Anda di halaman 1dari 119


Evolutionary psychology History of evolutionary psychology Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology Psychological adaptation Adaptive bias Cognitive module Dual inheritance theory Evolutionary developmental psychology Human behavioral ecology Instinct Modularity of mind Cultural universal Consciousness Evolutionary linguistics Evolutionary psychology of religion Criticism of evolutionary psychology Standard social science model Evolutionary educational psychology 1 27 30 36 38 39 42 53 57 60 63 67 70 86 92 96 106 109

Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 115 117

Article Licenses
License 118

Evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary psychology

Outline History Subfields

Basic types

Abnormal Biological Cognitive Comparative Cultural Differential Developmental Evolutionary Experimental Mathematical Personality Positive Quantitative Social

Applied psychology

Applied behavior analysis Clinical Community Consumer Educational Environmental Forensic Health Industrial and organizational Legal Military Occupational health Political Religion School Sport


Disciplines Organizations Psychologists Psychotherapies

Evolutionary psychology

Publications Research methods Theories Timeline Topics Psychology portal

Part of a series on

Evolutionary biology

Diagrammatic representation of the divergence of modern taxonomic groups from their common ancestor.

Evolutionary biology portal Category Book Related topics

Evolutionary psychology (EP) is an approach in the social and natural sciences that examines psychological traits such as memory, perception, and language from a modern evolutionary perspective. It seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection. Adaptationist thinking about physiological mechanisms, such as the heart, lungs, and immune system, is common in evolutionary biology. Some evolutionary psychologists apply the same thinking to psychology, arguing that the mind has a modular structure similar to that of the body, with different modular adaptations serving different functions. Evolutionary psychologists argue that much of human behavior is the output of psychological adaptations that evolved to solve recurrent problems in human ancestral environments.[1] The adaptationist approach is steadily increasing as an influence in the general field of psychology.[2][3] Evolutionary psychologists suggest that EP is not simply a subdiscipline of psychology but that evolutionary theory can provide a foundational, metatheoretical framework that integrates the entire field of psychology, in the same way it has for biology.[][4][5] Evolutionary psychologists hold that behaviors or traits that occur universally in all cultures are good candidates for evolutionary adaptations[3] including the abilities to infer others' emotions, discern kin from non-kin, identify and prefer healthier mates, and cooperate with others. They report successful tests of theoretical predictions related to such topics as infanticide, intelligence, marriage patterns, promiscuity, perception of beauty, bride price, and parental investment.[6]

Evolutionary psychology The theories and findings of EP have applications in many fields, including economics, environment, health, law, management, psychiatry, politics, and literature.[7][8] Controversies concerning EP involve questions of testability, cognitive and evolutionary assumptions (such as modular functioning of the brain, and large uncertainty about the ancestral environment), importance of non-genetic and non-adaptive explanations, as well as political and ethical issues due to interpretations of research results.[9]

Evolutionary psychology is an approach that views human nature as the product of a universal set of evolved psychological adaptations to recurring problems in the ancestral environment. Proponents of EP suggest that it seeks to integrate psychology into the other natural sciences, rooting it in the organizing theory of biology (evolutionary theory), and thus understanding psychology as a branch of biology. Anthropologist John Tooby and psychologist Leda Cosmides note: "Evolutionary psychology is the long-forestalled scientific attempt to assemble out of the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory human disciplines a single, logically integrated research framework for the psychological, social, and behavioral sciencesa framework that not only incorporates the evolutionary sciences on a full and equal basis, but that systematically works out all of the revisions in existing belief and research practice that such a synthesis requires."[10] Just as human physiology and evolutionary physiology have worked to identify physical adaptations of the body that represent "human physiological nature," the purpose of evolutionary psychology is to identify evolved emotional and cognitive adaptations that represent "human psychological nature." According to Steven Pinker, EP is "not a single theory but a large set of hypotheses" and a term that "has also come to refer to a particular way of applying evolutionary theory to the mind, with an emphasis on adaptation, gene-level selection, and modularity." Evolutionary psychology adopts an understanding of the mind that is based on the computational theory of mind. It describes mental processes as computational operations, so that, for example, a fear response is described as arising from a neurological computation that inputs the perceptional data, e.g. a visual image of a spider, and outputs the appropriate reaction, e.g. fear of possibly dangerous animals. While philosophers have generally considered the human mind to include broad faculties, such as reason and lust, evolutionary psychologists describe evolved psychological mechanisms as narrowly focused to deal with specific issues, such as catching cheaters or choosing mates. EP views the human brain as comprising many functional mechanisms,[citation needed] called psychological adaptations or evolved cognitive mechanisms or cognitive modules, designed by the process of natural selection. Examples include language-acquisition modules, incest-avoidance mechanisms, cheater-detection mechanisms, intelligence and sex-specific mating preferences, foraging mechanisms, alliance-tracking mechanisms, agent-detection mechanisms, and others. Some mechanisms, termed domain-specific, deal with recurrent adaptive problems over the course of human evolutionary history.[citation needed] Domain-general mechanisms, on the other hand, are proposed to deal with evolutionary novelty.[citation needed] EP has roots in cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology but also draws on behavioral ecology, artificial intelligence, genetics, ethology, anthropology, archaeology, biology, and zoology. EP is closely linked to sociobiology,[3] but there are key differences between them including the emphasis on domain-specific rather than domain-general mechanisms, the relevance of measures of current fitness, the importance of mismatch theory, and psychology rather than behavior. Most of what is now labeled as sociobiological research is now confined to the field of behavioral ecology.[citation needed] Nikolaas Tinbergen's four categories of questions can help to clarify the distinctions between several different, but complementary, types of explanations.[11] Evolutionary psychology focuses primarily on the "why?" questions, while traditional psychology focuses on the "how?" questions.[12]

Evolutionary psychology

Sequential vs. Static Perspective Historical/Developmental Explanation of current form in terms of a historical sequence How vs. Why Questions Proximate Ontogeny How an individual organism's Developmental explanations for changes in structures function individuals, from DNA to their current form Evolutionary Why a species evolved the structures (adaptations) it has Phylogeny The history of the evolution of sequential changes in a species over many generations Current Form Explanation of the current form of species

Mechanism Mechanistic explanations for how an organism's structures work Adaptation A species trait that evolved to solve a reproductive or survival problem in the ancestral environment

Evolutionary psychology is founded on several core premises. 1. The brain is an information processing device, and it produces behavior in response to external and internal inputs.[][13] 2. The brain's adaptive mechanisms were shaped by natural and sexual selection.[][13] 3. Different neural mechanisms are specialized for solving problems in humanity's evolutionary past.[][13] 4. The brain has evolved specialized neural mechanisms that were designed for solving problems that recurred over deep evolutionary time,[13] giving modern humans stone-age minds.[] 5. Most contents and processes of the brain are unconscious; and most mental problems that seem easy to solve are actually extremely difficult problems that are solved unconsciously by complicated neural mechanisms.[] 6. Human psychology consists of many specialized mechanisms, each sensitive to different classes of information or inputs. These mechanisms combine to produce manifest behavior.[13]

Evolutionary psychology has its historical roots in Charles Darwins theory of natural selection.[3] In The Origin of Species, Darwin predicted that psychology would develop an evolutionary basis: In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 1859, p. 449.
Nobel Laureates Nikolaas Tinbergen (left) and

Two of his later books were devoted to the study of animal emotions Konrad Lorenz (right) who were, with Karl von Frisch, acknowledged for work on animal and psychology; The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex [] behavior in 1871 and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872. Darwin's work inspired William Jamess functionalist approach to psychology.[3] Darwin's theories of evolution, adaptation, and natural selection have provided insight into why brains function the way they do. [][14] The content of EP has derived from, on one hand, the biological sciences (especially evolutionary theory as it relates to ancient human environments, the study of paleoanthropology and animal behavior) and, on the other, the human sciences, especially psychology.

Evolutionary psychology Evolutionary biology as an academic discipline emerged with the modern evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s.[15] In the 1930s the study of animal behavior (ethology) emerged with the work of Dutch biologist Nikolaas Tinbergen and Austrian biologists Konrad Lorenz and Karl von Frisch. W.D. Hamilton's (1964) papers on inclusive fitness and Robert Trivers's (1972)[] theories on reciprocity and parental investment helped to establish evolutionary thinking in psychology and the other social sciences. In 1975, Edward O. Wilson combined evolutionary theory with studies of animal and social behavior, building on the works of Lorenz and Tinbergen, in his book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. In the 1970s, two major branches developed from ethology. Firstly, the study of animal social behavior (including humans) generated sociobiology, defined by its pre-eminent proponent Edward O. Wilson in 1975 as "the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior"[16] and in 1978 as "the extension of population biology and evolutionary theory to social organization."[17] Secondly, there was behavioral ecology which placed less emphasis on social behavior by focusing on the ecological and evolutionary basis of both animal and human behavior. In the 1970s and 1980s university departments began to include the term evolutionary biology in their titles. The modern era of evolutionary psychology was ushered in, in particular, by Donald Symons' 1979 book The Evolution of Human Sexuality and Leda Cosmides and John Tooby's 1992 book The Adapted Mind.[3] From psychology there are the primary streams of developmental, social and cognitive psychology. Establishing some measure of the relative influence of genetics and environment on behavior has been at the core of behavioral genetics and its variants, notably studies at the molecular level that examine the relationship between genes, neurotransmitters and behavior. Dual inheritance theory (DIT), developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has a slightly different perspective by trying to explain how human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. DIT is seen by some as a "middle-ground" between views that emphasize human universals versus those that emphasize cultural variation.[18]

Theoretical foundations
The theories on which evolutionary psychology is based originated with Charles Darwin's work, including his speculations about the evolutionary origins of social instincts in humans. Modern evolutionary psychology, however, is possible only because of advances in evolutionary theory in the 20th century. Evolutionary psychologists say that natural selection has provided humans with many psychological adaptations, in much the same way that it generated humans' anatomical and physiological adaptations.[19] As with adaptations in general, psychological adaptations are said to be specialized for the environment in which an organism evolved, the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA.[19][20] Sexual selection provides organisms with adaptations related to mating.[19] For male mammals, which have a relatively high maximal potential reproduction rate, sexual selection leads to adaptations that help them compete for females.[19] For female mammals, with a relatively low maximal potential reproduction rate, sexual selection leads to choosiness, which helps females select higher quality mates.[19] Charles Darwin described both natural selection and sexual selection, and he relied on group selection to explain the evolution of altruistic (self-sacrificing) behavior. But group selection was considered a weak explanation, because in any group the less altruistic individuals will be more likely to survive, and the group will become less self-sacrificing as a whole. In 1964, William D. Hamilton proposed inclusive fitness theory, emphasizing a "gene's-eye" view of evolution. Hamilton noted that individuals can increase the replication of their genes into the next generation by helping close relatives with whom they share genes survive and reproduce. According to "Hamilton's rule", a self-sacrificing behavior can evolve if it helps close relatives so much that it more than compensates for the individual animal's sacrifice. Inclusive fitness theory resolved the issue of how "altruism" evolved. Other theories also help explain the evolution of altruistic behavior, including evolutionary game theory, tit-for-tat reciprocity, and generalized reciprocity. These theories not only help explain the development of altruistic behavior, but also account for hostility toward cheaters (individuals that take advantage of others' altruism).[2]

Evolutionary psychology Several mid-level evolutionary theories inform evolutionary psychology. The r/K selection theory proposes that some species prosper by having many offspring, while others follow the strategy of having fewer offspring but investing much more in each one. Humans follow the second strategy. Parental investment theory explains how parents invest more or less in individual offspring based on how successful those offspring are likely to be, and thus how much they might improve the parents' inclusive fitness. According to the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, parents in good conditions tend to invest more in sons (who are best able to take advantage of good conditions), while parents in poor conditions tend to invest more in daughters (who are best able to have successful offspring even in poor conditions). According to life history theory, animals evolve life histories to match their environments, determining details such as age at first reproduction and number of offspring. Dual inheritance theory posits that genes and human culture have interacted, with genes affecting the development of culture, and culture, in turn, affecting human evolution on a genetic level (see also the Baldwin effect).

Evolved psychological mechanisms

Evolutionary psychology is based on the hypothesis that, just like hearts, lungs, livers, kidneys, and immune systems, cognition has functional structure that has a genetic basis, and therefore has evolved by natural selection. Like other organs and tissues, this functional structure should be universally shared amongst a species, and should solve important problems of survival and reproduction. Evolutionary psychologists seek to understand psychological mechanisms by understanding the survival and reproductive functions they might have served over the course of evolutionary history.[citation needed] These might include abilities to infer others' emotions, discern kin from non-kin, identify and prefer healthier mates, or cooperate with others. Consistent with the theory of natural selection, evolutionary psychology sees humans as often in conflict with others, including mates and relatives. Even mothers sometimes struggle with their children over weaning, which benefits the mother more than the child. Evolutionary psychology also recognizes the role of kin selection and reciprocity in evolving prosocial traits such as altruism.[2] Like chimps and bonobos, humans have subtle and flexible social instincts, allowing them to form extended families, lifelong friendships, and political alliances.[2] In studies testing theoretical predictions, evolutionary psychologists have made modest findings on topics such as infanticide, intelligence, marriage patterns, promiscuity, perception of beauty, bride price and parental investment.[6]

Products of evolution: adaptations, exaptations, byproducts, and random variation

Not all traits of organisms are adaptations. As noted in the table below, traits may also be exaptations, byproducts of adaptations (sometimes called "spandrels"), or random variation between individuals.[21] Psychological adaptations are hypothesized to be innate or relatively easy to learn, and to manifest in cultures worldwide. For example, the ability of toddlers to learn a language with virtually no training is likely to be a psychological adaptation. On the other hand, ancestral humans did not read or write, thus today, learning to read and write require extensive training, and presumably represent byproducts of cognitive processing that use psychological adaptations designed for other functions.[22] However, variations in manifest behavior can result from universal mechanisms interacting with different local environments. For example, Caucasians who move from a northern climate to the equator will have darker skin. The mechanisms regulating their pigmentation do not change; rather the input to the those mechanisms change, resulting in different output.

Evolutionary psychology

Adaptation Definition Organismic trait designed to solve an ancestral problem(s). Shows complexity, special "design", functionality Bones / Umbilical cord

Exaptation Adaptation that has been "re-designed" to solve a different adaptive problem.

By-Product Byproduct of an adaptive mechanism with no current or ancestral function

Random Noise Random variations in an adaptation or byproduct

Physiological Example

Small bones of the inner ear

White color of bones / Belly button

Bumps on the skull, convex or concave belly button shape Within-sex variations in voice pitch.

Psychological Example

Toddlers ability to learn to talk with minimal instruction.

Voluntary Attention

Ability to learn to read and write.

One of the tasks of evolutionary psychology is to identify which psychological traits are likely to be adaptations, byproducts or random variation. George C Williams suggested that an "adaptation is a special and onerous concept that should only be used where it is really necessary."[23] As noted by Williams and others, adaptations can be identified by their improbable complexity, species universality, and adaptive functionality.

Obligate and facultative adaptations

A question that may be asked about an adaptation is whether it is generally obligate (relatively robust in the face of typical environmental variation) or facultative (sensitive to typical environmental variation).[24] The sweet taste of sugar and the pain of hitting one's knee against concrete are the result of fairly obligate psychological adaptations; typical environmental variability during development does not much affect their operation. By contrast, facultative adaptations are somewhat like "if-then" statements. For example, adult attachment style seems particularly sensitive to early childhood experiences. As adults, the propensity to develop close, trusting bonds with others is dependent on whether early childhood caregivers could be trusted to provide reliable assistance and attention. The adaptation for skin to tan is conditional to exposure to sunlight; this is an example of another facultative adaptation. When a psychological adaptation is facultative, evolutionary psychologists concern themselves with how developmental and environmental inputs influence the expression of the adaptation.

Cultural universals
Evolutionary psychologists hold that behaviors or traits that occur universally in all cultures are good candidates for evolutionary adaptations.[3] Cultural universals include behaviors related to language, cognition, social roles, gender roles, and technology.[25] Evolved psychological adaptations (such as the ability to learn a language) interact with cultural inputs to produce specific behaviors (e.g., the specific language learned). Basic gender differences, such as greater eagerness for sex among men and greater coyness among women,[26] are explained as sexually dimorphic psychological adaptations that reflect the different reproductive strategies of males and females.[2][27] Evolutionary psychologists contrast their approach to what they term the "standard social science model," according to which the mind is a general-purpose cognition device shaped almost entirely by culture.[28][29]

Evolutionary psychology

Environment of evolutionary adaptedness

EP argues that to properly understand the functions of the brain, one must understand the properties of the environment in which the brain evolved. That environment is often referred to as the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" (EEA).[20] The idea of an environment of evolutionary adaptedness was first explored as a part of attachment theory by John Bowlby.[citation needed] This is the environment to which a particular evolved mechanism is adapted. More specifically, the EEA is defined as the set of historically recurring selection pressures that formed a given adaptation, as well as those aspects of the environment that were necessary for the proper development and functioning of the adaptation. Humans, comprising the genus Homo, appeared between 1.5 and 2.5 million years ago, a time that roughly coincides with the start of the Pleistocene 1.8 million years ago. Because the Pleistocene ended a mere 12,000 years ago, most human adaptations either newly evolved during the Pleistocene, or were maintained by stabilizing selection during the Pleistocene. Evolutionary psychology therefore proposes that the majority of human psychological mechanisms are adapted to reproductive problems frequently encountered in Pleistocene environments.[] In broad terms, these problems include those of growth, development, differentiation, maintenance, mating, parenting, and social relationships. The EEA is significantly different from modern society.[30] The ancestors of modern humans lived in smaller groups, had more cohesive cultures, and had more stable and rich contexts for identity and meaning.[30] Researchers look to existing hunter-gatherer societies for clues as to how hunter-gatherers lived in the EEA.[2] Since hunter-gatherer societies are egalitarian[citation needed], the ancestral population may have been egalitarian as well, a social pattern different from the hierarchies found in chimp bands.[2] Unfortunately, the few surviving hunter-gatherer societies are different from each other, and they have been pushed out of the best land and into harsh environments, so it is not clear how closely they reflect ancestral culture.[2] Evolutionary psychologists sometimes look to chimpanzees, bonobos, and other great apes for insight into human ancestral behavior.[2] Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jetha argue that evolutionary psychologists have overemphasized the similarity of humans and chimps, which are more violent, while underestimating the similarity of humans and bonobos, which are more peaceful.[31]

Since an organism's adaptations were suited to its ancestral environment, a new and different environment can create a mismatch. Because humans are mostly adapted to Pleistocene environments, psychological mechanisms sometimes exhibit "mismatches" to the modern environment. One example is the fact that although about 10,000 people are killed with guns in the US annually,[32] whereas spiders and snakes kill only a handful, people nonetheless learn to fear spiders and snakes about as easily as they do a pointed gun, and more easily than an unpointed gun, rabbits or flowers.[] A potential explanation is that spiders and snakes were a threat to human ancestors throughout the Pleistocene, whereas guns (and rabbits and flowers) were not. There is thus a mismatch between humans' evolved fear-learning psychology and the modern environment.[][] This mismatch also shows up in the phenomena of the supernormal stimulus, a stimulus that elicits a response more strongly than the stimulus for which the response evolved. The term was coined by Niko Tinbergen to refer to non-human animal behavior, but psychologist Deirdre Barrett said that supernormal stimulation governs the behavior of humans as powerfully as that of other animals. She explained junk food as an exaggerated stimulus to cravings for salt, sugar, and fats,[33] and she says that television is an exaggeration of social cues of laughter, smiling faces and attention-grabbing action.[34] Magazine centerfolds and double cheeseburgers pull instincts intended for an EEA where breast development was a sign of health, youth and fertility in a prospective mate, and fat was a rare and vital nutrient.[]

Evolutionary psychology

Research methods
Evolutionary theory is heuristic in that it may generate hypotheses that might not be developed from other theoretical approaches. One of the major goals of adaptationist research is to identify which organismic traits are likely to be adaptations, and which are byproducts or random variations. As noted earlier, adaptations are expected to show evidence of complexity, functionality, and species universality, while byproducts or random variation will not. In addition, adaptations are expected to manifest as proximate mechanisms that interact with the environment in either a generally obligate or facultative fashion (see above). Evolutionary psychologists are also interested in identifying these proximate mechanisms (sometimes termed "mental mechanisms" or "psychological adaptations") and what type of information they take as input, how they process that information, and their outputs.[24] Evolutionary developmental psychology, or "evo-devo," focuses on how adaptations may be activated at certain developmental times (e.g., losing baby teeth, adolescence, etc.) or how events during the development of an individual may alter life history trajectories. Evolutionary psychologists use several strategies to develop and test hypotheses about whether a psychological trait is likely to be an evolved adaptation. Buss (2011)[35] notes that these methods include: Cross-cultural Consistency. Characteristics that have been demonstrated to be cross cultural human universals such as smiling, crying, facial expressions are presumed to be evolved psychological adaptations. Several evolutionary psychologists have collected massive datasets from cultures around the world to assess cross-cultural universality. Function to Form (or "problem to solution"). The fact that males, but not females, risk potential misidentification of genetic offspring (referred to as "paternity insecurity") led evolutionary psychologists to hypothesize that, compared to females, male jealousy would be more focused on sexual, rather than emotional, infidelity. Form to Function (reverse-engineering or "solution to problem"). Morning sickness, and associated aversions to certain types of food, during pregnancy seemed to have the characteristics of an evolved adaptation (complexity and universality). Margie Profet hypothesized that the function was to avoid the ingestion of toxins during early pregnancy that could damage fetus (but which are otherwise likely to be harmless to healthy non-pregnant women). Corresponding Neurological Modules. Evolutionary psychology and cognitive neuropsychology are mutually compatible evolutionary psychology helps to identify psychological adaptations and their ultimate, evolutionary functions, while neuropsychology helps to identify the proximate manifestations of these adaptations. Evolutionary psychologists also use various sources of data for testing, including experiments, archaeological records, data from hunter-gatherer societies, observational studies, self-reports and surveys, public records, and human products.[36] Recently, additional methods and tools have been introduced based on fictional scenarios,[] mathematical models,[] and multi-agent computer simulations.[]

Evolutionary psychology


Major areas of research

Foundational areas of research in evolutionary psychology can be divided into broad categories of adaptive problems that arise from the theory of evolution itself: survival, mating, parenting, family and kinship, interactions with non-kin, and cultural evolution.

Survival and individual level psychological adaptations

Problems of survival are thus clear targets for the evolution of physical and psychological adaptations.Wikipedia:Please clarify Major problems the ancestors of present day humans faced included food selection and acquisition; territory selection and physical shelter; and avoiding predators and other environmental threats.[37] Consciousness Consciousness is likely an evolved adaptation since it meetsWikipedia:ASF#A_simple_formulation George Williams' criteria of species universality, complexity,[38] and functionality, and it is a trait that apparently increases fitness.[39] In his paper "Evolution of consciousness," John Eccles argues that special anatomical and physical adaptations of the mammalian cerebral cortex gave rise to consciousness.[40] In contrast, others have argued that the recursive circuitry underwriting consciousness is much more primitive, having evolved initially in pre-mammalian species because it improves the capacity for interaction with both social and natural environments by providing an energy-saving "neutral" gear in an otherwise energy-expensive motor output machine.[41] Once in place, this recursive circuitry may well have provided a basis for the subsequent development of many of the functions that consciousness facilitates in higher organisms, as outlined by Bernard J. Baars.[42] Richard Dawkins suggested that humans evolved consciousness in order to make themselves the subjects of thought.[43] Daniel Povinelli suggests that large, tree-climbing apes evolved consciousness to take into account one's own mass when moving safely among tree branches.[43] Consistent with this hypothesis, Gordon Gallup found that chimps and orangutans, but not little monkeys or terrestrial gorillas, demonstrated self-awareness in mirror tests.[43] The concept of consciousness can refer to voluntary action, awareness, or wakefulness. However, even voluntary behavior involves unconscious mechanisms. Many cognitive processes take place in the cognitive unconscious, unavailable to conscious awareness. Some behaviors are conscious when learned but then become unconscious, seemingly automatic. Learning, especially implicitly learning a skill, can take place outside of consciousness. For example, plenty of people know how to turn right when they ride a bike, but very few can accurately explain how they actually do so. Sleep may have evolved to conserve energy when activity would be less fruitful or more dangerous, such as at night, especially in winter.[43] Sensation and perception Many experts, such as Jerry Fodor, write that the purpose of perception is knowledge, but evolutionary psychologists hold that its primary purpose is to guide action.[44] For example, they say, depth perception seems to have evolved not to help us know the distances to other objects but rather to help us move around in space.[44] Evolutionary psychologists say that animals from fiddler crabs to humans use eyesight for collision avoidance, suggesting that vision is basically for directing action, not providing knowledge.[44] Building and maintaining sense organs is metabolically expensive, so these organs evolve only when they improve an organism's fitness.[44] More than half the brain is devoted to processing sensory information, and the brain itself consumes roughly one-fourth of one's metabolic resources, so the senses must provide exceptional benefits to fitness.[44] Perception accurately mirrors the world; animals get useful, accurate information through their senses.[44]

Evolutionary psychology Scientists who study perception and sensation have long understood the human senses as adaptations.[44] Depth perception consists of processing over half a dozen visual cues, each of which is based on a regularity of the physical world.[44] Vision evolved to respond to the narrow range of electromagnetic energy that is plentiful and that does not pass through objects.[44] Sound waves go around corners and interact with obstacles, creating a complex pattern that includes useful information about the sources of and distances to objects.[44] Larger animals naturally make lower-pitched sounds as a consequence of their size.[44] The range over which an animal hears, on the other hand, is determined by adaptation. Homing pigeons, for example, can hear very low-pitched sound (infrasound) that carries great distances, even though most smaller animals detect higher-pitched sounds.[44] Taste and smell respond to chemicals in the environment that are thought to have been significant for fitness in the EEA.[44] For example, salt and sugar were apparently both valuable to the human or pre-human inhabitants of the EEA, so present day humans have an intrinsic hunger for salty and sweet tastes.[44] The sense of touch is actually many senses, including pressure, heat, cold, tickle, and pain.[44] Pain, while unpleasant, is adaptive.[44] An important adaptation for senses is range shifting, by which the organism becomes temporarily more or less sensitive to sensation.[44] For example, one's eyes automatically adjust to dim or bright ambient light.[44] Sensory abilities of different organisms often coevolve, as is the case with the hearing of echolocating bats and that of the moths that have evolved to respond to the sounds that the bats make.[44] Evolutionary psychologists claim that perception demonstrates the principle of modularity, with specialized mechanisms handling particular perception tasks.[44] For example, people with damage to a particular part of the brain suffer from the specific defect of not being able to recognize faces (prosopagnosia).[44] EP suggests that this indicates a so-called face-reading module.[44] Learning and facultative adaptations In evolutionary psychology, learning is said to be accomplished through evolved capacities, specifically facultative adaptations.[45] Facultative adaptations express themselves differently depending on input from the environment.[45] Sometimes the input comes during development and helps shape that development.[45] For example, migrating birds learn to orient themselves by the stars during a critical period in their maturation.[45] Evolutionary psychologists claim that humans also learn language along an evolved program, also with critical periods.[45] The input can also come during daily tasks, helping the organism cope with changing environmental conditions.[45] For example, animals evolved Pavlovian conditioning in order to solve problems about causal relationships.[45] Animals accomplish learning tasks most easily when those tasks resemble problems that they faced in their evolutionary past, such as a rat learning where to find food or water.[45] Learning capacities sometimes demonstrate differences between the sexes.[45] In many animal species, for example, males can solve spatial problem faster and more accurately than females, due to the effects of male hormones during development.[45] The same might be true of humans.[45] Emotion and motivation Motivations direct and energize behavior, while emotions provide the affective component to motivation, positive or negative.[46] In the early 1970s, Paul Ekman and colleagues began a line of research that suggests that many emotions are universal.[46] He found evidence that humans share at least five basic emotions: fear, sadness, happiness, anger, and disgust.[46] Social emotions evidently evolved to motivate social behaviors that were adaptive in the EEA.[46] For example, spite seems to work against the individual but it can establish an individual's reputation as someone to be feared.[46] Shame and pride can motivate behaviors that help one maintain one's standing in a community, and self-esteem is one's estimate of one's status.[2][46]


Evolutionary psychology Cognition Cognition refers to internal representations of the world and internal information processing. From an EP perspective, cognition is not "general purpose," but uses heuristics, or strategies, that generally increase the likelihood of solving problems that the ancestors of present day humans routinely faced. For example, present day humans are far more likely to solve logic problems that involve detecting cheating (a common problem given humans' social nature) than the same logic problem put in purely abstract terms.[47] Since the ancestors of present day humans did not encounter truly random events, present day humans may be cognitively predisposed to incorrectly identify patterns in random sequences. "Gamblers' Fallacy" is one example of this. Gamblers may falsely believe that they have hit a "lucky streak" even when each outcome is actually random and independent of previous trials. Most people believe that if a fair coin has been flipped 9 times and Heads appears each time, that on the tenth flip, there is a greater than 50% chance of getting Tails.[46] Humans find it far easier to make diagnoses or predictions using frequency data than when the same information is presented as probabilities or percentages, presumably because the ancestors of present day humans lived in relatively small tribes (usually with fewer than 150 people) where frequency information was more readily available.[46] Personality Evolutionary psychology is primarily interested in finding commonalities between people, or basic human psychological nature. From an evolutionary perspective, the fact that people have fundamental differences in personality traits initially presents something of a puzzle.[48] (Note: The field of behavioral genetics is concerned with statistically partitioning differences between people into genetic and environmental sources of variance. However, understanding the concept of heritability can be trickyheritability refers only to the differences between people, never the degree to which the traits of an individual are due to environmental or genetic factors, since traits are always a complex interweaving of both.) Personality traits are conceptualized by evolutionary psychologists as due to normal variation around an optimum, or due to frequency-dependent selection, or facultative adaptations. Like variability in height, some personality traits may be simply reflect inter-individual variability around a general optimum.[48] Or, personality traits may represent different genetically predisposed "behavioral morphs" alternate behavioral strategies that depend on the frequency of competing behavioral strategies in the population. For example, if most of the population is generally trusting and gullible, the behavioral morph of being a "cheater" (or, in the extreme case, a sociopath) may be advantageous.[49] Finally, like many other psychological adaptations, personality traits may be facultativesensitive to typical variations in the social environment, especially during early development. For example, later born children are more likely than first borns to be rebellious, less conscientious and more open to new experiences, which may be advantageous to them given their particular niche in family structure.[50] Language According to Steven Pinker, who builds on the work by Noam Chomsky, the universal human ability to learn to talk between the ages of 1 4, basically without training, suggests that language acquisition is a distinctly human psychological adaptation (see, in particular, Pinker's The Language Instinct). Pinker and Bloom (1990) argue that language as a mental faculty shares many likenesses with the complex organs of the body which suggests that, like these organs, language has evolved as an adaptation, since this is the only known mechanism by which such complex organs can develop.[51] Pinker follows Chomsky in arguing that the fact that children can learn any human language with no explicit instruction suggests that language, including most of grammar, is basically innate and that it only needs to be activated by interaction. Chomsky himself does not believe language to have evolved as an adaptation, but suggests that it likely evolved as a byproduct of some other adaptation, a so-called spandrel. But Pinker and Bloom argue that the organic nature of language strongly suggests that it has an adaptational origin.[52] Evolutionary psychologists hold that the FOXP2 gene may well be associated with the evolution of human language.[53] In the 1980s, psycholinguist Myrna Gropnik identified a dominant gene that causes language


Evolutionary psychology impairment in the KE family of Britain.[53] This gene turned out to be a mutation of the FOXP2 gene.[53] Humans have a unique allele of this gene, which has otherwise been closely conserved through most of mammalian evolutionary history.[53] This unique allele seems to have first appeared between 100 and 200 thousand years ago, and it is now all but universal in humans.[53] Currently several competing theories about the evolutionary origin of language coexist, none of them having achieved a general consensus.[54] Researchers of language acquisition in primates and humans such as Michael Tomasello and Talmy Givn, argue that the innatist framework has understated the role of imitation in learning and that it is not at all necessary to posit the existence of an innate grammar module to explain human language acquisition. Tomasello argues that studies of how children and primates actually acquire communicative skills suggests that humans learn complex behavior through experience, so that instead of a module specifically dedicated to language acquisition, language is acquired by the same cognitive mechanisms that are used to acquire all other kinds of socially transmitted behavior.[55] On the issue of whether language is best seen as having evolved as an adaptation or as a spandrel, evolutionary biologist W. Tecumseh Fitch, following Stephen J. Gould, argues that it is unwarranted to assume that every aspect of language is an adaptation, or that language as a whole is an adaptation. He criticizes some strands of evolutionary psychology for suggesting a pan-adaptionist view of evolution, and dismisses Pinker and Bloom's question of whether "Language has evolved as an adaptation" as being misleading. He argues instead that from a biological viewpoint the evolutionary origins of language is best conceptualized as being the probable result of a convergence of many separate adaptations into a complex system.[56] A similar argument is made by Terrence Deacon who in The Symbolic Species argues that the different features of language have co-evolved with the evolution of the mind and that the ability to use symbolic communication is integrated in all other cognitive processes.[57] If the theory that language could have evolved as a single adaptation is accepted, the question becomes which of its many functions has been the basis of adaptation, several evolutionary hypotheses have been posited: that it evolved for the purpose of social grooming, that it evolved to as a way to show mating potential or that it evolved to form social contracts. Evolutionary psychologists recognize that these theories are all speculative and that much more evidence is required to understand how language might have been selectively adapted.[58]


Given that sexual reproduction is the means by which genes are propagated into future generations, sexual selection plays a large role in the direction of human evolution. Human mating, then, is of interest to evolutionary psychologists who aim to investigate evolved mechanisms to attract and secure mates.[59] Several lines of research have stemmed from this interest, such as studies of mate selection[60][61][62] mate poaching,[63] mate retention,[64] and mating preferences[65] Much of the research on human mating is based on parental investment theory,[66] which makes important predictions about the different strategies men and women will use in the mating domain (see above under "Middle-level evolutionary theories"). In essence, it predicts that women will be more selective when choosing mates, whereas men will not, especially under short-term mating conditions. While some other scientists such as Tim Brikhead assert that promiscuity can have benefits to women, such as fertility insurance, trading up to better genes, reducing risk of inbreeding, and insurance protection of her offspring.[67] Sarah Blaffer hrdy, also asserts that female chimpanzees, bonobos and langur monkeys and probably women, have seemingly indiscriminate sexuality, and being selective is biologically less advantageous than being promiscuous.[68] This has led some researchers to predict sex differences in such domains as sexual jealousy,[69][70] (however, see also,)[71] wherein females will react more aversively to emotional infidelity and males will react more aversively to sexual infidelity. This particular pattern is predicted because the costs involved in mating for each sex are distinct. Women, on average, should prefer a mate who can offer some kind of resources (e.g., financial, commitment), which means that a woman would also be more at risk for losing those valued traits in a mate who commits an emotional infidelity. Men, on the other hand, are

Evolutionary psychology limited by the fact that they can never be certain of the paternity of their children because they do not bear the offspring themselves. This obstacle entails that sexual infidelity would be more aversive than emotional infidelity for a man because investing resources in another man's offspring does not lead to propagation of the man's own genes. Another interesting line of research is that which examines women's mate preferences across the ovulatory cycle.[72][73] The theoretical underpinning of this research is that ancestral women would have evolved mechanisms to select mates with certain traits depending on their hormonal status. For example, the theory hypothesizes that, during the ovulatory phase of a woman's cycle (approximately days 1015 of a woman's cycle),[74] a woman who mated with a male with high genetic quality would have been more likely, on average, to produce and rear a healthy offspring than a woman who mated with a male with low genetic quality. These putative preferences are predicted to be especially apparent for short-term mating domains because a potential male mate would only be offering genes to a potential offspring. This hypothesis allows researchers to examine whether women select mates who have characteristics that indicate high genetic quality during the high fertility phase of their ovulatory cycles. Indeed, studies have shown that women's preferences vary across the ovulatory cycle. In particular, Haselton and Miller (2006) showed that highly fertile women prefer creative but poor men as short-term mates. Creativity may be a proxy for good genes.[75] Research by Gangestad et al. (2004) indicates that highly fertile women prefer men who display social presence and intrasexual competition; these traits may act as cues that would help women predict which men may have, or would be able to acquire, resources.


Reproduction is always costly for women, and can also be for men. Individuals are limited in the degree to which they can devote time and resources to producing and raising their young, and such expenditure may also be detrimental to their future condition, survival and further reproductive output. Parental investment is any parental expenditure (time, energy etc.) that benefits one offspring at a cost to parents' ability to invest in other components of fitness (Clutton-Brock 1991: 9; Trivers 1972). Components of fitness (Beatty 1992) include the well being of existing offspring, parents' future reproduction, and inclusive fitness through aid to kin (Hamilton, 1964). Parental investment theory is a branch of life history theory. Robert Trivers' theory of parental investment predicts that the sex making the largest investment in lactation, nurturing and protecting offspring will be more discriminating in mating and that the sex that invests less in offspring will compete for access to the higher investing sex (see Bateman's principle).[76] Sex differences in parental effort are important in determining the strength of sexual selection. The benefits of parental investment to the offspring are large and are associated with the effects on condition, growth, survival and ultimately, on reproductive success of the offspring. However, these benefits can come at the cost of parent's ability to reproduce in the future e.g. through the increased risk of injury when defending offspring against predators, the loss of mating opportunities whilst rearing offspring and an increase in the time to the next reproduction. Overall, parents are selected to maximize the difference between the benefits and the costs, and parental care will be likely to evolve when the benefits exceed the costs. The Cinderella effect is an alleged high incidence of stepchildren being physically, emotionally or sexually abused, neglected, murdered, or otherwise mistreated at the hands of their stepparents at significantly higher rates than their genetic counterparts. It takes its name from the fairy tale character Cinderella, who in the story was cruelly mistreated by her stepmother and stepsisters.[77] Daly and Wilson (1996) noted: "Evolutionary thinking led to the discovery of the most important risk factor for child homicide the presence of a stepparent. Parental efforts and investments are valuable resources, and selection favors those parental psyches that allocate effort effectively to promote fitness. The adaptive problems that challenge parental decision making include both the accurate identification of one's offspring and the allocation of one's resources among them with sensitivity to their needs and abilities to convert parental investment into fitness increments. Stepchildren were seldom or never so valuable to one's expected fitness as one's own offspring would be, and those parental psyches that were easily parasitized by

Evolutionary psychology just any appealing youngster must always have incurred a selective disadvantage"(Daly & Wilson, 1996, p64 65). However, they note that not all stepparents will "want" to abuse their partner's children, or that genetic parenthood is any insurance against abuse. They see step parental care as primarily "mating effort" towards the genetic parent.[78]


Family and kin

Inclusive fitness is the sum of an organism's classical fitness (how many of its own offspring it produces and supports) and the number of equivalents of its own offspring it can add to the population by supporting others.[79] The first component is called classical fitness by Hamilton (1964). From the gene's point of view, evolutionary success ultimately depends on leaving behind the maximum number of copies of itself in the population. Until 1964, it was generally believed that genes only achieved this by causing the individual to leave the maximum number of viable offspring. However, in 1964 W. D. Hamilton proved mathematically that, because close relatives of an organism share some identical genes, a gene can also increase its evolutionary success by promoting the reproduction and survival of these related or otherwise similar individuals. Hamilton claimed that this leads natural selection to favor organisms that would behave in ways that maximize their inclusive fitness. It is also true that natural selection favors behavior that maximizes personal fitness. Hamilton's rule describes mathematically whether or not a gene for altruistic behavior will spread in a population:

where is the reproductive cost to the altruist, is the reproductive benefit to the recipient of the altruistic behavior, and is the probability, above the population average, of the individuals sharing an altruistic gene commonly viewed as "degree of relatedness".

The concept serves to explain how natural selection can perpetuate altruism. If there is an '"altruism gene"' (or complex of genes) that influences an organism's behavior to be helpful and protective of relatives and their offspring, this behavior also increases the proportion of the altruism gene in the population, because relatives are likely to share genes with the altruist due to common descent. Altruists may also have some way to recognize altruistic behavior in unrelated individuals and be inclined to support them. As Dawkins points out in The Selfish Gene (Chapter 6) and The Extended Phenotype,[80] this must be distinguished from the green-beard effect. Although it is generally true that humans tend to be more altruistic toward their kin than toward non-kin, the relevant proximate mechanisms that mediate this cooperation have been debated (see kin recognition), with some arguing that kin status is determined primarily via social and cultural factors (such as co-residence, maternal association of sibs, etc.),[] while others have argued that kin recognition can also mediated by biological factors such as facial resemblance and immunogenetic similarity of the major histocompatibility complex (MHC).[81] For a discussion of the interaction of these social and biological kin recognition factors see Lieberman, Tooby, and Cosmides (2007)[82] (PDF [83]). Whatever the proximate mechanisms of kin recognition there is substantial evidence that humans act generally more altruistically to close genetic kin compared to genetic non-kin.[84][85] )[86]

Interactions with non-kin / reciprocity

Although interactions with non-kin are generally less altruistic compared to those with kin, cooperation can be maintained with non-kin via mutually beneficial reciprocity as was proposed by Robert Trivers.[] If there are repeated encounters between the same two players in an evolutionary game in which each of them can choose either to "cooperate" or "defect," then a strategy of mutual cooperation may be favored even if it pays each player, in the short term, to defect when the other cooperates. Direct reciprocity can lead to the evolution of cooperation only if the probability, w, of another encounter between the same two individuals exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of the

Evolutionary psychology altruistic act: w > c/b Reciprocity can also be indirect if information about previous interactions is shared. Reputation allows evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity. Natural selection favors strategies that base the decision to help on the reputation of the recipient: studies show that people who are more helpful are more likely to receive help. The calculations of indirect reciprocity are complicated and only a tiny fraction of this universe has been uncovered, but again a simple rule has emerged.[87] Indirect reciprocity can only promote cooperation if the probability, q, of knowing someones reputation exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act: q > c/b One important problem with this explanation is that individuals may be able to evolve the capacity to obscure their reputation, reducing the probability, q, that it will be known.[88] Trivers argues that friendship and various social emotions evolved in order to manage reciprocity.[89] Liking and disliking, he says, evolved to help present day humans' ancestors form coalitions with others who reciprocated and to exclude those who did not reciprocate.[89] Moral indignation may have evolved to prevent one's altruism from being exploited by cheaters, and gratitude may have motivated present day humans' ancestors to reciprocate appropriately after benefiting from others' altruism.[89] Likewise, present day humans feel guilty when they fail to reciprocate.[89] These social motivations match what evolutionary psychologists expect to see in adaptations that evolved to maximize the benefits and minimize the drawbacks of reciprocity.[89] Evolutionary psychologists say that humans have psychological adaptations that evolved specifically to help us identify nonreciprocators, commonly referred to as "cheaters."[89] In 1993, Robert Frank and his associates found that participants in a prisoner's dilemma scenario were often able to predict whether their partners would "cheat," based on a half hour of unstructured social interaction.[89] In a 1996 experiment, for example, Linda Mealey and her colleagues found that people were better at remembering the faces of people when those faces were associated with stories about those individuals cheating (such as embezzling money from a church).[89]


Evolution and culture

Evolutionary psychology incorporates insights derived from other disciplines about how cultural phenomena evolve over time. Theories that have applied evolutionary perspectives to cultural phenomena include memetics, cultural ecology, and dual inheritance theory (gene-culture co-evolution).[90] Memetics is a theory of mental content based on an analogy with evolution, originating from Richard Dawkins' 1976 book The Selfish Gene. It purports to be an approach to evolutionary models of cultural information transfer. A meme, analogous to a gene, is essentially a "unit of culture"an idea, belief, pattern of behavior, etc. which is "hosted" in one or more individual minds, and which can reproduce itself from mind to mind. Thus what would otherwise be regarded as one individual influencing another to adopt a belief is seen memetically as a meme reproducing itself. As with genetics, particularly under Dawkins's interpretation, a meme's success may be due to its contribution to the effectiveness of its host. Memetics is notable for sidestepping the traditional concern with the truth of ideas and beliefs. Susan Blackmore (2002) re-stated the definition of meme as: whatever is copied from one person to another person, whether habits, skills, songs, stories, or any other kind of information. Further she said that memes, like genes, are replicators in the sense as defined by Dawkins.[91] That is, they are information that is copied. Memes are copied by imitation, teaching and other methods. The copies are not perfect: memes are copied with variation; moreover, memes compete for humans' limited memory capacity and for the chance to be copied again. Only some of the variants can survive. The combination of these three elements (copies; variation; competition for survival) forms precisely the condition for Darwinian evolution, and so memes (and hence human cultures) evolve. Large groups of memes that are copied and passed on together are called co-adapted meme complexes, or memeplexes. In her

Evolutionary psychology definition, the way that a meme replicates is through imitation. Dual inheritance theory (DIT), also known as gene-culture coevolution, suggests that cultural information and genes co-evolve. Marcus Feldman and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza (1976) published perhaps the first dynamic models of gene-culture coevolution.[92] These models were to form the basis for subsequent work on DIT, heralded by the publication of three seminal books in 1980 and 1981. Charles Lumsden and E.O. Wilson's Genes, Mind and Culture (1981).[93] also outlined a series of mathematical models of how genetic evolution might favor the selection of cultural traits and how cultural traits might, in turn, affect the speed of genetic evolution. Another 1981 book relevant to this topic was Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach.[94] Borrowing heavily from population genetics and epidemiology, this book built a mathematical theory concerning the spread of cultural traits. It describes the evolutionary implications of vertical transmission, passing cultural traits from parents to offspring; oblique transmission, passing cultural traits from any member of an older generation to a younger generation; and horizontal transmission, passing traits between members of the same population. Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson's (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process presents models of the evolution of social learning under different environmental conditions, the population effects of social learning, various forces of selection on cultural learning rules, different forms of biased transmission and their population-level effects, and conflicts between cultural and genetic evolution. Along with game theory, Herbert Gintis suggested that Dual inheritance theory has potential for unifying the behavioral sciences, including economics, biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology and political science because it addresses both the genetic and cultural components of human inheritance.[95] Laland and Brown hold a similar view.[citation needed]


In psychology sub-fields
Developmental psychology
According to Paul Baltes, the benefits granted by evolutionary selection decrease with age. Natural selection has not eliminated many harmful conditions and nonadaptive characteristics that appear among older adults, such as Alzheimer disease. If it were a disease that killed 20 year-olds instead of 70 year-olds this may have been a disease that natural selection could have eliminated ages ago. Thus, unaided by evolutionary pressures against nonadaptive conditions, modern humans suffer the aches, pains, and infirmities of aging and as the benefits of evolutionary selection decrease with age, the need for culture increases.[96]

Social psychology
As humans are a highly social species, there are many adaptive problems associated with navigating the social world (e.g., maintaining allies, managing hierarchies, interacting with outgroup members). Researchers in the emerging field of evolutionary social psychology have made many discoveries pertaining to topics traditionally studied by social psychologists, including person perception, social cognition, attitudes, altruism, emotions, group dynamics, leadership, motivation, prejudice, intergroup relations, and cross-cultural differences.[97][98][99]

Evolutionary psychology


Abnormal psychology
Adaptationist hypotheses regarding the etiology of psychological disorders are often based on analogies between physiological and psychological dysfunctions,[100] as noted in the table below. Prominent theorists and evolutionary psychiatrists include Michael T. McGuire and Randolph M. Nesse. They, and others, suggest that mental disorders are due to the interactive effects of both nature and nurture, and often have multiple contributing causes.[12]
Possible Causes of Psychological 'Abnormalities' from an Adaptationist Perspective [84] [85] Summary based on information in these textbooks (all titled "Evolutionary Psychology"): Buss (2011), Gaulin & McBurney (2004), [101] [102] Workman & Reader (2008) as well as Cosmides & Tooby (1999) Toward an evolutionary taxonomy of treatable conditions Causal mechanism of failure or malfunction of adaptation Functioning adaptation (adaptive defense) Physiological Example Hypothesized Psychological Example

Fever / Vomiting (functional responses to infection or ingestion of toxins)

Mild depression or anxiety (functional responses to mild loss or stress / reduction of social interactions to prevent infection by contagious [103] pathogens) Sexual fetishes (?) (possible byproduct of normal sexual arousal adaptations that have 'imprinted' on unusual objects or situations) Adaptation(s) for high levels of creativity may also predispose schizophrenia or bi-polar disorder (adaptations with both positive and negative effects, perhaps dependent on alternate developmental trajectories) Autism (possible malfunctioning of theory of mind module)

By-product of an adaptation(s)

Intestinal gas (byproduct of digestion of fiber)

Adaptations with multiple effects

Gene for malaria resistance, in homozygous form, causes sickle cell anemia

Malfunctioning adaptation

Allergies (over-reactive immunological responses)

Frequency-dependent morphs

The two sexes / Different blood and immune system types

Personality traits and personality disorders (may represent alternative behavioral strategies dependent on the frequency of the strategy in the population) More frequent modern interaction with strangers (compared to family and close friends) may predispose greater incidence of depression & anxiety Tails of the distribution of personality traits (e.g., extremely introverted or extroverted)

Mismatch between ancestral & current environments

Modern diet-related Type 2 Diabetes

Tails of normal (bell shaped) curve

Very short or tall height

Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that schizophrenia and bipolar disorder may reflect a side-effect of genes with fitness benefits, such as increased creativity.[104] (Some individuals with bipolar disorder are especially creative during their manic phases and the close relatives of schizophrenics have been found to be more likely to have creative professions.[104]) A 1994 report by the American Psychiatry Association found that people suffered from schizophrenia at roughly the same rate in Western and non-Western cultures, and in industrialized and pastoral societies, suggesting that schizophrenia is not a disease of civilization nor an arbitrary social invention.[104] Sociopathy may represent an evolutionarily stable strategy, by which a small number of people who cheat on social contracts benefit in a society consisting mostly of non-sociopaths.[12] Mild depression may be an adaptive response to withdraw from, and re-evaluate, situations that have led to disadvantageous outcomes (see Evolutionary approaches to depression). Some of these speculations have yet to be developed into fully testable hypotheses, and a great deal of research is required to confirm their validity.[105][106] Clinical psychology and psychiatry are relatively isolated from the field of

Evolutionary psychology evolutionary psychology and the etiological speculations of evolutionary psychology have yet to pass the scrutiny and demanding research criteria of these larger disciplines.[] Some psychiatrists raise the concern that evolutionary psychologists seek to explain hidden adaptive advantages without engaging the rigorous empirical testing required to back up such claims.[][107] While there is strong research to suggest a genetic link to bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, there is significant debate within clinical psychology about the relative influence and the mediating role of cultural or environmental factors.[108] For example, epidemiological research suggests that different cultural groups may have divergent rates of diagnosis, symptomatology, and expression of mental illnesses.[109] There has also been increasing acknowledgment of culture-bound disorders,[109][110] which may be viewed as an argument for an environmental versus genetic psychological adaptation.[111] While certain mental disorders may have psychological traits that can be explained as 'adaptive' on an evolutionary scale, these disorders cause afflicted individuals significant emotional and psychological distress and negatively influence the stability of interpersonal relationships and day-to-day adaptive functioning.[112]


Psychology of religion
Adaptationist perspectives on religious belief suggest that, like all behavior, religious behaviors are a product of the human brain. As with all other organ functions, cognition's functional structure has been argued to have a genetic foundation, and is therefore subject to the effects of natural selection and sexual selection. Like other organs and tissues, this functional structure should be universally shared amongst humans and should have solved important problems of survival and reproduction in ancestral environments. However, evolutionary psychologists remain divided on whether religious belief is more likely a consequence of evolved psychological adaptations,[] or is a byproduct of other cognitive adaptations.[113]

Initial response
Although the application of adaptationist approaches to studying animal behavior has become standard and uncontroversial, evolutionary psychology has been entangled in the larger philosophical and social science controversies related to the nature versus nurture debate. Some of the controversy has been related not to the science itself, but to concerns about its potential political misuse by others. For example, eugenics and social darwinism were political philosophies of the early 20th century that were largely based on the naturalistic fallacy the idea that what is natural is necessarily a moral good.[114]

Standard social science model

Evolutionary psychologists typically contrast evolutionary psychology with what they call the standard social science model (SSSM). They characterize the SSSM as the "blank slate," social constructionist, or "cultural determinist" perspective that they claim dominated the social sciences throughout the 20th century and assumed that the mind was shaped almost entirely by culture.[114] Critics have argued that evolutionary psychologists created a false dichotomy between their own view and the caricature of the SSSM.[][115][116] Other critics regard the SSSM as a rhetorical device or a straw man[][][117] and suggest that the scientists whom evolutionary psychologists associate with the SSSM did not believe that the mind was a blank state devoid of any natural predispositions.[]

Evolutionary psychology


Reductionism and determinism

Some critics view evolutionary psychology as a form of genetic reductionism and genetic determinism,[118][119] a common critique being that evolutionary psychology does not address the complexity of individual development and experience and fails to explain the influence of genes on behavior in individual cases.[120] Evolutionary psychologists respond that EP works within a nature-nurture interactionist framework that acknowledges that many psychological adaptations are facultative (sensitive to environmental variations during individual development). EP is generally not focused on proximate analyses of behavior but rather its focus is on the study of distal/ultimate causality (the evolution of psychological adaptations). The field of behavioral genetics is focused on the study of the proximate influence of genes on behavior.[]

Testability of hypotheses
A frequent critique of the discipline is that the hypotheses of evolutionary psychology are frequently arbitrary and difficult or impossible to adequately test, thus questioning its status as an actual scientific discipline, for example because many current traits probably evolved to serve different functions than they do now.[3][121] While evolutionary psychology hypotheses are difficult to test, evolutionary psychologists assert that it is not impossible.[122] Part of the critique of the scientific base of evolutionary psychology includes a critique of the concept of the Environments of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA). Some critics have argued that researchers know so little about the environment in which Homo sapiens evolved that explaining specific traits as an adaption to that environment becomes highly speculative.[123] Evolutionary psychologists respond that they do know many things about this environment, including the facts that only women became pregnant, present day humans' ancestors were hunter-gatherers that generally lived in small tribes, etc.[124]

Modularity of mind
Evolutionary psychologists generally presume that, like the body, the mind is made up of many evolved modular adaptations,[] although there is some disagreement within the discipline regarding the degree of general plasticity, or "generality," of some modules.[] It has been suggested that modularity evolves because, compared to non-modular networks, it would have conferred an advantage in terms of fitness[125] and because connection costs are lower.[126] In contrast, some academics argue that it is unnecessary to posit the existence of highly domain specific modules, and, suggest that the neural anatomy of the brain supports a model based on more domain general faculties and processes.[127][128] Moreover, empirical support for the domain-specific theory stems almost entirely from performance on varations of the Wason selection task which is extremely limited in scope as it only tests one subtype of deductive reasoning.[129][130]

Evolutionary psychology defense

Overall, evolutionary psychologists argue that many of the criticisms leveled against the field are straw men, are based on an incorrect nature vs. nurture dichotomy, or are based on a misunderstandings of the discipline.[]

[1] [2] [3] [4] Confer et al. 2010; Buss, 2005; Durrant & Ellis, 2003; Pinker, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005 Wright 1995 Schacter et al. 2007, pp. 2627 Duntley and Buss 2008

[5] Carmen, R.A., et al. (2013). Evolution Integrated Across All Islands of the Human Behavioral Archipelago: All Psychology as Evolutionary Psychology. EvoS Journal: The Journal of the Evolutionary Studies Consortium, 5, pp. 108-126. ISSN: 1944-1932 PDF (http:/ / evostudies. org/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2013/ 03/ Carmen_-Vol5Iss1. pdf) [6] "Despite this difficulty, there have been many careful and informative studies of human social behavior from an evolutionary perspective. Infanticide, intelligence, marriage patterns, promiscuity, perception of beauty, bride price, altruism, and the allocation of parental care have all

Evolutionary psychology
been explored by testing predictions derived from the idea that conscious and unconscious behaviours have evolved to maximize inclusive fitness. The findings have been impressive." "social behaviour, animal." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 23 Jan 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 550897/ animal-social-behaviour). [7] The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Edited by Robin Dunbar and Louise Barret, Oxford University Press, 2007 [8] The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, edited by David M. Buss, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005 [10] Tooby & Cosmides 2005, p. 5 [11] Nesse, R.M. (2000). Tingergen's Four Questions Organized. Read online (http:/ / www-personal. umich. edu/ ~nesse/ Nesse-Tinbergen4Q. PDF). [12] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 1-24. [13] Evolutionary Psychology at the University of Texas (http:/ / homepage. psy. utexas. edu/ homepage/ Group/ BussLAB/ about. htm) [15] Sterelny, Kim. 2009. In Ruse, Michael & Travis, Joseph (eds) Wilson, Edward O. (Foreword) Evolution: The First Four Billion Years. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma. ISBN 978-0-674-03175-3. p. 314. [16] Wilson, Edward O. 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. (http:/ / www. hup. harvard. edu/ catalog/ WILSOR. html) Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma. ISBN 0-674-00089-7 p.4. [17] Wilson, Edward O. 1978. On Human Nature. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma. p. x. [18] Laland, Kevin N. and Gillian R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 287319. [19] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 25-56. [20] See also "Environment of evolutionary adaptation," a variation of the term used in Economics, e.g., in Rubin, Paul H., 2003, "Folk economics" Southern Economic Journal, 70:1, July 2003, 157171. [21] Buss et al. 1998 [22] Pinker, Steven. (1994)The Language Instinct [23] George C Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection. p.4. [24] Buss, D. M. (2011). Evolutionary psychology. [25] Brown, Donald E. (1991) Human Universals. New York: McGraw-Hill. [26] Symons, D. (1979). The evolution of human sexuality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 6. [27] Pinker 2002 [28] Barkow et al. 1992 [29] "instinct." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 18 Feb 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 289249/ instinct). [30] "social behaviour, animal." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 23 Jan 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 550897/ animal-social-behaviour). [31] Ryan, Christopher and Cacilda Jeth. Sex at Dawn: The Prehistoric Origins of Modern Sexuality. Harper. 2010. [32] CDC pdf (http:/ / www. cdc. gov/ nchs/ data/ nvsr/ nvsr54/ nvsr54_10. pdf) [33] Barrett, Deirdre. Waistland: The R/Evolutionary Science Behind Our Weight and Fitness Crisis (2007). New York: W.W. Norton. p. 31-51. [34] Barrett, Deirdre. Supernormal Stimuli: How Primal Urges Overran Their Evolutionary Purpose. New York: W.W. Norton, 2010 [35] Buss, D.M. (2011). Evolutionary psychology. Chapter 2. Boston: Pearson/A and B. [37] Buss, D.M. (2011). Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind [38] * [39] Freeman and Herron. Evolutionary Analysis. 2007. Pearson Education, NJ. [41] Peters, Frederic "Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self-Location" (http:/ / precedings. nature. com/ documents/ 2444/ version/ 1) [42] Baars, Bernard J. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. 1993. Cambridge University Press. [43] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 101-121. [44] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 81-101. [45] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 Chapter 8. [46] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 121-142. [47] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 Chapter 7. [48] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 Chapter 9. [50] Sulloway, F. (1996). Born to rebel. NY: Pantheon. [52] Workman, Lance and Will Reader (2004) Evolutionary psychology: an introduction. Cambridge University Press p. 259 [53] Workman, Lance and Will Reader (2008). Evolutionary psychology: an introduction. 2nd Ed. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 10. [54] Workman & Reader 2008:277 "There are a number of hypotheses suggesting that language evolved to fulfil a social function such as social grooming (to bind large groups together), the making of social contracts (to enable monogamy and male provisioning) and the use of language to impress potential mates. While each of these hypotheses has its merits, each is still highly speculative and requires more evidence from different areas of research (such as linguistics and anthropology)." [55] Workman, Lance and Will Reader (2004) Evolutionary psychology: an introduction. Cambridge University Press p. 267 [56] W. Tecumseh Fitch (2010) The Evolution of Language. Cambridge University Press p.65-66 [57] Deacon, Terrence W. (1997) The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. W.W. Norton & Co [58] Workman, Lance and Will Reader (2004) Evolutionary psychology: an introduction. Cambridge University Press p. 277


Evolutionary psychology
[59] Wilson, G.D. Love and Instinct. London: Temple Smith, 1981. [60] Buss 1994 [61] Buss & Barnes 1986 [63] Schmitt and Buss 2001 [64] Buss 1988. [65] Shackelford, Schmitt, & Buss (2005) Universal dimensions of human mate preferences; Personality and Individual Differences 39 [66] Trivers, R. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (Ed.), Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. [67] http:/ / www. guardian. co. uk/ uk/ 2000/ sep/ 03/ anthonybrowne. theobserver [68] [69] Buss 1989 [70] Buss et al. 1992 [75] Miller, G. F. (2000b) The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Anchor Books: New York. [77] Daly, Matin, and Margo I. Wilson. (1999) [78] Daly & Wilson 1998 [79] Definition and explanation of inclusive fitness from Personality (http:/ / www. personalityresearch. org/ evolutionary/ inclusive. html) [80] Dawkins, Richard, "The Extended Phenotype", Oxford University Press 1982 (Chapter 9) [81] Villinger, J., and Waldman, B. (2012). Social discrimination by quantitative assessment of immunogenetic similarity. Published online before print September 5, 2012, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2012.1279 Proc. R. Soc. B [82] Lieberman, D., Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. The architecture of human kin detection Nature 445, 727-731 (15 February 2007) | doi:10.1038/nature05510 [83] http:/ / www. psych. ucsb. edu/ research/ cep/ papers/ kinnature05510. pdf [84] Buss, D.M. (2011). Evolutionary Psychology. Monterey: Brooks-Cole. [85] Gaulin & McBurney (2004), Evolutionary Psychology, 2nd Ed. NY: Prentice Hall [86] Workman & Reader (2008), Evolutionary Psychology, 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [89] Gaulin, Steven J. C. and Donald H. McBurney. Evolutionary Psychology. Prentice Hall. 2003. ISBN 978-0-13-111529-3, Chapter 14, p 323-352. [90] Workman, Lance and Will Reader (2004) Evolutionary psychology: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 13. [91] Dawkins, R. (1982) "Replicators and Vehicles" (http:/ / www. stephenjaygould. org/ library/ dawkins_replicators. html) King's College Sociobiology Group, eds., Current Problems in Sociobiology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.4564. "A replicator may be defined as any entity in the universe of which copies are made." [93] Lumsden C., and E. Wilson. 1981. Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [94] Cavalli-Sfornza, L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. [96] Santrock, W. John (2005). A Topical Approach to Life-Span Development (3rd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. pp.62. [97] Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2010). Evolutionary social psychology. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th Edition, Vol. 2, pp. 761796). New York: John Wiley & Sons. [98] Schaller, M., Simpson, J. A., & Kenrick, D. T. (Eds.) (2006). Evolution and social psychology. New York: Psychology Press. [100] (adaptationist perspective to both physiological and psychological dysfunctions) [101] Workman & Reader (2008), Evolutionary Psychology, 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [103] Raison, C.L, Miller, A. N. (2012). The evolutionary significance of depression in Pathogen Host Defense (PATHOS-D) Molecular Psychiatry 1-23. PDF (http:/ / www. nature. com/ mp/ journal/ vaop/ ncurrent/ pdf/ mp20122a. pdf). [104] Gaulin and McBurney 2003 p 239-256. [105] OConnell, H. (2004) Evolutionary theory in psychiatry and psychology. Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine, 21 (1), pp. 3737. [108] Adams, H. and Sutker, P. Comprehensive Handbook of Psychopathology, 3rd Ed. Springer. 2001. Chapter 3, p 53-84. [109] Adams, H. and Sutker, P. Comprehensive Handbook of Psychopathology, 3rd Ed. Springer. 2001. Chapter 5, p 105-127 [110] American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed., text revision). 2000. Culture Bound Syndromes, p 897-903. [111] Schumaker, J. The Age of Insanity: Modernity and Mental Health. Praeger. 2001. Chapter 3, p 29-49. [112] Adams, H. and Sutker, P. Comprehensive Handbook of Psychopathology, 3rd Ed. Springer. 2001 [114] Pinker, S. (2003). The blank slate. NY: Penguin [119] Plotkin, Henry. 2004 Evolutionary thought in Psychology: A Brief History. Blackwell. p.150. [120] "instinct." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 9 Feb 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 289249/ instinct). [122] "Testing ideas about the evolutionary origins of psychological phenomena is indeed a challenging task, but not an impossible one" Buss et al. 1998; Pinker, 1997b). [123] Plotkin, Henry. 2004 Evolutionary thought in Psychology: A Brief History. Blackwell. p.149.


Evolutionary psychology
[124] The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (2005), David M. Buss, Chapter 1, pp. 567, Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides


Barkow, Jerome H. (2006). Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for Social Scientists. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN0-19-513002-2. Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1992. The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Buss, D. M.; Barnes, M. (1986). "Preferences in human mate selection" ( homepage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/prefs_mate_selection_1986_jpsp.pdf) (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50 (3): 559570. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.50.3.559 ( 50.3.559). Buss, D. M. (1988). "From vigilance to violence: Tactics of mate retention in American undergraduates" (http:// (PDF). Ethology and Sociobiology 9 (5): 291317. doi: 10.1016/0162-3095(88)90010-6 ( 0162-3095(88)90010-6). Buss, D. M. (1989). "Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures" ( Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12: 149. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00023992 ( S0140525X00023992). Buss, D. M.; Larsen, R. J.; Westen, D.; Semmelroth, J. (1992). "Sex differences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psychology" ( SexDifferencesinJealousy.PDF). Psychological Science 3 (4): 251255. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00038.x ( Buss, D. M. (1994). The evolution of desire: Strategies of human mating. New York: Basic Books. Buss, David M. (2004). Evolutionary psychology: the new science of the mind. Boston: Pearson/A and B. ISBN0-205-37071-3. Buss, David M.; Haselton, Martie G.; Shackelford, Todd K.; Bleske, April L.; Wakefield, Jerome C. (1998). "Adaptations, Exaptations, and Spandrels" ( html). American Psychologist 53 (5): 533548. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.53.5.533 ( 0003-066X.53.5.533). PMID 9612136 ( Retrieved 29 August 2011. Clarke, Murray (2004). Reconstructing reason and representation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. ISBN0-262-03322-4. Confer, Easton, Fleischman, Goetz, Lewis, Perilloux & Buss Evolutionary Psychology (http://homepage.psy., American Psychologist, 2010. Duntley, J.D.; Buss, D.M. (2008). "Evolutionary psychology is a metatheory for psychology" (http://homepage. (PDF). Psychological Inquiry 19: 3034. doi: 10.1080/10478400701774105 ( Durrant, R., & Ellis, B.J. (2003). Evolutionary Psychology. In M. Gallagher & R.J. Nelson (Eds.), Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology, Volume Three: Biological Psychology (pp.133). New York: Wiley & Sons. Evan, Dylan (2000). Introducing Evolutionary Psychology. Lanham, MD: Totem Books USA. ISBN1-84046-043-1. Fruehwald, Edwin Scott, Law and Human Behavior: A Study in Behavioral Biology, Neuroscience, and The Law (Vandeplas 2011). ISBN 978-1-60042-144-0

Evolutionary psychology Gaulin, Steven J. C. and Donald H. McBurney. Evolutionary psychology. Prentice Hall. 2003. ISBN 978-0-13-111529-3 Joyce, Richard (2006). The Evolution of Morality (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. ISBN0-262-10112-2. Miller, Geoffrey P. (2000). The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday. ISBN0-385-49516-1. Nesse, R.M. (2000). Tingergen's Four Questions Organized ( Nesse-Tinbergen4Q.PDF). Nesse, R; Williams, George C. (1996). Why We Get Sick. NY: Vintage. Pinker, Steven (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton. ISBN0-393-04535-8. Pinker, Steven (2002). The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature. New York, N.Y: Viking. ISBN0-670-03151-8. Richards, Janet C. (2000). Human nature after Darwin: a philosophical introduction. New York: Routledge. ISBN0-415-21243-X. Ryan, C. & Jeth, C. (2010). Sex at Dawn: The Prehistoric Origins of Modern Sexuality. New York, NY: Harper. ISBN0-06-170780-5. Santrock, John W. (2005). The Topical Approach to Life-Span Development(3rd ed.). New York, N.Y: McGraw Hill. ISBN0-07-322626-2. Schacter, Daniel L, Daniel Wegner and Daniel Gilbert. 2007. Psychology. Worth Publishers. ISBN 0-7167-5215-8 ISBN 9780716752158. Schmitt, D. P.; Buss, D. M. (2001). "Human mate poaching: Tactics and temptations for infiltrating existing relationships" ( Human_Mate_Poaching_2001.pdf) (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80 (6): 894917. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.894 ( PMID 11414373 (http:// Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp.567). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Full text ( research/cep/papers/bussconceptual05.pdf) Wilson, Edward Raymond (2000). Sociobiology: the new synthesis. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN0-674-00089-7. Wright, Robert C. M. (1995). The moral animal: evolutionary psychology and everyday life. New York: Vintage Books. ISBN0-679-76399-6.


Further reading
Buss, D. M. (1995). "Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psychological science" (http://homepage. Psychological Inquiry 6: 130. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli0601_1 ( Confer, J.C.; Easton, J.A.; Fleischman, D.S.; Goetz, C. D.; Lewis, D.M.G.; Perilloux, C.; Buss, D. M. (2010). "Evolutionary Psychology: Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations" (http://homepage.psy.utexas. edu/homepage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010.pdf) (PDF). American Psychologist 65 (2): 110126. doi: 10.1037/a0018413 ( PMID 20141266 ( Heylighen F. (2012). " Evolutionary Psychology ( pdf)", in: A. Michalos (ed.): Encyclopedia of Quality of Life Research (Springer, Berlin). Kennair, L. E. O. (2002). "Evolutionary psychology: An emerging integrative perspective within the science and practice of psychology" ( Human Nature Review 2: 1761.

Evolutionary psychology Medicus, G. (2005). "Evolutionary Theory of Human Sciences" ( humanethologie/ws/medicus/block1/inhalt.html). pp.9, 10, 11. Retrieved 2009-09-08.


External links
Evolutionary Psychology ( Evolutionary_Psychology/) at the Open Directory Project What Is Evolutionary Psychology? by Clinical Evolutionary Psychologist Dale Glaebach (http://www. Evolutionary Psychology-Approaches in Psychology ( htm)

Academic societies
Human Behavior and Evolution Society (; international society dedicated to using evolutionary theory to study human nature The International Society for Human Ethology (; promotes ethological perspectives on the study of humans worldwide European Human Behaviour and Evolution Association ( an interdisciplinary society that supports the activities of European researchers with an interest in evolutionary accounts of human cognition, behavior and society The Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (; an international and interdisciplinary association of scholars, scientists, and policymakers concerned with evolutionary, genetic, and ecological knowledge and its bearing on political behavior, public policy and ethics. Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law ( a scholarly association dedicated to fostering interdisciplinary exploration of issues at the intersection of law, biology, and evolutionary theory The New England Institute for Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology ( aims to foster research and education into the interdisciplinary nexus of cognitive science and evolutionary studies The NorthEastern Evolutionary Psychology Society (; regional society dedicated to encouraging scholarship and dialogue on the topic of evolutionary psychology Feminist Evolutionary Psychology Society ( researchers that investigate the active role that females have had in human evolution

Evolutionary Psychology ( free access online scientific journal Evolution and Human Behavior (; journal of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society ( Politics and the Life Sciences ( is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal published by the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences ( ) Human Nature: An Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective ( anthropology+and+archaeology/journal/12110) advances the interdisciplinary investigation of the biological, social, and environmental factors that underlie human behavior. It focuses primarily on the functional unity in which these factors are continuously and mutually interactive. These include the evolutionary, biological, and sociological processes as they interact with human social behavior. Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition ( html) devoted to theoretical advances in the fields of biology and cognition, with an emphasis on the conceptual

Evolutionary psychology integration afforded by evolutionary and developmental approaches. Evolutionary Anthropology ( [[Behavioral and Brain Sciences (]] interdisciplinary articles in psychology, neuroscience, behavioral biology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, linguistics and philosophy. About 30% of the articles have focused on evolutionary analyses of behavior. Evolution and Development ( Research relevant to interface of evolutionary and developmental biology The Evolutionary Review Art, Science, and Culture (


Brief video clip re what EP is (from the "Evolution" PBS Series) ( watch?v=pEmX8Rim-hs) TED talk ( by Steven Pinker about his book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature RSA talk ( by evolutionary psychologist Robert Kurzban on modularity of mind, based on his book Why Everyone (Else) is a Hypocrite Richard Dawkins' lecture on natural selection and evolutionary psychology ( watch?v=BzJUCG7L9I4) Evolutionary Psychology-Steven Pinker & Frans de Waal ( Audio recording Stone Age Minds: A conversation with evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (http://www. Margaret Mead and Samoa ( mead+and+samoa&total=8&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0). Review of the nature vs. nurture debate triggered by Mead's book "Coming of Age in Samoa." Secrets of the Tribe ( Documents the conflicts between cultural and evolutionary anthropologists who have studied the Yanomamo tribes. Video interview ( with Steven Pinker by Robert Wright (journalist) discussing evolutionary psychology Video interview ( with Edward O. Wilson by Robert Wright (journalist), contextualizing evolutionary psychology within science, politics, academics and philosophy

History of evolutionary psychology


History of evolutionary psychology

The history of evolutionary psychology began with Charles Darwin, who proposed that humans have social instincts that evolved by natural selection. Darwin's work inspired later psychologists such as William James and Siegmund Freud but for most of the 20th century psychologists focused more on behaviorism and proximate explanations for human behavior. E. O. Wilson's landmark 1975 book, Sociobiology, synthesized recent theoretical advances in evolutionary theory to explain social behavior in animals, including humans. Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby popularized the term "evolutionary psychology" in their 1992 book The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture.[] Like sociobiology before it, evolutionary psychology has been embroiled in controversy, but evolutionary psychologists see their field as gaining increased acceptance overall.

19th century
After his seminal work in developing theories of natural selection, Charles Darwin devoted much of his final years to the study of animal emotions and psychology. He wrote two books;The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex in 1871 and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872 that dealt with topics related to evolutionary psychology. He introduced the concepts of sexual selection to explain the presence of animal structures that seemed unrelated to survival, such as the peacock's tail. He also introduced theories concerning group selection and kin selection to explain altruism.[1] Darwin pondered why humans and animals were often generous to their group members. Darwin felt that acts of generosity decreased the fitness of generous individuals. This fact contradicted natural selection which favored the fittest individual. Darwin concluded that while generosity decreased the fitness of individuals, generosity would increase the fitness of a group. In this case, altruism arose due to competition between groups.[2] The following quote, from Darwin's Origin of Species, is often interpreted by evolutionary psychologists as indication of his foreshadowing the emergence of the field: In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. -- Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 1859, p. 449.

20th century
Darwin's theory inspired William James's functionalist approach to psychology.[3] At the core of his theory was a system of "instincts."[4] James wrote that humans had many instincts, even more than other animals.[4] These instincts, he said, could be overridden by experience and by each other, as many of the instincts were actually in conflict with each other.[4] In their Evolutionary Psychology Primer him:

Tooby and Cosmides make note of James' perspective, and also quote

"We do not realize that 'normal' behavior needs to be explained at all. This "instinct blindness" makes the study of psychology difficult. To get past this problem, James suggested that we try to make the "natural seem strange": It takes...a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits so upside-down? The common man can only say, Of course we smile, of course our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and flagrantly made for all eternity to be loved!

History of evolutionary psychology And so, probably, does each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in the presence of particular objects. ... To the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the she-bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which it is to her. Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious to them. (William James, 1890) In our view, William James was right about evolutionary psychology. Making the natural seem strange is unnatural -- it requires the twisted outlook seen, for example, in Gary Larson cartoons. Yet it is a pivotal part of the enterprise. Many psychologists avoid the study of natural competences, thinking that there is nothing there to be explained." According to Noam Chomsky, perhaps Anarchist thinker Peter Kropotkin could be credited as having founded evolutionary psychology, when in his 1902 book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution he argued that the human instinct for cooperation and mutual aid could be seen as stemming from evolutionary adaption.[6] William McDougall made a reference to "evolutionary psychology" in his 1919 book An Introduction to Social Psychology: "It is only a comparative and evolutionary psychology that can provide the needed basis (for psychology); and this could not be created before the work of Darwin had convinced men of the continuity of human with animal evolution as regards all bodily characters, and had prepared the way for the quickly following recognition of the similar continuity of mans mental evolution with that of the animal world." (p.16)


Post world war II

While Darwin's theories on natural selection gained acceptance in the early part of the 20th century, his theories on evolutionary psychology were largely ignored. Only after the second world war, in the 1950s, did interest increase in the systematic study of animal behavior. It was during this period that the modern field of ethology emerged. Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen were pioneers in developing the theoretical framework for ethology for which they would receive a Nobel prize in 1973. Desmond Morris's book The Naked Ape attempted to frame human behavior in the context of evolution, but his explanations failed to convince academics because they were based on a teleological (goal-oriented) understanding of evolution. For example, he said that the pair bond evolved so that men who were out hunting could trust that their mates back home were not having sex with other men.[1]

In 1975, E O Wilson built upon the works of Lorenz and Tinbergen by combining studies of animal behavior, social behavior and evolutionary theory in his book Sociobiology:The New Synthesis. Wilson included a chapter on human behavior. Wilson's application of evolutionary analysis to human behavior caused bitter debate.[7][8] With the publication of Sociobiology, evolutionary thinking for the first time had an identifiable presence in the field of psychology.[3] E O Wilson argues that the field of evolutionary psychology is essentially the same as "human sociobiology".[9] Edward H. Hagen writes in The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology that sociobiology is, despite the public controversy regarding the applications to humans, "one of the scientific triumphs of the twentieth century." "Sociobiology is now part of the core research and curriculum of virtually all biology departments, and it is a foundation of the work of almost all field biologists" Sociobiological research on nonhuman organisms has increased dramatically and appears continuously in the world's top scientific journals such as Nature and Science.The more general term behavioral ecology is commonly used as substitute for the term sociobiology in order to avoid the public controversy.[10]

History of evolutionary psychology


Modern use of the term "evolutionary psychology"

The term evolutionary psychology was used by American biologist Michael Ghiselin in a 1973 article published in the journal Science.[11] Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby popularized the term "evolutionary psychology" in their 1992 book The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture.[] In contrast to sociobiology and behavioral ecology, evolutionary psychology emphasizes that organisms are "adaptation executors" rather than "fitness maximizers."[12] In other words, organisms have emotional, motivational and cognitive adaptations that generally increased inclusive fitness in the past but may not do so in the present. This distinction may explain some maladaptive behaviors that are the result of "fitness lags" between ancestral and modern environments.[12] For example, our ancestrally developed desires for fat, sugar and salt often lead to health problems in modern environment where these are readily available in large quantities. Also, in contrast to sociobiology and behavioral ecology (which mostly study non-human animal behavior), rather than focus primarily on overt behavior, EP attempts to identify underlying psychological adaptations (including emotional, motivational and cognitive mechanisms), and how these mechanisms interact with the developmental and current environmental influences to produce behavior.[13][14] Before 1990, introductory psychology textbooks scarcely mentioned Darwin.[15] In the 1990s, evolutionary psychology was treated as a fringe theory,[16] and evolutionary psychologists depicted themselves as an embattled minority.[1] Coverage in psychology textbooks was largely hostile.[16] According to evolutionary psychologists, current coverage in psychology textbooks is usually neutral or balanced.[16] The presence that evolutionary theory holds in psychology has been steadily increasing.[3] According to its proponents, evolutionary psychology now occupies a central place in psychological science.[16]

[1] Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal: Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. Vintage. 1995. [3] Schacter, Daniel L, Daniel Wegner and Daniel Gilbert. 2007. Psychology. Worth Publishers. pp. 26-27 [4] Buss, David M. Evolutionary psychology: the new science of the mind. Pearson. 2008. Chapter 1, p. 2-35. [5] http:/ / cogweb. ucla. edu/ ep/ EP-primer. html [6] http:/ / www. chomsky. info/ interviews/ 200401--. htm [7] Pinker, Steven. The Blank Slate. New York: Penguin. 2002 [8] Diamond, Jared. The Third Chimpanzee. [10] The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, edited by David M. Buss, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005. Chapter 5 by Edward H. Hagen . [12] Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psychological science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1-30. [13] Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed (http:/ / instruct. uwo. ca/ psychology/ 371g/ Smith2001. pdf) [14] Evolutionary Psychology By Lance Workman, Will Reader (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=9Ni9ggiew1UC& pg=PA17& dq=sociobiology+ evolutionary+ psychology+ controversy& ei=XqZRSYmJOIzukgSGm-mwBg#PPA17,M1) [15] Gaulin, Steven J. C. and Donald H. McBurney. Evolutionary psychology. Prentice Hall. 2003. ISBN 978-0-13-111529-3, Chapter 1, p 1-24. [16] Confer, et al., 2010 (http:/ / homepage. psy. utexas. edu/ homepage/ Group/ BussLAB/ pdffiles/ evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010. pdf)

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology


Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology

The theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology are the general and specific scientific theories that explain the ultimate origins of psychological traits in terms of evolution. These theories originated with Charles Darwin's work, including his speculations about the evolutionary origins of social instincts in humans. Modern evolutionary psychology, however, is possible only because of advances in evolutionary theory in the 20th century. Evolutionary psychologists say that natural selection has provided humans with many psychological adaptations, in much the same way that it generated humans' anatomical and physiological adaptations.[1] As with adaptations in general, psychological adaptations are said to be specialized for the environment in which an organism evolved, the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA.[1][2] Sexual selection provides organisms with adaptations related to mating.[3] For male mammals, which have a relatively fast reproduction rate, sexual selection leads to adaptations that help them compete for females.[3] For female mammals, with a relatively slow reproduction rate, sexual selection leads to choosiness, which helps females select higher quality mates.[3] Charles Darwin described both natural selection and sexual selection, but he relied on group selection to explain the evolution of self-sacrificing behavior. Group selection is a weak explanation because in any group the less self-sacrificing animals will be more likely to survive and the group will become less self-sacrificing. In 1964, William D. Hamilton proposed inclusive fitness theory, emphasizing a "gene's-eye" view of evolution. Hamilton noted that individuals can increase the replication of their genes into the next generation by helping close relatives with whom they share genes survive and reproduce. According to "Hamilton's rule", a self-sacrificing behavior can evolve if it helps close relatives so much that it more than compensates for the individual animal's sacrifice. Inclusive fitness theory resolved the issue of how "altruism" evolved. Other theories also help explain the evolution of altruistic behavior, including evolutionary game theory, tit-for-tat reciprocity, and generalized reciprocity. These theories not only help explain the development of altruistic behavior but also account for hostility toward cheaters (individuals that take advantage of others' altruism).[4] Several mid-level evolutionary theories inform evolutionary psychology. The r/K selection theory proposes that some species prosper by having many offspring while others follow the strategy of having fewer offspring but investing much more in each one. Humans follow the second strategy. Parental investment theory explains how parents invest more or less in individual offspring based on how successful those offspring are likely to be, and thus how much they might improve the parents' inclusive fitness. According to the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, parents in good conditions tend to invest more in sons (who are best able to take advantage of good conditions), while parents in poor conditions tend to invest more in daughters (who are best able to have successful offspring even in poor conditions). According to life history theory, animals evolve life histories to match their environments, determining details such as age at first reproduction and number of offspring. Dual inheritance theory posits that genes and human culture have interacted, with genes affecting the development of culture and culture, in turn, affecting human evolution on a genetic level (see also the Baldwin effect). Critics of evolutionary psychology have sometimes challenged its theoretical underpinnings, saying that humans never developed powerful social instincts through natural selection and that the hypotheses of evolutionary psychologists are merely just-so-stories.

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology


General evolutionary theory

Evolutionary psychology primarily uses the theories of natural selection, sexual selection, and inclusive fitness to explain the evolution of psychological adaptations. Evolutionary psychology is sometimes seen not simply as a subdiscipline of psychology but as a metatheoretical framework in which the entire field of psychology can be examined.[]

Natural selection
Evolutionary psychologists consider Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection to be important to an understanding of psychology.[1] Natural selection occurs because individual organisms who are genetically better suited to the current environment leave more descendants, and their genes spread through the population, thus explaining why organisms fit their environments so closely.[1] This process is slow and cumulative, with new traits layered over older traits.[1] The advantages created by natural selection are known as adaptations.[1] Evolutionary psychologists say that animals, just as they evolve physical adaptations, evolve psychological adaptations.[1]

Evolutionary psychologists emphasize that natural selection mostly generates specialized adaptations, which are more efficient than general adaptations.[1] They point out that natural selection operates slowly, and that adaptations are sometimes out of date when the environment changes rapidly.[1] In the case of humans, evolutionary psychologists say that much of human nature was shaped during the stone age and may not match the contemporary environment.[1]

Darwin's illustrations of beak variation in the finches of the Galpagos Islands.

Sexual selection
Sexual selection favors traits that provide mating advantages, such as the peacock's tail, even if these same traits are usually hindrances.[3] Evolutionary psychologists point out that, unlike natural selection, sexual selection typically leads to the evolution of sex differences.[3] Sex differences typically make reproduction faster for one sex and slower for the other, in which case mates are relatively scarce for the faster sex.[3] Sexual selection favors traits that increase the number of mates for the fast sex and the quality of mates for the slow sex.[3] For mammals, the female has the slower reproduction rate.[3] Males typically evolve either traits to help them fight other males or traits to impress females.[3] Females typically evolve greater abilities to discern the qualities of males, such as choosiness in mating.[3]

Inclusive fitness
Inclusive fitness theory, proposed by William D. Hamilton, emphasized a "gene's-eye" view of evolution. Hamilton noted that what evolution ultimately selects are genes, not groups or species. From this perspective, individuals can increase the replication of their genes into the next generation not only directly via reproduction, by also indirectly helping close relatives with whom they share genes survive and reproduce. General evolutionary theory, in its modern form, is essentially inclusive fitness theory. Inclusive fitness theory resolved the issue of how "altruism" evolved. The dominant, pre-Hamiltonian view was that altruism evolved via group selection: the notion that altruism evolved for the benefit of the group. The problem with this was that if one organism in a group incurred any fitness costs on itself for the benefit of others in the group, (i.e.

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology acted "altruistically"), then that organism would reduce its own ability to survive and/or reproduce, therefore reducing its chances of passing on its altruistic traits. Furthermore, the organism that benefited from that altruistic act and only acted on behalf of its own fitness would increase its own chance of survival and/or reproduction, thus increasing its chances of passing on its "selfish" traits. Inclusive fitness resolved "the problem of altruism" by demonstrating that altruism can evolve via kin selection as expressed in Hamilton's rule: cost < relatedness benefit In other words, altruism can evolve as long as the fitness cost of the altruistic act on the part of the actor is less than the degree of genetic relatedness of the recipient times the fitness benefit to that recipient. This perspective reflects what is referred to as the gene-centered view of evolution and demonstrates that group selection is a very weak selective force.


Theoretical foundations Central Concepts[5]

System level Individual Problem How to survive? Author Charles Darwin [6] (1859), [7] (1872) Basic ideas Natural Selection (or "survival selection") [4] Example adaptations Bones, skin, vision, pain perception, etc.

The bodies and minds of organisms are made up of evolved adaptations designed to help the organism survive in a particular ecology (for example, the fur of polar bears, the eye, food preferences, etc.). Sexual selection [4]


How to attract a mate and/or compete with members of one's own sex for access to the opposite sex?

Charles Darwin [8] (1871)

Organisms can evolve physical and mental traits designed specifically to attract mates (e.g., the Peacock's tail) or to compete with members of one's own sex for access to the opposite sex (e.g., antlers). Inclusive fitness (or "gene's eye view", "kin [4] selection") / Evolution of sexual reproduction

Peacock's tail, antlers, courtship behavior, etc.

Family & Kin

Gene replication. How W.D. Hamilton to help those with (1964) whom we share genes survive and reproduce?

Altruism toward kin, parental investment, the behavior of the social insects with sterile Selection occurs most robustly at the level of the gene, workers (e.g., ants). not the individual, group, or species. Reproductive success can thus be indirect, via shared genes in kin. Being altruistic toward kin can thus have genetic payoffs. (Also see Gene-centered view of evolution) Also, Hamilton argued that sexual reproduction evolved primarily as a defense against pathogens (bacteria and viruses) to "shuffle genes" to create greater diversity, especially immunological variability, in offspring. Parental Investment Theory / Parent - Offspring [4] Conflict / Reproductive Value The two sexes often have conflicting strategies regarding how much to invest in offspring, and how many offspring to have. Parents allocate more resources to their offspring with higher reproductive value (e.g., "mom always liked you best"). Parents and offspring may have conflicting interests (e.g., when to wean, allocation of resources among offspring, etc.) Sexually dimorphic adaptations that result in a "battle of the sexes," parental favoritism, timing of reproduction, parent-offspring conflict, sibling rivalry, etc.

Kin and Family

How are resources best Robert Trivers allocated in mating (1972) and/or parenting contexts to maximize inclusive fitness?

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology


Facultative, or frequency-dependent, adaptations. Examples: hawks vs. doves, cooperate vs. defect, fast vs. coy courtship, etc.

Non-kin small group

How to succeed in competitive interactions with non-kin? How to select the best strategy given the strategies being used by competitors?

Neumann & Morgenstern (1944); John Smith (1982)

Game Theory / Evolutionary Game Theory

Organisms adapt, or respond, to competitors depending on the strategies used by competitors. Strategies are evaluated by the probable payoffs of alternatives. In a population, this typically results in an "evolutionary stable strategy," or "evolutionary stable equilibrium" -- strategies that, on average, cannot be bettered by alternative strategies. [4] "Tit for Tat" Reciprocity A specific game strategy (see above) that has been shown to be optimal in achieving an evolutionary stable equilibrium in situations of repeated social interactions. One plays nice with non-kin if a mutually beneficially reciprocal relationship is maintained across multiple interactions, while cheating is punished. Generalized Reciprocity (Also called "strong reciprocity"). One can play nice with non-kin strangers even in single interactions if social rules against cheating are maintained by neutral third parties (e.g., other individuals, governments, institutions, etc.), a majority group members cooperate by generally adhering to social rules, and social interactions create a positive sum game (i.e., a bigger overall "pie" results from group cooperation). Generalized reciprocity may be a set of adaptations that were designed for small in-group cohesion during times of high inter-tribal warfare with out-groups. Today the capacity to be altruistic to in-group strangers may result from a serendipitous generalization (or "mismatch") between ancestral tribal living in small groups and today's large societies that entail many single interactions with strangers. (The dark side of generalized reciprocity may be that these adaptations may also underlie aggression toward out-groups.)

Non-kin small group

How to maintain mutually beneficial relationships with non-kin in repeated interactions?

Robert Trivers (1971)

Cheater detection, emotions of revenge and guilt, etc.

Non-kin, large groups governed by rules and laws

How to maintain mutually beneficial relationships with strangers with whom one may interact only once?

Herbert Gintis (2000, 2003) and others

To in-group members: Capacity for generalized altruism, acting like a "good Samaritan," cognitive concepts of justice, ethics and human rights. To out-group members: Capacity for xenophobia, racism, warfare, genocide.

Large groups How to transfer / culture. information across distance and time?

Richard Dawkins [] (1976), Susan Blackmore [9] (2000), Boyd & Richerson [10] (2004)

Memetic Selection / Memetics / Dual inheritance theory Genes are not the only replicators subject to evolutionary change. Cultural characteristics, also [][9] referred to as "Memes" (e.g., ideas, rituals, tunes, cultural fads, etc.) can replicate and spread from brain to brain, and many of the same evolutionary principles that apply to genes apply to memes as well. Genes and memes may at times co-evolve ("gene-culture co-evolution").

Language, music, evoked culture, etc. Some possible by-products, or "exaptations," of language may include writing, reading, mathematics, etc.

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology


Middle-level evolutionary theories

Part of a series on

Evolutionary biology

Diagrammatic representation of the divergence of modern taxonomic groups from their common ancestor.

Evolutionary biology portal Category Book Related topics

Middle-level evolutionary theories are consistent with general evolutionary theory, but focus on certain domains of functioning (Buss, 2011)[11] Specific evolutionary psychology hypotheses may be derivative from a mid-level theory (Buss, 2011). Three very important middle-level evolutionary theories were contributed by Robert Trivers as well as Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson[12][13][14] The theory of parent-offspring conflict rests on the fact that even though a parent and his/her offspring are 50% genetically related, they are also 50% genetically different. All things being equal, a parent would want to allocate their resources equally amongst their offspring, while each offspring may want a little more for themselves. Furthermore, an offspring may want a little more resources from the parent than the parent is willing to give. In essence, parent-offspring conflict refers to a conflict of adaptive interests between parent and offspring. However, if all things are not equal, a parent may engage in discriminative investment towards one sex or the other, depending on the parent's condition. The TriversWillard hypothesis, which proposes that parents will invest more in the sex that gives them the greatest reproductive payoff (grandchildren) with increasing or marginal investment. Females are the heavier parental investors in our species. Because of that, females have a better chance of reproducing at least once in comparison to males, but males in good condition have a better chance of producing high numbers of offspring than do females in good condition. Thus, according to the TriversWillard hypothesis, parents in good condition are predicted to favor investment in sons, and parents in poor condition are predicted to favor investment in daughters. r/K selection theory,[12] which, in ecology, relates to the selection of traits in organisms that allow success in particular environments. r-selected species, i.e., species in unstable or unpredictable environments, produce many offspring, each of which is unlikely to survive to adulthood. By contrast, K-selected species, i.e., species in stable or predictable environments, invest more heavily in fewer offspring, each of which has a better chance of surviving to adulthood.

Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology Life history theory posits that the schedule and duration of key events in an organism's lifetime are shaped by natural selection to produce the largest possible number of surviving offspring. For any given individual, available resources in any particular environment are finite. Time, effort, and energy used for one purpose diminishes the time, effort, and energy available for another. Examples of some major life history characteristics include: age at first reproductive event, reproductive lifespan and aging, and number and size of offspring. Variations in these characteristics reflect different allocations of an individual's resources (i.e., time, effort, and energy expenditure) to competing life functions. For example, attachment theory proposes that caregiver attentiveness in early childhood can determine later adult attachment style. Also, Jay Belsky and others have found evidence that if the father is absent from the home, girls reach first menstruation earlier and also have more short term sexual relationships as women.[15]


[1] Gaulin, Steven J. C. and Donald H. McBurney. Evolutionary Psychology. Prentice Hall. 2003. ISBN 978-0-13-111529-3, Chapter 2, Natural Selection, p 25-56. [2] See also "Environment of evolutionary adaptation," a variation of the term used in Economics, e.g., in Rubin, Paul H., 2003, "Folk economics" Southern Economic Journal, 70:1, July 2003, 157-171. [3] Gaulin, Steven J. C. and Donald H. McBurney. Evolutionary Psychology. Prentice Hall. 2003. ISBN 978-0-13-111529-3, Chapter 2, Natural Selection, p 25-56. [4] Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal: Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology. Vintage. 1995. [5] Mills, M.E. (2004). Evolution and motivation. Symposium paper presented at the Western Psychological Association Conference, Phoenix, AZ. April, 2004. [6] Darwin, C. (1859). On The Origin of Species. [7] Darwin, C. (1872), The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals [8] Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. [9] Blackmore, Susan. (2000) The Meme Machine [10] Boyd & Richerson, (2004) Not by Genes Alone. [11] Buss, D.M. (2011). Evolutionary Psychology. NY: Bacon. [12] Pianka, E.R. (1970). On r and K selection. American Naturalist 104, 592597./> [15] Buss, D. (2011). Evolutionary Psychology.

Psychological adaptation


Psychological adaptation
A psychological adaptation, also known as evolved psychological mechanism (EPM), is evolved human or animal behavior resulting from evolutionary pressures. It could serve a specific purpose, have served a purpose in the past (see vestigiality), or be a side-effect of another EPM (see spandrel (biology)).[1] Evolutionary psychology proposes that the human psychology mostly comprises psychological adaptations, in opposition to tabula rasa or blank slate model of human psychology such as the standard social science model,[2] popular throughout most of the twentieth century. Instead, EPM's are ongoing processes in their emotions and intellect, that help individuals with their well being whether its through their mental state of mind or in culture.[3] The least controversial EPMs are those commonly known as instincts, including interpreting stereoscopic vision and suckling a mother's breast.[4]

Evolutionary Psychology as Adaptation

Evolutionary psychologists are scarce because they try and determine not the interaction between environment behavior but why a behavior is created in a specific environment.[5] In a Darwinian outlook, evolutionary psychology is seen as a succession of psychological adaptations occurring at individual times.[6] Not every trait of humans or animals are adaptations, but the ones that are tend to reflect the trend of the current population.[7] Evolutionary psychologists tend to study adaptations to give meaning to specific behaviors found in humans today.[8] Evolutionary psychologist, David Buss, lays out six properties of evolved psychological mechanisms (EPM's):[9] 1. An EPM exists in the form that it does because it solved a specific problem of survival or reproduction recurrently over evolutionary history. 2. An EPM is designed to take in only a narrow slice of information 3. The input of an EPM tells an organism the particular adaptive problem it is facing 4. The input of an EPM is transformed through decision rules into output 5. The output of an EPM can be physiological activity, information to other psychological mechanisms, or manifest behaviors 6. The output of an EPM is directed toward the solution to a specific adaptive problem

Natural Selection as Adaptation

Charles Darwin's theory of Natural Selection is one of the more common psychological adaptations to be studied in history. His ideas began the understanding of adaptation due to survival.[10] The idea of Zietgeist also has a way of explaining psychological adaptation. The idea is of the nature of the times in which a specific event takes place. Whether its cultural influences, environmental influences, or political influences, the zietgiest should have an impact on the ways in which adapting occurred.[11] EPM's tend to aid in solving specific adaptive problems. In biology, the idea that a plant or animal becomes fitted to its environment is the result of natural selection adapting to its inherited variation. However, in Psychological adaptation, the part of the environment causing the adaptation is society and culture of the times, while the adapting is taking place in the individual rather than the plant or animal. This helps contribute to ideas in human nature such as food selection, mate selection and intrasexual competition. Further important properties include the following:[12] EPM's provide nonarbitrary criteria, (i.e. adaptive function) for "carving the mind at its joints," (i.e. evolved structure). EPM's are believed to be numerous, which contributes to human behavioral flexibility. An analogy would be like a carpenter who, instead of having one tool that does everything, has many tools, each with a specific function for

Psychological adaptation a specific task, (e.g. a hammer for pounding nails, a saw for cutting wood, etc.) Some EPM's are domain-specific, (i.e. evolved to solve specific, recurrent adaptive problems), while others are domain-general, (i.e. evolved to aid the individual in dealing with novelty in the environment).


[1] Barrett, H. C.; Kurzban, R. (2006). "Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate". Psychological Review 113 (3): 628647. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.113.3.628. PMID 16802884. [2] http:/ / www. themindevolution. com/ 2010/ 08/ 30/ how-to-explain-human-nature-evolution-or-standard-social-science-model/ [3] http:/ / medical-dictionary. thefreedictionary. com/ Psychological+ adaptation [4] Ell, K., Nishimoto, R., Morvay, T., Mantell, J. and Hamovitch, M. (1989). A longitudinal analysis of psychological adaptation among. Survivors of cancer. Cancer, 63: 406413. Funder, D. C. (2010). The Personality Puzzle (5th ed.). New York, NY: Norton [5] Boyer, P. & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Domain specificity and intuitive ontology. In Buss, D.M. (ed.). Handbook of evolutionary psychology. (pp. 96118). Wiley. [6] Chiappe, D.; MacDonald, K. B. (2005). "The Evolution of Domain-General Mechanisms in Intelligence and Learning". Journal of General Psychology 132 (1): 540. doi:10.3200/GENP.132.1.5-40. PMID 15685958 [7] http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 9386913 [8] Krill, A. L.; Platek, S. M.; Goetz, A. T.; Shackelford, T. K. (2007). "Where evolutionary psychology meets cognitive neuroscience: A prcis to evolutionary cognitive neuroscience". Evolutionary Psychology 5: 232256. [9] Buss, D.M. (2004).Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. Boston, MA. Pearson Education, Inc. [10] http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 20100419 [11] Schultz, P.F. and Sydney, E.S. (2012). A History of Modern Psychology (10th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth [12] Tooby, J., Cosmides, L. & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Resolving the debate on innate ideas: Learnability constraints and the evolved interpenetration of motivational and conceptual functions. In Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. & Stich, S. (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. NY: Oxford University Press.

External links
Leda Cosmides &, John Tooby. "Evolutionary Psychology Primer by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby" (http:// Retrieved 2008-06-17.

Adaptive bias


Adaptive bias
Adaptive bias is the idea that the human brain has evolved to reason adaptively, rather than truthfully or even rationally, and that cognitive bias may have evolved as a mechanism to reduce the overall cost of cognitive errors as opposed to merely reducing the number of cognitive errors, when faced with making a decision under conditions of uncertainty.

Error Management Theory

According to Error Management Theory, when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, two kinds of errors need to be taken into account"false positives", i.e. deciding that a risk or benefit exists when it does not, and "false negatives", i.e. failing to notice a risk or benefit that exists. False positives are also commonly called "Type I errors", and false negatives are called "Type II errors". Where the cost or impact of a Type I error is much greater than the cost of a Type II error (e.g. the water is safe to drink), it can be worthwhile to bias the decision-making system towards making fewer Type I errors, i.e. making it less likely to conclude that a particular situation exists. This by definition would also increase the number of Type II errors. Conversely, where a false positive is much less costly than a false negative (blood tests, smoke detectors), it makes sense to bias the system towards maximising the probability that a particular (very costly) situation will be recognised, even if this often leads to the (relatively un-costly) event of noticing something that is not actually there. This situation is exhibited in modern airport screeningmaximising the probability of preventing a high-cost terrorist event results in frequent, low-cost screening hassles for harmless travelers who represent a minimal threat. Martie G. Haselton and David M. Buss (2003) state that cognitive bias can be expected to have developed in humans for cognitive tasks where: decision-making is complicated by a significant signal-detection problem (i.e. when there is uncertainty) the solution to the particular kind of decision-making problem has had a recurrent effect on survival and fitness throughout evolutionary history the costs of a "false positive" or "false negative" error dramatically outweighs the cost of the alternative type of error

The costly information hypothesis

The costly information hypothesis is used to explore how adaptive biases relate to cultural evolution within the field of dual inheritance theory. The focus is on the evolutionary trade-offs in cost between individual learning, (e.g., operant conditioning) and social learning. If more accurate information that could be acquired through individual learning is too costly, evolution may favor learning mechanisms that, in turn, are biased towards less costly, (though potentially less accurate), information via social learning.

Haselton, M.G., Nettle, D. & Andrews, P.W. (2005). The evolution of cognitive bias. In D.M. Buss (Ed.), Handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 724746). Hoboken: Wiley. Full text [1] Haselton, M.G. & Buss, D.M. (2003). Biases in Social Judgment: Design Flaws or Design Features? In J. Forgas, K. Williams, & B. von Hippel (Eds.), Responding to the social world: Implicit and explicit processes in social judgments and decisions. New York, NY: Cambridge. Full text [2] Henrich, J. & McElreath, R. (2007). Dual Inheritance Theory: The evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Ch. 38. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press. Full text [3]

Adaptive bias


[1] http:/ / www. sscnet. ucla. edu/ comm/ haselton/ webdocs/ handbookevpsych. pdf [2] http:/ / www. sscnet. ucla. edu/ comm/ haselton/ webdocs/ designflaws. pdf [3] http:/ / arbeit. ucdavis. edu/ mcelreath/ files/ Henrich%20and%20McElreath%20final. pdf

Cognitive module
A cognitive module is, in theories of the modularity of mind and the closely related society of mind theory, a specialised tool or sub-unit that can be used by other parts to resolve cognitive tasks. The question of their existence and nature is a major topic in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Some see cognitive modules as an independent part of the mind.[1] Others also see new thought patterns achieved by experience as cognitive modules.[2] Other theories similar to the cognitive module are cognitive description,[3] cognitive pattern[4] and psychological mechanism. Such a mechanism, if created by evolution, is known as evolved psychological mechanism.[5]

Some examples of cognitive modules: The modules controlling your hands when you ride a bike, to stop it from crashing, by minor left and right turns. The modules that allow a basket-ball player to accurately put the ball into the basket by tracking ballistic orbits.[6] The modules that recognise hunger and tell you that you need food.[7] The modules that cause you to appreciate a beautiful flower, painting or person.[8] The modules that make humans very efficient in recognising faces, already shown in Rhesus monkeys and in two-month-old babies, see Face perception.[9] The modules that cause some humans to be jealous of their partners' friends.[10][11] The modules that compute the speeds of incoming vehicles and tells you if you have time to cross without crashing into said vehicles.[12] The modules that cause parents to love and care for their children.[13] The libido modules.[14] Modules that specifically discern the movements of animals.[15][16] The fight or flight reflex choice modules.[17][18][19]

Psychological disorders cognitive modules run amok

Many common psychological and personality disorders are caused by cognitive modules running amok. Jealousy: A common cause of unnecessary conflict in relations is that a man is jealous of a woman's previous sexual partners before she met him.[20] All people are born with a basic jealousy cognitive module, developed through as evolutionary strategy in order to safeguard a mate and trigger aggression towards competitors to ensure paternity and prevent bastards.[21] If this module is activated to too strong a degree, it becomes a personality disorder.[22][23][24] Stalking: An extreme psychological disorder related to jealousy is stalking.[25] A stalker is a person (usually a man) who behaves as if he had a relation to another person (usually a woman) who is not interested in him. There are also women who stalk men, men who stalk men and women who stalk women, but most common is a man stalking a woman. In modern western culture this behaviour is strongly frowned upon. Paranoia:[26] Being suspicious of fellow human beings is a trait to safeguard against perceived, secret plots against us, a basic human cognitive module useful for survival. But in some people, this turns into unreasonable suspiciousness where there is in reality no plotting against one. Such behaviour is by psychiatrists labeled as

Cognitive module paranoid schizophrenia or in milder forms as paranoid personality disorder.[27] These disorders thus occur when the suspiciousness cognitive module is triggered too often and too strongly for triggers that would not trigger this module in normal people.[28] Obsessive-compulsive disorder: In this quite common disorder, a person will repeatedly check, for example, that a door is locked. One may repeatedly wash hands or other body parts, sometimes for hours, to ensure cleanliness.[29] Again, this disorder is a malfunction of a normal adaptation in all humans to check that a door is locked, to wash to keep us clean, etc. Transference:[30] A cognitive module developed to solve a particular problem can sometimes crop up in other situations where it is not appropriate. One may be angry at one's boss, but take the anger out on one's fellow man. Often, the transference is unconscious (see also Subconscious mind and Unconscious mind). In psychotherapy, the patient is made aware of this, which makes it easier to modify the unsuitable behaviour.[31] Sigmund Freud's theory of sublimation:[32] said that cognitive modules for some activities, such as sex, may incorrectly show up in disguise in cases where they are not suitable. Freud also introduced the idea of the unconscious, which interpreted as cognitive modules where a person is not aware of the initial cause of these modules and may use them inappropriately. Schizophrenia: is a psychotic disorder where cognitive modules are triggered too often, overwhelming the brain with information.[33] The inability to repress overwhelming information is a cause of schizophrenia.[34]


Treatment of cognitive module psychological disorders

Cognitive therapy is a psychotherapeutic method that helps people better understand the cognitive modules that cause them to do certain things, and to teach them alternative, more appropriate cognitive modules to use instead in the future.

Psychoanalytic view of cognitive modules

According to psychoanalytic theory, many cognitive modules are unconscious and repressed, to avoid mental conflicts. Defenses are meant to be cognitive modules used to suppress the awareness of other cognitive modules. Unconscious cognitive modules may influence our behaviour without our being aware of it.

Evolutionary psychology view of cognitive modules

In the research field of evolutionary psychology it is believed that some cognitive modules are inherited and some are created by learning, but the creation of new modules by learning is often guided by inherited modules.[35] For example, the ability to drive a car or throw a basket-ball are certainly learned and not inherited modules, but they may make use of inherited modules to rapidly compute trajectories. There is some disagreement between different social scientists on the importance to the capabilities of the human mind of inherited modules. Evolutionary psychologists claim that other social scientists do not accept that some modules are partially inherited,[36] other social scientists claim that evolutionary psychologists are exaggerating the importance of inherited cognitive modules.

Cognitive module


Memory and creative thought

A very important aspect of how humans think is the ability, when encountering a situation or problem, to find more or less similar, but not identical, experiences or cognitive modules. This can be compared to what happens if you sound a tone near a piano. The piano string corresponding to this particular tone will then vibrate. But also other strings, from nearby strings, will vibrate to a lesser extent. Exactly how the human mind does this is not known, but it is believed that when you encounter a situation or problem, many different cognitive modules are activated at the same time, and the mind selects those most useful for understanding a new situation or solving a new problem.[37][38]

Ethics and law

Most law-abiding people have cognitive modules that stop them from committing crimes. Criminals have different modules, causing criminal behaviour. Thus, cognitive modules can be a cause of both ethical and unethical behaviour.[39]

This article is based on an article in Web4Health [40].
[1] Max Coltheart: Modularity and cognition (http:/ / www. biols. susx. ac. uk/ ugteach/ cws/ iin/ Readings/ coltheart. pdf) - Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1999 [2] Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda 1992 The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in Barkow, Jerome H., Cosmides, Leda, Tooby, John, (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-506023-7, page 30-32. [3] Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda 1992 The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in Barkow, Jerome H., Cosmides, Leda, Tooby, John, (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-506023-7, page 64. [4] Doreen Kimura, Elizabeth Hampson (1994) Cognitive Pattern in Men and Women Is Influenced by Fluctuations in Sex Hormones. Current Directions in Psychological Science 3 (2), 5761. . [5] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Science of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 50ff. [6] Ralf Th. Krampe, Ralf Engbert and Reinhold Kliegl: "Representational Models and Nonlinear Dynamics: Irreconcilable Approaches to Human Movement Timing and Coordination or Two Sides of the Same Coin? Introduction to the Special Issue on Movement Timing and Coordination", Brain and Cognition Volume 48, Issue 1, February 2002, Pages 1-6. [7] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Science of the Mind] - 1st edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 71-87. [8] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Science of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 407-410. [9] Bruce, Vicki; Young, Andy: "Understanding face recognition", British Journal of Psychology. 1986 Aug Vol 77(3) 305-327. [10] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Science of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 325-330. [11] The Evolution of Jealousy: The Specific Innate Module Theory (http:/ / www. americanscientist. org/ template/ AssetDetail/ assetid/ 29664/ page/ 2;jsessionid=aaa5LVF0) Scientific American, Volume: 92 Number: 1, (JanuaryFebruary 2004) [12] Ralf Th. Krampe, Ralf Engbert and Reinhold Kliegl: "Representational Models and Nonlinear Dynamics: Irreconcilable Approaches to Human Movement Timing and Coordination or Two Sides of the Same Coin? Introduction to the Special Issue on Movement Timing and Coordination", Brain and Cognition Volume 48, Issue 1, February 2002, Pages 1-6. [13] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Sciend of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 188ff [14] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Science of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 103 ff. [15] Category-specific attention for animals reflects ancestral priorities, not expertise (http:/ / www. pnas. org/ cgi/ content/ abstract/ 0703913104v1) Joshua New, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, October 2, 2007; 104 (40) [16] More news from the savannah (http:/ / www. economist. com/ science/ displaystory. cfm?story_id=9861405) The Economist, Sep 27th 2007 [17] W.B. Cannon: Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An Account of Recent Research Into the Function of Emotional Excitement, 2nd ed. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929 [18] Daniel Kruger and Randolph Nesse: Sexual selection and the Male:Female Mortality Ratio (http:/ / human-nature. com/ ep/ articles/ ep026685. html), Human Nature Review 2004. 2: 68 (http:/ / human-nature. com/ ). [19] Arthur S.P. Jansen: Central Command Neurons of the Sympathetic Nervous System: Basis of the Fight-or-Flight Response, Science 27 October 1995: Vol. 270. no. 5236, pp. 644 - 646. [20] Problem with Jealousy of Past Relations (http:/ / web4health. info/ en/ answers/ life-jealousy-past-relations. htm) By Gunborg Palme 2006 [21] Tatiana's Sex Advice to All Creation: The Definitive Guide to the Evolutionary Biology of Sex (http:/ / books. google. com/ books?q=Olivia+ Judson& btnG=Search+ Books) Olivia Judson, Dr. Publisher: Vintage; New Ed (2003), 320p. ISBN 0-09-928375-1 [22] David M. Buss: The evolution of desire] - 2nd edition, Basic Books 2003, pages 125ff.

Cognitive module
[23] Margo Wilson and Martin Daly: The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, in Jerome H. Barkow et al., The Adapted Mind, Oxford University Press, 1992, page 302-305. [24] David M. Buss: The evolution of desire] - 2nd edition, Basic Books 2003, pages 129ff. [25] J. Reid Meloy The Psychology of Stalking - Clinical and Forensic Perspectives, by J. Reid Meloy (ed.), Academic Press, 2001. [26] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association 1994 page 287 [27] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association 1994 pages 634ff [28] Erlene Rosowsky, Robert C. Abrams, Richard A. Zweig: Personality Disorders in Older Adults: Emerging Issues in Diagnosis and Treatment; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999. p. 154. [29] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association 1994 pages 417ff [30] Thornton, Stephen P. (2006) Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ f/ freud. htm) [31] Gabbard GO, Horwitz L, Allen JG, Frieswyk S, Newsom G, Colson DB, Coyne L.: "Transference interpretation in the psychotherapy of borderline patients: a high-risk, high-gain phenomenon", Harv Rev Psychiatry. 1994 Jul-Aug;2(2):59-69. [32] Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ f/ freud. htm) Thornton, Stephen P. (2006) [33] D. Weinberger, Prefrontal neurons and the genetics of schizophrenia Biological Psychiatry, Volume 50, Issue 11, Pages 825-844. [34] Randolph M. Nesse and Alan T. Lloyd, The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms, in Jerome H. Barkow et al., The Adapted Mind, Oxford University Press, 1992, page 608. [35] David M. Buss: Evolutionary Psychology - The New Sciend of the Mind] - 2nd edition, Pearson Education 2004, pages 19-21 [36] Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda 1992 The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-506023-7 page 38. [37] Liane Gabora: Toward a theory of creative inklings (http:/ / cogprints. org/ 2105/ 0/ inklings. htm) In (R. Ascott, ed.) Art, Technology, and Consciousness, Intellect Press, p. 159-164. [38] D. Goleman, Vital lies, simple truths, Simon & Schuster 1985. [39] David Abrahamsen: The Psychology of Crime; Columbia University Press, 1960. p. 158ff [40] http:/ / web4health. info/ en/ answers/ bio-brain-work. htm


Dual inheritance theory

Dual inheritance theory (DIT), also known as geneculture coevolution or biocultural evolution,[1] was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s to explain how human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. In DIT, culture is defined as information and behavior acquired through social learning. One of the theory's central claims is that culture evolves partly through a Darwinian selection process, which dual inheritance theorists often describe by analogy to genetic evolution.[2] Because genetic evolution is relatively well understood, most of DIT examines cultural evolution and the interactions between cultural evolution and genetic evolution.

Theoretical basis
DIT holds that genetic and cultural evolution interacted in the evolution of Homo sapiens. DIT recognizes that the natural selection of genotypes is an important component of the evolution of human behavior and that cultural traits can be constrained by genetic imperatives. However, DIT also recognizes that genetic evolution has endowed the human species with a parallel evolutionary process of cultural evolution. DIT makes three main claims:[3]

Culture capacities are adaptations

The human capacity to store and transmit culture arose from genetically evolved psychological mechanisms. This implies that at some point during the evolution of the human species a type of social learning leading to cumulative cultural evolution was evolutionarily advantageous.

Dual inheritance theory


Culture evolves
Social learning processes give rise to cultural evolution. Cultural traits are transmitted differently than genetic traits and, therefore, result in different population-level effects on behavioral variation.

Genes and culture coevolve

Cultural traits alter the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates. For example, the cultural adoptions of agriculture and dairying have, in humans, caused genetic selection for the traits to digest starch and lactose, respectively.[4][5][6][7][8][9] As another example, it is likely that once culture became adaptive, genetic selection caused a refinement of the cognitive architecture that stores and transmits cultural information. This refinement may have further influenced the way culture is stored and the biases that govern its transmission. DIT also predicts that, under certain situations, cultural evolution may select for traits that are genetically maladaptive. An example of this is the demographic transition, which describes the fall of birth rates within industrialized societies. Dual inheritance theorists hypothesize that the demographic transition may be a result of a prestige bias, where individuals that forgo reproduction to gain more influence in industrial societies are more likely to be chosen as cultural models.[10][11]

View of culture
People have defined the word "culture" to describe a large set of different phenomena.[12][13] A definition that sums up what is meant by "culture" in DIT is: Culture is information stored in individuals' brains that is capable of affecting behavior and that got there through social learning.[14][15] This view of culture emphasizes population thinking by focusing on the process by which culture is generated and maintained. It also views culture as a dynamic property of individuals, as opposed to a view of culture as a superorganic entity to which individuals must conform.[16] This view's main advantage is that it connects individual-level processes to population-level outcomes.[17]

Genetic influence on cultural evolution

Genes have an impact on cultural evolution via psychological predispositions on cultural learning. Genes encode much of the information needed to form the human brain. Genes constrain the brain's structure and, hence, the ability of the brain to acquire and store culture. Genes may also endow individuals with certain types of transmission bias (described below).

Cultural influences on genetic evolution

Culture can profoundly influence gene frequencies in a population. One of the best known examples is the prevalence of the genotype for adult lactose absorption in human populations, such as Northern Europeans and some African societies, with a long history of raising cattle for milk. Other societies such as East Asians and Amerindians, retain the typical mammalian genotype in which the body shuts down lactase production shortly after the normal age of weaning. This implies that the cultural practice of raising cattle for milk led to selection for genetic traits for lactose digestion.[18] Recently, analysis of natural selection on the human genome suggests that civilization has accelerated genetic change in humans over the past 10,000 years.[19]

Dual inheritance theory


Mechanisms of cultural evolution

In DIT, the evolution and maintenance of cultures is described by five major mechanisms: natural selection of cultural variants, random variation, cultural drift, guided variation and transmission bias.

Natural selection
Cultural differences among individuals can lead to differential survival of individuals. The patterns of this selective process depend on transmission biases and can result in behavior that is more adaptive to a given environment.

Random variation
Random variation arises from errors in the learning, display or recall of cultural information, and is roughly analogous to the process of mutation in genetic evolution.

Cultural drift
Cultural drift is a process roughly analogous to genetic drift in evolutionary biology.[20][21][22] In cultural drift, the frequency of cultural traits in a population may be subject to random fluctuations due to chance variations in which traits are observed and transmitted (sometimes called "sampling error").[23] These fluctuations might cause cultural variants to disappear from a population. This effect should be especially strong in small populations.[24] A model by Hahn and Bentley shows that cultural drift gives a reasonably good approximation to changes in the popularity of American baby names.[23] Drift processes have also been suggested to explain changes in archaeological pottery and technology patent applications.[22] Changes in the songs of song birds are also thought to arise from drift processes, where distinct dialects in different groups occur due to errors in songbird singing and acquisition by successive generations.[25] Cultural drift is also observed in an early computer model of cultural evolution.[26]

Guided variation
Cultural traits may be gained in a population through the process of individual learning. Once an individual learns a novel trait, it can be transmitted to other members of the population. The process of guided variation depends on an adaptive standard that determines what cultural variants are learned.

Biased transmission
Understanding the different ways that culture traits can be transmitted between individuals has been an important part of DIT research since the 1970s.[27][28] Transmission biases occur when some cultural variants are favored over others during the process of cultural transmission.[29] Boyd and Richerson (1985)[29] defined and analytically modeled a number of possible transmission biases. The list of biases has been refined over the years, especially by Henrich and McElreath.[30]

Dual inheritance theory Content bias Content biases result from situations where some aspect of a cultural variant's content makes them more likely to be adopted.[31] Content biases can result from genetic preferences, preferences determined by existing cultural traits, or a combination of the two. For example, food preferences can result from genetic preferences for sugary or fatty foods and socially-learned eating practices and taboos.[31] Content biases are sometimes called "direct biases."[29] Context bias Context biases result from individuals using clues about the social structure of their population to determine what cultural variants to adopt. This determination is made without reference to the content of the variant. There are two major categories of context biases: (1) model-based biases, and (2) frequency-dependent biases. Model-based biases Model-based biases result when an individual is biased to choose a particular "cultural model" to imitate. There are four major categories of model-based biases: (1) prestige bias, (2) skill bias, (3) success bias, (4) similarity bias.[3][32] A "prestige bias" results when individuals are more likely to imitate cultural models that are seen as having more prestige. A measure of prestige could be the amount of deference shown to a potential cultural model by other individuals. A "skill bias" results when individuals can directly observe different cultural models performing a learned skill and are more likely to imitate cultural models that perform better at the specific skill. A "success bias" results from individuals preferentially imitating cultural models that they determine are most generally successful (as opposed to successful at a specific skill as in the skill bias.) A "similarity bias" results when individuals are more likely to imitate cultural models that are perceived as being similar to the individual based on specific traits. Frequency-dependent biases Frequency-dependent biases result when an individual is biased to choose particular cultural variants based on their perceived frequency in the population. The most explored frequency-dependent bias is the "conformity bias." Conformity biases result when individuals attempt to copy the mean or the mode cultural variant in the population. Another possible frequency dependent bias is the "rarity bias." The rarity bias results when individuals preferentially choose cultural variants that are less common in the population. The rarity bias is also sometimes called a "nonconformist" or "anti-conformist" bias.


Social learning and cumulative cultural evolution

In DIT, the evolution of culture is dependent on the evolution of social learning. Analytic models show that social learning becomes evolutionarily beneficial when the environment changes with enough frequency that genetic inheritance can not track the changes, but not fast enough that individual learning is more efficient.[33] While other species have social learning, and thus some level of culture, only humans, some birds and chimpanzees are known to have cumulative culture.[34] Boyd and Richerson argue that the evolution of cumulative culture depends on observational learning and is uncommon in other species because it is ineffective when it is rare in a population. They propose that the environmental changes occurring in the Pleistocene may have provided the right environmental conditions.[35] Michael Tomasello argues that cumulative cultural evolution results from a "ratchet effect" that began when humans developed the cognitive architecture to understand others as mental agents.[36] Furthermore Tomasello proposed in the 80s that there are some disparities between the observational learning mechanisms found in humans and great apes - which go some way to explain the observable difference between great ape traditions and human types of culture (see Emulation (observational learning)).

Dual inheritance theory


Cultural group selection

Although group selection is commonly thought to be nonexistent or unimportant in genetic evolution,[37][38][39] DIT predicts that, due to the nature of cultural inheritance, it may be an important force in cultural evolution. The reason group selection is thought to operate in cultural evolution is because of conformist biases (see above section on transmission biases). Conformist biases make it difficult for novel cultural traits to spread through a population. Conformist bias also helps maintain variation between groups. These two properties, rare in genetic transmission, are necessary for group selection to operate.[40] Based on an earlier model by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,[41] Boyd and Richerson show that conformist biases are almost inevitable when traits spread through social learning,[42] implying that group selection is common in cultural evolution. Analysis of small groups in New Guinea imply that cultural group selection might be a good explanation for slowly changing aspects of social structure, but not for rapidly changing fads.[43] The ability of cultural evolution to maintain intergroup diversity is what allows for the study of cultural phylogenetics.[44]

Historical development
The idea that human cultures undergo a similar evolutionary process as genetic evolution goes back at least to Darwin[45] In the 1960s, Donald T. Campbell published some of the first theoretical work that adapted principles of evolutionary theory to the evolution of cultures.[46] In 1976, two developments in cultural evolutionary theory set the stage for DIT. In that year Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene introduced ideas of cultural evolution to a popular audience. Although one of the best-selling science books of all time, because of its lack of mathematical rigor, it had little impact on the development of DIT. Also in 1976, geneticists Marcus Feldman and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza published the first dynamic models of geneculture coevolution.[47] These models were to form the basis for subsequent work on DIT, heralded by the publication of three seminal books in the 1980s. The first was Charles Lumsden and E.O. Wilson's Genes, Mind and Culture.[48] This book outlined a series of mathematical models of how genetic evolution might favor the selection of cultural traits and how cultural traits might, in turn, affect the speed of genetic evolution. While it was the first book published describing how genes and culture might coevolve, it had relatively little impact on the further development of DIT.[49] Some critics felt that their models depended too heavily on genetic mechanisms at the expense of cultural mechanisms.[50] Controversy surrounding Wilson's sociobiological theories may also have decreased the lasting impact of this book.[49] The second 1981 book was Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach.[21] Borrowing heavily from population genetics and epidemiology, this book built a mathematical theory concerning the spread of cultural traits. It describes the evolutionary implications of vertical transmission, passing cultural traits from parents to offspring; oblique transmission, passing cultural traits from any member of an older generation to a younger generation; and horizontal transmission, passing traits between members of the same population. The next significant DIT publication was Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson's 1985 Culture and the Evolutionary Process.[29] This book presents the now-standard mathematical models of the evolution of social learning under different environmental conditions, the population effects of social learning, various forces of selection on cultural learning rules, different forms of biased transmission and their population-level effects, and conflicts between cultural and genetic evolution. The book's conclusion also outlined areas for future research that are still relevant today.

Dual inheritance theory


Current and future research

In their 1985 book, Boyd and Richerson outlined an agenda for future DIT research. This agenda, outlined below, called for the development of both theoretical models and empirical research. DIT has since built a rich tradition of theoretical models over the past two decades.[51] However, there has not been a comparable level of empirical work. In a 2006 interview Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson expressed disappointment at the little attention afforded to DIT: "...for some reason I haven't fully fathomed, this most promising frontier of scientific research has attracted very few people and very little effort." [52] Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown attribute this lack of attention to DIT's heavy reliance on formal modeling. "In many ways the most complex and potentially rewarding of all approaches, [DIT], with its multiple processes and cerebral onslaught of sigmas and deltas, may appear too abstract to all but the most enthusiastic reader. Until such a time as the theoretical hieroglyphics can be translated into a respectable empirical science most observers will remain immune to its message."[53] Economist Herbert Gintis disagrees with this critique, citing empirical work as well as more recent work using techniques from behavioral economics.[54] These behavioral economic techniques have been adapted to test predictions of cultural evolutionary models in laboratory settings [55][56][57] as well as studying differences in cooperation in fifteen small-scale societies in the field.[58] Since one of the goals of DIT is to explain the distribution of human cultural traits, ethnographic and ethnologic techniques may also be useful for testing hypothesis stemming from DIT. Although findings from traditional ethnologic studies have been used to buttress DIT arguments,[59][60] thus far there have been little ethnographic fieldwork designed to explicitly test these hypotheses.[43][58][61] Herb Gintis has named DIT one of the two major conceptual theories with potential for unifying the behavioral sciences, including economics, biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology and political science. Because it addresses both the genetic and cultural components of human inheritance, Gintis sees DIT models as providing the best explanations for the ultimate cause of human behavior and the best paradigm for integrating those disciplines with evolutionary theory.[62] In a review of competing evolutionary perspectives on human behavior, Laland and Brown see DIT as the best candidate for uniting the other evolutionary perspectives under one theoretical umbrella.[63]

Relation to other fields

Sociology and cultural anthropology
Two major topics of study in both sociology and cultural anthropology are human cultures and cultural variation. However, Dual Inheritance theorists charge that both disciplines too often treat culture as a static superorganic entity that dictates human behavior.[64][65] Cultures are defined by a suite of common traits shared by a large group of people. DIT theoriests argue that this doesn't sufficiently explain variation in cultural traits at the individual level. By contrast, DIT models human culture at the individual level and views culture as the result of a dynamic evolutionary process at the population level.[64][66]

Human sociobiology and evolutionary psychology

Human sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists try to understand how maximizing genetic fitness, in either the modern era or past environments, can explain human behavior. When faced with a common and seemingly maladaptive trait, practitioners from these disciplines try to determine how the trait actually increases genetic fitness (maybe through kin selection or by speculating about early evolutionary environments). Dual Inheritance theorists, in contrast, will consider a variety of genetic and cultural processes in addition to natural selection on genes.

Dual inheritance theory


Human behavioral ecology

Human behavioral ecology (HBE) and DIT have a similar relationship to what ecology and evolutionary biology have in the biological sciences. HBE is more concerned about ecological process and DIT more focused on historical process. One difference is that human behavioral ecologists often assume that culture is a system that produces the most adaptive outcome in a given environment. This implies that similar behavioral traditions should be found in similar environments. However, this is not always the case. A study of African cultures showed that cultural history was a better predictor of cultural traits than local ecological conditions.[67]

Memetics, which comes from the meme idea described in Dawkins's The Selfish Gene, is similar to DIT in that it treats culture as an evolutionary process that is distinct from genetic transmission. However, there are some philosophical differences between memetics and DIT.[68] One difference is that memetics' focus is on the selection potential of discrete replicators (memes), where DIT allows for transmission of both non-replicators and non-discrete cultural variants. DIT does not assume that replicators are necessary for cumulative adaptive evolution. DIT also more strongly emphasizes the role of genetic inheritance in shaping the capacity for cultural evolution. But perhaps the biggest difference is a difference in academic lineage. Memetics as a label is more influential in popular culture than in academia. Critics of memetics argue that it is lacking in empirical support or is conceptually ill-founded, and question whether there is hope for the memetic research program succeeding. Proponents point out that many cultural traits are discrete, and that many existing models of cultural inheritance assume discrete cultural units, and hence involve memes.[69]

A number of criticisms of DIT have been put forward.[70][71][72] From some points of view, use of the term dual inheritance to refer to both what is transmitted genetically and what is transmitted culturally is technically misleading.[citation needed] Many opponents cite horizontal transmission of ideas to be so "different" from the typical vertical transmission (reproduction) in genetic evolution that it is not evolution. However, 1)even genetic evolution uses non-vertical transmission through the environmental alteration of the genome during life by acquired circumstance: epigenetics, and 2) genetic evolution is also affected by direct horizontal transmission between separate species of plants and strains of bacteria: horizontal gene transfer. Other critics argue that there can be no "dual" inheritance without cultural inheritance being "sequestered" by the biotic genome [citation needed]. Evidence for this process is scarce and controversial. Why this is a demand of critics, however, can be considered unclear as it refutes none of the central claims laid down by proponents of DIT. More serious criticisms of DIT arise from the choice of Darwinian selection as an explanatory framework for culture. Some argue, cultural evolution does not possess the algorithmic structure of a process that can be modeled in a Darwinian framework as characterized by John von Neumann[73] and used by John Holland to design the genetic algorithm.[74] Forcing culture into a Darwinian framework gives a distorted picture of the process for several reasons. First, some argue Darwinian selection only works as an explanatory framework when variation is randomly generated.[citation needed] To the extent that transmission biases are operative in culture, they mitigate the effect of Darwinian change, i.e. change in the distribution of variants over generations of exposure to selective pressures.[citation needed] Second, since acquired change can accumulate orders of magnitude faster than inherited change, if it is not getting regularly discarded each generation, it quickly overwhelms the population-level mechanism of change identified by Darwin; it swamps the phylogenetic signal. [citation needed] However, DIT proponents might reply that, 1) biotic evolution does not function only on randomly generated phenotypes either, since the phenotypes present in a population are the combined result of random and selective effects during the last generation; and 2)that transmission bias would quite often also reinforce "Darwinian change" since it is widely evidenced that Culture has adaptive value in increasing human fitness.

Dual inheritance theory Another discord in opinion stems from DIT opponents' assertion that there exists some "creative force" that is applied to each idea as it is received and before it is passed on, and that this agency is so powerful that it can be stronger than the selective system of other individuals assessing what to teach and whether your idea has merit [citation needed] . But if this criticism was valid then it would be comparatively much easier to argue an unpopular or incorrect concepts than it actually is. In addition, nothing about DIT runs counter to the idea that an internally selective process (some would call creativity) also determines the fitness of ideas received and sent. In fact this decision making is a large part of the territory embraced by DIT proponents but is poorly understood due to limitations in neurobiology (for more information see Neural Darwinism). Related criticisms of the effort to frame culture in Darwinian terms have been leveled by Richard Lewontin,[75] Niles Eldredge,[76] and Stuart Kauffman.[77]


[3] McElreath, R. & Henrich, J. 2007. Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. (http:/ / arbeit. ucdavis. edu/ mcelreath/ files/ Henrich and McElreath final. pdf) In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press. [4] Simoons, F. 1969. Primary adult lactose intolerance and the milking habit: A problem in biologic and cultural interrelations: I. Review of the medical research. The American Journal of Digestive Diseases 14:819-836. [5] Simoons, F. 1970. Primary adult lactose intolerance and the milking habit: A problem in biologic and cultural interrelations: II. A culture historical hypothesis. The American Journal of Digestive Diseases 15:695-710. [6] Cavalli-Sforza, L., P. Menozzi and A. Piazza. 1994. The history and geography of human genes Princeton: Princeton University Press [7] Holden, C. and R. Mace. 1997. Phylogenetic analysis of the evolution of lactose digestion in adults. Human Biology 69:605-628. [8] Durham, W. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, culture and human diversity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chapter 5 [9] Perry, G., N. Dominy, K. Claw, A. Lee, H> Fiegler, R. Redon, J. Werner, F. Villanea, J. Mountain, R. Misra, N. Carter, C. Lee, A. Stone. Diet and the evolution of human amylase gene copy number variation. Nature Genetics 39:1256-1260. [10] Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 199-202. [11] Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 169-182. [12] Kroeberm A. and C. Kluckhohn. 1952. Culture; A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. [13] Fox, R. and B. King. 2002. Anthropology Beyond Culture Oxford: Berg. [14] Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg 6. [15] Boyd, R. and P. Richerson. 2000. Memes: Universal Acid or a Better Mouse Trap? In R. Aunger, Ed. Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 143-162. Full text (http:/ / www. sscnet. ucla. edu/ anthro/ faculty/ boyd/ CambMeme. PDF) [16] Richerson, P.J. and R. Boyd. 2001. Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept Serves the Human Sciences Badly. In Science Studies: Probing the Dynamics of Scientific Knowledge, In S. Maasen and M. Winterhager, Ed. Bielefeld: Verlag. (http:/ / xcelab. net/ rm/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2008/ 08/ cultureisbiology. pdf) [17] Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg 7. [18] Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg. 260 [19] Cochran, G. and H. Harpending. 2009. The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution. Basic Books. [20] Koerper, H. and E. Stickel. 1980. Cultural Drift: A Primary Process of Culture Change Journal of Anthropological Research. 36: 463-469. [21] Cavalli-Sfornza, L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. [22] Bentley, R.A., M.W. Hahn and S.J. Shennan. 2004. Random drift and culture change. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 271: 1443-1450. Full text (http:/ / artsci. wustl. edu/ ~pboyer/ CEwebsite/ Archive/ ShennanRandomDrift. pdf) [23] Hahn, M.W. and R. A. Bentley. 2003. Drift as a mechanism for cultural change: An example from baby names. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 271: S353-S356. Full text (http:/ / www. duke. edu/ ~mwh3/ BabyNames. pdf) [24] Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.9, 69 [25] P.J.B. Slater, V.M. Janik. Vocal Learning. In "Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior", 2010, Pages 551-557. http:/ / www. sciencedirect. com/ science/ referenceworks/ 9780080453378 [26] Gabora, L. (1995). Meme and variations: A computer model of cultural evolution (http:/ / www. vub. ac. be/ CLEA/ liane/ papers/ mav. htm). In (L. Nadel & D. Stein, Eds.) 1993 Lectures in Complex Systems, Addison-Wesley, 471-486.

Dual inheritance theory

[27] Feldman, M. and L. Cavalli-Sfornza. 1976. Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission. Theoretical Population Biology 9: 238-259. [28] Feldman, M and L. Cavalli-Sfornza. 1977. The evolution of continuous variation: II, complex transmission and assortive mating. Theoretical Population Biology 11:161-181. [29] Boyd, R., and P. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [31] Henrich, J. and R. McElreath. 2007. Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, eds., Ch. 38. Oxford: Oxford Univ Press. [32] Henrich, J. and R. McElreath. 2003. The evolution of cultural evolution. (http:/ / arbeit. ucdavis. edu/ mcelreath/ files/ henrich mcelreath EA 2003. pdf) Evolutionary Anthropology 12:123-135. [33] Richerson, P.J. and R. Boyd. 2000. Climate, culture, and the evolution of cognition. In C.M. Heyes and L. Huber, (Eds), The Evolution of Cognition. Massachusetts: MIT Press. [34] Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press. [35] Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2000. The Pleistocene and the origins of human culture: built for speed. Perspectives in Ethology 13:1-45, 2000. [36] Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [37] Williams, G.C. 1972. Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02357-3 [38] Williams, G.C.. 1986. Evolution Through Group Selection. Blackwell. ISBN 0-632-01541-1 [39] Maynard Smith, J.. 1964. Group selection and kin selection 'Nature' 201:11451147 [40] Uyenoyama, M. and M. W. Feldman. 1980. Theories of kin and group selection: a population genetics perspective. Theoretical Population Biology 17:380-414. [41] Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. and M. W. Feldman. 1973. Models for cultural inheritance. I. Group mean and within group variation. Theoretical Population Biology 4:42-44. [42] Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg. 227-240. [43] Soltis, J., Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1995. Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? An empirical test (http:/ / www. des. ucdavis. edu/ faculty/ richerson/ SoltisBoydRichersonCA95. pdf) Current Anthropology 36:473-494 [44] Mace, R., C. Holden, and S. Shennan (Eds.) 2005. The evolution of cultural diversity: a phylogenetic approach. London:University College London Press. [45] Darwin, C. 1874. The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. 2nd ed. 2 vols. New York: American Home Library. [46] Campbell, D. 1965. Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In Social change in developing areas: A reinterpretation of evolutionary theory, ed. H. Barringer, G. Blanksten, and R. Mack, 19-49. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company. [47] Feldman, M. and Cavalli-Sforna L. 1976. Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission. Theoretical Population Biology, 9:238-59. [48] Lumsden C., and E. Wilson. 1981. Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [49] Laland K. and G. Brown. 2002. Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [50] Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. 1983. The cultural transmission of acquired variation: effects on genetic fitness. Journal of Theoretical Biology 100:567-96. [51] Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg. 294-299. [52] Haag, Allison. 2006. The synthesizer (http:/ / seedmagazine. com/ news/ 2007/ 01/ the_synthesizer. php). SEED, 2(7): 46. [53] Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg 290. [54] Herb Gintis review: http:/ / www. amazon. com/ review/ product/ 0198508840/ [55] McElreath, R., M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson, T. M. Waring, W. Baum, E. Edsten, C. Efferson, and B. Paciotti. 2005. Applying formal models to the laboratory study of social learning: The impact of task difficulty and environmental fluctuation. (http:/ / www. des. ucdavis. edu/ faculty/ Richerson/ WheatPotatoes. pdf) Evolution and Human Behavior 26: 483-508. [57] Baum, W. M., P. J. Richerson, C. M. Efferson, B. M. Paciotti. 2004. Cultural evolution in laboratory micro-societies including traditions of rule-giving and rule-following (http:/ / www. des. ucdavis. edu/ faculty/ Richerson/ Baumetalprinted. pdf). Evolution and Human Behavior 25: 305-326. 2004. [58] Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis (Eds). 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies Oxford: Oxford University Press. [59] Cavalli-Sfornza, L. L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. [60] Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [61] McElreath, R. 2004. Social learning and the maintenance of cultural variation: An evolutionary model and data from East Africa (http:/ / arbeit. ucdavis. edu/ mcelreath/ files/ mcelreath AA 2004. pdf). American Anthropologist 106:308-321. [62] Gintis, H. 2006. Behavioral and Brain Sciences A framework for the integration of the behavioral sciences (http:/ / www. umass. edu/ preferen/ gintis/ Unity-BBS Print Version. pdf) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:1-61 [63] Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg. 287-319.


Dual inheritance theory

[64] Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2001. Culture is part of human biology: Why the superorganic concept serves the human sciences badly (http:/ / www. des. ucdavis. edu/ faculty/ Richerson/ CultureIsBiology. pdf). In M. Goodman and A. S. Moffat(Eds.) Probing Human Origins. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The American Academy of Arts & Sciences. [65] Gintis, H. 2007. A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences (http:/ / www. umass. edu/ preferen/ gintis/ Unity-BBS Print Version. pdf). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 30:1-61. [66] Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg. 5-8 [67] Guglielmino, C. R., Viganotti, C., Hewlett, B., and Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. 1995. Cultural variation in Africa: role of mechanism of transmission and adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 92:7585-7589. [68] Boyd, R. and P.J. Richerson. 2000. Memes: universal acid or better mouse trap (http:/ / www. des. ucdavis. edu/ faculty/ Richerson/ CambMeme. PDF). In R. Aunger (Ed), Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg 143162. [69] Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg. 289-290. [70] Gabora, L. (2008). The cultural evolution of socially situated cognition (http:/ / www. vub. ac. be/ CLEA/ liane/ papers/ ssc. htm). Cognitive Systems Research, 9(1-2), 104-113. [71] Gabora, L. (2011). Five clarifications about cultural evolution (https:/ / people. ok. ubc. ca/ lgabora/ papers/ gabora-five-JOCC2011. pdf). Journal of Cognition and Culture, 11, 61-83. [72] Gabora, L. (2011). How a generation was misled about natural selection (http:/ / www. psychologytoday. com/ blog/ mindbloggling/ 201105/ how-generation-was-misled-about-natural-selection). Psychology Today, Mindbloggling. [73] von Neumann, J. (1966). The theory of self-reproducing automata. University of Illinois Press, Chicago. [74] Holland, J. (1975). Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. Cambridge: MIT Press. [75] Fracchia, J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1999). Does culture evolve? History and Theory, 38, 5278. [76] Temkin, I. & Eldredge, N. (2007). Phylogenetics and material cultural evolution. Current Anthropology, 48(1), 146-153. [77] Kauffman, S. (1999). Darwinism, neoDarwinism, and the autocatalytic model of culture: Commentary on Origin of Culture (http:/ / www. cogsci. ecs. soton. ac. uk/ cgi/ psyc/ newpsy?10. 022), Psycoloquy, 10(22), 14.


Further reading
Lumsden, C. J. and E. O. Wilson. 1981. Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Durham, W. H. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, Culture and Human Diversity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1537-8 Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press. Shennan, S. J. 2002. Genes, Memes and Human History: Darwinian Archaeology and Cultural Evolution. London: Thames and Hudson. Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dual inheritance theory


Smith, E. A. 1999. Three styles in the evolutionary analysis of human behavior. ( easmith/ThreeStyles.pdf) In L. Cronk, N. Chagnon, and W. Irons, (Eds.) Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Henrich, J. and R. McElreath. 2003. The evolution of cultural evolution. ( files/henrich mcelreath EA 2003.pdf) Evolutionary Anthropology 12:123-135. Mesoudi, A., A. Whiten, and K. N. Laland. 2006. Towards a unified science of cultural evolution. (http:// Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29:329-383 Gintis, H. 2006. A framework for the integration of the behavioral sciences ( gintis/Unity-BBS Print Version.pdf) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:1-61 Bentley, R.A., C. Lipo, H.D.G. Maschner and B. Marler 2007. Darwinian Archaeologies. In R.A. Bentley, H.D.G. Maschner & C. Chippendale (Eds.) Handbook of Archaeological Theories. Lanham (MD): AltaMira Press. McElreath, R. & Henrich, J. 2007. Modeling cultural evolution. ( mcelreath_henrich_mce_final.pdf) In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press. McElreath, R. & Henrich, J. 2007. Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. ( and McElreath final.pdf) In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sterelny, Kim (2002). Review Genes, Memes and Human History ( documents/sterelny-papers/tripod.pdf#search='dual inheritance theorypdf'). Stephen Shennan. London: Thames and Hudson. pp.304. Laland, K.N., Odling-Smee, J. & Myles, S. 2010. How culture shaped the human genome: bringing genetics and the human sciences. Nature Reviews: Genetics 11:137-148

Journal articles
"Culture, Adaptation, and Innateness" ( ver 4.1. pdf). The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. "Built for Speed, Not for Comfort: Darwinian Theory and Human Culture" ( anthro/faculty/boyd/Built for Speed, Not for Comfort.pdf). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (23): 425465. 2001.

External links
Current DIT researchers
Rob Boyd (, Department of Anthropology, UCLA Marcus Feldman (, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford Joe Henrich (, Departments of Psychology and Economics, University of British Columbia Richard McElreath (, Anthropology Department, UC Davis Peter J. Richerson (, Department of Environmental Science and Policy, UC Davis

Dual inheritance theory


Related researchers
Liane Gabora (, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia Herb Gintis (, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts & Santa Fe Institute Kevin Laland (, School of Biology, University of St. Andrews Ruth Mace (, Department of Anthropology, University College London Michael Tomasello (, Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology

Evolutionary developmental psychology


Outline History Subfields

Basic types

Abnormal Biological Cognitive Comparative Cultural Differential Developmental Evolutionary Experimental Mathematical Personality Positive Quantitative Social

Applied psychology

Applied behavior analysis Clinical Community Consumer Educational Environmental Forensic Health Industrial and organizational Legal Military

Evolutionary developmental psychology

Occupational health Political Religion School Sport


Disciplines Organizations Psychologists Psychotherapies Publications Research methods Theories Timeline Topics Psychology portal

Evolutionary developmental psychology, (or EDP), is the application of the basic principles of Darwinian evolution, particularly natural selection, to explain contemporary human development. It involves the study of the genetic and environmental mechanisms that underlie the universal development of social and cognitive competencies and the evolved epigenetic (gene-environment interactions) processes that adapt these competencies to local conditions. It assumes that not only are behaviors and cognitions that characterize adults the product of natural selection pressures operating over the course of evolution, but so also are characteristics of children's behaviors and minds. It further proposes that an evolutionary account would provide some insight into not only predictable stages of ontogeny, but into specific differences between individuals as well. Such a perspective suggests that there are multiple alternative strategies to recurring problems that human children would have faced throughout our evolutionary past and that individual differences in developmental patterns arent necessarily idiosyncratic reactions, but are predictable, adaptive responses to environmental pressures.

Brief history of EDP

Traditionally, evolutionary psychologists tended to focus their research and theorizing primarily on adults, especially on behaviors related to socializing and mating. There was much less of a focus on psychological development, as it relates to Darwinian evolution. Developmental psychologists, for their part, have been wary of the perceived genetic determinism of evolutionary thinking, which seemed critical of all the major theories in developmental psychology. Pioneers of EDP have worked to integrate evolutionary and developmental theories, without totally discarding the traditional theories of either. They argue that a greater understanding of the whys of human development will help us acquire a better understanding of the hows and whats of human development.

Evolutionary developmental psychology


Some basic assumptions of EDP

1. All evolutionarily-influenced characteristics develop, and this requires examining not only the functioning of these characteristics in adults but also their ontogeny. 2. All evolved characteristics develop via continuous and bidirectional gene-environment interactions that emerge dynamically over time. 3. Development is constrained by genetic, environmental, and cultural factors. 4. An extended childhood is needed in which to learn the complexities of human social communities and economies. 5. Many aspects of childhood serve as preparations for adulthood and were selected over the course of evolution (deferred adaptations). 6. Some characteristics of infants and children were selected to serve an adaptive function at specific times in development and not as preparations for adulthood (ontogenetic adaptations). 7. Children show a high degree of plasticity, or flexibility, and the ability to adapt to different contexts.

Domain-Specificity vs. Domain-Generality

A fundamental issue is how best to characterize the cognitive mechanisms that afford humans such flexibility in problem-solving. Authors Leda Cosmides and John Tooby would argue that human beings simply possess a greater number of content-specific modules, each of which specializes in solving a specific type of adaptive problem. And it is the sheer number of these content-specific modules which lends humans such great problem-solving flexibility.
[citation needed]

Other authors, such as Robert Burgess and Kevin B. MacDonald, while agreeing that content-specific modules exist, favor a differing view. They would say instead that the flexibility of human problem-solving ability is owed primarily to powerful domain-generality, and that humans use the same non-specific cognitive machinery for a multitude of different tasks. It is also important to point out that this is not an either/or argument for the legitimacy of the domain-specific or the domain-general position, but is concerned simply with the importance of both in regards to our problem-solving capabilities. [citation needed]

Relevant journals
Evolution and Development [1] Research relevant to interface of evolutionary and developmental biology

Further reading
Bjorklund, D.F.; Pellegrini, A.D. (2002). The Origins of Human Nature: Evolutionary Developmental Psychology [2] . Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. Bjorklund, D.F.; Pellegrini, A.D. (2000). "Child Development and Evolutionary Psychology" [3]. Child Development 71 (6): 16871708. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00258 [4]. PMID11194266 [5]. Boyce, W.T. & Ellis, B.J. (2005). Biological sensitivity to context: I. An evolutionary-developmental theory of the origins and functions of stress reactivity. Development & Psychopathology, 17, 271-301. Full text [6] Burgess, R. L. & MacDonald (Eds.) (2004). Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development, 2nd ed [7]. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Burman, J. T. (in press). Experimenting in relation to Piaget: Education is a Chaperoned Process of Adaptation. Perspectives on Science, 16(2). Ellis, B.J., & Bjorklund, D.F. (Eds.) (2005). Origins of the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and child development [8]. New York: Guilford Press. Ellis, B.J., Essex, M.J., & Boyce, W.T. (2005). Biological sensitivity to context: II. Empirical explorations of an evolutionary-developmental theory. Development & Psychopathology 17, 303-328. Full text [9]

Evolutionary developmental psychology Ellis, B.J. (2004). Timing of pubertal maturation in girls: An integrated life history approach. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 920-958. Full text [10] Flinn M.V. (2004). Culture and developmental plasticity: Evolution of the social brain. In K. MacDonald and R. L. Burgess (Eds.), Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development. Chapter 3, pp. 73-98. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Full text [11] Flinn, M.V. & Ward, C.V. (2004). Ontogeny and Evolution of the Social Child. In B. Ellis & D. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the social mind: Evolutionary psychology and child development. Chapter 2, pp. 19-44. London: Guilford Press. Full text [12] Geary, David C. (2006). "Evolutionary developmental psychology: Current status and future directions" [13]. Developmental Review 26 (2): 113119. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2006.02.005 [14]. Geary, D. C. (2005). Folk knowledge and academic learning. In B. J. Ellis & D. F. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the social mind. (pp. 493-519). New York: Guilford Publications. Full text [15] Geary, D. C. (2004). Evolution and cognitive development. In R. Burgess & K. MacDonald (Eds.), Evolutionary perspectives on human development (pp. 99-133). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Full text [16] Geary, D. C., Byrd-Craven, J., Hoard, M. K., Vigil, J., & Numtee, C. (2003). Evolution and development of boys social behavior. Developmental Review, 23, 444-470. Full text [17] Geary, D.C., & Bjorklund, D.F. (2000). Evolutionary Developmental Psychology. Child Development, 71, 57-65. Full text [18] MacDonald, K. (2005). Personality, Evolution, and Development. In R. Burgess and K. MacDonald (Eds.), Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development, 2nd edition, pp. 207242. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Full text [19] MacDonald, K., & Hershberger, S. (2005). Theoretical Issues in the Study of Evolution and Development. In R. Burgess and K. MacDonald (Eds.), Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development, 2nd edition, pp. 2172. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Full text [20] Maestripieri, D. & Roney, J.R. (2006). Evolutionary developmental psychology: Contributions from comparative research with nonhuman primates. Developmental Review, 26, 120-137. Full text [21] Medicus G. (1992). The Inapplicability of the Biogenetic Rule to Behavioral Development. Human Development 35, 1-8. Full text [22] Robert, J. S. Taking old ideas seriously: Evolution, development, and human behavior. New Ideas in Psychology. Vigil, J. M., Geary, D. C., & Byrd-Craven, J. (2005). A life history assessment of early childhood sexual abuse in women. Developmental Psychology, 41, 553-561. Full text [23]


[1] http:/ / www3. interscience. wiley. com/ journal/ 118546131/ home [2] http:/ / www. apa. org/ books/ 431671A. html [3] http:/ / bernard. pitzer. edu/ ~dmoore/ psych199s03articles/ Bjorklund. pdf [4] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1111%2F1467-8624. 00258 [5] http:/ / www. ncbi. nlm. nih. gov/ pubmed/ 11194266 [6] http:/ / ag. arizona. edu/ fcs/ fshd/ people/ ellis/ DPBoyceEllis2005. pdf [7] http:/ / www. csulb. edu/ ~kmacd/ HEB_2005_3. pdf [8] http:/ / www. guilford. com/ cgi-bin/ cartscript. cgi?page=pr/ ellis. htm& dir=pp/ dp& cart_id=208191. 21056 [9] http:/ / ag. arizona. edu/ fcs/ fshd/ people/ ellis/ DPEllisEssexBoyce2005. pdf [10] http:/ / ag. arizona. edu/ fcs/ fshd/ people/ ellis/ Psyc%20Bull%20Ellis%202004. pdf [11] http:/ / www. missouri. edu/ ~anthmark/ pdf/ Ch_3--Mark_Flinn. pdf [12] http:/ / www. missouri. edu/ ~anthmark/ pdf/ Flinn& WardE& B2004. pdf [13] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~gearyd/ files/ Geary%20Final%20Evo%20Dev%20Psy%20Issue. pdf [14] http:/ / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1016%2Fj. dr. 2006. 02. 005 [15] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ FolkKnowledgePDF. pdf [16] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ EvoCogDev%5BChap%5D. pdf [17] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ DevelRev03. pdf

Evolutionary developmental psychology

[18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] http:/ / www. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ EvoDevPsy. pdf#search='evolutionary%20developmental%20psychology' http:/ / www. csulb. edu/ ~kmacd/ BURG%2008%20ED. pdf http:/ / www. csulb. edu/ ~kmacd/ BURG%2002%20ED. pdf http:/ / primate. uchicago. edu/ 2006DR. pdf http:/ / homepage. uibk. ac. at/ ~c720126/ humanethologie/ ws/ medicus/ block6/ HumanDevelopment. pdf#search=' http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ Vigiletal%5BDP2005%5D. pdf


Human behavioral ecology

Human behavioral ecology (HBE) or human evolutionary ecology applies the principles of evolutionary theory and optimization to the study of human behavioral and cultural diversity. HBE examines the adaptive design of traits, behaviors, and life histories of humans in an ecological context. One aim of modern human behavioral ecology is to determine how ecological and social factors influence and shape behavioral flexibility within and between human populations. Among other things, HBE attempts to explain variation in human behavior as adaptive solutions to the competing life-history demands of growth, development, reproduction, parental care, and mate acquisition. HBE overlaps with evolutionary psychology, human or cultural ecology, and decision theory. It is most prominent in disciplines such as anthropology and psychology where human evolution is considered relevant for a holistic understanding of human behavior or in economics where self-interest, methodological individualism, and maximization are key elements in modeling behavior Wikipedia:Disputed statement. It has been resisted in fields such as sociology and political science where the findings on human evolution are either ignored or regarded as irrelevant.[citation needed]

Evolutionary theory
Human behavioral ecology rests upon a foundation of evolutionary theory. This includes aspects of both general evolutionary theory and established middle-level evolutionary theories, as well. Aspects of general evolutionary theory include: Natural selection, the process by which individual organisms with favorable traits are more likely to survive and reproduce. Sexual selection, the theory that competition for mates between individuals of the same sex results in differential mating and reproduction. Kin selection, the changes in gene frequency across generations that are driven at least in part by interactions between related individuals, and Inclusive fitness, the sum of an individual's own reproductive success, (natural and sexual selection), plus the effects the individual's actions have on the reproductive success of that individual's kin, (kin selection). Middle-level evolutionary theories used in HBE include: The theory of parental investment, which predicts that the sex making the largest investment in lactation, nurturing and protecting offspring will be more discriminating in mating and that the sex that invests less in offspring will compete for access to the higher investing sex. Parent-offspring conflict, which predicts that because the genetic interests of parents and offspring are not identical, offspring will be selected to manipulate their parents in order to ensure higher investment, and that, conversely, parents will be selected to manipulate their offspring. The theory of reciprocal altruism, a form of altruism in which one organism provides a benefit to another in the expectation of future reciprocation. The TriversWillard hypothesis, which proposes that parents should invest more in the sex that gives them the greatest reproductive payoff (grandchildren) with increasing or marginal investment.

Human behavioral ecology r/K selection theory, which, in ecology, relates to the selection of traits in organisms that allow success in particular environments. r-selected species - in unstable or unpredictable environments - produce many offspring, any individual one of which is unlikely to survive to adulthood, while K-selected species - in stable or predictable environments - invest more heavily in fewer offspring, each of which has a better chance of surviving to adulthood. Evolutionary game theory, the application of population genetics-inspired models of change in gene frequency in populations to game theory. Evolutionarily stable strategy, which refers to a strategy, which if adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any competing alternative strategy.


Basic principles of HBE

Ecological selectionism
Ecological selectionism refers to the assumption that humans are highly flexible in their behaviors. Furthermore, it assumes that various ecological forces select for various behaviors that optimize humans' inclusive fitness in their given ecological context.

The piecemeal approach

The piecemeal approach refers to taking a reductionist approach as opposed to a holistic approach in studying human socioecological behavior. Human behavioral ecologists assume that by taking complex social phenomena, (e.g., marriage patterns, foraging behaviors, etc.), and then breaking them down into sets of components involving decisions and constraints that they are in a better position to create models and make predictions involving human behavior. An example would be examining marriage systems by examining the ecological context, mate preferences, the distribution of particular characteristics within the population, and so forth.

Conditional strategies
Human behavioral ecologists assume that what might be the most adaptive strategy in one environment might not be the most adaptive strategy in another environment. Conditional strategies, therefore, can be represented in the following statement: In environmental context X, engage in adaptive strategy A. In environmental context Y, engage in adaptive strategy B.

The phenotypic gambit

The phenotypic gambit refers to the assumption that humans possess a high amount of phenotypic plasticity. Human behavioral ecologists attempt to control for culture, genetic variation, human cognition, and human phylogeny. It is not that human behavioral ecologists think that these concepts are irrelevant. It is simply that the primary focus of HBE is to discover correlations between variations of ecological contexts and variations of human behavior.

Theoretical models that human behavioral ecologists employ include, but are not limited to: Optimal foraging theory, which states that organisms focus on consuming the most energy while expending the least amount of energy. Life history theory, which postulates that many of the physiological traits and behaviors of individuals may be best understood in relation to the key maturational and reproductive characteristics that define the life course.

Human behavioral ecology Sex allocation theory, which predicts that parents should bias their reproductive investments toward the offspring sex generating the greatest fitness return. The polygyny threshold model, which suggests that polygyny is driven by female choice of mates who control more resources relative to other potential mates in the population.


Further reading
Borgerhoff Mulder, M. & Schacht, R. (2012). Human Behavioural Ecology [1]. Nature Encyclopedia of Life Sciences. Hames, R. (2001). Human Behavioral Ecology. [2] International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier Science Ltd. Cronk, L. (1991). Human behavioral ecology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 20, 25-53. Smith, Eric Alden (1999). Three Styles in the Evolutionary Analysis of Human Behavior [3] in Lee Cronk, Napoleon Chagnon and William Irons Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective [4], 27-48, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Winterhalder, Bruce & Smith, Eric Alden (2000). Analysing Adaptive Strategies: Human Behavioral Ecology at Twenty-Five. [5] Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, Volume 9, Issue 2.

External links
Behavioral Ecology Blog [6] The Human Behavioral Ecology Bibliography [7] - Maintained by Kermyt G. Anderson

[1] [2] [3] [4]

http:/ / www. academia. edu/ 2166350/ Human_Behavioural_Ecology http:/ / www. unl. edu/ rhames/ ms/ behavioral-ecology-hames. pdf#search='human%20behavioral%20ecology' http:/ / faculty. washington. edu/ easmith/ ThreeStyles. pdf http:/ / shopping. yahoo. com/ p:Adaptation%20and%20Human%20Behavior%3A%20An%20Anthropological%20Perspective:3000093488;_ylc=X3oDMTB1c21tcDhkBF9TAzk2NjMyOTA3B [5] http:/ / www. hbes. com/ HBES/ evolanth. pdf [6] http:/ / blog. behavioralecology. net/ [7] http:/ / faculty-staff. ou. edu/ A/ Kermyt. G. Anderson-1/ HBE/




Animal Portal Biology Portal Category

Instinct or innate behavior is the inherent inclination of a living organism toward a particular complex behavior. The simplest example of an instinctive behavior is a fixed action pattern, in which a very short to medium length sequence of actions, without variation, are carried out in response to a clearly defined stimulus. Any behavior is instinctive if it is performed without being based upon prior experience (that is, in the absence of learning), and is therefore an expression of innate biological factors. Sea turtles, newly hatched on a beach, will automatically move toward the ocean. A joey climbs into its mother's pouch upon being born.[1] Honeybees communicate by dancing in the direction of a food source without formal instruction. Other examples include animal fighting, animal courtship behavior, internal escape functions, and the building of nests. All of these are examples of complex behaviors and are thus substantially different from simple reflex behaviors.

An instinctive behavior of shaking water from wet fur.

An instinct should be distinguished from a reflex, which is a simple response of an organism to a specific stimulus, such as the contraction of the pupil in response to bright light or the spasmodic movement of the lower leg when the knee is tapped. Instincts, in contrast, are inborn complex patterns of behavior that



must exist in every member of the species and that cannot be overcome by force of will.[2] However, the absence of volitional capacity must not be confused with an inability to modify fixed action patterns. For example, people may be able to modify a stimulated fixed action pattern by consciously recognizing the point of its activation and simply stop doing it, whereas animals without a sufficiently strong volitional capacity may not be able to disengage from their fixed action patterns, once activated.[3]
A baby leatherback turtle makes its way to the open ocean

The role of instincts in determining the behavior of animals varies from species to species. The more complex the neural system of an animal, the greater is the role of the cerebral cortex, and social learning and instincts play a lesser role. A comparison between a crocodile and an elephant illustrates how mammals for example are heavily dependent on social learning. Lionesses and chimpanzees raised in zoos away from their birth mothers most often reject their own offspring because they have not been taught the skills of mothering. Such is not the case with simpler species such as reptiles.

Behavioral sciences
In Information Behavior: An Evolutionary Instinct (2010, pp.3542), Amanda Spink notes that "currently in the behavioral sciences instinct is generally understood as the innate part of behavior that emerges without any training or education in humans." She claims that the viewpoint that information behavior has an instinctive basis is grounded in the latest thinking on human behavior. Furthermore, she notes that "behaviors such as cooperation, sexual behavior, child rearing and aesthetics are [also] seen as 'evolved psychological mechanisms' with an instinctive basis (Buss, 2008; Dickens & Cohen, 2003; Geary, 2004)." Spink adds that Stephen Pinker similarly asserts that language is instinctive in humans in his book, The Language Instinct, How the mind creates language, (1994).

Reflexes and instinct

Examples of behaviors that do not require conscious will include many reflexes. The stimulus in a reflex may not require brain activity but instead may travel to the spinal cord as a message that is then transmitted back through the body, tracing a path called the reflex arc. Reflexes are similar to fixed action patterns in that most reflexes meet the criteria of a FAP. However, a fixed action pattern can be processed in the brain as well; a male stickleback's instinctive aggression towards anything red during his mating season is such an example. Examples of instinctive behaviors in humans include many of the primitive reflexes, such as rooting and suckling, behaviors which are present in mammals.



Maturational instincts
Some instinctive behaviors depend on maturational processes to appear. For instance, we commonly refer to birds "learning" to fly. However, young birds have been experimentally reared in devices that prevent them from moving their wings until they reached the age at which their cohorts were flying. These birds flew immediately and normally when released, showing that their improvement resulted from neuromuscular maturation and not true learning.[4]

In biology
Jean Henri Fabre, an entomologist, considered instinct to be any behavior which did not require cognition or consciousness to perform. Fabre's inspiration was his intense study of insects, some of whose behaviors he wrongly considered fixed and not subject to environmental influence.[5] Instinct as a concept fell out of favor in the 1920s with the rise of behaviorism and such thinkers as B. F. Skinner, which held that most significant behavior is learned. These beliefs, like Fabre's belief that most behaviors were simply reflexive, also proved to be too simplistic to account for the complex emotional and social behavior of human beings. An interest in innate behaviors arose again in the 1950s with Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, who made the distinction between instinct and learned behaviors. Our modern understanding of instinctual behavior in animals owes much to their work. For instance, in imprinting a bird has a Primitive reflexes sensitive period during which it learns who its mother is. Konrad Lorenz famously had a goose imprint on his boots. Thereafter the goose would follow whomever wore the boots. The identity of the goose's mother was learned, but the goose's behavior towards the boots was instinctive...[citation needed]

In psychology
The term "instinct" in psychology was first used in 1870s by Wilhelm Wundt. By the close of the 19th century, most repeated behavior was considered instinctual. In a survey of the literature at that time, one researcher chronicled 4,000 human "instincts," having applied this label to any behavior that was repetitive.[citation needed] As research became more rigorous and terms better defined, instinct as an explanation for human behavior became less common. In a conference in 1960, chaired by Frank Beach, a pioneer in comparative psychology, and attended by luminaries in the field, the term was restricted in its application.[citation needed] During the 60's and 70's, textbooks still contained some discussion of instincts in reference to human behavior. By the year 2000, a survey of the 12 best selling textbooks in Introductory Psychology revealed only one reference to instincts, and that was in regard to Sigmund Freud's referral to the "id" instincts.[citation needed]. In this sense, instincts appeared to have become regarded as increasingly superfluous in trying to understand human psychological behavior. Some Freudian Psychoanalysts have retained the term instinct to refer to human motivational forces (such as sex and aggression), sometimes represented as Eros - life instinct and Thanatos - death instinct. This use of the term motivational forces has been replaced by the term drives to correct the original error in the translation of Freud's

Instinct work.[citation needed] Psychologist Abraham Maslow argued that humans no longer have instincts because we have the ability to override them in certain situations. He felt that what is called instinct is often imprecisely defined, and really amounts to strong drives. For Maslow, an instinct is something which cannot be overridden, and therefore while the term may have applied to humans in the past, it no longer does.[6] The book Instinct (1961) established a number of criteria which distinguish instinctual from other kinds of behavior. To be considered instinctual, a behavior must: a) be automatic, b) be irresistible, c) occur at some point in development, d) be triggered by some event in the environment, e) occur in every member of the species, f) be unmodifiable, and g) govern behavior for which the organism needs no training (although the organism may profit from experience and to that degree the behavior is modifiable).[7] In a classic paper published in 1972,[8] the psychologist Richard Herrnstein decries Fabre's opinions on instinct (see: In biology section).


[2] Naiman, Joanne. (2004) How Societies Work. Thomson Publishers. 3rd ed. [3] Lorenz, Konrad. "Behind the Mirror, A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge", (1973) R. Piper & Co. Verlag, English translation (1977) Methuen & Co. [4] Campbell and Reece, 6th ed. [6] Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality Chapter 4, Instinct Theory Reexamined [7] Mandal, F. B. (2010) Textbook of animal behaviour. PHI Learning Pvt. Ltd. p. 47. ISBN 8120340353, 9788120340350

Modularity of mind
Modularity of mind is the notion that a mind may, at least in part, be composed of innate neural structures or modules which have distinct established evolutionarily developed functions. Somewhat different definitions of "module" have been proposed by different authorities.

Early investigations
Historically, questions regarding the functional architecture of the mind have been divided into two different theories of the nature of the faculties. The first can be characterized as a horizontal view because it refers to mental processes as if they are interactions between faculties such as memory, imagination, judgement, and perception, which are not domain specific (e.g., a judgement remains a judgement whether it refers to a perceptual experience or to the conceptualization/comprehension process)). The second can be characterized as a vertical view because it claims that the mental faculties are differentiated on the basis of domain specificity, are genetically determined, are associated with distinct neurological structures, and are computationally autonomous. The vertical vision goes back to the 19th century movement called phrenology and its founder Franz Joseph Gall, who claimed that the individual mental faculties could be associated precisely, in a sort of one to one correspondence, with specific physical areas of the brain. Hence, someone's level of intelligence, for example, could be literally "read off" from the size of a particular bump on his posterior parietal lobe. This simplistic view of modularity has been disproven over the course of the last century.

Modularity of mind


Fodor's Modularity of Mind

In the 1980s, however, Jerry Fodor revived the idea of the modularity of mind, although without the notion of precise physical localizability. Drawing from Noam Chomsky's idea of the language acquisition device and other work in linguistics as well as from the philosophy of mind and the implications of optical illusions, he became one of its most articulate proponents with the 1983 publication of Modularity of Mind.[1] According to Fodor, a module falls somewhere between the behaviorist and cognitivist views of lower-level processes. Behaviorists tried to replace the mind with reflexes which Fodor describes as encapsulated (cognitively impenetrable or unaffected by other cognitive domains) and non-inferential (straight pathways with no information added). Low level processes are unlike reflexes in that they are inferential. This can be demonstrated by poverty of the stimulus arguments in which the proximate stimulus, that which is initially received by the brain (such as the 2D image received by the retina), cannot account for the resulting output (for example, our 3D perception of the world), thus necessitating some form of computation. In contrast, cognitivists saw lower level processes as continuous with higher level processes, being inferential and cognitively penetrable (influenced by other cognitive domains, such as beliefs). The latter has been shown to be untrue in some cases, such as with many visual illusions (ex. Mller-Lyer illusion), which can persist despite a person's awareness of their existence. This is taken to indicate that other domains, including one's beliefs, cannot influence such processes. Fodor arrives at the conclusion that such processes are inferential like higher order processes and encapsulated in the same sense as reflexes. Although he argued for the modularity of "lower level" cognitive processes in Modularity of Mind he also argued that higher level cognitive processes are not modular since they have dissimilar properties. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, a reaction to Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works, is devoted to this subject. Fodor (1983) states that modular systems mustat least to "some interesting extent"fulfill certain properties: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Domain specificity, modules only operate on certain kinds of inputsthey are specialised Informational encapsulation, modules need not refer to other psychological systems in order to operate Obligatory firing, modules process in a mandatory manner Fast speed, probably due to the fact that they are encapsulated (thereby needing only to consult a restricted database) and mandatory (time need not be wasted in determining whether or not to process incoming input) Shallow outputs, the output of modules is very simple Limited accessibility Characteristic ontogeny, there is a regularity of development Fixed neural architecture.

Pylyshyn (1999) has argued that while these properties tend to occur with modules, one stands out as being the real signature of a module; that is the encapsulation of the processes inside the module from both cognitive influence and from cognitive access.[2] This is referred to as "information encapsulation". One example is that conscious awareness of the Mller-Lyer illusion being an illusion does not correct the visual processing.[]

Modularity of mind


Evolutionary psychology and Massive Modularity

Other perspectives on modularity come from evolutionary psychology, particularly from the work of Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. This perspective suggests that modules are units of mental processing that evolved in response to selection pressures. On this view, much modern human psychological activity is rooted in adaptations that occurred earlier in human evolution, when natural selection was forming the modern human species. Evolutionary psychologists propose that the mind is made up of genetically influenced and domain-specific[3] mental algorithms or computational modules, designed to solve specific evolutionary problems of the past.[4] Cosmides and Tooby also state in a brief "primer" on their website,[5] that the brain is a physical system. It functions like a computer, the brains function is to process information, different neural circuits are specialized for solving different adaptive problems, and our modern skulls house a stone age mind. The definition of module has caused confusion and dispute. J. A. Fodor initially defined module as "functionally specialized cognitive systems" that have nine features but not necessarily all at the same time. In his views modules can be found in peripheral processing such as low-level visual processing but not in central processing. Later he narrowed the two essential features to domain-specificity and information encapsulation. Frankenhuis and Ploeger[] write that domain-specificity means that "a given cognitive mechanism accepts, or is specialized to operate on, only a specific class of information". Information encapsulation means that information processing in the module cannot be affected by information in the rest of the brain. One example being awareness that certain optical illusion, caused by low level processing, are false not preventing the illusions from persisting.[] Evolutionary pscyhologists instead usually define modules as functionally specialized cognitive systems that are domain-specific and may also contain innate knowledge about the class of information processed. Modules can be found also for central processing. This theory is sometimes referred to as Massive Modularity.[] A 2010 review by evolutionary psychologists suggested that domain general theories, such as for "rationality," has several problems: 1. Evolutionary theories using the idea of numerous domain-specific adaptions have produced testable predictions that have been empirically confirmed; the theory of domain-general rational thought has produced no such predictions or confirmations. 2. The rapidity of responses such as jealousy due to infidelity indicates a domain-specific dedicated module rather than a general, deliberate, rational calculation of consequences. 3. Reactions may occur instinctively (consistent with innate knowledge) even if a person have not learned such knowledge. One example being that in the ancestral environment it is unlikely that males during development learn that infidelity (usually secret) may cause paternal uncertainty (from observing the phenotypes of children born many months later and making a statistical conclusion from the phenotype dissimilarity to the cuckolded fathers).[] Several groups of critics, including psychologists working within evolutionary frameworks,[6] argue that the massively modular theory of mind does little to explain adaptive psychological traits. Proponents of other models of the mind argue that the computational theory of mind is no better at explaining human behavior than a theory with mind entirely a product of the environment. Even within evolutionary psychology there is discussion about the degree of modularity, either as a few generalist modules or as many highly specific modules.[6][7] Other critics suggest that there is little empirical support in favor of the domain-specific theory beyond performance on the Wason selection task, a task critics state is too limited in scope to test all relevant aspects of reasoning.[][8] Moreover, critics argue that Cosmides and Tooby's conclusions contain several inferential errors and that the authors use untested evolutionary assumptions to eliminate rival reasoning theories.[9][] Wallace (2010) observes that the evolutionary psychologists' definition of 'mind' have been heavily influenced by cognitivism and/or information processing definitions of the mind[10] Critics point out that these assumptions underlying Evolutionary Psychologists hypotheses are controversial and have been contested by some psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists. For example, Jaak Panksepp, an affective neuroscientist, point to the "remarkable degree of neocortical plasticity within the human brain, especially during development" and states that "the developmental interactions among ancient special-purpose circuits and more recent general-purpose brain mechanisms can generate many of the modularized human abilities that evolutionary psychology has

Modularity of mind entertained."[6] Philosopher David Buller agrees with the general argument that the human mind has evolved over time but disagree with the specific claims evolutionary psychologists make. Buller has argued that the contention that the mind consists of thousands of modules, including sexually dimorphic jealousy and parental investment modules, are unsupported by the available empirical evidence.[11] However, Buller has also stated that even if massive modularity is false this does not necessarily have broad implications for evolutionary psychology. Evolution may create innate motives even without innate knowledge.[12] In contrast to modular mental structure, some theories posit domain-general processing, in which mental activity is distributed across the brain and cannot be decomposed, even abstractly, into independent units. A staunch defender of this view is William Uttal, who argues in The New Phrenology (2003) that there are serious philosophical, theoretical, and methodological problems with the entire enterprise of trying to localise cognitive processes in the brain.[13] Part of this argument is that a successful taxonomy of mental processes has yet to be developed. Merlin Donald argues that over evolutionary time the mind has gained adaptive advantage from being a general problem solver.[14] The mind, as described by Donald, includes module-like "central" mechanisms, in addition to more recently evolved "domain-general" mechanisms. For counter arguments to some of these criticisms of modularity, see Daly and Wilson's response to Buller [15][16][17] and Bryant (2006)[18] With respect to general purpose problem solvers, see Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and The Generation of Culture for their argument that a purely general problem solving mechanism is impossible to build due to the frame problem. Computer simulations of the evolution of neural nets suggests that modularity evolves because, compared to non-modular networks, connection costs are lower.[19]


[1] Fodor, Jerry A. (1983). Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-56025-9 [2] Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(3), 341-423. Full text (http:/ / ruccs. rutgers. edu/ ftp/ pub/ papers/ bbs1999_reprint. pdf) [3] Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of Domain Specificity: The Evolution of Functional Organization. In L.A. Hirschfeld and S.A. Gelmen, eds., Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in R. Cummins and D.D. Cummins, eds., Minds, Brains, and Computers. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, 523-543. [4] Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange. In Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1992, 163-228. [6] Panksepp, J. & Panksepp, J. (2000). The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology. Evolution and Cognition (http:/ / www. flyfishingdevon. co. uk/ salmon/ year3/ psy364criticisms-evolutionary-psychology/ panksepp_seven_sins. pdf), 6:2, 108-131. [7] Buller, David J. and Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2005) Chapter 4. "Modularity", in Buller, David J. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology. The MIT Press. pp. 127 - 201 [10] Wallace, B. (2010). Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Wont Work. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. [11] (http:/ / www. skeptic. com/ the_magazine/ featured_articles/ v12n01_sex_jealousy. php) (But see Daly and Wilson's response to Buller (http:/ / psych. mcmaster. ca/ dalywilson/ reply to david buller. pdf).) [13] Uttal, William R. (2003). The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [14] Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (http:/ / psyc. queensu. ca/ faculty/ donald/ book/ mindsorare2. htm). [16] Delton, Robertson, Kenrick (2006) The Mating Game Isnt Over: A Reply to Bullers Critique of the Evolutionary Psychology of Mating. (http:/ / www. epjournal. net/ wp-content/ uploads/ ep042622732. pdf) [17] Miele (2006) Evolutionary Psychology is Here to Stay: A Response to Buller. (http:/ / www. skeptic. com/ the_magazine/ featured_articles/ v12n01_here_to_stay. html)

Modularity of mind


Further reading
Barrett, H.C., and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628-647. Full text ( Kurzban 2006.pdf) Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Also available through CogNet). Animal Minds : Beyond Cognition to Consciousness Donald R. Griffin, University of Chicago Press, 2001 (ISBN 0226308650)

Online videos
RSA talk ( by evolutionary psychologist Robert Kurzban on modularity of mind, based on his book, Why Everyone (Else) is a Hyprocite Stone Age Minds: A conversation with evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (http://www. Video ( of a computer simulation of the evolution of modularity in neural nets.

Cultural universal
A cultural universal (also called an anthropological universal or human universal), as discussed by Emile Durkheim, George Murdock, Claude Lvi-Strauss, Donald Brown and others, is an element, pattern, trait, or institution that is common to all human cultures worldwide. Taken together, the whole body of cultural universals is known as the human condition. Evolutionary psychologists hold that behaviors or traits that occur universally in all cultures are good candidates for evolutionary adaptations.[1] Some anthropological and sociological theorists that take a cultural relativist perspective may deny the existence of cultural universals: the extent to which these universals are "cultural" in the narrow sense, or in fact biologically inherited behavior is an issue of "nature versus nurture". These "universals" are unique to humans.

The emergence of these universals dates to the Upper Paleolithic, with the first evidence of full behavioral modernity.

List of cultural universals

Among the cultural universals listed by Brown (1991) are:

Language and cognition

Language Abstraction in speech and thought Antonyms, synonyms Logical notions of "and," "not," "opposite," "equivalent," "part/whole," "general/particular" Binary cognitive distinctions

Color terms: black, white Classification of: age, behavioral propensities, body parts, colors, fauna, flora, inner states, kin, sex, space, tools, weather conditions

Cultural universal Continua (ordering as cognitive pattern) Discrepancies between speech, thought, and action Figurative speech, metaphors Symbolism, symbolic speech Synesthetic metaphors Tabooed utterances Special speech for special occasions Prestige from proficient use of language (e.g. poetry) Planning Units of time


Personal names Family or household Kin groups Peer groups not based on family Actions under self-control distinguished from those not under control Affection expressed and felt[citation needed] Age grades Age statuses Age terms Law: rights and obligations, rules of membership Moral sentiments Distinguishing right and wrong, good and bad Promise/oath Prestige inequalities Statuses and roles[citation needed] Leaders[citation needed] De facto oligarchy Property Coalitions Collective identities Conflict Cooperative labor Gender roles Males dominate public/political realm Males more aggressive, more prone to lethal violence, more prone to theft Males engage in more coalitional violence Males on average travel greater distances over lifetime Marriage Husband older than wife on average Copulation normally conducted in privacy Incest prevention or avoidance, incest between mother and son unthinkable or tabooed Rape, but rape proscribed Collective decision making

Etiquette Inheritance rules

Cultural universal Generosity admired, gift giving Redress of wrongs, sanctions Sexual jealousy Shame Territoriality Triangular awareness (assessing relationships among the self and two other people) Some forms of proscribed violence Visiting Trade


Myth, ritual and aesthetics

Magical thinking Use of magic to increase life and win love Beliefs about death Beliefs about disease Beliefs about fortune and misfortune Divination Attempts to control weather Dream interpretation Beliefs and narratives Proverbs, sayings Poetry/rhetorics Healing practices, medicine Childbirth customs Rites of passage Music, rhythm, dance Play Toys, playthings Death rituals, mourning Feasting Body adornment Hairstyles

Shelter Control of fire Tools, tool making Weapons, spear Containers Cooking Lever Tying material (i.e., something like string), twining (i.e. weaving or similar)

Cultural universal


[1] Schacter, Daniel L, Daniel Wegner and Daniel Gilbert. 2007. Psychology. Worth Publishers. pp. 26 - 27

Erika Bourginon (1973) Diversity and Homogeneity in World Societies. New Haven, Connecticut: HRAF Press. Donald Brown (1991) Human Universals. Philadelphia, Temple University Press ( online summary (http:// Joseph H. Greenberg, et al. (1978) Universals of Human Language, 4 vols. Stanford University Press. Charles D. Laughlin and Eugene G. d'Aquili (1974) Biogenetic Structuralism. New York: Columbia University Press. Claude Lvi-Strauss (1966) The Savage Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [first published in French in 1962]. George P. Murdock (1945), "The Common Denominator of Culture," in The Science of Man in the World Crisis, Ralph Linton (ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. Charles E. Osgood, William S May, and Murray S Miron (1975) Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. Steven Pinker (2002), The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, New York: Penguin Putnam. Rik Pinxten (1976) "Epistemic Universals: A Contribution to Cognitive Anthropology," in Universalism Versus Relativism in Language and Thought, R. Pinxten (ed.). The Hague: Mouton.

Consciousness is the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.[1][] It has been defined as: subjectivity, awareness, sentience, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind.[] Despite the difficulty in definition, many philosophers believe that there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what consciousness is.[2] As Max Velmans and Susan Schneider wrote in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness: "Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at once the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives."[3] Philosophers since the time of Descartes and Locke have struggled to comprehend the nature of consciousness and pin down its essential properties. Issues of concern in the philosophy of consciousness include whether the concept is fundamentally valid; whether consciousness can ever be explained mechanistically; whether Representation of consciousness from the non-human consciousness exists and if so how it can be recognized; seventeenth century. how consciousness relates to language; whether consciousness can be understood in a way that does not require a dualistic distinction between mental and physical states or properties; and whether it may ever be possible for computers or robots to be conscious.

Consciousness At one time consciousness was viewed with skepticism by many scientists, but in recent years it has become a significant topic of research in psychology and neuroscience. The primary focus is on understanding what it means biologically and psychologically for information to be present in consciousnessthat is, on determining the neural and psychological correlates of consciousness. The majority of experimental studies assess consciousness by asking human subjects for a verbal report of their experiences (e.g., "tell me if you notice anything when I do this"). Issues of interest include phenomena such as subliminal perception, blindsight, denial of impairment, and altered states of consciousness produced by psychoactive drugs or spiritual or meditative techniques. In medicine, consciousness is assessed by observing a patient's arousal and responsiveness, and can be seen as a continuum of states ranging from full alertness and comprehension, through disorientation, delirium, loss of meaningful communication, and finally loss of movement in response to painful stimuli.[4] Issues of practical concern include how the presence of consciousness can be assessed in severely ill, comatose, or anesthetized people, and how to treat conditions in which consciousness is impaired or disrupted.[5]


In philosophy
The philosophy of mind has given rise to many stances regarding consciousness. Any attempt to impose an organization on them is bound to be somewhat arbitrary. Stuart Sutherland exemplified the difficulty in the entry he wrote for the 1989 version of the Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology: ConsciousnessThe having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with self-consciousnessto be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it.[] Most writers on the philosophy of consciousness have been concerned to defend a particular point of view, and have organized their material accordingly. For surveys, the most common approach is to follow a historical path by associating stances with the philosophers who are most strongly associated with them, for example Descartes, Locke, Kant, etc. An alternative is to organize philosophical stances according to basic issues.

The validity of the concept

Philosophers and non-philosophers differ in their intuitions about what consciousness is.[6] While most people have a strong intuition for the existence of what they refer to as consciousness,[citation needed] skeptics argue that this intuition is false, either because the concept of consciousness is intrinsically incoherent, or because our intuitions about it are based in illusions. Gilbert Ryle, for example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a Cartesian dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of individuals, or persons, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking of 'consciousness' we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings.[] More generally, many philosophers and scientists have been unhappy about the difficulty of producing a definition that does not involve circularity or fuzziness.[]



Types of consciousness
Many philosophers have argued that consciousness is a unitary concept that is understood intuitively by the majority of people in spite of the difficulty in defining it.[] Others, though, have argued that the level of disagreement about the meaning of the word indicates that it either means different things to different people, or else is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of distinct meanings with no simple element in common.[] Ned Block proposed a distinction between two types of consciousness that he called phenomenal (P-consciousness) and access (A-consciousness).[7] P-consciousness, according to Block, is simply raw experience: it is moving, colored forms, sounds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the center. These experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are called qualia. A-consciousness, on the other hand, is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perceive, information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past is access conscious, and so on. Although some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity of this distinction,[] others have broadly accepted it. David Chalmers has argued that A-consciousness can in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, but that understanding P-consciousness is much more challenging: he calls this the hard problem of consciousness.[] Some philosophers believe that Block's two types of consciousness are not the end of the story. William Lycan, for example, argued in his book Consciousness and Experience that at least eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be identified (organism consciousness; control consciousness; consciousness of; state/event consciousness; reportability; introspective consciousness; subjective consciousness; self-consciousness)and that even this list omits several more obscure forms.[8]

Mindbody problem
The first influential philosopher to discuss this question specifically was Descartes and the answer he gave is known as Cartesian dualism. Descartes proposed that consciousness resides within an immaterial domain he called res cogitans (the realm of thought), in contrast to the domain of material things which he called res extensa (the realm of extension).[9] He suggested that the interaction between these two domains occurs inside the brain, perhaps in a small midline structure called the pineal gland.[] Although it is widely accepted that Descartes explained the problem cogently, few later philosophers have been happy with his solution, and his ideas about the pineal gland have especially been ridiculed.[10] Alternative solutions, however, have been very diverse. They can be divided broadly into two categories: dualist solutions that maintain Descartes' rigid distinction between the realm of consciousness and the realm of matter but give different Illustration of dualism by Ren Descartes. Inputs are answers for how the two realms relate to each other; and monist passed by the sensory organs to the pineal gland and solutions that maintain that there is really only one realm of being, from there to the immaterial spirit. of which consciousness and matter are both aspects. Each of these categories itself contains numerous variants. The two main types of dualism are substance dualism (which holds that the mind is formed of a distinct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics) and property dualism (which holds that the laws of physics are universally valid but cannot

Consciousness be used to explain the mind). The three main types of monism are physicalism (which holds that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way), idealism (which holds that only thought truly exists and matter is merely an illusion), and neutral monism (which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct essence that is itself identical to neither of them). There are also, however, a large number of idiosyncratic theories that cannot cleanly be assigned to any of these camps.[11] Since the dawn of Newtonian science with its vision of simple mechanical principles governing the entire universe, some philosophers have been tempted by the idea that consciousness could be explained in purely physical terms. The first influential writer to propose such an idea explicitly was Julien Offray de La Mettrie, in his book Man a Machine (L'homme machine). His arguments, however, were very abstract.[] The most influential modern physical theories of consciousness are based on psychology and neuroscience. Theories proposed by neuroscientists such as Gerald Edelman[12] and Antonio Damasio,[] and by philosophers such as Daniel Dennett,[13] seek to explain consciousness in terms of neural events occurring within the brain. Many other neuroscientists, such as Christof Koch,[] have explored the neural basis of consciousness without attempting to frame all-encompassing global theories. At the same time, computer scientists working in the field of Artificial Intelligence have pursued the goal of creating digital computer programs that can simulate or embody consciousness.[14] A few theoretical physicists have argued that classical physics is intrinsically incapable of explaining the holistic aspects of consciousness, but that quantum theory provides the missing ingredients. Several theorists have therefore proposed quantum mind (QM) theories of consciousness.[] Notable theories falling into this category include the Holonomic brain theory of Karl Pribram and David Bohm, and the Orch-OR theory formulated by Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose. Some of these QM theories offer descriptions of phenomenal consciousness, as well as QM interpretations of access consciousness. None of the quantum mechanical theories has been confirmed by experiment. Recent papers by Guerreshi, G., Cia, J., Popescu, S. and Briegel, H.[] could falsify proposals such as those of Hameroff which rely on quantum entanglement in protein. At the present time many scientists and philosophers consider the arguments for an important role of quantum phenomena to be unconvincing.[15] Apart from the general question of the "hard problem" of consciousness, roughly speaking, the question of how mental experience arises from a physical basis,[16] a more specialized question is how to square the subjective notion that we are in control of our decisions (at least in some small measure) with the customary view of causality that subsequent events are caused by prior events. The topic of free will is the philosophical and scientific examination of this conundrum.


Problem of other minds

Many philosophers consider experience to be the essence of consciousness, and believe that experience can only fully be known from the inside, subjectively. But if consciousness is subjective and not visible from the outside, why do the vast majority of people believe that other people are conscious, but rocks and trees are not?[17] This is called the problem of other minds.[18] It is particularly acute for people who believe in the possibility of philosophical zombies, that is, people who think it is possible in principle to have an entity that is physically indistinguishable from a human being and behaves like a human being in every way but nevertheless lacks consciousness.[19] The most commonly given answer is that we attribute consciousness to other people because we see that they resemble us in appearance and behavior: we reason that if they look like us and act like us, they must be like us in other ways, including having experiences of the sort that we do.[] There are, however, a variety of problems with that explanation. For one thing, it seems to violate the principle of parsimony, by postulating an invisible entity that is not necessary to explain what we observe.[] Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett in an essay titled The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies, argue that people who give this explanation do not really understand what they are saying.[20] More broadly, philosophers who do not accept the possibility of zombies generally believe that consciousness is reflected in behavior (including verbal behavior), and that we attribute consciousness on the basis of behavior. A more straightforward way of saying this is that we attribute experiences to people because of what they

Consciousness can do, including the fact that they can tell us about their experiences.[21]


Animal consciousness
The topic of animal consciousness is beset by a number of difficulties. It poses the problem of other minds in an especially severe form, because animals, lacking the ability to express human language, cannot tell us about their experiences.[] Also, it is difficult to reason objectively about the question, because a denial that an animal is conscious is often taken to imply that it does not feel, its life has no value, and that harming it is not morally wrong. Descartes, for example, has sometimes been blamed for mistreatment of animals due to the fact that he believed only humans have a non-physical mind.[22] Most people have a strong intuition that some animals, such as dogs, are conscious, while others, such as insects, are not; but the sources of this intuition are not obvious.[] Philosophers who consider subjective experience the essence of consciousness also generally believe, as a correlate, that the existence and nature of animal consciousness can never rigorously be known. Thomas Nagel spelled out this point of view in an influential essay titled What Is it Like to Be a Bat?. He said that an organism is conscious "if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism something it is like for the organism"; and he argued that no matter how much we know about an animal's brain and behavior, we can never really put ourselves into the mind of the animal and experience its world in the way it does itself.[] Other thinkers, such as Douglas Hofstadter, dismiss this argument as incoherent.[23] Several psychologists and ethologists have argued for the existence of animal consciousness by describing a range of behaviors that appear to show animals holding beliefs about things they cannot directly perceive Donald Griffin's 2001 book Animal Minds reviews a substantial portion of the evidence.[]

Artifact consciousness
The idea of an artifact made conscious is an ancient theme of mythology, appearing for example in the Greek myth of Pygmalion, who carved a statue that was magically brought to life, and in medieval Jewish stories of the Golem, a magically animated homunculus built of clay.[24] However, the possibility of actually constructing a conscious machine was probably first discussed by Ada Lovelace, in a set of notes written in 1842 about the Analytical Engine invented by Charles Babbage, a precursor (never built) to modern electronic computers. Lovelace was essentially dismissive of the idea that a machine such as the Analytical Engine could think in a humanlike way. She wrote: It is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine. ... The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform. It can follow analysis; but it has no power of anticipating any analytical relations or truths. Its province is to assist us in making available what we are already acquainted with.[25] One of the most influential contributions to this question was an essay written in 1950 by pioneering computer scientist Alan Turing, titled Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Turing disavowed any interest in terminology, saying that even "Can machines think?" is too loaded with spurious connotations to be meaningful; but he proposed to replace all such questions with a specific operational test, which has become known as the Turing test.[] To pass the test a computer must be able to imitate a human well enough to fool interrogators. In his essay Turing discussed a variety of possible objections, and presented a counterargument to each of them. The Turing test is commonly cited in discussions of artificial intelligence as a proposed criterion for machine consciousness; it has provoked a great deal of philosophical debate. For example, Daniel Dennett and Douglas Hofstadter argue that anything capable of passing the Turing test is necessarily conscious,[] while David Chalmers argues that a philosophical zombie could pass the test, yet fail to be conscious.[] In a lively exchange over what has come to be referred to as "The Chinese room Argument", John Searle sought to refute the claim of proponents of what he calls 'Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI)' that a computer program can be conscious, though he does agree with advocates of "Weak AI" that computer programs can be formatted to

Consciousness "simulate" conscious states. His own view is that consciousness has subjective, first-person causal powers by being essentially intentional due simply to the way human brains function biologically; conscious persons can perform computations, but consciousness is not inherently computational the way computer programs are. To make a Turing machine that speaks Chinese, Searle gets in a room stocked with algorithms programmed to respond to Chinese questions, i.e., Turing machines, programmed to correctly answer in Chinese questions asked in Chinese, and he finds he's able to process the inputs to outputs perfectly without having any understanding of Chinese, nor having any idea what the questions and answers could possibly mean. And, this is all a current computer program would do. If the experiment were done in English, since Searle knows English, he would be able to take questions and give answers without any algorithms for English questions, and he would be affectively aware of what was being said and the purposes it might serve: Searle passes the Turing test of answering the questions in both languages, but he's only conscious of what he's doing when he speaks English. Another way of putting the argument is to say computational computer programs can pass the Turing test for processing the syntax of a language, but that semantics cannot be reduced to syntax in the way Strong AI advocates hoped: processing semantics is conscious and intentional because we use semantics to consciously produce meaning by what we say.[] In the literature concerning artificial intelligence (AI), Searle's essay has been second only to Turing's in the volume of debate it has generated.[] Searle himself was vague about what extra ingredients it would take to make a machine conscious: all he proposed was that what was needed was "causal powers" of the sort that the brain has and that computers lack. But other thinkers sympathetic to his basic argument have suggested that the necessary (though perhaps still not sufficient) extra conditions may include the ability to pass not just the verbal version of the Turing test, but the robotic version,[26] which requires grounding the robot's words in the robot's sensorimotor capacity to categorize and interact with the things in the world that its words are about, Turing-indistinguishably from a real person. Turing-scale robotics is an empirical branch of research on embodied cognition and situated cognition[27]


The transitivity principle

One argument in the field of philosophy of consciousness deals with what it is that makes a mental state conscious in the sense of there being something it is like to experience that state. David Rosenthal posits the transitivity principle as a possible answer to this question. This principle holds that what makes a state conscious is the individual being aware of being in that state. This happens, on Rosenthals account, through the use of a higher-order thought that is directed on the mental state in question. Rosenthal cites several empirical paradigms in support of his theory. Blind-sight is one. This is a occurs in individuals with damage to the visual center of their brains. These individuals are relatively simple forms of visual awareness (like being able to spatially locate an x in a picture) anything concerning what it is like to experience these visual stimuli. Rosenthal claims that explained as a perception which the subject is not aware of experiencing. phenomenon that often capable of but do not report this can only be

Rosenthal also cites masked-priming, in which the individual is presented a priming stimulus which is quickly replaced by a masking stimulus. The individual does not report having experienced the state even though they clearly received the visual input. Again, Rosenthal claims that this can only be an instance of a visual stimulus of which the subject is not aware, and which there is therefore nothing it is like to experience. Fred Dretske has objected to the transitivity principle on the basis that we often experience mental states that are consciously different without being aware of the conscious different. For instance, one might look at a picture of two forests. The pictures might be exactly the same except that there is one tree that is present in one picture but absent in the other. Dretske points out that what it is like to see the one forest is different from what it is like to see the other. And yet the individual looking at the pictures can easily fail to be aware that they differ at all.



Spiritual approaches
To most philosophers, the word "consciousness" connotes the relationship between the mind and the world. To writers on spiritual or religious topics, it frequently connotes the relationship between the mind and God, or the relationship between the mind and deeper truths that are thought to be more fundamental than the physical world. Krishna consciousness, for example, is a term used to mean an intimate linkage between the mind of a worshipper and the god Krishna.[28] The mystical psychiatrist Richard Maurice Bucke distinguished between three types of consciousness: Simple Consciousness, awareness of the body, possessed by many animals; Self Consciousness, awareness of being aware, possessed only by humans; and Cosmic Consciousness, awareness of the life and order of the universe, possessed only by humans who are enlightened.[29] Many more examples could be given. The most thorough account of the spiritual approach may be Ken Wilber's book The Spectrum of Consciousness, a comparison of western and eastern ways of thinking about the mind. Wilber described consciousness as a spectrum with ordinary awareness at one end, and more profound types of awareness at higher levels.[30]

Scientific approaches
For many decades, consciousness as a research topic was avoided by the majority of mainstream scientists, because of a general feeling that a phenomenon defined in subjective terms could not properly be studied using objective experimental methods.[31] In 1975 George Mandler published an influential psychological study which distinguished between slow, serial, and limited conscious processes and fast, parallel and extensive unconscious ones.[32] Starting in the 1980s,an expanding community of neuroscientists and psychologists have associated themselves with a field called Consciousness Studies, giving rise to a stream of experimental work published in books,[33] journals such as Consciousness and Cognition, and methodological work published in journals such as the Journal of Consciousness Studies, along with regular conferences organized by groups such as the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness.[34] Modern scientific investigations into consciousness are based on psychological experiments (including, for example, the investigation of priming effects using subliminal stimuli), and on case studies of alterations in consciousness produced by trauma, illness, or drugs. Broadly viewed, scientific approaches are based on two core concepts. The first identifies the content of consciousness with the experiences that are reported by human subjects; the second makes use of the concept of consciousness that has been developed by neurologists and other medical professionals who deal with patients whose behavior is impaired. In either case, the ultimate goals are to develop techniques for assessing consciousness objectively in humans as well as other animals, and to understand the neural and psychological mechanisms that underlie it.[]

Experimental research on consciousness presents special difficulties, due to the lack of a universally accepted operational definition. In the majority of experiments that are specifically about consciousness, the subjects are human, and the criterion that is used is verbal report: in other words, subjects are asked to describe their experiences, and their descriptions are treated as observations of the contents of consciousness.[35] For example, subjects who stare continuously at a Necker Cube usually report that they experience it "flipping" between two 3D configurations, even though the stimulus itself remains the same.[36] The objective is to understand the relationship between the conscious awareness of stimuli (as indicated by verbal report) and the effects the stimuli have on brain activity and behavior. In several paradigms,

The Necker Cube, an ambiguous image

Consciousness such as the technique of response priming, the behavior of subjects is clearly influenced by stimuli for which they report no awareness.[] Verbal report is widely considered to be the most reliable indicator of consciousness, but it raises a number of issues.[] For one thing, if verbal reports are treated as observations, akin to observations in other branches of science, then the possibility arises that they may contain errorsbut it is difficult to make sense of the idea that subjects could be wrong about their own experiences, and even more difficult to see how such an error could be detected.[37] Daniel Dennett has argued for an approach he calls heterophenomenology, which means treating verbal reports as stories that may or may not be true, but his ideas about how to do this have not been widely adopted.[38] Another issue with verbal report as a criterion is that it restricts the field of study to humans who have language: this approach cannot be used to study consciousness in other species, pre-linguistic children, or people with types of brain damage that impair language. As a third issue, philosophers who dispute the validity of the Turing test may feel that it is possible, at least in principle, for verbal report to be dissociated from consciousness entirely: a philosophical zombie may give detailed verbal reports of awareness in the absence of any genuine awareness.[39] Although verbal report is in practice the "gold standard" for ascribing consciousness, it is not the only possible criterion.[] In medicine, consciousness is assessed as a combination of verbal behavior, arousal, brain activity and purposeful movement. The last three of these can be used as indicators of consciousness when verbal behavior is absent.[] The scientific literature regarding the neural bases of arousal and purposeful movement is very extensive. Their reliability as indicators of consciousness is disputed, however, due to numerous studies showing that alert human subjects can be induced to behave purposefully in a variety of ways in spite of reporting a complete lack of awareness.[] Studies of the neuroscience of free will have also shown that the experiences that people report when they behave purposefully sometimes do not correspond to their actual behaviors or to the patterns of electrical activity recorded from their brains.[40] Another approach applies specifically to the study of self-awareness, that is, the ability to distinguish oneself from others. In the 1970s Gordon Gallup developed an operational test for self-awareness, known as the mirror test. The test examines whether animals are able to differentiate between seeing themselves in a mirror versus seeing other animals. The classic example involves placing a spot of coloring on the skin or fur near the individual's forehead and seeing if they attempt to remove it or at least touch the spot, thus indicating that they recognize that the individual they are seeing in the mirror is themselves.[41] Humans (older than 18 months) and other great apes, bottlenose dolphins, pigeons, and elephants have all been observed to pass this test.[42]


Neural correlates
A major part of the scientific literature on consciousness consists of studies that examine the relationship between the experiences reported by subjects and the activity that simultaneously takes place in their brainsthat is, studies of the neural correlates of consciousness. The hope is to find that Schema of the neural processes underlying consciousness, from Christof Koch activity in a particular part of the brain, or a particular pattern of global brain activity, will be strongly predictive of conscious awareness. Several brain imaging techniques, such as EEG and fMRI, have been used for physical measures of brain activity in these studies.[43] One idea that has drawn attention for several decades is that consciousness is associated with high-frequency (gamma band) oscillations in brain activity. This idea arose from proposals in the 1980s, by Christof von der Malsburg and Wolf Singer, that gamma oscillations could solve the so-called binding problem, by linking

Consciousness information represented in different parts of the brain into a unified experience.[44] Rodolfo Llins, for example, proposed that consciousness results from recurrent thalamo-cortical resonance where the specific thalamocortical systems (content) and the non-specific (centromedial thalamus) thalamocortical systems (context) interact in the gamma band frequency via synchronous oscillations.[45] A number of studies have shown that activity in primary sensory areas of the brain is not sufficient to produce consciousness: it is possible for subjects to report a lack of awareness even when areas such as the primary visual cortex show clear electrical responses to a stimulus.[46] Higher brain areas are seen as more promising, especially the prefrontal cortex, which is involved in a range of higher cognitive functions collectively known as executive functions. There is substantial evidence that a "top-down" flow of neural activity (i.e., activity propagating from the frontal cortex to sensory areas) is more predictive of conscious awareness than a "bottom-up" flow of activity.[47] The prefrontal cortex is not the only candidate area, however: studies by Nikos Logothetis and his colleagues have shown, for example, that visually responsive neurons in parts of the temporal lobe reflect the visual perception in the situation when conflicting visual images are presented to different eyes (i.e., bistable percepts during binocular rivalry).[48] In 2011 Graziano and Kastner[] proposed the attention schema theory of awareness. In that theory specific cortical machinery, notably in the superior temporal sulcus and the temporo-parietal junction, is used to build the construct of awareness and attribute it to other people. The same cortical machinery is also used to attribute awareness to oneself. Damage to this cortical machinery can lead to deficits in consciousness such as hemispatial neglect. In the attention schema theory, the value of constructing the feature of awareness and attributing it to a person is to gain a useful predictive model of that persons attentional processing. Attention is a style of information processing in which a brain focuses its resources on a limited set of interrelated signals. Awareness, in this theory, is a useful, simplified schema that represents attentional state. To be aware of X is to construct a model of ones attentional focus on X.


Defining consciousness
"The evolution of the capacity to simulate seems to have culminated in subjective consciousness. Why this should have happened is, to me, the most profound mystery facing modern biology" Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene. Since 1976, it has remained so. In 2004, eight neuroscientists felt it was too soon for a definition. They wrote an apology in "Human Brain Function":[49] "We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature." In contrast to philosophical definitions, an operational definition can be tested experimentally, and is useful for current research. A current definition for self-awareness, proposed in the 1970s by Gordon Gallup, is known as the mirror test. An operational definition proposed in 2012 [50] states "consciousness is the sum of the electrical discharges occurring throughout the nervous system of a being at any given instant". What many consider consciousness may simply be the personal awareness of all the neurons delivering messages to the mind, but operational consciousness can include all neuronal activity. Extending this concept to all sentient beings, one can measure a range of consciousness based on how many and how powerfully neurons are actually firing, varying from worms to humans. One can answer the question, is someone asleep less conscious than someone thinking about a difficult problem. Although technology does not exist currently to measure this, it can be estimated by determining oxygen consumption by the brain.

Consciousness To properly understand the definition of consciousness, three principal meanings have been developed and it is critical to distinguish them. Firstly, consciousness can be defined as the waking state. This essentially means that to be conscious, one needs to be awake, aroused, alert or vigilant. The stages of consciousness can range from wakefulness, to sleep to coma even. Secondly, consciousness is defined as experience, a far more subjective approach. This notion suggests that consciousness is the content of experience from one moment to another. Consciousness is highly personal, involving a conscious subject with a limited point of view. Thirdly, consciousness can be defined as the mind. Any mental state with a propositional content is considered conscious. Thus this includes beliefs, fears, hopes, intentions, expectations and desires [51] Christof Koch lists the following four definitions of consciousness in his latest book,[52] which can be summarized as follows: Consciousness is the inner mental life that we lose each night when we fall into dreamless sleep. Consciousness can be measured with the Glasgow Coma Scale that assesses the reactions of patients. An active cortico-thalamic complex is necessary for consciousness in humans, and Put philosophically, consciousness is what it is like to feel something.


Biological function and evolution

Regarding the primary function of conscious processing, a recurring idea in recent theories is that phenomenal states somehow integrate neural activities and information-processing that would otherwise be independent.[53] This has been called the integration consensus. Another example has been proposed by Gerald Edelman called dynamic core hypothesis which puts emphasis on reentrant connections that reciprocally link areas of the brain in a massively parallel manner.[54] These theories of integrative function present solutions to two classic problems associated with consciousness: differentiation and unity. They show how our conscious experience can discriminate between infinitely different possible scenes and details (differentiation) because it integrates those details from our sensory systems, while the integrative nature of consciousness in this view easily explains how our experience can seem unified as one whole despite all of these individual parts. However, it remains unspecified which kinds of information are integrated in a conscious manner and which kinds can be integrated without consciousness. Nor is it explained what specific causal role conscious integration plays, nor why the same functionality cannot be achieved without consciousness. Obviously not all kinds of information are capable of being disseminated consciously (e.g., neural activity related to vegetative functions, reflexes, unconscious motor programs, low-level perceptual analyses, etc.) and many kinds of information can be disseminated and combined with other kinds without consciousness, as in intersensory interactions such as the ventriloquism effect.[84] Hence it remains unclear why any of it is conscious. For a review of the differences between conscious and unconscious integrations, see [84] As noted earlier, even among writers who consider consciousness to be a well-defined thing, there is widespread dispute about which animals other than humans can be said to possess it.[] Thus, any examination of the evolution of consciousness is faced with great difficulties. Nevertheless, some writers have argued that consciousness can be viewed from the standpoint of evolutionary biology as an adaptation in the sense of a trait that increases fitness.[55] In his paper "Evolution of consciousness," John Eccles argued that special anatomical and physical properties of the mammalian cerebral cortex gave rise to consciousness.[56] Bernard Baars proposed that once in place, this "recursive" circuitry may have provided a basis for the subsequent development of many of the functions that consciousness facilitates in higher organisms.[] Peter Carruthers has put forth one such potential adaptive advantage gained by conscious creatures by suggesting that consciousness allows an individual to make distinctions between appearance and reality.[57] This ability would enable a creature to recognize the likelihood that their perceptions are deceiving them (e.g. that water in the distance may be a mirage) and behave accordingly, and it could also facilitate the manipulation of others by recognizing how things appear to them for both cooperative and devious ends. Other philosophers, however, have suggested that consciousness would not be necessary for any functional advantage in evolutionary processes.[58][59] No one has given a causal explanation, they argue, of why it would not

Consciousness be possible for a functionally equivalent non-conscious organism (i.e., a philosophical zombie) to achieve the very same survival advantages as a conscious organism. If evolutionary processes are blind to the difference between function F being performed by conscious organism O and non-conscious organism O*, it is unclear what adaptive advantage consciousness could provide.[60] As a result, an exaptive explanation of consciousness has gained favor with some theorists that posit consciousness did not evolve as an adaptation but was an exaptation arising as a consequence of other developments such as increases in brain size or cortical rearrangement.


States of consciousness
There are some states in which consciousness seems to be abolished, including sleep, coma, and death. There are also a variety of circumstances that can change the relationship between the mind and the world in less drastic ways, producing what are known as altered states of consciousness. Some altered states occur naturally; others can be produced by drugs or brain damage.[] Altered states can be accompanied by changes in thinking, disturbances in the sense of time, feelings of loss of control, changes in emotional expression, alternations in body image and changes in meaning or significance.[61] The two most widely accepted altered states are sleep and dreaming. Although dream sleep and non-dream sleep appear very similar to an outside A Buddhist monk meditating observer, each is associated with a distinct pattern of brain activity, metabolic activity, and eye movement; each is also associated with a distinct pattern of experience and cognition. During ordinary non-dream sleep, people who are awakened report only vague and sketchy thoughts, and their experiences do not cohere into a continuous narrative. During dream sleep, in contrast, people who are awakened report rich and detailed experiences in which events form a continuous progression, which may however be interrupted by bizarre or fantastic intrusions. Thought processes during the dream state frequently show a high level of irrationality. Both dream and non-dream states are associated with severe disruption of memory: it usually disappears in seconds during the non-dream state, and in minutes after awakening from a dream unless actively refreshed.[62] A variety of psychoactive drugs have notable effects on consciousness. These range from a simple dulling of awareness produced by sedatives, to increases in the intensity of sensory qualities produced by stimulants, cannabis, or most notably by the class of drugs known as psychedelics.[] LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, and others in this group can produce major distortions of perception, including hallucinations; some users even describe their drug-induced experiences as mystical or spiritual in quality. The brain mechanisms underlying these effects are not well understood, but there is substantial evidence that alterations in the brain system that uses the chemical neurotransmitter serotonin play an essential role.[63] There has been some research into physiological changes in yogis and people who practise various techniques of meditation. Some research with brain waves during meditation has reported differences between those corresponding to ordinary relaxation and those corresponding to meditation. It has been disputed, however, whether there is enough evidence to count these as physiologically distinct states of consciousness.[] The most extensive study of the characteristics of altered states of consciousness was made by psychologist Charles Tart in the 1960s and 1970s. Tart analyzed a state of consciousness as made up of a number of component processes, including exteroception (sensing the external world); interoception (sensing the body); input-processing (seeing meaning); emotions; memory; time sense; sense of identity; evaluation and cognitive processing; motor output; and interaction with the environment.[64] Each of these, in his view, could be altered in multiple ways by drugs or other manipulations. The components that Tart identified have not, however, been validated by empirical studies. Research in this area has not yet reached firm conclusions, but a recent questionnaire-based study identified eleven significant

Consciousness factors contributing to drug-induced states of consciousness: experience of unity; spiritual experience; blissful state; insightfulness; disembodiment; impaired control and cognition; anxiety; complex imagery; elementary imagery; audio-visual synesthesia; and changed meaning of percepts.[65]


Phenomenology is a method of inquiry that attempts to examine the structure of consciousness in its own right, putting aside problems regarding the relationship of consciousness to the physical world. This approach was first proposed by the philosopher Edmund Husserl, and later elaborated by other philosophers and scientists.[66] Husserl's original concept gave rise to two distinct lines of inquiry, in philosophy and psychology. In philosophy, phenomenology has largely been devoted to fundamental metaphysical questions, such as the nature of intentionality ("aboutness"). In psychology, phenomenology largely has meant attempting to investigate consciousness using the method of introspection, which means looking into one's own mind and reporting what one observes. This method fell into disrepute in the early twentieth century because of grave doubts about its reliability, but has been rehabilitated to some degree, especially when used in combination with techniques for examining brain activity.[67] Introspectively, the world of conscious experience seems to have considerable structure. Immanuel Kant asserted that the world as we perceive it is organized according to a set of fundamental "intuitions", which include object (we perceive the world as a set of distinct things); shape; quality (color, warmth, etc.); space (distance, direction, and location); and time.[68] Some of these constructs, such as space and time, correspond to the way the world is structured by the laws of physics; for others the correspondence is not as clear. Understanding the physical basis of qualities, such as redness or pain, has been particularly challenging. David Chalmers has called this the hard problem of consciousness.[] Some philosophers have argued that it is Neon color spreading effect. The apparent bluish tinge of the white areas intrinsically unsolvable, because qualities ("qualia") are ineffable; that is, inside the circle is an illusion. they are "raw feels", incapable of being analyzed into component processes.[69] Most psychologists and neuroscientists have not accepted these arguments nevertheless it is clear that the relationship between a physical entity such as light and a perceptual quality such as color is extraordinarily complex and indirect, as demonstrated by a variety of optical illusions such as neon color spreading.[70] In neuroscience, a great deal of effort has gone into investigating how the perceived world of conscious awareness is constructed inside the brain. The process is generally thought to involve two primary mechanisms: (1) hierarchical processing of sensory inputs, (2) memory. Signals arising from sensory organs are transmitted to the brain and then processed in a series of stages, which extract multiple types of information from the raw input. In the visual system, for example, sensory signals from the eyes are transmitted to the thalamus and then to the primary visual cortex; inside the cerebral cortex they are sent to areas that extract features such as three-dimensional structure, shape, color, and motion.[] Memory comes into play in at least two ways. First, it allows sensory information to be evaluated in the context of previous experience. Second, and even more importantly, working memory allows information to be integrated over time so that it can generate a stable representation of the worldGerald Edelman expressed this point vividly by titling one of his books about consciousness The Remembered Present.[71] Despite the large amount of information available, the most important aspects of perception remain mysterious. A great deal is known about low-level signal processing in sensory systems, but the ways by which sensory systems interact with each other, with "executive" systems in the frontal cortex, and with the language system are very incompletely understood. At a deeper level, there are still basic conceptual issues that remain unresolved.[] Many scientists have found it difficult to reconcile the fact that information is distributed across multiple brain areas with the apparent unity of consciousness: this is one aspect of the so-called binding problem.[72] There are also some

Consciousness scientists who have expressed grave reservations about the idea that the brain forms representations of the outside world at all: influential members of this group include psychologist J. J. Gibson and roboticist Rodney Brooks, who both argued in favor of "intelligence without representation".[73]


Medical aspects
The medical approach to consciousness is practically oriented. It derives from a need to treat people whose brain function has been impaired as a result of disease, brain damage, toxins, or drugs. In medicine, conceptual distinctions are considered useful to the degree that they can help to guide treatments. Whereas the philosophical approach to consciousness focuses on its fundamental nature and its contents, the medical approach focuses on the amount of consciousness a person has: in medicine, consciousness is assessed as a "level" ranging from coma and brain death at the low end, to full alertness and purposeful responsiveness at the high end.[] Consciousness is of concern to patients and physicians, especially neurologists and anesthesiologists. Patients may suffer from disorders of consciousness, or may need to be anesthetized for a surgical procedure. Physicians may perform consciousness-related interventions such as instructing the patient to sleep, administering general anesthesia, or inducing medical coma.[] Also, bioethicists may be concerned with the ethical implications of consciousness in medical cases of patients such as Karen Ann Quinlan,[74] while neuroscientists may study patients with impaired consciousness in hopes of gaining information about how the brain works.[75]

In medicine, consciousness is examined using a set of procedures known as neuropsychological assessment.[] There are two commonly used methods for assessing the level of consciousness of a patient: a simple procedure that requires minimal training, and a more complex procedure that requires substantial expertise. The simple procedure begins by asking whether the patient is able to move and react to physical stimuli. If so, the next question is whether the patient can respond in a meaningful way to questions and commands. If so, the patient is asked for name, current location, and current day and time. A patient who can answer all of these questions is said to be "oriented times three" (sometimes denoted "Ox3" on a medical chart), and is usually considered fully conscious.[76] The more complex procedure is known as a neurological examination, and is usually carried out by a neurologist in a hospital setting. A formal neurological examination runs through a precisely delineated series of tests, beginning with tests for basic sensorimotor reflexes, and culminating with tests for sophisticated use of language. The outcome may be summarized using the Glasgow Coma Scale, which yields a number in the range 315, with a score of 3 indicating brain death (the lowest defined level of consciousness), and 15 indicating full consciousness. The Glasgow Coma Scale has three subscales, measuring the best motor response (ranging from "no motor response" to "obeys commands"), the best eye response (ranging from "no eye opening" to "eyes opening spontaneously") and the best verbal response (ranging from "no verbal response" to "fully oriented"). There is also a simpler pediatric version of the scale, for children too young to be able to use language.[]

Disorders of consciousness
Medical conditions that inhibit consciousness are considered disorders of consciousness.[77] This category generally includes minimally conscious state and persistent vegetative state, but sometimes also includes the less severe locked-in syndrome and more severe chronic coma.[77][78] Differential diagnosis of these disorders is an active area of biomedical research.[79][80][81] Finally, brain death results in an irreversible disruption of consciousness.[77] While other conditions may cause a moderate deterioration (e.g., dementia and delirium) or transient interruption (e.g., grand mal and petit mal seizures) of consciousness, they are not included in this category.



Disorder Locked-in syndrome

Description The patient has awareness, sleep-wake cycles, and meaningful behavior (viz., eye-movement), but is isolated due to quadriplegia and pseudobulbar palsy. The patient has intermittent periods of awareness and wakefulness and displays some meaningful behavior.

Minimally conscious state Persistent vegetative state Chronic coma Brain death

The patient has sleep-wake cycles, but lacks awareness and only displays reflexive and non-purposeful behavior.

The patient lacks awareness and sleep-wake cycles and only displays reflexive behavior. The patient lacks awareness, sleep-wake cycles, and brain-mediated reflexive behavior.

One of the most striking disorders of consciousness goes by the name anosognosia, a Greek-derived term meaning unawareness of disease. This is a condition in which patients are disabled in some way, most commonly as a result of a stroke, but either misunderstand the nature of the problem or deny that there is anything wrong with them.[82] The most frequently occurring form is seen in people who have experienced a stroke damaging the parietal lobe in the right hemisphere of the brain, giving rise to a syndrome known as hemispatial neglect, characterized by an inability to direct action or attention toward objects located to the right with respect to their bodies. Patients with hemispatial neglect are often paralyzed on the right side of the body, but sometimes deny being unable to move. When questioned about the obvious problem, the patient may avoid giving a direct answer, or may give an explanation that doesn't make sense. Patients with hemispatial neglect may also fail to recognize paralyzed parts of their bodies: one frequently mentioned case is of a man who repeatedly tried to throw his own paralyzed right leg out of the bed he was lying in, and when asked what he was doing, complained that somebody had put a dead leg into the bed with him. An even more striking type of anosognosia is AntonBabinski syndrome, a rarely occurring condition in which patients become blind but claim to be able to see normally, and persist in this claim in spite of all evidence to the contrary.[83]

Etymology and early history

The origin of the modern concept of consciousness is often attributed to John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1690.[84] Locke defined consciousness as "the perception of what passes in a man's own mind."[85] His essay influenced the 18th century view of consciousness, and his definition appeared in Samuel Johnson's celebrated Dictionary (1755).[86] The earliest English language uses of "conscious" and "consciousness" date back, however, to the 1500s. The English word "conscious" originally derived from the Latin conscius (con- "together" + scire "to know"), but the Latin word did not have the same meaning as our wordit meant knowing with, in other words having joint or common knowledge with another.[87] There were, however, many occurrences in Latin writings of the phrase conscius sibi, which translates literally as "knowing with oneself", or in other words sharing knowledge with oneself about something. This phrase had the figurative meaning of knowing that one knows, as the modern English word "conscious"

John Locke, British philosopher active in the 17th century

does. In its earliest uses in the 1500s, the English word "conscious" retained the meaning of the Latin conscius. For example Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan wrote: "Where two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are

Consciousness said to be Conscious of it one to another."[88] The Latin phrase conscius sibi, whose meaning was more closely related to the current concept of consciousness, was rendered in English as "conscious to oneself" or "conscious unto oneself". For example, Archbishop Ussher wrote in 1613 of "being so conscious unto myself of my great weakness".[89] Locke's definition from 1690 illustrates that a gradual shift in meaning had taken place. A related word was conscientia, which primarily means moral conscience. In the literal sense, "conscientia" means knowledge-with, that is, shared knowledge. The word first appears in Latin juridical texts by writers such as Cicero.[90] Here, conscientia is the knowledge that a witness has of the deed of someone else.[91] Ren Descartes (15961650) is generally taken to be the first philosopher to use "conscientia" in a way that does not fit this traditional meaning.[92] Descartes used "conscientia" the way modern speakers would use "conscience." In Search after Truth he says "conscience or internal testimony" (conscientia vel interno testimonio).[93]


Stream of consciousness
William James is usually credited with popularizing the idea that human consciousness flows like a stream, in his Principles of Psychology of 1890. According to James, the "stream of thought" is governed by five characteristics: "(1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness. (2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing. (3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous. (4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself. (5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others".[94] A similar concept appears in Buddhist philosophy, expressed by the Sanskrit term Citta-satna, which is usually translated as mindstream or "mental continuum". In the Buddhist view, though, the "mindstream" is viewed primarily as a source of noise that distracts attention from a changeless underlying reality.[95] In the west, the primary impact of the idea has been on literature rather than science: stream of consciousness as a narrative mode means writing in a way that attempts to portray the moment-to-moment thoughts and experiences of a character. This technique perhaps had its beginnings in the monologues of Shakespeare's plays, and reached its fullest development in the novels of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, although it has also been used by many other noted writers.[96] Here for example is a passage from Joyce's Ulysses about the thoughts of Molly Bloom: Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting for that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was actually afraid to lay out 4d for her methylated spirit telling me all her ailments she had too much old chat in her about politics and earthquakes and the end of the world let us have a bit of fun first God help the world if all the women were her sort down on bathingsuits and lownecks of course nobody wanted her to wear them I suppose she was pious because no man would look at her twice I hope Ill never be like her a wonder she didnt want us to cover our faces but she was a welleducated woman certainly and her gabby talk about Mr Riordan here and Mr Riordan there I suppose he was glad to get shut of her.[97]



[16] For a discussion see [24] Note: In many stories the Golem was mindless, but some gave it emotions or thoughts. [32] Mandler, G. Consciousness: Respectable, useful, and probably necessary. In R.Solso (Ed.)Information processing and cognition: NJ: LEA. [33] Mandler, G. Consciousness recovered: Psychological functions and origins of thought. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2002 [46] Koch, The Quest for Consciousness, pp. 105116 [48] Koch, The Quest for Consciousness, pp. 269286 [49] Human Brain Function, by Richard Frackowiak and 7 other neuroscientists, page 269 in chapter 16 "The Neural Correlates of Consciousness" (consisting of 32 pages), published 2004 [50] What Consciousness is (http:/ / chemistry. beloit. edu/ Ordman/ classes/ cls/ idst125sp11/ 1rocdef. htm) Roc Ordman's Consciousness class, Beloit College, 2012, [52] Consciousness, Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, Christof Koch, 2012, MIT Press [68] Note: translating Kant's terminology into English is often difficult. [72] Koch, The Quest for Consciousness, pp. 167170 [75] Koch, The Quest for Consciousness, pp. 216226 [76] Note: A patient who can additionally describe the current situation may be referred to as "oriented times four".

External links
Anthropology of Consciousness ( Consciousness and Cognition ( description#description) Consciousness & Emotion ( Consciousness Studies ( Consciousness_Studies/) at the Open Directory Project Journal of Consciousness Studies ( Psyche ( (ASSC) Quantum Mind ( Evolution and Function of Consciousness ( Alan Turing Year

Evolutionary linguistics


Evolutionary linguistics
Theoretical linguistics

Cognitive Generative Quantitative Functional theories of grammar Phonology Morphology Morphophonology Syntax Lexis Semantics Pragmatics Graphemics Orthography Semiotics Descriptive linguistics

Anthropological Comparative Historical Etymology Graphetics Phonetics Sociolinguistics Applied and experimental linguistics

Computational Evolutionary Forensic Internet Language acquisition (second-language)

Language assessment Language development Language education Linguistic anthropology Neurolinguistics Psycholinguistics Related articles

History of linguistics Linguistic prescription List of linguists Unsolved problems Linguistics portal

Evolutionary linguistics


Part of a series on

Evolutionary biology

Diagrammatic representation of the divergence of modern taxonomic groups from their common ancestor.

Evolutionary biology portal Category Book Related topics

Evolutionary Linguistics is a cover term for the scientific study of both the origins and development of language as well as the cultural evolution of languages.[1] The main challenge in this research is the lack of empirical data: spoken language leaves practically no traces. This led to an abandonment of the field for more than a century.[2] Since the late 1980s, the field has been revived in the wake of progress made in the related fields of psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science.

August Schleicher (18211868) and his Stammbaumtheorie are often quoted as the starting point of evolutionary linguistics. Inspired by the natural sciences, especially biology, Schleicher was the first to compare languages to evolving species.[3] He introduced the representation of language families as an evolutionary tree in articles published in 1853. Joseph Jastrow published a gestural theory of the evolution of language in the seventh volume of Science, 1886.[4] The Stammbaumtheorie proved to be very productive for comparative linguistics, but didn't solve the major problem of studying the origin of language: the lack of fossil records. The question of the origin of language was abandoned as unsolvable. Famously, the Socit Linguistique de Paris in 1866 refused to admit any further papers on the subject. The field has re-appeared in 1988 in the Linguistic Bibliography, as a subfield of psycholinguistics. In 1990, Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom published their paper "Natural Language & Natural Selection"[5] which strongly argued for an adaptationist approach to language origins. Their paper is often credited with reviving the interest in evolutionary linguistics. This development was further strengthened by the establishment (in 1996) of a series of conferences on the Evolution of Language (now known as "Evolang"), promoting a scientific, multidisciplinary approach to the issue, and interest from major academic publishers (e.g., the Studies in the Evolution of Language series has been appearing with Oxford University Press since 2001) and scientific journals.

Evolutionary linguistics


Recent developments
Evolutionary linguistics as a field is rapidly emerging as a result of developments in neighboring disciplines. To what extent language's features are determined by genes, a hotly debated dichotomy in linguistics, has had new light shed upon it by the discovery of the FoxP2-gene. An English family with a severe, heritable language dysfunction was found to have a defective copy of this gene. Mutations of the corresponding gene in mice (FOXP2 is fairly well conserved; modern humans share the same allele as Neanderthals) cause reductions in size and vocalization rate. If both copies are damaged, the Purkinje layer (a part of the cerebellum that contains better-connected neurons than any other) develops abnormally, runting is more common, and pups die within weeks due to inadequate lung development.[] Additionally, higher presence of FOXP2 in songbirds is correlated to song changes, with downregulation causing incomplete and inaccurate song imitation in zebra finches. In general, evidence suggests that the protein is vital to neuroplasticity. There is little support, however, for the idea that FOXP2 is 'the grammar gene' or that it had much to do with the relatively recent emergence of syntactical speech.[6] Another controversial dichotomy is the question of whether human language is solely human or on a continuum with (admittedly far removed) animal communication systems. Studies in ethology have forced researchers to reassess many claims of uniquely human abilities for language and speech. For instance, Tecumseh Fitch has argued that the descended larynx is not unique to humans. Similarly, once held uniquely human traits such as formant perception, combinatorial phonology and compositional semantics are now thought to be shared with at least some nonhuman animal species. Conversely, Derek Bickerton and others argue that the advent of abstract words provided a mental basis for analyzing higher-order relations, and that any communication system that remotely resembles human language utterly relies on cognitive architecture that co-evolved alongside language. As it leaves no fossils, language's form and even its presence are extremely hard or impossible to deduce from physical evidence. Computational modeling is now widely accepted as an approach to assure the internal consistency of language-evolution scenarios. Approximately one-third of all papers presented at the 2010 Evolution of Language conference [7] rely at least in part on computer simulations.

One original researcher in the field is Luc Steels, head of the research units of Sony CSL in Paris and the AI Lab at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He and his team are currently investigating ways in which artificial agents self-organize languages with natural-like properties and how meaning can co-evolve with language. Their research is based on the hypothesis that language is a complex adaptive system that emerges through adaptive interactions between agents and continues to evolve in order to remain adapted to the needs and capabilities of the agents. This research has been implemented in fluid construction grammar (FCG), a formalism for construction grammars that has been specially designed for the origins and evolution of language. The approach of computational modeling and the use of robotic agents grounded in real life is claimed to be theory independent. It enables the researcher to find out exactly what cognitive capacities are needed for certain language phenomena to emerge. It also focuses the researcher in formulating hypotheses in a precise and exact manner, whereas theoretical models often stay very vague. Some linguists, such as John McWhorter, have analyzed the evolution and construction of basic communication methods such as Pidginization and Creolization.[8] "Nativist" models of "Universal Grammar" are informed by linguistic universals such as the existence of pronouns and demonstratives, and the similarities in each languages process of nominalization (the process of verbs becoming nouns) as well as the reverse, the process of turning nouns into verbs.[9] This is a purely descriptive approach to what we mean by "natural language" without attempting to address its emergence. Finally there are those archaeologists and evolutionary anthropologists among them Ian Watts,[10] Camilla Power[11] and Chris Knight (co-founder with James Hurford of the EVOLANG series of conferences) who argue

Evolutionary linguistics that 'the origin of language' is probably an insoluble problem. In agreement with Amotz Zahavi,[12] Knight argues that language being a realm of patent fictions is a theoretical impossibility in a Darwinian world, where signals must be intrinsically reliable. If we are to explain language's evolution, according to this view, we must tackle it as part of a wider one the evolutionary emergence of symbolic culture as such.[13]


EVOLANG Conference
The Evolution of Language International Conferences [14][15] have been held biennially since 1996. 1. 1996 Edinburgh: Hurford, J. R., Studdert-Kennedy, M. & Knight C. (eds), Approaches to the Evolution of Language - Social and Cognitive Bases, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 2. 1998 London: Chris Knight, James R. Hurford and Michael Studdert-Kennedy (eds), The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Social function and the origins of linguistic form, Cambridge University Press, 3. 2000 Paris: J. L. Desalles & L. Ghadakpour (eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on the Evolution of Language 4. 2002 Boston: J. Hurford & T. Fitch (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Evolution of Language 5. 2004 Leipzig 6. 2006 Rome: Angelo Cangelosi, Andrew D. M. Smith, Kenny Smith The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Evolution of Language, World Scientific, ISBN 981-256-656-2. 7. 2008 Barcelona: [16] Andrew D. M. Smith, Kenny Smith, Ramon Ferrer i Cancho "The Evolution of Language (EVOLANG 7)", World Scientific, ISBN 981-277-611-7. 8. 2010 Utrecht, the Netherlands, April 1417, 2010. [7]. Andrew D. M. Smith, Marieke Schouwstra, Bart de Boer, Kenny Smith "The Evolution of Language (EVOLANG 8)", World Scientific, ISBN 981-4295-21-3. 9. 2012 Kyoto, Japan, March 1316, 2012. [17]. Scott-Phillips, T.C. and Tamariz, M. and Cartmill, E.A. and Hurford, J.R., editor, The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference (EVOLANG9), World Scientific. 10. 2014 Vienna

[2] for about 12 decades, from the 1860s to the 1980s. [3] Taub, Liba. Evolutionary Ideas and "Empirical" Methods: The Analogy Between Language and Species in the Works of Lyell and Schleicher. British Journal for the History of Science 26, pages 171193 (1993) [6] Diller, K. C. and R. L. Cann 2009. Evidence against a genetic-based revolution in language 50,000 years ago. In R. Botha and C. Knight (eds), The Cradle of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 135-149. [7] http:/ / evolang2010. nl [8] (2002) McWhorter, John. The Power of Babel: The Natural History of Language, Random House Group. [9] (2005) Deutscher, Guy. The Unfolding of Language, Owl Books. [10] Watts, I. 2009. Red ochre, body painting, and language: interpreting the Blombos ochre. In R. Botha and C. Knight (eds), The Cradle of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 62-92. [11] Power, C. 2009. Sexual selection models for the emergence of symbolic communication: why they should be reversed. In R. Botha and C. Knight (eds), The Cradle of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257-280. [12] Zahavi, A. 1993. The fallacy of conventional signalling. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 340: 227-230. [13] Chris Knight, 2010. The origins of symbolic culture. (http:/ / www. chrisknight. co. uk/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2007/ 09/ The-Origins-of-Symbolic-Culture. pdf) In Ulrich J. Frey, Charlotte Strmer and Kai P. Willfhr (eds) 2010. Homo Novus A Human Without Illusions. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 193-211. [14] http:/ / www. ling. ed. ac. uk/ evolang/ [15] http:/ / www. let. uu. nl/ evolang2010. nl/ history. php [16] http:/ / stel. ub. edu/ evolang2008/ pro. htm [17] http:/ / kyoto. evolang. org/

Evolutionary linguistics


Cangelosi, A.; Harnad, S. (2001). "The adaptive advantage of symbolic theft over sensorimotor toil: Grounding language in perceptual categories" ( Evolution of Communication 4 (1): 117142. doi: 10.1075/eoc.4.1.07can ( M. Christiansen and S. Kirby (eds.), Language Evolution, Oxford University Press, New York (2003), ISBN 978-0-19-924484-3. Bickerton, D., Symbol and Structure: A Comprehensive Framework for Language Evolution, pp.7793. Hurford, J. R., The Language Mosaic and Its Evolution, pp.3857. Lieberman, P.,Motor Control, Speech, and the Evolution of Language, pp.252271. Deacon, T. (1997) The symbolic species: the coevolution of language and the brain, Norton, New York. Hauser, M.D. (1996) The evolution of communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Daniel Dor and Jablonka Eva (2001). How language changed the genes. In Tabant J. Ward. S. (editors). Mouton de Gruyer: Berlin, pp 149175. Dor D. and Jablonka E. (2001) From cultural selection to genetic selection: a framework for the evolution of language. Selection, 13, pp.3357.

Hauser MD, Chomsky N, Fitch WT (2002). "The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?" ( Science 298 (5598): 156979. doi: 10.1126/science.298.5598.1569 ( PMID 12446899 ( Jackendoff, R. (2002) Foundations of language: brain, meaning, grammar, evolution (http://www.bbsonline. org/Preprints/Jackendoff-07252002/Referees/) Oxford University Press, New York Knight, C. (2010). The origins of symbolic culture. In Ulrich J. Frey, Charlotte Strmer and Kai P. Willfhr (eds) 2010. Homo Novus A Human Without Illusions. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp.193211. PDF (http:/ /</ref> Komarova, N.L. (2007). Language and Mathematics: An evolutionary model of grammatical communication. In: History & Mathematics ( list=1). Ed. by Leonid Grinin, Victor C. de Munck, and Andrey Korotayev. Moscow, KomKniga/URSS. pp.164179. ISBN 978-5-484-01001-1. Nowak, M.A.; Komarova, N.L. (2001). "Towards an evolutionary theory of language". Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (7): 288295. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01683-1 ( S1364-6613(00)01683-1). PMID 11425617 ( Pinker, S. (1994) The language instinct, HarperCollins, New York. Pinker, S.; Bloom, P. (1990). "Natural language and natural selection" ( a/00/00/04/99/index.html). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 707784. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00081061 ( Power, C. 2009. Sexual selection models for the emergence of symbolic communication: why they should be reversed. In R. Botha and C. Knight (eds), The Cradle of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.257280. Sampson, Geoffrey: Evolutionary Language Understanding, published 1996 by Cassel (London), ISBN 0-304-33650-5 Steels, Luc (2001) Grounding Symbols through Evolutionary Language Games. In: Cangelosi A. and Parisi D. (Eds.) Simulating the Evolution of Language ( html) Springer. Steklis, H.D.; Harnad, S (1976). "From hand to mouth: Some critical stages in the evolution of language In: Harnad, S., Steklis, H. D. and Lancaster, J., (1976) (Eds) Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech" (http:// Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 280: 1914.

Evolutionary linguistics See also the UIUC Language Evolution and Computation Bibliography/Repository ( amag/langev/) (1200+ related references, citations, and fulltext pointers) Encyclopedia Americana,Americana Corporation of Canada{1959}-Iceland-Language Watts, I. 2009. Red ochre, body painting, and language: interpreting the Blombos ochre. In R. Botha and C. Knight (eds), The Cradle of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.6292. Zuidema, W. H., The Major Transitions in the Evolution of Language, PhD thesis, Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, University of Edinburgh (2005) ( html) Johansson, Sverker, Origins of language : constraints on hypotheses, Converging evidence in language and communication research vol. 5, Amsterdam : Benjamins (2005). Mithen, Steven J., The singing neanderthals : the origins of music, language, mind and body London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson (2005), ISBN 978-0-297-64317-3 Partha Niyogi, The computational nature of language learning and evolution MIT Press, Current studies in linguistics 43 (2006). A. Carstairs-McCarthy, The evolution of language, Lingua vol. 117, issue 3 (2007, March). Bernd Heine, Tania Kuteva, The genesis of grammar : a reconstruction, Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-19-922776-1, ISBN 978-0-19-922777-8. James R. Hurford, Language in the light of evolution, Oxford University Press, Studies in the evolution of language vol. 1 (2007). Atkinson QD, Meade A, Venditti C, Greenhill SJ, Pagel M (2008). "Languages evolve in punctuational bursts". Science 319 (5863): 588. doi: 10.1126/science.1149683 ( PMID 18239118 (


Further reading
Botha, R; Knight, C., [editors] (2009). The Cradle of Language. Oxford Series in the Evolution of Language. Oxford.: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-954586-5. Elvira, Javier (2009). Evolucin lingstica y cambio sintctico. Fondo Hispnico de Lingstica y Filologa. Bern et al.: Peter Lang. ISBN978-3-0343-0323-1. Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2010). The Evolution of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge. ISBN978-0-521-67736-3. Harnad, Stevan R.; Steklis, Horst D.; Lancaster, Jane, [editors] (1976). Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, v. 280. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. ISBN0-89072-026-6. Johanson, Donald C.; and Edgar, Blake (2006). From Lucy to Language (Revised, updated, and expanded ed.). New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. ISBN0-7432-8064-4. OCLC 72440476 ( 72440476). Kenneally, Christine (2007). The First Word: The Search for the Origins of Language. New York, NY: Viking. ISBN978-0-670-03490-1. OCLC 80460757 ( Tallerman, Maggie (2005). Language Origins: Perspectives on Evolution. Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-927904-7. OCLC 60607214 (

Evolutionary linguistics


External links
Fluid Construction Grammar ( Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, University of Edinburgh ( ) Sony CSL Research ( ARTI Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Vrije Universiteit Brussel ( ECAgents: The Project on Embodied and Communicating Agents ( Blog about quantification of the genetic proximity between languages (

Evolutionary psychology of religion

The evolutionary psychology of religion is the study of religious belief using evolutionary psychology principles. It is one approach to the psychology of religion. As with all other organs and organ functions, the brain and cognition's functional structure have been argued to have a genetic basis, and are therefore subject to the effects of natural selection and evolution. Like other organs and tissues, this functional structure should be universally shared amongst humans and should solve important problems of survival and reproduction. Evolutionary psychologists seek to understand cognitive processes, religion in this case, by understanding the survival and reproductive functions they might serve.

Mechanisms of evolution
There is general agreement among scientists that a propensity to engage in religious behavior evolved early in human history. However, there is disagreement on the exact mechanisms that drove the evolution of the religious mind. There are two schools of thought. One is that religion itself evolved due to natural selection and is an adaptation, in which case religion conferred some sort of evolutionary advantage. Alternatively, religious beliefs and behaviors may have emerged as by-products of other adaptive traits without initially being selected for because of their own benefits. Religious behavior often involves significant costs including economic costs, celibacy, dangerous rituals, or by spending time that could be otherwise used. This would suggest that natural selection should act against religious behavior unless it or something else causing religious behavior have significant advantages.[1]

Religion as an adaptation
Richard Sosis and Candace Alcorta have reviewed several of the prominent theories for the adaptive value of religion.[] Many are "social solidarity theories", which view religion as having evolved to enhance cooperation and cohesion within groups. Group membership in turn provides benefits which can enhance an individual's chances for survival and reproduction. These social solidarity theories may help to explain the painful or dangerous nature of many religious rituals. Costly-signaling theory suggests that such rituals might serve as public and hard to fake signals that an individual's commitment to the group is sincere. Since there would be a considerable benefit in trying to cheat the system - taking advantage of group living benefits without taking on any possible costs - the ritual would not be something simple that can be taken lightly.[] Warfare is a good example of a cost of group living, and Richard Sosis, Howard C. Kress, and James S. Boster carried out a cross-cultural survey which demonstrated that men in societies which engage in war do submit to the costliest rituals.[2] Studies that show more direct positive associations between religious practice and health and longevity are more controversial. Harold G. Koenig and Harvey J. Cohen summarized and assessed the results of 100 evidence-based

Evolutionary psychology of religion studies that systematically examined the relationship between religion and human well-being, finding that 79% showed a positive influence.[3] These studies are popular in the media, as seen in a recent NPR program including University of Miami Professor Gail Ironson's findings that belief in God and a strong sense of spirituality were good predictors of a lower viral load and improved immune cell levels in HIV patients.[4] However, Dr. Richard P. Sloan of Columbia University was quoted in the New York Times as saying that "...there is no really good compelling evidence that there is a relationship between religious involvement and health.".[5] There is still debate over the validity of these findings, and they do not necessarily prove a direct cause-and-effect relationship between religion and health. Mark Stibich claims there is a clear correlation but the reason for it is unclear. [6] A criticism of such placebo effects, as well as the advantage of religion giving a sense of meaning, is that it seems likely that less complex mechanisms than religious behavior could achieve such goals.[1]


Religion as a by-product
Stephen Jay Gould cites religion as an example of an exaptation or spandrel, but he does not himself select a definite trait which he thinks was actually acted on by natural selection. He does, however, bring up Freud's suggestion that our large brains, which evolved for other reasons, led to consciousness. The beginning of consciousness forced humans to deal with the concept of personal mortality. Religion may have been one solution to this problem.[] Other researchers have proposed specific psychological processes which may have been co-opted for religion. Such mechanisms may include the ability to infer the presence of organisms that might do harm (agent detection), the ability to come up with causal narratives for natural events (etiology), and the ability to recognize that other people have minds of their own with their own beliefs, desires and intentions (theory of mind). These three adaptations (among others) allow human beings to imagine purposeful agents behind many observations that could not readily be explained otherwise, e.g. thunder, lightning, movement of planets, complexity of life, etc.[7] Pascal Boyer suggests, in his book Religion Explained, that there is no simple explanation for religious consciousness. He builds on the ideas of cognitive anthropologists Dan Sperber and Scott Atran, who argued that religious cognition represents a by-product of various evolutionary adaptations, including folk psychology. He argues that one such factor is that it has, in most cases, been advantageous for humans to remember "minimally counter-intuitive" concepts which are somewhat different from the daily routine and somewhat violate innate expectations about how the world is constructed. A god that is in many aspects like humans but much more powerful is such a concept while the often much more abstract god discussed at length by theologians is often too counter-intuitive. Experiments support that religious people think about their god in anthropomorphic terms even if this contradicts the more complex theological doctrines of their religion.[1] Pierre Lienard and Pascal Boyer suggest that humans have evolved a "hazard-precaution system" which allows us to detect potential threats in the environment and attempt to respond appropriately.[8] Several features of ritual behaviors, often a major feature of religion, are held to trigger this system. These include the occasion for the ritual, often the prevention or elimination of danger or evil, the harm believed to result from nonperformance of the ritual, and the detailed proscriptions for proper performance of the ritual. Lienard and Boyer discuss the possibility that a sensitive hazard-precaution system itself may have provided fitness benefits, and that religion then "associates individual, unmanageable anxieties with coordinated action with others and thereby makes them more tolerable or meaningful". Justin L. Barrett in Why Would Anyone Believe in God? suggests that belief in God is natural because it depends on mental tools possessed by all human beings. He suggests that the way our minds are structured and develop make belief in the existence of a supreme god with properties such as being superknowing, superpowerful and immortal highly attractive. He also compares belief in God to belief in other minds, and devotes a chapter to looking at the evolutionary psychology of atheism. He suggests that one of the fundamental mental modules in the brain is the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), another potential system for identifying danger. This HADD may confer a survival benefit even if it is over-sensitive: it is better to avoid an imaginary predator than be killed by a real

Evolutionary psychology of religion one. This would tend to encourage belief in ghosts and spirits.[9]


Richard Dawkins suggests in The Selfish Gene that cultural memes function like genes in that they are subject to natural selection. In The God Delusion Dawkins further argues that because religious truths cannot be questioned, their very nature encourages religions to spread like "mind viruses". In such a conception, it is necessary that the individuals who are unable to question their beliefs are more biologically fit than individuals who are capable of questioning their beliefs. Thus, it could be concluded that sacred scriptures or oral traditions created a behavioral pattern that elevated biological fitness for believing individuals. Individuals who were capable of challenging such beliefs, even if the beliefs were enormously improbable, became rarer and rarer in the population. (See denialism.) This model holds that religion is the byproduct of the cognitive modules in the human brain that arose in our evolutionary past to deal with problems of survival and reproduction. Initial concepts of supernatural agents may arise in the tendency of humans to "overdetect" the presence of other humans or predators (momentarily mistaking a vine for a snake). For instance, a man might report that he felt something sneaking up on him, but it vanished when he looked around.[10] Stories of these experiences are especially likely to be retold, passed on and embellished due to their descriptions of standard ontological categories (human, artifact, animal, plant, natural object) with counterintuitive properties (humans that are invisible, houses that remember what happened in them, etc.). These stories become even more salient when they are accompanied by activation of non-violated expectations for the ontological category (houses that "remember" activates our intuitive psychology of mind; i.e. we automatically attribute thought processes to them).[11] One of the attributes of our intuitive psychology of mind is that humans are interested in the affairs of other humans. This may result in the tendency for concepts of supernatural agents to inevitably cross connect with human intuitive moral feelings (evolutionary behavioral guidelines). In addition, the presence of dead bodies creates an uncomfortable cognitive state in which dreams and other mental modules (person identification and behavior prediction) continue to run decoupled from reality producing incompatible intuitions that the dead are somehow still around. When this is coupled with the human predisposition to see misfortune as a social event (as someone's responsibility rather than the outcome of mechanical processes) it may activate the intuitive "willingness to make exchanges" module of the human theory of minds resulting in the tendency of humans to try to interact and bargain with their supernatural agents (ritual).[] In a large enough group, some individuals will seem better skilled at these rituals than others and will become specialists. As the societies grow and encounter others, competition will ensue and a "survival of the fittest" effect may cause the practitioners to modify their concepts to provide a more abstract, more widely acceptable version. Eventually the specialist practitioners form a cohesive group or guild with its attendant political goals (religion).[]

Biological mechanisms causing religiosity

The God gene hypothesis proposes that a specific gene (VMAT2) predisposes humans towards spiritualor mysticexperiences. Proponent Dean Hamer see this predisposition as increasing optimism which has positive effects on other factors such as health and reproductive success. Also, any gene that contributes to denialism allows an otherwise preposterous meme to increase in frequency as long as the resulting behavior increases biological fitness. The individual simply denies that the meme is untrue, behaves as if it were, and benefits from the elevated fitness. While general intelligence and denialism are inversely related, the two are not directly related. A highly intelligent individual can become a denier, though this more rarely occurs. [12] It is worth noting that while denialism can have a genetic origin, there are other reasons someone might become a denier. For instance, a psychopath may deny climate change because he or she does not care what happens to the

Evolutionary psychology of religion world or anyone else in it. However, it is fallacious to assume that all such deniers are psychopaths, and in fact, most of them probably are not. Only about 1 in 25 people in the United States suffer from anti-social personality disorder, and far fewer suffer from this malady in less individualistic cultures, such as those in East Asia. [13] One can see how a religious adherence to ideas can be beneficial to the individual by imagining, for instance, the behavioral result of denying overpopulation.[14] One such genetic trait that could cause denialism is any trait that enhances the ego. A genetic propensity to be egotistical may have evolved or increased in frequency dramatically after the advent of religion. Once the individual has invested in believing the memes, ego causes him or her not to be able to question them. Doing so would be to admit having been wrong, which is a threat to the ego. It was aforementioned that most deniers are probably not psychopaths. The model is, however, a more complex than that. What is a psychopath if he or she is not an individual who is completely egotistical? And, in fact, one might predict that psychopaths could hide under the assumptions of religion, since even a complete narcissist does not wish to go to hell. In this way, a genetic propensity to be egotistical, as well as a genetic propensity to be psychopathic, may have increased in frequency dramatically after the advent of religion. However, scientific studies have yet to come to a conclusion about this topic. Ironically, if the world ever became atheist and then if scientific evidence for the existence of God became available, scientists would hypothetically have trouble convincing a mass of deniers. More sadly, violent individuals might then commit acts of terrorism against individuals who do not ascribe to atheism. The point here is that the alternatives to be denied, sometimes referred to as heresy, are not constrained by objective reality.[citation needed]


[1] The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Edited by Robin Dunbar and Louise Barret, Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 44 The Evolution of Religion by Joseph A. Bulbulia [6] http:/ / longevity. about. com/ od/ longevityboosters/ a/ religion_life. htm

Further reading
Robert Wrights "The Evolution of God" ( Stewart Guthrie Faces in the clouds A New Theory of Religion ( 0195098919) ISBN 0-19-509891-9. Evolutionary psychology of religion ( htm) Steven Pinker. Adaptations, Exaptations, and Spandrels ( html) Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion ( pg=PA235&dq=religion+exaptation&ei=IbtoR5iaD4v8sQOgn62-Ag& sig=zzFvCIcvIULWFyXx8ED5tEfh0tc#PPA238,M1) ISBN 1-59385-088-3 Atran, Scott In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion ( 0195178033/) ISBN 0-19-517803-3 Religious thought and behaviour as by-products of brain function ( diesendruck/9.pdf) Pascal Boyer Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion By Todd Tremlin ( books?id=o4J2AjN2JXAC&pg=PA43&dq=todd+tremlin& sig=JLt0_heOblsS4etSaWM-scLFAw8#PPA16,M1), 2006 ISBN 0-19-530534-5

Evolutionary psychology of religion


External links
International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (

Criticism of evolutionary psychology

From its beginning, evolutionary psychology (EP) has generated substantial controversy and criticism.[1] Criticisms include 1) disputes about the testability of evolutionary hypotheses, 2) alternatives to some of the cognitive assumptions (such as massive modularity) frequently employed in evolutionary psychology, 3) claimed vagueness stemming from evolutionary assumptions (e.g. uncertainty about the environment of evolutionary adaptation, EEA), 4) differing stress on the importance of non-genetic and non-adaptive explanations, as well as 5) political and ethical issues. Evolutionary psychologists respond by arguing that many of these criticisms are straw men, are based on an incorrect nature vs. nurture dichotomy, or are based on misunderstandings of the discipline.[2]

History of the debate

Critics and supporters have debated various aspects of evolutionary psychology. The history of debate from the evolutionary psychology perspective is covered in detail in books by Segerstrle (2000) and Alcock (2001). Also see recent overviews of EP with rebuttals to critics in Confer, et al. (2010),[3] as well as relevant chapters in D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology.[4] The history of the debate from the critics' perspective is detailed by Gannon (2002). Critics of EP include the philosophers of science David Buller author of Adapting Minds, Robert C. Richardson author of Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology, and Brendan Wallace, author of Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won't Work. Other critics include Neurobiologists like Steven Rose who edited "Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments against Evolutionary Psychology", and biological anthropologists like Jonathan Marks and social anthropologists like Tim Ingold and Marshall Sahlins.[citation needed] Critics of EP have argued that evolutionary psychology is based on misconceptions of biological and evolutionary theory.[5]Wikipedia:Please clarify

Massive modularity
One controversy concerns the particular modularity of mind theory used in evolutionary psychology (massive modularity). Critics, including some psychologists using other evolutionary frameworks, argue in favor of other theories.[citation needed]

Fear and phobias as innate or learnt

Critics have questioned the proposed innateness of certain phobias.[6]Wikipedia:Please clarify

Environment of evolutionary adaptedness

One method employed by evolutionary psychologists is using knowledge of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness to generate hypotheses regarding possible psychological adaptations. Part of the critique of the scientific base of evolutionary psychology includes a critique of the concept of the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA). EP often assumes that human evolution occurred in a uniform environment, and critics suggest that we know so little about the environment (or probably multiple environments) in which homo sapiens evolved, that explaining specific traits as an adaption to that environment becomes highly

Criticism of evolutionary psychology speculative.[7] Evolutionary psychologists John Toby and Leda Cosmides state that research is confined to certainties about the past, such as pregnancies only occurring in women, and that humans lived in groups. They argue that there are many environmental features that are known regarding our species' evolutionary history. They argue that our hunter-gatherer ancestors dealt with predators and prey, food acquisition and sharing, mate choice, child rearing, interpersonal aggression, interpersonal assistance, diseases and a host of other fairly predictable challenges that constituted significant selection pressures. Knowledge also include things such as nomadic, kin-based lifestyle in small groups, long life for mammals, low fertility for mammals, long female pregnancy and lactation, cooperative hunting and aggression, tool use, and sexual division of labor.[8]


A frequent critique of EP is that its hypotheses are difficult or impossible to adequately test, challenging its status as an empirical science. As an example, critics point out that many current traits likely evolved to serve different functions than they do now, confounding attempts to make backward inferences into history.[9] Evolutionary psychologists acknowledge the difficulty of testing their hypotheses but assert it is nevertheless possible.[10] Critics argue that many hypotheses put forward to explain the adaptive nature of human behavioural traits are "just-so stories"; neat adaptive explanations for the evolution of given traits that do not rest on any evidence beyond their own internal logic. They allege that evolutionary psychology can predict many, or even all, behaviours for a given situation, including contradictory ones. Therefore many human behaviours will always fit some hypotheses. Noam Chomsky argued: "You find that people cooperate, you say, Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating. You find that they fight, you say, Sure, thats obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."[11][12] Leda Cosmides argued in an interview [13]: "Those who have a professional knowledge of evolutionary biology know that it is not possible to cook up after the fact explanations of just any trait. There are important constraints on evolutionary explanation. More to the point, every decent evolutionary explanation has testable predictions about the design of the trait. For example, the hypothesis that pregnancy sickness is a byproduct of prenatal hormones predicts different patterns of food aversions than the hypothesis that it is an adaptation that evolved to protect the fetus from pathogens and plant toxins in food at the point in embryogenesis when the fetus is most vulnerable during the first trimester. Evolutionary hypotheses whether generated to discover a new trait or to explain one that is already known carry predictions about the nature of that trait. The alternative having no hypothesis about adaptive function carries no predictions whatsoever. So which is the more constrained and sober scientific approach?" A 2010 review article by evolutionary psychologists describes how an evolutionary theory may be empirically tested. An hypothesis is made about the evolutionary cause of a psychological phenomenon or phenomena. Then the researcher makes predictions that can be tested. This involves predicting that the evolutionary cause will have caused other effects than the ones already discovered and known. Then these predictions are tested. The authors argue numerous evolutionary theories have been tested in this way and confirmed or falsified.[] Buller (2005) makes the point that the entire field of evolutionary psychology is never confirmed or falsified; only specific hypotheses, motivated by the general assumptions of evolutionary psychology, are testable. Accordingly he views evolutionary psychology as a paradigm rather than a theory, and attributes this view to prominent evolutionary psychologists including Cosmides, Tooby, Buss, and Pinker.[14] In his review article Discovery and Confirmation in Evolutionary Psychology Philosophy of Psychology) Edouard Machery concludes:

(in The Oxford Handbook of

Criticism of evolutionary psychology "Evolutionary psychology remains a very controversial approach in psychology, maybe because skeptics sometimes have little first-hand knowledge of this field, maybe because the research done by evolutionary psychologists is of uneven quality. However, there is little reason to endorse a principled skepticism toward evolutionary psychology: Although clearly fallible, the discovery heuristics and the strategies of confirmation used by evolutionary psychologists are on a firm grounding."


One aspect of evolutionary psychology is finding traits that have been shown to be universal in humans. Many critics have pointed out that many traits considered universal at some stage or another by evolutionary psychologists and sociobiologists often turn out to be dependent on cultural and particular historical circumstances. Critics allege that evolutionary psychologists tend to assume that their own current cultural context represents a universal human nature; for example, in a review of Steven Pinker's book on evolutionary psychology (The Blank Slate), Louis Menand wrote: "In general, the views that Pinker derives from 'the new sciences of human nature' are mainstream Clinton-era views: incarceration is regrettable but necessary; sexism is unacceptable, but men and women will always have different attitudes toward sex; dialogue is preferable to threats of force in defusing ethnic and nationalist conflicts; most group stereotypes are roughly correct, but we should never judge an individual by group stereotypes; rectitude is all very well, but 'noble guys tend to finish last'; and so on.".[16] However, evolutionary psychologistsWikipedia:Avoid weasel words point out that their research actually focuses on commonalities between people of different cultures to help to identify "human psychological nature" and cultural universals. It is not a focus on local behavioral variation (which may sometimes be considered ethnocentric) that interests evolutionary psychologists; rather their focus is to find underlying psychological commonalities between people from various cultures.[17]

Reductionism and determinism

Some critics view evolutionary psychology as a form of genetic reductionism and determinism[1] Evolutionary psychology is in part based on the theory that our psychology is fundamentally based on biology, the composition of our brains. Some see this as a form of reductionism whereby the nature of complex things can be understood in terms of simpler or more fundamental things (i.e. reduced). Such critics argue that a reductionist analysis of the relationship between genes and behaviour results in a flawed research program and a restricted interpretation of the evidence, creating problems for the creation of models attempting to explain behaviour. Lewontin, Rose & Kamin instead advocate a dialectical interpretation of behaviour in which "it is not just that wholes are more than the sum of their parts, it is that parts become qualitatively new by being parts of the whole."[18] They argue that reductionist explanations such as the hierarchical reductionism proposed by Richard Dawkins[citation needed] will cause the researcher to miss dialectical ones. Evolutionary psychologists Workman and Reader reply that while reductionism may be a "dirty word" to some it is actually an important scientific principle. They argue it is at the root of discoveries such as the world being made up of atoms and complex life being the result of evolution. At the same time they emphasize that it is important to look at all "levels" of explanations, e.g. both psychologists looking at environmental causes of depression and neuroscientists looking the brain contribute to different aspects of our knowledge of depression. Workman and Reader also deny the accusation of genetic determinism, asserting that genes usually do not cause behaviors absolutely but predispose to certain behaviors that are affected by factors such as culture and an individual's life history.[19]

Criticism of evolutionary psychology


Alternative explanations
Adaptive explanations vs. environmental, cultural, social, and dialectical explanations
A common critique is that evolutionary psychology does not address the complexity of individual development and experience and fails to explain the influence of genes on behavior in individual cases.[20] Critics assert that evolutionary psychology has trouble developing research that can distinguish between environmental and cultural explanation and adaptive evolutionary explanations. Some studies have been criticized for their tendency to attribute to evolutionary processes elements of human cognition that may be attributable to social processes (e.g. preference for particular physical features in mates), cultural artifacts (e.g. patriarchy and the roles of women in society), or dialectical considerations (e.g. behaviours in which biology interacts with society, as when a biologically determined skin colour determines how one is treated). Evolutionary psychologists are frequently criticized for ignoring the vast bodies of literature in psychology, philosophy, politics and social studies. Both sides of the debate stress that statements such as "biology vs. environment" and "genes vs. culture" amount to false dichotomies, and outspoken critics of sociobiology such as Richard Lewontin, Steven Rose and Leon Kamin helped to popularise a "dialectical" approach to questions of human behaviour, where biology and environment interact in complex ways to produce what we see.[21] Evolutionary psychologists respond that their discipline is not primarily concerned with explaining the behavior of specific individuals, but rather broad categories of human behaviors across societies and cultures. It is the search for species-wide psychological adaptations (or "human nature") that distinguishes evolutionary psychology from purely cultural or social explanations. These psychological adaptations include cognitive decision rules that respond to different environmental, cultural, and social circumstances in ways that are (on average) adaptive.[citation needed] Evolutionary psychologists Confer et al. argue the evolutionary psychology fully accept nature-nurture interactionism and that it possible to test the theories in order to distinguish between different explanations.[]

Adaptive explanations vs. other evolutionary mechanisms

Critics point out that within evolutionary biology there are many other non-adaptive pathways along which evolution can move to produce the behaviors seen in humans today. Natural selection is not the only evolutionary process that can change gene frequencies and produce novel traits. Genetic drift refers to random effects resulting from chance variation in the genes, environment, or development. Evolutionary by-products are traits that were not specially designed for an adaptive function, although they may also be species-typical and may also confer benefits on the organism. A "spandrel" is a term coined by Gould and Lewontin (1979a) for traits which confer no adaptive advantage to an organism, but are 'carried along' by an adaptive trait. Gould advocates the hypothesis that cognition in humans came about as a spandrel: "Natural selection made the human brain big, but most of our mental properties and potentials may be spandrels - that is, nonadaptive side consequences of building a device with such structural complexity".[22] Once a trait acquired by some other mechanism confers an adaptive advantage, as evolutionary psychologists argue that many of our "mental properties and potentials" do, it may be open to further selection as an "exaptation".Wikipedia:No original research Critics allege that the adaptive (and exaptive) significance of mental traits studied by evolutionary psychologists has not been shown, and that selection has not necessarily guided the appearance of such traits.[citation needed] Evolutionary psychologists suggest that critics mischaracterize their field, and that their empirical research is designed to help identify which psychological traits are likely to adaptations, and which are not.[23]

Criticism of evolutionary psychology


Disjunction and grain problems

Some have argued that even if the theoretical assumptions of evolutionary psychology turned out to be true, it would nonetheless lead to methodological problems that would compromise its practice.[24][25] The disjunction and grain problems are argued to create methodological challenges related to the indeterminacy of evolutionary psychologys adaptive functions. That is, the inability to correctly choose, from a number of possible answers to the question: "what is the function of a given mechanism?"[24] The disjunction problem[24][26] occurs when a mechanism appears to respond to one thing (F), but is also correlated with another (G). Whenever F is present, G is also present, and the mechanism seems to respond to both F and G. The difficulty thus involves deciding whether to characterize the mechanism's adaptive function as being related to F, G, or both. "For example, a frogs pre-catching mechanism responds to flies, bees, food pellets, etc.; so is its adaptation attuned to flies, bees, fleebees, pellets, all of these, or just some?"[24] The grain problem[24][27] refers to the challenge in knowing what kind of environmental problem an adaptive mental mechanism might have solved. As summarized by Sterenly & Griffiths (1999): "What are the problems out there in the environment? Is the problem of mate choice a single problem or a mosaic of many distinct problems? These problems might include: When should I be unfaithful to my usual partner? When should I desert my old partner? When should I help my sibs find a partner? When and how should I punish infidelity?"[28] The grain problem therefore refers to the possibility that an adaptive problem may actually involve a set of nested sub-problems "which may themselves relate to different input domains or situations. Franks states that "if both adaptive problems and adaptive solutions are indeterminate, what chance is there for evolutionary psychology?"[24] Franks also states that "The arguments in no sense count against a general evolutionary explanation of psychology." and that by relaxing assumptions the problems may be avoided, although this may reduce the ability to make detailed models.[24]

Behaviors that reduce reproductive success

Behaviors such as homosexuality and suicide seem to reduce reproductive success and pose a challenge for evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists have proposed explanations, such that there may be reproductive benefits for relatives or that they may be byproducts of adaptive behaviors that usually increase reproductive success but a review by Confer et al. states that they "remain at least somewhat inexplicable on the basis of current evolutionary psychological accounts."[]

Political and ethical issues

That human psychology may be determined by our biology, which is shaped by our evolutionary past, is an important idea for those involved in ethics. The implications are as broad and varied as the field of ethics itself.

"Is" and "ought"

Part of the controversy has consisted in each side accusing the other of holding or supporting extreme political viewpoints: evolutionary psychology has often been accused of supporting right wing politics, whereas critics have been accused of being motivated by Marxist view points.[7][29] Many critics have alleged that evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are nothing more than political justifications for the "status quo." Evolutionary psychologists have been accused of conflating "is" and "ought", and evolutionary psychology has been used to argue against social change (because the way things are now has been evolved and adapted), and to argue against social justice (e.g. the argument that the rich are only rich because they've inherited greater abilities, so programs to raise the standards of the poor are doomed to fail).[30] In rebuttal, Glenn Wilson, a pioneer of EP, "promoting recognition of the true power and role of instincts is not the same as advocating the total abandonment of social restraint."[31] Left-wing philosopher Peter Singer in his book A

Criticism of evolutionary psychology Darwinian Left has argued that the view of human nature provided by evolution is compatible with and should be incorporated into the ideological framework of the Left. Evolutionary psychology critics have argued that researchers use their research to promote a right-wing agenda. Evolutionary psychologists conducted a 2007 study investigating the views of a sample of 168 United States PhD psychology students. The authors concluded that those who self-identified as adaptationists were much less conservative than the general population average. They also found no differences compared to non-adaptationist students and found non-adaptationists to express a preference for less strict and quantitative scientific methodology than adaptationists.[32] The book The Blank Slate by Steven Pinker responded to many of the moral and political criticisms. He also describes two logical fallacies: The naturalistic fallacy is the idea that what is found in nature is good. It was the basis for Social Darwinism, the belief that helping the poor and sick would get in the way of evolution, which depends on the survival of the fittest. Today, biologists denounce the Naturalistic Fallacy because they want to describe the natural world honestly, without people deriving morals about how we ought to behave -- as in: If birds and beasts engage in adultery, infanticide, cannibalism, it must be OK). The moralistic fallacy is that what is good is found in nature. It lies behind the bad science in nature-documentary voiceovers: lions are mercy-killers of the weak and sick, mice feel no pain when cats eat them, dung beetles recycle dung to benefit the ecosystem and so on. It also lies behind the romantic belief that humans cannot harbor desires to kill, rape, lie, or steal because that would be too depressing or reactionary.[33] Evolutionary psychology has been criticized by some feminists, such as Tang-Martinez, as justifying rape.[] Evolutionary psychologists McKibbin et al. argue that this is a fallacy in the same way it would be a fallacy to accuse the scientists doing research on the causes of cancer of justifying cancer. Instead, they argue that understanding the causes of rape may help create preventive measures.[] For more discussion of these issues, see Confer, et al., (2010).[]


[1] Plotkin, Henry. 2004 Evolutionary thought in Psychology: A Brief History. Blackwell. p.150. [3] , Evolutionary Psychology: Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations. (http:/ / homepage. psy. utexas. edu/ homepage/ Group/ BussLAB/ pdffiles/ evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010. pdf) [4] (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley), including Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology Full text (http:/ / www. psych. ucsb. edu/ research/ cep/ papers/ bussconceptual05. pdf), and Controversies surrounding evolutionary psychology (http:/ / itb. biologie. hu-berlin. de/ ~hagen/ papers/ Controversies. pdf) by Edward H. Hagen. [6] Buller, David. (2005) Adapting Minds. [7] Plotkin, Henry. 2004 Evolutionary thought in Psychology: A Brief History. Blackwell. p.149. [8] The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (2005), David M. Buss, Chapter 1, pp. 5-67, Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides [9] Schacter, Daniel L, Daniel Wegner and Daniel Gilbert. 2007. Psychology. Worth Publishers. pp. 26-27 [10] "Testing ideas about the evolutionary origins of psychological phenomena is indeed a challenging task, but not an impossible one (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Pinker, 1997b)." Schacter, Daniel L, Daniel Wegner and Daniel Gilbert. 2007. Psychology. Worth Publishers. pp. 26-27 [12] http:/ / www. stevens. edu/ csw/ cgi-bin/ blogs/ horganism/ ?p=11 [13] http:/ / www. psych. ucsb. edu/ research/ cep/ ledainterview. htm [15] http:/ / www. pitt. edu/ ~machery/ papers/ Discovery_and_Confirmation_in_Evolutionary_Psychology_FINAL. pdf [17] Buss, D. M. (2011) [18] See Chapter 10 of "Biology, Ideology and Human Behavior: Not In Our Genes" (1984) by Lewontin, Rose & Kamin for a discussion of these issues. [19] Evolutionary psychology: an introduction, Lance Workman, Will Reader, Cambridge University Press; 2004, p25-26 [20] "instinct." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 09 Feb. 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 289249/ instinct). [21] Lewontin, Rose & Kamin (1984) "Biology, Ideology and Human Nature: Not In Our Genes", Chapter 10 [22] Quote from Stephen Jay Gould, The Pleasures of Pluralism, p.11

Criticism of evolutionary psychology

[24] Franks, Bradley (2005). The Role of The Environment in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 18, 1, 59-82. [25] Richardson, Robert (2007). Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology. London. MIT Press. [26] Fodor, Jerry (1991). Reply to Millikan. In B. Loewer & G. Rey (Eds.), Meaning in mind. Fodor and his critic. Oxford, England: Blackwell. [27] Sterelny, K., & Griffiths, P. E. (1999). Sex and death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology. London: University of Chicago Press. [28] Sterelny, K., & Griffiths, P. E. (1999). Sex and death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology. In B. Franks, The Role of The Environment in Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 18, 1, p. 66 [30] Lewontin, R.C., Rose. S & Kamin, L (1984) Biology, Ideology and Human Nature: Not In Our Genes [31] Wilson, G.D. Love and Instinct, 1981. [33] Q&A: Steven Pinker of 'Blank Slate', United Press International, 10/30/2002, http:/ / pinker. wjh. harvard. edu/ books/ tbs/ media_articles/ 2002_10_30_upi. html


Further reading
Books and book chapters
Alcock, John (2001). The Triumph of Sociobiology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-516335-3 Barkow, Jerome (Ed.). (2006) Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for Social Scientists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-513002-7 Buller, David. (2005) Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. Buss, David, ed. (2005) The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. ISBN 0-471-26403-2. Degler, C. N. (1991). In search of human nature: The decline and revival of Darwinism in American social thought. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-507707-0 Ehrlich, P. & Ehrlich, A. (2008). The dominant animal: Human evolution and the environment. Washington, DC: Island Press. Fodor, J. (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology Fodor, J. & Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (2011). What Darwin got wrong. Gould, S.J. (2002) The Structure of Evolutionary Theory Joseph, J. (2004). The Gene Illusion: Genetic Research in Psychiatry and Psychology Under the Microscope. New York: Algora. (2003 United Kingdom Edition by PCCS Books) Joseph, J. (2006). The Missing Gene: Psychiatry, Heredity, and the Fruitless Search for Genes. New York: Algora. Kitcher, Philip. (1985). Vaulting Ambitions: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. London:Cambridge. Kohn, A. (1990) The Brighter Side of Human Nature: Altruism and Empathy in Everyday Life Leger, D. W., Kamil, A. C., & French, J. A. (2001). Introduction: Fear and loathing of evolutionary psychology in the social sciences. In J. A. French, A. C. Kamil, & D. W. Leger (Eds.), The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 47: Evolutionary psychology and motivation, (pp. ix-xxiii). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press Lewontin, R.C., Rose, S. & Kamin, L. (1984) Biology, Ideology and Human Nature: Not In Our Genes Malik, K. (2002). Man, beast, and zombie: What science can and cannot tell us about human nature Rose, H. and Rose, S. (eds.)(2000) Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology Nova York: Harmony Books Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. New York: Viking. Richards, Janet Radcliffe (2000). Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-21244-1 Richardson, Robert C. (2007). Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology Sahlins, Marshall. (1976) The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology Scher, Stephen J.; Rauscher, Frederick, eds. (2003), Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches, Kluwer Segerstrale, Ullica (2000). Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-286215-0 Wallace, B. (2010). Getting Darwin Wrong: Why Evolutionary Psychology Won't Work McKinnon, S. (2006) Neo-liberal Genetics: The Myths and Moral Tales of Evolutionary Psychology

Criticism of evolutionary psychology Gillette, Aaron. (2007) Eugenics and the Nature-Nurture Debate in the Twentieth Century. Palgrave Macmillanadd on


Buller, D. et al. (2000). "Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity". Brain & Mind 1 (3): 307325. doi: 10.1023/A:1011573226794 ( A:1011573226794). Buller, D. (2005). "Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm". TRENDS in Cognitive Science 9 (6): 277283. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.04.003 ( PMID 15925806 ( Confer, J. C.; Easton, J. A.; Fleischman, D. S.; Goetz, C. D.; Lewis, D. M.; Perilloux, C.; Buss, D. M. (2010). "Evolutionary Psychology: Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations" (http://homepage.psy.utexas. edu/homepage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/evolutionary_psychology_AP_2010.pdf) (PDF). American Psychologist 65 (2): 110126. doi: 10.1037/a0018413 ( PMID 20141266 ( Crane-Seeber, J.; Crane, B. (2010). "Contesting essentialist theories of patriarchal relations: Evolutionary psychology and the denial of history". Journal of Men's Studies 18 (3): 218237. doi: 10.3149/jms.1803.218 ( Davies, P. (2009). "Some evolutionary model or other: Aspirations and evidence in evolutionary psychology". Philosophical Psychology 22 (1): 8397. doi: 10.1080/09515080802703745 ( 09515080802703745). Derksen, M. (2010). "Realism, relativism, and evolutionary psychology". Theory & Psychology 20 (4): 467487. doi: 10.1177/0959354309350245 ( Derksen, M. (2005). "Against integration: Why evolution cannot unify the social sciences". Theory and Psychology 15 (2): 139162. doi: 10.1177/0959354305051360 ( 0959354305051360). Ehrlich, P.; Feldman, Marcus (2003). "Genes and cultures: What creates our behavioral phenome?". Current Anthropology 44 (1): 87107. doi: 10.1086/344470 ( Fox, E.; Griggs, L.; Mouchlianitis, E. (2007). "The Detection of Fear-Relevant Stimuli: Are Guns Noticed as Quickly as Snakes?" ( Emotion 7 (4): 691696. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.691 ( PMC 2757724 (http:// PMID 18039035 ( pubmed/18039035). Franks, B. (2005). "The role of 'the environment' in cognitive and evolutionary psychology". Philosophical Psychology 18 (1): 5982. doi: 10.1080/09515080500085387 ( 09515080500085387). Gannon, L. (2002). "A Critique of Evolutionary Psychology". Psychology, Evolution & Gender 4 (2): 173218. doi: 10.1080/1461666031000063665 ( Gerrans, P. (2002). "The Theory of Mind Module in Evolutionary Psychology". Biology and Philosophy 17 (3): 305321. doi: 10.1023/A:1020183525825 ( Looren, H. Looren, de Jong, H., Steen, W.J. Van der (1998). "Biological thinking in evolutionary psychology: rockbottom or quicksand?". Philosophical Psychology 11 (2): 183205. doi: 10.1080/09515089808573255 (http:/ / Lewontin, R.C. (1998) The evolution of cognition: questions we will never answer, in D. Scarborough and S. Sternberg (eds), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Vol. 4: Methods, Models and Conceptual Issues. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp.10732.

Criticism of evolutionary psychology Lipp, O.; Waters, A.; Derakshan, N.; Logies, S. (2004). "Snakes and Cats in the Flower Bed: Fast Detection Is Not Specific to Pictures of Fear-Relevant Animals". Emotion 4 (3): 233250. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.4.3.233 ( PMID 15456393 ( pubmed/15456393). Lloyd, E.A. (1999). "'Evolutionary psychology: the burdens of proof'". Biology and Philosophy 14 (2): 21133. doi: 10.1023/A:1006638501739 ( Machery, E. (2007). "Massive modularity and brain evolution". Philosophy of Science 74 (5): 825838. doi: 10.1086/525624 ( McKinnon, S. (2005). On Kinship and Marriage: A Critique of the Genetic and Gender Calculus of Evolutionary Psychology. In: Complexities: Beyond Nature & Nurture, McKinnon, S. & Silverman, S. (Eds); pp.106131. Panksepp, J.; Panksepp, J.; Moskal, J.; Kroes, R. (2002). "Comparative approaches in evolutionary psychology: Molecular neuroscience meets the mind". Neuroendocrinology Letters 23 (4): 105115. Panksepp, J.; Panksepp, J. (2000). "The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology". Evolution and Cognition 6 (2): 108131. Smith, E.A.; Borgerhoff Mulder, M.; Hill, K. (2001). "Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: A guide to the perplexed". Trends in Ecology and Evolution 16 (3): 128135. doi: 10.1016/S0169-5347(00)02077-2 (http:/ / PMID 11179576 ( 11179576). Smith, E.A., Borgerhoff Mulder, M. & Hill, K. (2000). Evolutionary analyses of human behaviour: a commentary on Daly & Wilson. Animal Behaviour, 60, F21-F26. Verweij, K. et al. (2010). "A genome-wide association study of Cloninger's temperament scales: Implications for the evolutionary genetics of personality" ( Biological Psychology 85 (2): 306317. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2010.07.018 ( biopsycho.2010.07.018). PMC 2963646 ( PMID 20691247 ( Samuels, R. (1998). "Evolutionary psychology and the Massive Modularity hypothesis", British Journal for the Philosophy of". Science 49: 575602. Wilson, D.S.; Dietrich, E. et al. (2003). "On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology". Biology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669682. doi: 10.1023/A:1026380825208 ( 1023/A:1026380825208). Weber, Bruce H.; Scher, Steven J.; Rauscher, Frederick (2006). "Review: Re-Visioning Evolutionary Psychology". The American Journal of Psychology 119: 148156. doi: 10.2307/20445326 ( 10.2307/20445326). JSTOR 20445326 ( Wood, W.; Eagly, A. H. (2002). "A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Behavior of Women and Men: Implications for the Origins of Sex Differences". Psychological Bulletin 128 (5): 699727. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.128.5.699 ( PMID 12206191 ( pubmed/12206191).


Criticism of evolutionary psychology


Other documents
Stephen Jay Gould. "Darwinian Fundamentalism" (, New York Review of Books, Volume 44, Number 10 June 12, 1997 David Buller. "Evolution of the Mind: 4 Fallacies of Psychology" ( cfm?id=four-fallacies&print=true) Scientific American. December 19, 2008. David Buller. "Sex, Jealousy & Violence. A Skeptical Look at Evolutionary Psychology" (http://www.skeptic. com/the_magazine/featured_articles/v12n01_sex_jealousy.html). Skeptic. "Paul Ehrlich challenges Evolutionary Psychology" ( september20/humans920.html) Malik, Kenan. 1998. "Darwinian Fallacies" ( Prospects. Schlinger Jr, Henry (1996). "Full text "How the human got his spots. A Critical Analysis of the Just So Stories of Evolutionary Psychology" ( (PDF). Skeptic 4 (1): 1996. Alas Poor Evolutionary Psychology: Unfairly Accused, Unjustly Condemned ( 02/apd.html). Robert Kurzban's review of the book Alas, Poor Darwin: Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology. Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp.567). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Full text ( research/cep/papers/bussconceptual05.pdf) Tooby, J., Cosmides, L. & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Resolving the debate on innate ideas: Learnability constraints and the evolved interpenetration of motivational and conceptual functions. ( research/cep/papers/innate05.pdf) In Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. & Stich, S. (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. NY: Oxford University Press. Controversies surrounding evolutionary psychology ( Controversies.pdf) by Edward H. Hagen, Institute for Theoretical Biology, Berlin. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (pp.567). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Why do some people hate evolutionary psychology? ( html) by Edward H. Hagen, Institute for Theoretical Biology, Berlin. (Also see his Evolutionary Psychology FAQ ( which responds to criticisms of EP.) Geher, G ( (2006). Evolutionary psychology is not evil! and heres why Psihologijske Teme (Psychological Topics); Special Issue on Evolutionary Psychology, 15, 181-202. (http:// Liddle, J. R.; Shackelford, T. K. (2009). "Why Evolutionary Psychology is "True." A review of Jerry Coyne, Why Evolution is True" ( (PDF). Evolutionary Psychology 7 (2): 288294. The Never-Ending Misconceptions About Evolutionary Psychology: Persistent Falsehoods About Evolutionary Psychology ( the-never-ending-misconceptions-about-evolutionary-psychology) by Gad Saad Evolutionary Psychology Under Attack ( php?option=com_content&view=article&id=471:evolutionary-psychology-under-attack&catid=29:dan& Itemid=34) by Dan Sperber Bryant, G. A. (2006). American Journal of Psychology 19 (3): 481487. Tybur, J.M.; Miller, G.F.; Gangestad, S.W. (2007). "Testing the controversy: An empirical examination of adaptationists' attitudes toward politics and science" ( 2007 politics.pdf) (PDF). Human Nature 18: 313328.

Criticism of evolutionary psychology Online videos TED talk ( by Steven Pinker about his book The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature Margaret Mead and Samoa ( mead+and+samoa&total=8&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=0). Review of the nature vs. nurture debate triggered by Mead's book "Coming of Age in Samoa." Secrets of the Tribe ( Documents the conflicts between cultural and evolutionary anthropologists who have studied the Yanomamo tribes. The Norwegian "Brainwash" series examines the very different perceptions and theoretical orientations of cultural determinists and evolutionary adaptationists. * The Gender Equality Paradox ( * The Parental Effect ( * Violence ( * Sex ( * Nature or Nurture (


Standard social science model

The term the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) was first introduced to a wide audience by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides in the 1992 edited volume The Adapted Mind,[1] to describe the "blank slate," social constructionist, or "cultural determinist" perspective that they claim is the dominant theoretical paradigm in the social sciences as they developed during the 20th century. According to this alleged paradigm, the mind is a general-purpose cognitive device shaped almost entirely by culture.[2]

Alleged proponents
Steven Pinker names several prominent scientists as supposed proponents of the standard social science model, including Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, B. F. Skinner, Richard Lewontin, John Money, and Steven J. Gould.[3]

Alternative theoretical paradigm: the Integrated Model

The authors of Adapted Mind have argued[4] that the SSSM is now out of date and that a progressive model for the social sciences requires evolutionarily-informed models of nature-nurture interactionism, grounded in the computational theory of mind. Tooby and Cosmides refer to this new model as the Integrated Model (IM). Tooby and Cosmides[5] provide several comparisons between the SSSM and the IM, including the following:

Standard social science model


Standard Social Science Model Humans born a blank slate

Integrated Model Humans are born with a bundle of emotional, motivational and cognitive adaptations

Brain a general-purpose computer

Brain is a collection of modular, domain specific processors

Culture/socialization programs behavior

Behavior is the result of interactions between evolved psychological mechanisms and cultural & environmental influences

Cultures free to vary any direction on any trait

Culture itself is based on a universal human nature, and is constrained by it

Biology is relatively unimportant to understand behavior An analysis of interactions between nature and nurture is important to understand behavior

Richardson (2007) argues that evolutionary psychologists developed the SSSM as a rhetorical technique: "The basic move is evident in Cosmides and Tooby's most aggressive brief for evolutionary psychology. They want us to accept a dichotomy between what they call the "Standard Social Science Model" (SSSM) and the "Integrated Causal Model" (ICM) they favor ... it offers a false dichotomy between a manifestly untenable view and their own."[6] Wallace (2010) has also suggested the SSSM to be a false dichotomy and claims that "scientists in the EP tradition wildly overstate the influence and longevity of what they call the Standard Social Science Model (essentially, behaviorism)".[7] Geoffrey Sampson argues that the SSSM is based on a straw man. He views Pinker's claim that the SSSM has been the dominant theoretical paradigm in the social sciences since the 1920s as "completely untenable". He cites British education policies in the 20th century which were based on the belief that children had in-built talents and needs, thus challenging Pinker's assertion that the view of the mind as a tabula rasa was ubiquitous. Moreover, Sampson states that the scientists Pinker associates with the SSSM such as Skinner, Watson, and Mead were influential, "but to identify them as responsible for the general tone of intellectual life for eighty years seems comical."[8] Similarly, Neil Levy suggests that the conception of the SSSM against which evolutionary psychologists direct much of their criticism is a straw man. He adds that "no-one not even Skinner and his followers has ever believed in the blank slate of Pinker's title."[9]

[1] Barkow, Jerome; Cosmides, Leda & Tooby, John (1992). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press. [2] "instinct." Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica, 2011. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. (http:/ / www. britannica. com/ EBchecked/ topic/ 289249/ instinct). [3] Pinker, Steven. The Blank Slate. New York: Penguin. 2002 [4] Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992). The adapted mind. [5] Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1992)

Standard social science model


External links
Tooby and Cosmides briefly define the SSSM in their Evolutionary Psychology Primer (http://cogweb.ucla. edu/ep/EP-primer.html).

Barkow, J., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. 1992. The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Degler, C.N. 1991. In search of human nature: The decline and revival of Darwinism in American social thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Harrison, L.E. & Huntington, S.H. 2000. Culture Matters. New York: Basic Books. Rose, H. 2001. Colonising the Social Sciences? In Rose, H. and Rose, S. (Eds) "Alas Poor Darwin": London, Cape. Somit, A. & Peterson, S.A. 2003. Human Nature and Public Policy: An Evolutionary Approach. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further reading
Fruehwald, Scott. 2006. "Postmodern Legal Thought and Cognitive Science," 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 375. Hampton, Simon Jonathan (2004). "The Instinct Debate and the Standard Social Science Model". Psychology, Evolution & Gender (Routledge) 6 (1): 1544. doi: 10.1080/14616660412331279657 ( 1080/14616660412331279657). Levy, Neil (2004). "Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the Standard Social Science Model" (http:/ / Biology and Philosophy (Kluwer Academic Publishers) 19 (3): 45972. doi: 10.1023/B:BIPH.0000036111.64561.63 (http:// Retrieved March 18, 2013. Schmaus, Warren (2003). "Is Durkheim the Enemy of Evolutionary Psychology?". Philosophy of the Social Sciences (SAGE Publications) 33 (1): 2552. doi: 10.1177/0048393102250281 ( 0048393102250281).

Evolutionary educational psychology


Evolutionary educational psychology


Outline History Subfields

Basic types

Abnormal Biological Cognitive Comparative Cultural Differential Developmental Evolutionary Experimental Mathematical Personality Positive Quantitative Social

Applied psychology

Applied behavior analysis Clinical Community Consumer Educational Environmental Forensic Health Industrial and organizational Legal Military Occupational health Political Religion School Sport


Disciplines Organizations Psychologists Psychotherapies

Evolutionary educational psychology

Publications Research methods Theories Timeline Topics Psychology portal

Evolutionary educational psychology is the study of the relation between inherent folk knowledge and abilities and accompanying inferential and attributional biases as these influence academic learning in evolutionarily novel cultural contexts, such as schools and the industrial workplace. The fundamental premises and principles of this discipline are presented below.

The premises of evolutionary educational psychology

The premises state there are (a) aspects of mind and brain that have evolved to draw the individuals attention to and facilitate the processing of social (folk psychology), biological (folk biology), physical (folk physics) information patterns that facilitated survival or reproductive outcomes during human evolution (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Geary, 2005; Gelman, 1990; Pinker, 1997; Shepard, 1994; Simon, 1956); (b) although plastic to some degree, these primary abilities are inherently constrained to the extent associated information patterns tended to be consistent across generations and within lifetimes (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Geary & Huffman, 2002); (c) other aspects of mind and brain evolved to enable the mental generation of potential future social, ecological, or climatic conditions and enable rehearsal of behaviors to cope with variation in these conditions, and are now known as general fluid intelligence, or gF (including skill at everyday reasoning/problem solving; Chiappe & MacDonald, 2005; Geary, 2005; Mithen, 1996); and (d) children are inherently motivated to learn in folk domains, with the associated attentional and behavioral biases resulting in experiences that automatically and implicitly flesh out and adapt these systems to local conditions (Gelman, 1990; Gelman & Williams, 1998; Gelman, 2003).

The principles of evolutionary educational psychology

The principles represent the foundational assumptions for an evolutionary educational psychology. The gist is knowledge and expertise that is useful in the cultural milieu or ecology in which the group is situated will be transferred across generations in the form of cultural artifacts, such as books, or learning traditions, as in apprenticeships (e.g., Baumeister, 2005; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Flinn, 1997; Mithen, 1996). Across generations, the store of cultural knowledge accumulates and creates a gap between this knowledge base and the forms of folk knowledge and abilities that epigenetically emerge with childrens self-initiated activities. There must of course be an evolved potential to learn evolutionarily novel information and an associated bias to seek novelty during the developmental period and indeed throughout the life span; this may be related to the openness to experience dimension of personality (Geary, 1995, 2002, in press). However, the cross-generational accumulation of knowledge across cultures, individuals, and domains (e.g., people vs. physics) has resulted in an exponential increase in the quantity of secondary knowledge available in modern societies today. For most people, the breadth and complexity of this knowledge will very likely exceed any biases to learn in evolutionary novel domains.

Evolutionary educational psychology


The creation of knowledge vs. the learning of knowledge

A related issue concerns the traits that enable the creation of biologically secondary knowledge and thus culture and the extent to which these traits overlap with the ability to learn knowledge created by others. Stated differently, Is the goal of education to have children recreate the process of discovery, to learn the products of discovery, or some combination? Some educators have advocated a focus on the process of discovery without full consideration of the constellation of traits and opportunity that contribute to the creation of secondary knowledge (e.g., Cobb, Yackel, & Wood, 1992). In fact, research on creative-productive individuals suggests that the full constellation of traits that facilitate the discovery and creation of secondary knowledge is rare and not likely reproducible on a large scale (Simonton, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Sternberg, 1999; Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2005).

1.) Natural selection has resulted in an evolved motivational disposition to attempt to gain access to and control of the resources that have covaried with survival and reproductive outcomes during human evolution. 2.) These resources fall into three broad categories: social, biological, and physical which correspond to the respective domains of folk psychology, folk biology, and folk physics. 3.) Attentional, perceptual, and cognitive systems, including inferential and attributional biases, have evolved to process information in these folk domains and to guide control-related behavioral strategies. These systems process restricted classes of information associated with these folk domains. 4.) To cope with variation in social, ecological, or climatic conditions, systems that enabled the mental generation of these potential future conditions and enabled rehearsals of behaviors to cope with this variation evolved and the supporting attentional and cognitive mechanisms are known as general fluid intelligence and everyday reasoning. 5.) Children are biologically biased to engage in activities that recreate the ecologies of human evolution; these are manifested as social play, and exploration of the environment and objects. The accompanying experiences interact with the inherent but skeletal folk systems and flesh out these systems such that they are adapted to the local social group and ecology.

1.) Scientific, technological, and academic advances initially emerged from the cognitive and motivational systems that support folk psychology, folk biology, and folk physics. Innovations that enabled better control of ecologies or social dynamics or resulted in a coherent (though not necessarily scientifically accurate) understanding of these dynamics are likely to be retained across generations as cultural artifacts (e.g., books) and traditions (e.g. apprenticeships). These advances result in an ever growing gap between folk knowledge and the theories and knowledge base of the associated sciences and other disciplines (e.g., literature). 2.) Schools emerge in societies in which scientific, technological, and intellectual advances result in a gap between folk knowledge and the competencies needed for living in the society. 3.) The function of schools is to organize the activities of children such that they acquire the biologically secondary competencies that close the gap between folk knowledge and the occupational and social demands of the society. 4.) Biologically secondary competencies are built from primary folk systems and the components of fluid intelligence that evolved to enable individuals to cope with variation and novelty. 5.) Children's inherent motivational bias to engage in activities that will adapt folk knowledge to local conditions will often conflict with the need to engage in activities that will result in secondary learning. 6.) The need for explicit instruction will be a direct function of the degree to which the secondary competency differs from the supporting primary systems.

Evolutionary educational psychology


Baumeister, R. F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life [1]. New York: Oxford University Press. Bernhard, J. Gary (1988). Primates in the Classroom: An Evolutionary Perspective on Children's Education. Amhurst: University of Massachusetts Press. Burman, J. T. (in press). Experimenting in relation to Piaget: Education is a Chaperoned Process of Adaptation. Perspectives on Science, 16(2). Caramazza, A., & Shelton, J. R. (1998). Domain-specific knowledge systems in the brain: The animate-inanimate distinction [2]. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 1-34. Chiappe, D., & MacDonald, K. (2005). The evolution of domain-general mechanisms in intelligence and learning [3] . Journal of General Psychology, 132, 5-40. Cobb, P., Yackel, E., & Wood, T. (1992). A constructivist alternative to the representational view of mind in mathematics education. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 23, 2-33. (Abstract [4]) Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture [5] (pp.85116). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Abstract [6]) Flinn, M. V. (1997). Culture and the evolution of social learning [7]. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 23-67. Geary, D.C. (2007). Educating the Evolved Mind [8]. In J.S. Carlson & J.R. Levin(Eds.), Psychological Perspectives on Contemporary Educational Issues (p.28). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing. (Cited with permission by author) Geary, D. C. (2005). The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence [9]. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Geary, D. C. (2002). Principles of evolutionary educational psychology [10]. Learning and Individual Differences, 12, 317-345. Geary, D. C., & Huffman, K. J. (2002). Brain and cognitive evolution: Forms of modularity and functions of mind [11] . Psychological Bulletin, 128, 667-698. Geary, D. C. (1995). Reflections of evolution and culture in childrens cognition: Implications for mathematical development and instruction [12]. American Psychologist, 50, 24-37. Gelman, R., & Williams, E. M. (1998). Enabling constraints for cognitive development and learning: Domain-specificity and epigenesis [13]. In D. Kuhl & R. S. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Cognition, perception, and language [14], Vol 2 (pp.575630). W. Damon (Gen. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (Fifth Ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and animate-inanimate distinction as examples [15]. Cognitive Science, 14, 79-106. Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought [16]. New York: Oxford University Press. Mithen, S. (1996). The prehistory of the mind: The cognitive origins of art and science [17]. New York: Thames and Hudson, Inc. Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works [18]. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution [19]. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Excerpt [20] Shepard, R. N. (1994). Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 2-28. (Abstract [21]) Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review, 63, 129-138. Simonton, D. K. (1999a). Talent and its development: An emergenic and epigenetic model. Psychological Review, 106, 435-457. (Abstract [22])

Evolutionary educational psychology Simonton, D. K. (1999b). Origins of genius: Darwinian perspective on creativity [23]. New York: Oxford University Press. Simonton, D. K. (2003). Scientific creativity as constrained stochastic behavior: The integration of product, person, and process perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 475-494. (Abstract [24]) Sternberg, R. J. (Ed.) (1999). Handbook of creativity [25]. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wai, J., Lubinski, D., & Benbow, C. P. (2005). Creativity and occupational accomplishments among intellectually precocious youths: An age 13 to age 33 longitudinal study [26]. Journal of Educational Psychology, 97, 484-492.


Further reading
Geary, D. C. (2006). Evolutionary developmental psychology: Current status and future directions [27]. Developmental Review, 26. Geary, D. C. (2005). Folk knowledge and academic learning. [15] In B. J. Ellis & D. F. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the social mind (pp.493519). New York: Guilford Publications. Geary, D. C. (2004). Evolution and cognitive development. [16] In R. Burgess & K. MacDonald (Eds.), Evolutionary perspectives on human development (pp.99133). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Genovese, J.E.C. (2003). Piaget, Pedagogy, and Evolutionary Psychology [28]. Evolutionary Psychology 1: 127-137. J. Henrich and R. Boyd. (2002).Culture and Cognition: Why Cultural Evolution Does Not Require Replication of Representations [29]. Culture and Cognition, 2: 87112. Zentall, T.R. (2006). Imitation: Definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Animal Cognition, 9, 335-353. (A thorough review of different types of social learning) Full text [30]

[1] http:/ / www. us. oup. com/ us/ catalog/ general/ subject/ Psychology/ Social/ ?view=usa& ci=9780195167030 [2] http:/ / www. wjh. harvard. edu/ ~caram/ PDFs/ 1998_Caramazza_Shelton. pdf#search='Domainspecific%20knowledge%20systems%20in%20the%20brain%3A%20The%20animateinanimate%20distinction' [3] http:/ / www. csulb. edu/ ~kmacd/ iq. pdf [4] http:/ / www. citeulike. org/ user/ yish/ article/ 377816 [5] http:/ / www. cambridge. org/ us/ catalogue/ catalogue. asp?isbn=0521429935 [6] http:/ / cogweb. ucla. edu/ Abstracts/ Hirschfeld_Gelman_94. html#Cosmides,%20Leda%20and%20John%20Tooby [7] http:/ / www. missouri. edu/ ~anthmark/ pdf/ Flinn1997. pdf [8] http:/ / evolution. binghamton. edu/ evos/ pdf%20files/ Miami/ Geary01. pdf [9] http:/ / www. apa. org/ books/ 4318015. html [10] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ GearyEvoEd. pdf [11] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ GearyHuffman. pdf [12] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ AmericanPsych95. pdf [13] http:/ / ruccs. rutgers. edu/ faculty/ GnG/ pdf_files/ 1998EnablingConstraints. pdf [14] http:/ / www. wiley. com/ WileyCDA/ WileyTitle/ productCd-0471057304. html [15] http:/ / ruccs. rutgers. edu/ faculty/ GnG/ pdf_files/ 1990FirstPrinciplesOrganize. pdf [16] http:/ / www. us. oup. com/ us/ catalog/ general/ subject/ Psychology/ Developmental/ ?view=usa& ci=9780195181982 [17] http:/ / www. wwnorton. com/ thamesandhudson/ arch%5Fnew/ 528100%5Farch. htm [18] http:/ / pinker. wjh. harvard. edu/ books/ htmw/ index. html [19] http:/ / www. press. uchicago. edu/ cgi-bin/ hfs. cgi/ 00/ 16460. ctl [20] http:/ / www. press. uchicago. edu/ Misc/ Chicago/ 712842. html [21] http:/ / www. santafe. edu/ research/ publications/ wpabstract/ 199311073 [22] http:/ / psychology. ucdavis. edu/ simonton/ dksabstracts. html#205 [23] http:/ / www. us. oup. com/ us/ catalog/ general/ subject/ Psychology/ Cognitive/ ?view=usa& ci=9780195128796 [24] http:/ / psychology. ucdavis. edu/ simonton/ dksabstracts. html#260 [25] http:/ / www. cambridge. org/ us/ catalogue/ catalogue. asp?isbn=0521576040 [26] http:/ / www. vanderbilt. edu/ Peabody/ SMPY/ WaiJEP2005 [27] http:/ / web. missouri. edu/ ~psycorie/ files/ DevRev%5B2006,%20proof%5D. pdf [28] http:/ / human-nature. com/ ep/ downloads/ ep01127137. pdf

Evolutionary educational psychology

[29] http:/ / www. sscnet. ucla. edu/ anthro/ faculty/ boyd/ Culture& CognitionByHenrich& Boyd. pdf [30] http:/ / www. cogs. indiana. edu/ spackled/ imitation. pdf


Article Sources and Contributors


Article Sources and Contributors

Evolutionary psychology Source: Contributors: 2004-12-29T22:45Z, Adhib, Adoniscik, Aeusoes1, Alan Peakall, Alansohn, Allinthebrain, AmigoNico, Andonic, AndyTheGrump, Arbor, Arkuat, Arru, Aschwa5, AstroHurricane001, Averylongdream, Aviad.Aharonov, Azcolvin429, BBrihem, BKalesti, Bahhasg, Barbaking, BarryCull, Bart133, BashBrannigan, Beetstra, Ben Ben, Betterworld, Bfinn, Blingbling1000, Bmcirillo, Bmeacham, Bodinagamin, Bonnieguan, Bonzsu, BrainMagMo, Bryan Derksen, Bueller 007, CNicol, Cashtastrophy, Cat Cubed, Cavrdg, Cedibciz, Cesar Tort, Cgingold, Charles Matthews, Chet Ubetcha, Chevapdva, Circeus, Clicketyclack, Closedmouth, Coffee, Conversion script, Correctia, Corrigann, Courcelles, CourtChru., Craptree, Cybercobra, D6, DCDuring, DMSchneider, DNitch, DancingPhilosopher, Daniel Mietchen, Darth Panda, Das Murphs, David Ludwig, Davidzuccaro, Davril2020, Dbrodbeck, Defyn, Deglr6328, Delmonte, Der Golem, Dijxtra, Dillypickle, Dimionix, Dissembly, Divaatje73dog, Donaldsilver, DoostdarWKP, Dr Oldekop, Dresdenia, Duncharris, EPM, Ed Hagen, Edward, Ekimiheart, Eleanor J Miller, Eliz81, Emeraldcityserendipity, Emptymountains, Enochlau, Enric Naval, Erianna, Eumolpo, Event Nexus, EverSince, Evoluent, Evolve37830, Factster, Fationia, Feinbergdavid, FishoFish, FiveColourMap, Flubuk, FormerIP, Formeruser-81, Fox Wilson, FreplySpang, Froes, Frowanda, Frdrick Lacasse, Geoff archibald, George100, Glloq, Gnaussor, Goethean, Gonzonoir, Graft, Graham87, Granitethighs, Gregbard, Gregconquest, GregorB, Gregzeng, Grick, Gt2003, Guillaume2303, Gwernol, Habj, Harizotoh9, Headbomb, Helon, Hjepkes, Hmwith, Hollyvic, Hrafn, HrvojeSimic, Hu12, IRP, Ian Pitchford, Iffykid, Ihcoyc, Ilovewinniethepooh, Ilse@, Insanity Incarnate, Irmgard, Islandsage, Iss246, Itsmejudith, J.delanoy, JFreeman, JamesAM, Jamesontai, Jamesooders, Janto, Jarble, Jason Potter, Jemaura, Jfdwolff, Jhanley, Jj1236, Jockocampbell, Joe Decker, John Vandenberg, John of Reading, Johnkarp, Johnuniq, Jojalozzo, Jonkerz, Jonny-mt, JorisvS, Jose Icaza, Josh Parris, Josuechan, Jpalme, Jpgordon, Jtneill, JuJube, Just plain Bill, Justanotherspiritualentity, Kabads, Kajekai, Karada, Karn, Karol Langner, KevinColn, Khamsin, Kirstyc90, Kris the Kangaroo, Kuru, Kurykh, Landroo, LarissaCP78, Lauriec, Leadwind, Lee Daniel Crocker, Lenoxus, Leopoldhausen, Levil, Lifeartist, Light in Water, Lightmouse, LilHelpa, Lindosland, Lingo pen, LionKimbro, Logic prevails, Lord Patrick, Lorenzo Braschi, Lova Falk, Luigifan, MacMog, Macdonald-ross, Magioladitis, Maikstrik, Mange01, Mattisse, Maunus, Maximilianholland, Maximus Rex, Memills, Michael Hardy, Mikewax, Mikker, Mild Bill Hiccup, Minority2005, Miradre, Missdipsy, MistyMorn, Mjk2357, Moonriddengirl, Mortene, Mpbx3003, Mshecket, Muntuwandi, NBeale, Nathan Johnson, NawlinWiki, Nectarflowed, Nihil novi, Nono64, Ohconfucius, Orgone, OwenX, Ozean, Pandelver, Persian Poet Gal, Pete.Hurd, Phil Boswell, Philippe, Pound, Prochron, Psykhosis, R Lowry, RJHall, Rarichter, Reaper Eternal, Rebent, RedHouse18, Redskill13, Reedy, ResidentAnthropologist, RexNL, Rhlozier, Rich Farmbrough, Richfife, Rigadoun, Rjwilmsi, Rkurzban, Robin klein, Ronk01, Rosiestep, Ruedi33a, RyanHoliday, Sadi Carnot, SailorMoonLover4Life, Salamurai, Samsara, Sander123, Sardanaphalus, Saucepan, Schaefer, Scorpios, Sebesta, Semmler, Senortypant, SeoMac, Sethwegner, Shadowjams, Shalom Yechiel, Shambalala, Shotgunlee, SidP, Sietse Snel, Silverleaftree, SimonP, Sir Nicholas de Mimsy-Porpington, Slakr, Slrubenstein, Smalljim, Snuffkin, Sonicyouth86, SpuriousQ, Stegosaur, Steinsky, Stephenb, Stevenmitchell, Stimpster, Stragermont, Sun Creator, Superweapons, Surv1v4l1st, Swidbert R Ott, Taw, Tebbe en, Tectonicura, Temtem, ThatPeskyCommoner, The Anome, The Thing That Should Not Be, The stuart, TheaterMarine, Thiago90ap, Thorell, Tikiwont, Tim bates, Tjnelso1, Tmh, Tomwsulcer, Tony1, Topbanana,, Totorotroll, Tubby, Ubiq, Urthogie, User2004, Vaughan, Viriditas, Vlad24601, VladimirGolovin, Vrenator, W Pete Welch, WLU, Waldow, Wangi, Wapondaponda, Washburnmav, Waywethin, Whatiguana, Whispering, Will Beback, Wingnut99, Winston Trechane, Wlambeth, Wmahan, Wmspriggs2008, Woodsrock, Woohookitty, Wyang, Xezbeth, Yakushima, Yath, Yeohac, Yworo, Zooeycat, Zoostin, Zoz, , 581 anonymous edits History of evolutionary psychology Source: Contributors: Bearcat, Itsmejudith, Jojalozzo, Jonkerz, Leadwind, Maunus, Memills, Miradre, SchreiberBike, 1 anonymous edits Theoretical foundations of evolutionary psychology Source: Contributors: Crosstemplejay, Jarble, John, Kithira, Leadwind, Malcolma, Memills, Stuartyeates Psychological adaptation Source: Contributors: Clicketyclack, Delbroccos1, Delmonte, EPM, Johnuniq, Jpalme, Koavf, Lova Falk, Mattisse, Nabeth, Orgone, Schaefer, Shambalala, Tikiwont, Truthanado, Viriditas, 23 anonymous edits Adaptive bias Source: Contributors: Aaron Kauppi, Aggelophoros, EPM, Gongshow, Grick, Jgau2, Joebieber, Mattisse, Ric168, SimonP, TheAllSeeingEye Cognitive module Source: Contributors: Aaron Kauppi, Alvestrand, Andrewman327, CharlesGillingham, Chris the speller, DCDuring, Davecrosby uk, Doczilla, Gregbard, Jpalme, Keahapana, Lostprophet1, Luigi30, Mattisse, Pdcook, RJFJR, Redheylin, Rjwilmsi, SarahStierch, Swatjester, The Anome, The Evil Spartan, Victor falk, Woohookitty, , 28 anonymous edits Dual inheritance theory Source: Contributors: 1snailbyte, A Geek Tragedy, Anthon.Eff, Antonielly, AwIAT3eF, Barefact, Bobblehead, Bramfab, Brionthorpe, C Tennie, Circeus, Copana2002, Culturepatches, Cybercobra, Daniel Case, Drunken Pirate, EPM, Edward, Flyte35, Gioto, Goethean, Grafen, Gurch, Hgintis, Hires an editor, Itsmejudith, Joe Roe, Johnuniq, Jotomicron, KYPark, Laurinavicius, Mandarax, Mattisse, Maurreen, Mdfischer, Memills, Mirrormundo, Omnipaedista, Pete.Hurd, Piotrus, Reinyday, Rettetast, Rhetth, Rich Farmbrough, Rigadoun, Rjwilmsi, Robin klein, SMcCandlish, Samsara, Shenme, SimonGreenhill, Stemonitis, Torrentweb, Tveloz, Vclaw, Victor Chmara, Was a bee, Wotnow, 116 anonymous edits Evolutionary developmental psychology Source: Contributors: Circeus, Craigjclemson, Cybercobra, EPM, Gnaussor, H.sanat, JTBurman, Jackhynes, Jalalzahir, Mattisse, Memills, Mpluess, Nabeth, Pengortm, Pete.Hurd, Sardanaphalus, Semmler, Twirligig, Viriditas, We used to sit, 26 anonymous edits Human behavioral ecology Source: Contributors: Bissinger, Cgingold, Circeus, Cybercobra, DASonnenfeld, Dbrodbeck, Delusion23, Denispir, EPM, FD Johnston, Googlesalot, Hispaniensis, Hunarian, Jandalhandler, Jose nnnn, Pandelver, Richard001, Rolando, Semmler, Shot357, Shrumster, Slightsmile, Some standardized rigour, Tribaal, Vanished user 19794758563875, Viriditas, 22 anonymous edits Instinct Source: Contributors: .:Ajvol:., 1ForTheMoney, 28421u2232nfenfcenc, 2D, Aaron.t.phillips, Aboluay, Ace of Spades, Addshore, Agateller, Alansohn, Ale jrb, Altenmann, Ancatdubh43, AndreasJS, Anikingos, Anteneh yosph, Archipenko10, Asknine, Avenue, BD2412, Barneca, Bgwhite, Bilogo conservacionista, Bob the Wikipedian, Bobianite, Boism, Boondyke, Brianga, Bueller 007, Calvin 1998, CardinalDan, Cat Cubed, Caviglia42, Ceejayoz, Cerealkiller13, Chairboy, Charles Matthews, Chong3, Clark89, Cmputer, Comet Tuttle, CommonsDelinker, Dadewebster, DarrylRobertson, Darthbob100, DaughterofSun, Dave6, DavidWBrooks, Dhburns, Doctors without suspenders, Dragons flight, Dreadstar, Dysepsion, Eatkuso, Ed Poor, Eleaf, Esthurin, Eve Hall, Everyking, Excirial, Extremophile, Fahimshouse, Fastifex, Fconaway, Feeeshboy, Felddagryph, FossilWiki, GregorB, Grumpyyoungman01, Heron, Hgilbert, Holme053, Hut 8.5, I dream of horses, I rockkx33, Ingolfson, InternetMeme, Intershark, Iridescent, IronChris, IronGargoyle, IvanLanin, J.delanoy, J04n, JRYon, Jahsonic, Jared Preston, Jasongallant, Jeffgoin, Jeltz, Joyous!, Jwanders, K kisses, Karol Langner, Katieh5584, Kingpin13, Kross, Kuba1000, Kusunose, La comadreja, Larry hourany, phd, Lepidoptera, Liface, Link, Lotje, Lova Falk, Lugnuts, M1ss1ontomars2k4, MHall, Mahitgar, Makeitoak, Mange01, Marsupial2k, Martarius, Materialscientist, Memenen, Michael Hardy, Mickeysamuni, Mlewan, Mr.Taxonomist, Musark, NeantHumain, Neebe, NekoDaemon, NellieBly, NewEnglandYankee, Nk, Nostri Fahkhoul Glajme, Nsaa, Ojigiri, Open2universe, Pgk, Phlegm Rooster, Pinethicket, Porphyry87, Process-cory, Promsan, Puchiko, Pwjb, R Lee E, R'n'B, RJHall, Raghith, Raprat0, Rayc, RedHillian, Reddi, Remember the dot, RichardF, Rmky87, RodC, RogerK, Roricka, RoyBoy, Ryan Smith, Sadi Carnot, SailorfromNH, Saketb, SchfiftyThree, SchuminWeb, ScottDavis, SemanticMantis, Sgeureka, ShadowPuppet, Siliconov, Sokker30, SomeGuy1969, StaticGull, Stemonitis, Stevegallery, Stevenwagner, Steveprutz, Talrias, The Thing That Should Not Be, TheRasIsBack, Thingg, Third, Tide rolls, Titoxd, Tom2we, Tomprocter,, Tyler0309, Utcursch, Valmi, Vclaw, Vegetator, Viridiflavus, Viriditas, Vuong Ngan Ha, Weaseloid, Wegesrand, Wimt, XxTimberlakexx, Yidisheryid, ZachCrichfield, Zapperoni, Zbxgscqf, Zotel, , 331 anonymous edits Modularity of mind Source: Contributors: Aaron Kauppi, Acadmica Orientlis, Aranel, Ariosto, Cadr, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Cool Hand Luke, Cool3, Curb Chain, DCDuring, DLZONE68, Deleet, Der Golem, Doczilla, Dreadstar, EPM, Esqg, FreplySpang, GL, Greensburger, Gregbard, Itsmejudith, Jojalozzo, Jpalme, Just plain Bill, Karada, Klaxon, Kyoakoa, Lacatosias, Margin1522, Mattisse, Maunus, Memills, Mikeblas, Miracle Pen, Miradre, Mukadderat, Neuropsychology, Oxford pictionary, Pragmaknowledge, Psychonaut, Redheylin, Samsara, SlipperyN, Sonicyouth86, Spalding, Stevertigo, Svenonius, The Anome, Tmh, Vaughan, Victor falk, We used to sit, WikHead, Wileycount, WpZurp, Zenonwp, , 32 anonymous edits Cultural universal Source: Contributors: Aaron Kauppi, Alastair Haines, Athana, B9 hummingbird hovering, BD2412, BMF81, Bayle Shanks, Benjifriedman, CanadianLinuxUser, Charles D. Laughlin, Counterfact, Daniel Mietchen, Dbachmann, Doulos Christos, Dragnmastr2134, Eep, Elonka, Epsilon60198, Erkan Yilmaz, Gogo Dodo, Grafen, HarryHenryGebel, K kisses, Leadwind, Marcus Brute, Marechal Ney, Memills, Mynameisnotpj, Naznarreb, Neelix, Oleg-ch, Ospalh, Penarc, ProGloriaDei, Pwesth, Qviri, Res2216firestar, Rich Farmbrough, Rorybowman, Skysmith, Student7, Tassedethe, Terminator484, Timothy Campbell, Twipley, Umitcan, Urmother92, Velho, Wheelworker, Yworo, 65 anonymous edits Consciousness Source: Contributors: "alyosha", 'Ff'lo, -xfi-, 00110001, 119, 16@r, 1shaman, 1skyboy, 2004-12-29T22:45Z, 2012WorldPeace,,,, 5Q5, A314268, ALargeElk, Aa arquiza, Aaron McDaid, Aaron Schulz, Aaron.michels, Abimccs, Abu badali, Acmuller, Acummin8, Adam brown123, Agateller, Agquarx, Al1432, Alan347, Alexander Maier, Alexf, Alexkon, Alienus, Alo world, Altenmann, Amerika, Anbro, Ancheta Wis, Andres, Andrew Lancaster, Andrew3024, Andrewfhurt, Andrewpmk, Andris, Angr, Annielogue, Anthonyhcole, Anton H, Antonio Prates, Anypodetos, Aqui, Aranel, Arc de Ciel, Arcadian, Architect of ucadia, ArchonMagnus, Ark, Arrowcatcher, Art LaPella, Asarla, Astro Calisi, Aucitypops, AustinKnight, Avirab, B9 hummingbird hovering, BIOEE278WIM2008, BOK602, Bacchiad, Backin72, Balu.muthu, BarkerJr, Barnham, Baronnet, BashBrannigan, Bdubay, Beezhive, BiT, BillC, Bishopclinics, Bjdehut, Black Kite, Blainster, Blueelectricstorm, BolonYokte, Borgx, Borislav,

Article Sources and Contributors

Braincricket, Brendanurbanwarrior, Brent Allsop, Brews ohare, Brian0918, Brodmann1, Bryan8020, Burgosjl, Busboy, Byelf2007, Byrgenwulf, C0ffeeartc, CALR, CAPS LOCK, CX, Cacycle, Calamitybrook, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Capricorn42, Captain Smartass, Carn, Cassowary, Cat Cubed, Cdc, Cedders, Chaos, CharlesC, CharlesGillingham, Chealer, Cheffoxx, ChipsAHoyBoy7, Christian de Quincey, Chun-hian, Ciphers, Cjwright79, Ckatz, Clicketyclack, Clovis Sangrail, Cntras, Cognita, Columnist, Compass NW, Con Science, Conceiving consciousness, Consciousmess, Consciousnessmystery, Conversion script, Coolmel, Cowman109, Cowsop, Crasshopper, Crimea, Crippled Sloth, Cyde, DCDuring, DFS454, DMR Sekhar, DV8 2XL, Da baum, Danhan, Daniel Case, DanielCD, Danko Georgiev, Danny lost, Danrules2, Dark Charles, David Ludwig, Dbachmann, Dbfirs, Debatebob, Deeptrivia, DeirdreBar, Deli nk, Dell Adams, Delldot, Desawi, Dharmadhatu, Diamondlady1025, Dianelos, Discospinster, Diva industries, Djhbrown, Dlloader, Dmr2, Doczilla, Domurchu, Download, DrStein, Dream of Nyx, Dreish, Dungate, EMFilmGeek, EMIConscious, EPadmirateur, Ec5618, Edhubbard, EditorASC, Ehheh, Ekotkie, El C, ElTchanggo, Elassint, Elepnf, Encephalon, EncephalonSeven, Enigmocracy, Enric Naval, Eofproject, Epipelagic, Eric Kvaalen, Erich gasboy, Erindal, Eu.stefan, Evanh2008, Evil Monkey, Ewlyahoocom, Ezmorsella, Fahrenheit92, Fallenfromthesky, Famousdog, Fan-1967, Fancy.kira, Father O'Know, Faus, FeanorStar7, Feldma34, Fifelfoo, Flameoffire, Florian Blaschke, Fmorm, Fnielsen, Fractal91, Francois Dongier, Fredeaker, Fritz freiheit, Frmatt, Futurefocusfoundation, Fuzzypeg, Gaius Cornelius, GalaazV, GameKeeper, Gareth E Kegg, Gdje je nestala dua svijeta, Geometer, Ggenellina, Gioto, Gkoehler70, Gmandler, Go for it!, Goethean, Goingstuckey, Gongshow, Graham87, Greensburger, Gregbard, Habkvf, HaeB, Hanasato, Happenstance22, Harland1, Harnad, Hcx0331, Hdeasy, Hedonologist, Hephzibah Yohannan, Herk1955, Heron, Hesperian, Hgilbert, HolyBaloney, Hordaland, Hu, IRWolfie-, Ian Pitchford, Icut4you, Incka, Indeterminate, Infinity0, Instrument-luthier, Invertzoo, Iridescent, Isnow, Itschris, J04n, JCSBimp, JDPhD, JMD, JNW, JYolkowski, JaGa, Janice Rowe, Javik, JayDoering, Jayhawk of Justice, Jaymay, Jeff3000, Jefffire, Jenniz, Jialuzeng, Jiohdi, Jisatsusha, Joesydney, John Hubbard, John Hyams, John Vandenberg, John of Reading, JohnBlackburne, Johnfos, Johnkarp, Jorend, JorisvS, Jrthorpe, Jwaycuilis, Jwdink, Jwestbrook, K, KSchutte, Kabelsalat,, Karol Langner, Katalaveno, Keepcalmandcarryon, Kees van Zon, Kenny sh, Kesaloma, Khmir2467, Kilo-Lima, Kine, KirstenRichards, Kjdillon, Kmg90, Know108, KnowledgeAndVision, Knverma, Kripkenstein, Kzollman, Lacatosias, Langdell, Lapaz, Larry Rosenfeld, Lcarscad, Letranova, Levineps, LeyteWolfer, Liang9993, LilJesusboy101, Limarodessa, LonesomeDrifter, Looie496, Lordvolton, Lova Falk, Loxley, Ltradical, LuK3, Lucidish, Lugia2453, Lusanaherandraton, Lussmu, Lycurgus,, MPS, Machine Elf 1735, Madhukaleeckal, Magioladitis, Magnus Manske, Male1979, Mallexikon, Mandarax, MartinPoulter, MarylandArtLover, Materialscientist, Mathematics4life, Matt McIrvin, Matthew Auger, Matthew Stannard, MatthewJ, Matthisd, Mattisse, Maurice Carbonaro, Max Velmans, MaxSem, Mayumashu, Mbmaciver, McGeddon, Mdd, Meco, Meditationguru, Meldor, Meyrick Sainsbury, Mfu254, Mgbell, Michael Hardy, Michelferrari, Mike.lifeguard, Mikeybabel01, Millahnna, Mladifilozof, Mnemeson, Montrealcanada, MortenKringelbach, Mporch, Mr. Billion, MrJones, MrOllie, MrX, MsTumnus101, Msasscts, Mstroeck, Mtcv, Mtrack81, Mykhal, Myscience, Nachx, Naddy, Narnibird, Nasrullahsaif, NatNapoletano, NawlinWiki, Nbhatla, Ndru01, NeMorgoth, Ned Block, Neko-chan, Neotone, NeuronExMachina, Neutrality, Nguye823, Nick Michael, Niculaegeorgepion, Noizy, Noneofyourbusiness, Nrets, Nullie, Oblivious, Oliver Pereira, Oliver9909, Onemorebrown, Oodeegeeoo, Op2mus, Ordago, Orenburg1, Ostracon, Ott, Oxford73, PMDrive1061, PSYCHOLOGYAO1, Patrickwilken, Pawyilee, Pax:Vobiscum, Pcubbage, Pearle, Pekka.virta, Persephone19, PeterBokulich, Peterburton, Peterdjones, Philogo, Philos, PhnomPencil, Pictureuploader, PigFlu Oink, Pinethicket, Plumbago, PolarYukon, Pomte, Poor Yorick, Porcher, Preisler, Princessane, Psb777, Pschelden, Psycan2, Pwjb, Quadell, QuantumOne, RDF, RG2, RainbowOfLight, RainbowWiki, RandomP, Raven in Orbit, Ray Dassen, Razimantv, Razorbelle, Rbarreira, Redaktor, Redheylin, Redquark, Renamed user 4, Renfield, RexNL, Reyk, Rhkramer, Rhobite, Rich Farmbrough, Richard001, Rick Norwood, Rjclaudio, Rjwilmsi, Rletzgus, Rmallott1, Robert Daoust, Robinhw, Rocordman, RodC, RolandR, Romanm, Romanpoet, Ross Burgess, Rrburke, Rsanz, Ruedi33a, Rwiser, RyanParis, Ryanaxp, Ryguasu, S Marshall, Sacramentis, Saeed.Veradi, Salvo46, Sam Hocevar, Sam Korn, Sam Spade, Sampackgregory, SamuelRiv, Sandstein, Sanya3, ScAvenger lv, Scarpy, Schlegel, Schwnj, Sct72, Serpent's Choice, Sfnile, Shadowjams, Shanata, Shato, ShelfSkewed, Shii, Siddhi.powers, Silent Abstraction, Simonster, Sinalet, Skizzik, Skraz, Skywalker, Slehar, SlimVirgin, Slipperyweasel, Slugmaster, Smilo Don, Snickerson, Snowyfebsak, So Smart s0 Dumb, SoCal, SolidscoreX, Solitude, Some jerk on the Internet, Sontuk96, Spencemac724, Spotfixer, Squandermania, Stampit, Standardfact, Status, Stephen Allison, Stevertigo, Stringanomaly, Suidafrikaan, Superjova, Svdmolen, Sverdrup, Svick, Sycomonkey, Symane, Szeldich, T. Baphomet, THEN WHO WAS PHONE?, Tartarus, Tassedethe, Tbone55, TejasDiscipulus2, Tennenrishin, Tesseract2, Thaimoon, The Anome, The Rambling Man, The nnoob, The-verver, TheOldJacobite, Themfromspace, Theseker, Thisisborin9, Thseamon, Tiktuk, Tim Shuba, Timl, Timurbek1951, Timwi, TitchWundt, TjeerdB, Tkorrovi, Tmh, Tobias Hoevekamp, Toby D, Tomburns, Tomisti, Trevorgangstertoth, Tritium6, Tyharvey313, UberScienceNerd, ValorGigo, Vaughan, Vegetator, Velho, Verbal, Vhhkprhi, Vianello, VikiPicture, Vilas rokade, VinneOverwinner, Viriditas, Vishnava, Visualerror, Voiceofspirit, Vpolavia, Vsmith, WJetChao, WLU, WOT, Wafulz, Walkerma, Wallywilby, Walton One, WatermelonPotion, Wavelength, Waycool27, Wegner48, Weldingfish, WereSpielChequers, Wereon, Wik, Wiki alf, WikiLaurent, Wikiborg, Wikiestherz, Wikiik, Wikiklrsc, Wile E. Heresiarch, Willy turner, Wmahan, WpZurp, Wwmbes, Xaosflux, Xezbeth, Xiornik, Xzb, Yashram, Yidisheryid, Ykhwong, Yoninah, Yoonchae, Youandme, Yunshui, Zach Lipsitz, Zachorious, Zackrobinson, Zahd, ZombieRamen, Zoz, ZuluPapa5, Zzuuzz, , , , 1008 anonymous edits Evolutionary linguistics Source: Contributors:,, 21655, Acyso, Alison, Altg20April2nd, Andycjp, Angr, Asfarer, B9 hummingbird hovering, BBuchbinder, BD2412, Bhny, Burschik, Camster, Certes, Cgingold, Chase me ladies, I'm the Cavalry, Comtebenoit, Conversion script, Cromwellt, Crzer07, CumbiaDude, DancingPhilosopher, Daniel Mietchen, Dbachmann, Dduck, Dillardjj, Dmitri Lytov, Drork, Ericgoldstein, Fcummins, Fheyligh, Forefinger2, Gabbe, Gareth Jones, Garik, Greenmind, Harnad, Hoss, Hoziron, Hyacinth, Ikiroid, Irisdspring, JNShutt, Jimmy Fleischer, Jockocampbell, Josh Parris, Jossi, Lam Kin Keung, MER-C, Maunus, Michael Hardy, Nabeth, Neilc, NickelShoe, Penarc, Phanerozoic, PhiRho, Pietaster, Pivi11, RHaworth, Rjwilmsi, Rmallott1, Ryulong, SimonGreenhill, Sj, Spizzer2, Stefano.nolfi, The Noodle Incident, The Thing That Should Not Be, Tobias Hoevekamp, Trickstar, VikSol, Vincent2236, WLU, Wasell, WikiLambo, Wikiklrsc, Wikky Horse, Will Beback Auto, Wlievens, Xzqx, Yolgnu, Zuky79, 79 anonymous edits Evolutionary psychology of religion Source: Contributors: Acadmica Orientlis, BIOEE2780, Barbara Shack, Computertheology, Cybercobra, Dbachmann, Diversity23, Editor2020, Gavagai99, GregorB, Halofan101, Johnson-Bob, Jonkerz, JorisvS, Lotje, Mattisse, Mdiamante, MikamiLovesDeleting, Miket-NYC, Miradre, Muntuwandi, NBeale, Neapoli, Norenzayan, PelleSmith, Pigman, Proxima Centauri, Qqminuss, Rankiri, Rasheed2100, Rjwilmsi, Rockfang, Shambalala, Slusk, Smcg8374, Speedy la cucaracha, Sting au, Tktktk, Ttiotsw, Victor Chmara, Wapondaponda, We used to sit, Wikiberg, Xme, Zlatno Pile, 26 anonymous edits Criticism of evolutionary psychology Source: Contributors: Acadmica Orientlis, After Midnight, Against the current, Andycjp, Aunt Entropy, Baadog, Bamafader, Barbara Shack, Bodnotbod, Cgingold, Chet Ubetcha, Coubure, DKqwerty, Dethroned Buoy, Dillypickle, Dylgar, EPM, Fang 23, Frowanda, GregorB, Grow60, Headbomb, Irrevenant, Itsmejudith, JHunterJ, Jania902, Jeremy68, Jj1236, Johnson-Bob, Johnuniq, Jojalozzo, Jonkerz, La marts boys, Lar, Leadwind, Lestermann11, Logic prevails, Lynden Price, Mark Arsten, Mathsci, Maunus, Maximilianholland, Memills, Micru, Mild Bill Hiccup, Miradre, Mogism, Mpatmudd, Pakimark, Phildogg82, Redrose64, Rjwilmsi, Robo Cop, Ronhjones, RoyBoy, Silver seren, Slrubenstein, TestPilot, The Thing That Should Not Be, Tijfo098, Tstrobaugh, TuesdayActually, Vesal, Vestbors, Viriditas, Woland37, 162 anonymous edits Standard social science model Source: Contributors: Adoniscik, AndyTheGrump, Eastlaw, Hayden120, Jo3sampl, Jokestress, Leadwind, Logic prevails, Memills, Merimaa123, Morton Shumway, Nesasio, Nono1234, Quizkajer, Rohithfriend, Rosiestep, Ryanrs, Sonicyouth86, Tmh, Viriditas, 20 anonymous edits Evolutionary educational psychology Source: Contributors: Circeus, Cybercobra, Daniel Mietchen, EPM, Ekimiheart, JTBurman, Ktr101, Mattisse, Miradre, Nihiltres, Sardanaphalus, SteinbDJ, 2 anonymous edits


Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors


Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

File:Psi2.svg Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Arjen Dijksman, Badseed, Beao, Bouncey2k, Gdh, Herbythyme, Imz, Jack Phoenix, KillOrDie, Nagy, Proteins, Remember the dot, Wutsje, 25 anonymous edits File:CollapsedtreeLabels-simplified.svg Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Original uploader was User:TimVickers, SVG conversion by User:User_A1. Original uploader was User A1 at en.wikipedia File:Tree of life.svg Source: License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: User:Samsara File:Folder Hexagonal Icon.svg Source: License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Anomie, Mifter File:Office-book.svg Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Chris Down/Tango project Image:Lorenz and Tinbergen1.jpg Source: License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Max Planck Gesellschaft File:Darwin's finches.jpeg Source:'s_finches.jpeg License: Public Domain Contributors: John Gould (14.Sep.1804 - 3.Feb.1881) File:Ethology diversity.jpg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors: User:DrChrissy File:Instinct dog shake.jpg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors: User:Mickeysamuni File:BabyLoggerheadTlalcoyunque3.jpg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike Contributors: AlejandroLinaresGarcia File:Greifreflex.JPG Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: User:Mattes Image:RobertFuddBewusstsein17Jh.png Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Robert Fludd Image:Descartes mind and body.gif Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Hsarrazin, Magog the Ogre, Mdd, Polarlys, Tomia, Was a bee File:Necker cube.svg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: BenFrantzDale File:Neural Correlates Of Consciousness.jpg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0,2.5,2.0,1.0 Contributors: Christof Koch File:Abbot of Watkungtaphao in Phu Soidao Waterfall.jpg Source: License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Contributors: Beta M, Tevaprapas, Tmd File:Neon colour spreading illusion no caption.png Source: License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Original uploader was RobinH at en.wikibooks, modified by The Anome at en.wikipedia File:JohnLocke.png Source: License: Public Domain Contributors: Dcoetzee, Diomede, FranksValli, Herbythyme, Hystrix, Kilom691, Raymond, Shakko, 7 anonymous edits



Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported //