C2012 Consti1 MVF Leonen Compiled Digests From Zai

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C2O12 COMPILED DIGESTS | MVF LEONEN | CONSTI I
Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal
166 SCRA 651
October 27, 1988
EN BANC/ Gancayco, J.

Petitioners:
Firdusi Smail Abbas et al.

Respondent:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)

Nature:
Special Civil Action for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts:
On October 9, 1987 the petitioiners filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in May 11, 1987 congressional elections by COMELEC.

SET was composed of 3 Justices of the SC and 6 Senators. (Justices Yap, Narvasa and Gutierrez; Senator
Estrada, Gonzales, Guingona, Lina Jr., Tamano and Ziga).

Senator Joseph Estrada resigned from the SET, and was replaced by Senator Enrile.

On November 17, 1987 petitioners filed with the SET a motion for disqualification or inhibation of the Senator-
members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the election contest on the ground that they are all
interested parties to the case.

Some members of the SET voluntarily inhibited themselves from participating in the hearing and deliberations
of the tribunal in the cases against them.

After the filing of respective memorandas and oral arguments, the motion for disqualification or inhibition and
motion for consideration of the petitioners were denied. Hence, the present case.

ssue:
Petitioners contend that consideration of public policy, fair play and due process require the mass
disqualification of the SET's Senator-members.

And that the SET's rules of procedure should be amended in order to permit the contest to be decided only by
the 3 Justice-members.

Ruling:
The petitioner's proposal is constitutionally infirm.

1. By providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those "judicial and "legislative components commonly share the duty and
uthority of deciding all contests relating ti the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.

2. The said intent is clearly signalled by the prescribed membership of the SET which is 2 to 1 (6
senators, 3 justices). t is an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded.

3. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of
the Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

4. Every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective or partial judgment.

RATO
The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justice-Members alone the power of valid juirsidiction
of a senatorial election contest.

Dispostion:
The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

Vote: 11; 3 took no part members of SET

Ang-Angco VS Castillo
Nov. 30, 1963

Original Petition. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with premilinary mandatory injunction..

Bautista Anbelo, J.

FACTS:

1. Oct, 8, 1956: Pepsi Cola Far East Trade Development Co., nc. wrote to the Sec. of Commerce and ndustry
requesting for a special permit for the release of 1,188 units of pepsi cola concentrates from the customhouse.
Those commodities were imported without dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange.

2. On the same date, same company and Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, wrote to Sec. of
Finance (Hernandez) who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bankasking for
authority to withdraw the cola concentrates.. Sen. Sabido, and later Sec. Hernandez, also wrote to Acting
Governor of BSP Dr. Andres Castillo

3. mport-Export Committee of the BSP thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the Monetary Board a
memorandum re joint petition of Sabido Law Office and company on the withdrawal of the concentrates,
stating that is has no objection to the petition.
-Monetray Board failed to act on the matter because the transaction did not involve any dollar
allocation or foreign exchange; so BSP could not act on it.

4. Oct. 13, 1956: Counsel of Pepsi Cola approached the Collector of Customs, sidro Ang-Angco, in an
attempt to authorize the immediate release of the concentrates. Ang Angco, seeing that the importation did
not have release certificate from BSP referred counsel to No-Dollar mport Office, supposedly where they can
get the release certificate.

5. Mr. Aguilles Lopez of No-Dollar mport Office, wrote to Collector of Customs stating that his office has no
objection to the release of the concentrates but that it could not take action because its office has no
jurisdiction over the case within the contemplation of RA 1410.

6. Counsel showed letter to Ang-Angco who was still hesistant; Ang-Angco contacted Sec. of Finance
Hernandez and read to the latter the letter; Hernandez verbally expressed his approval of the release of the
certificates . Although in doubt, Ang Angco finally authorized the release of the concentrates.

7. When Commissioner of Customs Manuel Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates, he
immediately ordered their seizures. Thereafter, he filed an administrative complaint against Ang Angco for
grave neglect of duty prejudicial to the customs service.
- Pres. Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee chaired by former SolGen Ambrosio
Padilla, to investigate Ang Angco. As a result, Ang Angco was suspended in Dec. 1956.

8. The Committee submitted to Pres. Magsaysay its report recommending the suspension of Ang Angco for
15 days without pay; Apr. 1, 1957: Ang-Angco was reinstated by Sec. Hernandez. The decision of the
administrative case was still pending unitl Magsaysay's death (March 17, 1957).

9. For three years Ang Angco had been discharging the duties of his office; Feb. 12, 1960: Exec. Sec. Natalio
Castillo rendered decision finding Ang Angco guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. He was
considered resigned from the date of notice.

10. Ang Angco wrote a letter to Pres. Garcia stating that his removal from office by Sec. Castillo deprives him
of his statutory right to have his case decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service and right to appeal to
the Civil Service Board of Appeals.

11. Feb. 16, 1960: Sec. Castillo denied request for reconsideration; Ang Angco again sent memorandum to
Pres. Garcia; Sec. Castillo by authority of Pres. On July 1, 1960 denied the appeal: Presdient's power of
control over all executive departments can take direct action and dispose of administrative case . This power
of control can not be divested from Presdient nor can the same be diminished.

12. Thus, in violation of due process, Ang-Angco instituted petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. Denied request for injunction.

ARGUMENTS on due process

1. Ang Angco belongs to classified service because he was not a Presidential Appointee but was rather
appointed by the Sec. of Finance under the Revised Administrative. Thus his removal from office can only be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959.

2. Sec. 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 vests upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employers in the classified service
and to remove, separate, and suspend "except as may be provided by law.
- Revised Administrative Code: President has power to remove officials from office conformably to
law/in accordance with the Civil Service Law ---- that not blanket authority but still subject to law

3. Sec. 18 of the same Act provides that appeals can be made to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose
decision is final.

4. This Act does not provide any appeal to the Pres. Or confer to the latter the power to review motu proprio
unlike the Coomonwealth Act. 598 which was expressly repealed.

4. Therefore, Exec. Secretary violated the guaranty vouchsafed in the Constitution to classified service by
violating the provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests upon the Commissioner of the Civil Service
exclusive jurisdiction as regards classified service.

5. President therefore cannot exercise its power of control over classified service.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: - on power of control

1. Civil Service Act does not apply to power of control by President because to hold otherwise would be to
deprive the President of his power of control.

2. Whether the officers or employees are presidential appointees or belong to the classified service, as long
as they are all officers and employees in the executive department, they all come under the control of the
President and his power of removal may be exercised over them directly.

3. This power of control granted to the President can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress;
if Congress limits such power, then this is tantamount to amending the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to suspend or remove all employees or officials in executive
departments including those in the classified service.

RATIO: The power of the President to remove all employees or officials in the executive department
shall be limited by law and by the Civil Service Act of 1959.

1. Sec. 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 vests upon the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employers in the classified service.
2. Power of Commissioner to remove, separate, and suspend "except as may be provided by law.
- Revised Administrative Code: President has power to remove officials from office conformably to
law/in accordance with the Civil Service Law ---- that not blanket authority but still subject to law.

ISSUE 2: WON power of control (Sec. 10 Art. VII) as conferred by the Constitution to the President
gives the President the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.

RATIO2 : The power of control as provided in the Constitution shall mean control over the acts of the
subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself.

1. power pertains only to the power to modify or alter or nullify what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
2. Pres. s given direct control.whereupon he can "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or
offices.
3. President's power refers only to matters of general policy direct course of action or method followed by a
govt body or individual.
4. No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by
law.

ADDTL ARGUMENT: power to remove is inherent in power to appoint (Lacson v Romero).

- but not those who are under classified service coz they are not pres. Appointees.
-Congress may by law vest the appt of inferior officers in Pres. Alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
dept.
-Constitutional authority in Congress to vest the appt implies the authority to limits, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact.

Araneta v. Dinglasan
Date: August 26, 1949
Facts:
This is a consolidation of 5 cases that the Court chose to dispose of jointly.
Petitioners challenge the validity of 4 executive orders issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671.
1. First 2 cases involve EO No. 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
The petitioner in this cases (J. Antonio Araneta) is under prosecution in the CF of Manila for violation
of the provision of the said EO.
2. nvolved in the third case is EO No. 225 which appropriates funds for the operation of the Govt of the
Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes. The petitioner (Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr.) as a taxpayer, elector, and president of the
Nacionalista party applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from
disbursing this EO.
3. The fourth case involves EO No. 192 which aims to control exports from the Philippines. Petitioner
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office
and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner, which under
said EO is forbidden.
4. n the last case is EO No. 226 which appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and
incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov 1949. Petitioner (Antonio Barredo)
as a tax-payer and voter asks the Court to prevent the disbursal, spending, and disposal of the said
amount by the respondents (COMELEC, Auditor General and nsular Treasurer of the Philippines).
Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total
Emergency as a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules
and Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have any force and effect, thereby rendering the
assailed Executive Orders null and void.

ssue: WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when Congress held its regular
session
Held: YES. Section 26 of Article V of the 1935 Constitution provides: In time of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.
x The words "limited period are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in
order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp). t is to be presumed
that CA 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The assertion that new legislation is needed to
repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either because it would then be easier for
Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back because while Congress might delegate its
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote..
x There is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly
restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:
The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of
the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein
granted.
x Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the
enactment of the Emergency Powers Act stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No.
671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases
connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote
that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that
period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be
prolonged.
x Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he
issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would
hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." t can easily be discerned in this
statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific
view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet.

Decision: Petitions granted.


Aytona v. Castillo
Date: January 19, 1962
Petitioner: Dominador Aytona
Respondent: Andres Castillo et al
Nature: Action for quo warranto
Ponente: Bengzon
Facts:
Dec 29, 1961: Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of Central
Bank. Aytona took oath on same day. Pres Garcia also appointed numerous others amounting to 350
"midnight appointments.
Pres. Garcia sent to Commission on Appointments which was not in session, the appointments for
confirmation.
Dec 30, 1961 (noon): Pres. Diosdado Macapagal assumed office.
Dec 31, 1961: Pres. Macapagal issued Admin Order No. 2 recalling all ad interim appointments made
by Pres Garcia after Dec 13, 1961 (when Pres. Macapagal was proclaimed by Congress) up to Dec
31, 1961.
Jan 1,1962: Pres. Macapagal proclaimed Castillo as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. Castillo
qualified immediately.
Issue: WON an ad interim appointment done by an outgoing President is valid and effective when such
appointment is done when the Congress has already adjourned. [NO]
Ratio:
After the proclamation of the new president by Congress, the incumbent president is no more than a
"care-taker.
The Commission of Appointments that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the
time of the appointment.
Under Padillas concurring opinion:
The term "recess in Sec 10(4) Art V of Consti (Now Sec 16(2) Art V of Consti) is the period of time
from the adjournment of the Congres to the opening session, regular or special, of the same
Congress.
Under Bautistas concurring opinion:
Term "recess means a temporary dismissal and not adjournment sine die.
COA is not a continuing body but one that co-exists with Congress that has created it. When the
Congress has adjourned sine die, the COA cease to exist until the next session of the new Congress.
Disposition: Action dismissed.
Dissenting Opinions
Concepcion:
An ad interim appointment, made during recess of Congress, is complete and irrevocable upon the
performance of the last act required by law from the appointing power, even w/o previous notice to the
appointee, or acceptance by him, or without subsequent action of the legislative dep't that may
terminate its effectivity.
There is a difference between nomination and appointment. n appointment, it is final and conclusive
without confirmation.
COA being a continuing or a not does not affect the determination of the case.
Sec 4 Art X of Consti (now Sec 2(3) Art X) provides "no officer or employee in Civil Service shall be
removed except for cause as provided by law. n Erana v Vergel De Dios, it was stated that
revocation of an appointment should be communicated to appointee before the moment he qualified
and that revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal and must be judged according to rules
applicable to removal. n present case, the petitioner has already qualified, therefore, the revocation of
his appointment should have been subjected to the rules on removal.
This is a political case involving wisdom of executive in making the numerous appointments. t should
not have been adjudicated.
Barrera:
Citing Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives, a legislative interpretation by the US
Senate, recess shall mean Congress is not in session. PEROD. There should be no distinction
between sessions of one congress to that of another. When the law makes no distinction, no
distinction should be made.
Concurs with Justice Concepcion's stand that the case involves a political question. The remedy is
with the Commission on Appointments to which the appointments have been submitted.

Carino v. Insular Government
212 U.S. 449
Date: February 23, 1909
Ponente: Holmes, J.
>The case brings up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine slands affirming a judgment of the
Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.

Facts:
Mateo Carino is an gorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years
before the Treaty of Paris, and have cultivated parts of the land and had used parts for pasturing cattle. They
all had been recognized as owners by the gorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in
accordance with gorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and
although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in
force, nothing seems to have come of it. n 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the
mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory
title, it is said.

ssue: Won petitioner owns the land

Held: YES.

Government: The decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good;
the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land; the United States
succeeded to the title of Spain, and so the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to
respect.

Court:
x Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the Philippine
Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns
property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the
whole archipelago. Thus, he is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.
x Sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the
United States asserts that Spain had such power.
x Under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be
deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the
Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
x Bill of rights provides that "no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws."
x t might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
x The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly
that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. n other words,
Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even
into tenants at will.
x n the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546: "Where such possessors shall not be able
to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription."
x No sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that prescription was recognized in the Philippines in regard
to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
x The decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine slands. those who have been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty.
Art. 5. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings
that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a document of title or lose his land.
However, it does not appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied.
x Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are
unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury "will reassert the
ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it does not reserve. The
applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made.
x Natural construction of the decree shows that that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all
possession, recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then
suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their possession and
acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
x The words "may prove" in Articles 4 and 5 might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
x Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years, and against
the government which seeks to deprive him of it.
x Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine slands prior
to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for more
than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the continued possession thereof.

Decision: Judgment reversed.

Brillantes v. COMELEC
Date: June 15, 2004
Petitioner: Sixto Brillantes
Respondent: COMELEC
Intervenors: Concepcion, De Venecia, Angara, Galvez Tan, Drilon, San Juan, Gonzales, sleta and Bernas
Ponente: Callejo Sr.
Nature: Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Facts:
Dec 23, 1997: RA 8436 was promulgated. t is an act authorizing COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) in the Nat'l and Local elections.
The failure of the machines to read correctly deferred implementation.
On Oct 2002, COMELEC released a resolution dividing the automated election system into three
phases:
PHASE 1: registration and voters validation
PHASE 2: voting and counting
PHASE 3: electronic transmission of results
Supreme Court nullified the resolution released by COMELEC awarding Mega-Pacific Consortium the
contract for the PHASE 2 of AES.
Even without Phase 1 and 2, COMELEC decided to push through with PHASE 3. nstead of it being an
"official electronic transmission of results, COMELEC labeled it as a "quick-count and unofficial.
Issues:
(1) WON COMELEC has the power to directly canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President and
to conduct a quick count [NO]
(2) WON Comelec can reapportion its savings to the funding of AES [NO]
Ratio:
(1) Phase 3 allows the use of the third copy of the election returns, intended for the COMELEC, as basis
for encoding the transmission of advanced precinct results, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes
by Congress.
The power to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President is exclusively lodged in the
Congress as mandated by the Constitution (Sec 4(4) Art V).
The official canvassing (President and Vice-President) is granted to the Congress and not the
COMELEC; the unofficial canvassing is also not granted.
Under Sec 27 of RA No 7166, the citizen's arm has the exclusive rights to conduct a quick count.
(2) The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law as provided in Sec 25(5) Art
V. The COMELEC will be using the funds for the unofficial canvassing of votes while it is provided in
that such funds will be used to fund the official canvassing of votes.
Disposition: petition granted.

Chavez vs. Commission on Elections

Bidin, J.: 1992

G.R. No. 105323: Petition for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections and application for T.R.O.
enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24
th
highest senatorial candidate

Facts:
1. May 5, 1992 - Supreme Court issued a
Resolution disqualifying Melchor Chavez
from running for Senator in the May 11,
1992 elections.
2. May 6 -Respondent Comelec received the
above-mentioned resolution. Likewise,
petitioner filed an urgent motion with the
Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate
through the fastest available means the
May 5 SC Resolution to all its agents and
the general public and (2) order said
election officials to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates tally sheets, election
returns, and "to count all votes cast for the
disqualified Melchor Chavez in favor of
Francisco . Chavez.
3. May 8 -Comelec resolved to delete the
name of Melchor Chavez from the list of
qualified candidates. However, it failed to
order the crediting of all "Chavez votes in
favor of petitioner as well as the
cancellation of Melchor's name in the list of
qualified candidates. Thus, the name of
Melchor remained undeleted in the
candidate's list on Election Day. Confusion
arose as the 'Chavez' votes were either
declared stray or invalidated by the Board
of Election nspectors (BEs).
4. May 11 -Comelec Commissioner Rama
issued a directive over radio and TV
ordering all "Chavez votes to be credited in
favor of petitioner. Petitioner maintained
that the directive failed to reach all of
170,354 precincts nationwide. Hence,
"Chavez votes weren't credited in favor of
petitioner.
5. May 12 -Comelec issued another
Resolution directing all municipal and city
election registrars throughout the country to
examine the minutes of voting submitted by
the BEs and to credit all "Chavez votes in
favor of petitioner. Petitioner contends that
this proved futile because it didn't reach all
election precincts and that the minutes of
voting didn't indicate the number of
"Chavez votes which were declared stray
or invalidated.
6. May 14 -Petitioner wrote Comelec
requesting the latter to devise ways and
means in crediting "Chavez votes in his
favor but the respondent failed to act on
said letter/complaint.
7. May 22 -Petitioner filed an urgent petitioner
before Comelec praying the latter to (1)
implement its May 12 Resolution with costs
de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes in
13 provinces including the NCR and to
scan for the "Chavez votes for purposes of
crediting the same in his favor; (3) make
the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to
suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning
candidates.
8. Dissatisfied with the failure of Comelec to
act on his petition, petitioner filed this
urgent petition for prohibition and
mandamus.
9. May 30 -Respondent Comelec dismissed
Frank's urgent petition dated May 22.
10. June 4 -SC issued a TRO enjoining
respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
24
th
winning senatorial candidate and set
the case for hearing on June 9, 1992. On
the same day, petitioner filed a
manifestation and prayed that the petition
ad cautelam at bar be considered a regular
petition.
11. June 8 -Sen. Agapitos Aquino (ranked 24
th

winning candidate) prayed for the dismissal
of the instant petition on the ground that the
law does not allow pre-proclamation
controversy involving the election of
members of the Senate.
12. June 9 -Oral arguments were held. Court
resolved to lift the TRO in the afternoon.

Issues:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the case. (None)
Whether or not the petitioner has a cause
of action. (None)

Ratio decidendi:
The S.C. cannot review the decisions or
orders arising from the Comelecs exercise of its
administrative functions.
Reasoning:
Respondent Commission's alleged failure
to implement its own resolution is
undoubtedly administrative in nature,
hence, beyond judicial interference
The SC can review the decisions or orders
of the Comelec only in cases of grave
abuse of discretion committed by it in the
discharge of its quasi-judicial powers
Moreover, Comelec has in fact ordered the
deletion of Melchor's name not only on the
official list of candidates, but also on the
election returns, tally sheets, and certificate
of canvass. Hence, petitioner's allegation
doesn't hold water

Ratio decidendi:
While COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction
over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials, pre-proclamation cases arent
allowed in elections for President, VP, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives.
Reasoning:
Section 15 of R.A. 7166 provides that pre-
proclamation cases aren't allowed for the
above-mentioned officials. What is allowed
is the correction of "manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns.
t is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer
doesn't call for the correction of "manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass or ERs
before the Comelec but for the re-opening
of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the
ballots contained therein.
The petitioner has no cause of action; the
controversy presented being one in the
nature of a pre-proclamation.
n a pre-proclamation controversy, it is
axiomatic that the Comelec is not to look
beyond or behind election returns which
are on their face regular and authentic
returns.

Ratio decidendi:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. (Sec. 17, Article V, 1987-C)
Reasoning:
t is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
petitioner involving contest relating to the
election of a member of the Senate.
Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest before the SET
after the winning senatorial candidates
have been proclaimed.

Precedent: Sanchez vs. Commission on Elections
(1987)
Disposition: Petition dismissed. (SC voting
unanimously)

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA

Date: March 16, 1994
Petitioner: Laguna Lake Development Authority
Respondents: Hon. Serapio, Presiding Judge
RTC, Hon. Asistio Jr., Mayor of Caloocan and/or
City Government of Caloocan
Ponente: Romero
Nature: review of the decision of Court of Appeals
Facts:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady
of Lourdes Parish filed a complaint with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) that seeks to stop the operation of
the 8.5 ha open garbage dumpsite in Tala
Estate.
LLDA conducted an on-site investigation
and found out that the liquid that seeps
from the dumpsite could considerably affect
the water nearby. LLDA also found out that
dumpsite was also opened without the
Environmental Compliance Certificate from
the Environmental Management Bureau of
DENR (required under PD No. 1586) and
clearance from LLDA (required under RA
4850).
LLDA then issued a Cease and Desist
Order, the dumping operation stopped but
after a while it resumed since the LLDA, the
City Government of Caloocan, and Task
Force Camarin weren't able to settle the
problem. The LLDA then issued another
order reiterating the previous Cease and
Desist Order and enforced it, thus
prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump
trucks into the Tala Estate.
City Government filed action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist order to the RTC. RTC issued a TRO
in the implementation of the Cease and
Desist Order. LLDA filed a motion to
dismiss but it was subsequently denied.
RTC then referred the case to CA for
proper disposition.
CA's ruling: RTC had no jurisdiction to
issue the TRO. LLDA has no power and
authority to issue a Cease and Desist
Order under RA No. 4850.
Issue: WON LLDA has the power to issue a Cease
and Desist Order [YES]
Ratio:
The City Government of Caloocan claims
that it is within their power as a
governmental unit to determine the effects
of the dumpsite on the environment since it
has a territorial jurisdiction.
The LLDA has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. This is given by its
special charter.
The fundamental rule is that an
administrative agency has only powers as
expressly granted by the law, but it is also a
settled rule that an administrative agency
has powers that are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers.
The power granted over an administrative
agency supersedes the power of territorial
jurisdiction of the local government when
such administrative agency's power is
necessarily implied from the powers
expressly granted by the administrative
agency's charter.
Disposition: petition granted.

Daza v. Singzon

Date: December 21, 1989
Petitioner: Rep. Raul Daza
Respondent: Rep. Luis Singzon and Hon. Raoul Victorino (Secretary of Commission on Appointments)
Ponente: Cruz
Nature: Petition for prohibition and injunction
Facts:
House of Representatives appointed Rep. Daza as representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission
of Appointments.
Thereafter, 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
leaving Liberal Party with only 17 members. LDP had 159 members at that time.
The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments and
withdrew the seat occupied by Rep. Daza. Rep. Singzon replaced Rep. Daza, representing LDP.
Issue: WON a political party, as stated in Sec 18 Art V, should be registered in the COMELEC and should have
political stability before it have representation in the Commission on Appointments [NO]
Ratio:
The change in the political alliances in the House of Representatives reflected a permanent change.
The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership.
The COMELEC has also granted the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.

DE AGBAYANI vs. PNB

Date: April 29, 1971

Plaintiff: Francisca Serrano de Agbayani

Defendants: Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan

Ponente: Fernando, J.

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First nstance of Pangasinan

Facts:
x n 1939, De Agbayani obtained a loan from PNB secured by a real estate mortgage.
x n 1944, the loan matured but PNB could not collect because of the war.
x n 1945, Pres. Osmea issued EO No. 32 (Debt Moratorium Law) suspending the payment of loans for 4
years due to the ravages of the war.
x n 1948, RA No. 342 extended the debt moratorium for another 8 years (or up to 1956).
x n 1953, however, the Supreme Court declared RA No. 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter vs.
Esteban.
x n 1959, or 15 years after the date of maturity, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in the
office of the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan.
x De Agbayani countered with a suit against both PNB and the Provincial Sheriff
o the main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, 15
years having elapsed from the date of maturity.
x De Agbayani sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the Provincial Sherriff.
x PNB in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit
o the main allegation being that if the period of debt moratorium under an Executive Order and later
an Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be deducted from the computation, then the
right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting.
x The lower court decided the suit in favor of De Agbayani, permanently enjoining the Provincial Sheriff
from proceeding with an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Issues:
1. WON a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects.
2. WON a statute valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be declared
unconstitutional.

Held:
1. YES. A statute though subsequently declared unconstitutional shall have legal effects.
2. YES. A statute valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered circumstances, be declared
unconstitutional.

Ratio:
Issue 1:
x The orthodox view on an unconstitutional act is that it cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties.
Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
x HOWEVER, the orthodox view may not be sufficiently realistic. It is an accepted doctrine that prior to the
declaration of unconstitutionality the act is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
o Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality, the act must have been in force and complied with.
t has been acted upon by the public and accepted as valid.
o t is entitled to obedience and respect until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its
unconstitutionality.
o Because the judiciary is the organ which has the final say on the validity of an act, a period of
time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity.
o It would be to deprive the law of fairness and justice if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality.
Issue 2:
x There is a presumption of constitutionality (or that the "reasonableness test is satisfied).
o The legislature is not likely to allow an enactment suffering from infirmity.
o As its constitutionality is conditioned on its being reasonable, which in turn is dependent on actual
situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently,
due to altered circumstances, be stricken down.
At the time of the issuance of EO and the passage of RA, there was a factual justification
for the debt moratorium.
n 1953, however, the debt moratorium did not satisfy the rational basis test (e.g.
"unreasonable, oppressive) so that it was declared unconstitutional.

Disposition:
x During the 8-year period when the debt moratorium was in force, prescription did not run. The decision
appealed from is reversed and the suit dismissed.

Demetria vs Alba
Feb. 27, 1987.

Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec.
44 of PD 1177

Fernan, J.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners filed petition as concerned citizens, taxpayers, members of the Natl Assembly.

2. They were assailing PD 1177, Sec. 44 par. 1 which allegedly authorizes President to transfer appropriated
funds indiscriminately from one department to another; this is purportedly a violation of Art. V Sec. 16(5) 1973
Consti.

3. Sept. 19, 1985: SolGen questioned legal standing of petitioners; that petitioners were merely asking for an
advisory opinion since there is no justiciable controversy; PD 1177 enacted pursuant to 1973 Consti.

4. Feb. 27, 1986: Court required petitioners to reply to the Comment. Petitioners also noted that there was need
to put the case on hold bec of the change of the administration.

5. SolGen filed a rejoinder with motion to dismiss arguing that case is already moot and academic because 1973
Consti has been abrogated by the Freedom Consti on March 25, 1986.

ISSUE 1: WON petitioners have legal standing

RATIO 1: Petitioners shall have legal standing as taxpayers.
- There are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds.
- expenditures of public funds constituting misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer
- raxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditures of money raised by taxation

ISSUE 2: WON the Freedom Constitution of 1986 rendered the petition moot and academic.

RATIO 2: The abrogation of the old Constitution by the 1986 Freedom Constitution shall not render the
petition moot and academic.
- The new 1987 Constitution as ratified by the people on Feb. 2, 1987 carries Art. V Sec. 16(5) 1973
Consti. (now, Art. V, Sec. 25 par 5)

ISSUE 3: WON the President has the authority to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department to
another, as provided by PD 1177.

RATIO 3: Transfer of funds from one item to another, as provided by PD 1177, shall not be allowed except
when the transfer is made to augment an item and when the transferred funds are savings from the
original item.
- PD 1177, therefore, not only disregards the standard of the fundamental law amounting to undue
delegation of legislative powers but also goes beyond the tenor thereof.
- these standards are designed as safeguards to forestall abses in the expenditures of public funds.
- PD 1177 results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary
performance.

ISSUE 4: WON the court can interfere with the conduct of a coordinate political department in the
performance of its duties.

RATIO 4: The Court shall have the power to interfere with a coordinate department where such
department has gone beyond the limits of its authority as provided by the Constitution.
- each coordinate branch of govt is supreme while acting within the limits of its authority.
- but if that coordinate pol branch goes beyond its power, it is incumbent upon the Court to declare such
acts unconstitutional; this is not supremacy of the Court but Consti Supremacy, enforcing or administering
the will of the people.

Judgment: Petition granted.


Employers Confederation of the Phils. v National Wages and Productivity Commission

Date: 24 September 1991
Petitioner: Employers Confederation of the Philippines
Respondent: National Wages and Productivity Commission and
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR,
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
Nature: PETTON for review from the decision of NWPC
Facts:
ECOP is questioning the validity and is praying for the nullification of Wage Order No. NCR-01-A
promulgated pursuant to RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) specifically providing for the P17-increase of wages
from the statutory minimum up to the P125-wage rate. ECOP alleges board's excess authority when it
established a price ceiling in effect preempting collective bargaining agreements. t correctly points out that
wage-fixing is a legislative function and it prays for reinstatement of Wage Order No. NCR-01 (P17-increase in
minimum wage, NCR). Solicitor General argues that the salary-celining method used by the board is aimed at
correcting wage distortions that cause labor disputes.
ssue: 1. Whether or not board exceeded authority in establishing price ceiling
2. Whether or not salary-cap method serves purposes of RA No. 6727
Held: 1. Nay
2. Yea (on speculation)
Ratio: 1. While wage-fixing is indeed a legislative function, legislative may "delegate the power to fix rates
provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards," ergo the existence of Art. 124,
RA No. 6727, Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. Establishing price-ceiling is within bounds of board
authority designated by Congress. t is not the intent of the Congress to abdicate this duty of wage-fixing, but as
Cruz, J. observed, "...national legislature has found it more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
power of subordinate legislation," that is, leaving the matter to the expertise of experts.
2. Policy is reasonable. Will be taken up in the future if deemed perceptibly unfair to management.
Judgment: Petition denied.

Bengson III v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Date: 07 May 2001
Petitioner: Antonio Bengson
Respondent: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
Teodoro C. Cruz
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
Nature: SPECAL CVL ACTON in the SC. Certiorari.
Facts:

Teodoro C. Cruz
-born 27 April 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents; Filipino citizen under Section 1(2) Article
V of the 1987 Constitution:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines: (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines; XXX"
-enlisted in the US Marine Corps on 5 November 1985, taking oath of allegiance to the US without RP's
consent; lost Filipino citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4):
"How citizenship may be lost.--A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events: (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country
XXX"
-served until October 1993; naturalized as as American citizen on 5 June 1990
-returned to the Philippines upon discharge from USMC; reacquired his citizenship through RA No. 2630--
took and registered taking oath of allegiance to RP with the Local Civil Registry and executed Affidavit of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
-filed mayoral certificate of candidacy for 1995 local elections, declaring himself a naturalized Filipino
citizen; won and served one term
-filed congressional certificate of candidacy for 1998 elections, declaring himself a natural-born Filipino
citizen; won over petitioner by 26, 671 votes
-made respondent to case for Quo Warranto filed by petitioner with the HRET; citizenship assailed
-won case on 2 March 2000; HRET dismissed petition, declared respondent elected representative;
denied motion for reconsideration file by petitioner
-now respondent in the SC, petitioner alleging HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction
ssue: 1. Whether or not respondent can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen upon reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship
2. Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
rendering a decision favorable to respondent
Held: 1. Yea
2. Nay
Ratio: 1. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. Since respondent was originally a natural-
born Filipino, upon repatriation, he is restored to being a natural-born Filipino. Moreover, there are only two kinds
of citizens. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
2. HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess jurisdiction in initially deciding the
case since it is constitutionally mandated and authorized to be the sole judge of all election contests, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.

Panganiban, concurring: Repatriation is not a grant of a new citizenship but the recovery of the original
citizenship. Constitution does not qualify repatriates separately becasue they naturally reacquire their orignial
classification. HRET is sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members and thus did not commit grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case. t would be better to
err in facor of the people's choice than to be right to complex but little understood legalisms because piblic interest
and soverein will should, at all tiems, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. Globalization is
a trend, even in politics; hence we should welcome former Filipino citizens who desire to serve the Filipino people.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting: Respondent's act of retaking the oath, filing with the Local Registry and executing
an affidavit for the same purpose of reacquiring his natural-born Filipino citizenship clearly qualifies that
respondent had to perform acts to reacquire his citizenship. n plain construction of the words of the Constitution,
a citizen who has to peform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship is a naturalized Filipino.
Furthermore, also by the same plain construction, the words from birth implies that the citizenship must be
continuous and without any interruption. Quoting Justices Vitug and Melo, who were members of the HRET,
"Stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and
permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the
government directly involved and given the delicate task of legislation."

Judgment: Petition denied.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v Lim

Date: 24 October 2003
Petitioner: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et al.
Respondent: Victor Lim (President, Bases Conversion Dev't Authority), et al.
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
Nature: SPECAL CVL ACTON in the SC. Prohibition, Mandamus and Declaratory Relief.
Facts:
RA No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 accelerated the
conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations, and the John Hay extension camp into more productive uses
and created the Bases Conversion Development Authority. The same act also created the Subic Special
Economic Zone (Subic SEZ) and exempted it from local and national taxes and granted it other such incentives.
Other SEZs in Clark, Wallace Air Station, and Camp John Hay are to be created and declared through
Presidential Proclamations. Pursuant to the said act, Proclamation No. 420 Series of 1994 (July) creates and
designates 288.1 hectares of Camp John Hay as SEZ. BCDA enters into a Memorandum of Agreement and
Escrow Agreement, and subsequently a Joint Venture Agreement with foreign companies Tuntex and Asiaworld
for the setting up of company Baguio nternational Development and Management corporation which would lease
areas within the SEZs for the purpose of the development into tourist and recreation spots. Several resolutions
were passed by the Baguio City sanggunian from September 1993 to May 1994 in relation to the said
arrangement: 1) prayer of exclusion of all baranggays partly or totally within CJH; 2) prayer of abdication, waiver
or quitclaim of BCDA over residential lots in 9 barrangays surrounding CJH; 3) 15-point concept in the
development of CJH, liability of businesses for local taxes, mentioned inter alia; 4) request to mayor of
determination of applicable realty taxes; and 5) statement of support for President Ramos's Proclamation.
ssue: 1. Whether or not petitioners disregarded the hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion and
administrative remedies
2. Whether or not the grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ is Constitutional
Held: 1. Nay
2. Nay
Ratio: 1. RA No. 7227 specifically grants only the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the controversies in the
development of the said military reservations. Moreover, the same Court has full discretionary power to take
cognizance of petitions filed to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant.
2. Tax exemption grant is unconstitutional. ncentives under RA. No. 7227 are exclusive to the Subic
SEZ. More importantly, only the Legislative can, through a concurrence of a majority of all its members (Art. V,
Sec. 28 (4)), grant tax exemptions explicitly expressed in statutory provisions. Tax exemption granted by the 2nd
sentence of Proclamation No. 420, Sec. 3 in the case-at-hand declared void for being violative of the
Constitution.
Judgment: Petition partly granted.

EXECUTIVE

Drilon v Court of Appeals

Petitioner: Franklin Drilon (Justice Secretary), Silvestre Bello (Justice Undersecretary), Aurelio Trampe (loilo
Acting City Fiscal)
Respondent: Court of Appeals, Rodolfo Ganzon, Raul Paredes
Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
Nature: PETTON to review CA decision
Facts:
n 1973, Raul Paredes and Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with double murder before Military
Commission No. 34 from which the former was acquitted and the latter was sentenced to life imprisonment with
hard labor. Ganzon served sentence until placement on house arrest on 25 March 1978. Same private
respondent joined the KBL party in 1985 as campaign manager and was granted pardon by President Marcos on
27 January 1986. n 1988, when administration changed, Justice Secretary Ordonez ordered Fiscal Trampe to
conduct preliminary investigation on private respondent for the same charge of double murder. Private
respondents' motions for dismissal were denied despite claims of acquittal and absolute pardon, respectively.
ssue: 1. Whether or not Government may proceed criminally against the private respondents despite a verdict
earlier rendered by Military Commission No. 34
2. Whether or not Ganzon has completed the service of his sentence
3. Whether or not Ganzon has been pardoned
Held: 1. Nay
2. Yea
3. Unneccessary to consider
Ratio: 1. n Tan v Barrios, the Court ruled that: Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the the
sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered XXX It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it
as a authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial
and regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences
imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Hence, since neither the private respondents nor the State
allege a violation of Constitutional rights, retrial/reinvestigation cannot be reordered.
2. n Cruz v Enrile, the Court held that therein petitioners have: the option either to complete the service
of their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Ganzon has apparently accepted the option to complete
service of his sentence. Six years of service in the military stockade before his house arrest and pardon suffice to
imply that he was willing to serve his sentence fully. Subsequent release ordered by then Pres. Marcos
unavoidably commuted Ganzon's life imprisonment to six years; hence, Ganzon has completed sentence and
cannot be reinvestigated.
3. The pardon alleged to be subsequently awarded to Ganzon is somewhat irrelevant upon acceptance
that his sentence has been commuted or considerably reduced by Pres. Marcos. The "pardoning power" of the
Executive that includes grants of reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remits fines and forfeitures in Art. V,
Sec. 19 of the Constitution renders the commutation of Ganzon's sentence final and unappealable and makes the
absolute pardon alleged uneccessary to consider.
Judgment: Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND AUTONOMY

Tan v COMELEC

Petitioner: Yusop Jikiri, Abdel Anni, Abraham Daud, Lukman Omar, Onnih Ahmad,
Basaron Burahan, Den Rasher Salim, Talib Hayudini, Rizal Tingkahan, and Barlie Nahudan
Respondent: Abdusakur M. Tan, Abdulwahid Sahidulla, and Abraham Burahan
Commission on Elections
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
Nature: 1. PETTON for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. njunction and/or TRO and/or status quo ante
order on June 28 COMELEC order. (GR Nos. 148575-76; herein respondents are therein
petitioners except for herein public respondent, herein petitioners are therein respondents)
2. PETTON for certiorari. TRO and/or Preliminary njunction, nullification of October 3 and
April 17 COMELEC orders, dismissal of SPA Nos. 01-257 and 01-265 (GR Nos. 152882-83, same
petitioners and respondents herein)
Facts:
During May 2001 elections, private petitioners and respondents ran for the office in Sulu as in the ff:
Governor: Jikiri, Tan
Vice-Governor: Anni, Sahidulla
Representative, 1st district: A. Burahan
Sanggunian, 1st district: Salim, Hayudini, Tingkahan, Nahudan
Sanggunian, 2nd district: Daud, Omar, Ahmad, B. Burahan

Events transpire as follows:

-17 May 2001: private respondents herein file with the COMELEC petition to declare failure of elections in
Luuk (SPA No. 01-257)
-18 May 2001: private respondents herein file with the COMELEC petition to declare failure of elections in
Parang and ndanan (SPA No. 01-265)
-19 May 2001: private respondents herein move for suspension of proclamation of winning candidates;
motion granted, COMELEC ordered suspension of proclamation of all elective positions in the province
to the Provincial Board of Canvassers; PBC was not served a copy of the same order
-23 May 2001: petitioners herein are declared winners in their respective elective positions
-30 May 2001: amendments to SPAs are filed; call for annulment of proclamations, immediate special
elections in the three areas
-11, 18 June 2001: petitioners herein file their answer to the petitions, questioned COMELEC En Banc
jurisdiction on amended petitions, and seek available recourse based on validity, lawfulness and
existence of their proclamation; respondents herein filed urgent motion to annul proclamation; petitioners
contend motion claiming it appropriate only in pre-proclamation controversies
-20 June 2001: COMELEC En Banc issue order annuling May 23 proclamation; herein petitioners file
motion for recall of said order
-28 June 2001: post-hearing, COMELEC En Banc issues recall of June 20 order and affirmed May 23
proclamation
-11 July 2001: herein private respondents file first petition mentioned above
-03 October 2001: COMELEC issues an order directing the technical examination of the voters
registration records in the Municipalities of Parang, ndanan, and Luuk
-12 October 2001: herein petitioners file with the COMELEC an omnibus motion to resolve jurisdiction
issue with prayer to recall/suspend October 3 order; they allege that documentary evidence showed no
failure of election, and that private respondents should instead file regular election protests to be heard
by a division of the COMELEC as provided for in Section 3, Article X-C of the Constitution
-17 April 2002: COMELEC issues declaration that it had jurisdiction over amended petitions and denied
omnibus motion; it rules that there was no valid and legitimate elections held in the three municipalities
and that it had authority to order technical examinations of the VRRs (Loong v COMELEC)
-29 April 2002: herein petitioners file second petition mentioned above
-4 March 2003: SC orders TRO on COMELEC orders dated October 3 and April 17
-29 April 2003: Petitions herein are consolidated
ssues: 1. Whether or not public respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its Orders dated June 28, October 3, and April 17
Held: 1. Yea
Ratio: 1. The issuance of Orders dated October 3 and April 17 by the COMELEC constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. While the COMELEC can order a technical
examination, it may only be done in instances where a failure of election has been duly alleged.
Petitions seeking the declaration of failure of elections must be verified by making sure the following
conditions exist: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if
there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have
affected the result of the election. (Note that the cause of such failure of election could only be any of
the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.) n the questioned
municipalities, voting took place, hence, the petition for declaration of failure of election is without
merit. What herein respondents really sought was the suspension/annulment of the herein petitioners'
proclamations. The long standing rule is that the caption of the petitions are not determinative of the
nature thereof. The Court agrees with herein petitioners that herein private respondents should have
filed election protests and not the aforementioned petitions because what they are really questioning is
the validity and legitimacy of the actual elections that transpired. Moreover, herein petitioners enjoy
the presumption of regularity and validity that can only be destroyed if herein respondents can
substantially show that victory was procured through extra-legal means.
2. The COMELEC can suspend the proclamation pending the resolution of the petition to declare a failure
of election, the same order, however, is provisional in nature and can be lifted when evidence so warrants. With
respect to the June 28 Order, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction. During the hearing preceding the issuance of the said order, a motion and prayer to recall was
raised. The issuance of the order recalling the previous order of proclamation suspension does not render the
COMELEC guilty of grave abuse of discretion since it acted on valid grounds.
Judgment: Petition 1 dismissed. June 28 order affirmed.
Petition 2 granted. October 3 and April 17 orders set aside. COMELEC directed to dismiss SPAs.

Freedom from Debt Coalition vs. ERC and MERALCO
June 15, 2004
GR No. 161113
Tinga, J.

Facts:

MERALCO filed with ERC an Application for an increase in rates. t prayed ex parte for the grant of a provisional
authority to implement the increase according to the schedule proposed. The National Association of Electricity
Consumer for Reforms (NASECORE) informed ERC Chairman its intention to file an Opposition to Meralco's
application. Genaro Lualhati and Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) likewise expressed their intention to oppose the
applixation. ERC directed NASECORE, Lualhati and FDC to file their respective comments on the Application within
15 days. NASECORE and FDC filed a Motion for Production of Documents while Lualhati filed his Opposition. ERC
was ordered by MERALCO to produce the documents in connection with the evaluation of its Application.

However, on Nov. 27, 2003, ERC issued an Order provisionally approving MERALCO's ex parte application for rate
increases, without first resolving the Motions for Production of Documents of NASECORE and FDC and without
considering Lualhati's Opposition. Afterwards, motions and oppositions were filed by different groups and
organizations questioning the Nov. 27 Order. MERALCO refused to produce the documents requested by the
oppositiors on the ground that the documents are immaterial and irrelevant to its application. On the scheduled date of
hearing, ERC did not revoke the provisional authority granted to MERALCO per Nov. 27 Order. FDC did not file any
motion but instead this petition.

Issues:
1. WON the ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under RA 3196 (Electricity Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001, EPIRA)? (YES)

t is argued by the petitioners that ERC has no power to issue provisional orders because EPRA repealed
Commonwealth Act No. 146 (Public Service Act) and EO No. 172 (creating ERB). Moreover, it is contended that the
transfer of power in Sec. 44 of EPRA from ERB to ERC does not include the power to issue provisional orders. On the
other hand, respondents insist that Sec. 80 of the EPRA expressly mentions that the applicable provisions of the
Public Service Act and EO No. 172 that are not inconsistent shall continue to be in force and effect.

The Court sides with the respondents. Sec. 44 and Sec. 80 of EPRA provides the authority to ERC to approve
provisional adjustments. What is clear from Sec. 80 and 44 is that the legislators saw the superfluity or
needlessness of carrying over in the EPIRA the same provision found in the previous laws. The power to
approve provisional rate increases is included among the powers transferred to the ERC by virtue of Sec. 44
since the grant of that authority is not inconsistent with the EPIRA; rather it is in full harmoony with the thrust
of the law.

t is also plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of ERC to enable it to implement the reforms sought to
be accomplished by the EPRA. ERC therefore possesses the power to grant provisional rate adjustments
subject to the procedure laid down in these laws as well as in its Implelenting Rules and Regulations.

2. Assuming ERC has authority to grant provisional orders, WON the grant by the ERC of the provisional rate
adjustment in question was committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction? (YES)

t is argued that the issuance of the Nov. 27 Order is void because the affected sectors were not afforded the
opportunity to be heard. According to the petitioners, the ERC cannot dispense with the requirements of notice and
hearing. t is also claimed that ERC based the provisional increase only on MERALCO's bare allegation that it was in
dire financial straits, without actual proof of MERALCO's financial condition.

n contrast, the respondent ERC argues that Sec. 4(e) of the RR does not require the publication of the Application
itself. t further asserted by ERC that it is premature for the Court to rule on the issue since MERALCO's main petition
is pending hearing before it.

The Court find the petitioners' position meritorious. Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the RR requires ERC to resolve the motion for
issuance of a provisional order within 75 calendar days from the filing of the application or petition. f, within 30 days
from the publication of the application or receipt of its copy, an affected consumer or LGU files with ERC a comment,
ERC is mandated to consider the comment in its action on the prayer for provisional rate adjustment.

But ERC failed to comply with the rule. The provisional order cannot be issued under the circumstance based
exclusively on the application and supporting documents. ERC must consider the comments of the
consumers and the LGUs concerned on the application which were filed within 30 days from the receipt of a
copy of the application. Also, MERALCO failed to comply with the publication requirement prescribed by the RR.
What the RR requires to be published is the application itself. What was actually published is a mere notice of the
intent to file an application.

The violated provision, which is Sec. 4(e) Rule 3 of the RR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue
provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPRA. Since the RR was issued pursuant to the
EPRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the RR has the force and effect of law and thus should be complied with.

Petition is Granted. Nov. 27 Order is declared void. ERC is directed to comply with Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of RA
9136.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary

Petitioner: Congressman Enrique T. Garcia
Respondents: The Executive Secretary, The National Economic and Development Authority, The Board of nvestments,
The Securities and Exchange Commission, and The Bureau of Trade and Regulation and Consumer Protection
Intervenors: Senator Vicente T. Paterno, Philippine Association of Battery Manufacturers

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Nature: Petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 7042 (Foreign nvestment Act)

FACTS:
I. The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on the ground that it defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices. (Article , Section 19)

Provisions of the Act that that the petitioner questions:
Section 5- Foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its
capital without need of prior approval

Section 7- "non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises
unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign nvestment Negative List under
Section 8 hereof."

Section 8- The System of Negative List Abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of authority over
foreign investments n effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such
investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national economy.

Section 9- is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an area of investment should be included in
list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met

Transitory Provisions- allow unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed
Transitory Foreign nvestment Negative List

The Petitioner also challenges the statute for doing away with the provisions of the Omnibus nvestments Code of 1982.
t further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in
the Philippines.

II. Solicitor General
Section 5. The phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone

Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of
investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.

The Foreign nvestment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List C prohibits
foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the
economy and the consumer. The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to Filipinos their rights and
interests over the national economy.

Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C. The
Petition for inclusion requires "a public hearing at which affected parties will have the opportunity to show whether the
petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the consumers."(to protect the consumers as not all existing
enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C)

Transitory Provisions of the Foreign nvestment Negative List
- it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to Filipino under Section 5", and the "SEC shall
disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprises, particularly the
Filipino partners therein, can reasonably prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the domestic
market activities to be undertaken by the competing applicant.

Repealing of provisions of the Omnibus nvestment Code. Certain provisions are purposely removed because the
determination of the areas of investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign nvestment Negative List
formulated and recommended by NEDA following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act.

III. Senator Paterno (Intervenor):
The Act does not deregulate foreign investments to the disadvantage of the Filipino entrepreneur. He explained that the
over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote full
employment for Filipinos.

He suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question.

ISSUES:
1. WON the case is justiciable.
- actual controversy,
- ripeness for adjudication

2. WON RA 7042 is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principle that the state shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy.

RATIO:
1. There is no actual case or controversy, particularly because of the absence of the implementing rules that are
supposed to carry the Act into effect. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory. The constitutional question has been raised prematurely.

2. The law is challenged on broad constitutional principles and the cause of unconstitutionality has no been proven by
the petitioner. Article , Section 19 cannot be used to declare that a law is unconstitutional because it is a statement
of principle and no specific action or relief can be sought by invoking it. (note: 'm not so sure...)

Notes: Others:
Political Question
What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we are not competent
to rule.
a. n Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation."
b. "Judicial Power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable. The Court may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it
is unwise or impractical.
c. ".to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. no irregularity exists in the
case at bar
Wrong Forum. "The Court is not a Political Arena

JUDGEMENT: Petition dismissed.


GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000

FACTS
November 26, 1998: Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by then President
Joseph Estrada by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to "study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999
Feb 19, 1999: the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the PCCR's work
until Dec 31 1999
December 20, 1999: PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on and was dissolved by the
President
Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, assailing
the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:
o it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law
o by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.
Gonzales' petition:
o sought to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such
o sought to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations
o sought to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
Gonzales also prayed for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on names
of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the
recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang

ISSUES
1. WON the case has become moot and academic
2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
4. WON the President has power to create positions in the Office of the President and appoint presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants
5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of
luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.

RATIO and REASONING
1. When the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists, prohibition already becomes an inappropriate action
The PCCR already submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and it was already
dissolved on the same day. Thus, PCCR already ceased to exist and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
t is beyond the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion and any ruling regarding the PCCR is already
in the nature of advisory opinion
2. A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
3. A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, the action of which is properly brought only when
there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3 million is "appropriated for its
operational expenses "to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The appropriations were
authorized by the President, not by Congress. n fact, there was no appropriation at all since appropriation
has been defined 'as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that
money may be paid out of the Treasury.' The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the
Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive's power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5)
Art V of Constitution.
4. Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts to
enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer's interest.
5. Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. shall also mean
that the courts can determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public
The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which possesses the right.
"matters of public concern is a term which "embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

HELD: Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with information
requested.

Gonzales vs. Marcos
July 31, 1975
Fernando, J.
Petition for review by certiorari of an order of dismissal of the CFI of Manila

Facts:
Asserts the validity of the creation of EO No. 30 by President Marcos (encroachment into legislative prerogative): EO
No. 30 trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of CCP entrusted with the task to
construct a national theater, a national music hall, an arts building and facilities, to awaken our people's
consciousness in the nation's cultural heritage and to encourage its assistance in its preservation and promotion,
enhancement and development
o Board of Trustees: accepted donation from private sector and secure from the Chemical Bank of NY a loan of $5
million and $3.5 million from President Johnson of US (war damage funds) all intended for the construction of
CCP for P48 million
Headed by melda Romualdez Marcos
o Center having real and personal property, donations, financial commitments, gifts
CF stresses that the funds for the administration of the center came from donations and contributions without any
funds from taxation
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the current appeal:
o ssuance of EO No.30 was a valid exercise of executive power, without invasion of the legislative domain and it
supplements RA No. 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture.
o Petitioner did not have requisite personality: funds held by the Center came from donations and contributions and
not one centavo being raised by taxation
SolGen's motion to dismiss:
o Respondents restrainable by prohibition
o PD 15 was promulgated creating the CCP defining its objectives, powers and functions and other purposed. EO
No. 30 ceased to exist and the case-at-bar is now moot and academic
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have requisite standing to pursue the case? (NO)
When requisite pecuniary or monetary interest is absent, the petitioner cannot institute a taxpayer's suit for it failed to
satisfy the elemental requisites of the suit.
o Even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that
such kind of action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. (Tan vs.
Macapagal)
2. WON creation of EO No. 30 was a valid exercise of executive power vested on the President?
When the president, therefore, acted by disposing of a matter of general concern in accord with the constitutional
injunction to promote arts and letters and issued EO No. 30, he simply carried out the purpose of the trust in
establishing the CCP as the instrumentality through which this agreement between the US govt and Phil govt would
be realized.
o The President alone cannot and need not personally handle the duties of a trustee for and in behalf of the Filipino
people in relation with this trust. Creation of EO No. 30 to receive and administer the trust estate.
o The President has authority to create a group consisting of private citizens to administer the private contributions
and donations given by US and other persons for the Center.
o Justice Malcolm: duty to take care of government property lies with the executive.
f the President would refrain from taking action and wait for Congress, this could be tantamount to
dereliction of duty. Time was of the essence. Delay was far from conducive to public interest.
t could only be under the most strained construction of executive power to conclude that the President
has transgressed the power of the Congress in the creation of EO No. 30.
Congress may provide the rules and guidelines for an order/issuance by the executive. But with the
inaction or indifference of the Congress, it may enable independent presidential responsibility.
3. WON the case is moot and academic because of the promulgation of PD No. 15? (YES)
EO No. 30 has been superseded by PD No. 15. A coup de grace was administered to this proceeding.

Appeal by certiorari is dismissed.


SolGen vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority
December 11, 1991
Cruz, J.
Petition to review the resolution of MMA

Facts:
n MMA, West Traffic District vs. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of driver's license is prohibited under
PD 1605 except under LO 43 when there are stalled vehicles causing obstruction to traffic. Judgment became final
and executory.
Several complaints were presented and submitted to the Court:
o Malapira: he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation and his license was confiscated
o Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association: Asked whether they could seek damages for confiscation of
their driver's licenses and where they should file their complaints
o Monsanto: confiscation of driver's license for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong
o (L) Calderon: confiscation of driver's license by Makati Police Force
o (L) Trieste: protested the removal of his front license of MMA-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his
license by Metropolitan Police Command-WPD
Respondets invoked:
o Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong: authorized the confiscation of driver's license and the removal
of license plates for traffic violations
o Memorandum dater Feb. 27, 1991 from District Commander of the Western Traffic District of PNP, authorizing
confiscation and removal under certain conditions
Dir.Gen. Nazareno of PNP assured the court that is had never authorized the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles and directed full compliance with the decision in a memorandum called
"Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates
o Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's license.
o Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991: authorized MMA to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila
Court issued a resolution: Sec. 2 of Ordinance No. 11 appeared to be in conflict in Gonong decision.
Court resolved to require MMA and SolGen to submit separate comments.
x MMA contends that Ordinance No. 11 was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by
EO 392. t was authorized to promulgate rules and other issuances. The confiscation and removal
were valid because of the presence of Ordinance No. 11. Also, the validity of the Ordinance
cannot be assailed collaterally.
x SolGen contends that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise
of a delegated legislative power. t also violated PD 1605.
Issues:
1. WON there was an actual case or controversy? (NO)
When there are exceptional circumstances, the Court may set aside the requisites for judicial review.
o The Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power as expressly
recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
o Procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. They are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside technicalities of procedure. (Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Aznar vs. Bernad, Piczon vs. CA).
o MMA is correct to point out that the validity of Ordinance No. 11 cannot be assailed collaterally. But the rule is
flexible and maybe set aside. The current practices cause a great deal of confusion and require the Court to
resolve the questions immediately.
2. WON there was a valid delegation of legislative power to MMA to promulgate measures? (YES)
When the requisites of delegation are present, namely the completeness of the statute making the delegation and
presence of a sufficient standard, there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
o Completeness of the statue: when the statute reaches the delegate, it will only implement it. What only can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced and NOT to determine what law shall be
enforced.
o Presence of sufficient standard: determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority.
3. WON there was a valid exercise of the power delegated to MMA and Municipality of Mandaluyong in
promulgating Ordinance No. 11 and Ordinance No. 7 respectively? (NO)
The acts of the local government must reflect and conform to the will of the national legislature.
o Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except for revenues and taxes). LGU cannot contravene but must obey the will of their
principal.
o The enactments in question cannot prevail against the decree which has the force and effect of a statute. The
ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
Elliot's test of validity of municipal ordinance:
o Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
Ordinances No. 11 and 7 do not conform to PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metro Manila.
(Specifically Sec. 5 which expressly prohibits confiscation of driver's license. But nothing regarding
removal of license plates)
o Must not be unfair or oppressive
o Must not be partial or discriminatory
o Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o Must not be unreasonable
o Must be general and consistent with public policy
t is for Congress to determine in the exercise of its own discretion won to impose such sanctions either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila.

PD 1605 remains effective. Ordinances No. 11 and 7 are null and void. Respondent are enjoined.


JOYA vs. PCGG
August 24, 1993
Bellosillo, J.
Special Civil Action for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin PCGG to proceed with the auction sale

Facts:
On Aug. 9, 1990, Caparas, chairman of PCGG, wrote to Pres. Aquino requesting for her authority to sign the
proposed Consignment Agreement between Phil. and Christie's concerning the scheduled sale on Jan. 11, 1991 of 82
Old Masters Painting and antique silverware (part of ill-gotten wealth) seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila
Aug. 14. Through Exec. Sec. Macaraig, Pres. Aquino authorized Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement
allowing Christie's to auction the subject art pieces
Aug. 15. Caparas signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's. PCGG shall consign to Christie's the 82 Old
Masters Painting (MMM) and the silverware contained in 71 cartons (CBP)
Oct. 26. COA submitted to Pres. Aquino that:
o Authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was of doubtful legality
o Contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
o PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal
o Assets were historical relics and had cultural significance, thus disposal was prohibited by law.
Nov. 15. PCGG Chairman Castro refuted the allegations. Director of National Museum Casal issued a certification
that the items did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part
of the Filipino cultural heritage
Jan. 9, 1991. Court issued a resolution dismissing the petitions
Jan. 11. The sale proceeded and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to Treasury.
Petitioners raised the following issues:
o WON petitioners have legal standing
o WON the Old Masters Painting and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation
/ "cultural properties which is under the protection of the state (Consti/RA 4846)
o WON the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion
o WON respondent PCGG has jurisdiction and authority
o WON PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and
sale of the items
o WON the petition has become moot and academic
Issues:
1. WON the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review? (NO)
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
o Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. nterest must be material as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
o Exceptions to the rule on legal standing:
Case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution
x A writ of mandamus may be issued only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant
duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution (Legazpi vs. CSC)
x Petitioners do not fulfill the criteria for mandamus. They are not after the fulfillment of a duty but
seeking the enjoining of an official act. They also claim for the continued enjoyment of the
artworks which is a privilege and unenforceable as a constitutional right.
Taxpayer suit to question the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds
x A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
funds which may be enjoined by the request of a taxpayer.
x Petition cannot be allowed as a taxpayer's suit:
o The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation of the
members. The antique pieces of silverware were gifts to Marcos couple for their wedding
anniversary. They were confiscated and delivered to CBP.
o Confiscation should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on to the government without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process and just compensation.
o The defect must be raised only by the proper parties, the true owners, whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights. Petitioners do not show any clear legal
right to question the alleged unauthorized disposition.
2. Whether there is an actual controversy and the case is not moot and academic? (NO)
The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit when paramount public interest is involved.
o There is insufficient justification to warrant the relaxation of the rule. Since the purpose of the petition for
prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale which has occurred, the issues have
become moot and academic.
3. WON the properties subject of the sale are considered cultural properties? (NO)
The cultural properties are classified as the "important cultural properties and the "national cultural treasures.
o "mportant cultural properties singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional
historical and cultural significance to the Philippines but not sufficient to merit the classification of NCT
o "National cultural treasures unique object found locally possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic
and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to the country and nation
The properties subject of the sale do not constitute the protected cultural properties. The Director of National Museum
certified that they do not fall under the classifications. The certification is to be accorded with finality because of the
department's knowledge and expertise in the arts.

Petition for prohibition and mandamus is dismissed.

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority
July 1, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.
Original Petition

Facts:
Petitioner prays that the Court declare Sec. 28 and 44 of RA No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)
unconstitutional. He was a consultant of DPWH pursuant to a Contract regarding the Removal of Obstructions and
Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain. His basis for locus standi is that he was a consultant and that he is a
taxpayer.
Petitioner alleges that Sec. 28 and 44 serve as drawback to his tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal
structures. As a taxpayer, he alleges that he has a direct interest seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully disbursed
o Sec. 28: Eviction and Demolition generally discouraged except for 1) if located in dangerous areas; 2)
government projects are to be implemented in the areas and 3) there is a court order
o Sec. 44: Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition Suspension of eviction for three years from effectivity of the Act
and it would not apply if structures were built after the effectivity
Respondents contention
o NMRA: Sec. 28 merely provides a humanitarian approach and discourages eviction and demolition while Sec. 44
provides for the program beneficiaries.
o SolGen: Noncompliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review
No actual case because petitioners merely asks for advisory opinion
Petitioner is not a proper party
There is no showing that the decision is the lis mota of the case
Issues:
1. WON the Court can exercise its power of judicial review? (NO)
When the essential requisites of a judicial review are lacking, the Court will not determine the constitutionality of an
act except when there are "exempting circumstances.
o The first two requisites are absent.
There is no actual controversy. There was no actual prevention of duties as a consultant or as a property
owner. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
Petitioner is not a proper party. He was merely a consultant and not even an owner of a house to be
demolished. And despite invoking a taxpayer suit, the Court has ruled that it is not devoid of discretion as
to whether or not the question should be entertained.
o Petition was in reality a declaratory relief. But it will still not prosper because the essential requisites of a petition
for a declaratory relief are:
There must be a judiciable controversy
The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse
The party seeking the relief must have a legal interest
Also because an action of declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of SC.

Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Oposa vs. Factoran Jr.
July 30, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.
Special Civil Action for certiorari of the dismissal order of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66

Facts:
Principal petitioners are minors joined by their parents together with Philippine Ecological Network, nc. (PEN). The
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and as citizens of the RP, who are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the country's virgin tropical rainforests. The minors also represent their generation as well as
generation yet unborn.
Petitioners pray that the Court cancel all existing Timber License Agreements(TLAs) and cease and desist from
renewing or approving new TLAs.
General Averments: Philippines is an archipelago of 7,100 islands with a land mass of 30M hectares. t is endowed
with rainforests in which there are a rich number of animal and plant species found in them. ndigenous peoples also
live in the rainforests. To maintain a balanced ecology, land should be utilized into 56% rainforests and 44%
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and others. Distortion of the ratio would result to water shortage,
salinization of the water, massive erosion, endangering and extinction of unique species, disturbance and dislocation
of tribal communities, siltation of bodies of water, increasing velocity of typhoons, flooding, siltation and shortening of
dams and reduction of earth's capacity to process gases.
Petitioners presented an exhaustive list of the causes of action. t included statistics of rainforests, land mass, number
of TLAs, present rate of deforestation and the adverse effects of deforestation.
Respondent Factoran contends that:
o Petitioners have no cause of action
o ssue is a political question
Petitioners in response,
o There is a clear cause of action
o Motion to dismiss is dilatory
o Action presents a justiciable question
Respondent Judge granted the motion to dismiss and commented that the request to cancel all TLAs would result to
the impairment of contracts
Petitioners contend that there is a clear cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on several statutes and Sec. 15 and 16 of Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Also, they
contend that the case involves a judicial question. They also maintain that TLAs are not contracts, therefore, there
would be no impairment when they are cancelled.
Respondent reply that the rights being violated are vague and nebulous. They also contend that logging is a political
question and that the main recourse should be to lobby before the Congress. TLAs cannot also be cancelled because
they are to be effective for 25 years and that the cancellation would be violative of the due process clause.
Issues:
1. WON a class suit was appropriate? (YES)
When the petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests,
the Court shall deem a class suit as appropriate.
o Subject matter is of common and general interest.
o Personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility. The assertion of the minors' right to a sound environment constitutes the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of the generations to come.
2. WON the denial to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology and right to health invoke a cause of
action? (YES)
When self-executing provisions are invoked, they provide a specific and operable legal right wherein the denial of the
rights leads to a cause of action.
o The rights to health and balanced and healthful ecology are nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetration. They need not be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist.
o Statutes were also enacted to create DENR and guidelines wherein it is necessary to maintain a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment.
3. WON the case involves a political question? (NO)
When the issue does not involve policy formulation or determination but rather an enforcement of a right vis--vis
formulated policies, the issue is not of political nature and the Court may take cognizance of the case.
o Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution: The first part refers to the traditional authority of the Judiciary while the
second part refers to its expanded powers, wherein it could also resolve issues of political nature when there is a
grave abuse of territory.
4. WON cancellation of TLAs lead to the impairment of contracts? (NO)
When the Court revokes or rescinds a TLA, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked because a TLA is not a
contract, property or a property right but merely a permit to allow what is unlawful.
o Even if TLAs are to be assumed as contracts, the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is
limited. Also, contracts are to be limited and regulated to ensure public safety.

Petition is granted. The challenged Order is set aside. The petitioner may amend complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned TLAs.


Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.
May 5, 1994
Davide, Jr., J.
Special Civil Action

Facts:
PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system
Berjaya Group Berhad, Sports Toto Malaysia (subsidiary), nternational Totalizor Systems nc. (US) plus Filipino
investors created in March 1993 the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). t was intended to provide
technical and management services that would be offered and delivered to PCSO. PCSO issued in August 1993 a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the lease contract
Berjaya reduced its equity to 40%. PGMC submitted its bid and was evaluated by SPBAC. The bid was forwarded to
the Office of the President. The President gave its initial go signal to operate and required the submission of the
implementing contract.
KLOSBAYAN submitted a letter opposing the on-line lottery system. But Malacanang decided to push through with
the project reiterating that PCSO will operate and PGMC is merely a lessor. KLOSBAYAN requested copies of all
documents. But on the day of request, the Contract of Lease was executed between PCSO and PGMC.
Petitioner's contention:
1. PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint
venture
2. Congressional franchise is required for the
operation of telecommunications network
3. n Sec. 11, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution, a less
than 60% Filipino-owned corporation is disqualified
4. PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under
RA 7042 to install, establish, and operate on-line
and telecommunications system
Respondent's reply:
1. PGMC: Merely an independent contractor
a. Not a co-operator
b. Neither engaged in gambling nor in public
service
c. ssue of morality is political
2. PCSO
a. nterpretation of CAJV is too narrow
b. PGMC is a lessor and does not need to
acquire franchise because it is not a public
utility
c. Petitioners have no legal standing
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have a legal standing? (7-6: yes-no)
Procedural technicality may be brushed or set aside by the Court if the issue is of transcendental importance to the
public. t is the Court's duty to settle promptly and definitely these cases, to determine whether the officials acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction, given its wide discretion.
The case is of transcendental importance. The legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition and it the
exercise of the Court's sound discretion, it brushes aside the procedural barrier.
o Paramount public interest
o Ramification of the issues affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
o Counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
2. WON the Contract of Lease is valid in light of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42? (7-no)
PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of CAJV or assign, transfer or lease the franchise. The
franchise granted to PCSO to hold and conduct lotteries allows it to hold and conduct a species of gambling. A statute
carrying on a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed.
The contract is not to be decided on the basis of its title or designation but on the intent of the parties. Animus hominis
est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts
and the intent of the parties must be principally considered. No one should be deceived by the title or designation of a
contract.
o Collaboration: acts of working together
o Association: act of a number of persons uniting together for some special purpose or business
o Joint venture: association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise
PCSO has no funds and is unwilling to incur expenses and take risks. t was candid enough to state that "it seeks a
suitable contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities need to operate and maintain the system
xxx. The only contribution therefore from PCSO would be the franchise or authority to operate the on-line lottery
system.
PCSO and PGMC had the intention to leave to PGMC the technical, operations and management aspects of the on-
line lottery system. Even the employee and management pool would be coming from PGMC. t is only after the
expiration of the lease will PCSO operate.

The Contract of Lease is declared contrary to law and invalid. The petition is GRANTED.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

July 17, 1995
Mendoza, J.
Petition for prohibition, review and/or Injunction

Facts:
n Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for
P25 million.
Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention:
1. ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.
2. t is still violative of PCSO's charter.
3. t is violative of the law regarding public bidding.
4. t violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987
Constitution
5. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply:
1. ELA is different from the Contract of Lease
2. There is no bidding required
3. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is
vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO
4. PCSO does not have funds
5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade
6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have standing? (NO)
STARE DECSS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the
settled rulings on "real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case. The parties are
the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON CONCLUSVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved.
When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination
of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDNG is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTES in NTEREST.
o Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who sue in public interest
Whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy xxx
Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest; 2) has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustained some direct injury and 3) has bee or is about to be denied some right or privilege.
n the case at bar, there is no showing of particularized interest or an allegation of public funds being
misspent to make the action of public interest.
o Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit
Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. But they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
QUESTON of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show
the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract xxx.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe
made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. WON ELA is valid? (YES)
Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to review.
n the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioner states that this would allow PGMC to
control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. n any case, in the
construction of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The
doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
t is also claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is
needed to show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association
with the PGMC.
3. WON PCSO violated its charter?
4. WON a public bidding is required?
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction is dismissed.
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr.

April 6, 1995
Quiason, J.
Special Civil Action

Issues:
1. WON petitioners have legal standing? (YES)
The Court has allowed taxpayers to question CONTRACTS entered into by the National Government or COGGs in
contravention of the law and to disallow when only municipal contracts are involved.
2. Can respondent EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III, a public utility?
Phrasing is erroneous. What is owned are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, terminals, power plant etc. and not a public
utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public.
The Constitution requires a franchise for the operation of public utility. (Sec. 11 Art 12) But it does not require a
franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to
serve the public.
There is a clear distinction between the "operation of a public utility and the "ownership of the facilities and
equipment used to serve the public.
o Ownership: completely subjected to a person's will.
o The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and
used to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise.
o The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of its facilities. One
may operate a public utility without owning the facilities or one may own the facilities without operating the public
utility.
o A mere owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility is not a public utility. Even the mere formation of a
public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one of operating a public utility. The
moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or
any other form of authorization for that purpose.
ELC owns the facilities but it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility. DOTC shall operate EDSA LRT and shall
assume all the obligations and liabilities of a common carrier. ELC will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees
from the riding public.
o t is different from Kilosbayan vs. Guingona. The Contract of Lease between PGMC and PSCO was actually a
CAJV wherein PCSO leased out its franchise to PGMC which actually operated and managed the same.
3. WON the BLT scheme under the Agreement is not recognized in the BOT law? (NO)
BOT scheme: the contractor undertakes the construction and financing of an infrastructure facility and operates and
maintains the same. A contractor operates the facility for a fixed period and after the expiration, the contractor
transfers the ownership and operation to the government. The owner must comply with the CTZENSHP requirement
of the Constitution.
BT scheme: the contractor undertakes the construction and financing of the facility but after the completion the
ownership and operation are turned over to the government. The government shall pay the contractor its total
investment on the project plus an additional rate of return. No citizenship requirement is imposed.
A lease is a contract wherein one party enjoys the use of a thing for a certain price and for a period. There is no
transfer of ownership at the end of the lease period. But if there is a transfer, the lease becomes a lease-purchase
agreement.
n the agreement, rentals are to be paid on a monthly basis. At the end of the 25
th
year, when full payment has been
made, ownership shall be transferred to DOTC for $1.00. t is not significant that rents shall be paid in US currency
because EDSA LRT project is a high priority project and is outside the application of the Uniform Currency Act.
4. WON awarding through negotiation invalidates the award? (NO)
Since only one applicant passed the pre-qualification process, a public bidding is an absurd and pointless exercise.
Moreover, Sec. 5 of the BOT Law in relation to PD 1594 allows the negotiated award of government infrastructure.
Projects maybe negotiated when time is of the essence, lack of qualified bidders or where there is conclusive
evidence that greater economy or efficiency would be achieved.
o There is a lack of qualified bidders. No petition from the competing firms was instituted before PBAC.
RA 7718 did not render the BLT scheme moot and academic. t is a curative statute. t is intended to provide financial
incentives and minim government regulations and procedures in support of the private sector. t states that once an
applicant has prequalified, it may enter into any of the schemes.
5. WON the agreements are grossly disadvantageous? (NO)
DOTC shall be allowed to deduct any shortfalls from the monthly rent due ELC for the construction of EDSA LRT .
Also, petitioners have not presented evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other. The
matter of valuation is an esoteric field which is better left to experts and which this Court is not eager to take.
The discretion to award a contract is vested in the government agencies with that function.

Petition is dismissed.


De Agbayani vs. PNB
April 29, 1971
Fernando, J.
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Pangasinan

Facts:
Plaintiff obtained P450 loan from PNB maturing on July 19, 1944 secured by real estate mortgage. As of Nov. 27,
1959, the balance was P1294. As early as July 13, PNB instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding. Plaintiff
countered stating that the mortgage sought to be foreclose had long prescribed (15 years).
The court issued a permanent injunction. PNB appealed stating that the mortgage would have not prescribed if the
period from March 10, 1945 to July 26, 1948 was not counted. During this time, EO No. 32 was passed wherein
current debts were temporarily suspended.
HELD:
Orthodox view
o When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Any legislative or executive act contrary to the Constitution cannot survive.
o "When an enactment was considered unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect.
But prior to the declaration of nullity of the act or statute, it must have been in force and complied with. The fact of its
existence must be reckoned with. "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination of unconstitutionality,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
o t would take some time before the judiciary could exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to the
declaration of its nullity.
Police power legislation which is intended to protect the public but adversely affects property rights
o n the normal course of things, the public has accepted the validity of the act.
o EO No. 30: There was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was confronted with an
emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of the country's liberation from the Japanese military forces.
Economy lay prostrate. No wonder then that the suspension of payment of obligations was declared first by the
executive order and then by legislation. But time has passed and conditions did change.
The obligations had been pending since 1945 because of EO No. 30 and the period was extended for 8
more years because of RA 342. The creditors would have to observe a vigil of 12 years.
The period of 12 years is unreasonable. The relief accorded is an injustice to creditors who are practically
left at the mercy of the debtors. The debtor is not even required to pay interest.
RA 342 could not survive the test of validity. EO No. 30 should likewise be nullified.
o RA 342 and EO No. 30: During the 8-year period, the prescription did not run.

Foreclosure has not prescribed. Prescription could not be a valid defense. Decision appealed from is dismissed.


People vs. Cuaresma and dela Cruz
April 18, 1989
Narvasa, J.
Special Civil Action for certiorari to review the orders of the City Court of Dumaguete City

Facts:
Aug. 6, 1978. Cuaresma publicly speak and uttered against Luz Lumacao insulting and defamatory words and
expressions. Lumacao contends that Cuaresma dishonored her by accusing her as a paramour of her husband Victor.
Cuaresma moved to quash the case in violation of Art. 360 of RPC. Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
The Judge also required the fiscal to file with the Court the verified complaint of the offended party within 10 days.
Three months later, Cuaresma filed another motion to quash alleging that the offense had prescribed.
o The filing on Aug. 21, 1978 of the original information had not interrupted the running of the period of prescription
of the crime (2 months from discovery) and the prescriptive period had lapsed long prior to the submission of the
corrective complaint on Aug. 4, 1980.
Respondent Judge agreed and ordered dismissal of the case. Fiscal's motion for reconsideration dated June 26, 1981
was belatedly filed and was denied for lack of sufficient merit and for having been filed out of time. No steps were
taken until after 3 years when the Second Assistant City Fiscal commenced the present case.
Held:
The Order on August 4, 1980 was appealable at the instance of the People. The appeal could have been taken within
15 days from the promulgation of the judgment or order. The appeal had it been timely taken should have been
successful.
o The filing by the complainant of her complaint in the form of an affidavit had indeed tolled the period of
prescription. And the subsequent filing of an information based on the complaint sworn before the fiscal is
sufficient compliance with Art. 344 of RPC and Sec. 4 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
o The affidavit could have been presented as evidence but even if not offered is a matter of judicial notice.
The action was filed by the Second Assistant City Fiscal and not by the SolGen, and hence dismissible on this
account.
The certiorari suit is being made to substitute for, and perform the function of an appeal which is not permissible.
o Action was filed too late
o Commenced only after about 3 years had elapsed from the promulgation of the order sought to be annulled
o Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer exercising judicial functions or of any judge which
are claimed to be "without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Error did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion but an error of law.
Hierarchy of Courts:
The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the SC's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.
Petition is dismissed.

RAMON A. GONZALES (petitioner) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, and AUDITOR GENERAL (respondents)

PHILIPPINE CONSITUTION ASSOCIATION (petitioner) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (respondent)

DATE: 9 November 1967

NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction:
1. to restrain
a. the COMELEC from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913,
b. the Director of Printing from printing the ballots pursuant to said Act and Resolutions, and
c. the Auditor General form passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in the
said Act; and
2. to declare said the Act as unconstitutional and void.

PONENTE: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
1. On 16 March 1967, The Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
a. R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.1, proposing to amend Art. V Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the
Philippines, so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province was to have
at least one member;
b. R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be
held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;and
c. R.B.H. No. 3, proposing to amend Art. V Sec. 16 of the same Constitution as to authorize Senators and
the members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

2. On 17 June 1967, the Congress passed a bill, which upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and
3, be submitted for approval by the people, at the General Elections which shall be held on 14 November 1967.

3. On 21 October 1967, the first petition was filed. Petitioner Gonzales, citizen, taxpayer and voter, claims to have
instituted the same as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated. The
petitioner claims the following:
a. The Members of Congress which approved the resolutions and republic act in question were de facto and
not de jure Congressmen.
b. Congress may either propose amendments to the constitution as a constituent assembly or call a
constitutional convention to do the same, but may not avail of both at the same time.
c. The proposed amendments must be submitted for ratification in a special election and not a general
election.

4. On October 31 1967, PHLCONSA filed a petition for review by certiorari for a resolution by COMELEC in a
substantially identical case. t is a duly organized corporation and a civic and non-profit organization which aims to
uphold the constitution of the Philippines.
5. Citing Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the Solicitor General opined that the court has no jurisdiction over the instant case
because the same involves a political question and is therefore not susceptible of judicial review.

6. Senator Arturo Tolentino, who opposed the earlier petition of PHLCONSA before the COMELEC, was allowed to
appear before the Court and objected on the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the case.
b. The petition, if granted, would render Congress inoperational.
c. The failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law does not render it illegal and its subsequent
acts null and void.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over the case. YES.
2. WON the Congress which approved the resolutions and republic act in question was a de jure Congress. YES.
3. WON Congress can sit as a constituent assembly and call for a constitutional convention at the same time. YES.
4. WON proposed amendments to the constitution can be submitted to the people for ratification in a general
election instead of a special election. NO.
5. WON Congress provided for a "proper submission of the proposed amendments to the people for their
ratification. NO.

REASONING:
1. Congress, when sitting as a constituent assembly, is susceptible of judicial review.
a. The power to amend or propose amendments to the constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress but is a part of the inherent powers of the people to make and amend their
fundamental law.
b. Congress may therefore propose amendments merely because the constitution grants it the power to do
so. When exercising this power, Senators and members of the House do not act as members of
Congress, but as elements of a constituent assembly that derive their authority from the constitution.
c. Since Congress derives its authority from the constitution when sitting as a constituent assembly, it does
not have a final say on whether or not it is acting within or beyond its constitutional limits. Such final say
belongs to the judiciary which is "the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof (Angara vs. Electoral Commission).
d. Therefore, questions regarding the acts of Congress sitting as a constituent assembly are justiciable and
not political. n so far as this ruling is inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the
latter is deemed modified.
e. n arriving at this ruling, the court also cited preceding cases were it slowly abandoned the ruling in
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. These include the following:
i. Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate. Officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under the control and supervision of the court and not that of the Senate President.
ii. Avelino vs. Cuenco. The court may determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in
the Senate.
iii. Taada vs. Cuenco. The court, in a proper case, may nullify the election of Senators to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
iv. Macias vs. Commission on Elections. The court may strike an apportionment law from Congress
as unconstitutional if the same does not apportion the number of seats in Congress in
accordance to the number of inhabitants in each province.

2. The failure of Congress to make a valid reapportionment does not render it illegal and its subsequent acts
unconstitutional.
a. Congress actually passed a reapportionment bill within three years after the 1960 census but the same
was declared unconstitutional because the apportionment taken therein was not made according to the
number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the country (Macias vs. Commission on Elections).
b. The fact that Congress failed to enact a valid reapportionment bill, however, does not render it illegal
because Section 5 Article V of the 1935 Constitution provides that "until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that by fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
districts.
c. Since the constitution itself provides for the continuance of the existing districts in case Congress fails to
make a valid reapportionment, the status quo is therefore rendered legal and de jure.

3. Upon its discretion, Congress may act as a constituent assembly and call for a constitutional convention at the
same time.
a. The choice of the process by which Congress may propose amendments to the constitution depends
upon its own wisdom. Thus, questions arising therefrom are not subject to judicial review.
b. n the instant case however, the court held that Congress did not act as a constituent assembly and call
for a constitutional convention at the same time since the resolutions which enabled them to do so were
taken up and voted upon separately.
c. Moreover, Resolution Nos. 1 and 3 (where Congress acted as a constituent assembly) pertained to
proposed amendments to the constitutional provisions on Congress only while Resolution No. 2 (where
Congress called for a constitutional convention) considered proposals to change the constitution in
general. n other words, the said resolutions had different subject matters.
d. Lastly the word "or, although disjunctive in ordinary parlance, may mean "and when the spirit or context
of the law warrants it. The argument that Congress cannot sit as a constituent assembly and call for a
constitutional convention at the same time simply because the constitution uses the words "either and
"or in pertaining to them is therefore weak.

4. Proposed amendments to the constitution shall be ratified by the people in a "special and not a "general
election.

5. "Proper submission of proposed amendments to the constitution shall mean that the citizens are informed of the
provisions to be amended, of the proposed amendments thereof , and of the meaning, nature, and effects of the
same.
1


DISPOSITION: Six (6) members of the court believed that Resolution Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were constitutional and valid while
only three (4) members believed that they violate the spirit of the constitution. With the number of votes in favor of
declaring the assailed resolutions and republic act as unconstitutional being short of the required eight (8) votes, the
petition is dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied.

Ichong v. Hernandez and Sarmiento
No. L-7995
Date: May 31, 1957
Ponente: Labrador, J.
Nature: original action in the SC. njunction and mandamus.
Facts:
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business. t prohibits aliens and associations,
partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. n
effect it nationalizes the retail business.
- Lao chong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by
RA 1180 filed a petition for njunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino
Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila.

ssues:
1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without due process of law.
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the
retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.

4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:
1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there is a question of
public interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between
nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said
that classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded.
x Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the people on whom
he makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country. Alien participation in the retail
trade has been attended by intolerable practices like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
x Economic reason alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth since
the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase
national wealth.
x precedents
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
x legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- ts purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic
life
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country.
x Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XV provides that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
x Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption
is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.

3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the
title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law.
x The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been
included within the term regulation.

4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by
any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Judgment: petition dismissed.

In Re: Saturnino V. Bermudez
October 24, 1986
FACTS: Per Curiam; Petition for Declaratory Relief
Bermudez quotes Section 5 of Article XV of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which states: "Sec. 5. The
six year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of election hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. He says that the
provision "is not clear as to whom it refers, and he asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of
the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino
and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President
Arturo M. Tolentino, is being referred in the provision mentioned.
SSUE: 1. WON petitioner has legal standing to sue (NO)
2. WON the petition is cognizable by the court (NO)
RATONALE: 1. Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, it
is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief. More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the
incumbent President, which is not allowed because she is immune from suit.
2. The petition states no cause of action. The alleged ambiguity or vagueness of
the provision is not existent, as it is a matter of public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers to Aquino and Laurel. n previous cases where the legitimacy of the
Aquino government was questioned, they were dismissed outright because: "the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. t belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so it is not merely a de
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. There can be no question then that Aquino
and Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President.

Javellana V. The Executive Secretary
March 31, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
I. Plebiscite Cases
March 16, 1967 Resolution No. 2 passed by Congress
July 17, 1969 Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 passed, which provides for the creation of
Constitutional Convention (CONCON) to propose amendments to the 1935 Constitution
August 24, 1970 - RA 6132, which provides for the election of the delegates passed
June 1, 1971 CONCON convened
September 9, 1972 Marcos declares Martial Law (PD 1081)
November 29, 1972 CONCON approved the proposed constitution
November 30, 1972 Marcos passes PD 73, which calls for a plebiscite to be held on July 15, 1973 for
the ratification of the proposed constitution
Total of 10 petitions filed to contest the holding of the said plebiscite to enjoin the respondents from
implementing PD73 on the premise that:
o 1) there is no freedom of speech, assembly, press and not enough time for the people to properly
deliberate on the proposed constitution, and
o 2) the issuance of guidelines for a plebiscite, the assignment of ballots and allocation of funds are
powers that belong to the Congress and not the President
o Plebiscite Cases
x Planas v. COMELEC 12/7

x Sanidad v. COMELEC 12/8
x Roxas v. COMELEC 12/11
x Montecarlo v. COMELEC
x Ordonez v. the National Treasurer
x Tan v. COMELEC
x Diokno and Aquino v. COMELEC 12/12
x Jimenez v. COMELEC 12/14
x Raul Gonzalez v. COMELEC
x Hidalgo v. COMELEC 12/16
December 16, 1972, 12p.m. answers were filed, and a partial hearing of the petitions commenced
December 17, 1972 Temporary suspension of PP1081
December 23, 1972 Plebiscite for July 15, 1973 postponed
Court temporarily refrained from deciding on the cases.
January 7, 1973 limited freedom of debate withdrawn, PD 1081 reinstated.
Marcos issued PD 86 which calls for the creation of Citizen's Assemblies, which will be asked the
following questions:
January 10 15:
1) Do you approve of the New Society?
2) Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
3) Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
4) How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held?
o January 10, new question added
5) Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government?
o January 11, six additional questions added the most important of which are:
2) Do you approve of the new Constitution?
3) Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
January 12, 1973 petitioners file for an urgent motion for decisions
o Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order enjoining and restraining respondent
COMELEC, Department of Local Government, Department of Agrarian Reform, National
Ratification Coordinating Committee, their heads, deputies, and subordinates from collecting,
certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the results
of the referendum (Citizens Assemblies) given that such would be:
Against Art 15
x Qualification of voters (15 years of age included; voting age21 yrs; proposed
age 18 yrs [Tolentino v. COMELEC)
x Secrecy of choice of vote (show of hands instead of casting the ballot)
Against the Election Code
x COMELEC to provide for free, orderly and honest elections
x Doubt in the assemblage and quality of the Citizens Assemblies given the limited
amount of time
January 15, 1973 Marcos passed PP 1102 Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
o Yes: 14,976,561 ; No: 743,869. more the 95% agree
January 22, 1973 - Congress was supposed to convene for their regular session but there was no
quorum
o Congress had the power to decide on the issue of WON the president had the powers had he
purported to have in PD 73.
Petitioners Respondents
The two questions would by-pass and short-circuit
the SC from deciding on the validity of the
plebiscite
ssue involves a political question
Assent to questions may be equated to formal

assent to the proposed constitution
CONCON acted freely and with authority
Cases are to be rendered moot Plebiscite and funds issued by the President valid
People not sufficiently aware of the defects of the
proposals
No improper submission -> plebiscite can be held
despite Martial Law
There shall be a crisis, and confusion will ensue, as
to which constitution will be implemented
The argument that the proposed constitution is
vague and incomplete, makes an unconstitutional
delegation of power, includes a referendum on the
proclamation of Martial Law and purports to
exercise judicial power' is 'not relevant' and without
merit
Given the withdrawal of the president of the limited
freedom of discussion. a free plebiscite can no
longer be held

Courts Decision on the Plebiscite Cases
1) Validity of PD 73 justiciable
2) Decree valid [6 justices]
3) Authority of the 1971 CONCON moot and academic [4 justices], uphold the authority [5 justices]
4) 1971 CONCON had the authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite Martial Law [4
justices]
5) WON the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution
o Fernando: t does affect and would grant the petitions if only they have not become moot and academic
o 4 justices: questions of fact, and Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of
adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated in Art 15.
6) PP 1102:
o 7 justices: question of validity not properly raised before the court
o Barredo: strict compliance to Art 15 not observed but nonetheless the new Constitution is legally
recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately in force.
o Zaldivar: has not been ratified and thus has no force or effect whatsoever.
o Antonio: Court is not competent to act on the issue. in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards,' since the issue 'poses a question of fact.'
7) For dismissal [9 justices]; Antonio favors the granting of said petitions

Disposition of the Plebiscite Cases:

Cases Dismissed. 6 for dismissal, 3 dissenting with respect to GR L-35948 and another member dissenting as to
all of the cases [Zaldivar].

II. Ratification Cases [Cases at bar]
January 20, 1973 Josue Javellana filed a class suit (as a Filipino citizen, and qualified and registered
voter) against The Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to
restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents, from implementing any of the provisions of
the proposed Constitution not found in the present, 1935, Constitution.
x Javellana alleges that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the New
Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution upon the ground:
Commander-in-Chief has no authority to create the assemblies without power to approve
the proposed constitution
President without the power to proclaim the ratification
'Elections' that transpired weren't free
January 23, 1973 Tan, et. al., filed similar actions
Same day Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito Salonga, Salvador Laurel, Ramon Mitra, Jr. and
Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as Senator and Minority Floor Leader of the Senate and the others as duly
elected members thereof filed their case against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of General Services, the President and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
x Senate must convene for its 8
th
Session
x Prevented from entering the premises of the Senate Session Hall and performing their duties
x Senate hall occupied by the military
x Prayed for a writ of mandamus [Gil Puyat and Jose Roy] and prohibition
x Also writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
February 3, 1973 Monteclaro, as president of the National Press club filed his petition
February 12, 1973 Dilag et. Al, filed their petition
Respondents:
x Court without jurisdiction to act on the said petitions
x The questions raised therein are "political in character and therefore nonjusticiable
x There was substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
x The constitution was properly submitted to the people in a free, orderly and honest election
x Proc. No. 1102, certifying the results of the election, is conclusive upon the courts, and
x The amending process outlined in Art XV of the 1935 Constitution is not exclusive of other modes
of amendments

February 12, 1973 Hearing begins and continues for four more days (Feb 13,14,15, and 16)
March 3, 1973 petitioner in L-36165 filed a Manifestation and Supplemental Rejoinder, whereas the
OSG submitted in all these cases a "Rejoinder to Petitioners' Replies

ISSUES:

1. WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
2. WON the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not
strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed constitution been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people?
4. WON the petitioners are entitled to relief?
5. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?

1935 Constitutional Provisions
ARTICLE XV
AMENDMENTS
Section 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
*Notes: Nothing on revisions. No mention of the word
'plebiscite'.
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 10. All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc, and no treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Court.
**Note: Nothing specifically on Presidential
Proclamations or Presidential Decrees.

ARTICLE V
SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a
plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not
less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively
on the question.

Ratio Decidendi:
I dont know if these are even applicable given that the opinion of the ponente is a dissenting opinion, and
is thus different from the disposition of the cases.
I. WON the issue of the validity of Proc. No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore
non-justiciable, question.
[Better formulation: WON the issue of the validity of Proc. No 1102 constitutes a political
question]
RD: Number of Justices to Declare a Presidential Decree/ Presidential
Proclamation unconstitutional: Only a simple majority, or six votes, shall be required to
declare a presidential decree or proclamation unconstitutional. The 2/3 votes required to
declare a statute unconstitutional shall only be required in treaties and 'laws' [Sec 10,
Article V].
x Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight
Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an EO issued by the President.
x n laws and treaties, there has to be approval from both the Executive and
Legislature, whereas in PPs and PD only the Executive acts.
x Executive proclamation has no more than the force of an EO only 6 (simple
majority of this sitting) required.
RD: Political Question: The issue of the validity of the 1971 Constitution insofar as
deciding on the compliance of its ratification with the method and procedure prescribed in
Art XV of the 1935 Constitution is concerned, does not constitute a political question.
x Stare Decisis: Habeas Corpus cases and Plebiscite Cases wherein the court
decided to rule on the constitutionality of the cases.
x Separation of Powers: [n re: McConaughy]
1) making laws [legislature]; 2) enforcement of laws and judicial
decisions [Executive]; and 3) settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally
demandable and enforceable [judiciary] + checks and balances.
But!!!! When a power vested in said officer or branch of the government
is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such power are said
to be political in nature, and consequently, non-justiciable or beyond
judicial review.
Therefore political questions include:
1) People in their sovereign capacity
2) Or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the gov't
3) With discretionary power to act
4) Concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,

of a particular measure
x When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitation, the issue
on WON the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being
on legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom.
x Luther v. Borden People in Rhode sland dissatisfied with the Charter
government and called for the creation of a new constitution. CONCON wasn't
authorized by law. Upon return of the votes cast by them, the convention
declared that said Constitution had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the
people and became the paramount law and Constitution of Rhode sland.
Courts recognized its validity
napplicable to cases at bar
1) Didn't involve a federal question but a municipal one
2) Recognition of government paramount question, not recognition
of constitution
3) nvolves a conflict between 2 rival governments
x Baker v. Carr Federal Supreme Court reversed the appeal decision [non-
justiciablility] and held that said issue was justiciable and non-political question
inasmuch as: "deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitution interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
x n Re: McConaughy: "The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that
whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the
requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial question.

II. WON the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions?
Sdfdf
RD: Election The word 'election' shall refer to the process wherein duly registered
voters shall cast their votes to decide on constitutional amendments under the
supervision of the COMELEC.
x People The word 'people' stated in Sec 1, Art 15, shall refer to duly registered
voters who 21 years of age or above.
Revised Barrio Charter 18 years and above shall be qualified to be
part of the Barrio Assemblies. But voting complies with the 21-age
minimum. [those lacking in qualifications cannot be considered as
eligible to vote]
1935 CONCON age limit 21 years. Permissive language "suffrage may
be exercised does not pertain to laxity in standards.
Different legislation: Suffrage a grant or recognition of the right to vote,
and thus a denial to those who lack the requisite qualifications
nconceivable that the provisions of the 1935 constitution regarding
elections is applicable only to the election of public officers and not to
amendments or revisions of the constitution.
x Votes Cast
Smith v. Renville 'votes cast' equivalent to 'ballots cast' Citizens'

Assemblies void ab initio
Secret voting must have the privilege of keeping one's vote secret
x COMELEC: Sec 1, Art X ndependent COMELEC [independence here refers
to independence from the Executive Branch]
President's influence on the Department of nterior (that facilitated the
elections before)
x COMELEC: Sec 2, Art X COMELEC has the exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
All provisions of the Election Code of 1971, insofar as they are not
inconsistent' with said decree [PD73]. shall apply to the conduct of the
plebiscite.
Sec 2, Election Code "all elections of public officers except barrio
officials and plebiscites shall be conducted in the manner provided in this
Code.
PD 86-A doesn't and cannot exclude the exercise of the constitutional
supervisory power of the COMELEC
Barrio Assemblies took place without the intervention of the COMELEC
and without compliance with the Election Code of 1971 and PD 73.

III. WON the aforementioned proposed constitution been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
RD: Determination of Votes The final decision of election results rests upon the
Courts.
Proc. 1102's dispositive portion has no legal effect and is thus not conclusive upon the
court.
x Cruz (supposed president of the National Association/Federation of Presidents of
the Citizens' Assemblies) wasn't even a member of any barrio council since
1972. t's impossible for him to certify the results as stated in PP 1102.
t is settled law that the decisions of election officers, and canvassing boards are not
conclusive and that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares
that the decisions of the board shall be final.. " [n re McConaughy / State v. Mason]
Proc 1102 cannot serve as conclusive evidence as to the validity of the results.
Procedure still not followed [age, secret voting, votes cast]
x Many if not most didn't know that ratification or rejection would be decided
x What plebiscite was there to postpone if the vote of the Citizens' Assemblies
would already be considered as substitute for the plebiscites?
x Other questions in the poll not proper for an election of ratification or amendment
x Wording of the question "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE NEW CONSTTUTON?
not appropriate
x Question #8 inappropriate: "Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution?
x Citizens' Assemblies weren't held in many parts of Manila and the suburbs, as
well as in other parts of the Philippines.
Assemblies had no time to convene and discuss many thought that
the polls simply were to help in "shaping up government policies and
were merely consultative.
RD: Acquiesce of People A constitution shall be considered as ratified in spite of

failing to comply with all the constitutional requirements if 1) the Executive complies with
it, 2) if the Legislature issues a formal official act adopting a joint resolution to recognize
it, 3) if members of the legislature pass laws under it, 4) if the judiciary swears to uphold
it, and 5) if the people show their support to it by registering as voters under it.
x Taylor v. Commonwealth involves a constitution ordained in 1902 and
"proclaimed by a convention duly called by a direct vote of the people of the state
to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. Acquiesce was apparent by means
of the:
Governor swearing fidelity to it
Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint resolution oath of
individual members to support it and by having been engaged for nearly
a year, in legislating under it and putting its provisions in operation
Judiciary taking an oath to support it and by enforcing its provisions
People by registering as voters under it and by voting, under its
provisions, at a general election for their representatives in the Congress
of the United States
Notes: not submitted to people for ratification; acquiesce apparent
through the acts of the other sectors of the Government; no martial law.
x Respondents argue that acquiesce is complete (also found in the concurring
opinions), ponencia opines otherwise:
1) Executive reorganized the executive offices and departments
2) Legislature did not convene for session ; individual members joined
the interim NA
3) People agree to it PP 1102 as 'overwhelming' evidence (for
Marcos)
4)Judiciary members of the SC already sit as members of the 1973
Constitution SC
x mplications of Martial Law
mplied threat to those who disagree in Congress
The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience by the people, under
these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
This is specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and large,
unfamiliar with the parliamentary system, the new form of government
introduced in the proposed Constitution.
Enrolled Bill Rule why can't it be applicable to the President in Proc.
1102?
1) The aforementioned Association President (who isn't even a
member) and the Secretary of the Department of Local
Governments and Community Development have no authority to
ascertain the results as compared to the Congress and Senate
that are duly mandated to do their functions
2) Worse still they [the executive offices] are precisely the offices
that the 1935 Constitution provides safeguards against (in
ascertaining the independence of the COMELEC)

IV. WON the petitioners are entitled to relief.
RD: Mandamus - A writ of mandamus cannot be issued by the SC to the head of a co-equal
department of government.
V. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force.

As decided by the vote of the other judges.

Disposition:
n the overall the cases were dismissed. So there's the Makasiar group that agrees to everything that
Marcos did, and then there's the Chief Justice's group.
1. WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or political and therefore
non-justiciable, question? YES.
a. Justiciable 6 Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and
Concepcion
b. The court can inquire if there really was approval, and if so, then it becomes non-
justiciable Barredo
c. Political Questions 3 Justices Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra
2. WON the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
a. Not validly ratified 6 Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Concepcion
b. Falls short of the requirements but it should be considered that it was merely ratified in an
unorthodox manner Barredo
c. There was substantial compliance 3 Justices Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra
3. WON the aforementioned proposed constitution been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people?
a. Yes 4 Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
b. Not validly ratified but had been acquiesced to (insufficient judicial standard to know)
Barredo
c. No free expression by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the Proposed Constitution under Martial Law 2 Justices
Zaldivar and Concepcion
4. WON the petitioners entitled to relief? picketers
a. Effectivity of the Constitution the final issue and those non-justiciable 6 Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra
b. Deny motion to dismiss cases 4 Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, and
Concepcion
5. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force?
a. Yes 4 Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
b. No vote, they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted the
Constitution or not 4 Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
c. Not in force 2 Justices Zaldivar and Concepcion


CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1. Basics of Judicial Review

LAMBINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174153 & 174299
Date: October 25, 2006
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Nature: Special civil actions in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Facts:
1. February 15, 2006 petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, with other groups and
individuals commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution.
2. August 25, 2006 the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735
or the nitiative and Referendum Act.
3. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6, 327, 952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. These signatures were
verified by COMELEC election registrars.
4. The Lambino Group wanted to change the 1987 Constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Article
V (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article V (Executive Department) and by adding
Article XV entitled "Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
5. August 30, 2006 the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XV (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
6. August 31, 2006 the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. t invoked Santiago vs. Commision on Elections which declares RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposal to amend the Constitution.
7. n G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for an issuance of the writs for certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC resolution and to compel them to give due course to the
initiative condition. Lambino contends that Santiago is not a binding precedent, it only binds the
parties to the case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people.
8. n G.R. No. 174299, the Binay Group prays that the court require the COMELEC Commissioners
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for verifying the signatures and for
entertaining the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago.
9. n his Comment, the Solicitor General urged the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago
ruling and treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the
system of initiative.
10. Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition.
a. Supporting intervenors COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying in
Santiago.
b. Opposing intervenors Santiago is a binding precedent. They also challenged:
Lambino's standing to file the petition
The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
The Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article
XV of the 1987 Constitution
The nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments
as provided under Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution
The Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject
11. September 26, 2006 Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral argument.
Issues:
1. WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative.
2. WON the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
Held:
1. The Lambino Group's initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative
The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution on direct
proposal by the people
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with the Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. They only submitted a copy of a
signature sheet similar to that submitted by an opposing intervenor which does not
contain the draft of the proposed changes nor state that the text of the proposed changes
is attached to it.
a. The ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, from which Erico B. Aumentado purports to
derive his authority to write the amendment, does not state that it authorizes
Aumentado to prepare the amendment nor does it refer to the draft petition or to
the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
b. The Lambino Group never alleged that they amended the petition because the
amended petition was what they circulated but because the August 25, 2006
petition "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
c. The Lambino never alleged in their August 25, 2006 petition and in the August
30, 2006 amended petition that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition
together with the signature sheets. They only stated that they circulated to the
people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC after an opposing
intervenor pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the
proposed changes. This was later contradicted by Atty. Lambino who stated
during the oral arguments that they circulated the draft of the amended petition.
d. The Lambino Group cited as authority Corpus Juris Secundum stating that "a
signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the
act. The same authority, however, requires a proposed change to be attached to
the petition.
e. Even assuming that that the Lambino Group did circulate copies, they admittedly
circulated only very limited copies of the petition. Atty. Lambino could only certify
the printing of 100, 000 copies of the petition which could not have been
distributed to all 6.3 million signatories.
RATIO:
The phrase directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
[contained in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution] shall mean that the people
authored and signed a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments
which may be either written on the face of the petition or attached to it.

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives.
The Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. t proposes to
change the structure of the government, thus altering the separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances in the Constitution (reduction of the co-equal branches of
the government into two, abolition of the Office of the President, abolition of one chamber
of Congress). No less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected.
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. n contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention
can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution
RATIO:
Amendment shall mean an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed. It refers to a change that adds, reduces or deletes without altering the basic
principles involved. It affects only the specific provision being amended.
Revision shall broadly imply a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution. It alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. It generally affects several provisions of
the constitution.

2. A revisit of Santiago vs. Comelec is not necessary.
Since the petition warrants outright dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution, there is no need to revisit the
court's ruling in Santiago.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on
some other ground.
Even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail because it embraces
more than one subject matter.

3. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino Group's
nitiative. t only followed the court's ruling in Santiago.
RATIO:
A dismissal by the COMELEC of an initiative petition shall not amount to grave
abuse of discretion if it only followed the ruling of the court on a previous case.
Judgment: Petition DSMSSED.

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS
G.R. Nos. 96754, 96673

Date: June 22, 1995

Petitioners: Congressman James L. Chiongbian, et al.

Respondents: Hon. Oscar M. Orbos, Executive Secretary; et al.

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

Facts: Pursuant to Art. X, Sec. 18, 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6734 or the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) on August 1, 1989; calling for a plebiscite
involving 13 provinces (Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del
Sur) and 9 cities (Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, ligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa, and Zamboanga). Following the plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, 4 provinces (Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) voted in favor of creating an autonomous region and thereby
became the ARMM. Art. XX, Sec. 13, R.A. No. 6734 provides:
x x x The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
President Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 E.O. No. 429 (amended by E.O. No. 439), "Providing for
the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners, who are members of
Congress, wrote a protest letter to President Aquino dated November 12, 1990, contending that the
President's authority to merge does not include authority to reorganize regions. Unheeded, petitioners
filed instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the President, in reorganizing the administrative regions, violated the legislative
standard expressed in Art. XX, Sec. 13, R.A. No. 6734.

Ratio decidendi: A legislative standard in subordinate legislation may be implied and may be found in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged law.

Reasoning: Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Therefore, the power to reorganize regions is traditionally lodged in the President and incidental to the
power of general supervision over local governments (Art. X, Sec.4, 1987 Constitution) and control of
executive departments (Art. V, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution).

Disposition: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DSMSSED for lack of merit.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, 113888

Date: August 19, 1994

Petitioners: Phililppine Constitution Association, et al.

Respondents: Hon. Salvador Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management; et al.

Ponente: Quiason, J.

Nature: Petitions for review of orders or resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Budget and
Management, National Treasurer, and the Commission on Audit

Facts: Congress passed and approved the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 on December 17, 1993.
President Ramos signed the bill into law, R.A. No. 7663 or the General Appropriation Act of 1994,
delivered his Presidential Veto Message on December 30, 1993.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the power given to Congress to propose and identify activities to be funded by the
Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power.
(2) Whether or not the realignment of operational expenses given to a member of Congress violates Art.
V, Sec. 25, par. 5, 1987 Constitution.
(3) Whether or not giving the highest budget allocation to debt service than to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) violates Art. XV, Sec. 5, par. 5.
(4) Whether or not the President can veto special provision on debt service ceiling without vetoing the
entire amount for that purpose.

Ratio decidendi:
(1) The legislative power of appropriation shall include the power to propose and specify the activities to
be funded under the appropriation law.
(2) Any member of Congress may determine the necessary realignment of operating expenses subject to
the approval of the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the President of the Senate.
(3) While the highest budget allocation is given to debt service, education shall have the highest budget
allocation among all department budgets.
(4) The President cannot veto a provision in the GAB.

Reasoning:
(1) This legislative power is recommendatory and the President still implements the projects to be funded
under the CDF since members of Congress are more knowledgeable of the needs of their constituents.
(2) ndividual members of Congress are in a better position to determine the realignment of operating
expenses of their respective offices.
(3) The government needs to protect the credit standing of the country and to ensure the survival of the
economy.
(4) The Constitution allows the President to veto an item or items in the GAB but not to veto provisions
(Art. V, Sec. 27, par. 2).

Disposition: Petitions are DSMSSED except on the annulment of the veto of the special provision on
debt service.
ARROYO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 118597

Date: July 14, 1995

Petitioners: Joker P. Arroyo

Respondents: House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Augusto L. Syjuco

Ponente: Francisco, J.

Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the HRET

Facts: Syjuco filed an election protest before the HRET after the proclamation of Arroyo as the duly
elected representative of the lone district of Makati after the May 11, 1992 elections. Syjuco alleged
anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes and massive fraud; and sought for the revision and
recounting of ballots cast in 1,292 out of 1,714 precincts of Makati. Arroyo filed a counter-protest which
the HRET dismissed. Former Justice Gancayco reports anomalies by the HRET employees where Arroyo
was victimized. The HRET received evidence and then both parties filed their respective memoranda.
Syjuco, in his memorandum cum addendum, called upon the HRET to decide the case based on
Precinct-level document-based evidences. On January 25, 1993, the HRET, voting 6-3, annulled Arroyo's
proclamation and declared Syjuco as duly elected representative. Without filing for a motion for
reconsideration, Arroyo filed instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling election results in
some contested precincts.

Ratio decidendi: The HRET shall not nullify election results, in the absence of fraud, based on mere
irregularities or omissions committed by election officials.

Reasoning: Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal. The HRET disregarded its
own mandatory requisites for the annulment of elections based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism; and
basic rules on evidence; and disregarded basic rules on evidence when it received evidence which is
merely substitutional in nature when original evidence is available.

Disposition: Petition is GRANTED. Decision of HRET is SET ASDE.
LLAMAS VS. ORBOS

G.R. No. 99031

Date: October 15, 1991

Petitioners: Rodolfo D. Llamas

Respondents: Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and Mariano Un Ocampo

Ponente: Paras, J.

Nature: Petition to review the resolution of the Executive Secretary

Facts: Tarlac Provincial Governor Ocampo was suspended 90 days from office (March 1 to May 31,
1991) for having been found guilty of violating R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner Provincial Vice-Governor Llamas assumed office during the suspension period. On May 15,
1991, President Aquino through the Executive Secretary granted respondent Executive Clemency,
reducing the 90 day suspension to the period already served. Ocampo thereby reassumed office. Llamas
filed instant petition contending that the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment applies only
to criminal cases (Art. V, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution).

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to grant Executive Clemency in Administrative
Cases.

Ratio decidendi: The phrase "after conviction by final judgment shall apply not just in criminal cases but
also in administrative cases and are therefore subject to the power of executive clemency.

Reasoning: The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, except in impeachment cases.

Disposition: Petition DENED.

TORRALBA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

G.R. No. L-59180

Date: January 29, 1987

Petitioners: Clementino Torralba and Re L. Rugay

Respondents: The Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur and its Municipal Officers

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

Nature: Petition

Facts: Petitioners challenge the B.P. Blg. 56 enacted on February 1, 1980 creating the Municipality of
Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, for violating Art. X, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

Issues: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 56 in creating a municipality before the enactment of the Local
Government Code (February 10, 1983) violates Art. X, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution.

Ratio decidendi: Congress shall not be prohibited from creating municipal corporations before the
enactment of the Local Government Code, provided, that the new local government unit should be
approved by the people affected in a plebiscite.

Reasoning: There is no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a municipal corporation. n the absence of any constitutional limitations, Congress may create
any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government since the power to
create a municipal corporation is legislative in nature.

Disposition: Petition DSMSSED.

*Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.*

170 SCRA 191
February 9, 1989
EN BANC/ Fernan, C.J.

Petitioner:
Salavcion A. Monsanto

Respondent:
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

Nature:
Petition to review the resolution of the Deputty Executive Secretary.

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto, then Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City, and three
other accused of estafa through falsification of public documents.She was sentenced to imprisonment
and to indemnify the government.

Monsanto appealed the conviction to the SC, but the SC affirmed it. Pending her motion for
reconsideration the President extended to her an absolute pardon and she accepted it.

Petitioner then wrote the Treasurer of Calbayog City requesting that she be reinstated since her former
post is still vacant.

The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance, who ruled that the petitioner may be reinstated not
earlier than the date of the extension of the pardon, and he directed the City Treasurer to make sure that
the indemnity and costs of the petition are paid by the petitioner.

Monsanto sought reconsideration, avering that pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime, and
therefore her service was never interrupted and the date of her reinstatement must be on the day of her
suspension; and so she is entitled to backpay and she should not be required to pay her share in the
indemnity.

The Ministry referred the matter to the Office of the President for further review and action, Deputy
Executive Secretary Factoran denied the action and also the subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner. Hence, the petition in the SC.

ssue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.

Ruling:
RATO
No, the petitioner must be reappointed, she is not automatically reinstated to her position by virtue of an
absolute pardon.

1. Reinstatement may not be automatically made in cases of pardon.
Pardon does not release the person from guilt/conviction.
o When granted pending appeal, acceptance means foregoing the appeal and therefore judgment
of conviction by the lower court becomes final.
But relieves that person of all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including
disqualifications or disabilities.
t is not retrospective (therefore not entitled to backwages, etc).

2. Pardon cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing to appoint someone deemed of bad
character.
f the person pardoned wants to be reinstated he/she must wait for reappointment.
S/He must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for new appointment.

Dispostion:
Assailed resolution of Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. is affirmed.

Vote: 10 (1 concurring; 1 concurring in the result)

Planas v. COMELEC
Super Summary: petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the proposed plebiscite election for the
proposed new Constitution

Facts:
March 16 1967: Congress passed Resolution 2
June 17 1969: adopted Resolution 4, amending Res. 2
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution
implemented by RA 6132 approved on Aug 24 1970
Nov 20 2970: election of delegates for the 1971 Con-Con
Jun 1 1971: 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions

Sep 21 1972: Marcos declared Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) with the ConCon still in session
Nov 29 1972: Convention approved Proposed Constitution
Nov 30 1972: Marcos issued PD 73: submitting to the people the Constitution proposed by the 1971
ConCon for ratification or rejection and appropriating funds for it (for Jan 15 1973)

Dec 7 1972: Planas filed this case to enjoin respondents or their agents from implementing PD 73
k Setting of guidelines, prescription of ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the
voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress
k No freedom of speech, press, assembly
k No sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
dentical actions
Date Petitioner
Dec 8 1972 Pablo Sanidad
Dec 11 1972 Gerardo Roxas
Eddie Monteclaro
Sedfrey Ordonez
Dec 12 Vidal Tan, et al
Jose W. Diokno and
Benigno Aquino
Dec 14 Jacinto Jimenez
Raul M. Gonzales
Dec 16 Ernesto Hidalgo

Dec 17 1972: Marcos issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proc 1081 for the purpose of
free and open debate on the proposed Consti
Dec 23: postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Const
Jan 7 1973: Gen. Order 20: suspended in the meantime the order of Dec 17 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proc 1081 for free and open debate on the proposed Consti
- the Court refrained, for the time being, from deciding in the cases
- neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially
- Jan 22 1973: Congress regular session
Jan 12 1973: petitioners' urgent motion that case be decided asap preferably not later than Jan 15 1973
PD 86: organizing Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions
f they favor or oppose
1. New Society
2. Reforms instituted under Martial Law
3. holding of plebiscite on the proposed new Consti and when
4. Opening of regular session despite martial law
Forms of questions:
1. Do you approve of the New Society?
2. Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
3. Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
4. How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held? (bet Jan 10 -15 '73)
5. Do you like the way Marcos is running the affairs of the gov't?
6. Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular gov't to decide issues of
national interests?
7. Do you approve of the new Consti?
8. Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Consti?
9. Do you want elections to be held in Nov '73 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Consti?
10. f the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called?
11. Do you want martial law to continue?
Petitioners are also afraid that if question no. 7 is answered in the affirmative, the proposed Consti
would already be deemed ratified
Question 8: attempt to bypass the SC before which the question of the validity of the plebiscite on the
proposed Consti is now pending
Affirmative answer on 7 &8: fait accompli (An accomplished fact; an action which is completed before
those affected by it are in a position to query or reverse it.) the case would be rendered moot and
academic: supposed expression of the will of the people, the proposed Consti would be deemed
ratified
Confusion/chaos of which Consti is in force
Unconstitutionality of the Citizens Assemblies
1935 Consti Citizens Assemblies
ART XV: only
registered voters can
vote
Even persons 15 yrs
of age and older
Art XV: secrecy of
choice and vote
Votes were open and
were cast by raising
hands
Election Code:
provisions for free,
orderly and honest
elections
No similar provisions
to guide and regulate
proceedings
There should be
ample time to
organize the people
and enough time to
inform the people of
the provisions of the
Constitution
Lack of material time
to form the Citizen
Assemblies
Jan 17 1973: While the case was being heard, SOJ called CJ that Proclamation 1102 had already been
signed by the President
j Announced the ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention
j Do you approve of the New Constitution?
o 14 976 561: YES
o 743 869: NO
j Would you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
o 14 298 814: NO
j More than 95% of the member of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution
Respondents:
1. Political in character
2. ConCon had acted freely
3. President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of funds are valid
4. There is not an improper submission and there can be a plebiscite under martial law

ssues:
1. WON SC have the authority to pass upon the validity of PD 73
2. WON the 1971 ConCon had exceeded its authority in approving Sec 2, 3 (par 2) and 12 of Art
XV of the proposed Consti
3. WON the President have the authority to issue PD 73
4. WON martial law affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific
proposals for amendment of the Consti
Ratio:
CJ Concepcion:
WON SC has the authority to pass upon the validity of PD 73
k ssue is justiciable
k Subdivision (1) of Sec 2, Art V of the 1935 Consti: expressly provides for the authority of this Court
to review the issue
WON the 1971 ConCon had exceeded its authority in approving Sec 2, 3 (par 2) and 12 of Art XVII of the
proposed Consti
k Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose (except Jus
Cogens or international law): it has sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people. Also, said
proposals cannot be valid as part of the Consti unless and until approved by the majority of the
votes cast at an election for ratification (Sec 1 Art XV of the 1935 Consti
WON the President have the authority to issue PD 73
k not necessary to answer the question bec the plebiscite ordained in said decree has been
postponed
WON martial law affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for
amendment of the Consti
k related to Proclamation 1102
k is not adequately argued
k it would be improper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough
discussion possible
Disposition: PETTON DSMSSED

SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA, JR.
G.R. No. 134577
Date: November 18, 1998
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Nature: Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto

Facts:
1. The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress.
2. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows:
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats
of the Philippines
(Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members ndependent
23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
"independent".)
3. During session, Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan and Sen. Francisco S. Tatad were both nominated to the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
4. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader
because those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
5. During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at even after several sessions.
6. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
7. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue:
4. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
5. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution?
6. WON respondent Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
7. WON respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona
as the minority leader?

Ratio/Reasoning:
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the petition.
- Petitioner's assertion: Section 16 (1), Article V of the constitution, has not
been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Well-settled is the doctrine, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. n light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise
of their functions and prerogatives.
2. There is no actual violation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article V.
- The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the
number greater than half or more than half of any total." Majority may also
refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.
- n contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously
be the majority while the lesser would be the minority.
The Constitution is only explicit on the matter of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker. t is dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress. Neither does it delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body.
n the election for Senate President, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The method of choosing who will be the other officers of Senate must be prescribed by
the Senate itself. The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices
and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.
3. Respondent Guingona is not usurping or unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully
occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or
the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in
no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity Guingona's assumption and exercise of
the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
4. Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader.
Guingona belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP). By
unanimous resolution by the members of this party, he was chosen as minority leader.
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.
Judgment: Petition DSMSSED.


Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority (Digest)

Petitioner: Solicitor General, R. Malapira, S. Mosanto, D. Calderon, G. Trieste
Respondent: Metropolitan Manila Authority, Municipality of Mandaluyong
Ponente: J. Cruz
Nature: Petition to review the resolution of the Metropolitan Manila Authority

Facts/Background:
1. Jurisprudence: Prior to the chain of events prompting the petition, the Court held in Metropolitan
Traffic Command West District vs. Hon. Arsenio Gonong (Gonong decision for brevity) that the
confiscation of drivers' license was not among the imposable sanctions by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Authority) under PD 1605 except for conditions
under LO 43. Judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990.
2. Series of confiscation of license and detachment of plates happened thereafter:

Date Traffic Violator Location Officer Response to
Complaint
Oct. 17, 1990
Rodolfo Malapira
(license)
QC
Traffic enforcer
A. delos Reyes

Feb. 14, 1991 Stephen Mandaluyong Traffic enforcer Ordinance No. 7
Mosanto
(license)
AD. Martinez Series of 1988
(Mandaluyong) -
authorization to
confiscate
licenses and
remove plates in
case of traffic
obstruction.
Mar. 7, 1991
Atty. Dan
Calderon
(license)
Makati
Pat. Tano-an Gonong decision
only prohibited
removal of
license plates not
confiscation of
licenses.
Apr. 29, 1991
Atty. Grandy
Trieste (plate)

(license)
E. Ramos (MMA
Traffic
Operations
Center)

Pat. Emmanuel
(Metro. Police
Command -
WPD)

Memorandum of
District Comndr.
of PNP Western
Traffic District
authorizing the
confiscation

3. MMA issued Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 self-authorization to detach plates or tow and
impound vehicles illegally parked and in obstruction to traffic in Metro Manila.
4. MMA argued that the Ordinance does not supplant the decision rather supplements it -
confiscation of license plates was only invalid without a valid law or ordinance, Ord. No. 11
enactment validates confiscation; Ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct
action challenging its invalidity.
5. SolGen argues that the ordinance represented an invalid exercise of delegated legislative power;
in contravention to PD 1605 which prohibits confiscation of drivers' licenses and plates for traffic
violation.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not there was an actual case or controversy in the case at bar. (2) Whether or not
there was undue exercise of delegated legislative power. (3) Whether or not the assailed ordinances are
valid and enforceable.

Held/Reasoning: (1) Procedural issues have been relaxed by the Court to address transcendental public
interest. n the case at bar, TP is the confusion among motorists as to which law applies. (2 & 3) NO.
MMA invoked authority bestowed upon it by EO 392 while in issuing Ord. No. 11 while Ord. No. 7 was
justified based on the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code. Legislative power has
been validly delegated to these bodies, however the exercise of this power is NOT. Among the requisites
for the validity of an ordinance is that it should not contravene the Constitution or an existing statute. The
ordinances at hand do not conform to PD 1605 they allow giving sanctions that are expressly prohibited
by the statute. Legislative power is vested in the Congress (Section 1 Article 6 of the Constitution); local
political subdivisions are only to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (power of subordinate legislation). Enactments that are local in origin cannot prevail
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

Ratio Decidendi: Local political subdivisions are delegated with the power to legislate so long as their
enactments are not in contravention to laws issued by the Congress.

Disposition: Ordinance No. 11 series of 1991 (MMA) and Ordinance No. 7 series of 1988 (Mun. of
Mandaluyong) NULL and VOD; law enforcement authorities enjoined from removing license plates and
confiscating drivers' licenses for traffic violations.

*Notes from discussion: This is an example of a case where the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint. Petitioners had no legal standing and the case was not ripe for determination. Sanctions to
traffic violations are not transcendental an issue for the procedural issues to be relaxed. But then again,
the Court shall decide.
*Obiter (or maybe not -): Executive has supervisory power over local governments (Sec. 4 Art. 10 of the
Consti).

Prepared by: Toff Lamug 1-C

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. vs Balite Portal Mining Corp
April 03, 2002

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:

1. This involves a rich tract of mineral land located in Davao-Agusa-Surigao Forest Rserve otherwise
knows as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area controversial for the gold deposits found within its bowels.

2. From 1985-1991 people flocked to Diwalwal to stake their respective claims; hundreds died because
of mining-related accidents as consequence of unregulated mining activities.

3. March 10, 1988: Marcopper Mining Corp. was granted Exploration Permit (EP 133) over hectares of
lands which include the Diwalwal area; this grant was challenged by Apex Mining Corp in Apex Mining
Co., Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al.; but due to the failure of apex to comply with the
procedural requirements, court decided in favor of Marxopper in 1991.

4. June 27, 1991: RA 7076 or People's Small Scale Mining Act established and created People's Small
Scale Mining Program and the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PRMB) implemented and under direct
control of the Sec. of DENR.
- grants authority to set aside small-scale mining area subject to review by DENR
- and to award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions

5. Dec. 21, 1999: DENR Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Sec. by
Proc. 369 establishing the Agusan-Davao-Suriga Forest Reserve, issued DAO 66 declaring the Diwalwal
area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining.

6. A petition was filed to cancel the Exploration Permit and to admit an MPSA (mineral production
sharing agreement) proposal over Diwalwal: this is known as the RED Mines Case.

7. Feb. 16, 1994: During the pendency of the RED Mines Case, Marcopper assigned its EP 133 to
petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM),which applied for an integrated MPSA
over land covered by the permit.

8. Application for integrated MPSA was registered by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional
Office in Dacao; after its publication, application met oppositions through MAC Cases Nos. 004-012, 016,
and 97-01.

9. March 3, 1995: RA 7942 or Philippine Mining Act was enacted; MAC Cases were referred to the
Regional Panel Arbitrators tasked to resolve disputes involving mining rights; RPA took cognizance and
consolidated RED Mines case with the MAC cases.

10. April 1, 1997: PMRB of Davao passed Res. 26 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits
(OTPs) to small scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.

11. May 30, 1997: petitioner filed complaint for damages before RTC of Makati against DENR Sec. and
PMRB-Davao for the alleged illegal issuance of the OTPs which allowed the extraction and hauling of
P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEM's mining claim.

12. June 13, 1997: RPA resolved the consolidated mines case and decided in favor of SEM (petitioner)
upholding the validity of EP 133 and dismissing the adverse claims against MPSA 128.

13. June 24, 1997: DENR Sec. issued Memorandum Order 97-03 which provides that the DENR shall
consider the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area
through management agreements or operating agreements which shall include profit sharing
arrangements with small scale miners.

14. July 16, 1997: petitioner filed special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
CA against PMRB-Davao, DENR Sec., and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC)
representing all OTP grantees.
** to NULLFY MEMORANDUM ORDER 97-03 because "direct state utilization would impair its
vested rights under EP 133.
** the DENR Sec. usurped the jurisdiction of the RPA which upheld the validity of EP 133 and
dismissed all claims against SEMs.

15. January 6, 1998: MAB rendered decision in the Consolidated Mine cases setting aside the
judgment of RPA; this decision was elevated to the High Court along with the petition dismissed by the
CA on March 19, 1998 (thus, consolidated petition: GR Nos. 132475 and 132528).

16. March 19, 1998: CA voted 3-2 dismissing the petition of SEM on the ground that:
**DENR Sec. merely issued a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the
gov't. to resolve the Diwalwal conflict; it has not YET CONCLUSVELY adopted a DRECT
STATE UTLZATON. Thus, the order has not yet fixed any obligation, legal relationship or right;
the petition was then premature.
** petitioner's rights under EP 133 is not immutable or inviolable; it is merely a privilege granted
by State so that the Chief Exec can revoke or modify it when the natl interest so requires.
**CA did not rule on the validity of the OTPs as they are under the jurisdiction of the RPA.

17. Petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit on Aug. 19, 1998.

18. The appealed Consolidated Mines cases, as of Sept. 11, 2000, were still pending before the CA.
ISSUE 1: WON the assailed memorandum order adopts the direct state utilization scheme in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
- petitioner: the memorandum order dictated the said recourse.
- memorandum order is a legal shortcut to preempt the resolution of the Consolidated Mines case

RATIO 1: The assailed MO 97-03 shall constitute only a study of the option of direct state
utilization as a policy
- it simply directed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine feasibility
- it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small scale owners
- there is no showing that after the study, the State would directly take over the mines
- thus, petition was premature; order did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any
legal relation between and among the parties to the dispute.
-no valid opposition may be raised against mere study of an alternative. Art. X, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Consti: ".exploration, development, and utilization of natl resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State ; "The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements.

ISSUE 2: WON EP 133 vests rights upon petitioner which must be protected from violation by MO
97-03
- direct state utilization violates rights vested already through EP 133

RATIO 2: EP 133 shall, its validity still being in dispute and pending before the CA, not be a source
of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by MO 97-03.
- as per MAB decision, continued efficacy of EP 133 is in question: whether Marcopper can
legally assign the permit which had expired.
- therefore, won the petitioner has vested right under EP 133 is still indefinite and unsettled.

ISSUE 3: WON rights under EP 133 are total and absolute.

RATIO 3: Rights under EP 133 shall be merely a privilege granted by the State which may be
amended, modified when the natl interest so requires.
- exploration, development, and utilization of natl resources are impressed with public interest.
- like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any irrevocable rights
within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clause of the Constitution.
- State, under its police power, may alter, modify or amend the same in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare.
- Art. X, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Consti: ".exploration, development, and utilization of natl resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State ; "The State may directly undertake
such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements.
- Sec. 4, Chapter of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995: mineral resources are owned by the
State; edu and proc of natl resources under full control and supervision.
- State shall have the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the
exploration, development, utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources by either
undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities (guided by:
public interest, material and logistic feasibility).

ISSUE 4: WON MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining laws by allowing illegal miners to enter into
mining agreements with the State.

RATIO 4: The determination of whether BCMC and other mining entities it represents are
conducting illegal mining activities shall be determined in the Consolidated Mines as they
constitute questions of facts.
- Consolidated Mines case is still pending; it is yet to be disposed by the CA
- SC not to preempt the resolution of the cases.

ISSUE 5: WON the Apex Mining case can be used by SEM to justify its rights under EP 133 and
against BCMC and oppositor mining firms.
- the case settled that Marcopper has validly acquired mining rights over the Diwalwal case, not
Apex.

RATIO 5: The Apex Mining case shall not be binding and conclusive on BCMC and other mining
entities and shall not be dispositive of the question on the continuing validity of EP 133
- BCMC and other mining entities are not part or parties of the Apex Mining case.
- Apex Mining case does not settle the question on whether EP 133 had already expired and
remained valid subsequent to its transfer by Marcopper to petitioner

Judgment: Petition Denied.


*Tablarin vs. Gutierrez*

152 SCRA 730
July 31, 1987
EN BANC/ Feliciano, J.

Petitioners:
Teresita Tablarin,
Ma. Luz Ciriaco,
Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira
Evangelina S. Labao
- n behalf of themselves and in behalf of applicants for admissiion into Medical Colleges during SY
1987-1988 and future years who have not taken/successfully hurdled the NMAT (in short mga hindi
nagNMAT at mga ! )

Respondents:
Judge Angelina Gutierrez presiding judge of Br.37, RTC Manila
Sec. Lourdes Quisumbing in her capacity as Chairperson of BME
Center for Education Measurement (CEM)

Nature:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of RTC of Manila, Br. 37

Facts:
n 1959, RA 2382 also known as the Medical Act of 1959 was enacted.

t was subsequently amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946.

ts objectives are set out in Sec 1
a. Standardization and regulation of medical education

b. Examination for registration of physicians
c. Supervision, control, and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines

t also creates the Board of Medical Education (BME)
Functions of BME are outlined in Sec 5
(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of
those issued said certificate: and to collect from said applicants the amount of 25 pesos each which shall
accrue to the operating fund of the BME

Sec 7 prescribes minimum requirments for applicants to med schools
Not convicted of offense involving moral turpitude
Presents:
1. Record of completion of BA/BS degree
2. Certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from BME
3. Certificate of good moral character, by 2 former professors
4. Birth certificate

On August 23, 1985 the Ministry of Education Culture and Sports issued Order No. 52, series of 1985.
This established NMAT, a uniform admission test as an additional requirement for issuance of
certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools, beginning with SY1986-1987

n order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Sec 5 (a) and (f) of RA 2382 as amended and MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, petitioners filed with RTC of Manila, a petition for declaratory judgment and prohibition
with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction.

The petition was denied by the trial court.

NMAT was conducted as previously scheduled (Dec. 1986, April 1987).

Petition filed this action for the SC to set aside the order of respondent judge.

Arguments raised by Petitioners:
1. Sec 5 (a) & (f) of RA 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.52 violates a number of provisions
in the constitution
2. Sec 5 (a) & (f) of RA 2382, as amended, present an undue deleagtion of legislative power by
failing to establish standard to be followed by the BME
3. NMAT is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement w/c results in denial of due
process
4. MECS Order No.52, s.1985 is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Ruling:
1.Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the assailed statute and order collide/clash with the following
provisions:

Art 2, Sec 11 values dignity, respect human rights
Art 2, Sec 13 vital role of youth; physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being
Art 2, Sec 17 priority to education, science, and technology...
Art 14, Sec 1 "to make such education accessible to all
Art 14, Sec 5 (3) - "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements

a. When a statute is being challenged due to its alleged contravention of "state policies found in the
second half of Article 2, the extent or the manner by which they collide with these policies must be
sufficiently demonstrated.
b. Art 14 Sec 1 must be read together with Sec 5 (3) of the same article, the latter not to be read
with absolute literalness.
To make education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements

2.There is no undue delegation of legislative power.

General principle of non-delegation of legislative power, flows from and reinforces the rule on separation
and allocation of powers among the three branches of government.

Delegatus non potest delegare what is delegated cannot be delegated

The principle of non-delegation of legislative power must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes which deal with matters that are complex and technical.

Principle of subordinate legislation
Due to the complexities of modern government (multiplication of subjects of gov't regulation, increased
difficulty of administering laws) there is a growing tendency toward delegation of greater power of
legislature, and toward the approval of such practice by the courts.

RATO (?!? Or so think... )
There is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle even when the
standard set for subordinate legislation in the exercies of rule making authroity by an administrative
agency is broad and highly abstract.

n this case the standard was: "the standardization and regualtion of medical education.

The standard may be expressed or implied.

3. Petitioners have failed to specify what factors make the NMAT an unfair, unreasonable and an
unequitable requirement.

Petitioners suggest that NMAT is an unnecessary requirement,

a. Petitioners argument appear to relate to utility and the wisdom/desirability of the NMAT
requirement, a matter outside judicial discretion.
b. The impugned administrative and legislative provisions constitute a valid exercise of police
power.
The government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into med schools and "improving the quality of medical
education in the country.
Protection of the public from potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance on those who
would treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

4.Different cut-off scores for different school years do not constitute infringement of the requirements of
equal protection.

Petitioners contend that different cut off scores for the NMAT for different years renders the MECS ordeer
"arbitrary and capricious.

a. Different cut off scores for different school years may be dictated by varying conditions during
those years (difficulty of exam, no. of slots available, etc.).
b. A permanent and immutable cut off score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year may result to unreasonable rigidity.

Dispostion:
The petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Order of the trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is affirmed.

Costs against petitioner.

Vote: 14 0
(Kulang ng isang justice. Di ko alam kung sino bwahahah! )

"Gravedigger...
when you dig my grave....
can you make it shallow...
so that can feel the rain...

...in memory of Mr. LeRoi Moore.

Taada v. Angara
Date: May 2, 1997
Petitioner: Tanada and Coseteng, as members of Philippine Senate and as taxpayers, et al
Respondent: Angara et al, in their capacities as members of Senate who concurred in ratification by
President of Philippines of the Agreement establishing WTO.
Nature: Petition for
Ponente: Panganiban
Facts:
Apr 15, 1994: Rizalino Navarro, Sec of Dep't of Trade and ndustry, signed the Final Act
Embodying Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
The Final Act included the submission of WTO Agreement for consideration of the respective
authorities of the country and the adoption of the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
Afterwhich, two letters were submitted to the Senate by the President:
1. "Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Sec
21 Art V of Consti.
2. "Uruguay Final Act, Agreement establishing WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding on Committees in Financial Services are submitted.
Dec 9, 1994: President certified necessity of immediate action of PS 1083 (resolution Concurring
in Ratification of Agreement Establishing WTO).
Dec 14, 1994: Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which ratified the Agreement Establishing the
WTO.
Dec 16, 1994: President Ramos signed the instrument of Ratification.
Issue:
(1) WON the Senate has the right to concur in the WTO Agreement given the inclusion of
infringement of patents in the agreement [YES]
(2) WON the Senate's concurrence in the other documents contained in the FNAL ACT is also
needed [NO]
Ratio:
(1) According to petitioners, Art 34(1) of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of ntellectual Property Rights intrudes the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedures.
Article 34 provides:
. an identical product, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained
by the patented process if:
a. Product is new
b. Substantial likelihood that identical product obtained by patented process and owner
of patent cannot determine what process was used to make the product.
BURDEN OF PROOF/BURDEN OF EVDENCE: duty of the alleged patent infringer to
overthrow the presumption.
There is really no problem in changing the rules of evidence since our Patent Law (RA No. 165)
provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design.
pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty is not
a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
(2) The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification.
The ratification of the agreement includes with it the ratification of certain rules that facilitates the
operation and objectives of the agreement.
Other Related Issues:
The concurrence of the Senate to the WTO Agreement is also not unconstitutional because:
1. t does not contravene Sec 19 of Art . Sec 19 is not a self-executing provision.
Likewise, Sec 10 and 12 of Art X should be read with Sec 1 and Sec 13 of Art X.
2. t does not derogate Philippine sovereignty. The Constitution does not contemplate on economic
isolation but of trade with other states only providing for protection against unfair trade practices.
Disposition: petition dismissed for lack of merit.
CASE: TATAD VS. GARCIA, Jr. (243 SCRA 436)
DATE: April 6, 1995
NATURE: Special Civil Action
PONENTE: Quiason, J.
FACTS:

x Prohibit the implementation of the "Revised & Restated Agreement to Build Lease & Transfer an LRT
System for EDSA and "Supplemental Agreement.
x Petitioners are Tatad, Osmena, and Biazon suing as Senators and taxpayers
x 1989: DOTC plan to make LRT . Respondent is Sec. Jesus Garcia of DOTC.
x Mar 1990: intent by Levin Enterprises to do LRT ; held discussion with Sec. Orbos of DOTC
x July 1990: Approving RA 6957
o Act authorizing the financing, constructing, operating, maintenance of infrastructure projects
by private sector and for other purposes
o Under President Aquino
o Known as "BOT Law

o Comprises BOT and BT systems
x 1991: DOTC creating the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Technical
Committee (TC)
x Publication of PBAC guidelines:
o 5 groups to apply
o includes EDSA LRT Consortium = 10 foreign/domestic corporations
x Creations of the TC:
o Criteria for bidding: 10% legal aspect; 30% financial capability; 30% technical capability; 30%
management capability
o RR for RA 6957
x May 1991: only EDSA LRT Consortium passed
o All criteria passed (at least 21 points)
o Except legal aspect
x Secretary Prado as new DOTC Secretary; 2 letters to President Ramos:
o (1) recommending EDSA LRT Consortium
o (2) authority to negotiate with the company
x DOTC entered into BLT with EDSA LRT Consortium
o Substitution of EDSA LRT Consortium with EDSA Corporation
o Sent BLT contract for President's approval
o DENED by Exec. Sec. Drilon DUE to:
- No actual bidding
- Prequalification process NOT bidding
- tem 14 of the RR allowing negotiated contracts VOD
- No release of Congress approval for priority projects of BOT/BT laws
x DOTC renegotiated: "Revised & Restated Agreement to Build Lease & Transfer an LRT System for
EDSA and the "Supplemental Agreement.
o To clarify rights/responsibilities of the parties
x 1993: Submitted/approved by Pres. Ramos via a Memo
x 1994: Approving RA 7718
o Act amending certain sections of RA 6957
o Contains express recognition of BLT
o Allows direct negotiations of BLT Contracts

ISSUES:

(1) WON petitioners have legal standing
(2) WON foreign corporations like EDSA LRT Consortium can validly own a public utility
(3) WON BLTs contracts are recognized under RA 6957 (BOT Law)
(4) WON PD 1594 (Prescribing policies for government infrastructure contracts) should be read
with RA 6957 (BOT Law) to determine if negotiated contracts are allowed by law
(5) WON DOTC has the discretion to determine if a project is beneficial to the government or
not

RATIO/REASONING:

I. Legal standing shall mean that taxpayers are allowed to question contracts entered into
both by the government and government-controlled corporations.

x Reason: As long as locus standi in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona remains, no option but to hear
this case
x Bugnay Construction & Devt Corp: Disallow taxpayers' standing when municipal contracts
are involved

II. Ownership of the public utility shall be distinct from operation of it, the latter being
specifically granted by law to Filipino companies only. No such prohibition is made to
ownership.

Alternate Ratio: Right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof.

x Admittance of foreign character (HK) of EDSA Consortium
x Proving that franchise grant only required for operation of public utilities (Sec. 11, Art. 12,
Constitution)
x Defining ownership = complete control of will
o As in transportation of airline/ships
o Leasing of vessels instead of owning them due to high prices
x DOTC agreement will not result to respondent having franchise for operation BECAUSE of ff.
provisions:
o Due to delivery of equipment after 25 years
o EDSA Consortium only to train DOTC personnel for technical and maintenance
teams
o DOTC to assume fees to EDSA Consortium services coming from rent + reasonable
rate of return
o DOTC to assume all obligations of a common carrier
o HENCE, DOTC to deal with public and run it.
x Difference to Kilosbayan v. Guingona:
o Joint venture vs. Built-Lease-Transfer
o PGMG obligation to build facilities for PCSO spilled to participation in operation
x Mere formation of public utility NOT equal to operating a utility
x Determination of Filipino requisite for companies shall only be for application of franchise for
public utility

III. Recognition of BLT in RA 6957 shall be implied as a variation of the BT scheme.

x Definition of BOT (temporary operation shall be with company) vs. BT
x Emphasis on citizen requirement in BOT only, not in BT
x Law does not mention any "barring of other forms of payment schemes. N FACT, BLT
makes payment lighter by amortizing payments
x OBTER: defining lease contracts
x Payment in US$ of the project is not illegal. Project falls within high priority exceptions of the
Uniform Currency Act

IV. PD 1594 and RA 6957 are In pari materia laws which constitute the same subject matter,
and thus must be construed with one another. PD 1594 is the general law on government
infrastructure (GIC), while the RA 6957 is the law on specific GIC schemes/arrangements.

x Congress subsequent approval of project = ratification
x Petitioners = LRT contract was contemplated to be negotiated from the beginning to do
away with the bidding where other qualified individuals will be able to participate
o PD 1594 says: projects may be undertaken by negotiated contracts only in
exceptional cases where time is of essence, lack of qualified bidders
o PD 1594 and RA 6957 are "in pari materia laws.
o Since only 1 qualified bidder = bidding is now pointless
o No foul play since other bidders are NOT part of Complaint
x FURTHER, nothing in law prohibits renegotiation
x f to render BLT void = red tape = letting EDSA Consortium to go back to prequalification
stage
x Case moot and academic by virtue or RA 7718
o RA 7718 = curative statute
o Definition of curative statutes

V. Discretion shall mean the power, authority, and technical expertise of an agency in charge
to determine the advantages/disadvantages of government contracts. Such discretion
shall be accorded respect, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Alternate Ratio: Executive departments, like the DOTC, shall have the DISCRETION
(power, authority, and technical expertise) to determine necessity and viability of a project.

x Petitioners contend contract's gross disadvantage to the government because of the
following:
o excessive rental rates
o developmental rights over the 13 LRT stations
x Use of space/ads by EDSA Consortium = guaranteed revenue to DOTC. f guaranteed
revenue not met, amount left shall be deducted to monthly rental payments

x Presumption of good faith to public officials
x Petitioners did not show any evidence relating to the rentals
x Assumption that all parties to contract are to GAN, not because of charity

HELD: Petition DISMISSED.

DISSENTING OPINION: Davide, Jr.

I. DOTC no authority to enter to BLT
x To say a "variation is incorrect; must be strict interpretation
o Lease contracts not unknown to jurisdiction
o Congress enacted several laws about leases

II. Public bidding is mandatory
x Public bidding not an idle ceremony; to ensure elimination of overpricing, favoritism, etc.
x Public bidding with 1 bidder only NOT PONTLESS:
o May defer bidding anyway
o May allow former bidders to bid again as they could have now met qualifications
before
x RA 7718 which allows negotiated contract CANNOT be given retroactive effect (prospective
assumption of laws)

CONCURRING OPINION: Mendoza

Petitioners have no legal standing
x Legislators = no infringement of legislative prerogatives
x Taxpayers = BLT not equal to disbursement of public funds; not sufficient interest in the
illegal expenditure raised by taxation
x Citizen = no transcendental importance in the case
o Citing n Re: Bermudez and Lawyers' League for Better Phil.
o No standing because there is no cause of action, even at least in estimate
o Test of injury: s it abstract? s cause too attenuated from actual injury? s relief too
speculative?
x All resulting to conversion of Court into an Ombudsman due to entertaining of general

grievance
* * *

Tolentino v. COMELEC
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition
Ponente: Barredo, J.:

Facts:
Tolentino wants to restrain the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite on 8 November 1971 where the
proposal (Organic Resolution No. 1) to reduce the voting age to 18 will be submitted for ratification
Two Congress resolutions (Resolution 2 and 4) transforming Congress into a Constituent
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitutionmaking the Congress the Constitutional
Convention of 1971
10 Nov 1970: delegates elected
28 Sept 1971: Organic Resolution No. 1
(OR No. 1) approved
"Sec 2: This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of Philippines when approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971
"Sec 3: This partial amendment...shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future...
30 Sept 1971: COMELEC said they will hold plebiscite under certain conditions
12 Oct 1971: Resolution No. 24, confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to
implement OR No. 1
Petitioner's allege that OR No. 1 and other implementing resolutions have no force as laws in so
far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the election of 8 senators and all local
officials
That the power to hold plebiscites is exclusively with Congress as a legislative body
Respondents argue that it is within the power of the Convention to provide for, fix the date and lay
down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment to the constitution
ntervenors say that the issue is a political question

ssue:
1. WON the case involves a political question
2. WON the ConCon can make a proposal to amend the Constitution when it was not yet adjourned
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
Held/Ratio:
1. No, the case is not political, it is justiciable
Gonzales v. COMELEC: When the Congress has been called to act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the constitution, "it is said that Senators and members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly
When acting as constituent assembly, Congress derives its authority form the Constitution, unlike
the people when performing the same function
The issue whether or nor a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
constitution is justiciable
Acts of Congress as a constituent assembly or those of constitutional convention called for the
purpose of amending the Constitution is a justiciable question
2. No, the Constitutional Convention can not ratify a single proposal to amend the constitution when
it is not yet adjourned
Language of Sec. 1, Art. 15 is clear: "such amendments shall be valid as part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for ratificationan election, only one
Any amendment to the constitution is as important as the whole, harmonious whole
All amendments to be proposed by the same convention must be submitted to the people in a
single election or plebiscite
The people, upon their ratification of proposed amendments to the constitution have to be able to
assume its harmony as an integrated whole
n the case at bar, only one amendment is being proposedno one knows what changes in the
fundamental principles of the constitution will the convention approve
Under Sec. 1, Art. 15 there should be only one election or plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitution

Judgment:
The petition is granted. OR No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts
which provide for the holding of a plebiscite on 8 Nov 1971, and the COMELEC resolution (RR Res No.
695) complying therewith are declared null and void.


VILLALUZ vs. ZALDIVAR
No. L-22754
Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J.
Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court
Facts:
12. Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office. (nominated;
nomination confirmed by the Commission on Appointments)
13. Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee of Good Government of the
House of Representatives sent a letter to the President of the Philippines informing him of alleged
mismanagement and inefficiency committed by the petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office,
specifically:
a. malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government
b. failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating
thereby the commission of graft and corruption
c. negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting
14. Petitioner was suspended by the Executive Secretary as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles
Office. Thereafter, an investigating committee was created for the sole purpose of investigating
the charges against him and his assistant.
15. After the investigation, the President of the Philippines issued an Administrative Order decreeing
the removal from office of petitioner.
16. After having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant petition before the Court.
17. Respondents refuted petitioner's claim that:
a. The charges were against the petitioner not against his office in general. He was
specifically charged with mismanagement, gross inefficiency and negligence in the
performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a result he was
required to the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him
b. Petitioner was accorded due process. He was given every reasonable opportunity to
present his defense, to secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in
his behalf in a manner consistent with administrative due process.
c. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he
is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
d. The letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint

because it contained specific charges which constitute just causes for his suspension and
removal. The said charges need not be sworn to for the Chief Executive, as
administrative head of petitioner, is empowered to commence administrative proceedings
motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any
previous verified complaint.
Issue:
8. WON the President of the Philippines has the power to investigate and remove from office a
government employee or officer whom he appointed. YES
9. WON a verified complaint is necessary to enable an administrative head to institute administrative
proceedings against his subordinates. NO
Ratio/Reasoning:
1. The President shall have the power to investigate and remove from office a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
after due hearing.
Under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can
be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260
The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can only be
exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to
which classification petitioner does not belong.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the
investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is
under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the
reason that he is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of
the President.
2. An administrative head shall have the power to commence administrative proceedings
against a government officer or employee motu proprio without previous verified
complaint. This is pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941 which says:
Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee by the
head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any
person which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a
complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief of the
bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take action thereon if the public interest
or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant.
Judgment: Petition DENED.


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Garcia v. Executive Secretary

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr.

x Planas v. COMELEC 12/7

Assent to questions may be equated to formal

4) Concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,

Smith v. Renville 'votes cast' equivalent to 'ballots cast' Citizens'

RD: Acquiesce of People A constitution shall be considered as ratified in spite of

V. WON the aforementioned proposed Constitution is in force.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ

ARROYO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

LLAMAS VS. ORBOS

TORRALBA VS. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

- and to award mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions

a. Standardization and regulation of medical education

o Known as "BOT Law

x All resulting to conversion of Court into an Ombudsman due to entertaining of general

d. The letter of Congressman Joaquin R. Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint

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