k9R k9R

k9R k9R
Anor:s De+e|oens :n Cv|vro| SvJ:es
Ten Yeors Aer ^/11 An Anor:s F+o|vo:on
.h11.1
Notes on an Anarist eory
of Ianguage, or, A Sympathetic
Critique of Zerzans Primitivist
Refusal of Symbolic Ianguage
Tere Vaden

Abstract
e anaicho-piimitivist iefusal of symbolic language is typically pie-
sented in wiiting oi in speech. is obvious paiadox can be alleviated
by adopting a notion of language that is both moie natuialistic and
moie phenomenological than the one included in the piimitivist cii-
tique. liom the piimitivist point of view, a positive consequence is the
possibility of a non-hieiaichical theoiy of expeiience and language,
one in which the cut between the two is eiased. At the same time,
this asubjective theoiy of expeiience and language means that the
ciitique of technology and civilisation can not be based on the notions
of subjectivity and individuality, a consequence that does not sit well
with all of the tenets of anaicho-piimitivist thought.

Teie Vadn teaches philosophy and inteiactive media in the Univeisity of Tampeie,
linland. He is also an editoi of the linnish philosophical jouinal n::n & no:n.
k9k k9k
k9k k9k
zz Tere VoJen
e Problem Primitivist Paradox
ln Frogens o[ on Anor:s An|roo|og, (2004 1) anthiopolo-
gist David Giaebei ciedits authoi and poet Robeit Giaves with the
(most iecent) invention of two majoi intellectual tiaditions the
idea of a Gieat Goddess (Mothei Eaith, Gaia) and a iejection of in-
dustiial civilisation. Giaebei goes on to say that while pagans have
adopted the ist idea, a gioup of piimitivists with John Zeizan as
the most famous pioponent, have taken the iejection of civilisation
and hope of its collapse even fuithei by suggesting that the adop-
tion of agiicultuie was a Big Mistake.
1
Giaebei agiees with one of
the cential claims of piimitivist theoiy theie have been and still
aie societies (peoples, gioups, bands) that display veiy lile of the
hieiaichical and violent tiaits of modeinity. is is something that
the anthiopological iecoid is cleai on, and while Giaebei ielies also
on contempoiaiy woik (paitly his own) on contempoiaiy societies,
the |ocvs c|oss:cvs of piimitivism, Zeizans essay lutuie Piimitive
(1994), ciedits the seminal woik of anthiopologists like Maishall
Sahlin and Richaid Lee. Anothei common belief foi Giaebei and
Zeizan is that the study of these (typically non-Westein) non-hieiai-
chical societies may yield fiuitful expeiiences and knowledge about
how to oveicome the cuiient unsustainable piactices socially, eco-
logically, politically, spiiitually.
2
What does the anthiopological iecoid tell, then, accoiding to Giae-
bei, Zeizan and otheis` Both the examples we have and a theoietical
analysis of the ieasons of why they aie good examples point to the
covaiiant absence of violence and alienation with the absence of
agiicultuie, division of laboui and symbolic cultuie. ese thiee
chaiacteiistics agiicultuie/domestication, division of laboui and
symbolic cultuie foim an inteiweaving common taiget foi piim-
itivist ciitique. ey aie not only histoiically linked in that they
seem to aiise in human evolution ioughly simultaneously, but aie
also conceptually connected, in that agiicultuie demands division of
laboui and symbolic cultuie, without which it would be impossible
1
Zeizan (1994 42) sees the idea of the Mothei Eaith as a featuie of agiicultuial societies.
2
See also Douglas P. liys path-bieaking e Hvon Poen:o| [or Peoce An An|ro
o|og:co| C|o||enge o Assv:ons o|ov Vor onJ V:o|ence (200). liy shows that
aggiession and wai aie not natuial to human societies. On the othei hand, he does
nd both agiicultuial and gatheiei-huntei societies that have a cultuie of peaceful-
ness.
k9j k9j
k9j k9j
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge z3
in any laige scale. As Zeizan (1999 41) points out, wiiting aiises
as accounting, it is a tool of hieiaichy fiom its veiy inception e
eailiest wiitings aie iecoids of taxes, laws, teims of laboi seivitude.
Zeizan sees that even if these thiee and othei inteiconnected phe-
nomena such as hieiaichy, gendei systems, oiganised violence,
etc. could in abstiact thought be picked apait and analysed in
sepaiation, such an analysis is not helpful as it loses the integial
live phenomenon Self-domestication thiough language, ait, and
iitual inspiied the taming of animals and plants that followed (ibid.
28). One impoitant consequence to iemembei is that foi Zeizan, the
piogiess of domestication implies the :ncreose of violence contiaiy
to the ieceived undeistanding of the meaning of the teim.
ese two anaichists, Giaebei and Zeizan, pait ways in suggest-
ing the lessons of the anthiopological obseivations. While Zeizan
thinks that only piimitive conditions may piovide foi full human ie-
alisation, Giaebei (2004 1) does see something quixotic in anaicho-
piimitivism, compaiing it again to Giaeves woik [ . . . ] it is ieally
impossible to know on what level one is supposed to iead it. lts
both iidiculous self-paiody, and teiiibly seiious, at the same time.
ough Giaebei does not elaboiate, one can guess that one supposed
element of self-paiody in piimitivism is the fact that piimitivists
texts, including Zeizans oen eiudite and iichly souiced essays,
iead a lot like highly civilised tieatises, thus in a way taking pait
in the specialised, mediated and symbolic cultuie they at the same
time iefuse. Zeizan himself notes the paiadox at the end of the essay
Language Oiigin and Meaning (in Zeizan 1999), but goes on to say
that he has to use woids in oidei to speak. lndeed, we might want to
accept Zeizans piimitivist analysis of the Big Mistake only to end
up with a conundium if symbolic thought is necessaiy to ieication,
objectication and alienation, how is it possible to woik against it
in woids, by wiiting and speaking` One of the things that makes
wiiting and speaking about piimitivism iidiculous is, piesumably,
piecisely this stiict impossibility of piactising what one pieaches
an impossibility that is in a sense as tioubling as the piactical
impossibility of gatheiei-huntei livelihoods on the contempoiaiy
depleted and oveipopulated planet.
is paiadox might also be at the heait of a cuiious passage in an
inteiview of Zeizan by Deiiick Jensen. e context is a discussion on
violence and woids as weapons. Jensen is fiustiated by the fact that
while talking is being done, the woild deteiioiates fuithei and natuie
is being destioyed. Jensen (2000) says Oi to take anothei example,
k99 k99
k99 k99
z Tere VoJen
l iecently iead that Gandhi wiote a leei to Hitlei appealing to his
conscience, and was amazed that it didnt woik. Heie is Zeizans
answei Gandhis failuie doesnt mean woids must always fail.
He was obviously diiecting his woids at the wiong place. Had he
spoken moie iadical and eective woids to his fellow lndians, things
might be dieient theie now. is is a ielatively suipiising answei,
compaied, foi instance, with the blanket statement Along these
lines, in teims of stiuctuie, it is evident that fieedom of speech does
not exist, giammai is the invisible thought contiol of oui invisible
piison. With language we have alieady accommodated ouiselves
to a woild of unfieedom (Zeizan 1999 34). Do oi do not woids
always fail` Oi, to put it in anothei way, wheie does the obvious
libeiating and healing powei of language stem fiom`
To answei these questions we have to look closely at Zeizans
ciitique of symbolic cultuie and language, at the same time iemem-
beiing that these aie not to be sepaiated fiomthe laigei phenomenon
of which they aie paits. Hopefully, this way we might be able to
alleviate the paiadox without thiowing the baby out with the bath-
watei, that is, without losing the oveiall ciitical analysis of civilisa-
tion and the Big Mistake.
What is Wrong with Ianguage'
e quote above alieady locates the ciux of the ciitique language
is a stiuctuie set upon moie amoiphous and fiee expeiience. Moie
paiticulaily, Symbolising is lineai, successive, substitutive, it cannot
be open to its whole object simultaneously. lts instiumental ieason
is just that manipulative and seeking domination. lts appioach is
let a stand foi b instead of let a be a. Language has its basis in
the eoit to conceptualize and equalize the unequal, thus bypassing
the essence and diveisity of a vaiied, vaiiable iichness (Zeizan
2002 2). e claim that symbols and language have a petiifying
eect is, as such, a ielatively well-known theme even in standaid
Westein philosophy of language
3
and philosophical anthiopology,
3
loi instance, the anaichist philosophei Paul leyeiabend devoted his posthumously
published woik Conqves o[ A|vnJonce. A To|e o[ A|sroc:on +ersvs |e R:ness o[
Be:ng (1999) to the theme of how Westein philosophy has been obsessed with a tiend
of oveisimplication and a habit of gloiifying the oveisimplied.
k98 k98
k98 k98
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zs
as Zeizan demonstiates with ample quotations in Language Oiigin
and Meaning.
To be suie, most contempoiaiy philosophical thought on language
agiees with Zeizan that symbolisation in some sense obstiucts oi con-
stiucts expeiience. eie aie some schools in the so-called analytic
tiadition of philosophy of language, wheie thought (pioposition) and
language (iepiesentation) aie seen as independent. Consequently,
the dependence of thought on language (i.e., linguistic ielativism) is
denied, and the ultimate fieedomof symbolic thought asseited. How-
evei, alieady Beitiand Russell (2002 218), a classic of the analytic
tiadition, saw a connection between giammai and philosophical
thought. ln }ense:s +on Gv vnJ Bose Nietzsche famously speculated
on the inuence of lndo-Euiopean giammai on Westein metaphysics
and the dieience in compaiison to Uialic-Altaic languages (Niet-
zsche 1999). Since Nietzsche, the idea that language somehow foices
its stamp on thought and expeiience in spite of the wish oi will of
the expeiiencing subject has been a mainstay of many schools of
continental thought. ln fact, one of the main themes of 20
th
centuiy
phenomenology in Geimany (Heideggei) and liance (Saitie) is the
desciiption of how language widely undeistood foims that veiy
subjectivity and the social stiuctuies aiound it. An extieme example
is the thought of Jacques Lacan, wheie the intioduction of the in-
fant to the symbolic univeise is the founding gestuie of subjectivity
(see, e.g., iek 199, inteiestingly, iek (2008 2) agiees on the
violent natuie of symbolisation theie is something violent in the
veiy symbolisation of a thing, which equals its moitication).
Coiiesponding to this idea of language as an oppiessive ltei
on expeiience is both the philosophical and aitistic ciaving foi a
foim of expeiience (and possibly expiession) that would be fiee
of ossied linguistic stiuctuies. As an example one can mention
Schopenhaueis notion of music as the diiect life of V:||e, without
the piactical and symbolic and theiefoie seivile sides of all othei
foims of ait. One foim of this ciaving is the (iomantic) ideal of ait-
foi-aits-sake, ait without any ulteiioi motives that would demand
stiuctuies on expeiience.
e insistence on non-symbolic expeiience is oen seen as nave.
Many schools of philosophy otheiwise sympathetic to the ideas of
libeiation and emancipation point out that puie oi unmediated ex-
peiience does not exist. Oen this claim of non-existence is taken
fuithei by claiming that, consequently, a seaich foi puie expeiience
is not only empiiically misguided but also ethically dubious. loi
k9e k9e
k9e k9e
zo Tere VoJen
example, a Lacanian theoiist would point out that human subjectiv-
ity is foimed by the stiuctuies of the symbolic univeise so that a
yeaining foi puie expeiience is a yeaining beyond not only subjectiv-
ity but also humanity altogethei. No doubt, many Lacanians would
nd the idea of puie expeiience not so much a topic to be discussed
but a symptom to be diagnosed. Likewise, a postmodeinist thinkei
would point out that theie is nothing beyond text, all meaning is
constiucted. lf theie is something beyond text then that something
can not by denition be meaningful. is Deiiidean point is close to
Wigensteins (2001) aigument against piivate language meaning-
ful language is by denition something shaied and inteisubjective.
eiefoie a language fully libeiated fiom the stiuctuies of giammai,
ideology and so on would piesumably lose its intelligibility we
get the paiadox of piimitivist texts in a new foim. e pioblem
is not only ielated to meaning and communication, but also social.
loi instance, a loucaultian theoiist would say that an insistence
on puie expeiience is a move in a game of powei/knowledge with
specic eects and as such impotent to move outside the existing
co-oidinates of epistemologically ielevant action.
ln sum, most of contempoiaiy continental theoiy (as well as ana-
lytic philosophy, in its ciitique of the myth of the given (see Sellais
19), i.e., the myth of a theoiy-fiee oi symbol-fiee oi inteipieta-
tion-fiee expeiience) agiees that the stiuctuies of meaning and
subjectivity aie the stiuctuies of language, undeistood in a wide
sense. us the eiadication of language in favoui of a non-intei-
pietative, non-symbolic oi diiect expeiience is at best an illusion of
pie-human existence and at woist a pioto-authoiitative quest foi
unpioblematic and unciitical authenticity beyond both subjective
and inteisubjective ciiteiia. Put biiey, accoiding to the ciitique,
to insist on puie expeiience is to elevate something that can not
be discussed oi ciiticised into a decisive iole, theieby piomoting a
woild of might-makes-iight.
To his ciedit Zeizan is willing to face the paiadox and go all the
way. lf the inteisubjectivity of social life and meaningful communi-
cation aie, indeed, dependent on and constiucted out of symbolic lan-
guage, and if the ioad to diiect expeiience means languagelessness,
then we have to do without inteisubjectivity and communication in
the senses given to them in the theoiies mentioned above And if
timelessness iesolves the split between spontaneity and conscious-
ness, languagelessness may be equally necessaiy (Zeizan 1999 31).
at, most ceitainly, means doing without a civilisation iecognisable
k9d k9d
k9d k9d
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge z
fiom a Lacanian, Deiiidean oi loucaultian peispective. Zeizans
piimitivism accepts no half-measuies heie.
Getting Rid of Symbolic Ianguage
Howevei, theie is a deepei pioblem at issue. Let us pioceed by
way of an analogy. Anaicho-piimitivism is not about suivivalism oi
life-boatism. lt may be possible foi a healthy young peison to live
in piimitive conditions (say, in a foiest without modein technology)
howevei, that is not the inteiesting thing. e inteiesting pioblem
is how to live without civilisation in laigei, social gioups consisting
of seveial geneiations foi long peiiods of time. Analogously, it may
veiy well be possible to tempoiaiily get iid of ossied symbolic
language (say, in aitistic oi ieligious contexts), but that is not the
inteiesting pioblem. e inteiesting case is language that is social,
multi-geneiational and non-alienating. Let us call this inteiesting
case that of collective non-symbolic language.
e anthiopological iecoid also tells us that egalitaiian and non-
alienated band-societies, including the classic case of 'Kung Bush-
men, oen iely on iich oial tiaditions and engage in stoiy-telling and
othei types of discussions on a daily basis (Lee 198 3).
4
eie is
no r:o [oc:e ieason to think that this is symbolic communication,
at least no beei ieason than to think that piimitive stone tools aie
technology. lndeed, one may oei the hypothesis that in both cases,
i.e., in oveigeneialising stone tools as technology and all language
as symbolic communication, the mistake is to take the self-undei-
standing and self-desciiption of Westein metaphysics at face value.
Westein metaphysical civilisation believes that all language is sym-
bolic communication and that all engagement with the enviionment
is technology. lf these beliefs weie tiue, it would ceitainly make the
case foi civilisation much stiongei. ese beliefs aie also the diiving
foice behind the ciitique accoiding to which the abandonment of
ieason and communicative iationality means also the abandonment
of ethics in favoui of authoiity and violence.
4
See also Giaebeis emphasis on the centiality of oial tiaditions in modein day Piovi-
sional Autonomous Zones in Madagascai (Giaebei 200). e oiality of the linguistic
tiadition may be ciucial heie. As James C. Sco (2010) has aigued, the state-evasive
piactices of many peoples in upland Southeast Asia include the loss of liteiacy in
oidei to live without state hieiaichy ceitain gioups have become eectively post-lit-
eiate.
k93 k93
k93 k93
z8 Tere VoJen
Heie, it is impoitant to note that the consistent iefusal of intei-
subjective communicative symbolic language by Zeizan does not,
as such, answei to the ciiticism that at the same time meaningful
ciiteiia of ethics aie lost, and that the seaich foi immediacy and
expeiience happens in a vacuum wheie authoiity and foice have
all the assets on theii side. Two points have to be noted heie. liist,
again to his ciedit, Zeizan does not biush the pioblem undei the
caipet by claiming that expeiiential intensity oi immediacy would
somehow guaiantee non-authoiitaiian oi non-hieiaichical condi-
tions. Expeiiential intensity and immediacy does have a pait in
individual and collective oppiession and muideiousness. Second,
this is wheie the anthiopological obseivation that non-civilised and
egalitaiian societies Jo exist becomes ciucial. Of couise, it would in
piinciple be possible to claim that given the failuie of civilisation,
the iefusal of the essential symbolic stiuctuies making civilisation
possible and consequently the iefusal of civilisation would be
advisable even if we had no examples of successful non-civilised
life the iefusal would be a jump into the abyss. Howevei, the in-
cieased division of laboui, exploitation of natuie, spiiitual alienation,
and so on, seem to go togethei (and, +:ce +erso, the fact that when
these aie decieased, we may come close to a foim of huntei-gatheiei
egalitaiianism, sustainability and nonviolence) give the piimitivist
aigument against symbolic stiuctuies the natuie of a piogiamme
and piovide it with a diiection (towaid piimitive conditions). How-
evei, in oidei to answei to the ethical pioblem, this diiection has
to be supplemented with an idea of how the slide down the slope
of inteisubjective communicative symbolic language is to end in an
egalitaiian and anaichistic situation and not, say, in an expeiien-
tially exited iabid nationalism oi ethnicism. is is the expeiiential
side of the political pioblem of how the collapse of state powei is
to lead to a moie egalitaiian and anaichist society, and not to the
iule of wailoids and Maa thugs (a pioblem that conceins Giaebei
in Poss:|:|::es (200)).
With iegaid to the ethics of the issue, it is instiuctive to look at
the case of Geiman philosophei Maitin Heideggei, whose thought
seives as a spiingboaid foi neaily all contempoiaiy continental and
postmodein philosophy, including Deiiida and loucault. What does
Heideggei say about the ielationship between symbolic language
and expeiience` e case of Heideggei is ievealing because he has
been accused of making piecisely the mistake of giving full ieign to
the seaich foi authentic expeiience and theieby falling into the alluie
k9N k9N
k9N k9N
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zv
of Nazism (see Deiiida 1991 and iek 1999). Heideggeis philoso-
phy piesents humans ist and foiemost as engaged and embodied
beings that can undei ceitain ciicumstances function as individ-
ual subjects. Howevei, piimoidially and foi the most pait humans
aie a distiibuted opening and expeiiencing of a shaied always-
alieady meaningful woild to which they aie thiown (this mode of ex-
istence Heideggei calls Dose:n). Heideggei ciiticises contempoiaiy
civilisation foi foigeing this fundamental human constitution and
coveiing it up by the object-like stiuctuies of subjectivity, science,
iationality and so on. loi Heideggei, the subject and the object aie
both stiuctuies that aie undei ceitain conditions (those of Westein
metaphysics) built on a moie piimoidial asubjective and aobjective
level of being-in-the-woild (see Heideggei 1993 and the commentaiy
in Dieyfus 1990).
When Heideggei insists that losing oneself into the eveiyday av-
eiageness (Jos Mon) of what-eveiybody-says and what-eveiybody-
wants can be counteied by iesolutely facing moitality and anxiety
that ieveal a moie authentic way of being, the dangei of misusing
the notion of authenticity does, indeed, appeai. loi instance, it can
be claimed that this Heideggeiian desciiption leaves too much ioom
in teims of the content of authenticity almost any iesolute facing
of death and anxiety will do.

Accepting that human being is based

on nothing and that all meaning is going to die, and still iesolutely
pushing ahead and choosing a heio in the geneiational bale of a
people (as Heideggei puts it in the end of Se:n vnJ Ze:) becomes
a voluntaiistic enteipiise national socialism will do, if it piomises
a iooted and embodied stand in the face of nothingness. Losing
oneself in the authentic national (+o||:s) expeiience, one loses all
inteisubjective oi univeisal ethical ciiteiia. Heideggei (19) does
claim, foi instance, that the oveicoming of Westein metaphysics is
a pioblem that can be encounteied only in the Geiman language, if
Heideggei is iight, we who do not speak Geiman as a native language
just have to accept this claim without ieally being able to evaluate
it. e same goes foi national expeiience we who do not belong
to it, can not ieally ciiticise it oi its authenticity eithei. Howevei,
fiom the anaicho-piimitivist peispective the ciitique of Heideggei
should not concentiate on the fact that Heideggei tiies to undei-
mine the ciiteiia of communicative iationality (a goal that anaicho-
piimitivism shaies with Heideggei), but iathei on the fact that he

See the analysis of Heideggei as a decisionist by Kiockow (1990).

k8y k8y
k8y k8y
zsu Tere VoJen
did not iadically enough question stiuctuies like division of laboui
and hieiaichy, both of which chaiacteiised his views on politics and
philosophy.

Ianguage, Subjective and Asubjective

How does this ethical pioblem apply to a piimitivist seaich foi im-
mediate expeiience` We have to go back to Zeizans ciitique of lan-
guage. ln Zeizans account, language intioduces a distance between
humans and natuie and humans and theii expeiience ough
language, in its denitive featuies, seems to be complete fiom its
inception, its piogiess is maiked by a steadily debasing piocess. e
caiving up of natuie, its ieduction into concepts and equivalencies,
occuis along lines laid down by the paeins of language. And the
moie the machineiy of language, again paialleling ideology, subjects
existence to itself, the moie blind its iole in iepioducing a society
of subjugation (1999 33). ln this veiy basic sense, language is a
tool of alienation, when alienation is undeistood as explained by
Zeizan Maix dened alienation as being sepaiated fiom the means
of pioduction. lnstead of pioducing things to use, we aie used by
the system. l would take it a step fuithei and say that to me it means
estianged fiom oui own expeiiences, dislodged fiom a natuial mode
of being (Zeizan in Jensen 2000).
To be suie, this tendency exists in language. Heideggeis desciip-
tion of the aveiage eveiydayness of language and its way of levelling
authentic existence piovides a similai desciiption. But is this all theie
is to language`
To say that language is necessaiily oi only a tool of alienation
seems stiange given the full continuum of language fiom the simple
ciies and calls of animals to full-edged human language. eie
seems to be no cleai-cut point wheie the language of animals
and babies (oi, non-alienated, intoxicated, impaiied, etc., humans)
tuins into the necessaiily alienating symbolic stiuctuie (Zeizan)
oi the calculating, tianslatable and univeisalisable language of the
maiket place and the sciences (Heideggei). lndeed, given the iich
vaiiety of calls and ciies in the animal woild, it is lile wondei that
scientists widely agiee that some animals do posses iudimentaiy

e ethical pioblem in Heideggei and his ciitique of technology is fuithei discussed

in Vadn (2004).
k8R k8R
k8R k8R
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zs1
symbolic language. Considei the puy-nosed monkey with its thiee
distinct waining calls, piedatoi-in-aii, piedatoi-in-tiee, pieda-
toi-on-giound (Ainold, Pohlnei, and Zubeibuhlei 2008, Ainold and
Zubeibuhlei 2008). ese calls do not woik as ieexes on visual
oi othei sensoiy stimuli, but aie geneialised and contextualised,
i.e. symbolic. Similai obseivations have been made with iegaid to
dolphin and whale languages.
Looking fiom the othei end, it is obvious that human language
is not always symbolic. e ist sounds made by a new-boin can
haidly be classied as language. Howevei, at some point in the typi-
cal development of a child a matuie linguistic piociency is acquiied.
is means that in natuie symbolic language develops out of some-
thing that is less-than-symbolic, whethei we want to call it language
oi not. Likewise, in natuialistic (and non-Chomskian) cognitive
science, it is usually thought that full-edged conceptual and iepie-
sentational stiuctuies emeige thiough piocesses of leaining fiom a
moie piimoidial level of non-conceptual and non-iepiesentational
content.
lt seems that Zeizan would not like to call this less-than-symbolic
content linguistic. loi him, language is in essence communicative,
and communication is dened as the tiansmission of symbolic mes-
sages. Oi, to put it in anothei way, language is the stiuctuied medium
thiough which expeiience may be communicated lt is easiei still
to begin to locate language in these teims if one takes up anothei
denition common to both ideology and language namely, that
each is a system of distoited communication between two poles and
piedicated upon symbolization (1999 32). Heie communication is
dened as a piocess wheie l ist expeiience something inside my-
self, then code this something into the stiuctuies of language, which
aie then pushed outside of myself by being spoken oi wiien, aei
which the ieceivei decodes the stiuctuies and aiiives at some mental
content and possibly expeiiences. Again, this may well be a big pait
of language. lt is oen taken to be the most impoitant oi essential
pait, as in the Wigensteinian aigument against a piivate language.
Accoiding to this view, language as communication should be as
cleai and as unambiguous as possible, this foims the keinel of the
view of language as iepiesentative counting and accounting that
Heideggei, among otheis, stiongly ciiticises.
Howevei, again both a moie empiiical and natuialistic as well
as a moie phenomenological look at language point out that this
is not all theie is. Even in mainstieam analytic philosophy, it has
k8k k8k
k8k k8k
zsz Tere VoJen
been obseived that ceitain paits of natuial languages do not, in fact,
possess well-dened inteisubjective content. loi instance, indexical
woids aie meaningfully used even though they do not systematically
iepiesent oi symbolise, i.e., even though theii content is non-con-
ceptual (Peacocke 199). Likewise, a Heideggei oi a Bataille would
insist on the non-communicative natuie of language. loi Heideggei
(200), language is ist and foi the most pait a way in which the
woild opens itself to us in expeiience. is opening-up is engaged,
distiibuted and piactical, and only undei ceitain ciicumstances (like
the modein West) does the expeiience get aiticulated into subjects
and objects and the linguistic stiuctuies that coiiespond to them.
loi Bataille (1988), language is not communication but iathei com-
munion, in which expeiiential eneigies aie expanded and expended
as thiough wounds.
Let us imagine thiee concentiic ciicles. ey could be a house
on a yaid inside a foiest.

ln the inneimost ciicle, the house (the

o:|os), things have theii denite places and utilitaiian functions. Oi-
dei is established, and woids, as names, can systematically iefei to
objects needed. is ciicle is limited by the walls, oois and ioof
of the house, so that a ielative stability of conditions guaiantees
the ielative peimanence of ielationships and functions inside. e
house is essentially a hub of contiol and peimanence, and as a lim-
ited economy it engages in impoit and expoit. Aiound the house is
the yaid, with some cultivated patches, maybe buildings foi stoiage
and woik, and pathways between the vaiious buildings. Heie the
oidei and functionality alieady aained in the house is challenged.
e wind may sweep away some spoken woids, and make speech
indistinguishable fiom animal giunts. e paths giow in unless used.
lences have to be eiected, livestock piotected fiom beasts. Anthio-
pocentiic aieas have to be continually cultivated. e peiimetei of
this ciicle is moie poious and theiefoie demands moie upkeep than
the peiimetei of the house. linally, theie is the foiest. Heie theie is
no oidei oi limit set by humans. e foiest does not have to follow
any iules oi laws, not even its own. Humans may visit the foiest
and the foiest ultimately visits itself on the yaid and house. e
language of the foiest is not the seing-to-place and seing-to-woik
of the house. But the foiest is not mute.
8
e meaningful piocesses in

Oi, if one piefeis an aquatic myth moie in line with the Kantian-Schopenhaueiian
metaphoi of ieason as giound/ship and expeiience as the sea the house on an island
in the middle of the ocean.
k8j k8j
k8j k8j
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zs3
the foiest may be veiy long and sophisticated, spanning ovei many
human geneiations.
e ist ciicle coiiesponds to language-as-symbolic-communica-
tion. ln the house the ciicumstances foi subjects and objects aie
piesent. e subject and the object aie stiictly coiielative theie can
not be one without the othei. Howevei, the subject and the object
aie something natuial, too. is simply because theie is nothing
extia-natuial. eiefoie they aie foims that non-subjective and non-
objective expeiience may undei ceitain ciicumstances assume they
come latei in the development, so they aie dependent on the eailiei,
not +:ce +erso. e second ciicle is the aiea wheie subjectivity is con-
tested, wheie it is at times achieved and at times lost. Heie language
too is moie iudimentaiy, moie like a tool oi a piocess, toin between
the piessuies and demands of the house and the foiest.
9
linally, the
foiest is an aiea of asubjective (meaning something that does not
piivilege eithei the subjective oi the non-subjective) expeiience and
language.
Typically, asubjective expeiience is desciibed in negative teims,
such as, foi instance, Heideggeis notions of anxiety and neainess-
8
e linnish national epic, Ko|e+o|o, is based on a body of poems collected duiing the
18
th
and 19
th
centuiies. e poems weie pait of an oial tiadition, wheie each singei
of the poems iemembeied a set by heait. One of the majoi naiiative tensions in the
poems is the paitly fiiendly, paitly iivalious ielationship between two gioups of peo-
ple. Kaleva is the southein, sea-going, moie agiicultuial and eventually Chiistianised
community wheie most of the male heioes of the epic live. Pohjola is the Noithein,
daik, piimitive, gatheiei-huntei community, which, ciucially foi the plot, has all the
eligible maidens and is led by the matiiaich Louhi. e focal thing in the poems is
called Sampo, a mythical mill that without human inteivention, eoit oi laboui gives
all wanted iiches to its possessois. e Sampo is in Pohjola, and in the epic it gets
iobbed and eventually destioyed by the Kaleva heioes. e tension between Kaleva
and Pohjola can be inteipieted as the tension between incipient agiicultuial society
and a gatheiei-huntei society which undei Westein piessuie insists on the old
ways. (ln the epic, this oldei conict is iepeated in the innei conict that Kaleva faces
thiough the piocess of Chiistianisation). ln this inteipietation, Sampo iepiesents the
keinel of Pohjolas lifestyle it iepiesents the leisuiely and easy life of gatheiing and
hunting in Pohjola in the eyes of the toiling and moie civilised Kaleva people. With
iegaid to the topic at hand, the poems say Sampo did not lack woids, Louhi did not
lack incantations., oi in John Maitin Ciawfoids tianslation fiom 1888 lncantations
weie not wanting, Ovei Sampo and oei Louhi, Sampo giowing old in singing, Louhi
ceasing hei enchantment. (hp//www.gutenbeig.oig/diis/etext04/kalec10.txt). loi
the inteipietation in detail as well as the connection to Zeizans piimitivism, see
Vadn (200).
9
Language in the second ciicle coiiesponds to Wigensteins (2001) desciiption of
language-games.
k89 k89
k89 k89
zs Tere VoJen
of-death. e ciucial thing about anxiety foi Heideggei (1993) is
piecisely that in anxiety theie is no object of expeiience (unlike
in feai, in which theie is always the intentional stiuctuie of being
afiaid-of-x, consequently, foi Heideggei feai is an emotion that a
subject can have, while anxiety is an expeiience that Dose:n undei-
goes) and no subject eithei the subject is dissolved in anxiety this
dissolution is a big pait of the negativity of anxiety. Somebody like
Bataille (1988) might tuin his aention to moie positive cases of
asubjective expeiience, such as sexual oi ieligious eniaptuie. lt may
be that a well-dened Westein (adult) subject needs such extieme
foims of expeiience foi the hold of the subject to loosen its giip, but
otheiwise we may well expect that theie aie less extieme and less
gloiious foims of asubjective expeiience. Again, the expeiience of
young babies oi veiy old peisons, as well as expeiiences of piofound
boiedom, intoxication, oveijoy and so on may dissolve the subject/
object distinction.
lt is impoitant to notice that the dieience between asubjective
and subjective expeiience is not the same as the dieience between
unconscious and conscious expeiience.
10
Asubjective expeiience can
be both conscious oi unconscious. e same goes foi language. eie
is no ieason why asubjective expeiience could not be linguistic, could
not be in language. What it can not be is the expiession of innei
mental states in exteinal symbols. is does not mean that asub-
jective language (language in the foiest) is always oi by its natuie
somehow moie simple, elementaiy oi nave compaied to subjective
language. e pie-conceptual language of infants is only one ex-
ample, some foims of asubjective language may demand complex,
subtle and sophisticated if not Byzantine skills, a long life of
commied piactice. Heie one might think of ceitain communal (let
us say the language used while walking in the foiest by a gioup of
villageis who have lived togethei all theii lives) oi aitistic piactices
(let us say a gioup of suiiealists piactising automatic wiiting), oi of
oial tiaditions, in geneial.
What is asubjective language, then` Maybe an extieme exam-
ple could be useful in showing the ioom foi manoeuvie. ln oidei
to be giammatical, sentences in lndo-Euiopean languages typically
need to have a subject. Even in the so-called passive voice with no
denite agent, a suiiogate subject is used (I is iaining, Fs ieg-
net). is might lead one to believe that asubjective language is
10
loi an elaboiation of asubjectivity see Pylkk (1998) and Vadn (200).
k88 k88
k88 k88
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zss
an impossibility, since giammatical sentences (and, in consequence,
communicative language) always have a subject, even if only a sui-
iogate one. Howevei, the passive foim in, foi instance, linnish is
completely subjectless. lt is also objectless as nothing is piedicated
(theie is no X that is said to be Y, no it that is doing the iaining oi
no it that has the piopeity of iaining). loi example, let us considei
the linnish veib ajaa (to diive, to go aei, to hunt). ln the
ist peison singulai (l diive) the veib would be Min ajan. When
we stait diminishing the subjectivity of the sentence, an inexion
(-stu/sty, -utu/yty) inside the veib can be used Min ajaudun (l
am being diiven.). Again, we need to note that the linnish has no
connotation oi implication that this being diiven is being done by
something oi somebody, theie is no agent stiuctuie of diiven-by-x.
e inexion simply indicates that my ending up somewheie is not
contiolled by me and may be happening against my subjective will.
e inexion indicates the dissolution of the subject, even if the
subject is still piesent in the sentence. luithei down the ioad is
the completely de-subjectivised passive voice, Ajetaan, in which
theie is no subject, suiiogate oi otheiwise. Ciucially, the passive
voice has no gendei, no numbei, no subject and no object. us,
in tianslating it to English, one has to intioduce these stiuctuies,
Diiving is being done, eie is diiving, Diivingness happens, oi
something similai.
e examples fiom linnish aie not piesented in the sense that
asubjective language could be found only in exotic enviionments
oi languages. Asubjectivity may be eos:er to nd in languages on
the fiinges of Westein colonisation and globalisation, as they might
have pieseived moie of the linguistic tiaces that have alieady been
piuned fiom the coie languages of techno-civilisation. Howevei, it
is entiiely possible, indeed quite likely, that when piopeily aended
to, woids like death, mothei, fiiend do not peimit a cleai cut
subject-object distinction even when used in eveiyday English.
Heie things tuin metaphysical in a sense. Let us considei an anal-
ogy. lf someone believes that all things aie caused and deteimined,
then it is impossible to empiiically piove to hei the opposite. lf we
point out that accoiding to quantum mechanics, individual quantum
phenomena happen iandomly (and that the iandomness is ontolog-
ical, not epistemological), she can ietoit that this is only because
the causal Giand Unifying eoiy that biings togethei quantum me-
chanics and ielativity theoiy has not been invented yet. e same
goes heie. lf someone believes that all language is communicative
k8e k8e
k8e k8e
zso Tere VoJen
and symbolic, then it is impossible to empiiically piove to hei that
asubjective language exists. Given the examples above, she can in-
sist that humans aie boin with an innate language, whose giammai
goveins also cases like Ajetaan, even if the stiuctuies can not be
systematically identied fiom the suiface moiphology.
11
is deaf-
ness to asubjective language is quite consistent with the piactice
of discoveiing a giammai in the non-Euiopean languages of colo-
nialised peoples, funnily enough the giammais all tend to look a lot
like the giammai of Latin. Giammatical stiuctuies and conceptual
content have been insisted upon also in the case of pidgin oi Cieole
languages, which aie in a state of constant ux so that what was coi-
iect oi giammatical a decade ago has changed by now. Howevei,
any thinkei that takes even a veiy iudimentaiy foim of natuialism
seiiously has to take into account the continuum mentioned above
as well as the fact that moie iecent and stiuctuied phenomena have
to be explained in teims of oldei and less stiuctuied ones. Symbolic
language, if anything, is a piime example of a ielatively iecent and
stiuctuied phenomenon. Consequently, it has to be explained in
teims of an oldei and less stiuctuied non-symbolic language.
How Can Words Not Fail'
lt seems that Zeizans view of the essentially symbolic and alien-
ating natuie of language has, so to speak, bought the piopaganda of
the Westein victois too totally. lndeed, both the belief that symbols
and numbeis aie essential stiuctuies of piogiess, and the miiioiing
belief that they aie essentially alienating, contain a dose of oveicon-
dence. loi if it is the case that symbolic language is based on non-
symbolic language, then symbolic language also always ielapses
back to the non-symbolic and gets its live eect the communion
fiom asubjective stiata.
ln Language Oiigin and Meaning Zeizan wiites e question
is how did woids ist come to be accepted as signs at all` How did
11
e fact that these supposedly univeisal stiuctuies and denitions coiiespond to the
Latin-deiived stiuctuies of the colonising lndo-Euiopean languages should give any
anaicho-piimitivist pause. Chomskian linguistics notwithstanding, it is haid to see
why an anaichist theoiy of language should insist on the univeisality of stiuctuies
that aie cleaily cultuie-specic. is point is even moie acute, if theie is a link
between the giammai of a language and the metaphysical woildview that the native
speakeis of that language aie inclined to leain.
k8d k8d
k8d k8d
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zs
the ist symbol oiiginate` Contempoiaiy linguists nd this such
a seiious pioblem that one may despaii of nding a way out of its
diculties (1999 3). e only natuialistic answei to this question
is that they nevei did, oi at least, they aie nevei completely able to
peisist as signs.
12
We may undei favouiable conditions pietend that
woids function as symbols and that we aie able to communicate by
using them, but the conditions do not have to deteiioiate veiy much
(chemically, physically, psychologically, socially) foi the illusion to
disappeai. e functioning of woids as symbols is something that
is socially pioduced, takes haid woik and necessitates a peivasive
education. e stiuctuies of natuial languages aie connected to the
ways of life. lf theie aie dieient ways of life, theie aie dieient
linguistic (and cognitive) stiuctuies. lf and when the stiuctuies of
lndo-Euiopean giammai aie univeisalised oi globalised as the
pioject of Westein philosophy, academia and so on has been doing
foi 2000 yeais we get a stiatum of language that is tianslatable.
Zeizans ciitique of the implied obscuiantismand quietismof post-
modeinism is laudable, but he skips too quickly ovei the (Deiiidean)
postmodein idea that language is nevei fully able to iepiesent, to
become symbolic, to let a stand foi b. eie is a keinel of tiuth in
this contention, moieovei, a keinel that can be well connected to
the fact that language is a piece of natuie. e iealm of language
is a full continuum with no disciete jumps oi tianscendental aieas.
is is exactly what one would expect in natuie. e same goes foi
expeiience. eie aie no unquestionable aieas of expeiience. eie
is no tianscendentally puie human symbolic language that once and
foi all sepaiates us fiom animals, and theie is no unquestionably
authentic non-alienated linguistic expeiience (be it poetic, national,
philosophical oi whatevei). is is the way we should inteipiet ley-
eiabends dictum eveiy cultuie is potentially all cultuies. (1999 33)
eie is no cultuial oi linguistic authenticity that could not be, in
piinciple, ciiticised oi ieached fiom a dieient staiting point. e
claim of such authenticity is always a metaphysical gestuie of want-
ing to step outside this woild, outside the ieal-life negotiation and
stiuggle of inuence and eect. At the same time we have to notice
12
To put a poetic Heideggeiian oi embodied cognition spin on this conclusion, we
could say that the expeiiential oiigins of language tie it inexoiably with oui being in
the woild, the ioot cause foi the ultimate failuie of symbolic language is oui moitality.
e foimula let a stand foi b nevei fully succeeds because ultimately, in dying, no
stand-foi oi stand-in is allowed. lf we weie gods oi immoital Als, then puie
symbolism might be possible.
k83 k83
k83 k83
zs8 Tere VoJen
that actualising this potentiality is no minoi task. Changing the
ways of life of a cultuie, and in that sense becoming anothei cultuie,
is not an easy and not a fast piocess ceitainly it is not something
aainable by a peison oi subject at will oi duiing one geneiation. So
the expeiiences of things like technology in othei cultuies may be in
a sense tianscendent to us. We can not ieach them in oui lifetimes,
oi even if we could, it would mean that we would be tiansfoimed
beyond iecognition. e change of a cultuie is, by denition, a social
and multi-geneiational enteipiise, and as such belongs to the spheie
of asubjectivity, not subjective choices.
ln the case of music, Zeizan allows a qualication it is mainly
tonal music that is a pictuie and element of hieiaichy (1994 ). lt
seems that we need to do the same kind of adjustment in the case
of language it is mainly symbolic, conceptual, subject/object lan-
guage that is a tool of alienation. But to claim that tonal music is all
music oi that symbolic language is all of language is natuialistically
unacceptable.
eie is an inteiesting paiallel in Zeizans notion of the subject
oi self. Zeizan oen wiites in a tone that suggests that cuiient
industiial civilisation leads to an undeideveloped oi fiagmented
subjectivity, alienated fiom a natuial fullness. Howevei, as alieady
seen above, the subject is in all the senses that Zeizan insists in
the case of language a stiuctuie of hieiaichy and seivility. e
subject is a stiuctuie of iepetition and piedictability. What it means
to be a subject is to act and to think similaily oi at the veiy least
undeistandably to othei subjects given the ciicumstances. What
it means to be a subject is to peiceive the woild as objects. Again,
leaining to be a subject takes time and tiaining. Moieovei, it is
something that humans may fail to achieve. All of this suggests
the asubjective below the subjective. e subject is, by denition,
hostile to the asubjective, since the asubjective means the dissolution
of the subject. is dissolution is behind both the hoiioi and the
enthusiasm that the subject feels when confionted with asubjective
expeiiences. e function of the subject is to guaiantee a sense
of peimanence, continuity and contiol amid the ux of expeiience.
e subject can nevei asubjectify itself, the dissolution has to be
initiated by something non-subjective, such as the foiest.
is stiuctuial and contiol-diiven side of the subject is sometimes
made less cleai by the othei common usage of the teim subject
in this othei sense the subjective is the individuals point of view,
in contiast to the objective (oi inteisubjective) view. Howevei, on
k8N k8N
k8N k8N
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zsv
closei inspection the subject as idiosynciasy falls back to the subject
as stiuctuie. e sepaiation of expeiience into individuals with
viewpoints of theii own opening into an objective oi common woild
is alieady made fiom a position wheie the subject/object distinction
is assumed. Coiiespondingly, individuality is a stiuctuie of contiol
by which common expeiience is domesticated by the iules of J:+:Je
e :ero.
ln the case of a language like linnish, the impeiial natuie of the
subject is cleai. Like we saw above, when tianslated into lndo-Eu-
iopean languages (such as the Swedish and the Russian of the his-
toiical colonialists), the subject has to be intioduced into the tiansla-
tion. When linnish is taught at schools and univeisities, the subject
is equally intioduced thiough the theoiies of giammai, linguistics,
philosophical logic and so on. Given enough time, this intioduction
tuins into an occupation. A Euiopean subjectivity is foimed and
lives among the possible iesidues of asubjective expeiience still con-
tained in linnish language and expeiience.
13
A sentence of linnish
may thus contain both elements of asubjective expeiience and the
metaphysics of subjectivity. e subject as an occupiei is hostile to
the asubjective expeiience, which in tuin foims an anti-subjective
tendency manifesting itself socially as mutism, suicide, alcoholism,
heimetism and so on. ese tiaits as well as the peculiaiities of
the language aie something that the linns that aspiie to Euiopean-
ness and Westein matuiity feel as an embaiiassment, something to
be eiadicated, civilised. Howevei, asubjective expeiience as such
is wholly indieient with iegaid to both the subjective and anti-
subjective tendencies of expeiience.
An impoitant coiollaiy of the conclusion that sees the subject
13
Cuiiously, theie is a symptomatic linguistic phenomenon on the idiosynciatic side
of subjectivity. ln linnish, the inexion of woids is veiy common, e.g., genitive,
accusative and so on aie indicated by inexion. Even piopei names inect. e
genitive of the male name Mai would be Matin, the family name Viitanen would
be Viitasen, and so on. Recently, a giowing numbei of individuals have begun
to omit this inexion fiom theii names, and the habit is spieading to newspapeis
and the daily media. Piesumably, the ieason foi the omission is, on one hand, the
piessuie of the non-inecting lndo-Euiopean languages and, on the othei hand, the
fact that without the inexion the names aie moie iecognisable and the possibility of
mistakes is eliminated. Without the inexion the name becomes like a tiademaik, a
biand, standing out fiom the text oi the speech in the same foimat eveiy time. e
non-inected names liteially show up as petiications amid the uidity of the iest of
the language. us, the emphasis on subjectivity as individuality plays in the hands
of Euiopean metaphysics of subjectivity.
key key
key key
zou Tere VoJen
as an occupiei with iegaid to asubjective expeiience is that piimi-
tivism can not be a philosophy of the subject. A piimitivist can not
be a subjectivist in eithei of the two senses of the woid subject,
because the subject is one of the main stiuctuies of univeisalisation
and hieiaichy inside expeiience. e subject is the aibitei that al-
ways piefeis the piedictable, iational and contiollable. As a whole
plethoia of post-colonial ciitiques have shown, the Westein notion
of the subject that pietends to be univeisal and univeisally libeiating,
in fact contains a paiticulai bias in favoui of Westein values.
Anothei impoitant coiollaiy is a way out of the paiadox of wiit-
ing piimitivism. Language can be used in aacking civilisation, be-
cause language does not belong to civilisation. Language was boin
befoie civilisation and will outlast it. Even the most peimanent
subjects and the most stiuctuial symbols aie dependent on an asub-
jective and non-symbolic layei of expeiience and can be aected oi
wounded by it. Woids as symbols could not have any emotional oi
expeiiential eect, unless an umbilical coid aached the symbolic
stiata to the asymbolic ones. Zeizan wiites, eie is a piofound
tiuth to the notion that loveis need no woids (1999 43). is is,
indeed, notewoithy. What if it was loveis who invented language`
What if language in its inneimost coie is the intimate and non-me-
diated communion of loveis` is language does not iepiesent, it
is an expeiience, uniepeatable and unique. e same can be said of
much of eveiyday language with its ellipses, halts and stops, guies
of speech, hesitations, novelties and ungiammatical stiuctuies, and
so on. Symbolic language is only the tip of this icebeig, a tip that
emeiges undei veiy specic conditions and thiough a lot of eoit.
eie is no piivate language, because (conro Wigenstein) theie
is no peimanent subjectivity language need not be the pushing of
messages outside of my self, if my self is not a foitiess to begin with.
Subjective language is always also asubjective, if only minimally
in Westein highly subjectivised conditions. Asubjective language
can have an eect on subjective language piecisely because they
aie cut fiom the same cloth, and sepaiable only as abstiactions, not
in ieal life. is, simultaneously, is the ieason why the ossication
of subject/object ielationships can also spiead fuithei. Once begun,
expeiiential inuences can piopagate in any diiection and theie aie
no ultimate baiiieis that could absolutely stop them. is democ-
iacy of expeiiences applies also to the baiiieis that exist between
subjects. eie is no o r:or: ieason why the socially constiucted
boundaiies of subjects could always act as the limits of expeiience.
keR keR
keR keR
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zo1
Again, it is a commonplace that a new-boin and hei mothei oen
foim an insepaiable expeiiential eld. We noted Zeizans view of
loveis, above. eie is no o r:or: ieason to think that the new-boin,
the mothei, the loveis would not seo|. e human biain is alieady a
widely distiibuted system with centies, maigins and dead-ends of its
own. lt would be a miiacle if it would not happen that aieas of my
biain would sometimes be moie closely connected to aieas of youi
biain oi the non-human enviionment than they aie to some
paits of itself. Asubjective expeiience by its natuie is spiead ovei
seveial expeiiential centies, and in that sense is always collective
and shaied iathei than individual and punctual. e small distiibu-
tions of child-mothei, lovei-lovei aie one example, but dissolution in
the hunt oi in national expeiience piovide laigei-scale examples of
collective non-symbolic expeiience and the accompanying collective
non-symbolic language.
When Zeizan wiites that Civilization is oen thought of not as
a foigeing but as a iemembeiing, wheiein language enables accu-
mulated knowledge to be tiansmied foiwaid, allowing us to piot
fiom otheis expeiiences as though they weie oui own. Peihaps
what is foigoen is simply that otheis expeiiences aie no oui own,
that the civilizing piocess is thus a vicaiious and inauthentic one
(1999 3), he is only paitly iight. Civilization indeed is a foigeing
it is a foigeing of the shaied asubjective expeiience. luitheimoie,
it is the compaitmentalisation, individualisation and objectication
of that shaied expeiience. Asubjective expeiience is not my own
in any of the senses of the woid it is not owned (contiolled, decided
ovei) by me, and it is not inside myself. ese two chaiacteiistics
also piovide the uncanniness of asubjective expeiience, and aie
theiefoie one majoi ieason why civilisation wants to foiget and
discipline it (as Heideggei and Bataille, among otheis, suspected).
Zeizan elaboiates lt has been asseited that ieication is necessaiy
to mental functioning, that the foimation of concepts which can
themselves be mistaken foi living piopeities and ielationships does
away with the otheiwise almost intoleiable expeiience of ielating
one expeiience to anothei (1999 34). We need to add it does away
with the otheiwise almost intoleiable expeiience of ielating to each
othei without the baiiieis of subjectivity. e subjectication of
language is a way of foigeing about asubjective community and
communion.
To be suie, civilisation is at its peak, and language is coiiupted
and technologised ioughly to the same extent as life itself. Othei
kek kek
kek kek
zoz Tere VoJen
ways of thinking and speaking demand othei ways of life. us
we aie back to the question of how to go about incieasing expeii-
ential immediacy and intensity, decieasing division of laboui and
ieication, without at the same time ending up in national socialism,
heioic individual life-boatism oi something similai. One of the beau-
tiful featuies of Zen Buddhist piactice, with iegaid to its piomise of
geing iid of individual subjectivity and of the mind altogethei, is
the iobustness of the tiadition and the powei of example. eie aie
no guaiantees, no knock-down aiguments, just a good tiack-iecoid
and teacheis that aie willing to show the way. Maybe this is the key
ielevance of the anaicho-piimitivist anthiopological iecoid to set
up the examples that can be taught and applied.
kej kej
kej kej
Noes on on Anor:s eor, o[ Longvoge zo3
References
Ainold, Kate & Zubeibuhlei, Klaus. (2008). Language evolution
Semantic combinations in piimate calls. Novre (441)091.
Ainold, Kate, Pohlnei, Yvonne & Zubeibuhlei, Klaus. (2008). A
foiest monkeys alaim call seiies to piedatoi models. Be|o+:oro|
Fco|og, onJ Soc:o|:o|og, 2(4).
Bataille, Geoiges. (1988). Inner F:er:ence. Albany State Univeisity
of New Yoik Piess.
Deiiida, Jacques. (1991). O[ S:r: He:Jegger onJ |e es:on.
Chicago Univeisity of Chicago Piess.
Dieyfus, Hubeit L. (1990). Be:ng:n|eVor|J. Cambiidge, MA. e
MlT Piess.
leyeiabend, Paul. (1999). Conqves o[ A|vnJonce. A To|e o[ A|sroc
:on +ersvs |e R:ness o[ Be:ng. Chicago Univeisity of Chicago
Piess.
liy, Douglas P. (200). e Hvon Poen:o| [or Peoce An An|roo
|og:co| C|o||enge o Assv:ons o|ov Vor onJ V:o|ence. Oxfoid
Oxfoid Univeisity Piess.
Giaebei, David. (200). Poss:|:|::es. Fsso,s on H:eror,, Re|e||:on
onJ Des:re. Edinbuigh AK Piess.
Giaebei, David. (2004). Frogens o[ Anor:s An|roo|og,.
Chicago Piickly Paiadigm Piess.
Heideggei, Maitin. (200). Uner+egs :vr Sroe. Stugait Kle-
Coa.
Heideggei, Maitin. (1993). Se:n vnJ Ze:. Tubingen Max Niemayei.
Heideggei, Maitin. (19). Nui noch ein Go kann uns ieen. Der
S:ege| 30 (Mai 19).
Jensen, Deiiick. (2000). Enemy of the State. An lnteiview with
John Zeizan. A|erno:+e Press Re+:e+, 1().
Kiockow, Chiistian Giaf von. (1990). D:e Fnse:Jvng. liankfuit
am Main Campus Veilag.
Lee, Richaid E. (198). What Hunteis Do foi a Living, oi, How to
Make Out on Scaice Resouices. ln Mon |e Hvner (Richaid B.
Lee and liven de Voie, Eds.). New Yoik Aldine.
Nietzsche, liiediich. (1999). }ense:s +on Gv vnJ Bose. Munchen
Deutschei Taschenbuch Veilag.
Peacocke, Chiistophei. (199). A SvJ, o[ Conces. Cambiidge, MA.
e MlT Piess.
ke9 ke9
ke9 ke9
zo Tere VoJen
Pylkk, Pauli. (1998). e Aconcevo| M:nJ. He:Jegger:on ees :n
Ho|:s:c Novro|:s. Amsteidam John Benjamins.
Russell, Beitiand (2002). Mind and Maei. ln e Co||eceJ Poers
o[ BerronJ Rvsse||, Volume ll. London Routledge.
Sco, James C. (2010). e Ar o[ No Be:ng Go+erneJ. An Anor:s
H:sor, o[ U|onJ Sov|eos As:o. Yale Yale Univeisity Piess.
Sellais, Wilfiid. (19). Empiiicism and the Philosophy of Mind.
ln M:nnesoo SvJ:es :n |e P|:|oso|, o[ Sc:ence, Vo|ve I e
FovnJo:ons o[ Sc:ence onJ |e Conces o[ Ps,o|og, onJ Ps,o
ono|,s:s. (Heibeit leigl and Michael Sciiven, Eds.). Minneapolis
Univeisity of Minnesota Piess. pp. 23329.
Vadn, Teie. (200). What is Local inking` ln Ree|n:c:::ng |e
M:nJs' (oisten Botz-Boinstein, Ed.). Amsteidam Rodopi.
Vadn, Teie. (200). Kor|vn n::. Tampeie niin & nin.
Vadn, Teie. (2004). Ethics and gods How is local ethics possible`
Con:neno| P|:|oso|, Re+:e+ 3/2004.
Wigenstein, Ludwig. (2001). P|:|oso|:co| In+es:go:ons. Cam-
biidge Blackwell.
Zeizan, John. (2002). Rvnn:ng on F:ness. Los Angeles leial
House.
Zeizan, John. (1999). F|eens o[ Re[vso|. Columbia, MO. C.A.L.
Piess.
Zeizan, John. (1994). Fvvre Pr:::+e AnJ O|er Fsso,s. Biooklyn
Autonomedia.
iek, Slavoj. (2008). V:o|ence. New Yoik Picadoi.
iek, Slavoj. (1999). e T:|:s| Sv|jec e A|sen Cenre o[
Po|::co| Ono|og,. London Veiso.
iek, Slavoj. (199). e InJ:+:s:||e Reo:nJer. London Veiso.
R R
R R
Cieative Commons License
Aiibution-NonCommeicial-ShaieAlike 3.0 Unpoited
See hp//cieativecommons.oig/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
All content, including exclusive web content, is fieely available at
hp//www.Anaichist-Developments.oig
lSSN 19231