Undercurrents

Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri and Arshad H. Abbasi suleri@sdpi.org; abbasi@sdpi.org The statement that "Pakistan is soon going to join water scarce nations" is made in the latest United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) State of the Environment report. This is confirmed by the World Bank's latest publication on the Pakistan water situation, titled Pakistan: running dry. Population growth, rapid urbanisation, increases in per capita water consumption (due to improved life style?) and climate change are some of the reasons given for the increased water shortage in the country. However, we feel that it is the lethal combination of bad water governance, incompetence and high population growth which has pushed Pakistan into a situation of water scarcity which leaves no margin for error for our water management experts. So far, it seems that the approach to averting a crisis is entirely erroneous. Our mindsets are historically tuned to explore new water resources, but in this era of conservation the focus should be on the efficient use of existing water resources, rather than trying to construct new ones. Unfortunately, those whose word is law in managing drinking water resources keep repeating the same mistake, paying no heed to new concepts and continuing to focus on preparing feasibility reports for tapping new 'water resources'. Their focus is on mega-and macrointerventions to rectify the situation, although the required prescription for today is the management of finite water sources through micro-management. Why is this micro-management required? Take the example of Islamabad, where according to some government reports, 'unaccounted for' water (i.e. water lost between source and consumer) is more than 60 percent of the total. Three major water sources that cater to the requirements of Islamabad are the Khanpur Dam, the Simly Dam, and ground water extracted through tubewells. Consider the case of Khanpur Dam, built in 1985 with a huge investment of Rs 6.178 billion to cater to the water needs of the country's capital and its twin city of Rawalpindi till 2030 (keeping in mind population growth). Khanpur Dam had an original storage capacity of 110,000 acre feet (AF). Even today its storage capacity is only 91,000 AF, which is three times bigger than that of Simly Dam (27,800 AF). It is significant that the larger dam is producing less water (23 million gallons per day) than the smaller one (40 million gallons per day). It does not require sophisticated analysis to understand why Khanpur Dam is not delivering as much water as it should. It is simply because of the wrong selection in 1986 of the water conveyance route from the reservoir to the twin cities by the apex decision-making body of the country, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC).The catastrophic

story of this selection started when, in 1983, the government of Pakistan requested the Japan International Corporation Agency (JICA) to carry out a detailed study on delivering water from Khanpur to Rawalpindi/Islamabad. A team of the Japanese experts from JICA (on behalf of the government of Japan) conducted a detailed feasibility study and proposed three options for transporting water. These were: (1) Nicholson Monument utilising the 19 Km left bank canal (LBC) and pumping water to an elevation of 400 feet before supplying it to Islamabad/Rawalpindi (2) Direct supply from the Khanpur reservoir to Islamabad through a short tunnel, along with use of a canal and a pumping station and (3) direct supply from the reservoir through a long tunnel to Islamabad with gravity flow. The project was considered in an ECNEC meeting in 1985 in light of the JICA report. It was decided that the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) should appraise the three alternatives and recommend the most suitable one. This was done, and WAPDA recommended the third alternative as it was the most economical and sustainable route. But ECNEC turned down the recommendation in 1986 and opted for the first option. This meant that water had to flow down from the reservoir and then be pumped to an elevation of 400 feet. The monthly electricity bill for this pumping alone stands at more than Rs.7 million. The consequences of this decision are now proving more drastic than was apprehended by the experts. There are two problematic aspects of the situation: the high operational and maintenance cost of the water supply system, and the quality and availability of the water. The left bank canal passes through some sensitive and heavy industries in Taxila, where untreated effluent is disposed of in the water. Another primary problem is that the intake capacity of the LBC from Khanpur Dam has reduced from 440 cusec to 124 cusec over time because of the deteriorating canal structure. The leaky canal structure is also threatened by stone crushing operations all along its route, with debris continuously falling into it, which also reduces its capacity. JICA carried out a post-project evaluation of Khanpur Dam in 2003 and concluded that the regional drought was responsible for the insufficient water supply in the dam. However, the evaluators ignored the fact that 4,560 million gallons of water had to be released from the Khanpur reservoir through its spillway (that is, this water was diverted from the canal) in March 2003 in order to protect the dam from bursting after it had filled to capacity. Water storage statistics for 2005 reveal that 20,266.47 million gallons of water had to be released through the spillway. This is more than Rawalpindis entire annual consumption of water. In addition to this wasteful but necessary spilling of water, seepage is a major cause of loss. The daily seepage of Khanpur Dam is 16 MGD at the lower level and 40 MGD at the higher level.

(The latter obtains when the reservoir is full.) Contrast this with Islamabad's average daily water requirement, which is 65 MGD, and you realise that preventing this seepage could play an important role in stabilising the water supply to the capital city. Now that it is becoming increasingly evident that Khanpur Dam is unable to meet the water supply requirements of Islamabad, the official managers are once again bent upon taking the same error-filled route. To cope with the water deficiency, the Capital Development Authority has paid 15 million rupees to a consultancy firm for a feasibility study focused on carrying drinking water from either the Indus or the Jhelum to Islamabad. It must be kept in mind that the points where these rivers would be tapped are on average 800-900 feet below Islamabad. This means that if water is supplied to Islamabad from the two rivers, it will have to be pumped to at least an elevation of 800 feet. This study of the Khanpur Dam reveals that much can be achieved if we focus our attention on conserving existing water resources and rectifying the mistakes of the past, rather than repeating them. If expensive blunders with a high cost to the national exchequer keep being committed in the federal capital, under the noses of the high and the mighty of the land, what is the state of affairs in rest of the country? Let us conclude by saying that Pakistan is getting dry not only because of population growth or climate change, but also because of poor governance and flawed decision-making, both of which ignore the basic principles of sustainable development for short term gains. The findings of the study on the Khanpur Dam clearly support the contention that Pakistan can generate enough water resources to meet all its drinking and agricultural requirements simply by conserving and efficiently operating its existing resources. Who said it's a do or die situation when it comes to constructing big dams?