Manuel Nunes Viana: Paragon or Parasite of Empire? Author(s): A. J. R. Russell-Wood Reviewed work(s): Source: The Americas, Vol.

37, No. 4 (Apr., 1981), pp. 479-498 Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/980836 . Accessed: 28/01/2013 06:53
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MANUEL NUNES VIANA: PARAGON OR PARASITE OF EMPIRE?*

of face, with brown eyes and black hair". Made by the official at the register on the Rio Grande in the interior of Brazil on this is the only physical description of a charismatic figure 14, 1717, May whose word was law in the backlands of Brazil in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.' A native of Viana do Castelo in northern Portugal, Nunes Viana migrated to Brazil around the 1680's. Salvador was his point of entry but, after killing an assailant he lay low until pardoned by the governor; subsequently, he left for the sertao where he was to establish residence for some 40 years near to the bar of the Rio das Velhas.2 He sired at least six daughters and four sons. During his lifetime he returned to Portugal on two occasions, and was a minor literary Maecenas although in 1717 his signature is that of a barely literate man.3 He was financially successful as a result of ventures in cattle ranching,

"L

Nunes a manof medium ETpassManuel round Viana, build,

* This article is based on materials consulted in the following Brazilian archives: Public Archives of the State of Bahia, Collection of Royal Orders (hereinafter abbreviated as APBOR); Public Archives of the State of Minas Gerais, registers of the Delegacia Fiscal (APMDF), and registers of the Secretaria do Governo (APMSG); Archives of the Casa da Moeda, Lisbon. I"Passa Manoel Nunes Viana homem de mediana estatura, cara redonda, olhos pardos, cabello sua carregaqo q' consta de vinte e tres cargas de molhado, Rio grde 14de Mayo de 1717" pretto, comrn APMDF, vol. 17, fol. 47v. 2"Colesam das noticias dos primeiros descobrimentos das Minas na America, que fez o Dr. Caetano da Costa Matoco, sendo Ouvidor Geral das do ouro preto de que tomou pose em Fevro de 1749", fol. 101. Hereafter cited as Costa Matoso, this valuable codex is housed in the Biblioteca Municipal de Sio Paulo (MS D/ I /a/43). In 1727the king referredto a recent petition from Nunes Viana in which the sertanista claimed residence of 40 years in the valley of the Rio Sgo Francisco, APBOR, vol. 96, doc. 34. 3His first return was after the Guerra dos Emboabas (Costa Matoso, fol. 101);C. R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750 (The University of California Press, 1969)pp. 364-65 raises a doubt as to whether he did avail himself of the royal permission to travel to Portugal in 1725, but a later petition by one of his daughters refers to his departurefrom Portugal "auzentando-se o seu pay pa os Estados da Bahia", APBOR, vol. 54, fol. 226. On his role as literary sponsor, see Boxer, Golden Age, p. 365.

479

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commerce in foodstuffs to the developing mining areas, and investments in alluvial mining. Alone, and in league with his cousin Manuel Rodrigues Soares, he ruled the serthioof the captaincies of Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco for two decades, before dying in the mid1730's.4 He cocked a snook at governors and viceroys, although his loyalty to the crown was never called into question. If one viceroy in 1715 could report to the crown that Nunes Viana was not only the "most capable" of the inhabitants of the serttio and the best suited to carry out the royal will, the following year the Overseas Council in Lisbon was to refer to him as "guilty of many crimes."5 Not surprisinglythe king was at a loss to know whether he had a saint or a sinner on his hands. Governors ran the full gamut from regarding him as the only possible instrument to maintain a royal presence in the Brazilian west to considering him a cancer to be eliminated before infecting the loyalty and wellbeing of the colonial flock. To some settlers, he may have been a Robin Hood of the backlands, but for others he was a cruel and despotic figure who meted out arbitrary justice with excessive cruelty. Whatever the divergence of views, one fact was certain: Manuel Nunes Viana was not a man to whom anybody could remain indifferent. Nunes Viana possessed that blend of charisma, ruthlessness, and business acumen, which would have assured success regardless of time or place, but the nature of his chosen modus operandi throws into stark relief certain conditions which were conducive to the emergence and prominence of such personalities. One was that period of transition between exploration and settlement, between the unknown and the known, between flux and stasis, between anarchy and the imposition of centralized authority. The second condition lay in what were perceived to be, or actually were in physical terms, geographical frontiers. Such conditions were present in many theaters of the so-called expansion of Europe, but what made Portuguese America a case apart was that both factors remained present throughout the entire colonial period. Unlike Portuguese Asia where boundaries of empire were largely undefined, the treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Madrid (1750) laid the bases for Portugal's territorial claims to a region not substantially different from the eight and a half million square kilometers of modern Brazil. But for the three and a quarter centuries of the colonial period, the physical
4lsaias Golgher [Guerra dos Emboabas (Belo Horizonte, 1956), p. 251] places his death as being on 28 January 1738, but the absence of his name in a 1736 report of the three largest slave owners between Sio Miguel and the bar of the Rio das Velhas and which names his partner Manuel Rodrigues Soares may suggest his death in late 1735or early 1736, APMSG, vol. 55, fols. 100v-10 Iv. 5Marquis of Angeja to king, July 1, 1715 (APBOR, vol. 8, doc. 90a; Secretary of State to Angeja, April 1, 1716 referring the Nunes Viana as "reo de muitos crimes" (APBOR, vol. 10, doc. 32c).

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frontier in terms of exploration and settlement lay well within these limits. Indeed, only in our own days has there been the semblance of a coincidence between the dejure and the defacto frontiers of Brazil. These
two factors the temporal and the geographical with the

concomitant uncertainties, insecurities, and instability in human, social, economic, and political terms, provided the context for the exploits of Nunes Viana. From the crown perspective the tyranny of distance - be it between the metropolis and the colony, or between the seats of colonial government and the periphery - was an obstacle in itself. When allied to the two further factors of a chronic shortage of trained administrators and lack of capital, the forces militating against effective crown surveillance of Brazil were insuperable. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the Portuguese crown, unlike its Spanish counterpart, seriously pursued a policy of establishing a New Portugal in the Americas. This was reflected in the absence of an institutional network to match that of Spanish America. Throughout the 322 years of colonial rule, Portuguese America was but one viceroyalty or governorgeneralship; it counted one archbishopric and six bishoprics; there were only two high courts of appeals. There was no standing army. The Inquisition was never formally established. Requests by the colonists for the creation of a university were repeatedly denied. Away from the coastal cities, settlement was characterised by sporadic nuclei or, at best, archipelagos of humanity isolated from one another. Communications were poor. Commerce was hazardous because of poor roads, an environment hostile to man and beast, and threats of attack from bandits, Amerindians, or quilombos. Implementation of the royal will was an exercise in frustration; at no time did the crown exercise administrative control over the whole of its richest colony. Neither the will of the king, nor of his delegates, nor the imposition of the paraphernalia of government, were powerful enough to bring about the demise of a frontier tradition in the colony. It was in such areas of limitedjurisdictional effectiveness and (from the European perspective) geographical isolation, that an individual could make his mark unencumbered by the machinery of the State. Clearly the data are too incomplete to make a typology of such individuals, but the following components could be present. Holders of Portuguese citizenship, Catholic in varying degrees of orthodoxy and commitment, such figures were characterized by a love-hate attitude towards
institutions of their country of origin and, more particularly, to those representatives of the crown with whom they maintained relations

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running the gamut from scorn and derision to grudging respect. Some might have become acculturated to the customs and values of those peoples and regions where they functioned; some were diehard patriots, aggressive in their loyalty. Others, by their actions, implicitly rejectedthis heritage. Still others fell into the category designated as transfrontiersmen.6 From the official perspective, such personages were a boon and a bane. They possessed knowledge and skills, not easily attainable through other channels, which could contribute decisively to the attainment of official goals. They were informational resources on languages, behavior, political alliances, commercial practices, economic opportunities, navigation, and topography in areas in which the crown had, or might develop, an imperial interest. Furthermore, because of their unofficial position, they might undertake reconnaisances of a diplomatic, commercial, or political nature which, if favourable, could later be pursued through official channels. Not only could they protect the crown from placing the full weight of its authority behind some project which was doomed to failure, but, by so doing, they diminished the risk factor implicit in failure to both the treasury of empire and the reputation of king and state. Success on their part could have its rewards;in the event of failure, the crown denied any involvement in their actions. Some few did come in from the cold but, for the most part, the relationship was impersonal, undefined, and without further commitment other than it be mutually beneficial to both parties. The other side of the coin was that authorities were intensely aware - to the point of frustration and anger - that such individuals had identified, and proceeded to exploit for their own ends, the vulnerable pressure points of the soft underbelly of empire. Furthermore there was the risk that actions of questionable legality or morality by such individuals would not only defeat immediate crown objectives, but that injured parties would view their opponents not as individuals but as representativesand thus bring the name of crown and nation into disrepute, therebyjeopardizing future official overtures. Not surprisingly, the independent stance adopted by many such adventurers rankled with officialdom, causing unsought-for friction which could erupt into the open. Despite the potential for embarrassment, the fact remained that in the final analysis it was more expedient for the crown to tolerate rather than attempt to eliminate such figures.

6An interesting study of the internal dynamics of social and institutional change in a Portuguese overseas territory is Allen F. Isaacman, Mozambique. TheAfricanization ofa European Institution. The Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902 (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).

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Because of the ambiguity and ambivalency surrounding their conduct and motivations as individuals, and the sporadic and unpublicised nature of their involvement with the processes of empire, it is inevitable that an aura of fact and fiction, of truths, half-truthsand lies should envelop such personages. While not unknown to, nor ignored by, their contemporaries and later generations, they remain shadowy. But two very different regions of the Portuguese seaborne empire supply us with two classic examples of this type: from the outer limits of Portuguese Asia in the sixteenth century comes Ferndo Mendes Pinto; distanced in time by two centuries and several oceans is Manuel Nunes Viana whose theater of operations was Portuguese America. Whereas Pinto has been the object of scholarly scrutiny, Nunes Viana's activities have only been sketched in the most general terms.7 A brief survey of the colony will provide a background to his actions. The first decades of the eighteenth century were a period of dramatic transition. The preceding half a century had witnessed an agricultural crisis, decline in the sugar industry, stresses in the creaking hulk of the south Atlantic economy, and currency devaluation. The eighteenth century was heralded in by the accession of an absolutist monarch who was to reign for 44 years, and the discovery and exploitation of mineral deposits in Brazil. Two aspects of this new era should be emphasised. First, by its very nature alluvial mining is characterised by physical
mobility; furthermore, reports founded or unfounded of new

strikes stimulated successive migrations of free persons and slaves throughout the interior of Brazil for much of the first half of the century. Secondly, whereas the populace of the littoral had enjoyed an extended period during which institutions, commerce, and society could evolve, instant government and instant society characterised the mining areas. If these differences were not unsettling enough in themselves, the short- and long-term repercussions of mining exacerbated stress lines in the society, economy, and political life of the colony. Traditional patterns of trade were disrupted; new markets for foodstuffs and slaves were suddenly created; the epicenter of the colonial economy was violently dislocated to the interior; agriculturalists on the littoral experienced chronic labor shortages; prices of basic commodities and slaves skyrocketed; migratory movements westwards were followed by success, disillusion, and even reverse migration; the process was set in motion which would lead Rio de Janeiro to replace Salvador as the capital. In short, the two centuries old
7Maurice Collis, The Grand Peregrination. Being the Life and Adventures of Ferndo Mendes Pinto (London, 1949) provides a useful introduction; the only biographical note in English on Nunes Viana is in Boxer, The Golden Age, pp. 364-365.

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Brazil of the coastal enclaves was to become two Brazils:that of the coast, based on sugar and agriculture, and characterized by the uncertainty of stasis; and that of the interior, based on gold and diamond deposits, and characterized by the insecurities brought on by perpetual motion. The crown attempted to meet the challenge. In political terms new captaincies were created (Sao Paulo and Minas, 1709; Minas Gerais, 1720; Goias, 1744; Mato Grosso, 1748) with their respective governors. Ecclesiastically new bishoprics (Sao Paulo and Mariana) and prelacies (Cuiabi and Goias) were established in 1745. Militarily, two troops of dragoons were dispatched to Minas Gerais in 1719 and they and their successors were to play an invaluable role as an arm of government. A second high court of appeals was established in 1751 in Rio de Janeiro. Economically, the crown attempted (and largely failed) in the delicate balancing act of not dampening enthusiasm for, and exploitation of, mineral deposits while at the same time taking every measure to ensure that as much as possible of the new riches were syphoned off into the royal coffers by oppressive and inequitable taxation. The riches of Brazil, their protection, and their exploitation and development became the private obsession of Dom Joaio V. The regulatory measures, for the most part, were too little and too late. Response to the challenge created further turmoil in an already embroiled system: the establishment of new chains of command, reassessments of priorities, and fiscal and administrative experimentation were unsettling. Those failures which had been attendant on Portuguese crown rule, became even more acutely embarrassing to the crown in those decades which paradoxically enough constituted the golden age of Brazil. Indeed, it was in those very areas which were under the closest crown scrutiny and where there was most intervention and meddling by the king, that Dom Joa-o V was forced to delegate unusual latitude in decision-making to governors as "men on the spot." The fear that fiscal or social unrest would prejudice productivity and thereby threaten the royal exchequer, to a large degree forced the king's hand in the delegation of authority, and made the sovereign acquiesce in short-term solutions by governors which provided temporary stability but ran counter to the royal will or metropolitan interests. A by-blow of this degree of royal helplessness was that both the king and his representativesin the colony granted limited authority to, or contemplated actions by, individuals who might be of service to the crown. As such they became instruments for the furthering of royal policies, but this did not prevent them from exploiting such trust for
personal gain nor, on occasion, flying in the face of national interests. During that limited but critical phase of political, economic, and social uncertainty and transition, such a personage as Manuel Nunes Viana

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could not only survive but could reap a handsome profit. At a different time and place he would at the least have been convicted of crimes against the State or, at the worst, been unceremoniously hanged. Even his most carping critic would have conceded that his modus operandi was effective; and herein lay the secret of Nunes Viana's success. This may be examined in two facets: first, as regardsthe esteem in which he was held in the sertaio;secondly, as regards his stance vis-a-vis the crown. His prestige in the sertaiowas based on a shrewd understandingof the mentality of the "gente rtistica", a mixed bunch of whites, blacks, mulattoes, and mamelukes, for the most part illiterate, and eking out a precarious existence as drovers, boatsmen, small-holders, or as henchmen for local "powerfulmen of the backlands".Even today this is a region of mystery, of violence, of harsh struggle for survival in the socalled polygon of drought, and with a strong messianic tradition. Manuel Nunes Viana exploited the superstitious nature of the populace, using fear and, it was rumoured, magic to accomplish his dominance. It was widely believed that shots could not injure him; that he was all-seeing; that he could divine what was passing through the minds, and what was happening in the homes, of his "subjects".His black henchmen were not merely the objects of fear, loathing, and awe because of their infamous acts on his behalf but because they were widely reputed to be sorcerers.8 Needless to say Manuel Nunes Viana took no steps to disavow such rumours. Perhaps the greatest tribute to Viana was unconsciously paid by his severest critic, the count of Assumar (governor of Minas Gerais, 1717-21) when he noted "any step taken by this man is as intangible as a castle of the winds, and is a great phantasm".9 This shrewdness to examine a situation, be it in human, physical, or political terms, expose the weak points, and then exert pressure on these stress points directly or on related areas which would indirectly produce the sought after results, characterised his relationship to crown rule. From his command post at the bar of the Rio das Velhas - the undisputed key to Minas Gerais - he was beyond the effective jurisdiction of the viceroy in Salvador, or the governors of Pernambuco or Minas Gerais.'o Because of illdefined boundaries and jurisdictions, he could play off one crown official against another, shifting into another jurisdiction should the heat become too intense; from this stronghold he
8APMSG, vol. II, fols. 89v-91r 9"q' qualquer passo que da este homem, parece hum castello de vento, a fantasma mui hfia grande", APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9v loThe bar was 400 leagues upstream from Penedo, 2 months journey from Salvador, and 10days from Sabara (APBOR, vol. 8, doc. 90; APMSG, vol. 44, fol. 112). Appropriately enough, Assumar referred to it as the "balliza racional" of Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 136.)

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exerted pressure on the Achilles tendon of the mining areas, namely, the collection of taxes, be they tithes, entry fees, or the royal fifths; he could regulate the degree of stability or instability in the backlands; finally, he could control the supply of cattle on the hoof to an ever-growing population in Minas Gerais. Crown officials were constantly kept off balance by his tactics during the formative years of the mining communities. We may now turn to an examination of the manner in which this man who was a legend in his own lifetime was also to be an instrument of the crown. This service may be contrasted to the manner in which he sapped the strength from efforts at crown control and channeled these to his own advantage. By his success, unconsciously he paved the path for his decline, stimulating the crown and its representatives to act. Finally, we shall examine how changing circumstances eventually closed in on Nunes Viana, decreasing his options, and clipping his wings as a free agent. He first came to the eyes of the public and of the crown in the War of the Emboabas in Minas Gerais in 1708-09." Suffice it to say here that at this date no township had yet been established, there was no crown presence of note, anarchy and instability predominated, and there was chronic resentment between the Paulistas, who had made the initial strikes, and the outsiders who were upstaging their predecessors. To cut a long story short, hostilities erupted and, possibly against his better judgement, Nunes Viana permitted himself to be nominated by the Emboabas as their leader. He took the title of Regent, General of Minas, or Governor (depending on the source consulted), made civil and military appointments and, within three months, his forces effectively controlled the principal mining nuclei of Minas Gerais. Such disturbances invited swift administrative action. The governor of Rio de Janeiro made an excursion inland, tried abortively to conciliate both parties, and redistributed to Paulistas those posts given by Nunes Viana to Emboabas. At Congonhas do Campo, Manuel Nunes Viana confronted the governor, faced him down, and essentially sent him back to Rio with his tail between his legs. The new governor Ant6nio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho came to the task with trump cards:12
1I Much ink has been expended on his role in the Guerra dos Emboabas; vide C. R. Boxer, The Golden Age, pp. 64-77; Isaias Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas; Manoel da Silveira Cardozo, "The Guerra dos Emboabas, Civil War in Minas Gerais, 1708-1709", Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 22, no. 3 (August 1942), pp. 470-492. 12Albuquerque carried royal orders to take office as governor in Rio de Janeiro even if his predecessor had not yet returned from Minas Gerais; should Dom Fernando Martins Mascarenhas de Lencastre fail in Minas, Albuquerque was to proceed directly to the mining areas. He left Rio in July 1709 (APBOR, vol. 7, doc. 744).

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knowledge that dissension among Nunes Viana's followers undermined his position as undisputed leader of the Emboabas; secondly, that his popular support was also eroding prompted in part by his attempt to gain as his exclusive right slaughtering facilities in Sabara'; thirdly the governor carried a blanket amnesty for all those involved in the civil war except Nunes Viana and Bento do Amaral Coutinho.'3 Finally, Albuquerque was an old Brazil hand, son of a former governor of the Maranhio, and with experience as manager of family estates in Brazil and later as governor of Grao Para'and of the Maranhio. On arriving in the mining area Albuquerque ordered Nunes Viana, in the name of the king, to leave the 'General Mines'. Nunes Viana complied with this request and retired to his ranches on the Sdo Francisco River. Controversy surrounding the true nature, motives, or accomplishments of his participation in the War of the Emboabas was to be an albatross which Manuel Nunes Viana could not avoid. The charges against him were grave: lese Majest6, namely assumption of the position of governor by popular accord, and without royal sanction; obstruction of a royal delegate in the fulfillment of his duty; thirdly - although untrue - seizure of his position by force.14 Not all the evidence was negative. There was some basis for his own assertion that he had performed a valuable service to the crown:15he had indeed encouraged orderly collection of the royal fifths in a chaotic situation and had appointed a superintendent to accomplish this. Indicative of his success in preventing disruption in the collection of the fifths was the fact that for 1709 these were duly delivered on time (not always to be the case in subsequent, more orderly years). 16Secondly, in order to prevent a mass exodus, Manuel Nunes Viana had dispatched one Raphael da Silva e Sousa to farms and small holdings of Paulistas assuring them of Manuel Nunes Viana's protection of their possessions and lives in the name of the
13There was serious disagreement between Nunes Viana and the Bahian Sebastiio Pereira de Aguilar (Boxer, The Golden Age, pp. 76-77); the revolt against Nunes Viana's pretensions was led by a Padre Campos (Costa Matoso, fol. 37); the pardon was described in a letter from the king to the governor-general Luis Cesar de Menezes, August 22, 1709 (APBOR, vol. 7, doc. 744). 14Summariesof the charges against Nunes Viana are in APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215r-218r;vol. 11, fols. 94-99v. The charge of seizure of power by force was made by the count of Assumar to the crown judge of the comarca of Rio das Velhas (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 58v-6 1) in a letter dated October 10, 1718. The argument for the legitimacy of his popular election is in Costa Matoso, fol. 48. 151nhis Suplica of June 28, 1725, Nuno Marques Pereira was at pains to emphasize the valuable contribution of his literary sponsor in subduing the Paulistas, referringto Nunes Viana as a "loyal subject of the king" whose courage and prudence made him most worthy of royal favours; Compendio Narrativo do Peregrino da America (Lisbon, 1728). In 1719 Nunes Viana still believed that he had performed a valuable service to the king (Assumar to the king, January 8, 1719, APMSG, vol. 4, fol. 215. 16Boxer, The Golden Age, p. 80; Cardoso, "The Guerra dos Emboabas", p. 481.

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king.'7 It could also be claimed that, but for his intervention and strong leadership, there would have been greater factionalism resulting in loss of life, especially among the hopelessly outnumbered Emboabas."8This stabilizing role played by Nunes Viana was recognized by the viceroy himself who, in 1715, recommended him as being worthy of the royal favour in the granting of some benefice or pension. The viceroy also granted Nunes Viana blanket authority to "govern the sertdioof Bahia and Pernambuco."'9 Although Nunes Viana's case was to become a political football between the warring councillors of the Conselho Ultramarino and viceroy Angeja, on Good Friday 1716 the sertanista received a pardon for alleged usurpation of authority.20 Ironically enough Nunes Viana's greatest service to the crown by his forceful participation in the Guerra dos Emboabas escaped the immediate notice of both himself and the crown. It was to have focussed the royal attention on the potentially inflammatory position in the mining areas, and as a result the incorporation officially of the mining areas within the captaincy of Sdo Paulo. This lead to a visible crown presence in the establishment of townships, and the appointment of treasury, judicial, and administrative officers. As we shall have cause to examine later, this crown presence encroached on, and finally stifled, the freedom of action of Nunes Viana and other poderosos do sertilo. But the immediate impact was that Nunes Viana emerged as primus inter pares and was even courted for his knowledge as an eminence grise on matters of the sertdo. In this advisory role he was to give valuable services to the crown's appointed representatives. In 1714 the crown judge of the judicial district of Rio das Velhas informed the king that the region of the Sdo Francisco river valley was nothing but a "receptaclefor criminals from the whole of America"and noted that this situation could be remedied by a single action: namely, by enlisting the assistance of Nunes Viana. Evidently Nunes Viana was contacted and used his muscle on behalf of the crown, because the following year the viceroy praised
'7APMSG,vol. 65, fols. 119v-120v. 18Costa Matoso,fol. 48 of theking, thepriorapproval actionshadnot secured thatNunesViana's conceding 19Although to king,July 1, 1715, roleand recommended his stabilizing (Angeja royalfavours Angejarecognized in partfor his calmingof hostilities,in 1718Manuel APBOR, vol. 8, doc. 90a). Recommended Soareswas grantedletterspatentby the countof Assumar placinghimin chargeof the Rodrigues wasto charge of VilaNova da Rainhade Caethe(APMSG,vol. 12,fol. 28). Assumar governanca vol. 4, fols. 215vestedin him(APMSG,vol. 11,fols. 55-56; that NunesVianaabusedthe authority of thecountof Vimeiro thathebestripped to theincoming governor-general 218)and recommended to Vimeiro,October16, 1718,APMSG, vol. 11,fols. 61v-62r. his powers(Assumar was apparently 20This only a gubernatorial pardon,APBOR,vol. 10,doc. 32a.

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him as the "most capable" inhabitant of the region. Not only was he the only poderoso do sertaio to enact the royal orders, but he had kept the peace and curbed Amerindian hostilities. This was but the most measurable outcome from what the viceroy was to relate as having been lengthy and valuable discussions with Nunes Viana on the enforcement of law and order in the River Sao Francisco valley and Minas Gerais.21 Some fifteen years later we find Nunes Viana still being sought after as a consultant on matters of the hinterland. In his relationship to viceroy Sabugosa, who in 1721 had described him as a common criminal and murderer and who but 9 years later was to praise him as a "praicticodo sertio", Nunes Viana exemplified his extraordinary ability in interpersonal relations.22If he could not actually swing around to his cause those whom he had wronged, insulted, or offended by his high handed actions, at least he could gain their respect and even grudging admiration. His relationship over two decades as consultant to the crown's representatives underlines two other aspects of his personality. First, his willingness to take a calculated risk. His dealings with officialdom did not meet with the unanimous approval of his erstwhile companions and fellow-travellers. The governor of Minas Gerais may well have been understating the case when he remarked in 1718 that only the office and prestige of the governor stood between Nunes Viana and 40 potential assassins.23 There is evidence that Nunes Viana was not unaware that there had been an erosion in his formerly unquestioned control in the sertao, that his henchmen were not obeyed as readily as earlier, and that he had decided to gain a measure of crown protection. Secondly, his enhanced relations with the viceroys may have been born of a shrewd assessment of changing political, social, and economic realities in the hinterland. Earlier than most, and even earlier than the crown's official representatives, Nunes Viana realized that the ambience which had permitted his free-wheeling ways was being eroded by insidious but progressive crown influence. Rather than waiting for this to be
21"ehe certo, q' o d' Manuel Nunes Viana nio so he o homem mais capaz q' tem aquelles distritos, tanto pa fazer o cabal informe q' selhe manda, e executar as ordens de VMagde fazendoas observare respeitar como devem ser; mas he o unico q' actualm" da comprim" s q' selhe mandio, e faz ter em socergo e respto o districto, q' selhe tem asignado como sua capitania mor, socegandoa, e alimpandoa dos ladroens todas as vezes, q' aparessem algis por aquelles districtos, por cujos servigos se faz merecedor de q' VMagdeo attenda ...", Angeja to king, July 1, 1715 in response to the king's of November 17, 1714 (APBOR, vol. 8, docs. 90, 90a). Cf his of June 26, 1716to the secretary of state in an equally laudatory vein (APBOR, vol. 10, doc. 32a). 22"ManuelNunes Viana esti na minha opiniao confirmado regullo", Sabugosa to king, March 6, 1721 (APBOR, vol. 13, doc. 188a; Cf his letter of May 12, 1730 (APBOR, vol. 26, doc. 87.) 23APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 223v-224r.

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consolidated, which would have resulted in the closing to him of all avenues for manoeuvering, Nunes Viana acted; by so doing he kept open a range of options which would otherwise have been closed. To understand this calculated shift, we must briefly look at his actions before the Guerra dos Emboabas and, more critically, in the following decade. Nunes Viana's base of operations was at the confluence of the Rio das Velhas and Rio Sdo Francisco, at the boundaries of Bahia and Minas Gerais, and a linchpin in the critical Bahia-Sabara axis of supply to the mining areas. The vertiginous speed of successive mining strikes had repercussions unrelated to the industry itself: an instant demand for meat in the form of cattle on the hoof, other foodstuffs, and utensils; the imposition of exorbitant taxes by the crown not only on gold production but on imports into the mining areas, construction of barracks, tithes, and even donations to the expenses of royal marriages;finally, a feeling of individualism engendered in part by a lively awareness that the inhabitants were beyond the pale of effective crown control, and blended with dislike which could explode into actual hostility for representatives of the crown. Nunes Viana's success lay in exploiting for personal profit this highly vulnerable and soft underbelly of Portugal's golden calf. Customarily cattle destined for Minas Gerais left Piaui and Pernagua in May, arriving in somewhat desperate straits at the bar of the Rio das Velhas after a journey of 400 leagues. Here they were fattened up until December when they would be driven to the townships of Minas Gerais.24By his domination of the area of the bar, Nunes Viana increased or decreased the availability of meat to the mining areas virtually at will, raised prices artificially, and engendered unrest in the already unruly mining encampments.25 His actions also had an impact on the city of Salvador whose city councillors complained in 1716that the meat supply had decreased by two thirds, and that those supplies there were fetched exorbitant prices. Nunes Viana enhanced his unofficial control over meat supplies by bidding successfully for the highly lucrative contract on the importation of cargoes, slaves, and cattle into Minas Gerais.26 The second vulnerable point in the mining areas concerned collection of the royal revenues, especially the fifths (quintos) on all gold produced. Crown policy to impose the least ineffectual method of collecting these

24APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 71. 25During Albuquerque's governorship Nunes Viana had already been placing restraints on the free flow of cattle to Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 1l, fols. 55-56). 26Camarato king, July 28, 1716(APBOR, vol. 11, doc. 21); Nunes Viana held the contract for the triennium 1715-1718.

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dues varied; the result was misunderstanding, confrontation, and unrest. In 1715 the king ordered that a fixed quota system be replaced by a tax on the number of pans (bateias) in operation. Apparently accepted at first, violence erupted in the judicial district of Rio das Velhas and there was more than a hint that, if not directly a protagonist, Nunes Viana welcomed this unrest to enhance his own position.27 Allied to the production of gold was the always delicate issue of the granting of mining concessions and their registration: in 1718 Nunes Viana moved from the area of the curraes into the central mining region of Catas Altas where he shared mining concessions with his cousin. Nunes Viana's presence in itself was unsettling enough but it became apparent that his prime purpose was not to mine, but to disrupt mining operations. Backing up his demands by armed slaves, he forced neighbors to cede to him their water rights and mining concessions. Later, in direct contravention of gubernatorial edicts, Nunes Viana armed those slaves working on his mining concessions.28 It would not be too much to say that for a decade following the termination of the War of the Emboabas Nunes Viana was the indisputable ruler of the sertilo. It was this very immunity which Nunes Viana exploited in his personal and financial relationships with his neighbours. Here it is difficult to separate fact from fiction, but if only half of the stories of excesses were true, they would be sufficient to underscore the ruthlessness and ambition of Nunes Viana. It was alleged that he had stolen his Fazenda de Tabua from its former owners, whom he had reduced to begging for alms in the central mining area. He was capable of extreme cruelty, evicting tenants at will, throwing disobedient slaves and others into a pool stocked with piranhas, and murdering those who thwarted him. It was rumoured that he herded sick people on to his Fazenda de Tabuiaand waited for them to die so that he could inherit their estates.29Even his
27This disturbance focussedon VilaRealand VilaNovada Rainha, andwasof suchseverity that thegovernor wasforcedto retainthequotasystem(APMSG,vol. 4, fols. 34v, 194;APMSG,vol. 5, fols.41v-42r. Thatunrest wasin theair,andthatManuel NunesViana andhiscohortswereinvolved, wasexpressed in two lettersof 27 December 1715fromDom BrasBalthazar de Silveira of (governor MinasGerais,1713-1717) to theviceroy andto theking(APMSG,vol. 4, fols. 194v-197r). A valuable attendantupon the collectionof the fifthsis Manuelda SilveiraCardoso, surveyof the problems "TheCollection of theFifthin Brazil,1695-1709", American Historical vol. 20,no. Hispanic Review, 3 (August, 1940),pp. 359-379. 28NunesVianathreatened those who dalliedtoo long, or wererecalcitrant, that theirsevered headswould be sentto the regionof the Sdo Francisco river.Assumar the negotiating dispatched team of the formersecretary of the governmentManuelda Fonsecaand the Mestredo Campo to cool passions anddemarcate lands(APMSG,vol. 4, fols. 215-218; JosephRebelloPerdigdo vol. 11, fols. 43v, 61v-62.). 290n theTabuaallegations, see APMSG,vol. 4, fols. 215-218; vol. 11,fol. 128.Other abusesare chronicled in Boxer, TheGoldenAge, p. 365;APMSG,vol. 11, fols. 55-56,89v-91.

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cattle ranching activities were tainted with criminality. Large numbers of cattle and horses in the serhto left their natural pastures each year at the first rains for remote areas. Nunes Viana, it was charged, possessed the labor force needed to catch such animals, burn out their brands, and sell them for a tidy profit.30He also derived personal profit and prestigefrom the fortuitous circumstance that he was appointed agent for D. Izabel Maria Guedes de Brito, an inhabitant of Bahia and heiress to enormous tractsof land grantedby the king to herfatherin the late seventeenthcentury as a reward for "pacification"of the Amerindians and settlement of the interior. Nunes Viana looked on his duties as transcending those of a mere rent collector: not only did he interpret the terms of the grant as applying to a vaster region than originally conceived but, by threatening eviction of the tenants who refused to buckle under to his strong-arm extortion, he gained firm control over the terrified populace.31 It is clear that Nunes Viana escaped the wrath of justice not merely because of his geographical isolation but because of an extensive network of influential contacts, reaching to the very court. Not for nothing did the viceroy complain that through his Lisbon agent Nunes Viana knew of royal decisions before the viceroy himself.32Nunes Viana also exploited the combination of human avarice and inadequate salaries paid to magistrates. His friendship with the crown judge of thejudicial district of the Rio das Velhas and the curious circumstances which led to magistrates on the High Court of Appeals in Salvador changing their votes, aroused comment.33 But changing circumstances were whittling away at his power base, altering the context which had been so conducive to his operations.
30The proceeds of sales of all such "bens do vento", viz possessions without an owner and which were primarily cattle and slaves, were ordered by the king to be applied to redemption of captives. The absence of such a mamposteiro dos cativos had led the Provedor dos defuntos e auzentes in 1715 to gain Bras de Silveira's approval to make such sales and place the proceeds in his custody, but Assumar rejected this proposal (APMSG, vol. 59, fols. 145v-149v). 31On Maria Guedes de Brito, see A.J. R. Russell-Wood, "Female and Family in the Economy and Society of Colonial Brazil", in Asunci6n Lavrin, editor, Latin American Women. Historical Perspectives (Greenwood Press; Westport, 1978), pp. 88-89. Nunes Viana's abuses are chronicled in APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 37, 52v-53; vol. 5, fols. 69, 84v-85; vol. 11,fols. 55-56. Nunes Viana's claim was based on the phrase "Pais do S. Francisco ate as vertentes do Rio das Velhas", which he interpreted to mean that her territory extended to the headwaters of the Rio das Velhas in the heart of Minas Gerais, whereas the original intention (to be upheld later) was up to the confluence (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 61v-62, 277-278.) 32APBOR, vol. 20, doc. la. 33Manuel Carvalho Maya, a miner of Rio das Contas, had charged Nunes Viana with stealing a slave and gold. The case went to the RelaCio of Salvador: the decision was split, 3 to 2 in favor of Carvalho; Nunes Viana's presence in Salvador, and possibly other favours, led one Desembargador to switch his vote when the decision was appealed, thereby acquitting Nunes Viana (APBOR, vol. 18, doc. 7). On Nunes Viana's cosy relationship with Luis Botelho de Queiroz, crown judge of Rio das Velhas, see APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 130-133. Queiroz died on November 4, 1716 (Costa Matoso, fol. 42).

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Discovery was giving way to settlement. A degree of demographic stability was replacing rampant mobility. Blacks, mulattoes, and whites
both slaves and free were forming their own religious

brotherhoods. Townships were being established, the economy was becoming diversified with agriculture and cottage industries. There was encroachment on the formerly deserted expanses of the sertilo. Communications were improving. Above all, the seeds of royal government sowed by Albuquerque had taken root: boundaries were fixed between Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco; in 1720 Serro do Frio was made a separatejudicial district (comarca) with its own crownjudge; fiscal inspectors were making visits to the remote areas; militia companies were coming into being and, to give a little muscle to the royal will, trained dragoons were dispatched to the mining areas;a move to the collection of the royal fifths (quintos) in foundry houses demanded more effective registers to regulate the export of gold dust; parishes were being delineated and jurisdictional confusion over ecclesiastical appointments was being resolved. In 1721 Minas Gerais became a captaincy in its own right, but for the preceding four years the governor of the combined captaincy of Sio Paulo and Minas Gerais had resided in the heart of the mining area. The years 1717-21 were characterized by confrontation between the governor and Nunes Viana. It was a sign of the changing times that, with few exceptions, the governor emerged the winner. On the decisive issue of cattle, Nunes Viana suffered a double loss. First, despite intimidation, coercion and threats of disrupting future revenues, Nunes Viana was unable to maintain his hold on the cattle contract when it came up for renewal in 1718. The governor preempted action by Nunes Viana, by transferring the bidding to Vila do Carmo where Nunes Viana had no influence, with the result that he was outbid.34 Resorting to what he acknowledged to be a "mentiraoficiosa", by which Nunes Viana was led to believe that Assumar was acting on the direct command of the king, the governor met alone with Nunes Viana and exacted two promises: that Nunes Viana would desist from impeding the entry of cattle to Minas Gerais; that until a crown ruling resolved the issue, Nunes Viana would make no further efforts on behalf of D. Izabel Maria Guedes de Brito.35
34Prior to bidding, Nunes Viana had forbidden all fishing on the Rio Sdo Francisco, or transportation of fish to Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 1 , fols. 61v-62), with the purpose of lowering revenues and thereby discrediting the contract. His reaction to losing was to order nobody at the bar of the Rio das Velhas to receive cattle on their lands for fattening up prior to sale in Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215-218; vol. 11, fol. 71). 35Later Assumar confessed in a letter to the king (January 8, 1719)that he had been forced to this subterfuge by three considerations: the "muita arrogancia"of Nunes Viana; lack of means to repress him; popular revolt if there were to be a shortage of meat. (APMSG, vol. 4, fols. 215-218).

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Secondly, the development of ranching was such that although the curraes remained important, alternative sources of meat were emerging.36 Furthermore by improved communications and firmness, Assumar was able to undermine the effectiveness of Nunes Viana's potentially most destructive weapon: uncertainty. Rumours spread by Nunes Viana of proposed tax increases or of the governor exceeding his authority, were effectively scotched by Assumar himself in personal correspondence with leading citizens.37 Right on Nunes Viana's own doorstep, authority scored a double victory: despite every effort by Nunes Viana, a town was finally established in 1720 in Papagaio; secondly, by ordering that all bids on the contract of river passages be made in Lisbon, the crown undercut the effectiveness of Nunes Viana's brand of personal persuasion over the inhabitants of one of the most travelled crossings of the Rio das Velhas.38Finally, Assumar brought to his task the powerful instrument of the devassa, or legal enquiry. By selective application, Assumar arrested, or inspired fear enough to result in the flight of Nunes Viana's accomplices, and even reached into the inner circle of his coterie. Another expedient adopted by Assumar was to subvert the blind loyalty of those close to Nunes Viana by charging them with the undertaking of official missions in return for promises of immunity against criminal action: "fazer do ladrdo fiel" as he so aptly described this policy.39 In general, and in such particular matters as his thwarting Nunes Viana's efforts to place one of his own on the municipal council of Caeth6 by a rigged election, the count of Assumar slowly was

36APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 223v-224; vol. 4, fol. 211. 37Even before his arrival in Minas Gerais (November 15, 1717) Assumar faced the widespread rumour, openly denied by Nunes Viana, that the sertanista had advised the governor that it was not convenient for him to enter Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9v; Assumar to Angeja, December 30, 1717). More serious was the 1718 rumour that the newly drawn up list for payments of the fifths, would include a further tax of 10 per cent on each slave (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 70v-71r). When the crown judge arrived at Papagaio in 1718 to establish a town on Assumar's orders, the populace - fanned by rumours of a 10 per cent tax on all imported commodities if they acknowledged their being part of Minas Gerais rather than Bahia - refused to permit the creation of a town and threatened revolt. Nunes Viana had canvassed support from all the neighboring ranches (vol. 11, fols. 89v-91r) and himself dispatched 40 men from his ranch at Jaquitahi (2 days from Papagaio) to swell the opposition. 38King to Dom LourenCode Almeida, July 12, 1723 (APMSG, vol. 5, fols. 88v-90r; see also fols. 65, 68. 39The mining crisis in Catas Altas was defused by the threatened arrest of Manuel Rodrigues Soares' nephew (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 66-67) in 1718; Rodrigues Soares was ordered not to subvert the course of justice by intimidating witnesses for the devassa, and both he and Nunes Viana were threatened with arrest if they failed to keep the peace. In 1719 Assumar chose Faustino Rebello Barbosa and Jodo Ferreirados Santos, close supporters of Nunes Viana, to soften up opposition to the establishment of a town, the auctioning off of the river passage, and inclusion of that region in Minas Gerais (APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 135).

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gaining the upper hand over the wily old fox that was Manuel Nunes Viana.40 Nunes Viana was being isolated not only by the inexorable progress of social, political, and economic development. This isolation also found its expression in geographical and human terms. As regards the former, the strength of the poderosos do sertro was gradually being eroded as settlement occurred in the hinterlands, pushing the true frontier ever further to the west. As to the latter, fellow ranchers failed to comply with Nunes Viana's grandiose schemes for self aggrandisement and personal profit by manipulating the supply and market for cattle. Few possessed his financial reserves to maintain a protracted siege by freezing supplies, and preferredto throw in their lot with crown policies and preservea more or less regular income.41 Finally, that urgency engendered by the struggle between the Paulistas and the Emboabas, and which Nunes Viana had ridden to fame and fortune, had diminished over the next decade although it was never to die entirely. His deeds had dimmed in the memories of those who had participated; ever increasing influxes of people relegated the hostilities and their protagonists to oblivion. All of these factors contributed to facilitating the task of the incoming viceroy, the count of Sabugosa (1720-35). He called the old sertanista to his presence and gave him the city of Salvador as his prison. Nunes Viana posted bond of 20,000 cruzados not to leave the city without the express order of the king. A judicial enquiry into his actions was inconclusive and in 1725 Nunes Viana travelled to Lisbon ostensibly for the purpose of placing his six daughters in a convent, but also to plead his case before Dom Jodo V. In this he was successful. A royal decree of 3 November

40APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 120v-121r. Two close friends of Rodrigues Soares, Frutuoso Nunes and Joio Barreiros, sold up their possessions and intended to return to Portugal on the fleet of 1719. 411n a letter of September 27, 1718 Assumar noted this change, increasing hatred for Nunes Viana, refusal to abide by his policies, and that Nunes Viana would also lose from any siege (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 55-56.)

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1727 granted Nunes Viana permission to live out his last years on his ranches in the valley of the Rio Sao Francisco.42 It was a measure of the success of his balancing act that Nunes Viana received both official recognition and personal financial success. The king granted him a knighthood in the Order of Christ, letters patent as master of the field of the Rio Sdo Francisco, and the office of alcaide mdr of the township of Maragogipe in the Rec6ncavo of Bahia. He also received royal recognition in the concession of the proprietary post of scribe to the ouvidoria of the judicial district of Rio das Velhas.43His financial dealings were shrouded in secrecy, but there can be no doubt that he was a wealthy man. In 1717 the incoming governor of Minas Gerais noted that such were his riches that he had aroused many jealousies and enemies.44He was the owner of at least two cattlefazendas, was a partner in mining interests, and in 1721was reported by the viceroy to be able to muster 250 slaves.45An unusual measure of his financial independence was that he could pay the entry fees and sustain his 6

42Thus ended a long campaign, involving viceroys, governors-general, the king, the Overseas Council, and the count of Assumar. In 1717 viceroy Angeja was reprimanded for having failed to send requested information on Nunes Viana; he was informed that the Overseas Council thought Nunes Viana should be sent to Lisbon (Secretary of State to Angeja, April 14, 1717, APBOR, vol. I 1, doc. 57). Assumar recommended the same treatment (letter to count of Vimeiro, November 8, 1718, APMSG, vol. 11, fol. 71), and ordered the judge of Rio das Velhas to draw up a report summarizing testimony to send to Lisbon (January 21, 1719 idem, fols. 103v-105v). In January 1719 Assumar's devassas were taking effect but Nunes Viana and Rodigues Soares were spreading dissent prompting the governor to make the cryptic comment "ndo he novo haver mtos paos de dois bicos q' levdo e trazem de ambas as pte pa pescarem melhor nas aguas turbas" (APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 100v-101). Assumar received official recognition for his efforts, although abortive, to arrest the pair (APMSG, vol. 16, fol. 80). Sabugosa reported his action to the king by a letter on the fleet leaving Salvador in December 1723 (APBOR, vol. 18, doc. 6); should he leave within 5 months he would forfeit 6,000 cruzados to the Ribeira das Naus (APBOR, vol. 19, doc. 109). On the legal maneuvering, see APBOR, vol. 18, doc. 6; 96, doc. 34. The king granted Nunes Viana permission to come to Portugal (Secretary of State to Sabugosa, February 10, 1725) and Sabugosa granted this (Sabugosa to Secretary of State, July 11, 1725;APBOR, vol. 19, docs. 159, 159a). The royal letter of November 14, 1727 took the side of Nunes Viana, ordering Sabugosa to suspend the devassa (A PBOR, vol. 96, doc. 34). 43Boxer, The Golden Age, p. 365; Golgher, Guerra dos Emboabas, p. 247, and, for the scribal post the following references: Costa Matoso, fol. 101; APMSG, vol. 30, fol. 39v. 44APMSG, vol. 11, fols. 8v-9v. 45APBOR, vol. 13, doc. 188a. Manifests housed in the mint of Lisbon and recording remittances of bullion, coin, or precious stones from Brazil to Portugal contain but 6 referencesto Manuel Nunes Viana, and these are for modest sums, namely: 948$800 in 1731 and 1200$000 in 1735 (Archives of the Casa da Moeda, Lisbon, vol. 1999, nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, and vol. 2051, no. 230; vol. 2062, no. 121.). All such remittances were made to Francisco Fernandes Amorim and/or Jodo Rodrigues Bandeira.

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daughters in a convent in Santar6m, as well as paying for one son's education at Coimbra university.46 Nunes Viana was one of those lucky few who realized the hopes and aspirations of thousands who left Portugal and the Atlantic Islands in search of fame and fortune in the New World. He found both. Imbued with limitless energy, entrepreneurialinitiative, and what is referredto in modern management circles as "access vision", it would be all too easy to dismiss Nunes Viana as yet another gold rush success story. This is to do him an injustice. Possessor of keen intelligence, the ability to identify a general area with a potential for personal gain, and then pinpoint the specific and act quickly, perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nunes Viana's career was his only minor involvement with mining. Before his contemporaries he realized that the risk factor in mining was unreasonably high, that competition was severe, and that the industry would become the object of intense administrative and fiscal scrutiny. When all around him were succumbing to gold rush fever, his decision to insulate himself and maintain his independence was brilliant. By isolating himself geographically, he preservedhis physical independence; by feeding off, rather than committing himself to, mining he was the better able to cope with the vicissitudes of the industry and profit not only from its advances and its reverses in general terms, but also in specific regions at different times. It was in this ability to ride above the storm, to preserve options, and to move swiftly and simultaneously on different fronts that there lay not only Nunes Viana's secret for survival, but also the key to his relationship to royal government. While contributing to the imperial effort, or acting as consultant to viceroys or governors, Nunes Viana preserved a certain distance; in all his dealings he ensured there was still room for withdrawal rather than face commitment. In an oblique manner he contributed to the crown's efforts, but only in those areas which coincided with his own personal interests. At no time was he a true collaborator. This eternal search for compromise rather than commitment should not be interpreted to mean that Nunes Viana was incapable of taking a stand. We have seen his strength in this regardin the Guerra dos Emboabas. Similarly, in dealing with his fellow colonists, he did not flinch from forming alliances or resorting to physical force, excessively if needs be, to maintain his position.

46The admission fees alone were 16,000 cruzados. Placed in the convent of Sio Domingos das Donas of Santar6m, the six daughters were later to take legal action against their brother for failing to maintain them (APBOR, vol. 54, fols. 225-232; vol. 19, doc. 159;vol. 75, f. 188). The son Miguel graduated from Coimbra in 1737 (Francisco Morais, Estudantes da Universidade de Coimbra nascidos no Brasil) [ Brasilia, suplemento ao volume IV; (Coimbra, 1949), no. 858.]

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Finally, it is appropriate to mention what Nunes Viana was not. He

was no peasant bandit fighting on behalf of the people against an oppressive imperial establishment. While sharing some of the characteristics of the later cangaceiros, who were to provide E. J. Hobsbawm with the basis for a typology of "social banditry",it would be difficult to place Nunes Viana into the perhaps too neatly delineated categories of "avenger"or "noble robber".47 Nor can he be regardedas a prototype for later protagonists in the struggle for freedom and independence. His opportunism and his healthily developed talent for gain, coupled with his willingness to place accommodation above commitment effectively removed Nunes Viana from consideration as a "good" bandit either during his lifetime, or later as a popular hero to be eulogized as a national figure of protest. Nunes Viana was too deeply immersed in that exploitation and inequality which prevailed in colonial Brazil, and which were the pillars for a crown policy essentially based on the credo that ends justify means. Unlike a Manuel Beckman or a Joaquim Jose da Silva Xavier (known as Tiradentes), Nunes Viana knew no greater cause than his own interest. This inability to transcend the personal, the materialistic, and the local conspired against a niche being found for this fascinating personality in oral narratives or in scholarly studies. The trait of opportunism effectively denied Nunes Viana the position in history which he deserved; his penchant for accommodation and ambivalence led even his contemporaries to vacillate between regarding him as a paragon or a parasite of empire. The Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, Maryland A. J. R.
RUSSELL-WOOD

47E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York, 1959), chaps. 1-2; Bandits (New York, 1969). See also Linda Lewin, "The Oligarchical Limitations of Social Banditryin Brazil", Past and Present no. 82 (February 1979), pp. 116-46.

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