ICOTS 2, 1986: Ramesh Kapadia

Dl DACTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF PROBABl L I W Ramesh Kapadia South Bank Polytechnic, London England

T h i s research i s inspired by t h e f i r s t book i n t h e series launched by Reidel on mathematical education. Freudenthal (1983) expounds his philosophical approach i n great detail considering many topics i n mathematics b u t excluding (perhaps surprisingly) probability. The paper is presented i n t h r e e p a r t s which are kept succinct. A f t e r showing the relevance o f didactical phenomenology, a perspective on approaches t o probability is given as a framework f o r t h e experimental research which has been u n d e r taken.

1 . Didactical Phenomenoloqv
Mathematical concepts, structures and ideas serve t o organise phenomena from t h e concrete world as well as from mathematics. For example, triangles organise t h e world o f contour phenomena and numbers organise quantity; later, geometrical figures are organised by constructions and proofs, while numbers are viewed within t h e decimal system. Continuing abstraction unites similar looking mathematical phenomena under a global concept l i k e a g r o u p o r a topological space. The phenomenology o f a mathematical t h o u g h t object means describing it (a "nooumenon") i n i t s relation t o t h e phenomena o f which it is a means o f organising. I n t h i s relation t h e didactical element is stressed, how t h e r e lation i s acquired i n t h e teaching-learning process: hence t h e term didactical phenomenology. Probability organises t h e world of chance phenomena and idealised chance phenomena. One needs t o f i n d a posteriori constructed relation between t h e mathematical concept of probability and t h e world of chance objects. There are a v a r i e t y o f means t o discover t h e underlying didactical phenomenology. One must use one's own knowledge o f probability, i t s applications and i t s history. Textbook analysis has a role t o play. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one must observe the learning p r o cess t o understand t h e process o f t h e constitution of mathematical objects and t h e attainment of concepts. But, with regards t o learning, one must always remember that, i n no way do we realise a l l t h e things children need t o learn (as shown most startlingly by Piaget's work on conservation). Rather t h a n looking f o r materials t o concretise a particular concept one should look f o r phenomena t h a t might compel t h e learner t o constitute t h e mental object t h a t is being mathematised. T h i s constitution of mental objects precedes concept attainment. As Freudenthal says, f i r s t applications then concepts is t h e best order. I n probability a starting point is t h e language used t o describe chance events - likely, probably, certain, impossible etc. Assessment of likelihood

ICOTS 2, 1986: Ramesh Kapadia

t h r o u g h some form o f betting might be a way t o a more formalised approach. Might t h i s be an approach which would "compel" the learner t o constitute t h e mental objects encompassing probability? It is not possible t o answer t h i s question y e t b u t it provides a focus t o the work described below. Others may postulate a different approach and hence stimulate a f r u i t f u l discussion.

2. Common Philosophical Approaches

There are three basic philosophical positions on t h e nature of probability. t h e probability of a simple event (a) Classical, Laplacian or a p r i o r i view is obtained by making an assumption of equal likelihood. the probability of a simple event is obtained from (b) Frequentist view the obsebved relative frequency of t h a t event i n repeated trials. (c) Subjective view - the probability of a simple event is obtained b y a p e r sonal assignment. Perhaps one does not need t o make a preference between the three positions initially (just as one might like both chips and mashed potato). Problems may arise later depending on the situation being considered (just as certain foods may blend better with chips o r with mash). B u t it is important, pedagogically, t o sample each possibility so that one can make one's own choice later (some may still prefer chips t o t h e traditional sausage and mash). The main controversy is between the subjective viewpoint on the one hand and t h e symmetric and frequentist approaches on the other side. For a subjectivist, probability is inherent i n t h e mind, while f o r the other approaches probability is inherent i n t h e object. The f i r s t view asserts t h a t physical considerations o f symmetry lead d i r e c t ly t o a primitive notion ofWequally likely cases". However, any uncertain situation typically possesses many plausible symmetries, so a t r u l y object i v e theory would therefore require a procedure for choosing a particular symmetry and j u s t i f y i n g the choice. The frequentist view of probability is also contentious. For the measure of uncertainty is assigned t o an individual event by embedding it i n a collective an infinite class of "similar" events which are assumed t o have c e r tain "randomness" properties; then probability is the limit towards which the relative frequency tends. However, an individual event can be embedded in many d i f f e r e n t collectives, with no guarantee of the same resulti n g limiting frequences: one requires a procedure t o j u s t i f y the choice of a particular embedding sequence. Further there are obvious difficulties i n defining what is meant by "similar" o r b y "randomness", indeed there is an element of c i r c u l a r i t y involved. Even the notion of settling down presents difficulties how many trials are involved i n long term frequency?

ICOTS 2, 1986: Ramesh Kapadia

The subjectivist recognises t h a t regarding a specific symmetry as proba bilistically significant is itself, inescapably, an act o f personal judgement; it is equally t r u e of an assertion of similarity amongst different, individual events as required i n t h e frequentist formulation. This analysis needs t o be seen within an appropriate educational context. The curriculum issues are summarised i n three basic questions: (a) What i n t u i t i v e ideas of probability do children have?

(b) What

conceptual difficulties are there i n t h e teaching of probability?

( c ) How can i n t u i t i v e conceptions of probability be socially mediated i n t h e classroom towards more formal probabilistic ideas?

3. Experimental Work

A test instrument was devised t o address t h e f i r s t question directly and provides indicators f o r t h e second question. These results are now being used i n devising appropriate classroom materials.
The questions were selected according t o t h e i r capacity t o reveal i n t u i t i v e notions of chance and t h e i r relationship t o the approaches. Obviously the influence of teaching o r other experiences will mediate the findings; b u t t h e 120 children (aged 12-13 years o r grade 8) tested had not met probab i l i t y as a formal p a r t of t h e i r curriculum p r i o r t o testing. it will not be possible t o classify i n t u i t i v e notions into either a classical, frequentist o r subjective viewpoint, b u t t h e responses may reveal links. Rather than talk about e r r o r s and mistakes, children's conceptions o r misconceptions are highlighted. Thus t o indicate the approach only one question (which is perhaps t h e most basic one) is analysed, i n some detail. It is hoped t h a t this will p r o voke and encourage critical comment. Question: Write a sentence which ends: "is something t h a t happens b y chance", using your own words t o s t a r t it. This free response question was included t o see the range of phenomena considered t o be chance events and the variety was impressive. Between them the children covered t h e range of meanings of chance as given b y the dictionary. T h e responses were grouped into several categories - the largest of which involved references t o games of chance either directly o r b y implication. The most noticeable feature of these 38 replies was t h a t all except two children r e f e r r e d t o winning o r obtaining a particular result. Four boys wrote "Getting a 6 . " with another suggesting "Getting a 2" - all presumably w i t h reference t o dice. A girl said "Your name p u l l " and f o u r children referred t o "winning a competied o u t of a hat . . tion" while others were more specific: "winning a t bingo"; "sometimes if you go t o a f a i r you can win a great b i g toy". A subcategory of t h i s group were the replies which seemed t o view a v e r y unlikely or unexpected event as due t o chance.

..

ICOTS 2, 1986: Ramesh Kapadia

Typical of these replies were:

"A coin t h a t landed on i t s side

"Winning t h e pools 5 times"

. . ." - boy.
-

- boy.

This is a sharp contrast with the view t h a t it is precisely these sorts of r a r e events which cannot be chance t h a t there must be some k i n d of causal explanation. Ten children used examples of accidents such as: "Car breaks down"

"A

- girl. house falling on you" - boy. - girl.

"Being r u n over by 2 buses on the same day"

Another group of seven children r e f e r r e d t o natural phenomena such as rain, hurricane, earthquake, thunderstorm and eclipse. Coincidences were mentioned b y f o u r children: "Meeting a teacher i n Basingstoke" "When you say something together"

- girl.
girl.

Some children were concerned with t h e i r f u t u r e s and offered examples which others might consider were not primarily chance events:

"If I get into set one f o r maths"

- girl.
wrote another.

"Love", wrote one girl, "Marriage",

B u t f o r these children the-reasons f o r these events might well be unknown, making the events appear a r b i t r a r y and so down t o chance. I n these examples there undoubtedly are causal factors b u t ultimately t h e questions - why me? why now? are seen as unanswerable except in terms of chance. For the majority of the children chance represents a measure of t h e i r knowledge and information. The cases where an attribution of chance might be disputed are just those where another person has more information o r understanding about t h a t situation. Chance is often equated with opport u n i t y rather than with inherent randomness. It is perhaps easier t o develop a subjective approach from such notions than the classical or frequenti s t approaches.

4. Concluding Comments
The results o f - the whole test d i d not give a unique answer t o children's underlying intuitions of chance b u t there are strong indications of the basis from which probabilistic concepts can be developed.

ICOTS 2, 1986: Ramesh Kapadia

C h i l d r e n are familiar w i t h t h e probabilistic words such as likely, certain and impossible, which are i n e v e r y d a y usage. However t h e i r i n t u i t i o n s o f such terms are n o t v e r y precise. C e r t a i n t y i s equated w i t h h i g h likelihood, while impossibility is linked t o physical situations r a t h e r t h a n logical events. T h e w o r d "chance" is used in a number of d i f f e r e n t contexts, o f t e n being equated w i t h seeming a r b i t r a r i n e s s o r superstition r a t h e r t h a n randomness. T h e overall responses show t h a t equal likelihood i s n o t a p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t u i t i v e idea; n o r is t h e idea o f probabilities s e t t l i n g down common. However, all c h i l d r e n a r e , happy t o make probabilistic assessments o f single, u n r e peatable events as a subjectivist might. One could n o t claim t h a t children would make t h e i r assessments coherently. B u t c h i l d r e n do believe t h a t such judgements can be appropriately made. I n t h i s r a t h e r p r i m i t i v e sense c h i l d r e n are subjectivist. However' one also needs a means o f evaluating probabilities; i n i t i a l l y t h i s can be developed from notions of equal likelihood o r limiting frequencies. Equal likelihood is t h e common s t a r t i n g point, r e f l e c t i n g i n pedagogy what happened historically. However, t h i s i s n o t an idea which can be simply taken f o r granted. Time needs t o be spent on j u s t i f y i n g and discussing how symmetries might be utilized t o make an assumption o f equal l i k e l i hood: p a r t i c u l a r l y important is t h e need f o r such an assumption. Similar comments a p p l y t o t h e introduction o f f r e q u e n t i s t ideas. A subjective viewp o i n t o f f e r s a framework w i t h i n which children's notions o f chance can b e developed. References Freudenthal, H. (1983). t u r e s . Reidel D o r d r e c h t Didactical phenomenology o f mathematical s t r u c -

Hawkins, A.S., & Kapadia, R. (1984). Children's conceptions o f probability A psychological and pedagogical review. Educational Studies i n Mathematics, l5, 349-377. (This includes other relevant references)

Kapadia, R., & Ibbott, J. (forthcoming). Children's subjective notions o f p r o b a b i l i t y . Educational Studies i n Mathematics.