Interviews of Secretary William Cohen and

Chairman Hugh Shelton

Secretary Cohen was sworn in as the nation's 20th Secretary of Defense

on January 24, 1997.
Elected to the Senate in 1978

Chairman Shelton served as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from

October 1, 1997 to October 2001.
Served as Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations
Command (CINCSOCOM) from March 1996 to September 1997.

Topics of Inquiry

Overall: Was the military too reluctant to develop aggressive military

options to go after UBL and A-Q in Afghanistan?

Did you (Shelton) present options to the NSC that were essentially no
options at all?

What role did the CINCCENTCOM play in decisions made about military
options in Afghanistan?

Was the military too focused on force protection vis-a-vis counterterrorism?

Did any military planning on options take place during the Bush
Administration prior to 9-11?

Generally, what was your position in the major debates about the use of the
U.S. military in Afghanistan?

I: Khobar Towers (this was prior to their tenure)

A. Military options considered.

B. The issue of force protection.

C. Responsibility? When did you learn of who was responsible?

II: The East Africa Embassy Bombings

A. Policy Responses (PC meetings)

1. Who attended from OSD/DoD?

B. The decision-making on the use of force.

C. The decision to use the TLAMs as the method of retaliation.

D. Picking the Targets.

E. What was our objective?

F. International Reaction
1. "Wagging the Dog"

2. Monica Lewinsky

3. Was al-Shifa a mistake?

G. Military Options
1. Infinite Resolve
A. What was your position on these options?
1. What were your concerns about these options?

B. Describe discussions that took place at the NSC on

these options.

2. SOFs/JSOC
A. What was your opinion on the use of SOFs and JSOC
units in Afghanistan to go after UBL or A-Q?

3. What is your recollection about the AC-130 gun ships?

4. Navy submarines in the North Arabian Sea following the

Embassy bombings in 1998.

a. How long was the submarine in the North Arabian

Sea?
b. When was it moved? Please be specific.
 c. Who decided that the submarine would be taken off
status?
d. Who in the new Bush administration was told that
the submarine would be moved?
e. What is the normal procedure for this type of action?

5. TLAM strike opportunities lost: Spinning the gyroscopes

a. December 23, 1998
b. March 1999
c.May 14-18, 1999
d. Other possible opportunities (2x in February 1999?)
1. Refer to the Charlie Allen MFR
e. Why was there no strike?
1. Intelligence concerns? Collateral damage?
f. In your view, was the TLAM a viable option for going
after UBL and A-Q?

6. Any other understanding of interagency strategy for military

options following the East Africa bombings in 1998?

i. What was the overall interagency strategy?

1. How did we do?

ii. Is he aware of the interagency discussions Clarke

called "DELINDA?"

c. Discuss any other briefings given to the NSC at this

time on military options.

7. Kuster's memorandum
[ a. It is unlikely either Cohen or Shelton were aware of
this memorandum since it went up to the Under Secretary and
was sent back down. You can decide if it is worth asking.]

III. Actionable Intelligence

A. What were some of the problems in obtaining the intelligence

needed to plan a military operation in Afghanistan against UBL
and A-Q?
 B. What were the limits of HUMINT, SIGINT and COMINT?

C. Are the limits of AI an excuse for a lack of aggressive military

operations in Afghanistan?
IV. Millennium Plots 1999

A. Please provide an assessment of OSD/DoD's activities in relation

to the Millennium Plots.

B. Discuss your recollection of the December 13-15 conference on

Operation Able Danger.

V: The "Black Ninjas" (for Shelton)

A. Do you recall a statement by President Clinton to you (Shelton),

"You know, it would scare the shit out of A-Q if suddenly a bunch
of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters into the middle of their
camp. It would get us enormous deterrence and show the guys we
are not afraid." (See B&S, p. 318)
1. explain your reaction to this statement.

VI: The Predator

A. Did you support the use of the Predator in intelligence collection

the fall of 2000?

B. What position did you take on the idea of the unarmed Predator?

C. Did you support the use of the armed Predator in the spring of
2001?

D. What position did you take on the armed Predator debates?

1. Who should have the authority to shoot? CIA or DOD

2. Who should have the authority to determine when to shoot?
DCI, SecDef or President?
3. Funding.
4. The issue of assassination.

E. Discuss the telescope idea (that went nowhere).

 F. Do you recall a U-2 option over Afghanistan?

G. Discuss the suspension of Predator flights on October 7, 2000.

VII: USS The Sullivam

A. When did you have information about the attempted attack on The
Sullivans?

VIII: The Cole

A. Explain why there was no military response. Please be specific.

B. Were there options considered?

C. What were your concerns?

D. The 13 Options [Shelton]

1. Who tasked you to develop the options?
2. Who developed the options?
3. Did you brief these options to anyone? Who
a. If you did not brief the options, who did?
4. Were you tasked to do any further military planning on these
options?
5. We have had a difficult time locating these options. Can you
tell us what happened to them?
6. Were they briefed to the incoming Bush Administration?

E. Gregory Newbold's Options

1. In late 2000, LT General Gregory Newbold developed a
comprehensive strategy for CT. Do you recall seeing this
strategy?
a. Were you briefed on this?
b. Were these plans briefed to anyone in the NSC?
c. Do you know what happened to these plans?
d. Were they briefed to the incoming Bush
Administration?

G. When were you informed that A-Q was responsible for the Cole?
IX. Transition

A. What briefings did you give?

B. Who attended?

C. What was briefed?

D. How often did you brief?

E. Was CT discussed?

F. What priority was given to CT in the brief?

G. Was anyone in the new administration informed about the

submarine in the North Arabian Sea?

H. What in your view was the priority the new administration placed
on CT (as evidenced from the questions asked at the briefings)?

I. What were the major national security concerns of the new

administration (as evidenced from the questions asked at the
briefings)?

According to Benjamin and Simon, when Rumsfeld and

Wolfowitz came to office, their focus was missile defense and
military restructuring. Rumsfeld's attention was on military
doctrine, including existing guidance that US forces needed to
be able to fight two wars,
a. Please comment.

Also according to Benjamin and Simon, the last year of the

Clinton administration, the JSC began developing a project they
planned to launch in 2001. However, when they were briefed,
the Pentagon's new leadership killed the project,
a. Please comment.

X: Homeland Defense

A. Discussions in 1999 on a "CINC USA."

 B. Concerns about using the military in homeland security/homeland
defense missions.

C. What were President Clinton's concerns?

XI: The new administration (Shelton)

A. Why was there no response to the Cole when the new

administration took office?

B. Did the Bush Administration ever prepare military plans for A-Q?

C. NSPD-9: When did you begin preparing new military options as

directed by NSPD-9 for the Afghanistan sanctuary?

XII: The Summer of Threat (Shelton)

A. Explain your recollection of Dark Winter.

B. Provide a background of why the Fifth Fleet was put to sea.

XIII: September 4, 2001 PC (Shelton)

A. Do you recall discussions and the positions you took at that

meeting, particularly about the armed Predator?

XIV: Decision to go to War (Shelton)

A. What were the policy choices that were debated and that ultimately
led to the NCA decision to go to war?

B. What were the competing issues?

C. The military appeared to have no plans for a large operation in

Afghanistan. Any comments to this (see "Bush at War")?
XV: Questions Based on Secretary Rumsfeld's Memorandum
and Final Questions (Shelton and Cohen)

A. Is DoD winning the global war on terrorism (GWOT)?

1. Is DoD changing fast enough to fight the GWOT?
2. How is success in the GWOT measured? What are the
metrics by which success is measured?

B. Do you believe the U.S. has a broad, integrated and comprehensive

plan to combat terrorism? Are the various instruments working
well together (diplomacy, intelligence, military, financial, etc)?

C. What is your view on the establishment of NORTHCOM?

D. Give your view on the decision to make SOCOM the supported

command in the GWOT.

E. What role can the military play in winning the hearts and minds of
those who might one day become our enemies?

E. Lessons learned

F. Recommendations

G. What should we have asked?