looters ransacking those homes seemed like the crunch of termites boring into logs. At his headquarters at Braganzas Hotel, the Gurkhas top officer had been besieged by a horde of pathetic,

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half-hysterical Hindu businessmen ready to offer him anything, twenty-five, thirty, fifty thousand rupees, their daughters, their wives jewelry, if only he would let them flee in his jeep the hell Lahore had become. In nearby Amritsar, broad sections of the city, its Moslem sections, were nothing but heaps of brick and debris, twisting curls of smoke drifting above them into the sky, vultures keeping their vigil on their shattered walls, the pungent aroma of decomposing corpses permeating the ruins. [340-342] For hundreds of thousands of Punjabis, the first instinctive reflex action in the cataclysm shaking their province was to rush toward the little brick-and-tile buildings that offered in each important town a reassuring symbol of organization and orderthe railroad station. The names of the trains that, for generations, had rumbled past their concrete platforms were elements of the Indian legend and measures, as well, of one of Britains most substantial achievements on the subcontinent Now, in late summer 1947, those trains would become for hundreds of thousands of Indians the best hope of fleeing the nightmares surrounding them. For tens of thousands of others, they would become rolling coffins. During those terrible days the appearance of a locomotive in scores of Punjabi stations provoked the same frenzied scenes In a concert of tears and shrieks, the crowd would throw itself on the doors and windows of the cars. They jammed their bodies and the few belongings they carried into each compartment until the trains flanks seemed to expand from the pressure of the humans inside. Dozens more fought for a handhold at each door, on the steps, on the couplings until a dense cluster of humans enfolded each car like a horde of flies swarming over a sugar cube. When there were no handholds left, hundreds more scrambled onto their rounded roofs, clinging precariously to their hot metal until each roof was lined by its dense covering of refugees . . .. [For untold thousands, the refugee trains became horror chambers] After waiting for six hours for their train to leave the station of the little Pakistani town in which he had taught for twenty years, Nihal and his family finally heard the shriek of the locomotives whistle. The only departure it heralded, however, was that of the engine. As it disappeared, a howling horde of Moslems swept down on the station brandishing clubs, homemade spears and hatchets. Screaming Allah Akhbar (God is great), they charged into the train, lashing at every Hindu in sight. Some threw the helpless passengers out of their compartment windows to the platform, where their colleagues waited like butchers to slaughter them. A few Hindus tried to run, but the green-shirted Moslems pursued them, killed them and hurled them, the dead and the dying, into a well in front of the station. The schoolteacher, his wife and six children clung to each other in terror in their compartment. The Moslems battered their way inside and began to shoot [354-355]

The Moslems, September 1947 Indias machinations were not the real threat to Pakistan. The new nation, like its Indian neighbor, was about to be engulfed by the most massive migration in human history. The violence racking the Punjab was producing its inevitable result, the result sought by the desperate men behind it on both sides of the border. From one end of the Punjab to the

other, taking whatever possessions they could carry, by car, bicycle, train, mule back, bullock car and on foot, terrified people were fleeing their homes, rushing in headlong flight toward any promise of safety. They would produce an exchange of populations, an outpouring of humanity on a scale and of an intensity never before recorded. By the time the movement reached flood tide in late September, five million human beings would clog the roads and fields of the Punjab. Ten and a half million peopleenough to form, if they joined hands, a column of miserable humans stretching from Calcutta to New Yorkwould be uprooted, most of them in the brief span of three months. Their unprecedented exodus would create ten times the number of refugees the creation of Israel would produce in the Middle East, three or four times the number of Displaced Persons who had fled Eastern Europe after the war. For the Moslems of the Indian town of Karnal, north of Delhi, the word was announced by a drummer marching through their neighborhoods, thumping his drum, proclaiming in Urdu: For the protection of the Moslem population, trains have arrived to carry them to Pakistan. Twenty thousand people left their homes within an hour, marching off to the railroad station to the beat of that drummer. A town crier informed the two thousand Moslems of the Indian town of Kasauli that they had twenty-four hours to leave. When they were assembled at dawn the following morning on a parade ground, all their belongings except one blanket apiece and the clothes they wore, were taken from them. Then, a pathetic gaggle of people, they started to walk toward their Promised Land No one was immune. The Moslem patients at the Lady Linlithgow Tuberculosis Sanatorium in Kasauli were ordered out of the clinic by their Hindu doctors. Some of them had only one lung; others were recovering from surgery, but they were taken to the sanatoriums gates and told to start walking to Pakistan. In Pakistan the twenty-five sadhus of the Baba Lal ashram were driven out of the buildings where they had devoted their lives to prayer, meditation, yoga and Hindu study. Wrapped in their orange robes, their saint, Swami Sundar, on the ashrams miraculous white horse at their head, they marched off chanting mantras, while behind them a mob set their ashram ablaze [350351] Each day at dawn as reconnaissance pilots took off to pick the columns up again, refugees emerged from under the mantle of night to crawl a few more miles toward safety. The sight spread out below their wings on those September mornings was a spectacle such as no human eyes had ever beheld. One pilot, Flight Lieutenant Patwant Singh, would always remember whole antlike herds of human beings walking over open country spread out like cattle in the cattle drives of the Westerns Id seen, slipping in droves past the fires of the villages burning all around them. Another remembered flying for over fifteen breathtaking moments at 200 miles per hour, without reaching the end of one column. Sometimes, slowed by some inexplicable bottleneck, it bulged into a thick cluster of humans and carts, and then became a thin trickle a few miles on, only to coagulate once more into a bundle of people at the next roadblock. By day, pale clouds of dust churned by the hoofs of thousands of buffaloes and bullocks hung above each column, stains along the horizon plotting the refugees advance. At

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night, collapsing by the side of the road, the refugees built thousands of little fires to cook their scraps of food. From a distance, the light of their fires diffused by the dust settling above the columns merged into one dull red glow It was not just a brief trip to another village those helpless Indians and Pakistanis were making. Theirs was the trek of the uprooted, a journey with no return across hundreds of miles, each mile menaced with exhaustion, starvation, cholera, attacks against which there was often no defense. Hindu, Moslem and Sikh, those refugees were the innocent and the unarmed, illiterate peasants whose only life had been the fields they worked, most of whom did not know what a viceroy was, who were indifferent to the Congress Party and the Moslem League, who had never bothered with issues like partition or boundary lines or even the freedom in whose name they had been plunged into misery. [376-377] Delhi Riots In Delhi, capital city of India, it began with the slaughter of a dozen Moslem porters at the railroad station. A few minutes later, a French journalist, Max Olivier-Lecamp, emerged into Connaught Circus, the commercial heart of New Delhi, to discover a Hindu mob looting its Moslem shops and butchering their owners. Above their heads, he saw a familiar figure in a white Congress cap whirling a lathi, beating the rioters, showering them with curses, trying by his actions to arouse the dozen indifferent policemen behind him. It was Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister. Those attacks were the signal for commandos of Akali Sikhs in their electric-blue turbans and the R.S.S.S. with white handkerchiefs around their foreheads to unleash similar attacks all across the city. Old Delhis Green Market with its thousands of Moslem fruit and vegetable peddlers was set ablaze. In New Delhis Lodi Colony near the marbledomed mausoleum of the Emperor Humayun and the red-sandstone tomb of Akbars greatest general, Sikh bands burst into the bungalows of Moslem civil servants, slaughtering anyone they found home. By noon, the bodies of their victims were scattered about the green expanses ringing the buildings from which England had imposed her Pax Britannica over the subcontinent. The riots sweeping Delhi, however, threatened more than just another city. They threatened all India. A collapse of order in Delhi could menace the entire subcontinent. And that was exactly what had happened. The Citys Moslem policemen, over half its force, had deserted. There were only nine hundred troops on hand. The administration, already reeling under the impact of events in the Punjab, was grinding to a halt. Early in the evening of September 4, with more than a thousand people already dead in Delhi, V.P. Menon, the man who had prepared a final draft of Mountbattens partition plan, called a secret meeting of a handful of key Indian Civil Servants. Their conclusion was unanimous: there was no effective administration in Delhi. The capital and the country were on the verge of collapse. [368-369]

MOUNTBATTEN AND INDIA Part III On that historic September 4th [after independence], the caller to [Governor General] Mountbattens cool Himalayan mountain retreat in Simla was V.P. Menon. There was no one in India for whose advice and counsel Mountbatten had more respect. Your Excellency, Menon said, you must return to Delhi. But, V.P., Mountbatten protested, Ive just come away. If my Cabinet wishes me to countersign something, just send it up here and Ill countersign it. That was not it at all, Menon said. The situation has gone very badly since Your Excellency left. Trouble has broken out here in Delhi. We just dont know how far its going to go. The Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister are both very worried. They think its essential for Your Excellency to come back. They need more than your advice now, Menon said; they need your help. V.P., Mountbatten said, I dont think thats what they want at all. Theyve just gotten their independence. The last thing they want is their former chief of state coming back and putting his fingers in their pie. Im not coming. Tell them. Very well, replied Menon, I will. But theres no sense in changing your mind later. If Your Excellency doesnt come down in twenty-four hours, dont bother to come at all. It will be too late. Well have lost India. There was a long, stunned silence at the other end of the phone. Then Mountbatten said, very calmly: All right, V.P., you old swine, you win. Ill come down. [370] The Return of Power Three people were present at the meeting in Delhi: Mountbatten, Nehru, and Patel You must grip [handle] it, said Mountbatten to those who had called him. How can we grip it? Nehru replied. We have no experience. Weve spent the best years of our lives in your British jails. Our experience is in the art of agitation, not administration. We can barely manage to run a well-organized government in normal circumstances. Were just not up to facing an absolute collapse of law and order Were in an emergency and we need help. Will you run the country? Well pledge ourselves to do whatever you say Yes, seconded Patel at Nehrus side, hes right. Youve got to take it. Mountbatten was aghast. My God, he said, Ive just gotten through giving you the country, and here you two are asking me to take it back! Mountbatten thought a moment. He loved a challenge and this was a formidable one. His personal esteem for Nehru, his affection for India, his sense of responsibility left him no out. All right, he said, Ill do it, I can pull the thing together. [370-371]

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